The Reality of Aid 2006 Latin America

Part IV Latin America

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Security, Cooperation for Development and Conflict: Elements for Analysis of the Colombian Case

Mauricio Katz Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD)

Introduction their efforts for a counter-reform to cut For at least four decades has been back on and limit the rights consecrated in facing a complicated socio-political situation the constitution and to bring the nascent characterized by armed conflict between political regime back, in some ways, to the organizations of the extreme left and the centralist, authoritarian, exclusivist model of government’s armed forces. Towards the end 1886. This is the movement to which of the 70s this confrontation expanded in President Álvaro Uribe Vélez’s proposal scope and complexity with the entry of belongs. His strategy proposes to clear the extreme right groups. Known in different way “Towards a Communal State”1 which re- sectors as paramilitary groups, these groups concentrates and recentralizes many have links to criminal groups, especially functions, its strengthening being an end in organized drug traffickers, and have been itself and not a result of increased legality accused of collusion with government and growing legitimacy. players. This government promotes a model that The 1991 constitution made the building de-institutionalizes the state structure, setting of a modern democracy possible, since it up parallel administrative mechanisms and established the foundations of biodiversity, ignoring the established mediation system. It individual freedom, the separation of church uses nation-centered patriotic discourse and and state and the strengthening of civil symbolism, dividing Colombian society in a society. This political scheme strengthened Manichean manner. Its proposal for immediate the process of decentralization, provided for reelections will strike a sharp blow against broader social and political participation of constitutionally-designed mechanisms for individuals and established a more or less maintaining a balance among government balanced separation of the different branches. branches. In short, for the first time in The essence of the communal state has to history citizens were effectively drawn closer do with the state’s efforts to achieve a to the state. strategic victory in the conflict through setting From the moment this constitution was in motion the so-called Democratic Security proclaimed, its opponents have not rested in Policy, which hopes to gain territorial control

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and counteract and eliminate the risk to the armed forces for its operation and represented by the FARC. It is still too early modernization, in the framework of the anti- to assess the real impact of this policy’s drug and counter-insurgency struggle. On strategic goal, but it can be said that it has another front is help in dealing with the brought about a reconfiguration of the growing humanitarian crisis, with its dramatic that has meant, on the effects on a migrant or isolated population. one hand, its worsening and intensification, And, finally, there are efforts to support a and on the other, an expansion and political solution to the conflict, in particular aggravation of the so-called humanitarian by strengthening the different expressions crisis. organized by civil society. One of the most striking aspects of this This paper intends to analyze the current policy has to do with the way in which it situation of security, cooperation for intensifies US intervention in Colombia. This is development and conflict in Colombia. To this evident in ’s evolution into Plan end, it will first refer very generally to the Patriot, and in particular, in the latent risk foundations of international cooperation with that this military offensive might become the country by both the United States and the financially dependent on foreign aid. European Union, and then look at their US intervention has been facilitated by relationship with some essential aspects of the the recurring coincidence of President Uribe Colombian political context. The analysis will Vélez’s discourse with the war on also rapidly weigh the contributions of the so- proclaimed by President Bush after September called Plan Colombia and the results of the 11. Indeed, for the nation’s leader, Colombia is . Finally, some conclusions will be not experiencing a social and political conflict presented for discussion. but rather is host to terrorist groups threatening society. He is making this pivotal Diplomacy for war to his domestic policies and international The consequences of the Colombian conflict relations. have become acute as the conflict intensifies Thus Colombia’s foreign policy has aligned and worsens. The concerns of the international itself with unilateralism, contributing to the community are to provide attention to the deterioration of international law and ignoring dramatic humanitarian crisis, whose maximum the recent tradition that led the country to expression is the internal migration over the preside over the Movement of Unaligned last decade of at least 2 million people, as Nations in 1996. As a result, Colombia has well as to violations of human rights and become the most steadfast, reliable ally of international humanitarian law. the United States in the Andean region, a Until 1998 the Colombian guerrillas looked region characterized today by some as to the international community for support, as unstable and at risk, and by others as in long as the Colombian state stuck to its search of independently constructed doctrine of self-determination and non- development alternatives. involvement in internal affairs in order to In spite of the current government’s wish claim its right to deal with the conflict under to expand its agenda, Colombia’s international its own authority. With the start of the cooperation has three basic, closely- dialogue on January 7, 1999, between interacting dimensions, much against the will President Andrés Pastrana’s administration and of its contributors. Thus, on one front is aid the FARC (Fuerzas Revolucionarias de

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Colombia), a strategy called diplomacy for approaches prevalent during the Cold War peace was put into motion which sought the and declared a head-on war on terrorism. international community’s backing for the This doctrine would be first used in March, negotiations. 2003 in the war against Iraq, where the At the same time the same administration United States abandoned the international initiated Plan Colombia in 2000 with financing order that had emerged from the end of the from the United States — a plan that was Second World War and dealt a death blow to denounced from the start by the FARC as the fragile security system of the United proof of US intervention in the domestic Nations. conflict, even though at the beginning the The new paradigm that Washington is plan did not include direct counterinsurgency trying to impose is characterized by growing action. unilateralism, profound subversion of The panorama changed radically with international norms, and systematic the September 11, 2001 attacks and the militarization of disputes. A legitimate election to the presidency of Álvaro Uribe question worth asking is whether the Vélez, who put into motion diplomacy in underlying truth of this paradigm is not a support of the domestic war, adopting as his strategy to seize the world’s energy own President Bush’s new security doctrine resources, as illustrated by the desire to and declaration of war on terrorism. At the seize Iraqi oil at any cost. Although the same time Plan Colombia evolved from an principles of non-intervention and non- anti-narcotics strategy into Plan Patriot, a recourse to force are still the bases of the counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist international order, the United States strategy — a US priority for its cooperation appears not to feel any obligation to respect in Colombia. them when they represent a threat to its With the September 11, 2001 attacks, interests. security once again took on another The preventive war doctrine and the war meaning. The fear occasioned by the against Iraq signify a consolidation of the attacks, in both the US and the rest of the unilateral perspective, with a unipolar world world gave credence to the theory that vision, as opposed to multilateralism and normal mechanisms for dealing with security multi-polarity. This concept of security has threats are not effective against terrorism. had a permanent impact on state public Individual liberties and the legitimacy of order policies, placing domestic security democratic institutions were weakened and above other priorities such as democracy, a tendency for exceptional measures was human rights and economic and social generalized throughout the world. State welfare, and giving sufficient legitimacy to security acquired first priority to the the restriction of individual liberties, as seen detriment of human security and in the Patriot Act. acknowledged civil liberties and guarantees, Colombia was the only South American with the added complication that individuals country to back the United States, and were agreeing to this change. although it did not form part of the military The United States established a new contingency under the coalition, it declared its security and national defense doctrine, full support for military intervention in Iraq. defined as a preventive war doctrine, with The domestic agenda was related directly to which they definitively abandoned the the American agenda and Plan Patriot evolved

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Graph 5. US Military Aid to Colombia, 1998-2005 (e) (millions US$)

900 AyudaMilitary Militar Aid 800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

from Plan Colombia as a stronger intervention initiated their new war tactics with mechanism. operations in the extensive Colombian jungle in the Amazon basin. Plan Patriot is From Plan Colombia to Plan Patriot: defined as the largest, most ambitious US cooperation with Colombia military campaign the Colombian state has The Colombian government has consistently launched against the FARC since Operation leaned on the United States as its principal Marquetalia2 40 years ago. Its goal is the cooperation ally in its democratic security strategic defeat of the FARC in its own policy, arguing that security threats for historical area of influence. It hopes to Colombia are also security threats for the create favorable conditions for the world. All this, as this article has been trying Colombian government for a new round of to show up to now, is a consequence of a negotiations with the guerrillas — this time global definition of terrorism after September based on their strategic defeat. 11. This operation, defined within Plan In recent years Colombia has become the Colombia’s framework and in continuation of third largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world it, signified joint action by the Colombian after Israel and Egypt, and the largest in South state’s coercive forces (army, air force, navy, America, which has generated much distrust police and Security Administrative Department among its neighbors, especially Venezuela and [DAS in Spanish]) with US support and Brazil. Total U.S. cooperation for Plan monitoring. The operation involves from Colombia is US $3.54 billion, of which 80% is 14,000 to 17,000 members of the armed forces for military aid (Graph 5) and the remaining in a geographical area of approximately 20% for social aid (Graph 6). 242,000 square kilometers, with a population In October 2003, with much media of 1.7 million inhabitants, in a region known fanfare, the Colombian armed forces for its jungle and tropical rainforest. The

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operation is clear evidence that Plan acting as escorts and privileged witnesses, Colombia is really a counterinsurgency plan and contributing to the FARC’s acceptance rather than a simple anti-drug plan. “In of an international presence in the failed synthesis, US military aid today is clearly a dialogues. They constituted an axis of counter-insurgency strategy with the name “friendly countries” looking for a solution to of Plan Patriot, a name adopted not so much the ELN (National Liberation Army) dilemma. because of the concept of sovereignty, but The European Union proposed, as one more as an extension of the Patriot Act. It of the pivotal actions of its “Support opens up questions about growing US military Program for the ,” intervention in the Colombian conflict, now aid in establishing true “peace laboratories” not only with economic aid, but also with the in some of the country’s critical areas. This the direct presence of troops and advisors in concept came out of observation of the the area.”3 widespread citizens’ movements for peace, The plan is also the setting for which in some regions have become social ideological, symbolic and communicative laboratories exploring, with the use of confrontation. Uribe’s government and the proper legal instruments, the paths armed forces present this operation as a sort Colombian society and local communities of “final battle,” framed within a military have to take to defuse the conflict and triumphalism that puts in doubt the FARC’s foster sustainable development. frequently nourished myth of absolute The European Union uses the expression invincibility. The game is facilitated by the “peace laboratories” to synthetically designate absence of political control by the legislative the set of social participation and institutional bodies and state security organisms, and the strengthening processes. These processes, impossibility of media coverage informing the locally and regionally, seek to achieve public of the nature and results of operations economic, social, cultural and political for reasons of doctrine, costs, and the notion transformations in the midst of conflict, in of social duty. order to collectively build the conditions for a In response to Plan Colombia, the lasting peace based on a dignified life for all European Union devised a special program inhabitants. directed at sustaining Colombian peace The role the EU assigns to cooperation is efforts. With this approach it promised to that of an instrument of support for dynamics contribute logistic or financial support to already existing in the Colombian civil society. projects negotiated by the conflicting parties, Its specific function is to enable a structuring advising that it would act on this basis as and deepening of experiences that are already catalyzer for the UN and its specialized underway, and thus help in resolving the organizations (World Bank, IDB and European conflict. In March 2002 the first peace Development Bank), as well as the private laboratory started up in the middle Magdalena sector, to back the Colombian government’s region with a budget of 34.8 million euros. At financial efforts. the end of 2003, approval was given to In this manner Europe made a meaningful develop a second peace laboratory, with a contribution between 1998 and 2002. The budget of 33 million euros, this time for three ambassadors of the European Union regions: Macizo Colombiano (Cauca and Nariño participated in numerous conversations departments), the eastern part of Antioquia between the government and the guerrillas, department and North of Santander

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department. At present a third peace bilateral relations with the United States. laboratory is being prepared. The Colombian case illustrates the situation The peace laboratories are an innovative of a government that has not been able to strategy that coincides with the de- get the consensus of the dominant elites to centralization of European Commission achieve domestic peace, and has no services, which gives the European effective, autonomous policy for fighting Delegation’s office in Bogotá more capacity for drug trafficking. decision-making and real-time handling of this complex model for development cooperation Communal state and democratic in the midst of conflict. Although the strategy security may be innovative, administration and The breakdown of peace dialogues with the operation of these projects follows the classic FARC in February 2002, the economic crisis, lines of European cooperation, which limits the growing mistrust in politics and politicians the model’s development possibilities. and the atmosphere of public skepticism made In brief, the European Union’s position is it easy for an independent candidate to reach in principle a counterweight to US policies for the presidency, with the surprising result of hemispheric security and the war on drugs. 53% of the vote in the first round. The Nevertheless, it conditions its cooperation with election of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez for Colombia and the Andean nations to their the 2002 – 2006 term signifies a decision by capacity to autonomously resolve their the Colombian state to undertake the military domestic conflicts. And it is precisely this route as the solution to the domestic armed autonomy that some of these governments are conflict. not able to achieve, in terms of both In particular, the government has consensus and domestic governability and their developed a legal offensive aimed at

Graph 6. US Social Aid to Colombia, 1998-2005(e) (millions US$)

250 Social Aid

200

150

100

50

0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

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modifying the national constitution. This In the war on terrorism, the government would distance the state from the framework posits that citizens should cooperate in a of a democratic system, transforming its determined manner with the state in this war, foundations of law and legitimacy, so that given that “security is also a result of the the political regime would move away from citizenry’s efforts. The active participation of the practices of the liberal democratic citizens and all sectors of civil society in model and evolve toward a particular type of cooperating with administering justice and corporativism. This effort has failed thanks to supporting the authorities is an essential part of the constitutional resistance by magistrates strengthening democracy. But above all, citizen and the public ministry justice ministry . cooperation rests on the principle of solidarity, upon which the social state of law is founded.”6 Democratic security policy Thus, since his electoral campaign Uribe Uribe Vélez’s administration based its Vélez has proposed that “We should all government strategy on setting in motion the support the police force, basically with Democratic Security Policy (PSD in Spanish), information. We should start with a million which “consists of the exercise of an effective citizens. Without paramilitarism. With local authority that follows the rules, contains and security fronts in the neighborhoods and dissuades violent elements and dedicates itself commercial centers. Networks of people on to respecting human rights.”4 watch along the highways and in the fields. All The Democratic Security Policy (PSD) coordinated by the police force which, with includes development of the following this help, will be more effective and totally objectives: territorial control and defense of transparent. A million citizens, lovers of peace national sovereignty, the fight against drug and promoters of coexistence….Monday will be trafficking, the strengthening of the justice Reward Day when the government will pay system, the development of depressed areas citizens who helped the police the previous and areas in conflict, the protection and week to prevent a terrorist act and capture promotion of human rights and international the culprits.”7 This aspect, as will be seen humanitarian law, and an active foreign affairs later, is very controversial, because it has policy. meant getting civilians involved in the The basic emphasis of this policy is its conflict, either as informants or as those interpretation of the Colombian conflict, accused by informants of being the presumed according to which, “here what we have is authors of antipatriotic behavior or terrorists. a defiance of terrorism against a community In addition, within the framework of the that has been strengthening its democracy PSD the government defined one of its more and more from day to day… and I see priorities as adapting the constitutional and this in the face of an evolutionary process regulatory framework to giving the armed where democracy is permeating Colombian forces greater legal capacity in handling public society. And that leads me to reject the order disturbances. In the Democratic idea of calling this phenomenon a war.”5 Manifesto, the president put forward the This interpretation tries to eliminate the notion that, “we need an antiterrorist political nature of the insurgent groups, statute that will facilitate arrest, capture thus making it coherent with the and searches. Unlike in my student years, international “war on terrorism” current today political violence and terrorism are the after September 11, 2001. same thing….”8 Once in office as President of

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the Republic, and taking as an excuse the purpose of carrying out operations more terrorist attacks of the FARC on August 7, effectively. 2002, Uribe Vélez declared a “state of The PSD continued with the so-called domestic upheaval,”9 and then proceeded to modernization of the armed forces, initiated dictate the first PSD measures. under Plan Colombia, which aimed at Later the executive set in motion increasing force numbers, operational measures restricting civil liberties by means structures and logistic and operational of mass arrests,10 the creation of capacity. Graph 7 shows a significant “rehabilitation and consolidation areas,”11 increase in uniformed members of the police and constitutional reforms such as the force, which illustrates the dilemma faced by “anti-terrorist statute.”12 This new legal the current government. Having framework, later declared unconstitutional concentrated its entire strategy on the by the Constitutional Court, set forth three military front, with a critical social situation, types of measures. The first was the it must now guarantee the resources to subordination of civil authorities to military sustain this strategy. authorities, to the point of granting police Graph 8 gives an official balance of duties to the military. The second was to increased force numbers and new restrict the rights of citizens for the operational units created up to December purpose of re-securing an area, with the 31, 2004, showing very clearly the emphasis possibility of decreeing curfews, military President Uribe Vélez’s government is placing reserves, and programs for registering the on strengthening the military establishment.13 population. An officer would then be With respect to operational figures, the empowered to gather and verify information government reports are overly optimistic, about the homes and regular occupations recording a major increase in fallen combatants of people who lived, transited or came into among the illegal armed groups. Likewise, they the area. Finally, a coordinating office report an increase in arrests and desertions by, would be created in the area with the and a reduced, almost non-existent number of public prosecutor’s office, the attorney casualties among government troops. The general’s office and the military, for the difficulty with these figures is that they serve

Graph 7. Uniformed Police Force Members

353,803.00 27% 75,000 331,091.00 Additional Uniformed Members

278,296.00

Jul. 02 Dec . 03 Dec . 04

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Graph 8. Increments in Fighting Forces

Aug. 02 Dec. 02 1234 Mountain Battalions 1 3 2 1234 6 1234 Dec. 04 1234 Total at End of 2004 Mobile Brigades 7 2 3 12

Afeaur 1 12 1 14

Gaula Groups 29 3 2 32

Mobile Carabineer Squadrons 25 12 9 46 Municipalities w ith 450 140 Soldados de Mi Pueblo 590 Strengthening of Marine Infantry 2,184 1,202 3,386

Carabineer Plan 10,000 10,000 20,000

SLR Deferment 10,000 10,000

Regular Police Auxiliary 1,800 6,400 6,500 14,700

as publicity for the military and therefore due to the constant threats it faces and its need to be taken with a grain of salt. treatment by the armed forces as an “enemy”. Critical points of the Democratic The PSD is escalating the conflict, Security Policy aggravating the country’s humanitarian The PSD is not a strategy for strengthening crisis,14 and provoking migration, human and citizen security as a basic principle confinement, arbitrary arrests and murders. of the social foundation of law. It limits itself The civil population has also been turned to consolidating the state’s presence militarily, into a target by each side. without dealing with civil and institutional The military strategy has focused on consolidation. The central executive branch occupying and dislodging the FARC from sets priorities, ignoring local and regional areas considered their rear guard, without authorities and not concerning itself with taking into account the factors at play in safeguarding democratic processes and civil these areas, such as colonization, illegal liberties. crops, fragile ecosystems and the absence of Resolving the conflict and building institutions. On the contrary, for these areas reconciliation require a sustained there should be an integral policy for dealing strengthening of the state, not focusing on with drug trafficking, agrarian affairs and the quick, spectacular results. Territorial rapid destruction of the environment. control achieved in this way could be Aside from this, by mixing together drug artificial and short-lived; it could come at trafficking and insurgency in the same bag, the cost of the civil population’s security, the PSD generates confusion that may be at a

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high cost for the Colombian state. Defeat of social and economic situation. On the one drug trafficking may not mean defeat of the hand, the dynamics of the domestic conflict insurgency, and in turn, persecution of the were transformed when illegal armed groups insurgency does not guarantee reduced drug were linked to drug cultivation, processing trafficking, much less its elimination. and trafficking. On the other hand, a large The PSD grants strong primacy to the part of the agricultural system and the United States over the Colombian state’s peasant economy lack public and social autonomy in designing and developing this services, production infrastructure and policy, with overdependence on US communications, and is without access to ideology, technology and financing. This not credit and marketing for their products. In only affects sovereignty but also endangers this context producers have turned to coca the policy’s continuity should foreign aid be and poppy cultivation to earn and survive, withdrawn.15 even though this is against the law. Money By placing a military victory over the from drug trafficking has touched politics guerrillas at the top of the state’s priorities, and civil and military authorities at local, and making the war everyone’s affair, involving regional and national levels, giving rise to civilians in military intelligence tactics such as unceasing cases of corruption every day. surveillance, control and information — with The problem of coca cultivation, cocaine the aphorism that citizens cannot remain trafficking and the destination of funds derived neutral in the conflict — civilians are from this illegal business has become one of involved as if they were combatants with the main pivots of Colombia’s international commitments and obligations. This broaches relations. In fact, from before September 11, the possibility of abandoning or sacrificing 2001, after the end of the Cold War, everything the fundamental deliberative nature of indicated that drug trafficking would replace democracy. “It would appear necessary then communism as the source of evil. to remove temporarily from the liberal The problem lies in the growth of cocaine government its constituent instability to use in the United States, Europe and other ensure public order; it’s the old republican emerging markets (Asia and Latin America) and argument by which to preserve liberties one the huge amounts of money handled in this must restrict them, and to guarantee business, which involves, in addition to democratic stability one must suspend, cultivation and processing, an extensive chain, neutralize minimize or ignore human and from raw materials and chemical precursors to citizen rights.”16 banks and financial entities, where the money from this activity is presumably laundered. Coca cultivation and drug trafficking From the 1980s the United States has Coca cultivation, cocaine production and drug defined what would constitute the basis of its trafficking are today one of the central anti-drug policy. This policy puts emphasis on problems confronting society and the restricting supply (cultivation, production, Colombian state. Indeed, the country has processing, transporting and trafficking) and become the principal cocaine producer and not demand (retail distributing and use) — exporter in the world, and one of the largest firstly because this restricting takes place for heroin. outside its borders, and secondly because in The problem of illegal cultivation involves budget terms it appears to be more various aspects of the country’s political, economical. The policy would lead to fewer

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available psychoactive substances in hectares compared to the previous year’s consuming countries, higher prices for them, estimates, after having fumigated 136,000 and reduced purity — all of which should hectares in the same year. (See Graph 9) reduce consumption. This is like saying that in order to eradicate At the same time, the effect on one hectare of coca, 22.6 hectares must be producing countries would be “reduced sprayed, and to wipe out the area currently prices for illegal cultivation in the under plantation, about 1,988,800 hectares production areas, the decreased power of would need to be sprayed, which would traffickers, containment of the violence mean immeasurable social and environmental generated by drug trafficking in the most cost. sensitive sectors of the population linked to The figures and analysis of this report these crops, and reduced environmental demonstrate a few interesting phenomena. destruction generated by illegal plantations On the one hand, even though the in fragile, valuable areas.”17 cultivated area diminished, the number of The results of the anti-drug policy are not lots smaller than three hectares increased, consistent with the initial proposal, and although rising from 50% of the cultivated area to 69%. achieving the goal of reducing cultivated areas is On the other hand, the number of families getting closer, thanks to constant spraying, that linked to coca cultivation also increased of reducing the supply of cocaine in the world from one year to the next. In addition, market is still very far off. monitoring showed that coca cultivation has In the case of Colombia, the latest expanded and is found in 23 of the country’s UNODC18 report shows 80,000 hectares planted 32 departments. to coca for 2004, which according to this The anti-drug policy and fumigation are source means a reduction of only 6,000 criminalizing small peasant coca producers,

Graph 9. Coca Cultivation in Colombia, 1994-2004 (in hectares)

180,000 160,000 140,000 120,000 100,000 hectares 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 - 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Total in thousands 45,000 51,000 57,000 79,000 102,000 163,000 160,000 145,000 102,000 86,000 80,000

Sources: U.S. Department of State National Monitoring System – SIMSI, aided by UNODC

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leading to migration and environmental aid the counterinsurgency effort, with the damage. This pattern maintains the classic supposed collusion of the armed forces, until dynamics of Colombia’s colonization process, 1989, when the law, which allowed these whereby the peasant “civilizes” an area and forces, was revoked. During President then has to move to another, fleeing from Samper’s administration, Defense Minister persecution and cutting down more forests, Fernando Botero Zea decreed the creation of which then become pastures that sooner or the Rural Security Cooperatives (CONVIVIR, in later end up in the hands of the landowners. Spanish) which served as a legal umbrella Thus the war on drugs focuses on the organization for the Self-Defense Forces until weakest players, the peasant and indigenous they were declared illegal.20 population, without getting to the bottom of From the subsequent creation of the the complex network of the illegal drug United Self-Defence Forces in 1997 as a industry. federation of the different regional factions, These practices allowed for the re- the AUC has had the most growth in number structuring of criminal organizations, of combatants and the strongest and “organized Colombian drug criminals bloodiest impact ever on Colombian society. efficiently diversified production and It has reached the point where “today the processing of drugs, while the governments country is confirming that, after an offensive fought it with actions that had no serious involving the worst type of criminals, a effect on the illegal industry or the growing substantial part of the territory and daily power of domestic traffickers.”19 lives of millions of people, as well as the In conclusion, massive fumigation of politics, economy and local budgets, in illegal crops, after almost two decades and addition to an unknown amount of power more than 150,000 hectares, has up to now and influence in key institutions such as the shown major limitations as a mechanism for Congress, is in the hands of paramilitaries.”21 effective eradication. The effects on the Following 18 months of dialogue, on July environment and health are ominous. Drug 1, 2004, in Santa Fe de Ralito, formal cultivation is a social problem more than a negotiations were initiated between the legal problem. The anti-drug policy in use United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia and today with Plan Colombia presents a serious the government of President Álvaro Uribe weakness by centering its drug war on Vélez. The negotiations were preceded by an political and military organizations, announcement by the AUC of a supposed total overlooking the new characteristics of illegal cease-fire since December 1, 2002, and of the globalization, with ever-more organized Agreement of Santa Fe de Ralito, signed by cartels. The guerrillas are not at the core of the parties on July 15, 2003, establishing an the drug trafficking problem. understanding for reaching progressive, total demobilization of the group. The AUC is Negotiation between the National considered the illegal armed group with the Government and AUC paramilitaries most growth since 1998, and has a presence Paramilitary groups, organized under the name today in almost all the national territory of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, In the negotiations the paramilitaries emerged with the support and encouragement unceasingly insisted on recognition of the of the state, dating from the late 1960s. In political nature of their organization and their the 1980s civilian groups began operations to right to legal benefits, something that has

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been conceded to other political players in absent state. It was never our idea to build other negotiations. In particular, they hope to this goliath. We had to stand it up and avoid extradition to the United States for force it to walk out of physical necessity drug trafficking. This point of view has been and because God, in our consciences, told promoted by Uribe Vélez’s government in the us that this was the right road, that the Congress of the Republic and is on the verge country demanded this sacrifice, and that of being made into law. eventually better times would come, along These negotiations signify a quest for with the acknowledgement by the official the legitimacy of a Colombian state Colombia of “the other Colombia” that the discredited internationally for the supposed self-defense forces helped save and relations of state players with the AUC. In preserve from death, loss of liberty and the addition, with the PSD, the state’s decision Communist scourge.”22 for a definitive military confrontation with Negotiations with the paramilitaries faced the insurgency makes it unnecessary to various obstacles before they could get the activate the paramilitaries and opens the way support of Colombian society and the for their demobilization, at the same time endorsement of the international community. concentrating military efforts on a single The first obstacle concerned the inherent enemy, the guerrillas and the FARC. Finally, incoherency of the paramilitaries’ discourse. the paramilitaries’ power is so great now, with The promise of a ceasefire has been repeatedly military, economic and political control over broken and there is evidence that the vast regions of the country, that some social paramilitaries have continued murdering, sectors are encouraging their reintegration to extorting from and dislodging the civil society and the legalization of the properties population. As Alfredo Rangel stated, “to all of they acquired through terror and money from the above must be added the wars between extortion and drug trafficking. paramilitary groups, which haven’t ended, and The self-defense forces are now which have led to hundreds of deaths in the last demanding at the negotiation table the few months, an ongoing violation of the truce country’s acknowledgement of their work in the government has always demanded for containing the insurgency, and proclaimed that initiating and holding peace talks — without “the crimes of the guerrillas and the lack of the government having made any sort of public state presence for decades left civilians no warning to those groups who break the truce alternative over the last 22 years but to take and continue negotiating.”23 up arms and defend our lives, liberty, honor On the other hand, the Self-Defense and goods with whatever we had at hand, Forces have continued their criminal without military training or much less a activities, especially in relation to cocaine vocation to fight. However, very shortly we cultivation, processing and marketing. This discovered the invaluable solidarity of our fact has led the United States to view the Colombian people, who opened their arms negotiations with skepticism, as expressed by to us to join in the fight, and laid on our its ambassador, who stated, “I have a deeper shoulders a tremendous responsibility for concern … I’m not sure that the goal of the the security and social welfare of their self-defense forces is political, or that they families and themselves, constituting out of have a political program. They have only a nothing a “de facto state”, a state lacking narco-terrorism program and a single agenda: legality but not legitimacy, to replace the destruction.”24

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One very important obstacle is that of be analyzed against. While discussions are judging the crimes committed by the held about how to reincorporate into paramilitaries and providing reparations to society those who are accused of some of the victims. The paramilitary leaders have the worst crimes in the country’s recent defiantly warned that they will not spend a history (probably within a framework of single day in jail. The national government impunity), a major military campaign is being introduced a bill in 2003 called the “Penal waged in the south against the FARC, with Alternative Law,” which had to be quickly still unfore-seeable results in terms of a retracted because it sanctified absolute solution to the conflict. Nonetheless, the impunity, violating international agreements fact is that the humanitarian crisis is getting and the very laws of Colombia. To date it is worse, and even though official statistics not known how the government will deal show reduced migration numbers, other with prosecuting the authors of crimes numbers demonstrate an intensified, against humanity or if it can grant amnesties worsening confrontation. and pardons for crimes classified as common The increased number of families and crimes under penal law. geographic expansion of illegal crops, in spite of the reduced area under cultivation, Some Conclusions along with deteriorating social indicators, By making counter-insurgency a priority, the are evidence of not only the social crisis anti-drug and anti-terrorist fight model based facing Colombia, but also the failure of the on coinciding interests of the US and economic model in effect since the start of Colombian governments could mean the the 1990s. strengthening of an excluding, authoritarian Today the role of the international political regime linked to illegal mafia-type community and international cooperation is activities with solid local bases in regions of essential in helping Colombia resolve its Colombia. dilemma. It could follow in the footsteps of The long-term perspectives for success of the US, which has, especially since 1998 and this strategy giving military priority to solving more actively since 2002, supported a the Colombian armed conflict, as set forth by solution to the military conflict involving the Democratic Security Policy of President modernizing and operationalizing the armed Uribe Vélez, are not fully clear. The complex, forces — a solution set in the framework of deep-rooted interrelationship between the counterinsurgency and the war on drugs. different illegal armed players and the drug Currently this cooperation is bolstering the trade gives them enormous economic power war diplomacy crusade that identifies and tremendous capacity for long-term President Uribe Vélez with the war on resistance. On the other hand, it is not easy terrorism by President Bush’s government. for the government to keep up a military But international cooperation is also operation of this magnitude for very long. advanced by universal ethical values that Anyway, it has only been the Plan Colombia requires the continuation of aid for the contribution (financed by the U.S. growing humanitarian crisis and efforts in government) that has made it possible to set support of a political solution to the up and maintain this operation up to now. conflict, even at the risk of going against This is the backdrop to negotiations with the current Colombian government. In the AUC and against which Plan Patriot should particular, it should aim at strengthening

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the different organized groups in civil generate sustainable development based on a society. culture of peace, and a third is to promote European cooperation faces a delicate participative, pluralistic democratic paradox. On the one hand, it supports processes. political negotiation, but the Uribe Attention must still be paid to the government is ruling that out. On the other human rights situation, and a priority task hand, it pushes for multilateral commercial will be to maintain pressure on the negotiation with the Andean Community, just Colombian government to abide by and when this regional block is facing problems. implement the 27 recommendations in the In order for the idea of a negotiated reports of the United Nations High solution to succeed, the international Commissioner for Human Rights. community must contribute to making it a European Union cooperation must be serious process, with clear objectives. Its careful to avoid becoming the social goal must be the end of hostilities and component of the Democratic Security reincorporation of combatants into civil life. Policy, especially with respect to the peace This means support for a negotiation agenda laboratories. The Uribe Vélez with ample participation. administration, in order to meet its The nature of the Colombian conflict commitment of contributing its share of requires making an effort to support and funds, has taken out a US $30 million loan strengthen local and regional social from the World Bank for a peace and processes aimed at fostering participation, development program for developing these compromise and institutional strengthening in peace laboratories. However, the the midst of this conflict. The purpose government’s plan does not fully comply would be to generate political, cultural, with the strategy formulated by the EU for social and economic changes capable of supporting peace in Colombia.25 fomenting coexistence and sustainable Finally, it is very important that development. international civil society entities set up The idea is to support initiatives from civil some sort of system for monitoring and society groups and organizations with various reflecting on the Colombian situation, as purposes, one being to articulate, harmonize their contribution to the dialogue and to and concretize efforts among public, private construction of an agenda for resolving the and communal sectors for building collective Colombian conflict. regional projects. A second purpose is to

Notes

1 Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2002-2006, “Hacia un 3 The Plan Patriot, Codhes informa, Boletín Estado Comunitario,” Presidency of the Republic, informativo de la Consultoría para los Derechos National Planning Department, Bogotá, 2002. Humanos y el Desplazamiento, No 50, Bogotá, August 31, 2004. 2 Operation Marquetalia was an operation launched by the Colombian army in 1964, where peasant 4 Presidency of the Republic, National Planning guerrillas of liberal party origin and incipient Department. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2002-2006, Communist Party influence were able to break “Hacia un Estado Comunitario,” Bogotá, 2002. Page through the net and flee with their families and 31. belongings. This event became the founding myth of 5 TALK by Álvaro Uribe Vélez, President of the the FARC.

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Republic of Colombia, in the forum “Is the War Fuerzas Especiales de Asalto Urbanas (Group of being Won?”, Bogotá, July 28, 2004. Special Urban Assault Forces).

6 Presidency of the Republic, National Planning 14 For more examples, consult the periodic bulletins of Department, Op. Cit. P. 31. CODHES at www.codhes.org.co.

7 Democratic manifesto of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, 15 El Tiempo, September 25, 2004, p 2. This is a presidential candidate of Colombia, 2002 – 2006, medium-term hypothesis, given that the U.S. Points 38 and 39. http//www.dnp.gov.co/03_PROD/ Congress approved an aid package of US $580 CONPES/Manifiesto_Democrático.htm#5 million for 2005.

8 Democratic Manifesto de Álvaro Uribe Vélez, 16 URIBE DE HINCAPIE, Maria Teresa. “El Republicanismo presidential candidate of Colombia, 2002 – 2006. Op. Patriótico. Reelección: el embrujo continúa. Segundo Cit. Point 33. año de Gobierno de Álvaro Uribe Vélez.” Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y 9 Decree 1838 of August 11, 2002, establishing the Desarrollo, September 2004, P 15. “state of domestic upheaval.” 17 TOKATLIAN, Juan Gabriel. Globalización, Narcotráfico 10 The most frequent complaint of arbitrary action y Violencia. Siete ensayos sobre Colombia. Editorial with respect to mass arrests is that they were Norma, Bogotá, 2000. Page 94. carried out without any prior court order or evidence. On occasions the arrest warrants are 18 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AGAINST DRUGS AND CRIME. written out during or after the arrest, and Colombia. Coca Cultivation Monitoring in 2004. June, arrests are made based on the indications of 2005. masked men/women or the testimony of reformed 19 TOKATLIAN, Juan Gabriel. Op. Cit. P 112 guerrilla fighters or members of the informant network. The most recent and most scandalous case 20 The department where the largest number of is that of sociologist Alejandro Correa de Andreis, CONVIVIR was promoted was Antioquia, where the assassinated last September 17, after having been governor at that time was the current President of detained for a month for supposed ties with the the Republic Álvaro Uribe Vélez. guerrillas. Everything points to this accusation as 21 having cost him his life. SIERRA, Alvaro, El Tiempo, September 25, 2004, Page 11. 11 Decree 2002 issued on September 10, 2002, 22 dictating public order control measures and defining SPEECH by the Chief of Staff of the AUC, Commander rehabilitation and consolidation areas. Salvatore Mancuso, at the official opening of negotiations between the national government and 12 Legislative Act No 2 of December 18, 2002. The most the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. controversial points of this statute were: registering 23 of the population, citizen arrests through RANGEL, Alfredo, El Tiempo, November 7, 2003. administrative channels (without prior court 24 INTERVIEW with Mr. William Wood, Ambassador of the orders), granting of police duties to the armed United States of America in Colombia. Cambio forces, and violation of the right of impunity Magazine, June 28, 2004 (interception of communications, violation of correspondence). 25 Conpes Document No. 3278. http//www.dnp.gov.co/ archivosWeb/conpes/3278.pdf 13 In Graph 3, “afeaur” stands for Agrupación de

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