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Conciliation, Counter-Terrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence

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Conciliation, Counter-Terrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence Conciliation, Counter-Terrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence: A Comparative Study of Five Cases* Ethan Bueno de Mesquita† Abstract When governments offer concessions to an ideologically heterogeneous terrorist organization the moderates within that organization are most likely to accept the concessions. Consequently, the terrorist organization is left in the hands of extremists following concessions, leading to an increase in militantism and potentially in terrorist violence. However, governments often also require former terrorists to collaborate in counter-terrorism efforts, which improves the governments chances of eradicating terror entirely. I examine patterns of terrorist violence, government concessions, and counter-terrorism policy in five case studies: Basque separatists in Spain, Palestinian extremists, Irish Republican terrorists, Quebec separatists in Canada, and Zionist terrorists in British Mandate Palestine. The contribution of these case studies is twofold. First, they demonstrate that the proposed theoretical framework is an empirically useful conceptualization of the politics of terrorism. Second, and more importantly, I present a theoretically informed analysis of significant historical incidents of terrorism in an effort to shed light on the organizational and political dynamics underlying patterns of terrorist violence. This historical analysis demonstrates that, despite variance in government strategy, terrorist responses, and patterns of violence, all five case studies can be understood within a single theoretical framework. * Professor Ehud Sprinzak, who died an untimely death on November 8, 2002, first introduced me to the study of terrorism. He is greatly missed. I have benefited from the comments of Scott Ashworth, Bob Bates, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Charles Cohen, Eric Dickson, Orit Kedar, Macartan Humphries, Rebecca Milder, Matt Price, Ken Shepsle, David Singer, Alastair Smith, Matt Stephenson, and the participants in the Harvard University Political Economy Research Workshop. † Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis, MO (beginning July 2003). Please send correspondence to Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, 3421 Pape Ave,. #1, Cincinnati, OH 45208 or [email protected]. Conciliation, Counter-Terrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence: A Comparative Study of Five Cases Governments employ an array of strategies in their efforts to put an end to armed insurgency and terrorism. The twentieth century has witnessed government responses as varied as acquiescence, peace negotiations that include concessions to terrorists, and military crackdowns. Consider, for instance, the French withdrawal from Algeria, the Spanish granting of partial autonomy to Basque separatists, the Israeli negotiations with the Palestinians followed by a renewed focus on counter-terror, and the Russian refusal to negotiate with the Chechneyans coupled with a brutal military assault. This multiplicity of government reactions raises important questions for students of terrorism. Can granting concessions to terrorists resolve violent conflict? Why do governments simultaneously pursue both conciliatory and counter-insurgency strategies? What factors affect government and insurgent strategies and the level of political violence? These are the questions that motivate this study. I examine patterns of terrorist violence, government concessions, and counter-terrorism policy in five case studies: the Basque separatists in Spain, Palestinian extremists, the Irish Republican Army and its splinter groups, the Quebec separatists in Canada, and the Zionist terrorists in British Mandate Palestine. These case studies, as explained in greater detail later, are selected to probe theoretical claims deduced from a formal model of terrorist/government negotiations. In an earlier study I suggested a model that addresses how government concessions can cause terrorist organizations to become more militant (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). 1 Here I 1 Although I will not engage in a lengthy definitional discussion in this paper, it is important that I am describing internal, national level terror that happens more or less within the country that is the target of the terrorists’ demands, as opposed to transnational or international terrorism. For thorough discussions of definitional issues in terrorism studies, see Crenshaw (1995), Gibbs (1989), Hoffman (1998), and Laqueur (1977). 1 sketch the intuition behind that model and assess some of its central empirical implications. When governments offer concessions to an ideologically heterogeneous terrorist organization it is the moderates within that organization who are most likely to accept the concessions. Consequently, the terrorist organization is left in the hands of extremists following concessions, leading to an increase in militantism. Under certain conditions, elucidated below, this can cause an increase in terrorist violence. However, governments also stand to gain from conciliating moderate terrorists. In exchange for concessions, governments often expect former moderate terrorists to collaborate in counter-terrorism efforts, which improves the governments chances of eradicating terror entirely. Several additional hypotheses follow from the aforementioned model of the politics of terrorism. The purpose of this paper is not to present a conclusive test of all of the theoretical claims. Rather, I explore in depth whether the fundamental logic of the model, developed informally below, maps onto the real world dynamics of terrorist conflict. The contribution of these case studies is twofold. First, they help demonstrate that the proposed theoretical framework is an empirically useful conceptualization of the politics of terrorism. Second, and more importantly, I present a theoretically informed analysis of significant historical incidents of terrorism in an effort to shed light on the organizational and political dynamics underlying patterns of terrorist violence. This historical analysis demonstrates that, despite variance in government strategy, terrorist responses, and patterns of violence, all five case studies can be understood within a single theoretical framework. The Theoretical Framework Terror groups are not unitary actors. Rather, they are organizations made up of ideologically 2 heterogeneous cells and factions (Chai 1993, DeNardo 1985, Crenshaw 1981). Moderates within a terrorist movement are more likely to compromise with the government in exchange for concessions than are extremists. Moderate terrorists are also inclined to engage in less terrorist violence than are extremists. Consequently, when concessions are offered the moderates are most likely to accept them, leaving the extremists in control and the terrorist organization more militant than it was before. The result is a potential increase in attempted terror depending on the access to resources that extremists have after the moderates have ceased their participation in terror. Two examples, to be discussed in detail later, illustrate this argument. Following the signing of the Oslo accords the Palestinian terror campaign was left in the hands of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, groups that are more committed to violent terror than the PLO. Similarly, following the granting of autonomy to the Basque country the relatively moderate ETA-politico militar disbanded, leaving the extremist ETA-militar in control of ETA terrorism. The claim that concessions can lead to an increase in violence raises the question of why governments ever conciliate terrorists. I contend that the reduced size of the terror organization and the collaboration in counter-terror that governments demand from moderates with whom they compromise increase the probability that the government will be able to eradicate the remaining terror organization. Hence, a government will make concessions to moderate terrorists if the expected benefits of improved counter-terror outweigh the costs associated with facing a more militant residual terrorist movement. Behind this seemingly obvious claim, however, lies some surprising strategic implications. Because of increased militantism, if government counter-terrorism efforts fail following concessions the ex post level of terrorist violence will increase. This is consistent with observations in the empirical literature that concessions sometimes lead to more terrorism 3 (Hewitt 1984, Wilkinson 1999). However, governments would not make concessions if an increase in violence were expected ex ante. Consequently, diverging from the extant literature, my account suggests that there must also be cases where government concessions are followed by counter-terror crackdowns that, with the aid of former moderate terrorists, succeed at eradicating the remaining terrorist cells. An important nuance of the argument relates to terrorists’ access to resources. In situations where a large percentage of the terrorists’ resources disappear when the moderates depart, the remaining extremists may not have sufficient wherewithal to engage in the amount of violence they would like. In such cases, the level of violence following concessions is expected to decrease, even if government counter-terrorism fails. The change in level of resources following concessions will vary depending on the particulars of a terrorist organization. Sometimes, after moderate terrorists accept concessions, the resources available to the still-active extremists will remain fairly high. This is likely when extremist donors who are
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