How to Redeploy Implementing a Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces from

Lawrence J. Korb, Sean E. Duggan, Peter M. Juul Center for American Progress

Updated August 2008

“Those who fail to plan, plan to fail.” –Army Maxim www.americanprogress.org Center for American Progress

Introduction

ome have asserted that a U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq will take two years or more, but we believe it is not only possible, but necessary, to conduct a safe and Sresponsible redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq in no more than 10 months. Our military can accomplish such a task, should it be assigned, if it uses all elements of U.S. military power, focused on our land forces’ proficiencies in maneuver warfare and logistics.

There is significant disagreement and confusion about the time necessary to withdraw all U.S. military forces from Iraq. Proponents of an indefinite U.S. military presence in Iraq have asserted that a withdrawal of over 140,000 American troops and equipment would be fraught with risk, uncertainty, and overwhelming logistical complications. According to a recent ABC News piece, several commanders in Iraq stated that there was “no way” a withdrawal of one to two brigades per month could work logistically— although none of them agreed to be quoted on the record.1

The debate over how to conduct an American withdrawal has gravitated back and forth between those arguing that there must be either a rapid, precipitous withdrawal, and those advocating for a long, drawn-out redeployment. Many who argue for an extended redeployment over several years do so simply in order to “stay the course” in Iraq, and cherry-pick logistical issues to make the case for an extended U.S. presence.

Deciding between a swift or extended redeployment, however, is a false choice. Both options are logistically feasible, but this report will demonstrate that an orderly and safe withdrawal is best achieved over an 8 to 10 month period. This report, written in consultation with military planners and logistics experts, is not intended to serve as a playbook for our military planners; it is a guide to policymakers and the general public about what is realistically achievable. A massive, yet safe and orderly redeployment of U.S. forces, equipment, and support personnel is surely daunting—but it is well within the exceptional logistical capabilities of the U.S. military.

It is necessary now more than ever for the United States to commit to a responsible phased withdrawal. This must be done because, as many analysts have noted, the American invasion and occupation of Iraq has produced several unintended conse- quences.2 A large and indefinite military presence in Iraq has allowed Al Qaeda and the Taliban to reconstitute itself, diverted U.S. attention from the war in Afghanistan, weak- ened the United States’ ability to project its hard and soft power around the world, and strengthened Iranian influence throughout the greater Middle East.

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The latest unintended consequence is Iraq. Such a withdrawal gives the United widespread Iraqi opposition to the seem- States the best opportunity to achieve its ingly indefinite American troop presence. goals in Iraq and advance overall U.S. se- The Bush administration’s positions on curity interests in the greater Middle East. the bilateral Status of Forces and Strate- gic Framework Agreements has created a Iraqi leaders are increasingly eager and broad Iraqi political consensus in favor of able to take over their own affairs. Unlike a U.S. commitment to withdraw its forces during the Iraqi elections in 2005, scores from the country. of Sunni political parties are preparing to run in the provincial elections originally Recent calls from Prime Minister Nuri al- scheduled for this fall, and Iraqi Secu- Maliki, his cabinet, and the majority of rity Forces have taken the lead in several the Iraqi Parliament for a specific time- operations from to . Lt. Gen. table for the withdrawal of American James Dubik, the American officer cur- forces from Iraq represents the beginning rently in charge of training Iraq’s security of a broad cross-sectarian parliamentary forces, told Congress last month that the bloc that could provide the organizing Iraqi Army and police will be ready to principles for accommodation in the assume responsibility for Iraq’s internal short term and eventual reconciliation. security as early as April 2009.3 No such consensus yet exists among as to what the new Iraq will be, but Those opposed to a timetable for with- broad consensus does exist around the drawal make the argument that setting belief that no genuine, sustainable Iraqi such a timetable will undermine the gains unity can develop while the Iraqi govern- made by the surge of 30,000 American ment continues to be underwritten by a troops into Iraq in the first half of 2007. large foreign military presence. According to Gen. , the situation in Iraq is too volatile to project Despite Maliki’s many statements sup- a withdrawal date. In fact, Petraeus has it porting a timetable for a U.S. troop with- exactly backward. It is not listening to the drawal, many supporters of remaining in Iraqi government that will endanger the Iraq mistakenly argue that Maliki is just gains we have made in the last year. pandering to his constituents. Many of these same people thought we would be There can be no doubt that violence has greeted as liberators when we invaded reached its lowest levels since 2004, but and occupied Iraq, ignoring the fact that supporters of maintaining an indefinite resistance to foreigners is an integral part American troop presence in Iraq attri- of Iraq’s national identity and that it is bute the current reduction in violence the Iraqis, not the United States, that will solely to the simple increase in Ameri- determine their fate. can combat forces and ignore other factors that have contributed to today’s The United States must therefore move improved security environment. These beyond a discussion about the effect of the other factors were either directly linked surge, and seize this opportunity offered to the prospect of an American with- by the Iraqis to take control of their own drawal or had nothing to do with the security by beginning a responsible phased surge in the first place. Not setting a date withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from will actually undermine these gains.

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The recent decline in violence in Iraq in late 2006 because they believed we from the record levels of 2006 and early were leaving. The perception that we will 2007 is due in large part to the emer- main­tain a large presence in Iraq indefi- gence of Sunni “awakening” groups and nitely will endanger this cooperation. Sons of Iraq militias. These groups were co-opted by U.S. forces in the early fall of The unilateral standdown of Shia cleric 2006, long before the surge even began, Muqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Army, and were in part a response to the wide- which began in February 2007, was also spread belief by Sunni’s in that key to reducing violence. This develop- the United States would not be remain- ment, like the co-option of the “Sons of ing in Iraq indefinitely. Iraq” militias, was not a result of the U.S. troop build-up, nor was it instigated by According to commanders on the ground, the Iraqi government. It had much more the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal was the to do with Sadr positioning himself for main impetus for Sunni cooperation. Ma- the upcoming election. jor General John Allen, a Marine Com- mander in Anbar, has stated that the rising While Sadr’s power and influence have pro-withdrawal sentiment in the United been weakened over the past year, his States, which was reflected in the victory political movement still remains popular in the 2006 midterm election of pro-with- among many Shiites. The cleric still pos- drawal candidates, had a major effect on sesses a military wing, the Jaish al-Mahdi, the Sunnis. According to Allen, the elec- which is capable of causing problems for tion “did not go unnoticed....They talked the government of Prime Minister Maliki about it all the time.” He went on to say and his supporters in Parliament—the that the Marines in Anbar, “from top to Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and bottom, reinforced the message sent by the Dawa Party. Absent a timetable for the [2006 election results] by saying, ‘We withdrawal, this struggle for power can are leaving.... We don’t know when we are become violent again. leaving, but we don’t have much time, so you [the Anbaris] better get after this.’”4 Surge proponents point to the marked drop in ethno-sectarian violence, in Brigadier Gen. Sean McFarland, who particular, as a reason for maintaining had been a colonel in command of the the Bush administration’s current policy. Army’s First Brigade Combat Team, 1st Yet this decline in violence resulted as Armored Division in Al Anbar province much from the completion of ethnic and from January 2006 until January 2007, sectarian cleansing and the near homog- credited the “growing concern that the enization of neighborhoods as U.S. would leave Iraq and leave the Sun- from the U.S. troop build-up. nis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and Iranian-supported militias [which] made The surge proponents’ final claim, that these younger [Sunni] leaders open to recent troop reductions are what Presi- our overtures” as the main reason for the dent Bush calls “a return on success,” is turn around in Al Anbar.5 also misguided. The surge of combat troops ended not because of conditions In other words, the Sunni Awakening on the ground, but because the Penta- forces began cooperating with U.S. forces gon could not maintain 20 brigades in

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Iraq and keep the current level of forces political change in Iraq, while pushing in Afghanistan without extending the Iraq’s competing powers to recalculate tours of the surge brigades by more than their self-interest in light of a U.S. with- 15 months. drawal. By putting the Iraqi government and its neighbors on notice that they—not But debating how much the escalation the United States—will be responsible of 30,000 troops was responsible for the for the consequences of any instability in current levels of violence in Iraq is be- Iraq, the United States will give all play- side the point. The real issue is where do ers involved an incentive to begin acting we go from here. constructively in Iraq.

The reduction in violence has produced President Bush and his supporters, unde- a tenuous security balance in Iraq, but it terred, continue to reject setting a time- has not yet resulted in the kind of sustain- table for withdrawal. The White House able equilibrium that locks in the security justified a recent agreement that sets a and political gains that have been made vaguely worded “general time horizon in the country. Absent an incentive to for withdrawal,” by asserting that the truly take over their own affairs, the Iraqi “success” of the surge necessitates an in- government has not made satisfactory definite large-scale U.S. presence in Iraq. progress toward national reconciliation, This is the wrong course. nor have they implemented critical power or revenue sharing laws. In order to solidify recent security gains and bring about meaningful reconciliation, In fact, a continued large-scale U.S. pres- the United States must move beyond the ence in Iraq has allowed Iraq’s warring surge and begin a withdrawal of all Amer- factions to stall on making the tough ican troops as soon as possible from Iraq. choices that they would have to make This is what the majority of the American if faced with a timetable for U.S. with- people and the Iraqi people want. drawal. Provincial elections, originally scheduled for October 2008, are a case Withdrawal will not only improve the in point, as they are not likely to take chances of stabilizing the region; it will place this year. allow the United States to reset its entire Middle East policy. Over the past seven The United States can truly take advan- years, U.S. influence throughout the tage of what security gains have been greater Middle East has diminished to made over the last 18 months by using a such a degree that we are no longer liked, withdrawal timetable as a lever to force feared, or respected.6

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How to Redeploy: An Overview

hose who argue for a rapid and immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces have often been accused of adopting an unrealistic approach. This is a misplaced critique. TIt is certainly possible to conduct a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces, in perhaps as short a time as three months if the U.S. military, in the words of Iraq war veteran and military analyst Phillip Carter, were to effectively conduct an “invasion in reverse.”7

If the U.S. Army were ordered to withdraw to Kuwait, they could do so quickly and relatively safely. Yet such an exit would sacrifice a significant amount of equipment and create an instantaneous political and security vacuum similar to that created by the initial overthrow of . This option is certainly feasible, but we do not believe that it is the best course of action.

We must also caution that if the United States does not set a specific timetable, our mili- tary forces and our overall national security will remain hostage to events on the ground in Iraq. Worse still, a startling new development such as the assassination of the Grand al-Sistani or a large sectarian attack leading to an all-out civil war, could compel our forces to withdraw in as little as three months. We need to start planning now for redeployment.

Those who argue that a withdrawal will have to take place over a number of years, perhaps as many as four, base their analysis on the time it takes to complete a meticu- lous extraction and dismantling of all U.S. equipment and facilities. As this report will demonstrate, we believe that such an extended timeline actually increases the danger to U.S. forces and is not cost-effective from a logistical standpoint, even though such an ap- proach would presumably result in a complete extraction of all U.S. equipment.

The essential logistical point of disagreement between these approaches centers on the value placed on the equipment that is to be withdrawn. We believe that all essen- tial, sensitive, and costly equipment must be safely withdrawn, but taking out non-vital equipment and dismantling certain facilities with no military value should not be an obstacle to redeploying our troops out of harm’s way in Iraq and back into the fight against terrorism, which intelligence officials agree threatens the United States now more than at any time since 9/11.8

Since this report was first issued in September of 2007, the number of combat bri- gades has decreased by 25 percent, from 20 to 15, reducing the number of American troops in Iraq from a high of 170,000, to 140,000. Moreover, since last September, the

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Iraqis have assumed responsibility for in and out of Iraq in the spring of 2004, two more provinces. Last September we as the forces who led the invasion reached recommended that, given the number the end of their one-year deployments. of troops and equipment in theater, a phased redeployment of all U.S. troops Nor would we leave the region entirely. would be best achieved over a 10- to To maintain an offensive and deterrent 12-month timeframe. Given the decrease capability in the region, Marines would in troops and equipment in the interven- be tasked to provide security for per- ing 11 months, a redeployment initiated sonnel at the U.S. embassy in Iraq, and today would best be achieved over an 8- another ground brigade and tactical air to 10-month timeframe. wing would be based in Kuwait. A carrier battle group and a Marine expeditionary A phased military redeployment from Iraq force in the Persian Gulf would back up over the next 8 to 10 months would begin these forces. Our existing bases in Qatar, extracting U.S. troops from Iraq immedi- Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates ately and could be completed by May of will also be maintained to ensure security 2009. During this timeframe, the military in the region and reinforce our commit- will not replace outgoing troops as they ment to our allies. rotate home at the end of their tours, and it will draw down force and equipment The Pentagon’s civilian and military levels gradually, at a pace similar to previ- leadership will have to begin careful ous rotations conducted by our military planning for our departure from Iraq— over the past four years. According to a and do so with much more care than U.S. military official in Baghdad involved they did for the invasion and occupation. in planning, a withdrawal could take place Rather than continuing the president’s safely in this time period.9 current strategy in Iraq and criticiz- ing those who question it, the Pentagon Such troop and materiel movements are should immediately begin planning a also not without precedent. As this report strategic redeployment from Iraq. The will detail, the Pentagon was able to or- time for half-measures and experiments ganize the rotation of nearly 235,000 sol- is over; it is now time for a logistically diers and their accompanying equipment sound strategic redeployment.

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The Strategy: Phased Consolidation

he most effective strategy for removing American troops from Iraq involves grad- ually withdrawing troops from the most stable areas of Iraq first, with the goal of Treducing our military footprint and consolidating our presence before our final departure. A phased consolidation approach would be a slower and more deliberate ap- proach than an “invasion in reverse.”

The American military would withdraw from the most secure areas of Iraq first, which would enable the Iraqi security forces to take charge in the most stable security environ- ments before proceeding to more difficult ones. The first American units to withdraw would be the two regimental combat teams of the First Marine Expeditionary force cur- rently deployed in Anbar province. Army units would next be gradually withdrawn from Baghdad and its southern belts at a rate of two brigades per month. One brigade, the 1st Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division, will shift up to Diyala in order to allow the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment to withdraw when its 15-month tour is complete in January 2009. Once the brigades in and around Baghdad are withdrawn, the brigades in northern Iraq—where the last remnants of extremist groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq are locat- ed—will also be gradually withdrawn. Once the last brigade from northern Iraq has de- parted, the final American combat brigade—the 4th Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, currently performing routine security duties—will depart Iraq. (See map on page 12.)

A vast movement of this size is not without precedent. Over 211,000 pieces of equip- ment and a quarter of a million people were rotated into and out of Iraq from Decem- ber 2003 to May 2004 during Operation Iraqi Freedom II.10 Over a six-month period, the Pentagon moved 130,000 troops out of Iraq and 105,000 into the country in the largest rotation since World War II. The vast movement of forces was described by the military itself as unprecedented in scope and risk.

The rotation was successfully completed in an orderly fashion and without a large spike in casualties, despite initial criticism and uncertainty surrounding the operation. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, then deputy director for coalition operations and now deputy as- sistant secretary of state for political military affairs, said after the rotation: “I think it’s a great credit not only to the logisticians who planned it, but the leaders who led it.”11 Even amid the rotation, Gen. Kimmitt recognized just how smoothly these logistical challenges were being met, saying, “The real proof of how well this is going is not just the fact that we’ve been able to do this somewhat seamlessly…but that we’ve also been able to maintain an offensive operational tempo during this time period. We have not had to stop the offensive operations to transfer the forces.”12

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During the six months of the troop rota- The Army’s institutional and operational tion, American forces actually suffered strengths rest in both advanced logistics 15 percent fewer casualties than in the and maneuver tactics—strengths that six months that followed the rotation.13 will be called upon in conducting the re- Similarly, current U.S. casualties in Iraq deployment. Redeployment would allow have reached their lowest levels since the United States to regain the initiative 2004, while the last five combat bri- in Iraq by dominating the battlespace gades involved in the surge have rotated with overwhelming mass, firepower, and home over the last five months.14 This surveillance. As Army Field Manual 3-0: movement of personnel and equipment Operations notes, “retrograde opera- demonstrates the military’s outstanding tions,” such as withdrawal, are used to logistics capabilities. “create conditions to regain the initia- tive… Retrogrades improve the current What’s more, the troops that carried out situation or prevent a worse situation the 2004 rotation lacked sufficient quanti- from occurring.”17 ties of up-armored Humvees and were without the new Mine Resistant Ambush Those who argue that the United States Protected vehicles that have since been will have to “shoot its way out” of Iraq, introduced. At the time of the 2004 rota- implying a high degree of danger, ig- tion, only one in eight of the thousands nore that these operations are a form of of Humvees then in use by the occupa- conventional maneuver warfare at which tion forces were armored.15 As Lt. Col. the U.S. military excels. These operations Vincent Montera, commander of the play to the U.S. military’s strengths—its Long Island-based 310th Military Police capability for maneuver in the open ter- Battalion, commented at the time of the rain of southern Iraq; its sophisticated rotation, “We’re kind of sitting ducks in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- the vehicles we have.”16 sance systems; and its ability to deploy airpower and artillery against any threat. The vast majority of vehicles in use in Insurgents employing improvised explo- Iraq today are armored and provide sive devices, or IEDs, and small-arms significantly more protection than those ambushes would be significantly over- used in 2004. There is precedent for a matched against this military juggernaut, large-scale movement of U.S. forces in a much as they were during the April 2003 relatively short period of time; it is there- march to Baghdad. Indeed, the more fore well within our military’s capabilities. rapid and decisive the withdrawal, the greater U.S. forces’ advantage during this kind of operation. Strategic advantages of phased consolidation Yet a phased consolidation does not leave a sudden and immediate power vacuum The redeployment of U.S. forces under in the country. Withdrawing U.S. forces a plan of phased consolidation has three from the most stable parts of Iraq first significant advantages: it is a conventional would give the Iraqi government and operation that plays to the U.S. military’s local actors in contentious regions time strength; it does not leave a sudden or to prepare for the eventual withdrawal immediate power vacuum in the country; of all U.S. troops. In fact, according to and it will enhance security for U.S. forces. Iraqi National Security Advisor Mowaf-

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U.S. Bases in Iraq

IRAQ TURKEY Zakhu Dahuk Aqrah

Al Mawsil FOB Marez Rayat (Mosul) Mosul Air Base Tall Afar Arbil Kuysanjaq Al Qayyarah Makhmur SYRIA

K-2 Air Base FOB Warrior FOB Summerall Bayji T Tawuq ig r COB Speicher is - Al Qaim Balad Air Base Al Camp Anaconda Camp Warhorse Al Asad Airfield FOB Ba'qubah Hit Camp Al Walid Camp Taji Camp Taqaddum Fallujah Ar Ramadi BAGHDAD FOB Habbanlyah International Zone Rutbar Baghdad Camp Curve International FOB Falcon Airport Al Camp Victory Al

JORDAN Camp Liberty An Najaf Ad Diwaniyah Al '

Qal'at Sukkar T

i LSA Adder g r i s

As An Eup hrates Al Qurnah

Tallil Air Base National capital Basrah Governorate capital As Salman Camp Bucca Town, village Umm Qasr Airport Al Faw International boundary Expressway KUWAIT Main road Secondary road Route Tampa Primary military bases Other major U.S. camps and facilities SAUDI ARABIA IRAQ

0 50 100 150 200 150 300 km

0 50 100 150 200 mi

Source: Map adapted from United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section, Map No. 3835 Rev. 4.

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fak Rubaie, Iraqi officials are planning to of Iraq, planning for a worst-case hostile have control over security in all of Iraq’s environment must be the backbone of 18 provinces by the end of 2008.18 any withdrawal plan.

The United States can avoid the situation U.S. forces will not be barreling blindly created in April 2003—when the sudden down a highway out of Iraq. The route fall of the Hussein regime left a power into and out of Iraq is currently in daily vacuum that led to chaos—through an use to ferry supplies and equipment to extended drawdown over 8 to 10 months. and from Baghdad and Kuwait. A con- During this period, the U.S. military stant stream of U.S. forces and a domi- would carefully consolidate its forces nant presence will deny insurgents free- where they are most needed. By setting dom of movement along these roads. a certain date and redeploying over the course of a year, we would give the Iraqis American troops will also have the advan- time to prepare for our withdrawal. tage of surveillance and security patrolling the route. Unmanned aerial vehicles such Phased consolidation will also enhance as Predator drones and combat aircraft security for U.S. forces. Violence directed will be able to keep the route under con- against American troops is not likely to stant surveillance, enabling U.S. forces significantly increase during the with- to spot individuals planting improvised drawal timeframe. Internal Pentagon explosive devices—the roadside bombs deliberations suggest that our exit from that have caused roughly 40 percent of all Iraq would face scant resistance. An early troop deaths in Iraq.20 Electronic jamming August 2007 exercise involving military and minesweeping equipment will allow and Iraq experts determined: our troops to detonate those IEDs that slip past aerial surveillance. Two brigades U.S. troops would secure the exit route to trained and equipped for this task would Kuwait through largely Shi’a Muslim south- also provide route security, conducting a ern Iraq and face little fighting as they drove mix of checkpoints and route patrols to their equipment out. Any attacks, the panel deny insurgents and militias the opportu- judged, would be “harassment attacks,” nity to attack withdrawing U.S. units. most likely by a few Sunni members of Al Qaeda in Iraq who wanted to attack Ameri- IEDs planted on the main route out of can troops one last time. “Why would they Iraq are still probably the greatest danger stop us? They have been telling us to leave,” that U.S. troops will face when leaving said one participant.19 Iraq. Making things more difficult, in- surgents will likely be aware of the route U.S. forces could have to withdraw our forces will take, particularly through through an unstable environment cre- constricted terrain such as the Karbala ated by the rapidly fracturing Shi’a Gap and urban areas straddling major political landscape, which is why pru- road junctions such as Nasariyah. The dent military planners know that they careful planning and execution of the may hope for the best, but must always withdrawal should ensure that the Amer- plan for the worst. Contrary to the Bush ican military is able to prevent enemy administration’s naively optimistic and forces from effectively using IEDs against reckless approach following the invasion our departing forces.

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Implementing a phased to take with it. The military does not need consolidation to remove every nut and bolt out of every forward operating base in the country. Implementing a redeployment that fol- Sensitive equipment aside, at some point lows the phased consolidation strategy a cost-benefit analysis must be done. Such will be complex. There is an old military an analysis must consider what equipment truism made popular by Admiral Er- will be taken with us. Since it currently nest King, the chief of naval operations costs more than $10 billion per month during World War II, that amateurs talk to sustain our presence in Iraq, extend- tactics while professionals talk logistics. ing our stay in order to extract all non- Our military is capable of doing incred- sensitive equipment—such as freezers, ible things, and in the past has consistent- sinks, fuel, excess equipment, and x-ray ly proven that it can carry out massive machines—would not be cost-effective or troop and equipment movement of this worth risking the lives of our troops. size, but such undertakings should only be done with a great deal of professional deliberation and planning. Redeploying U.S. personnel

It is important to note two critical as- A phased consolidation withdrawal sumptions before elaborating on the de- strategy can extract all U.S. troops and tails of our plan for a phased withdrawal: essential equipment with a minimum risk within a 10-month timeframe. Our The primary objective is to get to plan is to remove two combat brigades a Kuwait. Many advocates of a long, month from Iraq while reducing pro- drawn-out withdrawal base their time- portionately the number of non-combat table on the fact that the United States support personnel necessary to sustain is currently capable of moving only one them. The basic concept behind this combat brigade per month out of our strategy is to simply not replace Ameri- ports in Kuwait. Many have extrapolat- can combat units currently deployed ed this to argue that a complete with- to Iraq. If such a policy were initiated drawal from Iraq will take at least 18 to immediately, American forces could be 24 months or longer, given the amount withdrawn from Iraq by the end of May of equipment in the country. But it mat- 2009. Another Marine Expeditionary ters more to get soldiers and Marines to Force will rotate in for a seven- month safety in Kuwait than it does to ensure tour, after which they will rotate home that one unit’s equipment is shipped out without replacement. before another unit is able to exit. Once soldiers, Marines, and their equipment Don’t replace units. Regimental are safely in Kuwait and in queue to Combat Team 1 and Regimental Com- board military transport ships or aircraft, bat Team 5 will be the first units to leave the main objective of leaving Iraq will Iraq and will not be replaced. Approxi- have been accomplished. mately two units will continue to with- draw each month until all American All equipment is not created equal. troops are withdrawn in May 2009 (see The time that it takes to withdraw from deployment schedule). In order to main- Iraq will depend in large part on the tain a two-brigade-a-month flow out of amount of equipment the military decides Iraq, the tour of one brigade—the 4th

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U.S. Troop Movements

IRAQ TURKEY

SYRIA IRAN JORDAN

1st Movement 2nd Movement 3rd Movement 4th Movement KUWAIT 5th Movement

National capital Governorate capital Expressway Main road SAUDI ARABIA Secondary road Route Tampa

Source: Map adapted from United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section, Map No. 3835 Rev. 4.

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Phased Redeployment Schedule

1st Movement September 2008

I MEF (RCT-1, RCT-5)

2nd Movement October 2008

3rd BCT, 101st Airborne Division; 4th BCT, 3rd Infantry Division

November 2008

2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division; 2nd BCT, 1st Armored Division

3rd Movement December 2008

2nd BCT, 25th Infantry Division; 4th BCT, 10th Mountain Division

January 2009

2nd Cavalry Regiment; 3rd BCT, 4th Infantry Division

1st BCT, 4th Infantry Division moves to Diyala from Baghdad

4Th Movement February 2009

1st BCT, 101st AIrborne Division

March 2009

3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment

April 2009

1st BCT, 4th Infantry Division; 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division

5th Movement May 2009

4th BCT, 1st Cavalry Division

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Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry— per-FOBs. “If we are going to withdraw,” currently providing route security, will be commented one senior commander at the last brigade to deploy. the time of the closings, “we need a base plan.”21 We couldn’t agree more. Consolidate U.S. presence. As men- tioned above, the American military The standard military procedure in Iraq would withdraw from the most secure ar- requires at least 100 days to shut a FOB. eas of Iraq first, enabling the Iraqi securi- This incorporates the time it takes to ty forces to take charge in the most stable completely dismantle and move all of the security environments before proceeding equipment and facilities within a particu- to more difficult ones. The first American lar base, as well as complete the tens or units to withdraw would be from the very hundreds of administrative procedures stable Al Anbar province. Next, Army necessary to relieve commanders of ac- units would be gradually withdrawn countability for property and transfer U.S. from Baghdad and its southern belts at property to Iraqi personnel. FOBs can be a rate of two brigades per month. One dismantled much faster if the focus is on brigade will be shifted to Diyala province extracting vital and sensitive equipment, where coalition forces still face intermit- and if the Pentagon waives certain regu- tent resistance. Once the brigades in and lations in the interest of the mission. around Baghdad are withdrawn, the brigades in northern Iraq—now the last Protecting the embassy. As we rec- stronghold of extremist groups such as ommended in “Strategic Reset,” the Al Qaeda in Iraq—will also be gradu- United States should downgrade the ally withdrawn. The last American forces size of its embassy in Baghdad and dis- would withdraw from northern Iraq in perse diplomatic and civilian personnel April and May of 2009. This would give throughout the more stable areas of Iraq. the Iraqis a sufficient window to conduct We will maintain an embassy in Baghdad, this winter’s provincial elections and the but with a much smaller staff than the long awaited Kirkuk referendum with current plans for a 1,000-strong embassy. large numbers of U.S. and Iraqi forces to We recommend stationing a Marine Ex- ensure security. peditionary Unit, or MEU, at Baghdad International Airport to secure our diplo- Closing forward operating bases. As matic presence in the capital and else- of September 2007, there were 75 for- where in Iraq as protecting our diplomats ward operating bases in Iraq, or FOBs, and civilians in Baghdad will be a top down from 106 in August of 2005. In priority. Marines have a long tradition of 2005, U.S. forces were able to close down protecting American diplomatic facili- 13 bases in only five months by shifting ties overseas, and MEUs have helicopter U.S. troops and equipment to other loca- lift capabilities, enabling them to move tions and by turning over bases to Iraqi quickly to protect our residual diplomatic security forces. Closing bases was com- presence if need be. monly referred to as “BRAC for Iraq,” in reference to the domestic Base Realign- Secure the route out of Iraq. Two ment and Closure Commission. The clo- brigades should secure the main route sures reflected then-commander General from Iraq to Kuwait—Route Tampa. George Casey’s plan to eventually consoli- The 4th Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Divi- date U.S. bases in Iraq into four major su- sion, which is already performing similar

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duties in Iraq, will be assigned to this move themselves and their critical equip- mission. Another brigade, preferably a ment. These units will also be used to es- highly mobile Stryker brigade, should cort heavy equipment that must be driven be deployed or re-tasked to provide ad- out, such as tracked vehicles on heavy- ditional security for units moving south equipment transports and flatbed trucks. down Route Tampa. Military police units freed from the mission to advise Iraqi Fulfill our moral obligation to Iraqi police units could assist as well.22 These contractors. As the United States with- security elements will secure the route draws from Iraq, it must find a way to by establishing checkpoints and logistical ensure that Iraqis who have worked with support areas, and conducting patrols. the United States have a way out as well. Currently, there are about 115,000 Iraqis Army doctrine endorses this type of route working as contractors for the United security over convoy escorts—which are States, including large numbers of Iraqis typically reserved for high-value con- who have worked for American diplo- voys—because it provides better security matic and military forces as translators with fewer troops. Furthermore, only units or in other capacities. The United States capable of conducting such a ground as- has a responsibility to begin planning to sault mission themselves, such as those at move those Iraqis and their families who the division level and below with vehicles, have risked their lives to help us in Iraq crew-served weapons, and communica- while we plan our redeployment. The tions gear, will drive out of Iraq. best way to serve our moral obligation to these Iraqis is to increase the number Airlift personnel out of Iraq. Many allowed into the United States as refugees personnel can simply be airlifted out of from the current paltry total of 12,000 to Iraq by the Air Force, Civil Reserve Air 100,000, as laid out in our earlier report, Fleet, or chartered commercial airlift. “Strategic Reset.” Support forces, headquarters person- nel, contractor and government civilians, Officials at the State Department and and those combat personnel not needed the Department of Homeland Security to provide support for the movement of are sure to say that the mere 12,000 heavy equipment to Kuwait will be air- refugees are all that can be physically lifted out in this fashion. The majority of accommodated in the system. In the first these personnel will be flown from Iraq six months of 2007, just 200 Iraqi refu- to Kuwait via intra-theater air transport; gees were admitted due to the Depart- some will fly via strategic air transport di- ment of Homeland Security’s inability rectly back to American bases in Europe to screen these refugees fast enough.23 or the continental United States. U.S. ro- We must do better. tary and fixed-wing aircraft will fly them- selves out of the country, or in support of U.S. intra-theater air transport could be redeployment operations, as necessary. used to transport Iraqis who have worked for us to refugee camps in neighboring Remaining personnel will escort states such as Jordan, which have hosted equipment out over land. Most com- many thousands of Iraqis since the war bat units at division level and below will began in 2003. Once the refugees are move themselves to Kuwait by ground outside of Iraq, the State Department assault convoy, based on their capability to should establish an infrastructure for the

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housing, screening, evaluating, and trans- withdrawal will force the United States to porting of these men and women. make hard choices on which equipment to bring back with our forces and which The late Julia Taft, a State Department to leave behind or destroy in place. official in the Ford administration who was responsible for resettling Vietnam- While it is difficult to assess the exact ese refugees in the 1970s, explained that amount of equipment in Iraq, during after the fall of Saigon in 1975, more the height of the surge, the United States than 131,000 people were resettled over had 1,900 heavy vehicles—Abrams the course of eight months.24 Taft said of tanks, Stryker, and Bradley fighting ve- the effort: “It was a huge enterprise. But hicles—43,000 other vehicles, including it never would have worked had there more than 20,000 Humvees, and over not been the sustained commitment on 700 aircraft—mostly helicopters—in the part of the administration working Iraq.26 And the United States had any- with Congress to make it happen.” She where from 140,000 to 200,000 metric noted that, “President Ford said, ‘Let tons of equipment and supplies at for- them come. Let’s help them. This is what ward operating bases spread across Iraq.27 we must do for them. They deserve it.’”25 While we must screen all refugees enter- The amount of equipment has been ing the United States for security pur- reduced proportionally as the number of poses, the United States simply must fol- combat brigades in Iraq has drawn down low in the tradition of President Gerald from 20 to 15. In late July, the 4th Bri- Ford’s humanitarianism. gade of the 2nd Infantry Division arrived at Fort Lewis, Washington with over 900 vehicles and hundreds of cargo contain- The constraint of equipment ers.28 Applied across five brigades, that would mean that approximately 4,500 Advocates of a quick drawdown argue pieces of heavy equipment and thou- that we can leave the bulk of equipment sands of cargo containers have left Iraq behind, taking only heavy war-fighting since September 2007. equipment back with us as we leave through Kuwait. Others argue that it will An 8- to 10-month withdrawal will ensure take anywhere from 18 to 24 months to that no critical supplies—arms and am- completely withdraw all American equip- munition, sensitive equipment such as ment and property from Iraq. computers, communications gear, or ar- mored vehicles—will be left behind, while We take a more realistic view: The non-essential equipment will remain or be United States clearly wants to remove all destroyed. It is simply not cost- effective, equipment of value or sensitive nature in terms of money, and most importantly, from Iraq as it withdraws, but it does our troops’ lives, to delay withdrawal for not need to remove every nut and bolt the sake of totally dismantling our PXs, belonging to the U.S. government. A gymnasiums, housing trailers, headquar- 10-month timeframe should be sufficient ters buildings, maintenance facilities, fast to remove most heavy or sensitive Ameri- food restaurants, and other non-essential can assets from Iraq while leaving behind facilities and associated equipment. Ours non-essential equipment and supplies. A is not a “no FOB left behind” policy.

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U.S. Airlift Capabilities

c-5 c-17 c-130 M1070 HET

Total 111 150 514 —

Troop Cap 270 102 92 n/a

Weight Cap 270,000 lbs 170,900 lbs 42,000 lbs 140,000 lbs payload

Arm Humvee 16 12 2 3 (realistically 2)

Stryker Cap 7 4 1 2

Bradley Capability 6 3 — 2

MI Capability 2 1 — 1

Pallet Cap 36 18 6 n/a

Source: Photos courtesy of globalsecurity.org and U.S. Air Force.

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Get the equipment to Kuwait. Many effective than unnecessarily lengthening who argue that a longer timeframe for the withdrawal from Iraq. withdrawal is necessary believe that the pace of cleaning and inspecting equip- A further objection will be raised that ment for sealift will be the greatest and units usually drive their equipment onto most time-consuming obstacle. General transport ships in port. But in this case, Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the troops that bring their equipment of Staff from 2005 to 2007, noted that out of Iraq can be flown out of Kuwait under normal circumstances, the United while a different unit can be assigned the States is capable of moving about one sole task of loading equipment for the brigade (about 3,500 troops and their sealift home. Much of this equipment equipment) in or out of the country in will not return to the unit anyway, as any given month.29 it will likely be diverted for depot-level maintenance or refit because of wear From this baseline, many have extrapo- and tear from combat duty. lated that a complete withdrawal from Iraq will take at least 18 to 24 months, Increase capacity of facilities in or perhaps longer, given the amount of Kuwait. Our port capacity in Kuwait equipment in country. This, however, must be expanded to accelerate the misses the point: It matters less how long process of cleaning and loading our it takes to load forces once they are safe equipment in Kuwait for shipment. in Kuwait than it does to get our ground The United States military is currently forces and their equipment to Kuwait allowed two port facilities at Shuaiba, safely in the first place. Once soldiers about 40 miles south of Kuwait City. and their equipment are safely in Kuwait These are the military’s only ports of en- and in queue to board military transport try and exit for heavy equipment such as ships or aircraft, the hard part is over. As tanks and armored vehicles. The United Lt. General R. Steven Whitcomb, com- States must begin negotiations immedi- manding general of the 3rd Army noted, ately with the Kuwaiti government to Kuwait has the capability to handle tens augment this capacity by one additional of thousands of troops and equipment facility, thus decreasing our drawdown that would stream out of Iraq during a time. This facility will include an addi- U.S. withdrawal.30 tional port that can accommodate the military’s roll–on, roll-off sealift ships as Once in Kuwait, our equipment can well as a cleaning station. wait as long as necessary to be trans- ported back to the United States. What Get vital equipment out. There are is important is getting our troops and two primary ways to bring equipment equipment out of Iraq’s hostile envi- and personnel out of Iraq: airlift and ronment. If tanks and other equipment ground transport. are forced to sit in the Kuwaiti desert a few extra months due to a port backlog, Airlift: The United States has four major air then so be it. Security for our equip- bases in Iraq: Balad, Al Asad, Tallil, and ment backlog in Kuwait is undoubtedly the Baghdad International Airport. Many important, but it can be taken care of FOBs are also collocated on airfields, such with relative ease and will be more cost- as Contingency Operating Base Spe-

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icher near and FOB Warrior near Force and Marine combat aircraft (pri- Kirkuk; even these airfields are capable of marily F-16 and F/A-18 fighters) can fly handling C-130 and C-17 aircraft. themselves out of Iraq. Their associated support and maintenance personnel and Most sensitive equipment, ammunition, equipment can be airlifted out of coun- and personnel not necessary for escort- try as well. ing convoys of heavy equipment can simply be flown out of Iraq on America’s Ground transport: Heavy equipment such 700-plus strong military airlift fleet (see as tanks and other armored vehicles will graphic on page 17). have to be transported to Kuwait over- land on Route Tampa, the military’s For efficiency purposes, and because civil- main road from Iraq. Many of these ian airliners should not be used to fly in vehicles will drive, as part of combat and out of Iraq, these military aircraft can units redeploying themselves to Kuwait. shuttle equipment and personnel between Some, however, will be transported on the airfields in Iraq and Kuwait. If neces- Army Heavy Equipment Transport- sary, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet can be ac- ers, or HETs, to reduce wear and tear. tivated to assist the airlift of personnel and Each HET can carry one M1 tank or equipment out of Kuwait. CRAF consists two Bradley Fighting Vehicles at a time, of over 1,300 civilian airliners that can be which will necessitate large convoys to activated for military service within 24 to travel down Route Tampa. 48 hours. Given proper planning, however, such short-notice activation will not be HETs and up-armored Army cargo necessary for redeployment from Iraq. trucks such as the Medium Tactical Ve- hicle can also carry shipping containers Corps and division headquarters units with valuable equipment, and as neces- will be airlifted out when the time comes sary, contractors can join these move- to withdraw them. Most helicopters will ments, as well. Once this heavy equip- be able to fly themselves down to Ku- ment is in Kuwait, it can be cleaned, wait, where they will await preparation inspected, and prepared for sealift back for sealift back to the United States. Air to the United States.

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Conclusion

he plan we have presented should not and must not occur in a vacuum. “Stra- tegic Reset,” our earlier Iraq policy report, laid out several diplomatic, political, Tand military steps to be taken ahead of and in conjunction with the redeploy- ment of U.S. forces from Iraq. The United States must be prepared to contain Iraq’s conflicts through targeted assistance within Iraq as well as through tough and effective diplomacy with Iraq’s neighbors. In order to stabilize the broader Middle East, the United States needs to re-engage in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict in addition to containing Iraq’s conflicts.

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Endnotes

1 Martha Raddatz, “Obama’s Iraq Withdrawal Plan May Prove Difficult,” ABC News, July 11, 2008, available at http://abcnews. go.com/Politics/Vote2008/Story?id=5351864&page=1. 2 Daniel Levy and Michael Wahid Hanna, “Finding a Silver Lining in the Iraq Cloud,” The Boston Globe, July 13, 2008. 3 Anne Flaherty, “Iraqi forces estimated to become proficient in ’09,” Associated Press, July 9, 2008, available at http:// ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hcWJu9bbzrJZ7uNHjvMn0BuTGqHQD91QGT5G1. 4 Colin H. Kahl and William E. Odom, “When to Leave Iraq: Today, Tomorrow, or Yesterday?” Foreign Affairs July/August 2008, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080701faresponse87413/colin-h-kahl-william-e-odom/when-to-leave-iraq.html. 5 Major Niel Smith and, Col. Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army, “Anbar Awakenings: The Tipping Point,” Military Review, March- April 2008. 6 Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land (Bantam, 2008). 7 Phillip Carter, “Exit Stage Right,” Slate, May 23, 2007, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2166853/pagenum/all/#page_start. 8 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community,” February 27, 2008, available at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080227_testimony.pdf. 9 Thomas Ricks, “Military Envisions Longer Stay in Iraq,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2007. 10 Cynthia Bauer, “AMC central to historic troop rotation,” Air Force Link, March 15, 2004, available at http://www.af.mil/news/ story.asp?storyID=123007212; “‘The Surge,’” Army Logistician, January/February 2005, available at http://www.almc.army. mil/alog/issues/JanFeb05/surge.html. 11 Coalition Provision Authority Statement, March 9, 2004, available at http://www.cpairaq.org/transcripts/20040308_Mar9_ KimmitSenor.html. 12 Ibid. 13 In the six months during the 2004 troop rotation there was an average of 62 casualties per month, while in the 6 months following the 2004 troop rotation there was an average of 73 casualties per month. Data available at http://icasualties.org. 14 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, available at http://www.icasualties.org. 15 Craig Gordon, “Troops seen vulnerable in Humvees,” Newsday, December 18, 2003, available at http://www.boston.com/ news/world/middleeast/articles/2003/12/18/troops_seen_vulnerable_in_humvees/. 16 Ibid. 17 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations, June 14, 2001, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/ch8.htm. 18 Saad Fakhrildeen and Alexandra Zavis, “Iraq wants to have control of all provinces by year-end,” The Los Angeles Times, July 17, 2008. 19 Nancy Youssef, “Army Tries Iraq Endgame,” McClatchy Newspapers, August 12, 2007. 20 Michael White and Glenn Kutler, “Iraq Coalition Casualty Count,” July 26, 2007, available at http://icasualties.org/oif/. 21 Bradley Graham, “Commanders Plan Eventual Consolidation of U.S. Bases in Iraq,” The Washington Post, May 22, 2005. 22 Under Army doctrine, different kinds of units are trained and equipped to provide route security, including armored cavalry regiments, military police, scouts, infantry, and armor units. See Army Field Manual 17-98, Scout Platoon Operations; Field Manual 3-19.1, Military Police Operations. The withdrawal of military police from the mission to advise the Iraqi police would free at least one brigade of forces for this mission; withdrawal of forces from operations elsewhere in Iraq could provide the additional forces for this mission. 23 Michael Gerson, “Another Test in Iraq: Our Aid to Refugees,” The Washington Post, August 22, 2007. 24 Scott Pelley, “Left Behind,” CBS News, March 11, 2007. 25 Ibid. 26 David Wood, “The long, hard haul from Iraq,” The Baltimore Sun, July 15, 2007, available at http://www.baltimoresun.com/ news/world/bal-te.withdraw15jul15,0,1684709,full.story; House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga- tions, Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces (June 27, 2007) available at http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI_ISFreport062707/OI_Report_FINAL.pdf. 27 Anthony Cordesman, “The Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq” (Washington, D.C.:Center for Strategic and Interna- tional Studies, August 8, 2007) available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080607_iraq-strategicpatience.pdf. 28 Associated Press, “Equipment from Iraq Unloaded at Tacoma,” Seattle PI, July 31, 2008. 29 Josh White, “Kuwait Facilities Could Handle Big Troop Pullout, General Says,” The Washington Post, August 2, 2007. 30 Ibid. 21