Perception As Unconscious Inference GARY HATFIELD Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, USA
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Eye-Movement Studies of Visual Face Perception
Eye-movement studies of visual face perception Joseph Arizpe A dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University College London Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience University College London 2015 1 Declaration I, Joseph Arizpe, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 2 Abstract This thesis investigates factors influencing eye-movement patterns during face perception, the relationship of eye-movement patterns to facial recognition performance, and methodological considerations impacting the detection of differences in eye-movement patterns. In particular, in the first study (chapter 2), in which the basis of the other-race effect was investigated, differences in eye- movement patterns during recognition of own- versus other-race (African, Chinese) faces were found for Caucasian participants. However, these eye- movement differences were subtle and analysis-dependent, indicating that the discrepancy in prior reports regarding the presence or absence of such differences are due to variability in statistical sensitivity of analysis methods across studies. The second and third studies (chapters 3 and 4) characterized visuomotor factors, specifically pre-stimulus start position and distance, which strongly influence subsequent eye-movement patterns during face perception. An overall bias in fixation patterns to the opposite side of the face induced by start position and an increasing undershoot of the first ordinal fixation with increasing start distance were found. These visuomotor influences were not specific to faces and did not depend on the predictability of the location of the upcoming stimulus. -
Readingsample
Interdisciplinary Anthropology Continuing Evolution of Man Bearbeitet von Wolfgang Welsch, Wolf Singer, André Wunder 1. Auflage 2011. Buch. xii, 174 S. Hardcover ISBN 978 3 642 11667 4 Format (B x L): 15,5 x 23,5 cm Gewicht: 499 g Weitere Fachgebiete > Chemie, Biowissenschaften, Agrarwissenschaften > Biowissenschaften allgemein > Evolutionsbiologie Zu Inhaltsverzeichnis schnell und portofrei erhältlich bei Die Online-Fachbuchhandlung beck-shop.de ist spezialisiert auf Fachbücher, insbesondere Recht, Steuern und Wirtschaft. Im Sortiment finden Sie alle Medien (Bücher, Zeitschriften, CDs, eBooks, etc.) aller Verlage. Ergänzt wird das Programm durch Services wie Neuerscheinungsdienst oder Zusammenstellungen von Büchern zu Sonderpreisen. Der Shop führt mehr als 8 Millionen Produkte. Intrinsic Multiperspectivity: Conceptual Forms and the Functional Architecture of the Perceptual System Rainer Mausfeld Abstract It is a characteristic feature of our mental make-up that the same percep- tual input situation can simultaneously elicit conflicting mental perspectives. This ability pervades our perceptual and cognitive domains. Striking examples are the dual character of pictures in picture perception, pretend play, or the ability to employ metaphors and allegories. I argue that traditional approaches, beyond being inadequate on principle grounds, are theoretically ill equipped to deal with these achievements. I then outline a theoretical perspective that has emerged from a theoretical convergence of perceptual psychology, ethology, linguistics, and -
The Neural Control of Fast Vs. Slow Vergence Eye Movements
European Journal of Neuroscience European Journal of Neuroscience, Vol. 33, pp. 2147–2154, 2011 doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2011.07692.x The neural control of fast vs. slow vergence eye movements Kathleen E. Cullen and Marion R. Van Horn Department of Physiology, Aerospace Medical Research Unit, McGill University, Montreal, PQ, Canada Keywords: binocular, burst neuron, conjugate, extraocular, monocular, saccade Abstract When looking between targets located in three-dimensional space, information about relative depth is sent from the visual cortex to the motor control centers in the brainstem, which are responsible for generating appropriate motor commands to move the eyes. Surprisingly, how the neurons in the brainstem use the depth information supplied by the visual cortex to precisely aim each eye on a visual target remains highly controversial. This review will consider the results of recent studies that have focused on determining how individual neurons contribute to realigning gaze when we look between objects located at different depths. In particular, the results of new experiments provide compelling evidence that the majority of saccadic neurons dynamically encode the movement of an individual eye, and show that the time-varying discharge of the saccadic neuron population encodes the drive required to account for vergence facilitation during disconjugate saccades. Notably, these results suggest that an additional input (i.e. from a separate vergence subsystem) is not required to shape the activity of motoneurons during disconjugate saccades. Furthermore, whereas motoneurons drive both fast and slow vergence movements, saccadic neurons discharge only during fast vergence movements, emphasizing the existence of distinct premotor pathways for controlling fast vs. -
Our Senses & Information Processing
Our senses What we see Light entering our eyes Question: How Tall does a mirror have to be to see your body from head to toe? Prediction A plane mirror is affixed to the wall. What do you think the minimum length of the mirror must be for you to see your entire body from head to toe (just as tall, ¾ as tall, ½ as tall etc…)? At what height does a mirror of this length need to be mounted to allow you to see your entire body from head to toe? Why is this? Procedure Materials: Plane mirror mounted to the wall, meter stick, dry erase marker. Note: While you’re waiting your turn for the mirror, skip to page 5 and start on one of the activities listed on pages 5, 6 or 7. 1. Choose your two most extreme group members, the tallest and the shortest. A. Have the shortest member, known as the object, stand in front of the plane mirror. Another group member will mark on the mirror with a dry erase marker where the object sees the top of their head. Then mark where the object sees their feet. Cover the unused areas of the mirror to verify that they are not needed for the object to see themselves from head to foot. B. Now have the object test to see how distance from the mirror affects the necessary size of mirror. The object should stand very close and very far from the mirror the entire time checking to see how the original head and feet marks align with their head and feet respectively. -
Vergence Eye Movements Redefined: the Neural Control of Fast Versus Slow Vergence
Vergence eye movements redefined: The neural control of fast versus slow vergence Marion R. Van Horn Aerospace Medical Research Unit Department of Physiology McGill University Montreal, Quebec, Canada August 2010 A thesis submitted to the faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the degree of Doctorate in Philosophy Copyright © Marion Van Horn 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT…………………………..…………………………..………………... xiii RÉSUMÉ…………………………..…………………………..…………………… xv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………..………………………… ..xviii CONTRIBUTIONS OF AUTHORS…………………………..………………….. xx LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………..……………….. xxii CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION & LITERATURE REVIEW 1.1 Overview and conceptual framework………...……………………………… 1 1.2 The extraocular eye muscles and their innervations…………….…………… 4 1.3 Classification of eye movements………………….…………….…………… 8 1.4 The neural control of disconjugate saccades: Hering versus Helmoholtz... 11 1.4.1 Evidence supporting Hering’s Law …………………………….... 11 1.5 The premotor circuitry of conjugate saccades ………………………….... 14 1.5.1 Saccadic burst neurons…………….…………………………….... 15 1.5.2 Omnipause neurons………………..…………………………….... 16 1.5.3 Oculomotor integration ………………………………………….... 17 1.6 The premotor circuitry of saccade-free vergence ……………………….... 19 1.7 Evidence against “Hering’s Law” ……………………………………….... 20 1.8 Research Goals ……………………………….………………………….... 22 CHAPTER 2: DYNAMIC CHARACTERIZATION OF OCULOMOTONEURONS DURING CONJUGATE AND DISCONJUGATE EYE MOVEMENTS 2.1 ABSTRACT ………………………………………………………………. 25 2.2 INTRODUCTION -
Hershenson (1992) Size-Distance Invariance. Kinetic Invariance Is
Perception & Psychophysics 1992, 51 (6), 541-548 Size-distance invariance: Kinetic invariance is different from static invariance MAURICE HERSHENSON Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts The static form of the size-distance invariance hypothesisasserts that a given proximal stimu- lus size (visual angle) determines a unique and constant ratio of perceived-object size to perceived object distance. A proposed kinetic invariance hypothesis asserts that a changing proximal stim- ulus size (an expanding or contracting solid visual angle) produces a constant perceived size and a changing perceived distance such that the instantaneous ratio of perceived size to perceived distance is determined by the instantaneous value of visual angle. The kinetic invariance hy- pothesis requires a new concept, an operating constraint, to mediate between the proximal ex- pansion or contraction pattern and the perception of rigid object motion in depth. As a conse- quence of the operating constraint, expansion and contraction patterns are automatically represented in consciousness as rigid objects. In certain static situations, the operation of this constraint produces the anomalous perceived-size-perceived-distance relations called the size- distance paradox. The size-distance invariance hypothesis (SDIH) asserts STATIC INVARIANCE RELATIONSHIP that a given proximal stimulus size (visual angle) deter- mines a unique constant ratio of perceived object size to Traditional Formulation perceived object distance (Epstein, 1977; Epstein, Park, The traditional form of the SDIH is derived from the & Casey, 1961; Kilpatrick & Ittelson, 1953). Is it possible analysis of stationary objects (Epstein, 1977; Gilinsky, to explain the moon illusion and retain this form of the 1951; Ittelson, 1951a; Johansson, 1977; Kilpatrick & It- SDIH? To do so, Kaufman and Rock (1962, 1989; Rock telson, 1953; Weintraub & Gardner, 1970). -
Seeing Black and White
Seeing Black and White Alan Gilchrist OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Seeing Black and White This page intentionally left blank SEEING BLACK AND WHITE Alan Gilchrist 1 2006 1 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright ᭧ 2006 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gilchrist, Alan. Seeing black and white / by Alan Gilchrist. p. cm. (Oxford psychology series; no. 40) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-518716-4 ISBN-13 978-0-19-518716-8 1. Imagery (Psychology). I. Title. II. Series. BF241.L54 2006 153—dc22 2006006283 987654321 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper This book is dedicated to the memory of Irvin Rock, my wonderful mentor and warm friend. This page intentionally left blank Foreword And God said let Gilchrist be and all was light. -
Munton Phil Perspectives 2
The Eye’s Mind: Perceptual Process and Epistemic Norms Jessie Munton Abstract: Philosophers have tended to formulate theories of perceptual justification independently of psychological investigation into perceptual functioning. Nevertheless, work in perceptual epistemology often conceals an implicit commitment to a normative view of what kinds of processing maximise the epistemic power of a perceptual experience, that is, its capacity to justify belief. This implicit commitment is to a set of “minimalist” norms, which treat sensory stimulation as the ultimate locus of epistemic power, and consequently set value on the purity of sensory signal and passivity of perceptual processing. These norms fit poorly with our best scientific models of perception, which draw out the ways in which it can be understood as akin to a hypothesis. Focusing on visual perception in particular, I argue that appreciating how it plays the role of a hypothesis within the visual system, whilst also constituting a form of evidence at the person level, gives us reason to reject these minimalist norms for perceptual processing.1 0. Introduction Visual experience can justify belief. Visual experience is also the result of a set of psychological processes. What is the significance of the latter set of facts for the former capacity? What role do psychological processes play in determining the epistemic value, or power, of a perceptual experience?2 According to one, influential train of thought in philosophy, the answer is, superficially at least, “none”. For the most part, epistemic norms have been formulated in isolation from psychological inquiry into perception. Philosophers have often granted perceptual experience an exceptional epistemic role: it puts us in immediate contact with the world around us, and can provide a foundational level of justification for certain basic beliefs, on which we can ground, via inference, a web of more complex beliefs. -
Points of View in the Modern History of Psychology
Points of View in the Modern History of Psychology Edited by Claude E. Buxton Department of Psychology Yale University New Haven, Connecticut 1985 ACADEMIC PRESS, INC. (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers) Orlando San Diego New York London Toronto Montreal Sydney Tokyo Passages from the following are reprinted by permission of the publishers: Newell, Α., Duncker on Thinking, in S. Koch & D. Leary (Eds.), A Century of Psychology as Science. Copyright 1985 by McGraw-Hill. Neisser, U., Cognitive Psychology. © 1967 by Prentice-Hall. COPYRIGHT © 1985 BY ACADEMIC PRESS, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. NO PART OF THIS PUBLICATION MAY BE REPRODUCED OR TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS, ELECTRONIC OR MECHANICAL, INCLUDING PHOTOCOPY, RECORDING, OR ANY INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM, WITHOUT PERMISSION IN WRITING FROM THE PUBLISHER. ACADEMIC PRESS, INC. Orlando, Florida 32887 United Kingdom Edition published by ACADEMIC PRESS INC. (LONDON) LTD. 24-28 Oval Road, London NW1 7DX LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA Main entry under title: Points of view in the modern history of psychology. Includes indexes. 1. Psychology— History. I. Buxton, Claude E. BF81.P57 1985 150\9 85-4010 ISBN 0-12-148510-2 (alk. paper) PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 85 86 87 88 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Contributors Numbers in parentheses indicate the pages on which the authors' contributions begin. Mitchell G. Ash (295), Department of History, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242 William Bevan (259), John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Chicago, Illinois 60603 Arthur L. Blumenthal (19, 51), Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts at Boston, Boston, Massachusetts 02125 Claude E. -
Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception
ision and Mind Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception edited by Alva Noë and Evan Thompson Vision and Mind This Page Intentionally Left Blank Vision and Mind Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception edited by Alva Noë and Evan Thompson A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England © 2002 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. This book was set in Sabon by SNP Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong. Printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Vision and mind : selected readings in the philosophy of perception / edited by Alva Noë and Evan Thompson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-262-14078-0 (alk. paper)—ISBN 0-262-64047-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Perception (Philosophy) I. Noë, Alva. II. Thompson, Evan. B828.45 .V565 2002 121¢.34—dc21 2002023533 Contents Preface vii Sources ix 1 Introduction 1 Alva Noë and Evan Thompson 2 Selections from Phenomenology of Perception 15 Maurice Merleau-Ponty 3 Some Remarks about the Senses 35 H. P. Grice 4 The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature 55 G. E. M. Anscombe 5 A Theory of Direct Visual Perception 77 James J. Gibson 6 Perception and Its Objects 91 P. F. Strawson 7 Perceptions as Hypotheses 111 Richard L. Gregory 8 Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision 135 David Lewis 9 Perception, Vision and Causation 151 Paul Snowdon 10 How Direct Is Visual Perception?: Some Reflections on Gibson’s “Ecological Approach” 167 Jerry A. -
Notions Such As 'Truth' Or 'Correspondence to the Objective World' Play No Role in Explanatory Accounts of Perception
Mausfeld, R. (2015). Notions such as ‘truth’ or ‘correspondence to the objective world’ play no role in ex- planatory accounts of perception. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review , DOI: 10.3758/s13423-014-0763-6 Notions such as ‘truth’ or ‘correspondence to the objective world’ play no role in explanatory accounts of perception Rainer Mausfeld University of Kiel Abstract. Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash (2015) intend to show that perceptions are evolutionarily tuned to fitness rather than to truth. I argue, partly in accordance with their objective, that issues of ‘truth’ or ‘veridicality’ have no place in explanatory accounts of perception theory, and rather belong to either ordinary discourse or to philosophy. I regard, however, their general presumption that the evolutionary development of core achievements of the human perceptual system would be primarily determined by aspects of fitness and adaption as unwarranted in light of the evidence available. In our ordinary intuitions about perception, we are convinced that our perceptual apparatus by and large conveys to us a basically ‘truthful’ account of the external world. We are apparently biologi- cally endowed with a predisposition to take certain expressions generated by our perceptual capaci- ties for ‘things in the objective world’. This propensity constitutes a kind of naïve realism that is deeply built-in into our mental make-up (cf. Mausfeld, 2010a). Although naïve realism already foun- ders in the face of most elementary scientific facts, say about the properties of our sense organs, it intellectually expresses some of our deepest convictions about the mental activity of perceiving, namely, being in direct touch with a mind-independent world. -
Chapter 2 Basic Color Theory
Chapter 2 Basic Color Theory In this chapter I will give an introduction to two classical theories of color vision. Probably the most influential theory is the theory of trichromatic color vision which will be discussed first. In the second part I will examine characteristics of a subpopulation of observers called dichromats. The existence and the character- istics of these color deficient observers are well explained within the framework of trichromatic theory. The chapter will be concluded with an introduction to the second classical theory of color vision, the theory of opponent colors. This theory had been standing in opposition to trichromatic theory for many years. Now it is commonly accepted that the two theories refer to different stages of color processing in the visual system. 2.1 Primary Color Coding The theory of trichromatic color vision was mainly developed in the 19th cen- tury and is closely connected with the names of Thomas Young, Hermann von Helmholtz, James Clerk Maxwell and Hermann Grassmann. The enormous suc- cess of the theory results especially from the fact that the theory of trichromatic color vision provides an adequate description of processing of light at retinal level. Furthermore, conclusions derived from the theory play an important role in most applications that deal with color vision. In particular, quantitative as- pects of the theory constitute the foundations of the field of colorimetry that these applications are based on. The main goal of the theory of trichromatic color vision is to connect charac- teristics of the physical stimulus of light, that is electromagnetic radiation within the visible spectrum, with the matching behavior of observers which is determined by psychological variables.