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J. Patrice McSherry. Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America. New York: Rowman & Littlefeld Publishers, 2005. 320 pp. $96.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7425-3686-9.

Reviewed by Dustin Walcher

Published on H-LatAm (June, 2010)

Commissioned by Kenneth Kincaid (Purdue University North Central)

Throughout the frst two weeks of November, the leaders of right-wing military governments, commemorations of the twentieth anniversary of along the corridors of political power in Washing‐ the fall of the were ubiquitous. You ton, within the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency only needed to turn on a television news program (CIA), and among ordinary people who committed or scan your favorite newspaper to be reminded almost unspeakable . of the events of 1989. Along with images of the McSherry defnes Operation Condor as “a se‐ celebrations that took place twenty years ago, cret intelligence and operations system created in those reports served to highlight the horrors of the 1970s through which the South American mili‐ state . Indeed, the and its satel‐ tary states shared intelligence and seized, tor‐ lites are justifably condemned for their human tured, and executed political opponents in one an‐ rights records. However, historians of other’s territory.” Military leaders were Latin America would be quick to point out that “[i]nspired by a continental security doctrine that communist governments were not alone in using targeted ideological enemies,” and consequently the power of the state against their own citizens; “engaged in terrorist practices to destroy the ‘sub‐ right-wing governments throughout the region versive threat’ from the left and defend ‘Western, abducted, tortured, and murdered in the name of Christian civilization’” (p. 1). Formally established national security and ideology. Lest the tri‐ by the military governments of , , umphalism of the early 1990s reappear, J. Patrice , , , and in 1975 McSherry provides a stinging indictment of Oper‐ ( and joined in 1978), Condor was ation Condor, the multilateral coordination of ter‐ premised on the idea that the most pressing ror and murder perpetuated by South American threats to the regimes emanated from domestic military governments with U.S. support. he leftist insurgencies. Condor states subsequently searches for villains and discovers plenty: among agreed to act collectively in confronting the per‐ H-Net Reviews ceived menace. They shared intelligence, detained Canal Zone, Washington also arranged lo‐ and tortured one another’s suspect citizens, and gistical support for Condor. Condor operatives all too often murdered alleged subversives. McSh‐ were trained at the School of the Americas. CIA of‐ erry defnes the networks, based within military fcers were sometimes present while detainees and intelligence agencies, as a “parallel state” that were tortured. Under the Nixon and Ford admin‐ “controlled the lives of their people through ter‐ istrations in particular, the emerged ror” (especially pp. 243-247). Although linked to as a full co-conspirator in Operation Condor. the formal state through the security apparatus, McSherry’s emphasis on U.S. involvement is the parallel state was designed to work outside signifcant in light of scholarly discussions on the the bounds of any legally sanctioned structure agency of Third World actors that go back at least and to provide plausible deniability to political two generations. In response to the excesses of de‐ leaders. Moreover, even after the military govern‐ pendency theory, most scholars of inter-American ments of Condor countries fell during the , afairs have highlighted the agency of Latin Amer‐ McSherry fnds that the parallel states continued ican actors from all walks of life. The vision of a to function. They remained active, for example, U.S. puppet master, manipulating the strings of by helping to carry out anti-subversive campaigns Latin American elites, has given way to a more in Central America throughout the decade. nuanced understanding of the construction of At its heart, Predatory States asks how Con‐ power across national borders, and of the means dor was structured and how it worked. The book that ordinary people employed to resist or accom‐ is divided into seven substantive chapters in addi‐ modate the application of that power. While Mc‐ tion to a conclusion. The frst three chapters es‐ Sherry is certainly cognizant of the asymmetrical tablish the background of Condor operations. Mc‐ power relationship between the United States and Sherry situates Condor squarely within the con‐ its Latin American neighbors, she adds to our un‐ text of the Cold War--as the logical culmination of derstanding of the mechanisms through which a global struggle against . Chapters 4 that power was employed. Predatory States does through 6 constitute the heart of the book. Here not argue that a prominent U.S. ofcial like Henry McSherry details specifc Condor operations. Like Kissinger personally ordered, for example, Phase a prosecutor, she meticulously lays out her evi‐ III Condor of suspected subver‐ dence. She introduces readers to both torturers sives, or that Latin American military leaders sim‐ and victims while painstakingly recreating the bu‐ ply did his bidding. Instead, McSherry builds on reaucratic connections between military and in‐ the new consensus by highlighting the interna‐ telligence services. By the end, Condor’s architec‐ tional networks through which such decisions ture is fully exposed. were reached. By no means does McSherry let Among the most important of the book’s argu‐ Washington policymakers of the hook, but South ments, McSherry links the United States directly American leaders rightfully share culpability. to Condor operations throughout its operational Although the question of why either U.S. or history. Indeed, she concludes that “U.S. forces South American leaders pursued such extreme laid the groundwork for Operation Condor” (p. tactics emerges throughout the narrative, the an‐ 251) by working “behind the scenes with the Latin swer is for the most part assumed. They were mo‐ American military and intelligence forces that tivated by anticommunism and the corresponding comprised the Condor Group, providing re‐ fear of domestic leftist insurgencies. Condor was a sources, administrative assistance, intelligence, brutal response to a clash of ideologies as framed and fnancing” (p. 250). From U.S. bases in the by the Cold War. However, McSherry does not

2 H-Net Reviews provide detailed analysis of why Condor hap‐ tion Condor. Her book provides a detailed ac‐ pened; she is primarily concerned with docu‐ counting of horrendous events throughout the menting Condor’s crimes and establishing that the hemisphere. Specialists in inter-American afairs, United States played a leading role. To that end, international history, U.S. foreign relations, and Predatory States succeeds. But it remains for oth‐ Latin American politics will all proft from her er scholars to interrogate the motivations behind work. Operation Condor with the same analytic rigor.

McSherry draws upon an impressively broad oscente array of sources, including oral histories and newspaper and magazine reports, in addition to , more traditional government documents archived of in North and . Her choice of topic required that she cast a wide net. Many govern‐ ment records, both in the United States and in South America, have not been declassifed and made available to researchers; the so-called terror archive in Paraguay is a notable exception to that trend. As a result, McSherry was forced to be cre‐ ative in her use of sources. She has exhaustively searched newspapers and magazines for stories on Condor and integrated her fndings throughout the book. In light of the reluctance of governments to release ofcial records, and in keeping with her desire to capture the voices of Condor’s victims, McSherry’s extensive use of newspaper articles and oral histories makes a great deal of sense. However, it also raises important methodological questions that I would like to have seen her ad‐ dress in some depth. The motives and memories refected in those sources must be interrogated. To what extent have the news reports and oral histories been corroborated by other sources? Have individual newspapers and their reporters been reliable, or have they too been colored by ideology? At times, McSherry includes a discus‐ sion of corroborating evidence when relying heavily on one such source. However, given ongo‐ ing discussions among scholars about the use of oral histories in particular, a detailed discussion would have been welcome. In the fnal analysis, McSherry has produced an appropriately international history of Opera‐

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Citation: Dustin Walcher. Review of McSherry, J. Patrice. Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America. H-LatAm, H-Net Reviews. June, 2010.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=26434

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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