Friday, January 15, 2010

Part II

Department of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 229, 234, 235, et al. Positive Train Control Systems; Final Rule

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION • Hand Delivery: Room W12–140 on accomplished by December 31, 2015. the Ground level of the West Building, This final rule intends to provide the Federal Railroad Administration 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., necessary Federal oversight, guidance, Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 and assistance toward successful 49 CFR Parts 229, 234, 235, and 236 p.m. Monday through Friday, except completion of that congressional [Docket No. FRA–2008–0132, Notice No. 3] Federal holidays. requirement. This final rule also Instructions: All submissions must necessitates or results in some minimal RIN 2130–AC03 include the agency name and docket revision or amendment to parts 229, number or Regulatory Identification 234, and 235, as well as previously Positive Train Control Systems Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. Note existing subparts A through H of part AGENCY: Federal Railroad that all petitions received will be posted 236. without change to http:// Administration (FRA), Department of Table of Contents for Supplementary www.regulations.gov including any Transportation (DOT). Information ACTION: Final rule; request for comment personal information. Please see the on specific issues. Privacy Act heading in the I. Introduction SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of II. Background SUMMARY: FRA is issuing regulations this document for Privacy Act A. The Need for Positive Train Control implementing a requirement of the Rail information related to any submitted Technology petitions, comments, or materials. B. Earlier Efforts To Encourage Voluntary Safety Improvement Act of 2008 that PTC Implementation defines criteria for certain passenger and Docket: For access to the docket to C. Technology Advances Under Subpart H freight rail lines requiring the read background documents or III. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 implementation of positive train control comments received, go to http:// IV. Public Participation (PTC) systems. This final rule includes www.regulations.gov or to Room W12– A. RSAC Process required functionalities of PTC system 140 on the Ground level of the West B. Public Hearing and Comments Filed technology and the means by which Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., V. Overview: The Proposed Rule, Comments, PTC systems will be certified. This final Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 and Resolution of Comments rule also describes the contents of the p.m. Monday through Friday, except VI. Seeking Further Comments Federal holidays. VII. Section-by-Section Analysis PTC implementation plans required by VIII. Regulatory Impact and Notices the statute and contains the process for FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT submission of those plans for review Thomas McFarlin, Office of Safety Regulatory Policies and Procedures and approval by FRA. These regulations Assurance and Compliance, Staff B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive could also be voluntarily complied with Director, Signal & Train Control Order 13272 by entities not mandated to install PTC Division, Federal Railroad C. Paperwork Reduction Act systems. This is a final rule; however, Administration, Mail Stop 25, West D. Federalism Implications FRA has identified specific provisions Building 3rd Floor, Room W35–332, E. Environmental Impact for which we are considering making 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 G. Energy Impact changes to the final rule, if warranted by Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202– H. Privacy Act the public comments received. We 493–6203); or Jason Schlosberg, Trial IX. The Rule expect to publish our response to those Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, RCC– comments, including any possible 10, Mail Stop 10, West Building 3rd I. Introduction changes to the rule made as a result of Floor, Room W31–217, 1200 New Jersey This final rule provides new them, as soon as possible following the Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590 performance standards for the end of the comment period. However, (telephone: 202–493–6032). implementation and operation of PTC the limited areas of this rule open for SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FRA is systems as mandated by the RSIA08 and additional comment do not affect the issuing this final rule to provide as otherwise voluntarily adopted. This requirement for railroads to prepare and regulatory guidance and performance final rule also details the process and submit plans in accordance with the standards for the development, testing, identifies the documents that railroads deadlines established in this final rule. implementation, and use of Positive and operators of passenger trains are to DATES: This final rule is effective March Train Control (PTC) systems for utilize and incorporate in their PTC 16, 2010. Petitions for reconsideration railroads mandated by the Rail Safety implementation plans required by the must be received on or before March 16, Improvement Act of 2008 § 104, Public RSIA08. The final rule also details the 2010. Comments must be received on or Law 110–432, 122 Stat. 4854 (Oct. 16, process and procedure for obtaining before February 16, 2010. 2008) (codified at 9 U.S.C. 20157) FRA approval of such plans. ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration (hereinafter ‘‘RSIA08’’), to implement While developing this final rule, FRA and comments: Any petitions for PTC systems. These regulations may applied the performance-based reconsideration or comments related to also be voluntarily complied with by principles embodied in existing subpart Docket No. FRA–2008–0132, may be entities not mandated to install PTC in H of part 236 to identify and remedy submitted by any of the following lieu of the requirements contained in any weaknesses discovered in the methods: subpart H of part 236. The final rule subpart H regulatory approach, while • Web site: The Federal eRulemaking establishes requirements for PTC system exploiting lessons learned from Portal, http://www.regulations.gov. standard design and functionality, the products developed under subpart H. Follow the Web site’s online associated submissions for FRA PTC FRA has continued to make instructions for submitting comments. system approval and certification, performance-based safety decisions • Fax: 202–493–2251. requirements for training, and required while supporting railroads in their • Mail: Docket Management Facility, risk-based criteria. The RSIA08 development and implementation of U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 mandates that widespread PTC system technologies. Development New Jersey Avenue, SE., W12–140, implementation of PTC across a major of this final rule was enhanced with the Washington, DC 20590. portion of the U.S. rail industry be participation of the Railroad Safety

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Advisory Committee (RSAC), which operating rules designed to prevent (ATCS). With broad participation by tasked a PTC Working Group to provide them. suppliers, railroads, and FRA, detailed advice regarding development of As early as 1970, following its specifications were developed for a implementing regulations for PTC investigation of the August 20, 1969, multi-level ‘‘open’’ architecture that systems and their deployment that are head-on collision of two Penn Central would permit participation by many required under the RSIA08. The PTC Commuter trains near Darien, suppliers while ensuring that systems Working Group made a number of Connecticut, in which 4 people were deployed on various railroads would consensus recommendations, which killed and 45 people were injured, the work in harmony as trains crossed were identified and included in the National Transportation Safety Board corporate boundaries. ATCS was proposed rule, and has contributed (NTSB) asked FRA to study the intended to serve a variety of business further refinements in the form of feasibility of requiring a form of purposes, in addition to enhancing the recommendations for resolution of the automatic train control system to protect safety of train operations. Pilot versions public comments. The preamble against train operator error and prevent of ATCS and a similar system known as discusses the statutory background, the train collisions. Following the Darien Advanced Railroad Electronic Systems regulatory background, the RSAC accident, the NTSB continued to (ARES) were tested relatively proceedings, the alternatives considered investigate one railroad accident after successfully, but the systems were never and the rationale for the options another caused by human error. During deployed on a wide scale primarily due selected, the proceedings to date, as the next two decades, the NTSB issued to cost. However, sub-elements of these well as the comments and conclusions a number of safety recommendations systems were employed for various on general issues. Other comments and asking for train control measures. purposes, particularly for replacement resolutions are discussed within the Following its investigation of the May 7, of pole lines associated with signal corresponding section-by-section 1986, rear-end collision involving a systems. analysis. Boston and Maine Corporation Collisions, derailments, and commuter train and a Consolidated Rail incursions into work zones used by II. Background Corporation (Conrail) freight train in roadway workers continued as a result A. The Need for Positive Train Control which 153 people were injured, the of the absence of effective enforcement Technology NTSB recommended that FRA systems designed to compensate for the promulgate standards to require the effects of fatigue and other human Since the early 1920s, systems have installation and operation of a train factors. Renewed emphasis on rules been in use that can intervene in train control system that would provide for compliance and federal regulatory operations by warning crews or causing positive train separation. NTSB initiatives, including rules for the trains to stop if they are not being Recommendation R–87–16 (May 19, control of alcohol and drug use in operated safely because of inattention, 1987), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/ railroad operations, operational testing misinterpretation of wayside signal Recs/letters/1987/R87_16.pdf. When the and inspection programs designed to indications, or incapacitation of the NTSB first established its Most Wanted verify railroad rules compliance, crew. Pursuant to orders of the Interstate List of Transportation Safety requirements for qualification and Commerce Commission (ICC)—whose Improvements in 1990, the issue of certification of locomotive engineers, safety regulatory activities were later Positive Train Separation was among and negotiated rules for roadway worker transferred to FRA when it was the improvements listed, and it protection, led to substantial reductions established in 1967—cab signal systems, remained on the list until just after in risk. However, the lack of an effective automatic train control, and automatic enactment of the RSIA08. Original collision avoidance system allowed the train stop systems were deployed on a ‘‘Most Wanted’’ list of Transportation continued occurrence of accidents, significant portion of the national rail Safety Improvements, as adopted some involving tragic losses of life, system to supplement and enforce the September 1990, available at http:// serious injury, and significant property indications of wayside signals and www.ntsb.gov/Recs/mostwanted/ damage. operating speed limitations. However, original_list.htm. The NTSB continues B. Earlier Efforts To Encourage these systems were expensive to install to follow the progress of the Voluntary PTC Implementation and maintain, and with the decline of technology’s implementation closely intercity passenger service following the and participated through staff in the As the NTSB continued to highlight Second World War, the ICC and the most recent PTC Working Group the opportunities for accident industry allowed many of these systems deliberations. prevention associated with emerging to be discontinued. During this period, Meanwhile, enactment of the Staggers train control technology through its railroads were heavily regulated with Rail Act of 1980 signaled a shift in investigations and findings, Congress respect to rates and service public policy that permitted the showed increasing interest, mandating responsibilities. The development of the railroads to shed unprofitable lines, three separate reports over the period of Interstate Highway System and other largely replace published ‘‘tariffs’’ with a decade. In 1994, FRA reported to factors led to reductions in the railroads’ appropriately priced contract rates, and Congress on this problem, calling for revenues without regulatory relief, generally respond to marketplace implementation of an action plan to leading to bankruptcies, railroad realities, which increasingly demanded deploy PTC systems (Report to Congress mergers, and eventual abandonment of flexible service options responsive to on Railroad Communications and Train many rail lines. Consequently, railroads customer needs. The advent of Control (July 1994) (hereinafter ‘‘1994 focused on fiscal survival, and microprocessor-based electronic control Report’’)). The 1994 Report forecasted investments in expensive relay-based systems and digital data radio substantial benefits of advanced train train control technology were technology during the mid-1980s led the control technology in supporting a economically out of reach. The removal freight railroad industry, through the variety of business and safety purposes, of these train control systems, which Association of American Railroads but noted that an immediate regulatory had never been pervasively installed, (AAR) and the Railway Association of mandate for PTC could not be justified permitted train collisions to continue, Canada, to explore the development of based upon normal cost-benefit notwithstanding enforcement of railroad Advanced Train Control Systems principles relying on direct safety

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benefits. The report outlined an timely or more secure manner (e.g., Corporation (Amtrak), the AAR, the aggressive Action Plan implementing a compromised bridge integrity, wayside State of Illinois, and the Union Pacific public-private sector partnership to detector data); and provide for future Railroad Company (UP), FRA created explore technology potential, deploy capability by generating data for transfer the North American Joint Positive Train systems for demonstration, and to highway users to enhance warning at Control (NAJPTC) Program, which set structure a regulatory framework to highway-rail grade crossings. The PTC out to describe a single standardized support emerging PTC initiatives. Working Group stressed that efforts to open source PTC architecture and Following through on the 1994 enhance highway-rail grade crossing system. UP’s line between Springfield Report, FRA committed approximately safety must recognize the train’s and Mazonia, Illinois was selected for $40 million through the Next necessary right of way at grade crossings initial installation of a train control Generation High-Speed Rail Program and that it is important that warning system to support Amtrak operations up and the Research and Development systems employed at highway-rail grade to 110 miles per hour, and the system Program to support development, crossings be highly reliable and ‘‘fail- was installed and tested on portions of testing, and deployment of PTC safe’’ in their design. that line. Although the system did not prototype systems in the Pacific As the PTC Working Group’s work prove viable as then conceived, the Northwest, Michigan, Illinois, Alaska, continued, other collaborative efforts, project hastened the development of and on some Eastern railroads. FRA also including development of Passenger PTC technology that was subsequently initiated a comprehensive effort to Equipment Safety Standards (including employed in other projects. Promised structure an appropriate regulatory private standards through the American standards for interoperability of PTC framework for facilitating voluntary Public Transit Association), Passenger systems also proved elusive. implementation of PTC and for Train Emergency Preparedness rules, In addition to financially supporting evaluating future safety needs and and proposals for improving locomotive the NAJPTC Program, FRA continued to opportunities. crashworthiness (including improved work with the rail carriers, rail labor, In September of 1997, FRA asked the fuel tank standards) have targeted and suppliers on regulatory reforms to RSAC to address the issue of PTC. The reduction in collision and derailment facilitate voluntary PTC RSAC accepted three tasks: Standards consequences. implementation. The regulatory reform for New Train Control Systems (Task In 2003, in light of technological effort culminated when FRA issued a 1997–06), Positive Train Control advances and potential increased cost final rule on March 7, 2005, establishing Systems-Implementation Issues (Task and system savings related to prioritized a technology neutral safety-based 1997–05), and Positive Train Control deployment of PTC systems, the performance standard for processor- Systems-Technologies, Definitions, and Appropriations Committees of Congress based signal and train control systems. Capabilities (Task 1997–04). The PTC requested that FRA update the costs and This new regulation, codified as subpart Working Group was established, benefits for the deployment of PTC and H to part 236, was carefully crafted to comprised of representatives of labor related systems. As requested, FRA encourage the voluntary organizations, suppliers, passenger and carried out a detailed analysis that was implementation and operation of freight railroads, other federal agencies, filed in August of 2004, Benefits and processor-based signal and train control and interested state departments of Costs of Positive Train Control (Report systems without impairing transportation. The PTC Working Group in Response to Committees on technological development. 70 FR was supported by FRA counsel and Appropriations, August 2004) (‘‘2004 11,052 (Mar. 7, 2005). staff, analysts from the Volpe National Report’’), which indicated that under FRA intended that final rule— Transportation Systems Center (Volpe one set of highly controversial developed through the RSAC process in Center), and advisors from the NTSB assumptions, substantial public benefits close cooperation with rail management, staff. would likely flow from the installation rail labor, and suppliers—to further In 1999, the PTC Working Group of PTC systems on the railroad system. facilitate individual railroad efforts to provided to the Federal Railroad Further, the total amount of these voluntarily develop and deploy cost Administrator a consensus report benefits was subject to considerable effective PTC technologies that would (Report of the Railroad Safety Advisory controversy. While many of the other make system-wide deployment more Committee to the Federal Railroad findings of the 2004 Report were economically viable. It also appeared Administrator, Implementation of disputed, there were no data submitted very possible that major railroads would Positive Train Control Systems (August to challenge the 2004 Report finding elect to make voluntary investments in 1999) (hereinafter ‘‘1999 Report’’)) with that reaffirmed earlier conclusions that PTC to enhance safety, improve service an indication that it would be the safety benefits of PTC systems were quality, and foster efficiency (e.g., better continuing its efforts. The 1999 Report relatively small in comparison to the asset utilization, reduced fuel use defined the PTC core functions to large capital and maintenance costs. through train pacing). include: prevention of train-to-train Accordingly, FRA continued to believe collisions (positive train separation); that an immediate regulatory mandate C. Technology Advances Under enforcement of speed restrictions, for widespread PTC implementation Subpart H including civil engineering restrictions could not be justified based upon While FRA and RSAC worked to (curves, bridges, etc.) and temporary traditional cost-benefit principles develop consensus on the regulations slow orders; and protection for roadway relying on direct railroad safety benefits. that would become subpart H, the workers and their equipment operating Despite the economic infeasibility of railroads continued with PTC prototype within their limits of authority. The PTC PTC based on safety benefits alone, as development. The technology neutral, Working Group identified additional outlined in the 1994, 1999, and 2004 performance-based regulatory process safety functions that might be included Reports, FRA continued with regulatory established by subpart H proved to be in some PTC architectures: provide and other efforts to facilitate and very successful in facilitating the warning of on-track equipment encourage the voluntary installation of development of other PTC operating outside their limits of PTC systems. As part of the High-Speed implementation approaches. Although authority; receive and act upon hazard Rail Initiative, and in conjunction with the railroads prototype development information, when available, in a more the National Railroad Passenger efforts were generally technically

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successful and offered significant system versions. The introduction of a Safety Plan approval in December of improvements in safety, costs of forward-compatible technology implies 2006, Amtrak demonstrated its ability to nationwide deployment continued to be that older devices can partly understand turn on revenue-quality PTC systems on untenable in the judgment of those and provide data generated or used by its own railroad in support of high- determining allocation of railroad new devices or systems. The concept speed rail. Beginning in the early 1990s, capital. Information gained from can be applied to electrical interfaces, Amtrak developed plans for enhanced prototype efforts did little to reduce the telecommunication signals, data high-speed service on the Northeast estimated costs for widespread communication protocols, file formats, Corridor (NEC), which included implementation of the core PTC safety and computer programming languages. electrification and other improvements functions on the nation’s railroads. A standard supports forward- between New Haven and Boston and Working under subpart H, the BNSF compatibility if older product versions introduction of the Acela trainsets as the Railway Company (BNSF), CSX can receive, read, view, play, execute, or premium service from Washington to Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), the Norfolk transmit data to the new standard. In the New York and New York to Boston. In Southern Corporation (NS), and UP case of wayside devices, they are said to connection with these improvements, undertook more aggressive design and be forward-compatible if they can which support train speeds up to 150 implementation work. The new subpart appropriately communicate and interact miles per hour, Amtrak undertook to H regulatory approach also made it with a PTC system when later installed. install the Advanced Civil Speed feasible for smaller railroads, such as A wayside device might serve the Enforcement System (ACSES) as a the Alaska Railroad and the Ohio function of providing only information supplement to existing cab signals and Central Railroad, to begin voluntary or providing information and accepting automatic train control (speed control). design and implementation work on commands from a new system. Together, these systems deliver PTC PTC systems that best suited their In addition to scheduling the core functionalities. In support of this needs. FRA provided, and continues to installation of the ETMS I configuration effort, FRA issued an order for the provide, technical assistance and as capital funding became available, installation of the system, which guidance regarding regulatory BNSF voluntarily undertook the design required all passenger and freight compliance to enable the railroads to and testing of complementary versions operators in the New Haven-Boston more effectively design, install, and test of ETMS that would support BNSF segment to equip their locomotives with their respective systems. operations on more complex track ACSES. See 63 FR 39,343 (July 22, In December 2006, FRA approved the configurations, at higher allowable train 1998). ACSES was installed between initial version of the Electronic Train speeds, and with additional types of rail 2000 and 2002, and has functioned Management System (ETMS®) product traffic. Meanwhile, CSXT was in the successfully between New Haven and for deployment on 35 of BNSF’s process of redesigning and relocating Boston, and on selected high-speed subdivisions (‘‘ETMS I Configuration’’) the test bed for its Communications segments between Washington and New comprising single track territory that Based Train Management (CBTM) York, for a number of years. was either non-signaled or equipped system, which it has tested for several Amtrak voluntarily began with traffic control systems. ETMS is a years, and UP and NS were working on development of an architecturally registered trademark of Wabtec Railway similar systems using vital onboard different PTC system, the Incremental Electronics. BNSF Railway has also processing. Train Control System (ITCS), for referred to its application of this As congressional consideration of installation on its Michigan Line. technology as ‘‘ETMS.’’ legislation that resulted in the RSIA08 Amtrak developed and installed ITCS In a separate proceeding, FRA agreed commenced, all four major railroads had under waivers from specific sections of that ETMS could be installed in lieu of settled on the core technology 49 CFR part 236, subparts A through G, restoring a block signal system on a line developed for them by Wabtec Railway granted by FRA. ITCS was applied to for which discontinuance had been Electronics (‘‘Wabtec’’). As the tenant NS locomotives as well as authorized followed by a significant legislation progressed, the railroads and Amtrak locomotives traversing the increase in traffic. During the same Wabtec worked toward greater route. Highway-rail grade crossings on period, BNSF successfully demonstrated commonality in the basic functioning of the route were fitted with ITCS units to a Switch Point Monitoring System the onboard system with a view toward pre-start the warning systems for high- (SPMS)—a system that contains devices interoperability. PTC applications of speed trains and to monitor crossing attached to switches that electronically ETMS include the non-vital PTC warning system health in real time. The report the position of the switches to the systems of BNSF’s ETMS I and ETMS II, ITCS was tested extensively in the field railroad’s central dispatching office and CSXT’s CBTM, UP’s Vital Train for safety and reliability, and it was to the crew of an approaching train— Management System (VTMS), and NS’s placed in revenue service in 2001. As and a Track Integrity Warning System Optimized Train Control (OTC). Further experience was gained, FRA authorized (TIWS)—a system that also work is being undertaken by BNSF to increases in speed to 95 miles per hour; electronically reports to the railroad’s advance the capability of ETMS by and FRA is presently awaiting final central dispatching office and to the integrating Amtrak operations (ETMS results of an independent assessment of crew of an approaching train if there are III). For a description of system verification and validation for the any breaks in the rail that might lead to enhancements planned by BNSF as per system with a view toward authorizing derailments or the condition of track the Product Safety Plan filed in operations at the design speed of 110 occupancy. FRA believes both of these accordance with subpart H, see FRA miles per hour. technologies help to reduce risk in non- Docket No. 2006–23687, Document Despite these successes, the signaled territory and are forward- 0017, at pp. 40–43. widespread deployment of these various compatible for use with existing and While the freight railroads’ efforts for train control systems, particularly on new PTC systems. To be forward- developing and installing PTC systems the general freight system, remained compatible, not to be confused with the progressed over a relatively long period very much constrained by prohibitive similar concept of extensibility, a of time, starting with demonstrations of capital costs. While the railroads were system must be able to gracefully ATCS and ARES in the late 1980s and committed to installing these new provide input intended for use in later culminating in the initial ETMS Product systems to enhance the safety afforded

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to the public and their employees, the early morning hours of January 6, 2005, warranted mandatory and accelerated railroads’ actual widespread when a northbound NS freight train, installation and operation of PTC implementation remained forestalled operating within non-signaled (dark) systems. due to an inability to generate sufficient territory, encountered an improperly As immediately relevant to this funding for these new projects in excess lined switch that diverted the train from rulemaking, the RSIA08 requires the of the capital expenditures necessary to the main line onto an industry track, installation and operation of PTC cover the ongoing operating and where it struck the locomotive of an systems on all rail main lines, meaning maintenance costs. Accordingly, the unoccupied, parked train. The collision all intercity and commuter lines—with railroads continued to plan very slow derailed both locomotives and 16 of the limited exceptions entrusted to FRA— deployments of PTC system 42 freight cars of the moving train, as and on freight-only rail lines when they technologies. well as the locomotive and 1 of the 2 are part of a Class I railroad system, cars of the parked train. Among the III. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of carrying at least 5 million gross tons of derailed cars from the moving train 2008 freight annually, and carrying any were three tank cars containing amount of poison- or toxic-by-inhalation On May 1, 2007, H.R. 2095 was chlorine, one of which was breached, (PIH or TIH) materials. While the statute introduced in the House of releasing about 60 tons of chlorine gas. vests certain responsibilities with the Representatives, which would, among The train engineer and eight other Secretary of the U.S. Department of other things, mandate the people died as a result of chlorine gas Transportation, the Secretary has since implementation and use of PTC inhalation. About 554 people delegated those responsibilities to the systems. The bill passed the House, as complaining of respiratory difficulties FRA Administrator. See 49 CFR amended, on October 17, 2007. The bill were taken to local hospitals. Of these, 1.49(oo); 74 FR 26,981 (June 5, 2009); was then amended and passed by the 75 were admitted for treatment. Because see also 49 U.S.C. 103(g). Senate on August 1, 2008. While the bill of the chlorine release, about 5,400 In the RSIA08, Congress established was awaiting final passage, the FRA people within a 1-mile radius of the very aggressive dates for PTC system Administrator testified before Congress derailment site were evacuated for build-out completion. Each subject that ‘‘FRA is a strong supporter of PTC almost 2 weeks. railroad is required to submit to FRA by technology and is an active advocate for The Chatsworth train collision April 16, 2010, a PTC Implementation its continued development and occurred on the afternoon of September Plan (PTCIP) indicating where and how deployment.’’ Senate Commerce 12, 2008, when a UP freight train and it intends to install PTC systems by Committee Briefing on Metrolink a Metrolink commuter train collided December 31, 2015. Accident, 110th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2008) head-on on a single main track In light of the timetable instituted by (written statement of Federal Railroad equipped with a Traffic Control System Congress, and to better support railroads Administrator Joseph H. Boardman), (TCS) in the Chatsworth district of Los with their installation while available at http://www.fra.dot.gov/ Angeles, California. Although NTSB has maintaining safety, FRA decided that it downloads/PubAffairs/09–23–08Final not yet released its final report, is appropriate for mandatory PTC StatementFRAAdministrator evidence summarized at the NTSB’s _ _ _ systems to be reviewed by FRA PTC Sen Boxer Meeting.pdf. public hearing suggested that the differently than the regulatory approval On September 24, 2008, the House Metrolink passenger train was being process provided under subpart H. FRA concurred with the Senate amendment operated on the main track past an believes that it is important to develop and added another amendment absolute signal at a control point a process more suited specifically for pursuant to H. Res. 1492. When displaying a stop indication, when it PTC systems that would better facilitate considering the House’s amendment, trailed through a power-operated switch railroad reuse of safety documentation various Senators made statements lined against its movement, and entered and simplify the process of showing that referencing certain train accidents that a section of single track where the the installation of the intended PTC were believed to be PTC-preventable. opposing UP freight train was operating system did not degrade safety. FRA also For instance, Senator Lautenberg (NJ) on a permissive signal indication. The believes that subpart H does not clearly took notice of the collision at UP train was lined to enter the siding at Graniteville, South Carolina, in 2005, address the statutory mandates and that the control point, after which the switch such lack of clarity would complicate and Senators Lautenberg, Hutchinson would have been lined for the Metrolink (TX), Boxer (CA), Levin (MI), and Carper railroad efforts to comply with the new train to proceed. As a consequence of statutory requirements. Accordingly, (DE) took notice of an accident at the accident, 25 people died and over Chatsworth, California, on September FRA hereby amends part 236 by 130 more were seriously injured. modifying existing subpart H and 12, 2008. According to Senator Levin, Prior to the accidents in Graniteville adding a new subpart I. federal investigators have said that a and Chatsworth, the railroads’ slow collision warning system could have incremental deployment of PTC IV. Public Participation prevented that crash and the subject technologies—while not uniformly A. RSAC Process legislation would require that new agreed upon by the railroads, FRA, and technology to prevent crashes be NTSB—was generally deemed In March 1996, FRA established the installed in high risk tracks. Senators acceptable by them in view of the RSAC, which provides a forum for Carper and Boxer made similar tremendous costs involved. Partially as collaborative rulemaking and program statements, indicating that PTC systems a consequence and severity of these very development. The RSAC includes are designed to prevent train public accidents, coupled with a series representatives from all of the agency’s derailments and collisions, like the one of other less publicized accidents, major stakeholder groups, including in Chatsworth. 154 Cong. Rec. S10283– Congress passed the RSIA08 and it was railroads, labor organizations, suppliers S10290 (2008). Ultimately, on October signed into law by the president on and manufacturers, other government 1, 2008, the Senate concurred with the October 16, 2008, marking a public agencies, and other interested parties. House amendment. policy decision that, despite the When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to The Graniteville accident referenced implementation costs, railroad the RSAC, and after consideration and by Senator Lautenberg occurred in the employee and general public safety debate, the RSAC may accept or reject

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the task. If accepted, the RSAC authority to resolve the issue, National Railroad Passenger Corporation establishes a working group comprised attempting to reconcile as many of the (Amtrak) of persons that possess the appropriate divergent positions as possible through National Transportation Safety Board expertise and representation of interests traditional rulemaking proceedings. (NTSB)* Railway Supply Institute (RSI) to develop recommendations to FRA for On December 10, 2008, the RSAC Transport Canada* action on the task. These accepted a task (No. 08–04) entitled Tourist Railway Association Inc. recommendations are developed by ‘‘Implementation of Positive Train United Transportation Union (UTU) consensus. The working group may Control Systems.’’ The purpose of this —————— establish one or more task forces or task was defined as follows: ‘‘To provide *Indicates associate (non-voting) member. other subgroups to develop facts and advice regarding development of From January to April 2009, FRA met options on a particular aspect of a given implementing regulations for Positive with the entire PTC Working Group 5 task. The task force, or other subgroup, Train Control (PTC) systems and their times over the course of 12 days. During reports to the working group. If the deployment under the Rail Safety those meetings, in order to efficiently working group comes to consensus on Improvement Act of 2008.’’ The task accomplish the tasks assigned to it, the recommendations for action, the called for the RSAC PTC Working Group PTC Working Group empowered three package is presented to the RSAC for a to perform the following: • task forces to work concurrently. These vote. If the proposal is accepted by a Review the mandates and objectives task forces were the passenger, short simple majority of the RSAC, the of the Act related to deployment of PTC line and regional railroad, and the radio proposal is formally recommended to systems; • and communications task forces. Each FRA. FRA then determines what action Help to describe the specific discussed issues specific to its to take on the recommendation. Because functional attributes of systems meeting particular interests and needs and FRA staff has played an active role at the statutory purposes in light of produced proposed rule language for the the working group and subgroup levels available technology; • PTC Working Group’s consideration. in discussing the issues and options and Review impacts on small entities The majority of the proposals were in drafting the language of the and ascertain how best to address them adopted into the proposed rule as consensus proposal, and because the in harmony with the statutory agreed upon by the working group, with RSAC recommendation constitutes the requirements; rule language related to a remaining few • Help to describe the details that consensus of some of the industry’s issues being further discussed and should be included in the leading experts on a given subject, FRA enhanced for inclusion into the rule by implementation plans that railroads is generally favorably inclined toward the PTC Working Group. the RSAC recommendation. However, must file within 18 months of The passenger task force discussed FRA is in no way bound to follow the enactment of the Act; • testing issues relating to parts 236 and recommendation and the agency Offer recommendations on the 238 and the definition of ‘‘main line’’ exercises its independent judgment on specific content of implementing under the statute, including possible whether the recommended rule achieves regulations; and passenger terminal and limited The task also required the PTC the agency’s regulatory goals, is soundly operations exceptions to PTC Working Group to: supported, and was developed in implementation. Recommendations of • Report on the functionalities of PTC accordance with the applicable policy the task force were presented to the PTC systems; and legal requirements. Often, FRA Working Group, which adopted or • Describe the essential elements varies in some respects from the RSAC refined each suggestion. bearing on interoperability and the recommendation in developing the The short line and regional railroad requirements for consultation with other actual regulatory proposal. task force was formed to address the railroads in joint operations; and In developing the proposed rule in questions pertaining to Class II and • Determine how PTC systems will this proceeding, FRA adopted the RSAC Class III railroads. Specifically, the work with the operation of non- approach by re-convening the PTC group discussed issues regarding the equipped trains. Working Group that had produced the trackage rights of Class II and III The PTC Working Group was formed rule recommendation resulting in railroads using trains not equipped with from interested organizations that are subpart H. As part of this effort, FRA PTC technology over a Class I railroad’s members of the RSAC. The following worked with the major stakeholders PTC territory, passenger service over organizations contributed members: affected by this rulemaking in track owned by a Class II or Class III collaborative a manner as possible. FRA American Association of State Highway and railroads where PTC would not believes establishing a collaborative Transportation Officials (AAHSTO) otherwise be required, and rail-to-rail relationship early in the product American Chemistry Council (ACC) crossings-at-grade involving a Class I development and regulatory American Public Transportation Association (APTA) railroad’s PTC equipped line and a Class development cycles can help bridge the American Short Line and Regional Railroad II or III railroad’s PTC unequipped line. divide between the railroad carrier’s Association (ASLRRA) After much discussion, there were no management, railroad labor Association of American Railroads (AAR) consensus resolutions reached to any of organizations, the suppliers, and FRA Association of State Rail Safety Managers the main issues raised. However, the by ensuring that all stakeholders are (ASRSM) discussion yielded insights utilized by working with the same set of data and Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way FRA in preparing this final rule. have a common understanding of Employes Division (BMWED) The radio and communications task product characteristics and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and force addressed wireless functionality or their related processes Trainmen Division (BLET) communications issues, particularly as Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS) production methods, including the Federal Transit Administration* (FTA) they relate to communications security, regulatory provisions, with which International Brotherhood of Electrical and recommended language for compliance is mandatory. However, Workers (IBEW) § 236.1033. where the group failed to reach National Railroad Construction and FRA staff worked with the PTC consensus on an issue, FRA used its Maintenance Association Working Group and its task forces in

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developing many facets of the final rule. timely manner. However, FRA V. Overview: The Proposed Rule, FRA gratefully acknowledges the responded to two of those requests on Comments, and Resolution of participation and leadership of the record, indicating that it is FRA’s Comments representatives who served on the PTC policy to consider late-filed comments In broad summary, the proposed rule Working Group and its task forces. to the extent practicable and inviting the provided for joint filing of PTCIPs by all These points are discussed to show the railroads to supplement their comments railroads engaged in joint operations. origin of certain issues and the course as soon as possible even if it is Each PTCIP was to be accompanied or of discussion on these issues at the task necessary to file after the formal preceded by a PTC Development Plan force and working group levels. We comment period has closed. (PTCDP) or PTC Safety Plan (PTCSP) believe this helps illuminate the factors On August 13, 2009, FRA held a detailing the technology to be FRA weighed in making its regulatory hearing to provide interested parties an employed, or by a Type Approval decisions regarding this final rule and opportunity to enter oral statements into obtained by another railroad through the logic behind those decisions. the record. The AAR, Amtrak, BNSF, approval of a PTCDP. As further In general, the PTC Working Group and CSXT entered prepared statements agreed on the process for implementing discussed below, this overall structure into the record and UP and NS was generally embraced by the industry PTC under the statute, including indicated their concurrence with those decisional criteria to be applied by FRA parties and the commenters; but the statements. An oral statement was also extended period for delivery of in evaluating safety plans, adaptation of entered into the record by a subpart H principles to support this interoperability standards has given rise representative of six (6) rail labor to the need for some significant mandatory implementation, and organizations, including the American refinements to subpart H and the part adjustments that are included in the Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA), final rule. 236 appendices necessary to dovetail BLET, BMWED, BRS, IBEW, and UTU the two regulatory regimes and take Under the NPRM language, Class I (collectively, the ‘‘Rail Labor freight railroads would be required to lessons from early implementation of Organizations’’ or ‘‘RLO’’). AASHTO also subpart H, including most aspects of the describe in their PTCIPs the routes to be provided an oral statement at the equipped based on traffic densities training requirements. Notable accords hearing, indicating that it fully supports were reached, as well, on major (lines carrying more than 5 million gross the implementation of the proposed tons) and presence of PIH traffic during functionalities of PTC and on rule. Copies of the prepared statements exceptions applicable to passenger calendar year 2008. They would be and of the hearing transcript can be permitted to amend those plans if FRA service (terminal areas and limited main found in the docket to this proceeding. line exceptions). Major areas of found that removal of a line was Subsequently, written comments were disagreement included whether to allow ‘‘consistent with safety and in the public filed by the American Shortline and non-equipped trains on PTC lines, interest.’’ The discussion below reflects Regional Railroad Association extension of PTC to lines not within the the serious objections of the Class I (ASLRRA), Amtrak, APTA, ACC, AAR, statutory mandate, and whether to railroads to this ‘‘base year’’ approach provide for onboard displays or BNSF, Caltrain, Canadian Pacific (CP), and adjustments that FRA makes in this terminals visible and accessible to The Chlorine Institute (CI), CSXT, final rule to provide somewhat greater employees other than the locomotive Friends of the Earth, GE Transportation flexibility on the face of the regulation. engineer when two or more persons are (GE), HCRQ, Inc. and Cattron Group The discussion and final rule also regularly assigned duties in the cab. International (collectively, ‘‘HCRQ/ provide FRA’s response to a suggestion Some additional areas of concern were CGI’’), Invensys Rail Group—Safetran by the AAR that FRA create a ‘‘de discussed but could not be resolved in Systems (‘‘Safetran’’), NTSB, New York minimis’’ exception to the requirement the time available. It was understood State Metropolitan Transportation that lines carrying PIH traffic be that where discussion did not yield Authority (NYSMTA), NJ Transit, equipped with PTC, an issue raised for agreement, FRA would make proposals Northern Indiana Commuter the first time in response to the NPRM. within a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Transportation District (NICTD), Pacific FRA proposed to adapt the (NPRM) and receive public comment. Southwest Railway Museum, RLO, performance-based structure of subpart Railroad Passenger Car Alliance, San H, which had been developed through B. Public Hearing and Comments Filed Bernardino Railway Historical Society, the consensus process to encourage FRA issued an NPRM on July 21, Southern California Regional Rail deployment of PTC and related 2009, and accepted comments on this Authority (SCRRA or Metrolink), The technologies to provide a means of proposed regulation until August 20, Fertilizer Institute (TFI), Tourist qualifying PTC systems under the 2009. A public hearing was also held in Railway Association, Trinity Railway RSIA08. In order to promote completion connection with the NPRM in Express (TRE or Trinity), Utah Transit of PTC deployment by the end of 2015, Washington, DC, on August 13, 2009, as Authority (UTA) and a number of as required by law, FRA proposed further described below. individuals. functional requirements that could be During the comment period, a number After the comment period closed on met by available technology. These of entities filed comments requesting August 20, 2009, the RSAC PTC provisions continue to enjoy broad that FRA extend the comment period to Working Group was reconvened for 3 support from the industry parties and the proposed rule in this proceeding. days. The PTC Working Group agreed commenters, but the final rule makes FRA regrettably denied those requests on a number of recommendations for numerous perfecting changes to the due to the urgent need to prepare, resolution of comments which were implementing language in response to process, and publish a final rule at the presented to the full RSAC on specific comments. earliest possible date. Since railroads September 10. In voting by mail ballot The NPRM set forth requirements for subject to the rules are each required to that concluded on September 24, the equipping of trains with PTC that file a PTCIP by April 16, 2010, under RSAC adopted the recommendations, reflected FRA’s perception of practical the terms of the RSIA08, it was which are discussed below in the considerations (e.g., not all locomotives important that FRA provide reliable context of the specific issues that they can be equipped at once, and switching guidance for this process to occur in a address. out locomotives to commit them to

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equipped routes would involve available to do so. Following these concerns, given limited technical significant cost and safety exposure), recommendations from the RSAC staffing at FRA, the potential for filings historic tolerance for some incidental Working Group, FRA is including representing technology that the unequipped movements under additional latitude to bring forward industry would not employ, the circumstances where strict adherence specific exceptions for FRA review and inherent difficulty associated with would create obvious hardship without approval, with or without conditions. addressing the safety of technology commensurate safety benefits (e.g., The NPRM was technology neutral below the system level, and the critical locomotives of Class II and III railroads and directed at the outcomes desired. A need to provide rapid responses to generally spend little time on Class I number of the comments addressed the necessary filings. railroads and have a good safety record, issue of market concentration and Each of the comments on the NPRM, yet requiring that they be equipped absence of effective choices in selecting including comments not within the could result in expenditures greater PTC technology. In this regard, some felt scope of this overview, is discussed in than the previous value of the that FRA should specify attributes of relation to the topic addressed in the locomotives), and movement interoperability in the form of open section-by-section analysis below. standards. The final rule continues to restrictions applicable where controlling VI. Seeking Further Comments locomotives might have failed onboard rely on safety performance as the basis PTC equipment. These proposals for FRA certification of PTC systems. While this final rule is effective on the elicited some strong objections and FRA declines at this time to deprive date indicated herein, FRA believes that proposals for improvement. Several those railroads that have served as certain issues warrant further commenters asked that occasional technology leaders in developing PTC discussion. Accordingly, FRA will movement of trains led by historic systems of the latitude to implement continue to seek comments limited to locomotives be permitted without their systems, given their apparent increasing the clarity, certainty, and equipping the locomotives with PTC willingness to provide open standards transparency of the criteria governing technology. The final rule makes a for attributes of the technology over the removal from a PTCIP (and therefore number of changes, while endeavoring which they have control, and given the from the requirement to install PTC) of to carry forward the lessons of many predictable delays that would ensue any track segments on which PTC decades and while recognizing the need should alternative approaches be systems have yet to be installed for for regulatory flexibility. specified. FRA is aware that this creates which a railroad seeks relief from the Relying on existing train control a degree of reliance on others with requirement to install PTC. FRA requirements, the NPRM proposed that respect to those railroads that stood considers this issue separate and each assigned crew member be able to back and waited for others to develop distinct from the discontinuance of any view the PTC display and perform PTC technology. Further, some degree of already installed or existing PTC assigned functions from their normal market concentration may exist on the systems, which is governed under position in the cab. The NPRM also general freight network, in particular, § 236.1021, part 235 of this title, and the addressed the need to avoid task given the dominance of one vendor or ‘‘Signal Inspection Act’’ (codified at 49 overload on the locomotive engineer by supplier with respect to the core of the U.S.C. 20501–20505). Any further having that person perform functions onboard systems. FRA financially comments should be limited to the that could distract from attention to supported development of scope of the issues indicated in this current safety duties. FRA has interoperability standards through the preamble to which FRA seeks further considered the Class I railroads’ North American Positive Train Control comments. argument that, if a single display was Program (the technology selected for In § 236.1005(b)(4)(i)(A)(2), the final acceptable under subpart H, it should be demonstration was not deployed, and rule provides certain factors that FRA acceptable under the proposed subpart no standards were delivered) and again will consider when determining I. Although FRA has considered through the American Railway whether to approve exclusion of a line carefully the carriers’ arguments on this Engineering and Maintenance from the PTCIP in the case of cessation point, the final rule carries forward Association (standards have been of PIH traffic over a particular track principles of crew resource management published and are available, but no segment. For instance, under by ensuring that each crew member has railroad has signaled an intention to § 236.1005(b)(4)(i)(A)(2)(ii), the the information and ability to perform employ them). The choice of technology requesting railroad must show that any their assigned function and, therefore, that will be deployed should, in FRA’s rerouting of PIH traffic from the subject where a PTC overlay system is used, view, be made by those who are making track segment is justified based upon that all of the safety features of the the investments. the route analysis submitted. FRA seeks underlying operation to which PTC is Finally, the NPRM took a traditional comments on how the elements of a added will be kept. approach to recognition of technology, route analysis should be weighed by One of the critical choices assigned to requiring that railroads step forward, FRA when determining whether FRA under the law was specification of individually or with their suppliers, to rerouting as provided under this any exceptions to passenger ‘‘main request recognition of PTC systems. paragraph is sufficiently justified. track’’ requiring installation of PTC. The Suppliers commented that they should Section 236.1005(b)(4)(i)(A)(2)(iii) NPRM carried forward narrow be able to step forward without railroad concerns the risk remaining on a track exceptions crafted at the request of participation and receive recognition for segment if PIH traffic were to be commuter and intercity railroads. systems, subsystems, and components removed. FRA also seeks comments on Amtrak followed with comments on the that would later be incorporated in PTC how to measure the appropriate level of NPRM asking for a broader exception. systems approved by FRA. They noted risk established in They noted in particular that the that the NPRM would burden them with § 236.1005(b)(4)(i)(A)(2)(iii) to require incremental costs of PTC on some lines reporting obligations while not the installation of PTC on lines not with limited freight traffic and relatively conferring status to receive direct carrying PIH or passenger traffic. No few Amtrak trains might need to be product recognition. While recognizing railroad has supplied data supporting borne by states that support particular the commenters’ logic, FRA could not further track exceptions from PTC services, and the funding might not be find a means in the final rule to relieve system installation consistent with

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statutory and safety requirements. Thus, the NPRM that is not explicitly as many crossings as possible should be FRA requests additional data to support modified in this final rule remains eliminated. To that end, 49 CFR 213.347 commenters’ positions. FRA also seeks applicable. requires a warning and barrier plan to comment and information on ways that be approved for Class 7 track (speeds Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part it might consider risk mitigations other above 110 miles per hour) and prohibits 229 than by a compensating extension of grade crossings on Class 8 and 9 track PTC or PTC technologies. Section 229.135 Event Recorders (above 125 miles per hour). That leaves In § 236.1005(b)(4)(i), the final rule The proposed amendment to the significant exposure on Class 5 and 6 provides an exception to PTC system existing event recorder section of the track (80 miles per hour for freight and implementation where such Locomotive Safety Standards is 90 miles per hour for passenger trains, implementation would provide only a intended to make that section parallel to up to 110 miles per hour for either) de minimis PIH risk. While in the the additions in § 236.1005(d) below. No which is currently not specifically proposed rule FRA sought means to comments were received, and the addressed by regulation. reduce the railroads’ burdens associated section is adopted as proposed. At the public hearing in this with this rule, no specific de minimis proceeding, the RLO indicated its exception was proposed. The AAR Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part agreement with FRA’s interpretation of mentioned this possibility in its 234 49 CFR 213.347 and stated that comment filed during the comment Section 234.275 Processor-Based significant exposure remains at period and offered in supplementary Systems highway-rail grade crossings for Class 5 comments filed after the comment and 6 track, because ‘‘such plans or period to work with FRA on this issue. Section 234.275 presently requires that each processor-based system, prohibitions are not currently addressed FRA believes that the de minimis by Federal Regulation.’’ In addition to exception provided in this final rule subsystem, or component used for active warning at highway-rail grade the proposed amendments to § 234.275, falls within the scope of the issues set however, the RLO believes that PTC forth in the proposed rule. However, crossings that is new or novel technology, or that provides safety- systems should also be mandated under since none of the parties has had an subpart I to incorporate technology that opportunity to comment on this specific critical data to a railroad signal or train control system which is qualified using would verify a highway-rail grade exception as provided in this final rule, crossing warning system’s activation for FRA seeks comments on the extent of the subpart H process, shall also be governed by those requirements, an approaching train and slow a train the de minimis exception. approaching a location where such As further explained below, this final including approval of a Product Safety system activation could not be verified. rule uses 2008 traffic data as an initial Plan. Particularly with respect to high- The RLO believes that such verification baseline in each PTCIP to determine the speed rail, FRA anticipates that PTC and speed restriction enforcement breadth and scope of PTC system systems will in some cases incorporate would significantly lower the exposure implementation and, in recognition of new or novel technology to provide for the fact that traffic patterns are likely to crossing warning system pre-starts for a potential collision between a change to some degree before December (eliminating the necessity of highway motor vehicle and a train. 31, 2015, provides means of adjusting lengthening the approach circuits for According to the RLO, this function is the track segments on which PTC must high-speed trains), to verify crossing currently incorporated into at least one be installed where adjustments are system health between the wayside deployed train control system and is appropriately justified. These issues warning system and approaching trains, therefore feasible. In addition, the RLO relate to the potential scaling back of the or to slow trains approaching locations propose that certain existing highway- breadth and scope of that baseline where vehicle storage has been detected rail grade crossing warning system through the request by the railroads— on a crossing, among other options. regulations and requirements, including made contemporaneously or Indeed, each of these functions is those in parts 213 and 234, and in subsequently to PTCIP submission and presently incorporated in at least one subpart H to part 236, could be cross prior to actual PTC system train control system, and others may referenced or included in subpart I to implementation—on the subject track one day be feasible (including in-vehicle ensure regulatory harmony. segments for FRA to apply certain warning). There would appear to be no While AAR understands the safety regulatory exceptions. Under the reason why such a functionality concern, it asserts that this function is procedures set forth in this final rule, intended for inclusion in a PTC system not related to the core PTC functions requests for such amendments may be mandated by subpart I could not be mandated by Congress. Furthermore, made after PTCIP submission. Since qualified with the rest of the PTC asserts AAR, the cost of installing these issues should not affect the PTCIP system under subpart I. On the other wayside interface units at grade required to be filed by the April 16, hand, care should be taken to set an crossings on PTC routes would be 2010, statutory deadline, FRA believes appropriate safety standard taking into prohibitively expensive and would that time is available for some further consideration highway users, occupants divert resources that would otherwise consideration. of the high-speed trains, and others be devoted to meeting the mandated potentially affected. PTC deadline. VII. Section-by-Section Analysis In fact, with new emphasis on high- The NTSB recommends that the Unless otherwise noted, all section speed rail, FRA needs to consider the warning and barrier protection plans references below refer to sections in title ability of PTC systems to integrate this similar to those for Class 7 track at grade 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations type of new technology and thereby crossings in 49 CFR 213.347 should also (CFR). FRA sought comments on all reduce risk associated with high-speed apply to Class 5 and 6 tracks. According proposals made in the NPRM. This rail service. Risk includes derailment of to the NTSB, such protection at portion of the preamble discusses the a high-speed train with catastrophic crossings (similar to protection at comments received, FRA’s assessment consequences after encountering an crossings afforded within the ITCS of those comments, and the basis for the obstacle at a highway-rail grade project) should be integrated as part of final rule provisions. Any analysis in crossing. To avoid such consequences, an approved PTC plan to reduce the risk

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of high-speed catastrophic derailments intermittent automatic train stop system above 49 and 59 miles per hour for at such grade crossings. is entirely obviated. There were no freight and passenger trains, FRA, while certainly recognizing objections in the PTC Working Group to respectively. According to the NTSB, these concerns, does not choose to this amendment. manual block does not afford the level provide further prescriptive The AAR submitted comment that of safety that block signal or PTC requirements for highway-rail grade within § 236.1021, paragraphs (j)(2) and systems provide for the detection of crossings beyond those set forth in (j)(3) should be revised to recognize the misaligned switches, broken rails, or § 213.347. FRA will, however, require allowance for removal of a signal used fouling equipment that may cause a that highway-rail grade crossing safety in lieu of an electric or mechanical lock train accident. at Class 5 and 6 track speeds be in the same manner as removal of the After review of the NPRM, AAR stated specifically addressed within a electric or mechanical lock. These two that paragraph (c)(1)(ii)(A) seemed to railroad’s PTCDP and PTCSP (see paragraphs are intended to recognize preclude the operations identified in §§ 236.1013 and 236.1015 respectively) that where train speed over the switch paragraph (c)(1)(ii)(B) and that it was subject to FRA approval. FRA has does not exceed 20 miles per hour, or unclear whether paragraph (c)(1)(ii)(A) separately developed Guidelines for where trains are not permitted to clear applies to opposing trains or some other Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety for the main track at such switch, removal condition. Therefore, the AAR high-speed rail that will be employed in of the devices intended to provide the recommended that paragraphs the grant review and negotiation process necessary protection without filing for (c)(1)(ii)(A) and (c)(1)(ii)(B) be revised. under the American Recovery and approval is appropriate. FRA agrees and has therefore revised Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. The regulation requiring the paragraphs (c)(1)(ii)(A) and (c)(1)(ii)(B), 111–5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (ARRA). installation of an electric or mechanical and added paragraphs (c)(1)(ii)(C) and These Guidelines encourage use of lock identifies the allowance for a signal (c)(1)(ii)(D), in the final rule to improve sealed corridor strategies for Emerging used in lieu thereof (see § 236.410). FRA clarity. High-Speed Rail systems and integration agrees with the AAR that when the FRA has also added paragraph (d)(2) of highway-rail warning systems with requirement for an electric or in the final rule to address the use of PTC where feasible. See Docket No. mechanical lock, or a signal used in lieu automatic cab signal, automatic train FRA–2009–0095. thereof, are eliminated, the removal of stop, or automatic train control systems any of these devices in their entirety on or after December 31, 2015. On or Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part without filing for approval is after December 31, 2015, the method of 235 appropriate. FRA is therefore amending protecting high-speed train operations Section 235.7 Changes Not Requiring paragraphs (j)(2) and (j)(3) of § 236.1021 will be through the use of PTC. FRA Filing of Application as recommended in order to clarify recognizes that there may be justifiable these allowances. reasons for continued use of automatic FRA amends § 235.7, which allows cab signal, automatic train stop, or specified changes within existing signal For the same reasoning and in a consistent manner, FRA is amending automatic train control systems on or or train control systems be made after December 31, 2015 on certain without the necessity of filing an paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) in existing § 235.7 in order to provide the same lines, where the installation of PTC application. The amendments consist of would be inappropriate. In situations adding allowance for a railroad to allowances for removal of a signal used in lieu of an electric or mechanical lock where the automatic cab signal, remove an intermittent automatic train automatic train stop, or automatic train stop system in conjunction with the within block signal systems without filing for approval. control systems are an integral part of implementation of a PTC system the PTC system design, no action will be approved under subpart I of part 236, Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part required by a railroad. In any other and a couple of minor editorial 236 situation, however, FRA will only allow corrections. continued use of an automatic cab The changes allowable under this Section 236.0 Applicability, Minimum Requirements, and Penalties signal, automatic train stop, or section, without filing of an application, automatic train control system on a are those identified on the basis that the FRA amends this existing section of case-by-case basis after sufficient resultant condition will be at least no the regulation to remove manual block justification has been provided to the less safe than the previous condition. from the methods of operation Associate Administrator. The required functions of PTC within permitting speeds of 50 miles per hour FRA has also added a preemption subpart I provide a considerably higher or greater for freight trains and 60 miles provision at the end of section 236.0. level of functionality related to both per hour or greater for passenger trains. Part 236, which FRA inherited from the alerting and enforcing necessary Manual block rules create a reasonably Interstate Commerce Commission at the operating limitations than an secure means of preventing train time FRA was created, has had intermediate automatic train stop collisions. However, where the preemptive effect by operation of law at system does. Additionally, in the event attributes of block signal systems are not least since enactment of the Federal of the loss of PTC functionality (see present, misaligned switches, broken Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (Pub. L. § 236.1029 regarding a failure en route), rails, or fouling equipment may cause a 111–43). However, no preemption the operating restrictions required will train accident. FRA believes that provision was ever added, largely as an provide the needed level of safety in contemporary expectations for safe historical accident. Since enactment of lieu of the railroad being expected to operations require this adjustment, the Implementing Recommendations of keep and maintain an underlying which also provides a more orderly the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 system such as intermittent automatic foundation for the application of PTC to Commission Act of 2007), Public Law train stop for use only in such cases. the subject territories. There were no 110–53, which amended 49 U.S.C. Therefore, FRA believes that with the objections in the PTC Working Group to 20106 significantly, FRA has been implementation of PTC under the this change and the NTSB supports the updating the preemption provisions of requirements of subpart I, the safety removal of manual block from a method its regulations to conform to the current value of any previously existing of operation permitting train speeds of statute as opportunities to do so are

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presented. New subsection 236.0(i) is surpassed and, past the point at which section is also being modified to added to accomplish that and to recite the requirements of federal law are eliminate an alternative option for a the preemptive effect of the Locomotive satisfied, says nothing about its railroad to use a risk metric in which Boiler Inspection Act (49 U.S.C. 20701– adequacy. That is why FRA believes consequences of potential accidents are 20703), which has been held by the U.S. that section 20106(b)(1)(B) covers the measured strictly in terms of fatalities. Supreme Court to preempt the entire former, but not the latter. The basic Prior to the modification of this field of locomotive safety; therefore, this purpose of the statute—improving section, paragraph (e)(1) discussed how part preempts any state law, including railroad safety—is best served by safety and risk should be measured for common law, covering the design, encouraging regulated entities to do the full risk assessment, but did not construction, or material of any part of more than the law requires and would accentuate the need for running a or appurtenance to a locomotive. be disserved by increasing potential tort sensitivity analysis on chosen risk The text of section 236.0(i)(1) and (2) liability of regulated entities that choose metrics to ensure that the worst case directly reflects FRA’s interpretation of to exceed federal standards, which scenarios for the proposed system 49 U.S.C. 20106, as amended. Read by would discourage them from ever failures or malfunctions are accounted itself, 49 U.S.C. 20106(a) preempts state exceeding federal standards again. for in the risk assessment. On the other standards of care, including common In this manner, Congress adroitly hand, Appendix B to this part mandates law standards, Norfolk Southern Ry. v. preserved its policy of national that each risk metric for the proposed Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 358–359 (2000), uniformity of railroad safety regulation product must be expressed with an expressed in section 20106(a)(1) and upper bound, as estimated with a CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 assured plaintiffs in tort cases involving sensitivity analysis. The FRA’s U.S. 658, 664 (1993), but does not railroads, such as Lundeen, of their experience gained while reviewing PSP expressly state whether anything ability to pursue their cases by documents required by subpart H of this replaces the preempted standards of clarifying that federal railroad safety part and submitted to FRA for approval care for purposes of tort suits. The focus regulations preempt the standard of revealed that railroads did not consider of that provision is clearly on who care, not the underlying causes of action it mandatory to run a sensitivity regulates railroad safety: The federal in tort. Under this interpretation, all analysis for the chosen risk metrics. government or the states. It is about parts of the statute are given meanings Thus, an additional effort was required improving railroad safety, for which that work together effectively and serve from the FRA staff reviewing PSP Congress deems nationally uniform the safety purposes of the statute. submittals to demonstrate to the standards to be necessary in the great railroads the validity and significance of Section 236.410 Locking, Hand- majority of cases. That purpose has such a request. Therefore, this final rule Operated Switch; Requirements collateral consequences for tort law amends paragraph (e)(1) to explicitly which new statutory section 20106 In this final rule, FRA is removing the require the performance of a sensitivity paragraphs (b) and (c) address. New Note following paragraph (b) of this analysis for the chosen risk metrics. The paragraph (b)(1) creates three exceptions section. During FRA’s review of the language in paragraph (e)(1) of this to the possible consequences flowing requirements contained in this part, section explains why the sensitivity from paragraph (a). One of those FRA discovered that the Note following analysis is needed and what key input exceptions (paragraph (b)(1)(B)) paragraph (b), which had previously parameters must be analyzed. precisely addresses an issue presented been removed as part of FRA’s 1984 FRA received comments on the in Lundeen v. Canadian Pacific Ry., 507 amendments to this part, was proposed modification to paragraph F.Supp.2d 1006 (D.Minn. 2007) that inadvertently reprinted in the rule text (e)(1) of this section. While the RLO Congress wished to rectify: It allows several years later and has remained expressed support for making the risk plaintiffs to sue a railroad in tort for there. As reflected in the preamble metric sensitivity analysis an integral violation of its own plan, rule, or discussion of the 1983 proposed rule, part of the full risk assessment, GE standard that it created pursuant to a FRA moved the provisions for removal sought clarification and a sample regulation or order issued by either of of electric or mechanical locks to § 235.7 regarding the proposed amendment to the secretaries. None of those exceptions based on FRA’s determination that the the clause regarding the risk assessment covers a plan, rule, or standard that a industry was capable of achieving sensitivity analysis. GE believes that a regulated entity creates for itself in compliance of train operations in literal interpretation of this clause order to produce a higher level of safety procedures more suitable to individual would mean that the risk analysis must than federal law requires, and such properties. evaluate the risk sensitivity to variations plans, rules, or standards were not at In light of the history of this section, in every individual electronic and issue in Lundeen. The key concept of FRA is taking the opportunity within mechanical component of the system. If section 20106(b) is permitting actions this rulemaking to remove the Note so interpreted, GE asserts that the under state law seeking damages for following paragraph (b), which presents combinatorial calculations would personal injury, death, or property information in conflict with the present a significant barrier to the safety damage to proceed using a federal allowances that have been added into analysis and delay PTC system standard of care. A plan, rule, or §§ 235.7(b)(2) and (b)(3). approval. GE further asserts that safety standard that a regulated entity creates coverage of discrete component failures pursuant to a federal regulation logically Section 236.909 Minimum can be assured through other techniques fits the paradigm of a federal standard Performance Standard in the overall system design. GE of care—federal law requires it and FRA is modifying paragraph (e)(1) of believes that the intent of this rule is determines its adequacy. A plan, rule, or this section to include a requirement for that ‘‘component’’ should mean standard, or portions of one, that a the risk metric sensitivity analysis to be ‘‘functional subsystem,’’ as system safety regulated entity creates on its own in an integral part of the full risk can be completely addressed by order to exceed the requirements of assessment that is required to be performing the sensitivity analysis at federal law does not fit the paradigm of provided in the Product Safety Plan that level. Accordingly, GE proffers that a federal standard of care—federal law (PSP) submittal in accordance with paragraph (e)(1) of this section should does not require that the law be § 236.907(a)(7). Paragraph (e)(2) of this be modified to allow the level of detail

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of the risk analysis to be chosen based the exposure must be measured in train training requirements, that are on the system safety philosophy and miles per year over the relevant railroad mandated for installation by FRA. This technology chosen. infrastructure where a proposed system subpart details the process and Similar concerns were expressed by is to be implemented. When identifies the documents that railroads HCRQ/CGI, which questioned the need determining the consequences of and operators of passenger trains are to for an additional requirement in the rule potential accidents, the railroad must utilize and incorporate in their PTC that would require the sensitivity identify the total costs involved, implementation plans. This subpart also analysis to document the sensitivity to including those relating to fatalities, details the process and procedure for worst case failure scenarios. In the injuries, property damage, and other obtaining FRA approval of such plans. alternative, HCRQ/CGI suggested that incidentals. This final rule eliminates A number of railroads indicated the final rule should require a the option of using an alternative risk concern with a potentially significant reasonable justification for all failure metric, which would allow the reprogramming of funds due to the rates. measurement of consequences strictly in statutorily mandated implementation of In response to these comments, FRA terms of fatalities. It is FRA’s experience PTC systems. These railroads claim that would like to clarify that the lowest that measuring consequences of the costs associated with PTC system level of system elements constructing accidents strictly in term of fatalities did implementation will lead to deferred the overall system that would be subject not serve as an adequate alternative to capital improvements and maintenance to risk analysis and the following metrics of total cost of accidents for two elsewhere in the general railroad sensitivity analysis are ‘‘components,’’ main reasons. First, the statistical data system, including degraded track, ‘‘modules,’’ ‘‘pieces of equipment,’’ or on railroad accidents shows that bridge, or drainage conditions, which ‘‘subsystems’’ that are processor-based in accidents involving fatalities also cause may then lead to accidents. Thus, nature, the functionality and injuries and significant damage to according to these railroads, the performance of which are governed by railroad property and infrastructure for mandated PTC implementation, within this part. FRA declines, however, to both freight and especially passenger an extremely aggressive timeframe, may provide a sample sensitivity analysis in operations. Even though the cost of lead to an overall reduced level of this rulemaking document, as the human life is often the highest safety. FRA recognizes that the cost of technique of sensitivity analysis has component of monetary estimates of PTC will be substantial. FRA does note been well covered by a number of accident consequences, the dollar that capital expenditures can often be system safety engineering studies. estimates of injuries, property losses, financed; and the Railroad FRA notes that the term, ‘‘worst case and damage to the environment Rehabilitation and Improvement failure scenario’’ is a subject of general associated with accidents involving Financing (RRIF) program is one source theory of system safety and reliability. fatalities cannot and should not be of such financing. Other potential Therefore, it does not appear to be discounted in the risk analysis. Second, sources include private financing, necessary to provide an interpretation of allowing fatalities to serve as the only public bond authority, and state and this term. Nonetheless, in response to federal appropriations. It is the comments that have been received on risk metrics of accident consequences confused the industry and the risk responsibility of each public and private this issue, FRA would like to add a railroad to determine appropriate clarifying statement. A sensitivity assessment analysts attempting to determine the overall risk associated funding sources to meet its needs. analysis must be conducted by defining Various railroads also urge FRA to not with the use of certain types of train the range of values (i.e., lower bound, use its discretion to require more than control systems. As a result, some risk upper bound, and associated the minimum mandated by the RSIA08. distribution) for key input parameters analysts inappropriately converted These railroads note that under FRA’s and assessing the impact of variations injuries and property damages for economic analysis, the costs of PTC over those ranges on the overall system observed accidents into relative implementation outweigh its benefits by risk. The worst case analysis must estimates of fatalities. This method a ratio of 15 to 1. While these railroads consider realistic combinations of the cannot be considered acceptable acknowledge that these costs are mostly key input parameters as they tend because, while distorting the overall unavoidable due to the congressional toward their worst case values. picture of accident consequences, it also mandate, they believe that there are Justification must be provided for the raises questions on appropriateness of ways FRA may mitigate these and other ranges and process used in the design of conversion coefficients. Therefore, FRA costs associated with this rule. FRA has the sensitivity analysis. considers it appropriate to eliminate crafted this final rule to limit the cost of Another comment from HCRQ/CGI from the rule the alternative option for implementation and to avoid further relates to the requirement that ‘‘the consequences to be measured in PTC development that could require sensitivity analysis must confirm that fatalities only. This approach gained the additional funding and additional time. the risk metrics of the system are not support of the RLO, who in their Accordingly, in the proposed and final negatively affected by sensitivity comments concur with a modification of rule, FRA indicates a willingness to analysis input parameters. * * *’’ paragraph (e)(2) that is eliminating an approve suitable systems employing HCRQ/CGI requested that the meaning option of risk consequences to be non-vital onboard processing, to of the phrase ‘‘negatively affected’’ be measured in fatalities only. recognize wayside signal logic as an specified. FRA agreed to provide such Subpart I—Positive Train Control appropriate means of protecting an explanation and therefore offered an Systems movements over switches, to recognize interpretation of the words ‘‘negatively systems that enforce the upper limit of affected’’ in paragraph (e)(1). Section 236.1001 Purpose and Scope restricted speed as suitable collision The modification to paragraph (e)(2) This section describes both the avoidance in the case of following trains of this section is intended to clarify how purpose and the scope of subpart I. and joint authorities, to avoid any the exposure and its consequences, as Subpart I provides performance-based requirements for monitoring of derails main components of the risk regulations for the development, test, off the main line in conventional speed computation formula, must be installation, and maintenance of PTC territory, to allow for conventional measured. As stated in paragraph (e)(2), systems, and the associated personnel arrangements at rail-to-rail crossings at-

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grade where speeds are moderate, and to e.g., § 236.1009). In proposing this to determine who operates over the recognize to the maximum extent definition, FRA sought to capture in a lines and under what conditions. In possible safety case showings made word the essence of fundamental general, those are the lines it owns under subpart H prior to the effective responsibility for the rail operation. directly or through public authorities date of this rule. In addition, FRA has FRA considered terms such as ‘‘track that cooperate in the joint powers made allowances for operation of Class owner’’ (used in the Track Safety arrangement. Lines owned and operated II and III locomotives in PTC territory Standards), but found that the by BNSF or UP and over which and significant ‘‘main line’’ exceptions alternatives had drawbacks of one kind Metrolink trains operate would be the for passenger routes. Together, these or another. There are places, for responsibility of BNSF and UP, actions will save the railroads billions of instance, where a non-railroad State or respectively, even if SCRRA or its dollars of initial expense, as well as local government or private corporation contractor has day-to-day responsibility continuing expense in maintenance over owns the underlying fee beneath the for dispatching some of them. the coming years. railroad infrastructure but is not GE Transportation expressed concern engaged in any way in managing or regarding the definition and use of the Section 236.1003 Definitions benefitting from the railroad (except in term Type Approval in § 236.1003 and Given that a natural language such as some cases by receiving revenue from a subsequent sections, including English contains, at any given time, a lease). There are also situations where § 236.1031. GE Transportation notes that finite number of words, any multiple railroads are dispatched from a under the proposed rule Type comprehensive list of definitions must common location, either by one of the Approvals apply only to complete PTC either be circular or leave some terms railroads or by a third party. It is systems, although it is generally undefined. In some cases, it is not increasingly the case that commuter recognized in the industry that there are possible and indeed not necessary to service is provided by a public authority five core component subsystems in a state a definition. Where possible and through multiple contractors who are PTC system configuration: (1) A practicable, FRA prefers to provide responsible for discrete portions of locomotive onboard subsystem; (2) a explicit definitions for terms and service as agents of the sponsoring dispatch center supervisory control and concepts rather than rely solely on a entity (e.g., equipment maintenance, data acquisition (SCADA) subsystem; (3) shared understanding of a term through track and signal maintenance, train a PTC server (central or wayside) if a use. operations, dispatching). In short, it is server is required; (4) wayside interface Paragraph (a) reinforces the hard to describe, in a common way, who units; and (5) a data communications applicability of existing definitions of is responsible here; nevertheless, in any network connecting the other subparts A through H. The definitions of concrete case, there can be but one subsystems. When a Type Approval is subparts A through H are applicable to entity ultimately responsible. granted to a PTC system, GE subpart I, unless otherwise modified by The Southern California Regional Rail Transportation suggests that core this part. Authority submitted comments subsystems of that PTC system should Paragraph (b) introduces definitions requesting that FRA provide additional be granted Component Type Approval for a number of terms that have specific clarification to what constitutes under certain conditions. According to meanings within the context of subpart ‘‘effective operating control’’ as stated in GE Transportation, the granting of such I. Paragraph (b) has been modified in the the definition of the term ‘‘host Component Type Approvals will drive final rule by adding a definition for the railroad.’’ Specifically, SCRRA simplified filings, faster approval, and term, ‘‘Notice of Product Intent.’’ questioned whether FRA would faster deployment for new system In lieu of analyzing each definition consider control of dispatching as configurations using a building block here, however, some of the delineated ‘‘effective operating control’’ even if approach. In addition, states GE terms will be discussed as appropriate responsibilities for the installation and Transportation, it reduces the risks while analyzing other sections below. maintenance of wayside devices and associated with PTC deployment by As a general matter, however, FRA infrastructure are under a different party simplifying substitution of components believes it is important to explain than the dispatcher. Although FRA does in the event of a problem, the market for certain organizational changes required not find it necessary to change the PTC system components becomes less pursuant to the RSIA08. The statute definition contained in the regulation, restrictive, and the next logical step is establishes the position of a Chief Safety FRA will offer clarification as to the for a supplier to be permitted to Officer within FRA. The Chief Safety intended meaning. As noted above, very introduce a core subsystem component Officer has been designated as the often railroads cooperate in dispatching for approval. GE Transportation asserts Associate Administrator for Railroad trains that traverse contiguous lines in that this will encourage market Safety. Thus, the use of the term order to maximize tactical planning and development and further reduce risks Associate Administrator in this subpart efficiency. Whether one railroad might for PTC deployment and sustained refers to the Associate Administrator for dispatch another railroad’s territory operation. Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer, would not cause the dispatching FRA understands GE’s concern. or as otherwise referenced, the railroad to take on the responsibilities of However, it appears to be based on a Associate Administrator for Railroad the host. Similarly, the fact that a misunderstanding of FRA’s definition of Safety/Chief Safety Officer. railroad might contract with another ‘‘Type Approval.’’ In developing the The NPRM defined ‘‘host railroad’’ to railroad to dispatch all or a portion of ‘‘Type Approval’’ concept, FRA looked mean ‘‘a railroad that has effective its lines would not relieve the former to the Federal Aviation Administration operating control over a segment of railroad of responsibilities of the host. (FAA) model of system approval as a track.’’ This term is used in In the example of SCRRA’s Metrolink basis. However, FRA modified the FAA § 236.1005(b) to identify the party operations, we would expect SCRRA, approach to better fit FRA’s regulatory responsible for installing PTC and in which defines its route structure and mandate and resources. FRA considers § 236.1007 with respect to attributes of timetable for passenger operations, to the ‘‘Type Approval’’ to be more akin to PTC systems for high-speed service. The undertake the duties of the host for the the FAA concept of an ‘‘Airworthiness host railroad is also responsible for lines for which it enjoys effective Certificate.’’ Under FAA rules, an planning and filing requirements (see, control in the sense that it has the right airworthiness certificate is only issued

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to a system (and, in the case of the FAA, environment.’’ This definition might occur at restricted speed. In this system is an aircraft). This analogy corresponds to that of the safe state signaled territory, there are is made only to make a minor definition in the U.S. Department of circumstances under which trains may clarification and should not necessarily Defense Military Standard (MIL–STD) pass red signals, other than absolute be construed to entirely equate subpart 882C. FRA, however, disagrees with signals without verbal authority, either I’s Type Approval concept with that of AAR that the term ‘‘safe state’’ should be at restricted speed or after stopping and FAA’s Airworthiness Certificate also applicable for the description of then proceeding at restricted speed. To concept. system state in non-failed conditions. avoid rear end collisions, available PTC FRA has also considered GE’s The definition of the term ‘‘safe state’’ technology does not always track the position that an FRA failure to issue should not be confused with the term rear-end of each train, but instead relies component level approvals could ‘‘safe operation’’ or ‘‘operating safely.’’ on the signal system to indicate the restrict the development of new The term ‘‘safe state’’ was added in appropriate action. In this example, the products. FRA notes that the current § 236.1003 strictly for the purpose of PTC system would display ‘‘restricted industry practice is based on vendor or defining a ‘‘protective’’ state (safe state) speed’’ to the locomotive engineer as the supplier determination that there will of the system, which the system must action required and would enforce the be a market for a particular product. take when it fails. At the same time, upper limit of restricted speed (i.e., 15 This determination may be based on a FRA admits erroneous use of the term or 20 miles per hour, depending on the specific request from a customer, or on ‘‘safe state’’ in the section quoted by railroad). This means that more serious the vendor’s or supplier’s perception AAR (74 FR 35,966) and amends it to rear end collisions will be prevented, that there is a need for the product. read: ‘‘If a switch is misaligned, the PTC because the upper limit of restricted While this process may consider the system shall provide an acceptable level speed is enforced. This also means that regulatory requirements that may be of safety of train operations.’’ fewer low speed rear-end collisions will applicable to a component, it has not occur because a continuous reminder of required FRA to issue an ‘‘approval’’ for Section 236.1005 Requirements for Positive Train Control Systems the required action will be displayed to any particular component. Given the the locomotive engineer (rather than the number of new products that have been The RSIA08 specifically requires that engineer relying on the aspect displayed brought to market, FRA believes that each PTC system be designed to prevent by the last signal, which may have been this development model has worked train-to-train collisions, overspeed passed some time ago). However, some very successfully. Further, the derailments, incursions into established potential for a low speed rear-end work zone limits, and the movement of requirements of the RSIA08 require FRA collision will remain in these cases, and a train through a switch left in the to certify that the PTC system, not the the rule is clear that this limitation has wrong position. Section 236.1005 PTC system components, meets the been accepted. Similar exposure may includes the minimum statutory regulatory requirements. The ‘‘Type occur in non-signaled territory where requirements and provides amplifying Approval’’ does not in any way certify trains are conducting switching information defining the necessary PTC a PTC system as required by statute; it operations or other activities under joint functions and the situations under only indicates to the system developer/ authorities. The PTC system can enforce which PTC systems must be installed. integrator that FRA believes that the the limits of the authority and the upper Each PTC system must be reliable and proposed system, if properly limit of restricted speed, but it cannot perform the functions specified in the implemented, may meet the statutory guarantee that the trains sharing the requirements. FRA therefore declines, at RSIA08. authority will not collide. Again, this time, to issue component level Train-to-train collisions. Paragraph however, the likelihood and average ‘‘type approvals’’. (a)(1)(i) applies the statutory The AAR believes that the definition requirement that a mandatory PTC severity of any potential collisions of ‘‘safe state’’ includes conditions not system must be designed to prevent would be greatly reduced considering necessarily applicable. According to train-to-train collisions. FRA such movements would be made under AAR, this term may be utilized to understands this to mean head-to-head, restricted speed. FRA may address this describe the operation of a system in rear-end, and side and raking collisions issue in a later modification to subpart non-failure scenarios and, in fact, is between trains on the same, converging, I if necessary as technology becomes arguably used in this fashion even or intersecting tracks. Currently available. within the NPRM preamble (see, e.g., 74 available PTC technology can meet FRA received comments on this FR 35,966 (July 21, 2009) (‘‘If a switch these needs by providing current and discussion of the inherent limitations of is misaligned, the PTC system shall continuous guidance to the locomotive available PTC technology with respect provide an acceptable safe state of train engineer and enforcement using to the prevention of certain collisions operations.’’)). Accordingly, the AAR predictive braking to stop short of that may occur at restricted speed from asserts that the definition of ‘‘safe state’’ known targets. FRA notes that the NYSMTA. NYSMTA sought should be modified to strike the clause technology associated with currently clarification that PTC is not intended to ‘‘when the system fails.’’ available PTC systems may not enforce conformance of block entry Some other commenters expressed the completely eliminate all collisions risks. speeds associated with wayside signal opinion that in the current definition of For instance, a PTC system mandated by aspects or similar cab signal aspects ‘‘safe state,’’ the clause ‘‘cannot cause this subpart is not required to prevent provided without speed control, except harm’’ lacks specificity. FRA agrees to a collision caused by a train that derails when a train is operating under a modify the definition of ‘‘safe state’’ by and moves onto a neighboring or wayside signal or cab signal aspect replacing the clause ‘‘system adjacent track (known in common requiring a speed not to exceed configuration that cannot cause harm parlance as a ‘‘secondary collision’’). restricted speed. FRA noted in the when the system fails’’ with the clause During discussions regarding NPRM, and repeats here, that FRA ‘‘system state that, when the system available PTC technology, it has been recognizes that some PTC architectures fails, cannot cause death, injury, noted that this technology also has will not directly enforce speed occupational illness, or damage to or inherent limitations with respect to restrictions imposed by all intermediate loss of property, or damage to the prevention of certain collisions that signals. FRA does expect that the

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PTCDP will be clear on how the system intersections is low, because typically route’s maximum speed in order to accomplishes train separation and one of the routes is favored on a regular protect the PTC route against a non- regulation of speeds over turnouts. basis and train crews expect delays until equipped train passing through a stop The final rule text, however, does signals clear for their movement. indication and equipment inadvertently provide an example of a potential train- Second, the special track structure used rolling out (i.e., a roll away) from the to-train collision that a PTC system at these intersections, known as crossing non-PTC route. should be designed to prevent. Rail-to- diamonds, experiences heavy wear; and AAR and CSXT challenge the rail crossings-at-grade—otherwise railroads tend to limit speeds over these imposition of split-point derails. CSXT known as diamond crossings—present a locations to no more than 40 miles per believes that the proposed rule merely risk of side collisions. FRA recognizes hour. Finally, FRA recognizes that for a shifts the safety risks associated with that such intersecting lines may or may train on either intersecting route, Class II and III railroads, but does not not require PTC system implementation elevated speed will translate into higher eliminate them altogether. For instance, and operation. Since a train operating kinetic energy available to do damage in CSXT points out that unlike a PTC- with an unregulated PTC system cannot a collision-induced derailment. Thus, compliant system, the split-point derail necessarily recognize a train not for the small number of rail crossings would not avoid derailment altogether; operating with a PTC system or moving with one or more routes having an rather, it would simply cause the non- on an intersecting track without a PTC authorized train speed above 40 miles PTC Class II or III train to derail away system, the PTC system—no matter how per hour, including higher speed from the crossing. According to CSXT, intelligent—may not be able to prevent passenger routes, it is particularly the most comprehensive safety regime a train-to-train collision in such important that any collision be that would avoid both collisions and circumstances. prevented. FRA believes that these more derailments would be to require Class II Accordingly, paragraph (a)(1)(i) aggressive measures are required to and Class III railroads operating on PTC requires certain protections for such ensure train safety in the event the routes also to be PTC equipped. rail-to-rail crossings-at-grade. While engineer does not stop a train before One commenter objected to the costs these locations are specifically reaching the crossing when the engineer of derails being borne by PTC equipped referenced in paragraph (a)(1)(i), their does not have a cleared route displayed Class I railroads. The NPRM did not inclusion is merely illustrative and does by the interlocking signal system and purport to address who would pay this not necessarily preclude any other type higher speed operations are possible on cost, but merely recited in a brief of potential train-to-train collision. the route intersected. The split-point reference that the assumption had been Moreover, a host railroad may have derail would prevent a collision in such made in the Regulatory Flexibility alternative arrangements to the specific a case by derailing the offending train Analysis that the railroad installing PTC protections referenced in the associated onto the ground before it reaches the would bear the cost. FRA does not table under paragraph (a)(1)(i), which it crossing. Should the train encounter a stipulate who is responsible for the cost must submit in its PTCSP—discussed in split-point derail as a result of the of split-point derails at rail-to-rail detail below—and receive a PTC System crew’s failure to observe the signal crossings at-grade, as the cost will be Certification associated with that indication, the slower speed at which borne in conformance with any PTCSP. the unequipped train is required to agreements between the railroads or Rail-to-rail crossings-at-grade that travel would minimize the damage to prior rights arising out of previous have one or more PTC routes the unequipped train and the potential transactions under which property was intersecting with one or more routes affect on the surrounding area. acquired. FRA would have appreciated without a PTC system must have an As an alternative to split-point some indication of how those costs are interlocking signal arrangement in place derails, the non-PTC line may be likely to fall, but no information was developed in accordance with subparts outfitted with some other mechanism provided on this point. A through G of part 236 and a PTC that ensures a positive stop of the The commenter also proposes enforced stop on all PTC routes. FRA unequipped crossing train. If a PTC exploration of lower-cost alternatives in has also determined that the level of risk system or systems are installed and lieu of split-point derails. FRA agrees varies based upon the speeds at which operated on all crossing lines, there are that less expensive alternatives to split- the trains operate through such no speed restrictions other than those point derails at rail-to-rail crossings at- crossings, as well as the presence, or that might be enforced as part of a civil grade can and should be proposed in a lack, of PTC equipped lines leading into or temporary speed restriction. railroad’s PTCIP or PTCDP. As FRA the crossing. Accordingly, under a However, the crossing must be stated in the preamble discussion of compromise accepted by the PTC interlocked and the PTC system or paragraph (a)(1)(i) in the proposed rule, Working Group, if the maximum speed systems must ensure that each of the ‘‘the non-PTC line may be outfitted with on at least one of the intersecting tracks crossing trains can be brought safely to some other mechanism that ensures a is more than 40 miles per hour, then the a stop before reaching the crossing in positive stop of the unequipped * * * routes without a PTC system must also the event that another train is already train.’’ (74 FR 35,950, 35,960). FRA have either some type of positive stop cleared through or occupying the expects, however, that any alternative to enforcement or a split-point derail on crossing. the split-point derail will provide the each approach to the crossing and The Rail Labor Organizations shares same level of separation as that afforded incorporated into the signal system, and FRA’s concerns regarding diamond by the installation of the split-point a permanent maximum speed limit of 20 crossings, supporting the requirements derail. miles per hour. FRA expects that these for interlocking signal arrangements, a CSXT submitted comments stating protections be instituted as far in PTC enforced stop on PTC routes, and that the installation of split-point derails advance of the crossing as is necessary installation of split-point derails with a would create a new danger, including a to stop the encroaching train from 20 miles per hour maximum authorized secondary collision. However, FRA entering the crossing. The 40 miles per speed on the approach of any believes that these aggressive measures hour threshold appears to be intersecting non-PTC route. However, at locations where train speeds exceed appropriate given three factors. First, the RLO believe that split-point derails 40 miles per hour through rail-to-rail the frequency of collisions at these rail should be required regardless of the PTC crossings at-grade, where not all routes

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have been equipped with a PTC system For instance, in the Chicago region, Appropriate speed margins or leeways or positive stop enforcement, are two serious train accidents occurred on associated with maximum authorized necessary in order to ensure train safety. the same Metra commuter line when speed are expected, but they must be FRA fully agrees that full PTC locomotive engineers operated trains at presented, justified, and approved technology that provides positive stop more than 60 miles per hour while within the context of a railroad’s PTCDP enforcement from all directions is a traversing between tracks using and PTCSP. more desirable method of protecting crossovers, which were designed to be Roadway work zones. Paragraph such locations. However, where such safely traversed at 10 miles per hour. (a)(1)(iii) requires that PTC systems technology has not been installed, the For illustrative purposes, the rule text mandated under subpart I be designed prescribed use of split-point derails in makes clear that such derailments may to prevent incursions into established approach to the crossing-at-grade is be related to railroad civil engineering work zone limits. Work zone limits are deemed necessary in the event the speed restrictions, slow orders, and defined by time and space. The length engineer of a train operating on a line excessive speeds over switches and of time a work zone limit is applicable without positive stop enforcement does through turnouts and that these types of is determined by human elements. not have a cleared route and fails to stop speed restrictions are to be enforced by Working limits are obtained by the train prior to reaching the crossing. the system. contacting the train dispatcher, who The split-point derail, in combination The UTA and APTA each submitted will confirm an authority only after it with the required speed limitation of 20 the same basic comment pertaining to has been transmitted to the PTC miles per hour or less, would prevent a paragraph (a)(1)(ii), with which SCRRA system’s server. Paragraph (a)(1)(iii) collision by derailing the offending train concurred. They contend that speed emphasizes the importance of each PTC onto the ground before it reached the restrictions are often set at a speed that system to provide positive protection for crossing. Should such a train encounter is far below a speed that would cause a roadway workers working within the a split-point derail in its derailing derailment. Therefore, they request that limits of their work zone. Accordingly, position as a result of the crew’s failure a PTC system should allow or display a once a work zone limit has been to observe or adhere to the signal speed higher than the actual speed established, the PTC system must be indication, the slower speed at which an restriction, but well short of a speed that notified. The PTC system must continue unequipped train is required to travel may cause a derailment. to obey that limit until it is notified by would minimize damage to the The RLO submitted a comment that, the dispatcher or roadway worker in ‘‘ unequipped train and the potential while the language prevent overspeed charge, with verification from the other, ’’ effect on the surrounding area. derailments accurately reflects the either that the limit has been released language found in the RSIA08, this and the train is authorized to enter or FRA has also considered the paragraph misses the congressional the roadway worker in charge has comments of the RLO that more secure intent of the statute and appears to be authorized movement of the train arrangements should be provided at unenforceable unless a derailment through the work zone. each rail-to-rail crossing-at-grade, occurs in conjunction with a PTC As a way to achieve this technological regardless of speed. FRA believes that system that fails to enforce an overspeed functionality, FRA’s Office of Railroad where the PTC-equipped and non-PTC- event. The RLO believe that FRA should Development has funded the equipped lines of the Class I railroads amend this paragraph to establish that it development of a Roadway Worker intersect, the railroads will generally will be a violation of this section if the Employee in Charge (EIC) Portable utilize the available PTC technology to PTC system fails to enforce an Terminal that allows the EIC to control ensure a positive stop short of the overspeed condition that is not the entry of trains into the work zone. crossing for any train required to stop corrected by the locomotive engineer While no rule includes the commonly short of the interlocking. The WIU at the regardless of whether or not such used term EIC, FRA recognizes that it is location and available onboard overspeed results in a derailment. Since the equivalent to the term ‘‘Roadway capability supported by a radio data link most overspeed occurrences do not Worker In Charge’’ as used in part 214. should make this an obvious solution. result in a derailment, the RLO asserts With the portable terminal, the EIC can FRA will scrutinize Class I PTCDPs to that waiting for a derailment to happen directly control the entry of trains into ensure that this is the case. FRA remains before declaring that the PTC system is the work zone and restrict the speed of concerned that more aggressive not operating as intended is contrary to the train through the work zone. If the solutions for intersections with Class II the purpose of the law. EIC does not grant authority for the train and III lines could impose substantial FRA intends and believes that the to enter the work zone, the train is costs without returning significant PTC core feature concerning ‘‘overspeed forced to a stop by the PTC system prior benefits. derailments’’ is such that the system to violating the work zone authority Overspeed derailments. Paragraph shall enforce various speed restrictions limits. If the EIC authorizes entry of the (a)(1)(ii) requires that PTC systems (i.e., civil speed restrictions, temporary train into the work zone, the EIC may mandated under subpart I be designed slow orders, excessive speeds over establish a maximum operating speed to prevent overspeed derailments and switches and through turnouts and for the train consistent with the safety addresses specialized requirements for crossovers, etc.) regardless of whether a of the roadway work employees. This doing so. FRA notes that a number of derailment actually occurs. However, speed is then enforced on the train passenger train accidents with a FRA elects to leave the rule text of authorized to enter and pass through the significant number of injuries have been paragraph (a)(1)(ii) as it was written in work zone. The technology is caused by trains exceeding the the proposed rule. FRA is aware of significantly less complex than the maximum allowable speed at turnouts various train control systems that have technology associated with dispatching and crossovers and upon entering a tolerance of 3 miles per hour before systems and the PTC onboard system. In stations. Accordingly, FRA emphasizes the system displays a warning to the view of this, FRA strongly encourages the importance of enforcement of train operator and that apply a penalty deployment of such portable terminals turnout and crossover speed brake application when the train as opposed to current methods that only restrictions, as well as civil speed reaches a speed 5 miles per hour above require the locomotive engineer to, in restrictions. the posted speed restriction. some manner, ‘‘acknowledge’’ his or her

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authority to operate into or through the especially when operating in concert non-signaled sidings and auxiliary limits of the work zone (e.g., by pressing with wayside, cab, or other similar tracks) will be display and enforcement a soft key on the onboard display, even signal systems—the final rule provides of the upper limit of restricted speed. if in error). more specific requirements in paragraph National Transportation Safety Board Pending the adoption of more secure (e) as discussed further below. representatives were asked to evaluate technology, such as the EIC Portable In numerous paragraphs, the final rule whether this strategy meets the needs of Terminal, FRA will scrutinize each requires various operating requirements safety from their perspective. The NTSB submitted PTCDP and PTCSP to based primarily on signal indications. returned with a list of accidents caused determine whether they leave any Generally, these indications are by misaligned switches that it had opportunity for single point human communicated to the engineer, who investigated in recent years, none of failure in the enforcement of work zone would then be expected to operate the which was in signaled territory. Based limits. FRA again notes that some train in accordance with the indications on that data, the NTSB staff decided that methods in the past have allowed the and authorities provided. However, a it was not necessary to monitor locomotive engineer to simply technology that receives the same individual switches in signaled acknowledge a work zone warning, even information does not necessarily have territory. if inappropriately, after which the train the wherewithal to respond unless it is In a filing to this proceeding, the could proceed into the work zone. FRA programmed to do so. Thus, paragraph NTSB indicated that switch monitoring expects that more secure procedures (a)(2) requires PTC systems in both dark and signaled territories will be included in safety plans implemented under subpart I to obey must demonstrate that a train will be submitted under subpart I. and enforce all such indications and stopped before crossing through a The RLO submitted a comment that, authorities provided by these safety- misaligned switch. Although the NTSB in order for a PTC system to effectively critical underlying systems. The recognizes that signal systems currently perform the core function of protecting integration of the delivery of the provide information about switch roadway workers operating within the indication or authority with the PTC positions, it asserts that FRA must limits of their authority, the PTC system system’s response to those ensure that any PTC system that uses must be designed in a manner that communications must be described and the signal system to monitor switch prevents override of an enforced stop justified in the PTCDP—further positions will provide adequate prior to entering an established work described below—and the PTCSP, as safeguards to prevent trains from being zone through simple acknowledgement applicable, and then must comply with routed through misaligned switches. of the existence of work zone limits by those descriptions and justifications. Accordingly, the NTSB agreed with a member of the train crew (i.e., by Again, FRA recognizes that in the case FRA’s decision to protect switches pressing a soft key on the onboard of intermediate signals, this may not within sidings with speed limits greater display, even if in error). The RLO involve direct enforcement of the signal than 20 miles per hour to prevent expressed support for FRA’s intention to indication. switch misalignment accidents. closely scrutinize each PTCSP to APTA submitted a comment that the Second, switch monitoring functions determine whether they leave any draft language of paragraph (a)(2) of contemporary PTC systems provide opportunity for a single point human appears to disallow systems such as an excellent approach to addressing this failure in the enforcement of work moving block overlays that may provide requirement in dark territory. However, limits. The RLO strongly encouraged superior service. Since APTA does not it is important to ensure that switch FRA to withhold approval of any PTC believe this was the intent of the position is determined with the same system that does not enforce a positive provision, APTA suggests that FRA degree of integrity that one would stop at the entrance to established work clarify the language in this paragraph. expect within a signaling system (e.g., zones until notified directly by the Paragraph (a)(2) is clear that the fail-safe point detection, proper dispatcher or the roadway worker in specified functions must be performed verification of adjustment). The PTC charge, with verification from the other, ‘‘except as justified’’ in the PTCDP or Working Group puzzled over sidings in that the movement into the work zone PTCSP. Here, FRA specifically intends dark territory and how to handle the has been authorized by the roadway to afford a means by which advanced requirement for switch monitoring in worker in charge. systems permitting moving block connection with those situations. (While FRA agrees with the concern operations could be qualified, either as these are not ‘‘controlled’’ sidings, as expressed by the RLO on this issue. stand-alone systems or as overlays such, they will often be mapped so that However, in the spirit of staying strictly integrated with the existing signal and train movements into and out of the within the mandate of the RSIA08 train control arrangements. sidings are appropriately constrained.) relating to required PTC functionality, The PTC Working Group had At the final PTC Working Group FRA will require that the actual method extensive discussions concerning the meeting, a proposal was accepted that of enforcement and acknowledgement monitoring of main line switches and would treat a siding as part of the main associated with work zones be came to the following general line track structure requiring monitoring presented within the PTCDP and PTCSP conclusions: of each switch off of the siding if the and subject to FRA approval. FRA First, signal systems do a good job of siding is non-signaled and the continues to strongly encourage use of monitoring switch position, and authorized train speed within the siding EIC portable terminals with electronic enforcement of restrictions imposed in exceeds 20 miles per hour. This issue is handshake of acknowledgement and accordance with the signal system is the more fully discussed below. authorizations to enter work zones. best approach within signaled territory Other functions. While FRA has Movement over main line switches. (main track and controlled sidings). As included the core PTC system Paragraph (a)(1)(iv) requires that PTC a general rule, the enforcement required requirements in § 236.1005, there is the systems mandated under subpart I be for crossovers, junctions, and entry into possibility that other functions may be designed to prevent the movement of a and departure from controlled sidings explicitly or implicitly required train through a main line switch in the will be a positive stop, and the elsewhere in subpart I. Accordingly, improper position. Given the enforcement provided for other switches under paragraph (a)(3), each PTC system complicated nature of switches— (providing access to industry tracks and required by subpart I must also perform

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any other functions specified in subpart enforcement functionalities where condition, impose a speed restriction or I. According to 49 U.S.C. 20157(g), FRA warranted. AASHTO submitted stop for an approaching train. must prescribe regulations specifying in comments expressing agreement that NYSMTA states that the addition of appropriate technical detail the inclusion of hazard warning detection highway-rail grade crossings to this essential functionalities of positive train in PTC systems for highway-rail grade subpart falls outside the statutory control systems and the means by which crossing warning systems is a significant mandate for PTC systems within the those systems will be qualified. enhancement to mitigate potential risk. RSIA08. This additional functionality In addition to the general performance AASHTO also underlined its position of presents an additional burden for LIRR standards required under paragraphs enhancing grade crossing safety further and Metro-North. Both railroads have (a)(1)–(3), paragraph (a)(4) contains by implementation of a program to fully hundreds of grade crossings in their rail more detailed standards relating to the eliminate at-grade highway-rail networks. NYSMTA further asserted situations paragraphs (a)(1)–(3) intend crossings through consolidation and that the language in paragraph (a)(4)(ii) to prevent. Paragraph (a)(4) defines grade separation wherever possible. was ambiguous with respect to whether specific situations where FRA has Some commenters expressed various ‘‘warning or enforcement’’ of reported determined that specific warning and logistic concerns with the proposed rule grade crossing failures would be enforcement measures are necessary to language relating to operational required, and what constitutes a provide for the safety of train restrictions issued in response to a ‘‘warning.’’ Required enforcement will operations, their crews, and the public warning system malfunction as required increase the capital cost of PTC, have an and to accomplish the goals of the PTC by §§ 234.105, 236.106, and 236.107 of adverse impact on operations, risk system’s essential core functions. Under this part. Other commenters asserted modifications to ACSES that could paragraph (a)(4)(i), FRA intends to that any PTC system functional trigger verification and validation, and prevent unintended movements onto requirements related to highway-rail create a further impediment to meeting PTC main lines and possible collisions grade crossing warning systems fall the other requirements of the proposed at switches by ensuring proper entirely outside the scope of the FRA regulations. NYSMTA therefore integration and enforcement of the PTC statutory mandate contained within the recommended that the final rule be system as it relates to derails and RSIA08 and therefore should not be limited at this time to the four switches protecting access to the main addressed in this rulemaking. requirements of the RSIA08. FRA believes that, although the line. The AAR stated that, while they Paragraph (a)(4)(ii) intends to account RSIA08 does not specifically require understand the safety concern, this for operating restrictions associated PTC systems to cover highway-rail grade function is not even remotely related to with a highway-rail grade crossing crossing warning system malfunctions the ‘‘core’’ PTC functions mandated by active warning system that is in a and associated operational reduced or non-operative state and Congress. Furthermore, the AAR asserts requirements, it does stipulate that FRA unable to provide the required warning that the great cost of installing wayside must develop rules and standards for for the motoring public. In this interface units at grade crossings on PTC PTC system functionality, which situation, the PTC system must provide routes would be prohibitively expensive include the four core features identified. positive protection and enforcement and would divert resources that would In light of the safety-critical nature of related to the operational restrictions of otherwise be devoted to meeting the the specified operational limitations for alternative warning that are issued to mandated PTC deadline. providing alternative warning to the crew of any train operating over NJ Transit stated that the RSIA08 does highway users pursuant to §§ 234.105, such crossing in accordance with part not indicate a requirement for highway- 236.106, and 236.107, and the 234. Paragraph (a)(4)(iii) concerns the rail grade crossing inclusion in the PTC catastrophic consequences that have movement of a PTC operated train in system speed and stop enforcement. often been experienced when those conjunction with the issuance of an Thus, the requirement contained in operational limitations have not been after arrival mandatory directive. While paragraph (a)(4)(ii) to include warning accomplished (including actual and FRA recognizes that the use of after and enforcement functionality simply potential impacts with motor vehicles arrival mandatory directives poses a risk adds an additional effort to an already involving serious injury and loss of life) that the train crew will misidentify one extremely aggressive December 31, and the fact that these operational or more trains and proceed prematurely, 2015, mandate for PTC. limitations equate to speed and stop PTC provides a means to intervene APTA and SCRRA stated that the targets that PTC systems may surely should that occur. Further, such requirements contained in proposed warn and enforce, FRA intends to carry directives may sometimes be considered paragraph (a)(4)(ii) were unclear. APTA the language contained within the operationally useful. Accordingly, FRA and SCRRA recommended that FRA proposed paragraph into this final rule. fully expects that the PTC system will should clarify that the language in Although FRA believes that the prevent collisions between the receiving paragraph (a)(4)(ii) is intended solely to proposed rule was clear that its purpose trains and the approaching train or provide that a dispatcher can place a was to enforce dispatcher-issued ‘‘stop- trains. restriction on a crossing that the PTC and-flag’’ orders and slow orders Numerous comments were received system must enforce in the event that a associated with credible reports of related to PTC system functional malfunction is reported. However, highway-rail grade crossing warning requirements associated with highway- according to APTA, paragraph (a)(4)(ii) device malfunctions, reference has been rail grade crossing active warning should not be read to require a PTC added to ‘‘mandatory directives,’’ a term systems. At the public hearing, the RLO system to protect a grade crossing and with a well-established meaning in FRA asserted that the use of technologies restrict or prevent a movement authority regulatory parlance (see 49 CFR part providing warning system pre-starts, of a train from being advanced across 220). activation verification, and various the crossing in the event of a failure While FRA recognizes that health monitoring information related to being detected in real time; nor should technologies exist to provide even the warning system to approaching paragraph (a)(4)(ii) be interpreted to further interface with warning system trains needs to be a required component require a grade crossing warning system activation and health, and encourages of the PTC system warning and to self-monitor and, if in a degraded railroads to include these technologies

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to the extent possible, FRA elects to not Paragraph (a)(4)(v) requires that ‘‘(1) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than 18 require those interfaces beyond that hazard detectors integrated into the PTC months after the date of enactment of the Rail which has been already identified system—as required by paragraph (c) of Safety Improvement Act of 2008, each Class within this paragraph. this section or the FRA approved I railroad carrier and each entity providing regularly scheduled intercity or commuter The NTSB submitted comments PTCSP—must provide an appropriate rail passenger transportation shall develop recommending that requirements for warning and associated applicable and submit to the Secretary of Transportation warning and barrier protection plans for enforcement through the PTC system. a plan for implementing a positive train Class 7 track should also apply to Class There are many types of hazard control system by December 31, 2015, 5 and 6 tracks as part of an approved detection systems and devices. Each governing operations on— PTCSP in order to reduce the risk of type has varying operational ‘‘(A) its main line over which intercity rail high-speed catastrophic derailments at requirements, limitations, and warnings passenger transportation or commuter rail associated grade crossings. FRA notes based on the types and levels of hazard passenger transportation, as defined in section 24102, is regularly provided; that the requirements contained within indications and severities. FRA expects ‘‘(B) its main line over which poison- or § 213.347 of this part require that a this enforcement to include a positive toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials, as warning/barrier plan be approved and stop where necessary to protect the train defined in parts 171.8, 173.115, and 173.132 adhered to for Class 7 track operations (e.g., areas with high water, flood, rock of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, and prohibit grade crossings on Class 8 slide, or track structure flaws) or to are transported; and and 9 track. Those requirements do not, provide an appropriate warning with ‘‘(C) such other tracks as the Secretary may however, address Class 5 and 6 tracks possible movement restriction being prescribe by regulation or order. specifically. Therefore, FRA believes acknowledged (i.e., hot journal or flat ‘‘(2) IMPLEMENTATION.—The plan shall that this comment falls outside the describe how it will provide for wheel detection). The details of these interoperability of the system with scope of the present rulemaking. As warnings and associated required movements of trains of other railroad carriers noted elsewhere in this preamble, FRA enforcements are to be specifically over its lines and shall, to the extent has developed Guidelines for Highway- addressed within a PTCDP and PTCSP practical, implement the system in a manner Rail Grade Crossing Safety on high- subject to FRA approval, and the PTC that addresses areas of greater risk before speed rail lines that endeavor to system functions are to be maintained in areas of lesser risk. The railroad carrier shall improve engineering with a strong accordance with the system implement a positive train control system in emphasis on closures. Those Guidelines specifications. FRA does not expect that accordance with the plan.’’ will be used to review and negotiate all hazard detectors be integrated into It is plain on the face of the statute grants under ARRA. the PTC systems, but where they are, that certain actions are required and FRA recognizes that movable bridges, they must interact properly with the some are discretionary and that these including draw bridges, present an PTC system to protect the train from the actions must come together operational issue for PTC systems. hazard that the detector is monitoring. progressively over a period beginning Under subpart C, § 236.312 already With the exception of the RLO’s strong on April 16, 2010 (18 months after governs the interlocking of signal emphasis on safety in PTC system enactment) and ending on December 31, appliances with movable bridge devices deployment, no comments were 2015. FRA has included revisions in and FRA believes that this section received on this issue; and the provision this final rule designed to fully express should equally apply to PTC systems is carried forward in the final rule. this intent. governing movement over such bridges. Paragraph (a)(5) addresses the issue of In paragraph (b) of § 236.1005 in the While subparts A through H apply to broken rails, which is the leading cause NPRM, FRA proposed to use 2008 traffic PTC systems—as stated in § 236.1001— of train derailments. FRA proposes to levels as a baseline to fix the network paragraph (a)(4)(iv) proposes to make strictly limit the speed of passenger and that would receive PTC, subject to any this abundantly clear. Accordingly, in freight operations in those areas where subsequently requested and approved paragraph (a)(4)(iv) and consistent with broken rail detection is not provided. amendments to the PTCIP that would § 236.312, movable bridges within a Under § 236.0(c), as amended in this justify removal of the line, and subject PTC route are to be equipped with an final rule, 24 months after the to the addition of lines that might interlocked signal arrangement which is publication of this final rule, freight qualify under the statutory mandate also to be integrated into the PTC trains operating at or above 50 miles per based on later data. In addition to FRA’s system. A train shall be forced to stop hour, and passenger trains operating at understanding of the rail lines Congress prior to the bridge in the event that the or above 60 miles per hour, are required intended to cover, FRA had several bridge locking mechanism is not locked, to have a block signal system unless a other fundamental reasons for doing so. the locking device is out of position, or PTC system meeting the requirements of First, in order to reach completion by the bridge rails of the movable span are this part is installed. Since current December 31, 2015, as required by law, out of position vertically or horizontally technology for block signal systems the railroads and FRA need to identify from the rails of the fixed span. Effective relies on track circuits—which also the relevant route structure very early in locking of the bridge is necessary to provide for broken rail detection—this the short implementation period and the assure that the bridge is properly seated final rule requires limiting speeds where railroads need to stage the financing and and thereby capable to support both the broken rail detection is not available to logistics to reach completion. weight of the bridge and that of a the maximums allowed under amended Otherwise, the statutory deadline will passing train(s) and preventing possible § 236.0 when a block signal system is not be met. Second, 2009 traffic levels derailment or other potential unsafe not installed. No comments were will be notably atypical as a result of the conditions. Proper track rail alignment received on this issue, and the provision recession, which has caused overall is also necessary to prevent derailments, is carried forward in the final rule. traffic levels to fall by as much as 20%. either of which again could result in Third, the burden of installing PTC, damage to the bridge or a train derailing Deployment requirements. Paragraph which the statute applies obligatorily to off the bridge. No comments were (a) of 49 U.S.C. 20157, as enacted by the very large railroads but not to others, received on this issue, and the provision RSIA08, reads as follows: may create an incentive to further ‘‘spin is carried forward in the final rule. ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.— off’’ certain lines to avoid installing PTC

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on lines Congress intended to cover. and trying to do too much too fast could from a misaligned main track switch in Finally, FRA was concerned about result in significant disruption of rail a collision very similar to the one at responsive and anticipatory actions transportation. Accordingly, during the Graniteville. Nor do we believe that being taken by some railroads in the initial implementation period, FRA will FRA was expected to be indifferent to face of emerging regulatory influences. not exercise its authority to require a the collision between two freight trains Accordingly, FRA sought in the NPRM build out of the PTC network beyond at Anding, Mississippi, on July 10, 2005, to take a snapshot of the Class I system something on the order of what the which killed four crew members, or the at the time the Congress directed the Congress contemplated. However, FRA collision with release of liquefied implementation of PTC and then, using will exercise its discretion to ensure that propylene gas and ensuing explosion at its discretionary authority under the the network design reflects safety needs Texarkana, Arkansas, on October 15, statute, to evaluate what adjustments and places a value on PTC that reflects 2005, which killed a resident of a may be in order. an understanding of the value applied community abutting the railroad.2 See, The Class I railroads responded with by the Congress. e.g., Rail Safety Reauthorization: the suggestion that FRA is without FRA understands the arguments Hearing Before the Subcomm. on discretion to require inclusion of lines surrounding PTC costs and benefits, Surface Transportation and Merchant that do not qualify as of 2015. However, having filed three congressionally- Marine of the S. Comm. on Commerce, FRA has already quoted the statute, required reports since 1994 with Science, & Transportation, 110th Cong. which makes clear the inclusion of information on the subject, having (May 22, 2007) (statement of Robert L. FRA-identified lines in the 2015 worked through the RSAC for several Sumwalt, Vice Chairman, National mandate. The statutory ‘‘shall’’ applies years evaluating this issue, having Transportation Safety Board). Thus, to these lines. Also, FRA and its funded PTC technology development FRA was provided latitude to require predecessor agency have long enjoyed and overseen PTC pilot projects from PTC system installation and operation the power to require installation of train the State of Washington to the State of on lines beyond those specifically control under the ‘‘Signal Inspection South Carolina, and having provided prescribed by Congress. While FRA has Act’’ (codified at 49 U.S.C. 20501– testimony to the Congress on many enjoyed the same latitude under pre- 20505). Further, FRA has been occasions. However, FRA believes that existing authority, RSIA08 indicates mandated since 1970 to issue rules and the issue is now presented in a different Congress’ elevated concern that FRA standards covering ‘‘every area of light than before. The Congress was ensure the more serious and thoughtful railroad safety’’ (49 U.S.C. 20103). In aware that the monetized safety benefits proliferation of PTC system conferring new responsibilities, the of PTC were not large in comparison technologies. Although, as noted above, Congress in no sense repealed what with the loss of life and injuries FRA would expect to exercise any such preceded them. associated with PTC-preventable authority with significant reserve, given Arguing in the alternative, the Class I accidents. With the passage of RSIA08, the high costs involved, it would be an railroads said that FRA had failed to Congress has in effect set its own value abdication of the agency’s responsibility rely on its discretionary authority to on PTC and directed implementation of not to determine that the basic core of accomplish its purpose. In fact, the PTC without regard to the rules by the Class I system is addressed, as subject statutory provisions were called which costs and benefits are normally would be the case based on 2008 traffic out in the authority section of the NPRM evaluated in rulemaking. patterns. text, with the exception of the Signal One could conclude that the Congress The tone of the Class I freight railroad Inspection Act, as codified (an oversight set the value only with respect to comments justified FRA’s concerns that remedied here).1 FRA also explicitly passenger trains and PIH releases, but railroads might take the wrong lesson stated in the preamble to the NPRM its that would assume that the interest from the statutory mandate. The lesson intention to use its statutory discretion expressed by the Congress over much FRA perceives is that the core of the to preserve congressional intent and tied more than a decade and a half was so national rail system, which carries that intention to the use of 2008 traffic limited. In fact, longtime congressional passenger and PIH traffic, needs to be levels. The railroads’ ancillary claim is interest stemmed in large part from the equipped with PTC and that Congress that, in effect, FRA would be ‘‘arbitrary loss of life among railroad crew used 5 million gross tons of freight and capricious’’ should the agency members in collisions, as well the traffic, the presence of PIH traffic, and require PTC on lines not carrying PIH as potential for release of other hazardous the presence of passenger service as of the end of 2015 absent a further materials. Most of the NTSB readily perceptible markers identifying congressional mandate or a showing investigations and investigations the core lines on which Congress wants that PTC on the subject lines would be pertaining to this ‘‘most wanted’’ PTC to be installed. In making its ‘‘cost beneficial.’’ transportation safety improvement in judgments, Congress was necessarily FRA is very conscious of the fact that fact derived from such events. looking at the national rail system as it PTC is expensive, and the agency’s In this light, the focus of the statute existed in 2008 when the statute was regulatory evaluation for the proposed on PIH and scheduled passenger trains passed. A corollary of that lesson is that rule does not seek to conceal it. The unit was clearly intended to provide specific the later disappearance or diminution of costs will be particularly high during guidance to the agency—a minimum the period before December 31, 2015, standard for action—and reflected the 2 Unique among these events, the Texarkana prominence of passenger train accidents collision may not have been prevented by PTC 1 Here we recognize the interest of railroads that (Placentia, CA, April 23, 2002; technology now being perfected. However, the will be making very costly investments to meet the Chatsworth, CA); and PIH releases consequences which ensued, including the fatality, requirements of the statute and this rule. The destruction of two residences and a highway bridge, ‘‘Signal Inspection Act,’’ as codified, makes it (Macdona, TX, June 28, 2004; and a significant evacuation are illustrative of the explicit that the presence of a signal or train control Graniteville, SC) in the most serious of consequences that can result from release of system on one line may not be considered in a civil the recent PTC-preventable accidents. flammable compressed gases in train accidents. action with respect to an accident on another line. FRA does not take this to mean that the There are approximately 100,000 carloads of PIH This law is also explicit that, once installed, such commodities shipped each year. There are a system may not be removed without approval. 49 Congress meant us to be indifferent to approximately 228,000 carloads of flammable U.S.C. 20501–20505. It should have been cited in the crew fatality at Shepherd, Texas, on compressed gases (other than those classified as the NPRM. September 15, 2005, which resulted PIH) shipped each year.

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one of those markers from a line does and PHMSA have a long and well The Rail Route Analysis Rule is only not necessarily mean that Congress established history of working together now being put into effect. Most railroads would no longer see that line as part of for the safe transportation of hazardous will not complete their initial analysis the core national rail system meriting materials; (2) as reflected in the until the first quarter of 2009, using 12 PTC. An alternative response would be rulemaking documents, FRA initiated months of 2008 data (per their request to adopt policies and tactics that the Rail Routing action in concert with in the subject rulemaking). While the penalize rail passenger service and PHMSA and participated in developing rule requires railroads to consider the attempt to drive PIH traffic off the the proposed rule well before the use of interchange agreements when network, consolidating the traffic that Congress mandated that the rulemaking considering alternative routes, FRA has remains on the smallest possible route be concluded; (3) the final rule affirms not had the opportunity to verify that structure for PTC. that PHMSA issued the revision in this has actually occurred with the two The freight railroads do not pretend coordination with FRA and TSA; (4) by railroads opting to comply with the that FRA is wrong in perceiving that the delegation from the Secretary, FRA is September 2009 due date for use of only freight railroads wish to remove PIH the agency responsible for administering six months of data. traffic from the network. That is wise, and enforcing the Rail Route Analysis The risk model intended to provide since the public record is replete with Rule and has issued a final rule (73 FR the foundation for the rail routing pleas from the Class I railroads to 72,194 (Nov. 26, 2008)) detailing the process is still subject to considerable remove their common carrier obligation procedures railroads must follow when refinement. No methodology is to transport PIH traffic. Rather, they challenging FRA enforcement decisions; currently specified for evaluating the contend, in effect, that FRA should not and (5) FRA and has worked with TSA potential impact of a PTC system (which trouble itself with this issue, since the to provide funding and oversight for would vary in risk reduction depending Congress and the Surface Transportation development of the risk model intended upon the underlying or previous Safety Board (STB) will ensure that PIH for use under the rule. method of operation). Under these shippers receive fair treatment, and the As it happens, FRA has good reason circumstances, there is a distinct Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety to be concerned with rail routing of PIH possibility the railroads may not give Administration (PHMSA) Rail Route commodities (as well as explosives and sufficient weight to train control 3 Analysis Rule will determine whether high level radioactive waste, which are (existing or planned). Railroads are not the traffic goes on the safest and most also covered by the PHMSA rule), both required to submit their route analysis secure routes. on the merits of the routing decisions and route selections to FRA for There are significant problems with (as the agency responsible for approval. While FRA intends to this contention. First, while the administering the rule) and in relation aggressively oversee railroads’ route Congress shows no interest in relieving analysis and route selections during the carriers of duty to transport PIH to the incidental impacts of re-routing decisions on the network of lines that FRA’s normal review process, including commodities, and STB has likewise their consideration of PTC, and require brushed back a recent attempt by a Class will be equipped with PTC technology. Because the Rail Route Analysis Rule rerouting when justified, this process I railroad to avoid this duty (see Surface will be resource-intensive and time- Transportation Board Decision, Union addresses both security and safety risks, operations under that rule necessarily consuming to complete. So FRA sees no Pacific Railroad Company—Petition for reason necessarily to defer in this Declaratory Order, STB Finance Docket lack the transparency typically afforded to safety risks. context to decision making made under No. 35219 (June 11, 2009)), it is by no the Rail Route Analysis Rule, even as to Significant re-routing has already means yet determined how the cost the role of PTC in safeguarding the occurred since 2008 as a result of the burden associated with PTC will be transportation of traffic within its ambit TSA Rail Transportation Security Rule borne. A railroad seeking to make the (PIH, certain explosives, and spent (73 FR 72,130 (Nov. 26, 2008)). In its most favorable case for burdening a PIH nuclear fuel). Instead, those decisions comments, CSXT states that the TSA shipper with the cost of PTC installation are simply useful information under this rule ‘‘required railroads to modify their would first clear a line of overhead rule. In April of 2010 when railroads routing operations to ensure that only traffic through rerouting and then seek must complete their PTCIP’s, a railroad attended interchanges are used for to surcharge the remaining shipper(s) may know its own routing decisions transporting TIH.’’ The resulting changes for the incremental cost of installing the under the Rail Route Analysis Rule, but are said to be ‘‘dramatic.’’ Comment of system. Under those circumstances, not FRA’s evaluation of those decisions. CSX Transportation, Inc., Docket FRA– would the STB decide that the railroad Furthermore, the Rail Route Analysis 2008–0132–0028.1, at 12 (Aug. 24, should transfer all of those costs to other Rule analysis does not consider the 2009). However, the TSA regulation shippers, or would the STB uphold the safety risk posed by the rail movement requires a secure chain of custody, not surcharge in whole or in part, thereby of hazardous materials it does not re-routing; and so any re-routing potentially making the cost of cover—but, as noted above, this is a resulting from the TSA regulation transportation unsupportable? legitimate concern when deciding The carriers would have us rely on presumably resulted not from the direct where to put PTC. command of the rule itself but from the the PHMSA Rail Route Analysis Rule in The Rail Route Analysis Rule desire to hold down costs by focusing determining whether the PIH criterion considers both safety and security, and the handoffs of these commodities requires installation of PTC on a PHMSA and FRA have worked with where personnel are already employed particular line. The Class I railroads’ TSA to ensure that the inherently comments state that ‘‘FRA is not even to oversee the transfers. This is perfectly the DOT agency with substantive sensible, of course, to the extent that the 3 At least one Class I railroad consolidated some responsibility for how railroads route re-routing did not create greater safety of its PIH traffic on signalized lines prior to TIH.’’ This is an odd point, considering or security concerns. However, since adoption of the Rail Route Analysis Rule. This that: (1) The statutory authority for both railroads have contended for years that reflects a recognition that method of operations matters, but that is not the same thing as having this rulemaking and the Rail Route their current routings were already completed a fully mature routing analysis against Analysis Rulemaking are vested in the optimized for safety, investigation is the 27 factors—something that will occur only over Secretary of Transportation, and FRA warranted. time in the face of great complexity.

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speculative risk of a security incident statutory discretion because it is the next 5 years (e.g., as a result of does not overwhelm known safety risks rationally related to the reduction in planned rerouting, coordinations, in the decision making. At the same risk Congress sought to achieve across location of new business on the line). In time, the structure is very responsive to the national rail system. addition, where the request involves known threats and special The structure of paragraph (b) of prior or planned rerouting of PIH traffic, circumstances. However, FRA is aware § 236.1005 is as follows: the railroad would be required to of at least one railroad that has balanced Paragraph (b)(1) brings together the provide a supporting analysis that takes its evaluation of safety and security policy of the statute requiring a phased, into consideration the rail security risks under the rule affording equal risk-based roll out of PTC with the types provisions of the PHMSA rail routing weight to each across the board. FRA of lines required to be equipped. FRA rule, including any railroad-specific and will be working with that railroad to has included the additional language interline routing impacts. FRA proposed determine the basis for this action and ‘‘progressively equip’’ to remind the that it could approve an exception if may later require the railroad to revise industry that the law does not expect a FRA finds that it would be consistent its analysis and possibly reroute traffic. risk-based implementation in which no with safety and in the public interest. See Railroad Safety Enforcement safety benefits are achieved until The AAR acknowledged in its Procedures; Enforcement, Appeal and December 31, 2015. To the contrary, the comments that ‘‘FRA does offer railroads Hearing Procedures for Rail Routing law and FRA evidence a strong the ability to apply to FRA for approval Decisions, 73 FR 72,194 (Nov. 26, 2008). expectation that PTC safety benefits will to not install PTC on a route which, in Since any given railroad may have be increasingly achieved as lines and 2015, is no longer used for PIH traffic thousands of origin-destination pairs for locomotives are equipped. See or which no longer meets the definition its PIH traffic, and since railroads are § 236.1006. FRA was distressed to hear of a main line.’’ However, asserted AAR, just at the threshold of cooperation to claims in the Class I railroad testimonies ‘‘FRA approval is predicated on the evaluate interline re-routing options, and filings to the effect that, not only are nebulous criteria of ‘‘consistent with this new program will settle out over a the railroads under no legal obligations safety and in the public interest.’’ period of several years during which to deploy incrementally and take In this final rule, paragraph (b)(4) lessons are learned. As custodian of this advantage of safety technology required provides the methods by which a program, FRA is best situated to by the law, FRA is without authority to railroad may seek the exclusion or conclude that using the products of require PTC system operation until removal of track segments from its initial analysis within a framework that December 31, 2015. We consider both PTCIP. Paragraph (b)(4)(i) deals with the confers significant discretion to utilize claims to be without merit on the face evaluation of track segments that no judgment should not control where PTC of the law, including FRA’s pre-existing longer carry 5 million gross tons or PIH is built—particularly given the strong authority over signal and train control traffic that the railroad seeks to remove incentives that carriers perceive to systems. from the PTCIP, either at the time of reduce the wayside mileage equipped Paragraph (b)(2) describes the initial filing or through an RFA with PTC and the fact that installation operation of the 2008 baseline as the thereafter. A request to remove a line of PTC might overwhelm other initial point of PTC implementation. would need to be accompanied by considerations with respect to PIH The section is clear that if any track future traffic projections. FRA routing. segment mandated for PTC exclusively understands that, in some cases, In the proposed rule, FRA said that on the basis of PIH traffic falls below 5 railroads will not be able to state with changes from the 2008 base could be million gross tons for two consecutive certainty whether total tonnage or PIH granted if ‘‘consistent with safety.’’ Even years, the line would be eligible for traffic will return to a line; and certainty though this is a familiar phrase drawn removal. The paragraph also identifies is not required. However, in other cases from FRA’s basic safety statute, concern the presence of PIH traffic in 2008 (or a railroad may in fact be able to make was expressed regarding how this term prior to filing the PTCIP) as initially reasonable projections (because of might be applied. The final rule further identifying the track segment in the control over a parallel main line that is defines that standard by adding a rule PTCIP for PTC implementation, but approaching capacity, planned for FRA decision making, i.e., if the refers to paragraph (b)(4) as a means of coordination with another railroad, remaining safety risk on the line removing it. etc.). exceeds the average safety risk per route Paragraph (b)(3) refers to changed In the case of cessation of passenger mile on lines carrying PIH traffic, as conditions after the filing of the PTCIP service or a decline of tonnage on a PIH determined in accordance with that might require a line or track line, FRA anticipates that approval of Appendix B to 49 CFR part 236, FRA segment to be added. This could occur, such requests will normally be routine. denies the request. The provision leaves inter alia, because overall freight However, in light of AAR’s comments, open the possibility of granting the volume increases, a shipper requests the final rule provides that, where PIH request if the railroad making PIH service on the line, or PIH traffic is traffic has been removed (or is projected application offers a compensating (actually or prospectively) rerouted over to be removed), three conditions must further build out on another line where the line to satisfy the Rail Route be met in order for FRA to approve such the resources would be better spent Analysis Rule. The provision requires requests. First, it is not expected that because they would enhance safety to a ‘‘prompt’’ filing when conditions there will be any local PIH traffic on the greater degree. FRA has available to it change. It makes clear that the railroad subject track segment. Second, to the adequate data to construct a simple risk will have at least 24 months after extent overhead traffic has been (or will model for use in this context and approval of its RFA to install the PTC be) removed from the line, the request expects to do so when reviewing such system on the line. must be supported by routing analysis requests. This provision treats similarly In the NPRM, FRA proposed that, in justifying the alternative routing of any risky rail lines similarly in carrying out order to have a line segment no longer traffic formerly traversing the line or the perceived congressional intent for carrying the PIH traffic be excepted from which might traverse the line as an PTC to be installed on the portion of the the requirement that it be initially alternative routing. This is not the same rail system Congress described, and it is equipped, the railroad would need to routing analysis required under part 49 an appropriate exercise of FRA’s provide estimated traffic projections for CFR part 172, but it may be presented

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in the same format. The difference is may be required despite the this position is untenable in light of the that, under the Rail Route Analysis consolidation of PIH traffic on other cost-benefit concerns (e.g., the 15-to-1 Rule, the current best route for the lines. For instance, FRA does not cost to benefit ratio under FRA’s movement of security sensitive believe that consolidation of PIH traffic economic analysis), especially on routes materials (which included PIH due to security reasons should unduly with minimal PIH traffic. The AAR materials) must be determined, taking influence PTC deployment. Train crews, takes the position that it would into consideration both safety and roadway workers, and communities therefore be arbitrary and capricious for security and assuming the existing along the routes have a strong interest FRA to not employ a de minimis method of operation, any changes that a in seeing PTC provided for their benefit. exception. According to AAR, its carrier may reasonably be anticipated to Examples of lines that could be preliminary analysis shows that a occur in the upcoming year, and any captured by this requirement are very meaningful de minimis exception could mitigation measures that the carrier high density lines to coal fields or save the industry hundreds of millions intends to implement. That is a tactical between major terminals where of dollars without significantly changing question, which focuses on a particular collision risk is significant and other the safety benefit calculation. geographical or logistical area. The very dangerous or environmentally question that needs to be addressed for sensitive hazardous materials are The AAR and some of its member PTC planning is the future best route, transported in significant quantities railroads assert that FRA has the taking into consideration the fact that (e.g., flammable compressed gas, authority to include a de minimis any route used for PIH will need to be halogenated organic compounds). Non- exception in the final rule. In separate equipped within the schedule contained signaled lines with traffic nearing comments, CSXT also recommends that in the approved PTCIP (but not later capacity and many manually operated FRA recognize a de minimis exception than December 31, 2015, for the least switches, together with significant for PIH transport. CSXT asserts that, in risky lines that need to be equipped). hazardous materials, would also be cases where a limited quantity of PIH This is a strategic question, which candidates for retention. materials are transported on a particular applies to the carrier’s entire network. As previously noted in the route—or where a segment of track Accordingly, this analysis would need Introduction and section VI to this happens to carry PIH materials on a to show that, even by equipping the preamble, FRA seeks further comments single occasion because of mere subject line with PTC, it would not have on paragraph (b)(4)(i). This provision happenstance—there are no safety an advantage over the route proposed to describes the specific considerations benefits that would justify costly PTC be selected. FRA will take into account in implementation. In addition, in the As noted in section VI of this determining whether a deviation from absence of specific language in the preamble, FRA seeks comments on how the baseline is ‘‘consistent with safety.’’ RSIA08 that would preclude FRA from elements of a route analysis should be FRA believes that this final rule could recognizing a de minimis exception, weighed by FRA when determining still benefit from input concerning this CSXT asserts that FRA possesses the whether rerouting under this paragraph application of the ‘‘consistent with requisite authority to do so. In support is sufficiently justified. safety’’ standard FRA has applied for of this assertion, CSXT points to three FRA includes one additional decades in considering waivers under cases from the DC Circuit (Shays v. FEC, requirement that invokes its 49 U.S.C. 20103(d) and whether FRA discretionary authority under the law. should interpret that standard 414 F.3d 76 (DC Cir. 2005); Even if a line has not or will not carry differently or in greater detail here. Environmental Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, PIH traffic after the 2008 base year or Accordingly, FRA continues to seek 82 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1996); and State later time period prior to filing of the comments on this issue with the desired of Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520 (DC Cir. PTCIP (i.e., for those filing a PTCIP for objective of providing greater 1993)), in which the DC Circuit new service initiated after the statutory predictability, transparency, and acknowledged the inherent authority deadlines), the final rule requires an consistency in decision making. More conferred upon agencies, in the absence additional test that fleshes out the specifically, FRA seeks comments that of an express prohibition, to promulgate ‘‘consistent with safety’’ notion would help clarify what issues, facts, a de minimis exception as a tool for contained in the proposed rule with the standards, and methodologies it should implementing legislative design and desired objective of providing greater consider when determining whether to avoiding pointless expenditures of predictability, transparency, and approve a request for amendment made effort. consistency in decision making. This pursuant to paragraph (b)(4)(i). FRA also FRA has reviewed the suggestion of test requires that, in order for a track seeks comments on how it should the Class I railroads that FRA possesses segment to be excluded, the remaining compare the levels of risk between lines an inherent, or at least reasonably risk on the line not exceed the average with PIH and lines without PIH for the inferred, authority to withhold any risk extant on lines required to be purposes of paragraph (b)(4)(i). requirement for deployment of PTC on equipped with PTC because they meet Paragraph (b)(4)(ii) contains a new lines with very low risk. FRA agrees the threshold for tonnage of 5 million provision that provides a basis for a that, as a general matter, it has an gross tons and carry PIH traffic. The railroad to request removal of a track inherent authority to create de minimis effect of this test should be to allow a segment from a PTCIP either at the time exceptions in its regulations to statutes majority of lines that formerly carried of initial filing or through an RFA PIH, which has been removed for thereafter. The provision is being added FRA administers. In fact, FRA has legitimate reasons, to be removed from in an effort to respond to comments utilized this inherent authority in this the PTCIP. With no intercity/commuter submitted on the NPRM requesting a de final rule in the following areas: passenger traffic and no PIH, these will minimis exception for low density track Providing limited exceptions for yard mostly be lines with moderate traffic segments with minimal PIH traffic. The operations; addressing the movement of involving commodities such as coal or AAR noted that, under the proposed equipment with inoperative PTC grain and minimal quantities of other regulations, even one car containing PIH systems; and providing for limited hazardous materials. However, with on a main line would require movements by non-equipped trains respect to lines with higher risk, PTC installation of PTC. AAR believes that operated by Class II and Class III

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railroads over PTC equipped main line.4 express terms of the statute.’’ necessary to bring risk down to de FRA believes these are all appropriate Environmental Defense Fund, 82 F.3d at minimis levels. uses of its discretionary authority. Based 466 (citing Public Citizen v. Young, 831 FRA has considered AAR’s proposed on existing case law, as well as its F.2d 1108, 1122 (DC Cir. 1987)). In other exception and has noted that, although review of the comments provided in this words, agency authority to promulgate the number of cars appears small, in fact proceeding, FRA believes that a de de minimis exemptions does not extend only about 100,000 loaded PIH cars are minimis exception to the statutory to ‘‘extraordinarily rigid’’ statutes. See offered for transportation in the United mandate requiring the installation of Shays, 414 F.3d at 114 (‘‘By States each year (approximately 200,000 PTC systems on any and all main lines promulgating a rigid regime, Congress loads and residue cars). Accordingly, transporting any quantity of PIH signals that the strict letter of its law FRA would expect that such an hazardous materials should also be applies in all circumstances.’’); Ass’n of exception might have a significant provided to low density main lines with ALJs, 397 F.3d at 962; Alabama Power, impact on the number of miles of minimal safety hazards that carry a truly 636 F.2d at 360–61 (As long as the railroad subject to the PTC mandate. None of the filings in this docket, and minimal quantity of PIH hazardous Congress has not been ‘‘extraordinarily none of the discussion in the PTC materials. rigid’’ in drafting the statute, however, With this said, however, and as Working Group, shed light on the ‘‘there is likely a basis for an implication explained below, that discretionary relevant facts despite an express request ’’ authority will not sustain the creation of of de minimis authority. ). Furthermore, from FRA to Class I railroads to supply the broad-brush exception sought by the such authority does not extend to facts bearing on their requested Class I railroads in this proceeding. situations ‘‘where the regulatory exception. Based on the limited United States Circuit Court decisions function does provide benefits, in the information available to FRA, FRA recognize that federal agencies may sense of furthering regulatory objectives, believes that such an exception would promulgate de minimis exemptions to but the agency concludes that the excuse installation of PTC on roughly statutes they administer. See, e.g., Shays acknowledged benefits are exceeded by 10,000 miles of railroad out of the v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 113 (DC Cir. 2005); the costs.’’ Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 almost 70,000 route miles FRA has Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. FLRA, F.2d 1541, 1557 (DC Cir. 1989) (quoting projected would need to be equipped 397 F.3d 957, 961–62 (DC Cir. 2005) Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 360–61) based on the proposed requirements. (‘‘[T]he Congress is always presumed to (emphasis removed); see also Shays, 414 Based on the limited information intend that pointless expenditures of F.3d at 114; Kentucky Waterways available, it appears that some of the effort be avoided’’ and that such Alliance v. Johnson, 540 F.3d 466, 483 lines within the AAR request carry very authority ‘‘is inherent in most statutory (6th Cir. 2008). ‘‘Instead, situations heavy tonnages (with many train schemes, by implication.’’); covered by a de minimis exemption movements raising the risk for a Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. must be truly de minimis.’’ Shays, 414 collision) at freight speeds up to 60 or EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 466 (DC Cir. 1996) F.3d at 114. That is, they must cover 70 miles per hour (predicting severe (‘‘[C]ategorical exemptions from the only situations where ‘‘the burdens of outcomes when accidents do occur). requirements of a statute may be regulation yield a gain of trivial or no Putting trains with PIH bulk cargoes permissible as an exercise of agency value.’’ Environmental Defense Fund at into this mix in the absence of effective power, inherent in most statutory 466 (inner quotations omitted) (citing train control would not be a de minimis schemes, to overlook circumstances that Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 360–61). risk as to those cars of PIH actually in context may fairly be considered de In this case, where release of the transported. Further, any public policy minimis.’’) (inner quotations and contents of one PIH tank car can have decision to excuse PTC installation citation omitted); Alabama Power Co. v. catastrophic consequences (e.g., the under these circumstances would have Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360 (DC Cir. 1979) 2005 Graniteville accident), FRA must to ignore other risk on those track segments. Creating a de minimis (the ability to create a de minimis determine whether the gain yielded by exception for less than 100 PIH cars on exemption ‘‘is not an ability to depart installing PTC on any rail line that a very busy and risk-laden track from the statute, but rather a tool to be carries a minimal amount of PIH segment simply on the basis of the used in implementing the legislative materials is ‘‘of trivial or no value.’’ number of PIH cars would, accordingly, design.’’); New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d During the RSAC Working Group 880, 888 (DC Cir. 2006) (noting the ignore the separate charge that the discussions conducted on August 31– Congress gave to the agency in 1970 to maxim de minimis non curat lex—‘‘the September 2, 2009, the major freight law cares not for trifles.’’). adopt regulations ‘‘as necessary’’ for railroads suggested that any track ‘‘every area of railroad safety’’ (49 U.S.C. However, ‘‘a de minimis exemption segment carrying fewer than 100 PIH cannot stand if it is contrary to the 20103(a)) and the value that the cars annually should be considered to Congress has obviously placed on PTC present a de minimis risk and be subject 4 This is not to say that there are independent as a means of reducing risk within the justifications for each of these decisions. Yard to an exception. (Their representatives reach of the four PTC core functions operations involve a mix of switching movements were very clear that the request did not under the RSIA08. Further, it would and train movements and have never been within extend to lines carrying intercity or stand on its head the structure of 49 public expectations for PTC because of issues of commuter passenger trains.) During the impracticability and inapplicability, as well as U.S.C. 20157, as added by the RSIA08, greatly reduced safety concerns. Movement of trains Working Group discussion, AAR was which mandates completion by the end with inoperative PTC equipment has historically asked to describe additional safety of 2015 of PTC on (1) lines of intercity been allowed for and governed within Interstate limitations that might apply to these and commuter passenger trains, (2) lines Commerce Commission and FRA regulations, and types of track segments (e.g., tonnage, proceeding otherwise would be a virtual of Class I railroads carrying 5 million impossibility. FRA does not understand RSIA08 to track class, population densities). The gross tons and PIH, and (3) ‘‘such other specify whether all trains operating on PTC lines AAR elected not to do so, adhering to tracks as the Secretary may prescribe by must be PTC equipped, and accordingly FRA the simple less than 100 car exception. regulation or order.’’ believes that it is required to make discretionary Subsequently, in an October 7, 2009, decisions in that regard. That said, the de minimis FRA believes that the broad-based concept clearly offers an alternative justification for docket filing, AAR suggested that safety type of de minimis exception sought by each of these decisions. mitigations could be applied where the AAR and its member railroads based

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solely on the number of PIH cars sustainable.5 Placing a limit on ruling line segment. FRA wishes to note that transported annually is not supported grade helps to avoid any situation in elements of PTC technology may in either legally or on a safety basis. which a train ‘‘gets away’’ as a result of some cases provide the means for However, FRA believes a limited a failure to invoke a brake application accomplishing this. Developing a track exception is necessary and justified for until momentum is such that no stop is database for a line segment, installing an those main lines that transport a truly possible (as the surface between the intermittent data radio capability, and limited quantity of PIH materials and brake shoe and wheel ‘‘goes liquid’’). utilizing PTC-equipped locomotives on that pose little safety hazard to the (PTC can prevent the initial overspeed the line could be used to enforce general public by not being equipped and intervene early.) Requiring that a temporary speed restrictions and with an operational PTC system. Thus, train carrying PIH and other trains be enforce track warrants without the FRA is including paragraph (b)(4)(ii) in ‘‘temporally separated’’ can help prevent major expense on the wayside. Where this final rule to permit railroads a collision in which a PIH car is struck necessary, based on somewhat higher exclude these types of main track directly by the locomotive of another train speeds, key switches could be segments from the statutory requirement train while traversing a turnout monitored; or, alternately, only those to install a PTC system. The initial (potentially exceeding the force levels trains containing PIH cars could be qualifying criterion is that of less than the tank can withstand). Given these speed restricted (with speed enforced on 100 PIH cars per year (loaded or combinations of circumstances, a de board). The notion here is to leverage residue), as suggested by the AAR. minimis exception should ordinarily be investments already made with modest In order to foster as much clarity as warranted. FRA would withhold additional expenditures that capture the possible regarding the exceptions approval only upon a showing of special bulk of the safety benefits while provided, FRA has broken the concept circumstances, such as where there specially protecting trains with PIH into two separate divisions. The first might be a need to protect movements cars. creates a presumption that a requested over a moveable bridge. Should FRA FRA believes that the savings from exception will be provided based on identify such a circumstance, the these provisions should be substantial. existing circumstances on the line, plus railroad might elect to proceed under Most of the line segments falling within an operating restriction. The second the additional exception. the criteria set forth for de minimis risk involves more challenging Paragraph (b)(4)(ii)(C) provides an will be non-signaled lines with limited circumstances and involves no alternative path to a de minimis freight traffic. The ability to omit presumption, but the railroad may exception by opening the door for equipping these routes with full data proffer safety mitigations in order to proposed risk mitigations that could radio infrastructure and with switch drive down risk to demonstrably drive risk down to negligible levels. The position monitoring at all switches negligible levels (subject to FRA railroad could offer any combination of should constitute a significant savings. review). Both are limited to lines that operating procedures, technology, or In fact, based on available information, carry less than 15 million gross tons of other means of risk reduction. Basically, FRA believes that as much as 3,500 traffic annually, a figure three times the the paragraph requires the railroad to miles of railroad could be included in threshold in the law. FRA has no ‘‘make its case’’ to FRA as to why a one of the exceptions provided. FRA confidence that a railroad could assure limited exception should be provided estimates that the gross savings from ‘‘negligible risk’’ in a busier and for the identified main line. The railroad omitting PTC from these lines might therefore more complex operation, and must provide FRA sufficient amount to about $175 million and that mitigations might offset roughly $32 allowing for consideration of lines with information to justify the application of million of those savings, for net savings more traffic could lead to neglect of a de minimis exception to the identified still exceeding $140 million. Of that other risk of concern (e.g., harm to train track segment, including current and amount, approximately $15 million crews in collisions, casualties to future traffic predictions, detailed could come from the first exception, roadway workers, release of other information regarding the safety hazards which deals with very low risk lines left hazardous materials). present on the involved track segment, in their current state and operated under Paragraph (b)(4)(ii)(B) specifies and an explanation of how the proposed temporal separation of trains containing additional tests that apply to the first mitigations would reduce the risk to a negligible level. FRA believes that, PIH traffic. exception: This provision was developed in the • The line segment must consist beyond the relatively narrow categorical exception provided in (B), a separate absence of a robust record. On October exclusively of Class 1 or 2 track under 7, 2009, the AAR filed supplementary the Track Safety Standards (maximum case-by-case analysis of each request is necessary to properly apply its inherent comments offering to work with FRA on authorized speed 25 mph); a more flexible process for de minimis • The line segment must have a discretionary authority to grant de minimis exceptions in this area. exceptions that would consider safety ruling grade of less than 1 percent; and mitigations designed expressly to drive • Approaching the issue in this manner Any train transporting a car risk down to de minimis levels on containing PIH materials (including a also permits full consideration of mitigations tailored to the particular candidate line segments. FRA attempted residue car) must be operated under to respond to this late-filed comment in conditions of temporal separation, as circumstances. FRA would evaluate the submittal and, if satisfied that the full recognition that the final rule will explained in § 236.1019(e) and in impose substantial costs and that Appendix A to part 211 of this title, proffered mitigations would be successful, approve the exception of the avoiding unnecessary cost is desirable. from other trains using the line segment, However none of the parties has had an as documented by a temporal separation 5 See Engineering Studies on Structural Integrity opportunity to comment on the plan submitted with the request and of Railroad Tank Cars Under Accident Conditions exception provided in this final rule. approved by FRA. (DOT/FRA/ORD–9/18; October 2009); see also 78 Accordingly, FRA seeks comments on Limiting maximum authorized train FR 17,818, 17,821 (Apr. 1, 2008) (discussion of the extent of the de minimis exception. proposed limitation on PIH train speeds in non- speed reduces the kinetic energy signaled territory prior to introduction of fully Such comments should be supported by available in any accident, and the forces crashworthy tank cars, which was later withdrawn sufficient and applicable safety data. impinging on the tank should be for other reasons). FRA notes that the time required for

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refinement of this provision should fit determined the public interest with focus on those areas as matters for within the existing PTC system respect to rail service. Again, FRA review. FRA could, of course, take a implementation timetable, since any would expect to recognize the value that different approach and order a lines where risk is low will be slated for the Congress placed on PTC as a means categorically broader implementation. PTC system installation relatively late in of risk reduction while not rewarding However, that has been understandably the implementation period that ends on transactions designed to avoid opposed by the railroads; and crafting December 31, 2015. installation of PTC on the line in any such approach would likely not Paragraph (b)(5) addresses an question. have been feasible during the time additional reason for proposing to use Paragraph (b)(6) states that no new available for this rulemaking. 2008 data as a baseline for PTC intercity or commuter passenger service Accordingly, what we have done in installation, rather than de facto shall commence after December 31, § 236.1011(b) is to require the PTCIP to conditions in 2015: i.e., the prospect 2015, until a PTC system certified under include a statement of criteria that the that Class I railroads will divest lines in this subpart has been installed and Class I railroad will apply in planning order to avoid the PTC mandate. Based made operative. FRA believes this is a future deployment of PTC and a on past practice at the Interstate clearly necessary requirement to satisfy requirement that the railroad’s Risk Commerce Commission and STB, lines the statute. In response to the Reduction Program Plan (required by sales can occur under circumstances comments, FRA has removed the the RSIA08 to be filed in 2013) contain where the new operator of the line is to reference to ‘‘continuing’’ of previous a specification of additional lines that a large extent the alter ego of the seller. passenger service. FRA agrees that the will be equipped in full (meeting all of The seller may retain overhead trackage remedy associated with any delays in the requirements of subpart I) or as a rights or merely lease the line; or completing PTC system installation partial implementation (subset of circumstances may be such that the should be determined based upon functionalities). Approaching the end of seller is the only available interchange circumstances at the time and without the initial deployment period, therefore, partner and thus continues to enjoy the disfavoring passenger service in relation FRA should be in a position to consider ‘‘long haul’’ portion of the rate. Typically to freight service. whether requiring additional PTC the buyer will have a lower cost General objections to a 2008 baseline. deployments will be appropriate to structure, and to the extent the sale is FRA is aware that the approach address remaining risk or whether merely a recognition that the line has embodied in the final rule may not play elective actions by the railroads will declined in traffic and will need to be out as an elegantly optimized risk meet that need. Over time, then, any redeveloped as a source of carload reduction strategy. If FRA were writing rough edges that remain should be traffic, that may be the best way to on a blank slate, the agency may have smoothed over. preserve rail service. However, to the considered factors that drive risk and extent that the seller sheds costs while thresholds for those factors, taking into Another objection to the 2008 retaining significant practical control consideration more than PIH and baseline is that more may need to be and depriving the buyer of adequate intercity or commuter passenger traffic. accomplished (i.e., the need to capture revenues, safety issues can arise. FRA Some lines that the Congress has more lines) in the period between has historically been reluctant to allow required to be equipped by the end of enactment and December 31, 2015. FRA discontinuance of signal systems in 2015 because of PIH traffic would be left responds as follows: First, no more will some of these cases, particularly where for deployment well downstream. need to be done than the Congress likely it remained within the seller’s ability to Under such a hypothetical scenario, expected. If FRA, an expert agency, did rebuild overhead traffic on the line others with heavy train counts or not foresee the ‘‘dramatic’’ consolidation downstream, where the seller retained without signal systems (and with robust of PIH traffic resulting from the TSA the right to repossess the property at a traffic) may have been in theory added rule, it is fairly unlikely that the later time, or where the line carried to the list for deployment of PTC by the Congress did. Second, the Class I freight passenger traffic. end of 2015. But FRA is not writing on industry has had it within its control to This background may help explain a clean slate. Rather, FRA is get this done, and one of FRA’s major why FRA made reference to the issue of endeavoring to implement the statute objectives in conducting this whether omitting PTC on a line that with fidelity both to its terms and its rulemaking has been to ensure success carried PIH traffic in 2008 might be ‘‘in intent, utilizing the discretion by keeping the technology bar at a the public interest’’ in the proposed rule. underscored by the law to get the job reasonable height and deferring as much In references during the subsequent done. as possible to work already RSAC working group deliberations, Part of the complexity of this task is accomplished. During the September 10, some question was raised about what the schedule. FRA has labored to 2009, RSAC meeting, the leaders of the that could mean. In light of that publish this final rule as soon as Interoperable Train Control project—an confusion, FRA has omitted the phrase humanly possible so that the industry effort led by BNSF, CSXT, NS, and UP from the final rule but has added could be ready to file PTC to develop interoperability standards for language addressing the issue of line Implementation Plans by the statutory the general freight system—advised that sales that expresses more directly how deadline of April 16, 2010. FRA will those standards will not be available FRA would handle line sales and then be required, again by the statute, to until the end of 2010 to the many modifications to a PTCIP. FRA’s approve or disapprove each plan within commuter railroads and Amtrak purpose is to ensure that decisions a period of 90 days. Accordingly, working in concert with a major freight regarding where PTC is deployed are establishing some degree of order in carrier. But the industry developed made in light of all the relevant framing the Implementation Plan Advanced Train Control Standards in circumstances. To the extent that this requirements is clearly necessary. the 1980s, standards that FRA approach represents an exercise of Taking the 2008 traffic base as a known pronounced mature in its 1994 Report, discretionary authority (and should any starting point, and evaluating any after which the industry abandoned the such exercise in fact occur), FRA would deviations from that base, will permit project. PTC interoperability standards expect to make the decision based upon FRA to identify any potentially were identified as a need in the safety criteria after the STB had inappropriate traffic consolidations and consensus report of the original PTC

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Working Group to the FRA in question, FRA would expect that line detectors at every location where a Administrator in 1999, and creation of to remain equipped. Further hazard might possibly exist. such standards was a major deliverable optimization of this approach is offered Paragraph (c)(3) requires, in the case of the North American PTC Program in the form of compensating risk of high-speed service (as described in (funded jointly by the FRA, industry, reduction. That is, a railroad could offer § 236.1007 as any service operating at and the State of Illinois). That delivery up a line that was not included in 2008 speeds greater than 90 miles per hour), was never made. In the interim, the traffic base for PTC implementation if it that the hazard analysis address any major signal suppliers, working through carries traffic that involves very hazards on the route and provide a the American Railway Engineering and substantial risk. Although this option is reason why additional hazard detectors Maintenance Association managed to offered, FRA does not expect any such are not required to provide warning and produce interoperability standards situation to arise. Based on FRA’s enforcement for hazards not already (again with FRA support), but these are review of known traffic flows and protected by an existing hazard detector. not standards that the freight railroads densities, FRA expects that most lines The hazard analysis must clearly have elected to employ. Accordingly, omitted from those reported in the identify the risk associated with the FRA concludes that the principal PTCIP based on 2008 data will fall into hazard, and the mitigations taken if a obstacle to completion of PTC is the a very low range of risk in relation to hazard detector is not installed and perfection of technology, including lines carrying PIH traffic. Further, FRA interfacing with a PTC system. For interoperability standards, by an believes it is very unlikely that any instance, in the past, large motor industry that has had two decades to legitimate consolidation of PIH traffic vehicles with parallel or overhead work. Any further delays in that after 2008 would have utilized a line structures have been left fouling active quadrant should not deprive the Nation that was not previously carrying at least passenger rail lines. Depending upon of a reasonably scaled PTC deployment. some PIH traffic. In short, although the the circumstances, such events can Other comments. FRA received agency may not have taken the same cause catastrophic train accidents. generally favorable comments on the approach, there is wisdom behind the Although not every such event can be base year issue from Friends of the congressional formulation based on prevented, detection of such obstacles Earth6 and the Rail Labor Organizations. conditions when the Congress acted. may make it more likely that the The Chlorine Institute also urged the In summary, FRA has fashioned an accident could be prevented. In its comments, Amtrak assumes that broadest application of PTC to the approach to review of candidate track on those lines where FRA has national rail network, and the American segments for PTC Implementation that previously approved such speeds (e.g., Chemistry Council submitted generally seeks to uphold the letter and the intent favorable comments without lingering portions of Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor of the RSIA08, that utilizes FRA (NEC) and Michigan line), a new hazard on this specific issue. The Fertilizer discretionary authority sparingly but in Institute commented that limiting lines analysis, which would serve only to a risk-informed manner, that it is allow that which is already allowed, to the 2008 PIH network could restrict administrable within the time allowed shipping options in the future and also will not be required. If so, it asserts that by law to review PTCIPs, that offers the the rule should make that explicit. FRA advocated a broader mandate. best chance of creating some stability in Final rule adjustments. FRA has has done so in the final rule. No further deployment strategy by permitting the changes were indicated by the further considered the need to optimize agency to focus on areas of greatest the risk reduction strategy captured in comments. sensitivity early in the process Under paragraph (d), the final rule this final rule with respect to lines that (including, as necessary, a threshold requires that each lead locomotive may no longer carry PIH traffic as of evaluation of whether Rail Route operating with a PTC system be some point (whether at filing of the Analysis Rule decisions require further equipped with an operative event PTCIP or thereafter). FRA has included evaluation), and that will ensure, to the recorder that captures safety-critical a requirement that the subject line from extent possible, that safety alone is the data routed to the engineer’s display which PIH has been removed would be governing criterion in determining that the engineer must obey, including required to be equipped with PTC only where PTC will be required to be all mandatory directives that have been if the line’s remaining traffic involves a deployed. electronically delivered to the train, level of risk that is above the average for Paragraph (c) provides amplifying maximum authorized speeds, warnings lines that carry PIH traffic. As noted information regarding the installation presented to the crew, including above, FRA would expect most lines and integration of hazard detectors into countdowns to braking enforcement and from which PIH traffic might be PTC systems. Paragraph (c)(1) reiterates warnings indicating that braking legitimately removed, exclusive of those FRA’s position that any hazard detectors enforcement is in effect, and the current that carry intercity or commuter that are currently integrated into an system state (‘‘ACTIVE’’, ‘‘FAILED’’, passenger traffic (which will need to be existing signal and train control system ‘‘CUTIN’’, ‘‘CUTOUT’’, etc.) equipped in any event), to fall below the must be integrated into mandatory PTC FRA intends that this information be average risk level and be removed from systems and that the PTC system will available in the event of an accident the PTCIP. These will be primarily what enforce as appropriate on receipt of a with a PTC-equipped system to are referred to as branch lines or warning from the detector. Paragraph determine root causes and the necessary secondary main lines, carrying moderate (c)(2) states that each PTCSP submitted actions that must be taken to prevent traffic volumes. However, if a line such by a railroad must identify any reoccurrence. Although FRA expects as a very busy coal line with intermixed additional hazard detectors that will be implemented PTC systems will prevent general freight (including, e.g., used to provide warnings to the crew PTC-preventable accidents, in the event flammable compressed gas or which a railroad may elect to install. If of system failure FRA believes it is halogenated organic compounds) were the PTCSP so provides, the PTCSP must necessary to capture available data clearly define the actions required by relating to the event. Further, FRA sees 6 Friends of the Earth also made detailed comments regarding administration of the Rail the crew upon receipt of the alarm or value in capturing information Route Analysis Rule that are beyond the scope of other warning or alert. FRA does not regarding any accident that may occur this proceeding. expect a railroad to install hazard outside of the control of a PTC system

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as it is currently designed—including Prior to the statute, PTC provided for and in the large majority of cases no the prevention of collisions with trains positive train separation, speed more than several hundred feet away not equipped with PTC systems—and enforcement, and work zone protection. from it. In contrast, in PTC territory accidents that could otherwise have The addition of switch point monitoring adhering to the aforementioned overly been prevented by PTC technology, but and run through prevention would have aggressive requirement, a train would were unanticipated by the system eliminated the Graniteville accident have to stop at the signal, which may be developers, the employing railroad, or where a misaligned switch resulted in in close proximity to its associated FRA. the unintended divergence of a train switch, and operate at no more than the The data may be captured in the operating on the main track onto a upper limit of restricted speed to that locomotive event recorder, or a separate siding track and the collision of that switch, where it would have to stop memory module. If the locomotive is train with another parked train on the again. FRA believes that, since the train placed in service on or after October 1, siding. The resulting release of chlorine would be required to stop at the signal, 2009, the event recorder and memory gas caused nine deaths and required the and must operate at no more than the module, if used, shall be crashworthy, evacuation of the entire town while upper limit of restricted speed until it otherwise known as crash-hardened, in remediation efforts were in progress. completely passes the switch (with the accordance with § 229.135. For As discussed above, FRA considered crew by rule watching for and prepared locomotives built prior to that period, requiring PTC systems to be to stop short of, among other concerns, the data shall be protected to the interconnected with each main line an improperly lined switch), a maximum extent possible within the switch and to individually monitor each secondary enforced stop at the switch limits of the technology being used in switch’s point position in such a would be unnecessarily redundant. manner as to provide for a positive stop the event recorder and memory module. Operations using hand-operated short of any misalignment condition. One commenter stated that paragraph switches would provide different, and However, after further consideration (d) was not clear. The commenter is arguably greater, difficulties and and discussion with the PTC Working unsure if FRA is requiring that all of the potential risks. Generally, in between Group, FRA believes that such an operator’s display be recorded and each successive interlocking and control approach may be overly aggressive and replicated upon playback. FRA only point, signal spacing along the right of terribly expensive in signaled territory. requires that the railroad capture the Under paragraph (e), FRA instead way can approximately be 1 to 3 miles safety-critical data routed to the display provides to treat switches differently, or more apart, determined by the usual which the engineer must obey. The depending upon whether they are length of track circuits and the sufficient choice of format to play back this data within a wayside or cab signal system— number of indications that would has been left to the railroad, keeping in or are provided other similar safeguards provide optimal use for train operations. mind that whatever format used for data (i.e., distant switch indicators and Each signal governs the movement playback needs to be available to FRA associated locking circuitry) required to through the entire associated block up for accident investigations and other meet the applicable switch position to the next signal. Thus, a train investigation activities. standards and requirements of subparts approaching a hand-operated switch As required by the RSIA08 and by A through G—within non-signaled may encounter further difficulties since paragraph (a)(1)(iv), as noted above, a (dark) territory. its governing signal may be much PTC system required by subpart I must While a PTC system in dark territory further away than the governing signal be designed to prevent the movement of would be required to enforce a positive for a power-operated switch. If within a train through a main line switch in the stop—as discussed in more detail signaled territory a hand-operated wrong position. Paragraph (e) provides below—a PTC system in signaled switch outside of an interlocking or amplifying information on switch point territory would require a train to operate control point were in a condition monitoring, indication, warning of at no more than the upper limit of resulting in the display of a restricted misalignment, and associated restricted speed between the associated speed signal indication by the signal enforcement. According to the statute, signal, over any switch in the block system, an approaching train may be each PTC system must be designed to governed by the signal, and until required to stop before entering the prevent ‘‘the movement of a train reaching the next subsequent signal that block governed by the signal and through a switch left in the wrong is displaying a signal indication more proceed at restricted speed, or otherwise position.’’ FRA understands ‘‘wrong permissive than proceed at restricted reduce its speed to restricted speed as position’’ to mean not in the position for speed. it enters the block governed by the the intended movement of the train. Signaled territory includes various signal. The train must then be operated FRA believes that Congress’ use of the types of switches, including power- at restricted speed until the train phrase ‘‘left in the wrong position’’ was operated switches, hand-operated reaches the next signal displaying an primarily directed at switches in non- switches, spring switches, electrically- indication more permissive than signaled (dark) territory such as the locked switches, electro-pneumatic proceed at restricted speed, while switch involved in the aforementioned switches, and hydra switches, to name passing over any switch within the accident at Graniteville, South Carolina. the majority. Each type of switch poses block. The governing signal, however, FRA also believes that, in order to different issues as it relates to PTC may be anywhere from a few feet to prevent potential derailment or system enforcement. We will look at more than a mile from the hand- divergence to an unintended route, it is power- and hand-operated switches as operated switch. For instance, if a signal critical that all associated switches be examples. governs a 3 mile long block, and there monitored by a PTC system in some On a territory without a PTC system, is a switch located 1.8 miles after manner to detect whether they are in if a power-operated switch at an passing the governing signal (stated in their proper position for train interlocking or control point were in a advance of the signal), and that switch movements. If a switch is misaligned, condition resulting in the display of a is misaligned, the train would have to the PTC system must provide an stop indication by the signal system, an travel that 1.8 miles at restricted speed. acceptable level of safety for train approaching train would generally have Even if the train crew members were operations. to stop only a few feet from the switch, able to correct the misaligned switch,

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they would need to remain at restricted switches are equipped with an signal system to detect misaligned speed at least until the next signal independent WIU. There could be many switches and facilitate safe movements (absent an upgrade of a cab signal switches within the same block in a city also provides an incentive to retain indication). or other congested area. Thus, there is existing signal systems, with substantial In signaled territory, to require a PTC a possibility that one or more switches additional benefits in the form of broken system to enforce a positive stop of an may be not in its proper position and rail detection and detection of approaching train at each individual the signal system would be unable to equipment fouling the main line. misaligned switch would be an transmit which switch or switches are Paragraph (e)(2) addresses movements unnecessary burden on the industry, not in normal position. The governing over switches in dark territory and particularly since movement beyond the signal could also be displaying a red under conditions of excessive risk, even governing signal would be enforced by aspect on account of a broken rail, within block signal territory. In dark the PTC system to a speed no more than broken bond wire, broken or wrapped territory, by definition, there are no the upper limit of restricted speed. line wire, bad insulated joint, bad signals available to provide any signal Accordingly, in signaled territory, insulated switch or gage rods, or other indication or to interconnect with the paragraph (e)(1) requires a PTC system defective condition. switches or PTC system. Without the to enforce the upper limit of restricted FRA believes that requiring a PTC benefit of a wayside or cab signal speed through the block. By definition, system to enforce the upper limit of system, or other similar system of at restricted speed, the locomotive restricted speed in the aforementioned equivalent safety, the PTC system will engineer must be prepared to stop situations is statutorily acceptable. The have no signals to obey. In such a case, within one-half the range of vision short statute requires each PTC system to the PTC system may be designed to of any misaligned switch or broken rail, prevent ‘‘the movement of a train allow for virtual signals, which are etc., not to exceed 15 or 20 miles per through a switch left in the wrong waypoints in the track database that hour depending on the operating rule of position.’’ Under this statutory language, would correspond to the physical the railroad. Accordingly, if a PTC the railroad’s intended route must factor location of the signals had they existed system is integrated with the signal into the question of whether a switch is without a switch point monitoring system, and a train is enforced by the in the ‘‘wrong’’ position. In other words, system. Accordingly, paragraph (e)(2)(i) PTC system to move at restricted speed in order to determine whether a switch requires that in dark territory where past a signal displaying a restricted is in the ‘‘wrong position,’’ we must PTC systems are implemented and speed indication, FRA feels comfortable know the switch’s ‘‘right position.’’ The governed by this subpart, the PTC that the PTC system will meet the ‘‘right position’’ is determined by the system must enforce a positive stop for statutory mandate of preventing the intended route of the railroad. Thus, each misaligned switch whereas the movement of the train through the when determining whether a switch is lead locomotive must be stopped short switch left in the wrong position by in the wrong position, it is necessary to of the switch to preclude any fouling of continuously displaying the speed to be know the railroad’s intended route and the switch. Once the train stops, the maintained (i.e., restricted speed) and whether the switch is properly railroad will have an opportunity to by enforcing the upper limit of the positioned to provide for the train to correct the switch’s positioning and railroads’ restricted speed rule (but not move through the switch to continue on then continue its route as intended. to exceed 20 mph). While this solution that route. The intended route is Unlike in signaled territory, FRA would not completely eliminate human normally determined by the dispatcher. expects that on lines requiring PTC in factors associated with movement Under the final rule, when a switch is dark territory, each switch will be through a misaligned switch, it would in the wrong position, the PTC system equipped with a WIU to monitor the significantly mitigate the risk of a train must have knowledge of that switch’s position. A WIU is a device moving through such a switch and information, must communicate that that aggregates control and status would be much more cost effective. information to the railroad (e.g., the information from one or more trackside Moreover, it would be cost prohibitive locomotive engineer or dispatcher), and devices for transmission to a central to require the industry to individually must control the train accordingly. Once office and/or an approaching train’s equip each of the many thousands of the PTC system or railroad has onboard PTC equipment, as well as hand-operated switches with a wayside knowledge of the switch’s position, FRA disaggregating received requests for interface unit (WIU) necessary to expects the position to be corrected in information, and promulgates that interconnect with a PTC system in order accordance with part 218 before the request to the appropriate wayside to provide a positive stop short of any train operates through the switch. See, device. Most of the switches in dark such switch that may be misaligned. e.g., §§ 218.93, 218.103, 218.105, territory are hand-operated with a much Currently each switch in signaled 218.107. smaller number of them being spring territory has its position monitored by a If the PTC system forces the train to and hydra switches. In dark territory, switch circuit controller (SCC). When a move at no more than the upper limit usually none of the switches have their switch is not in its normal position, the of restricted speed, the railroad will position monitored by a SCC and SCC opens a signal control circuit to have knowledge that a misaligned railroads have relied on the proper cause the signal governing movement switch may be within the subject block, handling of these switches by railroad over the switch location to display its and the railroad, by rule or dispatcher personnel. When it is necessary to most restrictive aspect (usually red). A permission, will then make the decision throw a main line switch from normal train encountering a red signal at the to move through the switch (i.e., the to reverse, an obligation arises under the entrance to a block will be required to railroad’s intent has changed as railroad’s rules to restore the switch operate at restricted speed through the indicated by rule or dispatcher upon completion of the authorized entire block, which can be several miles instructions), so the switch will no activity. Switch targets or banners are in length depending on signal spacing. longer be in the ‘‘wrong position.’’ The intended to provide minimal visual The signal system is not capable of RSAC PTC Working Group was indication of the switch’s position, but informing the train crew which switch, unanimous in concluding that these in the typical case trains are not if any, in the block may be in an arrangements satisfy the safety required to operate at a speed permitting improper position since none of objectives of RSIA08. Utilization of the them to stop short of open switches. As

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evidenced by the issuance of Emergency normally up to as much as a 5 mile per movement may diverge from one track Order No. 24 and the subsequent hour tolerance allowed for each speed onto an adjacent track potentially Railroad Operating Rules Final Rule (73 limit before the PTC system will directly in front of a proceeding FR 8,442 (Feb. 13, 2008)), proper actually enforce the applicable required movement of a separate train on that handling of main line switches cannot speed. Thus, in reality, the PTC system track. be guaranteed in every case. However, would not enforce the restricted speed Furthermore, FRA provides in now with the implementation and condition until each train obtained a paragraph (e)(3) that a railroad may operation of PTC technology, if a switch speed of up to 25 miles per hour. In this submit, with justification, alternative is not in the normal position, that scenario, it is conceivable that two PTC system enforcement associated information will be transmitted to the trains both operating at a speed of up to with unacceptable risk of train locomotive. The PTC system will then 25 miles per hour could collide with movements through improperly aligned know which switch is not in the normal each other at a combined impact speed switches in their applicable PTCDP or position and require a positive stop at (closing speed) of up to 50 miles per PTCSP for FRA approval. FRA therefore that switch location only. hour. While these examples are elects to leave the rule text of paragraph In the event that movement through a provided in the rule text, they are (e)(2)(ii) as it was written in the misaligned switch would result in an merely illustrative and do not limit the proposed rule. unacceptable risk, whether in dark or universe of what FRA may consider an The PTC system must also enforce a signaled territory, paragraph (e)(2)(ii) unacceptable risk for the purpose of positive stop short of any misaligned requires the PTC system to enforce a paragraph (e). FRA emphasizes that FRA switch on a PTC controlled siding in positive stop on each train before it maintains the final determination as to dark territory where the allowable track crosses the switch in the same manner what constitutes acceptable or speed is in excess of 20 miles per hour. as described above for trains operating unacceptable risk in accordance with Sidings are used for meeting and in dark, PTC territory. FRA paragraph (e)(2)(ii). passing trains and where those siding acknowledges that regardless of a Caltrain submitted a comment movements are governed by the PTC switch’s position, and regardless of recommending the removal of the system, safety necessitates the position whether the switch is in dark or following text from this section: of the switches located on sidings to be ‘‘ signaled territory, movement through Unacceptable risk includes conditions monitored in order to protect train certain misaligned switches—even at when traversing the switch, even at low movements operating on them. low speeds—may still create an speeds, could result in direct conflict Conversely, on signaled sidings, train unacceptable risk of collision with with the movement of another train movements are governed and protected another train. (including a hand-operated crossover by the associated signal indications, FRA understands the term between main track, a hand-operated track circuits, and monitored switches, ‘‘unacceptable risk’’ to mean risk that crossover between main track and an none of which are present in dark cannot be tolerated by the railroad’s adjoining siding or auxiliary track, or a territory. management (and in this case FRA plays hand-operated switch providing access the role of ensuring consistency). It is a to another subdivision or branch line, Paragraph (e)(3) notes that while type of identified risk that must be etc.)’’ Caltrain asserted that the PTC switch position detection and eliminated or controlled. For instance, Safety Plan is required to, and will enforcement must be accomplished, the such an unacceptable risk may exist address, whether a particular PTCSP may include a safety analysis for with a hand-operated crossover between configuration is an acceptable risk. The alternative means of PTC system two main tracks, between a main track examples cited can include a non- enforcement associated with switch and a siding or auxiliary track, or with signaled siding or auxiliary track several position. Moreover, an identification a hand-operated switch providing feet below the grade of the mainline and justification of any alternate means access to another subdivision or branch track. The possibility of the equipment of protection other than that provided in line. The switches mentioned in on the auxiliary track conflicting with this section shall be identified and paragraph (e)(2)(ii) are in locations movement on the main line track is no justified. FRA recognizes that, in certain where, if the switch is left lined in the greater at a crossover than if it is a single circumstances, this flexibility may allow wrong position, a train would be switch and turnout. Main to main the reasonable use of a track circuit in allowed to traverse through the crossovers are another topic that will be lieu of individually monitored switches crossover or turnout and potentially into addressed in the risk analysis. (addressing rail integrity as well as the path of another train operating on an FRA believes it to be important to identification of open switches). adjoining main track, siding, or other identify the requirement that a PTC Paragraph (e)(4) provides amplifying route. Even if such switches were system must enforce a positive stop information regarding existing standards located within a signaled territory, the short of any main line switch, and any of subparts A through G of this part signal governing movements over the switch on a siding where the allowable related to switches, movable-point frogs, switch locations, for both tracks as may speed is in excess of 20 miles per hour, and derails in the route governed that be applicable, would be displaying their if movement of a train over such a are equally applicable to PTC systems most restrictive aspect (usually red). switch not in its proper position could unless otherwise provided in a PTCSP This restrictive signal indication would create an unacceptable risk. FRA is approved under this subpart. This in turn allow both trains to approach the providing within the language of the paragraph explains that the FRA location at restricted speed where one or rule example of movements through an required and accepted railroad industry both of the crossover switches are lined improperly lined switch that FRA standard types of components used to in the reverse position. Since the PTC believes would result in unacceptable monitored switch point position and system is not capable of actually risk. This unacceptable risk is not how those devices are required to enforcing restricted speed other than its related to the potential ‘‘roll-out’’ of function. This paragraph allows for upper limits, the PTC system would equipment from another track onto the some alternative method to be used to enforce a 15 or 20 mile per hour speed main track, which was referenced in the accomplish the same level of protection limit dependent upon the operating comment submitted by Caltrain, but if it is identified and justified in a rules of the railroad. However, there is constitutes any situation where a PTCSP approved under this subpart.

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The AAR submitted comment that the PTC system is considered to be may not always be possible, especially language within paragraph (e)(4), which configured to prevent train-to-train when a track segment is out of service was presumably derived from subpart C collisions, as required under paragraph and a train must be rerouted in order to of this part, prescribes conditions under (a). FRA will consider the PTC system continue to destination. Accordingly, which ‘‘movement authorities can only as providing the required protection if paragraph (g) allows for temporary be provided.’’ (emphasis added). The the PTC system enforces the upper rerouting of traffic between PTC AAR contends that, in the context of limits of restricted speed. These criteria equipped lines and lines not equipped PTC design, this paragraph seems to will allow following trains to pass with PTC systems. FRA anticipates two prescribe a specific method (the intermediate signals displaying a situations—emergencies and planned withholding of movement authorities) to restricting aspect and will allow for the maintenance—that would justify such provide switch position protection per issuance of joint mandatory directives. rerouting. the requirements identified by Where a wayside signal displays a Paragraph (g) provides the paragraphs (e)(1) through (e)(3). The ‘‘Stop,’’ ‘‘Stop and Proceed,’’ or preconditions and procedural rules to AAR asserts that paragraph (e)(4) should ‘‘Restricted Proceed’’ indication, allow or otherwise effectuate a be clarified or revised to allow for PTC paragraph (f)(1)(i) requires the PTC temporary rerouting in the event of an systems that may meet these system to enforce the signal indication emergency or planned maintenance that requirements by methods other than, or accordingly. In the case of a ‘‘Stop’’ or would prevent usage of the regularly in addition to, those methods prescribed ‘‘Stop and Proceed’’ indication, used track. Historically, FRA has dealt by paragraph (e)(4). Thus, the AAR operating rules require that the train with temporary rerouting on an ad hoc suggests rewording paragraph (e)(4) to will be brought to a stop prior to passing basis. For instance, on November 12, include the language: ‘‘unrestricted the signal displaying the indication. The 1996, FRA granted UP, under its movement authorities can only be train may then proceed at 15 or 20 miles application RS&I–AP–No. 1099, provided’’. per hour, as applicable according to the conditional approval for relief from the FRA agrees with the principle of the host railroad’s operating rule(s) for requirements of § 236.566, which AAR’s comment. The intention appears restricted speed. In the case of a required equipping controlling to be that the permissiveness of all ‘‘Restricted Proceed’’ indication, the locomotives with an operative apparatus movement authorities over any train would be allowed to pass the responsive to all automatic train stop, switches, movable-point frogs, or derails signal at 15 or 20 miles per hour. Some train control, or cab signal territory must be determined by control circuits existing PTC systems do not enforce the equipment. The conditional approval or their electronic equivalent selected stop indication under these provided for ‘‘detour train movements through a circuit controller or circumstances, and FRA believes that necessitated by catastrophic occurrence functionally equivalent device that is this is acceptable. However, in either such as derailment, flood, fire, or operated directly by the switch points, event, the speed restriction would be hurricane’’ on certain listed UP derail, or switch locking mechanism, or enforced until the train passes a more territories configured with automatic through relay or electronic device favorable signal indication. NJ Transit cab signals (ACS) or automatic train controlled by such circuit controller or asserted, and FRA agrees, that in dark stop (ATS). Ultimately, the relief would functionally equivalent device. territory where trains operate by allow trains not equipped with the Unrestricted movement authorities can mandatory directive, the PTC system apparatus required under § 236.566 to only be provided when each switch, would be expected to enforce the upper enter those ACS and ATS territories. movable-point frog, or derail in the limit of restricted speed on a train when However, the relief was conditional route governed is in proper position. the train was allowed into a block upon establishing an absolute block in FRA has therefore revised paragraph already occupied by another preceding advance of each train movement—as (e)(4) to read as follows: ‘‘The control train traveling in the same direction. In prescribed by General Code of Operating circuit or electronic equivalent for all freight operations, there may be Rules (GCOR) 11.1 and 11.2—and movement authorities over any situations where, in order to accomplish notifying the applicable FRA Regional switches, movable-point frogs, or derails local switching, further latitude would Headquarters. The detour would only be shall be selected through circuit be necessary, so long as the upper limit permissible for up to seven days and controller or functionally equivalent of restricted speed is enforced. FRA could modify or rescind the relief device operated directly by switch NJ Transit suggests that the FRA for railroad non-compliance. points, derail, or by switch locking consider modifying the verbiage to more On February 7, 2006, that relief was mechanism, or through relay or clearly define the expectation of the temporarily extended to include defined electronic device controlled by such operating rules and enforcement territory where approximately two circuit controller or functionally requirements associated with the Stop months of extensive track improvements equivalent device, for each switch, and Proceed indication. were necessary. Additional conditions movable-point frog, or derail in the FRA fully understands the concern for this relief included a maximum train route governed. Circuits or electronic presented by NJ Transit, but suggests speed of 65 miles per hour and equivalents shall be arranged so that any that the recommended modification to notification to the FRA Region 8 movement authorities less restrictive verbiage is already provided for in the Headquarters within 24 hours of the than those prescribed in paragraphs language of paragraph (f)(1)(ii). FRA has beginning of the non-equipped detour (e)(1) and (e)(2) of this section can only therefore elected to retain the language train movements and immediately upon be provided when each switch, of paragraph (f) in the final rule. any accident or incident. On February movable-point frog, or derail in the Paragraphs (g) through (k) all concern 27, 2007, FRA provided similar route governed is in proper position, situations where temporary rerouting temporary relief for another three and shall be in accordance with may be necessary and would affect months on the same territory. subparts A through G of this part, unless application of the operational rules While the aforementioned conditional it is otherwise provided in a PTCSP under subpart I. While the final rule relief was provided on an ad hoc basis, approved under this subpart.’’ attempts to reduce the opportunity for FRA feels that codifying rules regulating Paragraph (f) provides amplifying PTC and non-PTC trains to co-exist on temporary rerouting involving PTC information for determining whether a the same track, FRA recognizes that this system track or locomotive equipment is

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necessary due to the potential dangers instantaneous rerouting without an FRA approval, to perform planned of allowing mixed PTC and non-PTC appropriate request and, in cases where maintenance rerouting. The relative traffic on the same track and the the request is for rerouting to exceed 30 predictability of planned maintenance inevitable increased presence of PTC days, FRA approval. Accordingly, under activities allows railroads to provide and PTC-like technologies. Moreover, paragraph (g), procedurally speaking, FRA with much more advanced request FRA believes that the subject railroads temporary rerouting for emergency of any necessary rerouting and allows and FRA would benefit from more circumstances will be treated differently FRA to review that request. FRA regulatory flexibility to work more than temporary rerouting for planned requires that the request be made at quickly and efficiently to provide for maintenance. While FRA continues to least 10 calendar days before the temporary rerouting to mitigate the have an interest in monitoring all planned maintenance rerouting problems associated with emergency temporary rerouting to ensure that it is commences. situations and infrastructure occurring as contemplated by FRA and To ensure a retrievable record, the maintenance. within the confines of the rule, the request must be made in writing. It may Under the final rule, FRA is providing timing of FRA notification, and the be submitted to FRA by fax, e-mail, or for temporary rerouting of non-PTC approval procedures, reflects the courier. Because of security protocols trains onto PTC track and PTC trains aforementioned differences. placed in effect after the terrorist attacks onto non-PTC track. A train will not be When an emergency circumstance of September 11, 2001, regular mail considered rerouted for purposes of the occurs that would prevent usage of the undergoes irradiation to ensure that any conditions set forth in this section if it regularly used track, and would require pathogens have been destroyed prior to operates on a PTC line that is other than temporary rerouting, the subject railroad delivery. The irradiation process adds its ‘‘normal route,’’ which is equipped must notify FRA within one business significant delay to FRA’s receipt of the and functionally responsive to the PTC day after the rerouting commences. To document, and the submitted document system over which it is subsequently provide for communicative flexibility in may be damaged due to the irradiation operated, or if it is a non-PTC train (not emergency situations, the final rule process. Thus, FRA implores those a passenger train or a freight train provides for such notification to be making a rerouting request in writing to having any PIH materials) operating on made in writing or by telephone. FRA deliver the request through other, more a non-PTC line that is other than its provides that written notification may acceptable, means. ‘‘normal route.’’ be accomplished via overnight mail, e- The lack of emergency circumstances Paragraph (g) effectively provides mail, or facsimile. In any event, the makes telephonic communication less temporary civil penalty immunity from railroad should take the steps necessary necessary, since the communication various applicable requirements of this for the method of notification selected need not be immediate, and less subpart, including provisions under to include confirmation that an preferable, since it may not be subpart I relating to controlling appropriate person actually on duty accurately documented for subsequent locomotives, similar to how waivers with FRA receives the notification and reference and review. Like notifications from FRA have provided certain FRA is duly aware of the situation. for emergency rerouting, the request for railroads immunity from § 236.566. While telephone notification may planned rerouting must include the FRA expects that emergency rerouting provide for easy communications by the number of days that the rerouting will require some flexibility in order to railroad, a mere phone call would not should occur. If the planned respond to circumstances outside of the provide for documentation of maintenance will require rerouting up railroad’s control—most notably information required under paragraph to 30 days, then the request must be changes in the weather, vandalism, and (g). Moreover, if for some reason the made with the Regional Administrator. other unexpected occurrences—that phone call is made at a time when the If it will require rerouting for more than would result in potential loss of life or designated telephone operator is not on 30 days, then the request must be made property or prevent the train from duty or if the caller is only able to leave with the Associate Administrator. These continuing on its normal route. While a message with the FRA voice mail longer time periods reflects FRA’s paragraph (g) lists a number of possible system, the possibility exists that the opportunity to review and approve the emergency circumstances, they are applicable FRA personnel would not be request. In other words, since FRA primarily included for illustrative timely notified of the communication expects that the review and approval purposes and are not a limiting factor in and its contents. process will provide more confidence determining whether an event rises to Emergency rerouting can only occur that a higher level of safety will be an emergency. For instance, FRA would without FRA approval for fourteen (14) maintained, the rerouting period for also consider allowing rerouting in the consecutive calendar days. If the planned maintenance activities may be event use of the track is prevented by railroad requires more time, it must more than the 14 days allotted for vandalism or terrorism. While these make a request to the Associate emergency rerouting. events are not the primary reasons for Administrator. The request must be Regardless of whether the temporary which paragraph (g) would allow made directly to the Associate rerouting is the result of an emergency rerouting, FRA recognizes that they may Administrator and separately from the situation or planned maintenance, the fall outside of the railroad’s control. initial notification sometime before the communication to FRA required under In the event of an emergency that 14-day emergency rerouting period paragraph (g) must include the would prevent usage of the track, expires. Unless the Associate information listed under paragraph (i). temporary rerouting may occur instantly Administrator notifies the railroad of his This information is necessary to provide by the railroad without immediate FRA or her approval before the end of the FRA with context and details of the notice or approval. By contrast, the vast allowable emergency rerouting rerouting. To attempt to provide majority of maintenance activities can timeframe, the relief provided by railroads with the flexibility intended be predicted by railroad operators. paragraph (g) will expire at the end of under paragraph (g), and to attempt to While the final rule provides for that timeframe. prevent enforcement of the rules from temporary rerouting for such activities, While a mere notification is necessary which the railroad should be receiving the lack of exigent circumstances does to commence emergency rerouting, a relief, FRA must be able to coordinate not require the allowance of request must be made, with subsequent with its inspectors and other personnel.

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This information may also eventually be no planned maintenance rerouting may signal indication, at no more than 40 important to FRA in developing occur if the Regional Administrator miles per hour to the next available statistical analyses and models, disapproves of the request. If the point of communication where report reevaluating its rules, and determining Regional Administrator does not must be made to a designated officer. the actual level of danger inherent in provide notice preventing the temporary Where no automatic block signal system mixing PTC and non-PTC traffic on the rerouting, then the planned is in use, the train shall be permitted to same tracks. maintenance rerouting may begin and proceed at restricted speed or where an For emergency rerouting purposes, occur as requested. However, once the automatic block signal system is in the information is also necessary for planned maintenance rerouting begins, operation according to signal indication FRA to determine whether it should the Regional Administrator may at any but not to exceed medium speed to a order the railroad or railroads to cease time order the railroad or railroads to point where absolute block can be rerouting or provide additional cease the rerouting in accordance with established. Where an absolute block is conditions that differ from the standard paragraph (k). established in advance of the train on conditions specified in paragraph (i). Requests for planned maintenance which the device is inoperative, the FRA recognizes the importance of rerouting exceeding 30 days, however, train may proceed at not to exceed 79 allowing temporary rerouting to occur must be made to the Associate miles per hour. Paragraph (j) utilizes automatically in emergency Administrator and are not self- that absolute block condition, which circumstances. However, FRA must also executing. No such rerouting may occur more actively engages the train maintain its responsibility of ensuring without Associate Administrator dispatcher in managing movement of that such rerouting occurs lawfully and approval, even if the date passes on the train over the territory (in both as intended by the rules. Accordingly, which the planned maintenance was signaled and non-signaled territory). the final rule provides the opportunity scheduled to commence. Under Recognizing that re-routes under this for FRA to review the information paragraph (h), like the Regional section will occur in non-signaled required by paragraph (g) to be Administrator, the Associate territory, the maximum authorized submitted in accordance with paragraph Administrator may provide conditional speeds associated with such territory are (i) and order the railroad or railroads to approval, request further information, or used as limitations on the speed of re- cease rerouting if FRA finds that such disapprove of the request to reroute. routed trains. FRA agrees with the rerouting is not appropriate or Once approved rerouting commences, comments of labor representatives in the permissible in accordance with the the Associate Administrator may also PTC Working Group who contend that requirements of paragraphs (g) through order the rerouting to cease in the statutory mandate alters to some (i), and as may be so directed in accordance with paragraph (k). extent what would otherwise be accordance with paragraph (k), as Where a train rerouted onto a track considered reasonable for these discussed further below. equipped with a PTC system is, for circumstances. For rerouting due to planned whatever reason, not compatible and It should be noted that this paragraph maintenance, the information required functionally responsive to that PTC (j) was added by FRA after further under paragraph (i) is equally applicable system (e.g., an unequipped controlling consideration of this issue and was not and will be used to determine whether locomotive, or one equipped but not part of the PTC Working Group the railroad should not reroute at all. If compatible with the associated wayside, consensus. FRA received several the request for planned maintenance is office, or communications system), such comments associated with the for a period of up to 30 days, then the train must be operated in accordance temporary rerouting requirements and request and information must be sent in with § 236.1029. Where any train is the restrictive operational conditions writing to the Regional Administrator of rerouted onto a track segment that is not imposed by paragraphs (j)(1) and (j)(2) the region in which the temporary equipped with a PTC system, such train as being overly burdensome, rerouting will occur. While such a must be operated in accordance with the unsupported and inappropriate. request is self-executing—meaning that operating rules applicable to the track Specifically, the idea that a train it will automatically be considered segment on which the train is being rerouted from a PTC line to a non-PTC permissible if not otherwise responded rerouted. line should be treated differently than to—the Regional Administrator may Moreover, as referenced in paragraph the existing traffic on the non-PTC line prevent the temporary rerouting from (g) as it applies to both emergency and is unjustified. The commenters suggest starting by simply notifying the railroad planned maintenance circumstances, current FRA operational requirements or railroads that its request is not the track upon which FRA expects the contained in §§ 236.0(c) and (d) approved. The Regional Administrator rerouting to occur would require certain providing for speeds greater than 49 may otherwise provide conditional mitigating protections listed under miles per hour for freight and 59 miles approval, request that further paragraph (j) in light of the mixed PTC per hour for passenger trains where a information be supplied to the Regional and non-PTC traffic. While FRA block signal system and/or an automatic Administrator or Associate purposefully intends paragraph (j) to cab signal, automatic train stop, or Administrator, or disapprove the apply similarly to § 236.567, FRA automatic train control system is in request altogether. If the railroad still recognizes that § 236.567 does not place, is applied safely today and seeks to reroute due to planned account for the statutory mandates of should continue as the applicable maintenance activities, it must provide interoperability and the core PTC safety regulation for this reroute scenario. the Regional Administrator or Associate functions. Accordingly, paragraph (j) Thus, the commenters suggest Administrator, as applicable, the must be more restrictive. rewording paragraph (j)(2) to read as requested information. If the Regional Section 236.567, which applies to follows: ‘‘Each rerouted train movement Administrator requests further territories where ‘‘an automatic train shall operate in accordance with information, no planned maintenance stop, train control, or cab signal device § 236.0.’’ rerouting may occur until the fails and/or is cut out en route,’’ requires When the PTC Working Group was information is received and reviewed trains to proceed at either restricted reconvened following the public hearing and the Regional Administrator speed or, if an automatic block signal and the NPRM comment period, the provides his or her approval. Likewise, system is in operation according to PTC Working Group formed three

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separate task forces for the purpose of with a PTC system, the train shall be as it is used in part 232 and as defined discussing and resolving several specific operated in accordance with the in § 232.5. Hence, a definition has been issues. One such task force, deemed the operating rules applicable to the line on added to § 236.1003 merely cross- Operational Conditions Task Force, was which the train is rerouted.’’ referencing to § 232.5. assigned the task of resolving the issues Paragraph (k), as previously noted, First, it is understood that during the associated with operational limitations provides the Regional Administrator time PTC technology is being deployed presented in the proposed rule with the ability to order the railroad or to meet the statutory deadline of associated with temporary rerouting railroads to cease rerouting operations December 31, 2015, there will be within § 236.1005, unequipped trains that were requested for up to 30 days. movements over PTC lines by trains operating within a PTC system within The Associate Administrator may order with controlling locomotives not § 236.1006, and en route failures within a railroad or railroads to cease rerouting equipped with a PTC onboard § 236.1029. operations regardless of the length of apparatus. In general, Class I railroad Following significant discussion of planned maintenance rerouting locomotives are used throughout the these issues, a PTC Working Group task requested. FRA believes this is an owning railroad’s system and, under force recommended rule text changes important measure necessary to prevent shared power agreements, on other that would maintain the intended level rerouting performed not in accordance railroads nationally. FRA anticipates of safety in an acceptable manner while with the rules and FRA’s expectations that the gradual equipping of recognizing the impractical nature and based on the railroad’s communications locomotives—which will occur at a perhaps even resultant increase in risk and to ensure the protection of train relatively small number of specialized associated with restricting the operation crews and the public. However, FRA is facilities and which will require a day of a rerouted train from a PTC-equipped confident that in the vast majority of or two of out of service time as well as line onto a non-PTC equipped line more cases railroads will utilize the afforded time in transit—will extend well into than other similarly equipped trains that latitude reasonably and only under the implementation period that ends on normally operated on the non-PTC necessary circumstances. December 31, 2015. It will not be equipped line. Therefore, the task force FRA expects each host railroad to feasible to tie locomotives down to PTC recommended that paragraph (j) be develop a plan to govern operations in lines, and the RSAC stakeholders fully revised to read as follows: ‘‘(j) Rerouting the event temporary rerouting is understood that point. The RLO did conditions. Rerouting of operations performed in accordance with this urge that railroads make every effort to under paragraph (g) of this section may section. Thus, as noted further below in use equipped locomotives as controlling occur according to the following: (1) § 236.1015, this final rule requires that units, and FRA believes that, in general, Where a train not equipped with a PTC each PTCSP include a plan accounting railroads will do so in order to obtain system is rerouted onto a track equipped for such rerouted operations. the benefits of their investment. The debate on this point has dealt with a PTC system, it shall be operated Section 236.1006 Equipping with the possibility of exceptions, in accordance with § 236.1029; (2) Locomotives Operating in PTC Territory Where any train is rerouted onto a track which was addressed in paragraph (b) in not equipped with a PTC system, it shall As reflected by § 236.566, the basic the NPRM. The discussion below be operated in accordance with the rule for train control operations is that pertains to the issue of temporary and operating rules applicable to the line on all trains will be equipped with permanent exceptions to the rule. which it is routed.’’ responsive onboard apparatus. The first issue arose under proposed This recommended revision to Paragraph (a) so provided in the NPRM, paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2), which paragraph (j) was presented to the PTC and the language is continued in the endeavored to set out the rules for the Working Group and gained consensus final rule. Paragraph (a) requires that, as transitional period during which PTC from the group. However, upon further a general rule, all trains operating over will be deployed. It is well understood consideration, FRA has decided to PTC territory must be PTC-equipped. In and accepted that it is not feasible to adopt a slight variation of the other words, paragraph (a) requires that require all trains operating on a PTC recommended revised rule text in order each controlling locomotive be operated line to be PTC-equipped and operative to provide additional clarification with a PTC onboard apparatus if it is from the first day the system is turned regarding the applicability of paragraph controlling a train operating on a track on. Locomotive fleets will be equipped (j)(1) to either a train not equipped with equipped with a PTC system in over a multi-year period, and a PTC system, or one not equipped with accordance with subpart I. The PTC deployment of locomotives will be a PTC system that is compatible and onboard apparatus should operate and driven by many factors, of which PTC functionally responsive to the PTC function in accordance with the PTCSP status is only one. Efficient use of system utilized on the line on which the governing the particular territory. locomotives requires them to be train is rerouted. Therefore, paragraph Accordingly, it must successfully and available for use on multiple routes and (j) has been revised in the final rule to sufficiently interoperate with the host even under ‘‘shared power’’ agreements read as follows: ‘‘(j) Rerouting railroad’s PTC system. with other railroads. In some cases, even conditions. Rerouting of operations In the NPRM, FRA recognized the when a PTC-equipped locomotive is under paragraph (g) of this section may possibility of controlling locomotives placed in a consist destined for a PTC occur under the following conditions: not necessarily being placed in a train’s line there may be legitimate reasons (1) Where a train not equipped with a lead position and sought comments on why it is not placed in the controlling PTC system is rerouted onto a track this issue. Comments were filed position. equipped with a PTC system, or a train indicating that the lead locomotive is Accordingly, the NPRM provided not equipped with a PTC system that is not always necessarily the controlling what FRA thought was a very modest compatible and functionally responsive locomotive. In light of this information, proposal that equipped locomotives to the PTC system utilized on the line the final rule reflects a change from placed in the lead on trains bound for to which the train is being rerouted, the ‘‘lead locomotive’’ to ‘‘controlling PTC territory have their PTC equipment train shall be operated in accordance locomotive’’ as necessary. FRA’s turned on. FRA even made allowance with § 236.1029; or (2) Where any train understanding of a ‘‘controlling for a declining percentage of such is rerouted onto a track not equipped locomotive’’ is the same understanding locomotives being dispatched into PTC

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territory after having failed PTCIP provides an additional effort that operate trains with the short hood in the ‘‘initialization.’’ The reaction from Class has a high probability of requiring direction of movement. Operating trains I railroad commenters was startling, to updates during the PTC implementation with the long hood forward presents say the least. period, while the schedules and a good safety concerns because the engineer The AAR stated that the proposal was faith effort alone may serve the purpose has a limited view of the track with that beyond FRA’s authority and that FRA most efficiently, especially for the short configuration. However, if any safety has no ability to require use of PTC time period anticipated (this should be feature or safe practice is impaired, before December 31, 2015. According to recognized as 2012 through 2015 at altered, or compromised in any AAR, railroads will be required to use worst). NJ Transit suggests that FRA locomotive, it should not be in the lead PTC-equipped locomotives on PTC should not include this plan as a PTCIP or operating position of the train. routes come December 31, 2015, and requirement, but require the best good Therefore, if the engine is not equipped AAR does not understand how this faith effort by each railroad for with air conditioning or if the long hood obligation could be addressed in the providing equipped vehicles during the is facing forward, the railroad would implementation plan other than to state short interim period subject to this have three choices: grant the crew the PTC-equipped locomotives would be concern. right to switch a fully-compliant used on PTC routes. In the AAR’s view, The AAR also stated that, for trains in locomotive to the lead at the first requiring PTC-equipped locomotives to long-haul service, the train’s point of location where this can be be turned on would create a origin or location where the locomotive accomplished, do not operate at all, or disincentive to equip locomotives early. was added to the train may be many remove the engine from the engine Limiting the ability of railroads to crew districts or hundreds or thousands consist entirely. The RLO asserts that operate trains with locomotives that fail of miles prior to the location where the this approach would create the safest initialization could result in railroads locomotive’s onboard PTC apparatus is possible working environment, as the attempting to avoid rail system initialized for operation in PTC- safest locomotive is the one with PTC, congestion by delaying the equipping of equipped territory. In this case, the AC, and the short hood forward. locomotives. To avoid such a paragraph is overly restrictive and GE asserts that, by using emerging disincentive for equipping locomotives, should be modified to be predicated on technology, it is possible to operate a AAR believes that FRA should permit, the location prior to entering PTC- PTC system from the lead controlling without limitation, the operation of equipped territory where initialization locomotive using at least some parts of locomotives that fail initialization failed. Accordingly, AAR suggests that a PTC system on trailing locomotives in before December 31, 2015. paragraph (b)(2)(i) be revised to read: the consist if the onboard network is CSXT asserted that the requirements ‘‘The subject locomotive failed extended through the locomotive contained in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) with initialization at the point of crew origin consist. According to GE, this can respect to the allowable percentage of for the train or at the location where the provide a useful contingent operation if controlling locomotives operating out of locomotive was added to the PTC some component fails in the locomotive each railroad’s initial terminals with initialized train.’’ and a backup component on a trailing failed systems over track segments The RLO also urges FRA to adopt a unit is linked over the network, equipped with PTC will deter early requirement that railroads place providing higher overall PTC implementation efforts and unfairly equipped engines in the lead or availability. For example, should the punish railroads that are diligently controlling position whenever such data radio fail on the lead locomotive, working to implement PTC on equipped engines are in the engine PTC could continue to operate through designated tracks. In addition, CSXT consist during the implementation a working radio on the second or third questioned the usefulness of such a period. The RLO states that locomotive unit. provision, as CSXT argued that there is implementing such consist management FRA agrees that PTC-equipped no meaningful difference between a initiatives will help identify any locomotives should be utilized when locomotive that is not equipped with problems in the interface of the onboard available on PTC territory during the PTC and a locomotive that is equipped and wayside systems. In the future, implementation period, and it is with a PTC system that is not fully states the RLO, railroad operations will recognized that it is possible for a unit functioning. come to rely heavily upon the proper to serve as the controlling locomotive Recognizing that matching PTC lines function of these PTC systems. when not positioned first in the consist. with PTC-equipped controlling According to the RLO, requiring FRA believes that railroads have strong locomotives will be a key factor in railroads to adopt this approach would incentives to take advantage of their obtaining the benefits of this technology require the minor operational maneuver investments in PTC, but also includes in in the period up to December 31, 2015, of switching a trailing unit to the train’s the final rule a requirement that the FRA requested comments on whether lead position. Since technical anomalies PTCIP include goals for PTC-equipped PTCIPs should be required to include that go undetected can be catastrophic, locomotives in PTC territory. power management elements describing the RLO asserts that FRA should not This issue was discussed further in how this will be accomplished to the squander the opportunity for the PTC Working Group during the degree feasible. In response, NJ Transit discovering them during the review of the comments, but no formal asserted that the PTCIP does require implementation period. resolution was achieved. FRA is not both the lines risk assessment (to During the public hearing conducted obligated to provide any exception here establish the track segment order of PTC on August 13, 2009, FRA specifically whatsoever, and the contention that commissioning) and the schedule to asked how the RLO expected a railroad FRA may not require use of PTC prior equip rolling stock and suggests that to handle the situation where an engine to December 31, 2015, is utterly without these schedules can and should indicate that is PTC-equipped may be positioned merit. Nevertheless, FRA does not wish the effort of a railroad to assure that with long hood forward or may have a to proceed in such a manner as to create vehicles are equipped and available for broken air conditioning system. In its even a temporary disincentive to deploy the PTC equipped lines. According to NJ comments dated August 20, 2009, the PTC locomotives on PTC-equipped Transit, inclusion of a power RLO responded by stating that it is lines. However, clearly leaving the management plan as well within the broadly accepted industry practice to carriers to their own devices without

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accountability or oversight appears locomotives must be equipped and financial assistance to certain small unwarranted given the tenor of their operative (see § 236.566). It was also railroads in equipping their comments and the known conflicts noted in the discussion that the locomotives, but that this would, of among departments of the railroad that Interstate Commerce Commission course, be done based on the corporate can arise during any implementation of (FRA’s predecessor agency in the interest of the Class I railroad. Although, new technology. Leaving the use of regulation of this subject matter) and in general, market forces and the public available PTC technology wholly FRA have provided some relief from interest can be expected to correspond unregulated until December 31, 2015, this requirement in discrete over time, this is not always the case. would not only open the possibility that circumstances where safety exposure So, for instance, there is a risk that safety gains would not be made during was considered relatively low and the requiring all Class II and Class III the period, it would also increase the hardship associated with equipping railroads operating on Class I PTC lines possibility that PTC systems would not additional locomotives was considered to be equipped with PTC could be be sufficiently stable and reliable as of substantial. (For instance, in the case of financially unsustainable absent a more the statutory completion date. intermittent automatic train stop generous division of the rate or other Accordingly, FRA has included in the installed many years ago on the former assistance (technical or otherwise) from final rule, in lieu of the language Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad the Class I interchange partner. A Class initially proposed, a requirement that (now BNSF Railway), only passenger I railroad might respond to such each railroad include in its PTCIP trains were subject to the requirement situations based exclusively on the specific goals for progressively effective for onboard apparatus. That value of the traffic interchanged with use of its equipped locomotives on PTC arrangement continues to the present respect to the transportation charge lines that have been made operational. day, and it is particularly unusual since recovered for the long haul less costs. FRA would review the goals and stated none of the host railroad’s locomotives Although that might be a good market justification as part of its review of the are equipped, while all Amtrak decision for the Class I railroad, the PTCIP. The railroad would then be locomotives operating over the territory result could be loss of rail service for a required to report annually its progress must be equipped.) rural community and diversion of the toward achieving its goals, including The ASLRRA noted that its member traffic to the highway—a result that any adjustments required to remedy railroads conduct limited operations might not be in the public interest. Over shortfalls. Although FRA does not over Class I railroad lines that will be the past several decades the federal intend to second guess details of power required to be equipped with PTC government and many of the states have management, FRA does believe it is systems in a substantial number of made investments in light density rail reasonable to expect results in the form locations. These operations are service (through grants, loans, or tax of steadily declining PTC-preventable principally related to the receipt and concessions) that could be undermined accidents during the implementation delivery of carload traffic in should this occur. period. The only way to accomplish that interchange. The small railroad service In the PTC Working Group and in is to ensure that PTC onboard apparatus extends onto the Class I railroad track in informal discussions around its is deployed on PTC lines in reasonable order to hold down costs and permit activities, Class I railroads indicated proportion to its deployment elsewhere both the small railroad and the Class I that they intended to take a strong and that, when so deployed, it is railroad to retain traffic that might be position against non-equipped trains utilized as intended. priced off the railroad if the Class I had The second major issue arose under to dispatch a crew to pick up or place operating on their PTC lines, and that in paragraph (b)(4), which proposed the cars. This, in turn, supports order to enforce this restriction fairly, limited exceptions for movements of competitive transportation options for they understood that they would need Class II and III trains over PTC lines of small businesses, including marginal to equip their own locomotives, the Class I railroads. The disagreements small businesses in rural areas. including older road switchers that attendant to that proposal warrant more The ASLRRA advocated an exception might venture onto PTC-equipped lines detailed treatment. that would permit the trains of its only occasionally. However, during New PTC systems will be like existing members and other small railroads to these discussions, FRA was not able to train control systems in the sense that continue use of existing trackage rights develop a clear understanding regarding they are comprised of onboard and and agreements without the necessity the extent to which the Class I railroads, wayside components. They will also for equipping their locomotives with under previously executed private involve a more substantial centralized PTC technology. They suggested that agreements or because of a senior ‘‘office’’ function. The railroad that has any incremental risk be mitigated by position derived from a prior the right to control movements over a requiring that such trains proceed transaction, enjoy the effective ability to line of railroad (generally the entity subject to the requirement for an enforce a requirement that all trains be providing or contracting for the absolute block in advance (similar to equipped. dispatching function) will provide for operating rules consistent with Proposed rule. On this question of equipping of the wayside and § 236.567 applicable to trains with non-equipped trains on PTC lines, the appropriate links to and interface with failed onboard train control systems). proposed rule represented a the office. In preparing the This position was consistently opposed compromise position between the recommendations that led to the NPRM, both by the rail labor organizations and requests of the Class II and III railroads the PTC Working Group discussed at the Class I railroads. These and the Class I railroads and labor great length the issues related to organizations took the position that all organizations. It proposed to permit the operation of PTC-equipped locomotives, trains should be equipped with PTC in practice only on territory where there and locomotives not equipped with PTC order to gain the benefits sought by the was no scheduled intercity or commuter onboard apparatus, over lines equipped congressional mandate and to provide passenger service. On any given subject with PTC. As explained above, the PTC the host railroad the full benefit of its track segment, a particular Class II or III Working Group recognized that the investment in safety. Informal railroad could operate up to 4 trains per typical rule with respect to train control discussions suggested that Class I day (2 round trips) for up to 20 miles territory is that all controlling railroads might offer technical or in perpetuity. For hauls in excess of 20

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miles, the practice could continue until not shown that there would actually be need to equip only one or two the end of 2020. a financial strain on Class II and III locomotives with PTC technology by FRA offered this proposal in order to railroads. According to AAR, a Class II sometime after 2015. limit the burden on small entities and or III railroad would not have to equip In any event, AAR asserts that this to avoid costs that were both avoidable a locomotive with PTC technology until proposed exemption for Class II and III and more greatly disproportionate to December 31, 2015. In any event, states railroads is inconsistent with the plain anticipated benefits than the basic AAR, the statute makes no distinction language of the statute, which does not requirements of the congressional among Class I, II, or III operations on a distinguish between Class I, II, or III mandate. FRA noted that the exceptions PTC route. operations on a main line with PIH would constitute a small portion of the CSXT disagreed with FRA’s materials. Congress determined that movements over the PTC-equipped line. interpretation of RSIA08, stating that the PTC should be required on Class I FRA asserted that the accident/incident statute, on its face, does not exempt routes meeting the statutory criteria data show that the risk attendant upon Class II and III railroads from the PTC regardless of any cost-benefit analysis. these movements is small. As reflected requirements. To the contrary, asserted The AAR believes that it is in the NPRM, a review of the last seven CSXT, the statute appears to inconceivable that Congress intended years of accident data covering 3,312 contemplate that Class II and III unequipped locomotives be permitted to accidents that were potentially railroads traveling on PTC lines would operate routinely where PTC is preventable by PTC showed that there be subject to the PTC requirements since required, thus undercutting the benefit were only two of those accidents that each PTCIP for those lines ‘‘must of equipping a PTC route with PTC involved a Class I railroad’s train and a provide for interoperability of the technology. Class II or III railroad’s train. (Left system with movements of trains of The AAR also challenges FRA’s unstated in the NPRM was the fact that other railroad carriers,’’ (emphasis conclusion about the ‘‘marginal safety the presence of PTC would have original) which presumably includes benefit,’’ which seems premised on its prevented one of the accidents even Class II and III railroads. CSXT also analysis of train-to-train collisions, absent equipping of the tenant train, questioned whether entities that carry a questioning whether FRA has while the other would not be prevented wide variety of commodities, including concluded that a train operated by a due to limitations of PTC architectures PIH traffic, but without the financial Class II or III railroad poses less of a risk with respect to low-speed rear-end wherewithal to adopt PTC technologies, with respect to each of the core PTC collisions.) FRA believed that the low should be permitted to impose an functions than a train operated by a level of risk revealed by these statistics arguably increased safety risk on the Class I railroad. Leaving aside AAR’s justified an exception for Class II and III public and other railroads. In any event, objection to any exception permitting railroad trains traversing a PTC- stated CSXT, the Class II and III Class II and III railroads to conduct equipped line for a relatively short railroads would only be responsible for routine operations over PTC routes with distance. FRA noted that the cost of outfitting their locomotives, and not unequipped locomotives, AAR does not equipping those trains would be high wayside units, with PTC technologies. agree with the proposal to wait until when viewed in the context of the Moreover, according to CSXT, the December 31, 2020, to impose the financial strength of the Class II or III exemption under proposed paragraph twenty-mile limitation. According to railroad and the marginal safety benefits (b)(4)(B)(ii) was unclear as to its AAR, FRA has no factual basis for its would be relatively low in those cases application This section allowed Class II concern that Class II and III railroads where a small volume of traffic is and III railroads to operate on PTC will be unable to obtain the technology moved over the PTC-equipped line. operated track segments to the extent as suppliers seek to equip their bigger Comments on the NPRM exceptions; that any single railroad is allowed ‘‘less Class I customers first. In fact, states FRA response. None of the commenters than four such unequipped trains’’ over AAR, it is more likely that Class I responded directly to FRA’s safety any given track segment. CSXT railroads will work with their Class II analysis, but they did take strong and questions whether the number of trains and III partners to prepare for the 2015 disparate stands. The RLO filed joint is limited per a common holding implementation deadline. comments that protested allowing an company or each railroad subsidiary. The Canadian Pacific Railway does unequipped train owned by a Class II or (The intent is that the limit will be not support the operation of III railroad to move on PTC-required applied to each separate railroad unequipped locomotives on PTC track with only minor restrictions. The company, regardless of common equipped lines after December 31, 2015. RLO believed that there are alternatives ownership.) It is CP’s position that all trains that are consistent with safety and the Recognizing FRA’s concerns with operating on PTC territory after intent of RSIA08, including temporal imposing the costs of PTC December 31, 2015, must be controlled separation or using the host railroad’s implementation on Class II and III by a locomotive equipped for PTC equipped locomotives. According to the railroads, AAR believes FRA is mixing operation, regardless of whether or not RLO, simply limiting the number of up Congress’ concern about the ability the locomotive in the controlling moves and miles of unequipped of Class II and III railroads to finance position is considered ‘‘historic.’’ locomotives on PTC-required track installation of PTC on their own routes NYSMTA, the parent organization for would not eliminate the risk associated with the ability of Class II and III the Long Island Rail Road and Metro- with the hazard or provide compliance railroads to operate locomotives North Railroad, asserted that subpart I of with the intent of RSIA08. equipped with PTC technology over this part should require all operators on The AAR has also expressed concerns Class I track. The AAR notes that FRA’s the same trackage as commuter railroads with the proposal, stating that ‘‘[s]urely own analysis shows that the cost of to be fully equipped, as is the case in Congress did not enact a requirement for equipping locomotives with PTC the existing FRA regulation, and that all the Class I railroads to spend billions of technology amounts to less than a third trains (including those of all Class II and dollars on PTC systems only to permit of total PTC development and Class III tenant railroads) operating in Class II and III railroads to operate trains installation costs. According to AAR, a cab signal/train control territory must unequipped with PTC technology on the Class II or III railroad qualifying for the have operative cab signal and ATC. PTC routes. AAR asserts that FRA has proposed exception likely would only Thus, NYSMTA suggested that subpart

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I should not permit any trains to enter use a controlling locomotive equipped through the mandate underlying this or operate in PTC territory that are not with PTC as a condition of operating rule. equipped with operative PTC systems onto the property. FRA wishes to Paragraph (b)(3) references the fact except where en route failures occur emphasize that, in issuing this final that operation of trains with failed within PTC territory. NYSMTA rule, FRA does not intend to influence onboard PTC apparatus is governed by suggested that the definition of the exercise of private rights or to the safeguards of § 236.1029, where ‘‘equipped’’ for paragraphs (a) through suggest that public policy would applicable; and paragraph (c) applies (b)(3) be clarified to mean the onboard disfavor an otherwise legitimate the same principle to non-equipped PTC system equipment has been fully restriction on the use of unequipped trains operating on PTC territory. commissioned, has passed all locomotives on PTC lines. FRA also acceptance tests and has met reliability notes that, in the absence of clear Section 236.1007 Additional and availability demonstration tests. In guidance on this issue, a substantial Requirements for High-Speed Service the final rule, FRA continues to make number of waiver requests could be Since the early 1990’s, there has been clear that all trains operating on expected that would have to be resolved an interest centered around designated intercity/commuter passenger territory without the benefit of decisional criteria high-speed corridors for the must be equipped. previously examined and refined introduction of high-speed rail, and a FRA received a number of comments through the rulemaking process. number of states have made progress in regarding the operation of historic With respect to limited operations of preparing rail corridors through safety locomotives over rail lines that will Class II or III railroads on Class I PTC improvements at highway-rail grade need to be equipped with a PTC system, lines, FRA continues to believe that the crossings, investments in track from commenters such as the San risk in question is very small in relation structure, and other areas. FRA has Bernardino Railway Historical Society, to the direct and indirect costs of administered limited programs of the Pacific Southwest Railway Museum, equipping locomotives with PTC and assistance using appropriated funds. the Railroad Passenger Car Alliance, and maintaining those locomotives over With the passage of ARRA, which J.L. Patterson & Associates. These time (including configuration provides $8 billion in capital assistance commenters requested that FRA provide management). FRA has also considered for high-speed rail corridors and clarification that a historic locomotive, the issues required applicable statutes intercity passenger rail service, and the as defined in 49 CFR 229.125(h), which concerning the affect of regulations on President’s announcement in April 2009 is not equipped with PTC may be small entities. (See also discussion of de of a Vision for High-Speed Rail in operated over rail lines equipped with minimis exceptions in the preamble to America, FRA expects those efforts to PTC systems in limited excursion § 236.1005.) Although FRA does expect increase considerably. FRA believes that service, provided an excursion that over time Class II and III railroads railroads conducting high-speed operating management plan is included will participate more fully in the use of operations in the United States can in the PTC railroad’s PTCIP that is PTC technologies, both as tenants and provide a world class service as safe as, consistent with the provisions of hosts, the initial costs and logistical or better than, any high-speed § 236.1029(b) of this part. These locomotives might include challenges of PTC system operation will operations conducted elsewhere. In steam locomotives many decades old. be significantly greater than the costs anticipation of such service, and to FRA notes that these operations are and challenges after interoperable PTC ensure public safety, FRA proposed relatively infrequent, and they normally systems have been demonstrated to be three tiers of requirements for PTC receive additional oversight by host reliable and after the market for PTC systems operating in high-speed service. railroads as a matter of course. equipment and services settles. The proposed performance thresholds Final rule. The final rule provides Mandating that every locomotive were intended to increase safety exceptions for trains operated by Class leading a Class II or III train be PTC performance targets as the maximum II and III railroads, including tourist or equipped during the initial roll out speed limits increase to compensate for excursion railroads. The exceptions are would create significant incentives to increased risks, including the potential limited to lines not carrying intercity or shed marginally profitable traffic with frequency and adverse consequences of commuter passenger service, except unpredictable societal effects. FRA does a collision or derailment. These where the host railroad and the believe that, as the end of the initial thresholds were supported by AASHTO passenger railroad (if different entities) implementation approaches, smaller and are adopted as proposed. have requested an exception in the PTC railroads can begin the process of Section 236.1007 sets the intervals for Implementation Plan, as further joining the PTC community by the high-speed safety performance discussed below, and FRA has approved equipping locomotives used for longer targets for operations with: maximum that element of the plan. Examples of hauls on PTC lines. FRA will also speeds at or greater than 60 and 50 potentially acceptable instances review the experience of Class I miles per hour for passenger service and concerning non-equipped operations on railroads as of that general time period freight operations, respectively, under an intercity/commuter route might (end of 2015, beginning of 2016) to paragraph (a); maximum speeds greater include a weekend excursion operation evaluate what additional requirements than 90 miles per hour under paragraph during periods scheduled passenger might be appropriate and sustainable. (b); maximum speeds greater than 125 service is very light or in terminal areas FRA has adopted final language miles per hour under paragraph (c); and under circumstances where all trains sufficiently flexible to permit occasional maximum speeds greater than 150 mph will be operated at reduced speed and tourist, historic and excursion service under paragraph (d). The reader should risk is otherwise very limited. on PTC lines. Much of the subject note that the requirements increase as FRA presumes for purposes of this equipment is used very lightly and in speed rises. Thus, for instance, final rule that there will be fact may spend the great majority of its operations with trains moving above circumstances rooted in previously time on static display. Ending the 125 miles per hour must, in addition to executed private agreements under educational and recreational role of the requirements under paragraph (c), which the Class I railroad would be occasional excursion service is no part adhere to the requirements under entitled to require the small railroad to of what the Congress was addressing paragraphs (a) and (b).

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Paragraph (a) addresses the PTC could create a significant challenge protected from such incursions (see system requirements for territories related to interoperability of freight § 213.347 of this title), including such where speeds are greater than 59 miles equipment operating over the same hazards as motor vehicles falling on the per hour for passenger service and 49 territory. Accordingly, FRA requested track structure from highway bridges. miles per hour for freight service. Under comment on whether, where operations Paragraph (d) addresses the highest 49 CFR 236.0 as it existed directly do not exceed 125 miles per hour or speeds existing or currently previous to the issuance of this final some other value, the requirement for contemplated for rail operations rule, block signal systems were required compliance with Appendix C safety exceeding 150 miles per hour. FRA at these speeds (unless a manual block assurance principles might be limited to expects these operations to be governed system was in place, an option that this the passenger trains involved, with by a Rule of Particular Applicability and final rule phases out). The final rule ‘‘non-vital’’ onboard processing the HSR–125 required by paragraph (c) expects covered operations moving at permitted for the intermingled freight shall be developed as part of an overall these speeds to have implemented a trains. No comments were received on system safety plan approved by the PTC system that provides, either this issue, apart from the general Associate Administrator. The directly or with another technology, all concern of the RLO that very safe quantitative risk showing required for of the statutory PTC system functions technology be employed in all PTC operations above 125 miles per hour is along with the safety-critical functions systems, and the restriction is adopted not required to include consideration of of a block signal system as defined in as proposed. acts of deliberate violence. The reason the existing standards of subparts A As speed increases, it also becomes for this exclusion is simply to remove through F of part 236. The safety-critical more important that inadvertent speculative or extraordinary functions of a block signal system incursions on the PTC-equipped track considerations from the analysis. include track circuits, which assist in be prevented at switch locations. In this However, FRA and the Department of broken rail detection and unintended final rule, FRA expects that this be done Homeland Security will certainly expect track occupancies (equipment rolling by effective means that might include that security considerations are taken out), and fouling circuits, which can use of split-point derails properly into account in system planning. identify equipment that is intruding on placed, equipping of tracks providing AASHTO believed that the proposed the clearance envelope and may prevent entry with PTC, or arrangement of tracks rule appropriately addressed the PTC raking collisions. FRA recognizes that and switches in such a way as to divert related safety levels for high-speed rail. advances in technology may render an approaching movement which is not According to AASHTO, the proposed current block signal, fouling, and broken authorized to enter onto the PTC line. rule text provided a clear position for rail detection systems obsolete and FRA The protection mechanism on the the levels of safety required for high- speed rail at speeds that are achieved does not want to preclude the slower speed line must be integrated today, and for speeds that may be introduction of suitable and appropriate with the PTC system on the higher achieved in the future, allowing for advanced technologies. Accordingly, speed line in a manner to provide benchmarking against precedent levels FRA believes that alternative appropriate control of trains operating achieved in the U.S. and internationally. mechanisms providing the same on the higher speed line if a violation AASHTO also commented that, in PTC functionality are entirely acceptable and is not prevented for whatever reason. Paragraph (c) addresses high-speed systems running over federally FRA encourages their development and rail operations exceeding 125 miles per designated high-speed rail corridors, use to the extent they do not have an hour, which is the maximum speed for highway-rail grade crossings should adverse impact on the level of safety. Class 7 track under § 213.307. At these either be eliminated or protected by Paragraph (b) addresses system higher speeds, the consequences of a hazard warning detection systems. requirements for territories where derailment or collision are significantly Amtrak notes that it currently operating speeds are greater than 90 greater than at lower speeds due to the operates safely above 90 miles per hour miles per hour, which is currently the involved vehicle’s increased kinetic on the Northeast Corridor and on its maximum allowable operating speed for energy. In such circumstances, in Michigan line, with the full knowledge, passenger trains on Class 5 track. At addition to meeting the requirements approval, and authorization of the FRA, these higher speeds, the implemented under paragraphs (a) and (b), including based on past and remaining safety PTC system must not only comply with having a fail-safe PTC system, the entity procedures and equipment. Amtrak also paragraph (a), but also be shown to be operating above 125 miles per hour states that it currently operates above fail-safe (as defined in Appendix C) and must provide an additional safety 125 mph on portions of the Northeast at all times prevent unauthorized analysis (the HSR–125) providing Corridor. Accordingly, Amtrak asserts intrusion of rail traffic onto the higher suitable evidence to the Associate that services above 90 and 125 miles per speed line operating with a PTC system. Administrator that the PTC system can hour that existed as of October 16, 2008, FRA intends this concept of fail-safe support a level of safety equivalent to, the date of RSIA08, should be exempted application to be understood in its or better than, the best level of safety of or ‘‘grandfathered’’ from the commonplace meaning; i.e., that insofar comparable rail service in either the requirements of this section. as feasible the system is designed to fail United States or a foreign country over FRA agrees that Amtrak has been to a safe state, which normally means the 5 year period preceding the providing safe passenger service at that each subject train will be brought submission of the PTCSP. Additionally, speeds between 90 and 150 miles per to a stop. Further, FRA understands that PTC systems on these high-speed lines hour on the Northeast Corridor as well there are aspects of current system must provide the capability, as as its Michigan line, and that the train design and operation that may create a appropriate, to detect incursion from control systems in use (ACSES with Cab remote opportunity for a ‘‘wrong-side’’ outside the right of way and provide Signals, and ITCS) have records of safe or unsafe failure and that these issues warnings to trains. Each subject railroad operations. Given the value of service would be described in the PTCSP and is free to suggest in its HSR–125 any experience and the extraordinary mitigations would be provided. FRA method to the Associate Administrator burden of review and decision making recognizes that, as applied in the that ensures that the subject high-speed associated with this rule, FRA intends general freight system, this final rule lines are corridors effectively sealed and to give full credit to established safety

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records in conducting these reviews, § 236.1003 that are required to install a This joint filing requirement reflects simplifying the task for all concerned. PTC system on one or more main lines FRA’s position that communication in accordance with § 236.1005(b). This between all parties involved in Section 236.1009 Procedural generally is each Class I railroad and establishing interoperability is Requirements each entity providing regularly absolutely essential to ensure the Section 236.1009 establishes the scheduled intercity or commuter rail implementation of timely, cost effective regulatory procedures that must be passenger transportation as defined by solutions. followed by each Class I railroad carrier statute. However, Class II and III Some railroads have also expressed and each entity providing regularly railroads that host intercity or commuter concern that they will be required to scheduled intercity or commuter rail rail service will also need to file support installation of PTC over Class II passenger transportation to obtain the implementation plans, whether or not and III railroads that would otherwise required FRA certification of PTC they directly procure or manage not be required to implement PTC, were systems prior to operating the system or installation of the PTC system. it not for the passenger/commuter component in revenue service. FRA is Intercity and commuter railroads that railroad presence. Amtrak noted that the implementing these requirements to are tenants on Class I, II, or III freight requirement for joint filings would, as a support more rapid FRA review and lines must also join with their host practical manner, require Amtrak to take decision making, while reducing the railroad in filing these plans. FRA a dominant role in the development and administrative burden on the railroads. believes that the railroad that maintains preparation of the required While the current subpart H of this operational control over a particular documentation. part provides a technically sound track segment is generally in the best While FRA appreciates the difficulties procedure for obtaining FRA approval of position to develop and submit the that both the passenger/commuter various processor-based signal and train PTCIP, since that railroad is more railroad, as well as the Class II or III control systems, it was crafted with the knowledgeable of the conditions of, and railroad may experience, FRA believes presumption that PTC implementation operations over, its track. FRA that this is essentially a commercial was a strictly voluntary action on the recognizes that, in cases where a tenant matter between the parties involved, part of railroads. Arguably FRA could passenger railroad operates over a Class which would be best resolved with have simply amended subpart H to II or III railroad, the passenger railroad government participation only as a last include requirements relating to may be required to take a more active resort. This position is consistent with implementation plans and to modify the role in planning the PTC system the underlying philosophy of sections language to equate ‘‘approval’’ under deployment by working with the host 151 through 188 of title 45 of the United subpart H with ‘‘certification’’ under the railroad. In the case of an intercity or States Code. statute. However, FRA believes that commuter railroad providing service Although FRA believes that the such a resultant amended subpart H over a Class I railroad, it may be resolution of differences between host would still remain unsuitable to support sufficient for the passenger railroad to and tenant railroads is a commercial the RSIA08 implementation schedule. file a letter associating itself with the issue, provisions have been made if a Accordingly FRA has developed the Class I railroad’s plan to the extent it host freight railroad and tenant new procedures of this section to avoid impacts the passenger service. AAR also passenger railroad cannot come to an redundancy, provide sufficient expressed some confusion whether the agreement to jointly file a PTCIP by flexibility to accompany the varying requirement to file joint plans was only April 16, 2010. In this situation, each needs of those seeking certification, and required when freight and passenger railroad must file an individual PTCIP, to mitigate the financial risk associated railroads conduct operations over the together with a notification to the with technological investment necessary same route. The final rule does not levy Associate Administrator, indicating that to comply with the regulatory any requirement for joint filing in the a joint filing was not possible and an requirements. case where another railroad has freight explanation of why the subject railroads Generally speaking, there are three trackage rights over a Class I railroad’s could not agree upon a final PTCIP for documents associated with the new PTC line. FRA expects that the host joint filing. procedures of this section: the PTCIP, Class I railroad will address these types Both the freight and passenger/ PTCDP, and PTCSP. The details of each of operations and discuss the issue of commuter railroads have strenuously document are set forth in §§ 236.1011, interoperability in its PTCIP as required objected to the assessment of civil 236.1013, and 236.1015, respectively. by law. penalties in the event that agreement To summarize these sections, the PTCIP The Class I railroads generally cannot be reached. Amtrak claimed that is the written plan that defines the opposed the requirement for a host failure to come to agreement did not rise specific details of how and when the railroad and tenant passenger railroad to to the level of an act that warranted railroad will implement the PTC system. file a joint PTCIP as being excessively penalty. AAR asserted that imposition The PTCDP provides a detailed burdensome and unnecessary because it of penalties would not be an appropriate discussion of the proposed technology merely appears to be intended to way to resolve good faith disputes over and product that will be implemented address interoperability issues. Beyond the implementation of PTC. Concern has according to the PTCIP. The PTCSP possibly addressing the interoperability also been raised that, in the event of a provides the railroad-specific issue, the AAR maintained that nothing dispute, the resolution process does not information demonstrating that the PTC further would be gained by requiring the appear to have any established system, as implemented by the railroad, joint filing of a PTCIP. milestones. NYSMTA expressed meets the required safety performance FRA has taken note of these concern related to the ability of objectives. Certification of a PTC system objections. However, FRA believes that railroads to fairly and quickly resolve by FRA for revenue operations is based the joint filing requirement provides disputes related to the development of on the review and approval of the motivation for the proactive host/tenant interoperability agreements information provided in these involvement by both parties in the required by RSIA08. NYSMTA asserted documents. decision-making process, especially that, even though FRA provides for Paragraph (a) requires that a PTCIP be with regards to interoperable equipment dispute resolution in § 236.1009, there filed by ‘‘host’’ railroads as defined in requirements and operating procedures. are no time limits or standards to ensure

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that disputes are resolved fairly and in mutually acceptable PTCIP and the APTA submitted similar comments a manner that does not affect railroads’ jointly-filed PTCIP is approved by FRA. stating that the inclusion of the PTCDP ability to comply with the statutory/ FRA notes that new passenger or PTCSP in the April 2010 submission mandatory implementation of PTC by railroads are likely to begin operations is problematic. Noting that submittal of December 31, 2015. during the period between issuance of these plans implies the selection of FRA has taken note of these this final rule and the end of the specific hardware and systems, APTA objections and concerns. FRA believes implementation period for PTC asserted that such submission is not that the milestones are self-evident. (December 31, 2015). Railroads that are possible given the current state of Railroads are required to file required to install PTC, who intend to development of industry standards by implementation plans by April 16, 2010. commence operations after April 16, the Railroad Electronics Standards Thus, failure to file an implementation 2010, but before December 31, 2015, Committee (RESC). Without available plan (either jointly or individually) by would be expected to file a PTCIP that industry standards, APTA asserted that April 16, 2010, constitutes a violation of meets the requirements of paragraph (a) it would be impossible for the vast the RSIA08. Railroads are also required as soon as possible after the decision is majority of public agencies that operate to complete implementation by made to commence operations. Any passenger rail systems to identify and December 31, 2015. FRA does not railroad commencing operations after contract with vendors or suppliers by intend to set any specific deadline for December 31, 2015, that is required to the April 2010 deadline. Even though completion of mediation or arbitration install PTC, will not be authorized to the freight railroads may have selected other than to state that the mediation or commence revenue operations until the a proprietary technology as a basis for arbitration must be resolved in time to PTC installation is complete. their PTC implementation, the allow both parties to complete the During review of the NPRM, AAR competition standards for publicly timely submission of their PTCIP by noted that paragraph (a)(2)(i) had not funded contracts limit the ability of April 16, 2010, and to complete PTC been updated to reflect an RSAC public agencies to follow a similar installation by December 31, 2015. agreement. FRA agrees and has updated procurement strategy. Additionally, the FRA will exercise its prosecutorial paragraph (a)(2)(i) to include the lack of specific hardware and system discretion if railroads have unresolved language, ‘‘[a] PTCIP if it becomes a host standards to support interoperability conflicts, but have filed individual railroad of a main line track segment for further limits the ability of public implementation plans in accordance which it is required to implement and agencies to enter into contracts by April with paragraph (a)(4) of this section and operate a PTC system in accordance 2010. Thus, if required to submit PTCDP are engaged in good faith mediation or with § 236.1005(b).’’ and PTCSP documents by April 16, arbitration. 2010, the documents would, of Paragraph (b) in the proposed rule Caltrain requested clarification of the necessity, be incomplete and required the submission of a PTCDP meaning of the term ‘‘confer,’’ as used in unacceptable. paragraph (a)(4)(iv) of this section. when the PTCIP is submitted to FRA for APTA further claimed that the sole During the conference process, FRA will approval. Some railroads, primarily legislative requirement tied to April request that all parties to the dispute those owned or operated by government 2010 is for submission of the PTCIP. advise FRA of where their differences agencies, who submitted comments on Thus, APTA believes FRA should allow arise, so that FRA can evaluate the this issue indicated that, while they submission of the PTCIP in a ‘‘product potential impact on completion of the would be able to identify the general neutral’’ fashion to meet the statutory statutorily-required build out and functional requirements of the PTC deadline and should defer submission understand the nature and extent of system, they expected public of the PTCDP and PTCSP to allow their disagreement. FRA may propose procurement regulations would flexibility and avoid incomplete alternative solutions for consideration preclude contract award and submissions and the compilation and by both parties in the dispute. FRA is identification of a particular vendor or review of documents that cannot be not, however, obligated to act as either supplier and the associated product approved. a mediator or arbitrator of essentially details in time to meet the statutory Amtrak similarly expressed concern commercial disputes. FRA expects that submission deadline. They requested with the inadequate amount of time the disputing parties will submit such that FRA not require submission of the necessary to prepare the PTCIPs for its issues to a mutually acceptable mediator PTCDP at the same time (or before) the own NEC and Michigan Line and for the or arbitrator. If the disputing parties are PTCIP. Class II and III railroads over which unable to find a mutually agreeable NYSMTA submitted comments Amtrak operates (to the extent that those private mediator or arbitrator, FRA may asserting that simultaneous submissions lines are not found to constitute other agree to mediate the dispute as a last would be problematic for LIRR. In view than ‘‘main lines’’) and to review those resort. Otherwise, the disputing parties of the complexities and unknown PTCIPs submitted by the Class I will need to seek judicial resolution of factors associated with developing PTC railroads and develop full PTCDPs. their issues. solutions for LIRR’s dark and ABS Because of the severe burden on It was also commented that if a PTCIP territories, and in light of its unique Amtrak’s resources, Amtrak or request for amendment (RFA), as signaling applications and operating recommended that the filing deadline provided in § 236.1021, is submitted rules, LIRR was identified as being at for PTCDPs be extended at least 9 after April 16, 2010, in accordance with high risk of non-compliance with the months beyond April 16, 2010. this rule, paragraph (a) does not provide April 16, 2010, PTCDP submission As a government agency, FRA clearly the subject railroads with an deadline, despite its best efforts. understands the position faced by these opportunity to file separately. FRA Inasmuch as the RSIA08 does not railroads. However, FRA believes that a intends, in such a situation, that if a explicitly stipulate a timeframe for a meaningful implementation plan cannot railroad wishes to use track that would PTCDP, NYSMTA requested that the be created if a railroad has not identified require the installation of a PTC system, regulation be modified to allow for and does not understand the technology and the parties have difficulty reaching submission of a PTCDP after the April it proposes to implement. Without this agreement, then such usage would be 16, 2010, deadline, at least with regard knowledge, it is not possible to have any delayed until the parties jointly file a to dark territory and ABS territories. informed discourse on system

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interoperability and implementation This final rule does not preclude a reference to an approved Type scheduling between railroads, vendors railroad from submitting its PTCDP Approval. If the railroad submits the or suppliers, and FRA. Therefore, in this before its PTCIP for FRA review and updated PTCIP within that period, FRA final rule, FRA has provided several approval. FRA encourages an earlier will treat the updated filing in the same mechanisms that eliminate the need for submission of the PTCDP to further manner as FRA would have treated the each railroad to submit a PTCDP for a reduce the required regulatory effort original PTCIP submission. If the proposed PTC system, while still necessary to review the PTCIP and railroad fails to update the PTCIP before providing FRA sufficient information to PTCDP if submitted together. More the end of that period, the Provisional carry out its regulatory responsibilities. importantly, it would present an Approval will automatically be revoked, One such mechanism, as specified in opportunity for FRA to issue a Type and the revocation will be considered as paragraph (b) is through the use of a Approval for the proposed PTC system retroactive to the original due date. FRA Type Approval. The Type Approval is a before April 16, 2010, thus providing has no intention of extending any number assigned to a particular off-the- other railroads intending to use the Provisional Approval beyond the 270 shelf or modified PTC system product— same or similar PTC system the day period and will not entertain described in a PTCDP in accordance opportunity to leverage off of the work requests to that effect. Each railroad is with § 236.1013—indicating FRA’s already performed by simply submitting expected to be capable of fully defining belief that the product could fulfill the the Type Approval and—in the event of the product they intend to use within requirements of subpart I. FRA’s any variances—a much less burdensome the 270 day period. Use of an NPI by a issuance of a Type Approval does not PTCDP. FRA also believes this railroad allows for incremental, albeit mean that the product will meet the regulatory procedure may incentivize limited, submission of the PTCDP. requirements of subpart I. The Type railroads using the same or similar PTC Railroads would still be required to Approval applies to the technology system to jointly develop and submit a fully describe their plans for the use and designed and developed, but not yet PTCDP, thus further reducing the completion of the PTCDP in their implemented, and does not bestow any paperwork burden on FRA and the PTCIPs. Having the PTCDP ownership or other similar interests or industry as a whole and increasing development extend beyond the PTCIP rights to any railroad. Each Type confidence in the interoperability due date may be beneficial to the entire Approval number remains under the between systems. industry, since it allows for practical control of the FRA, and can be issued Vendors believe that FRA should type development of PTC systems for or revoked in accordance with this approve specific components, so the railroads with unique technical subpart. vendor may sell the type approved requirements or financing restrictions FRA expects the Type Approval products. FRA believes that such a while potentially increasing the number process to provide a variety of benefits request may be based on the mistaken of viable suppliers, products, and to FRA and the industry. If a railroad belief that FRA has adopted the FAA systems. In addition to being practical, submits a PTCDP describing a PTC aviation model of type certifying aircraft this approach would further the system, and the PTC system receives a frames, aircraft engines, and propellers industry interests of having a more even Type Approval, then other railroads (see 14 CFR part 21, subparts B–G). This distribution of the workload for intending to use the same PTC system is not, however, the case. FRA has commuter rail agencies and for FRA without variances may, in accordance adopted some elements of the FAA staff. Additionally, it enhances the with paragraph (b)(1), simply rely on the Airworthiness Certificate process (see ability of railroads to provide sufficient Type Approval number without having 14 CFR part 21, subpart H), which detail in the PTCDP, due to greater to file a separate PTCDP. While the addresses the suitability of an entire confidence in the overall design railroad filing the PTCDP must expend aircraft for a particular purpose. FRA solution, thereby reducing the need for resources to develop and submit the will apply a similar standard and certify revision and the associated burden on PTCDP, all other railroads using the only complete PTC systems. FRA and railroad staff. same PTC system would not. This Another mechanism FRA is adding FRA clearly recognizes, regardless of should not only provide significant cost that will enable railroads to meet their the approach taken, that a vendor or and time savings for a number of statutory obligations in preparing and supplier to the railroad may prepare railroads, but should remove a submitting a PTCIP, while providing part, if not all, of the required significant level of redundancy from the enough information to FRA to facilitate documentation. Notwithstanding that approval process that is currently FRA’s evaluation of the technical fact, the railroad remains responsible for inherent in subpart H. feasibility of the PTCIP, can be found in the completeness and accuracy of any If, however, a railroad intends to use the provisions of paragraph (c). documentation submitted. For instance, a modified version of a PTC system that Paragraph (c) allows a railroad to file FRA may find that the PTCDP does not has already received a Type Approval an abbreviated PTCDP, called a Notice adequately conform to this subpart or number, and the variances between the of Product Intent (NPI), with their otherwise has insufficient information two systems are of a safety-critical PTCIP. The NPI, detailed in to justify approval. FRA may also nature, the railroad must submit a new § 236.1013(e), is handled in a manner determine that there are issues raised by PTCDP. The railroad may submit a new similar to a full PTCDP, with certain key the PTCDP that would adversely affect PTCDP that fully complies with the exceptions. First, a PTCIP may be the ability of FRA to eventually certify content requirements under § 236.1013 submitted with a NPI in lieu of either a the system. If such a situation were to or supply a Type Approval number for complete PTCDP (or reference to an arise, the railroad would need to the other PTC system upon which the approved Type Approval). Any PTCIP address the issues and resubmit the modified PTC system will rely and a submitted with an NPI and approved by documentation for FRA approval. document that fulfills the content FRA will only receive ‘‘Provisional The third mechanism available to requirements under § 236.1013 with Approval.’’ The Provisional Approval railroads is described in paragraph (d). respect to the safety-critical variances will only be valid for a maximum period This paragraph allows railroads the between the system described within of 270 days (approximately 9 months), opportunity to file a Request for the original PTCDP and the system as by which time a railroad must resubmit Expedited Certification (REC) in lieu of modified. its PTCIP with a complete PTCDP or an approved PTCDP or a Type

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Approval, and the subsequent PTCSP portions of documents that truly justify NICTD strongly urged FRA to only developed in accordance with such treatment (i.e., trade secrets and accept PTCIPs that provided full public § 236.1015 in order to receive PTC security sensitive information). disclosure of all the information needed System Certification. A REC applies While FRA continues to believe that to obtain components from multiple only to PTC systems that have already there is no need at this time to suppliers, including message interface been in revenue service and meet the substantially revise § 209.11, FRA will standards, functional allocation for each criteria of § 236.1031(a). If a PTC system require an additional document to assist subsystem, and safety allocation for is not eligible for expedited FRA in efficiently and correctly each subsystem (e.g., identifying which certification, the railroad will be limited reviewing requests for confidentiality. hazards and safety-critical assumptions to the options presented in paragraphs Under § 209.11, a redacted and an are made for each subsystem). NICTD (b) and (c). unredacted copy of the same document asserted that it was not requesting Paragraph (e) requires that each must be submitted. When FRA review is proprietary information for any PTCIP, PTCDP, and PTCSP must required to determine whether subsystems, but merely the ability to comply with the content requirements confidentiality should be afforded, FRA utilize alternative sources to fulfill the in §§ 236.1011, 236.1013, and 236.1015, personnel must painstakingly compare subsystem requirements within the respectively. If the submissions do not side-by-side the two versions to overall PTC system. According to comply with their respective regulatory determine what information has been NICTD, this would substantially requirements, then they may not be redacted. This process may result in improve the likelihood of commuter approved. Without approval, a PTC information for which exemption from railroads being able to obtain system may not receive a Type disclosure is being requested to be components from the multiple suppliers Approval or PTC System Certification. misidentified. To reduce this burden, that are currently more than willing to Ultimately, PTC System Certification is and ensure that the intellectual property develop components that will safely FRA’s formal recognition that the PTC of the railroad and their suppliers is operate with other systems. Moreover, system, as described and implemented, appropriately guarded, FRA requires NICTD stated that this would facilitate meets the statutory requirements and that any material submitted for compliance with interoperability the provisions of subpart I. It does not confidential treatment under subpart I requirements, as the knowledge gained imply FRA endorsement or approval of and § 209.11 include a third version that would simplify development of the PTC system itself. would indicate, without fully obscuring, interoperable systems and reduce In the interest of an open market, FRA the redacted portions for which procurement delays. Amtrak agrees on does not want to preclude the ability of protection is requested. For instance, in the need for full public disclosure and PTC system suppliers outside of the order to indicate without obscuring the asserts that it should be able to review United States from manufacturing PTC and comment on the PTCIPs of the Class systems or selling them to the regulated plan’s redacted portions, the railroad may use the highlighting, underlining, I railroads. FRA understands these railroads. However, in order to ensure positions, but FRA will not make any the safety and reliability of those or strikethrough functions of its word processing program. This document will flat pronouncements about the systems, FRA needs to be able to confidentiality of information it has not also be treated as confidential under conduct an adequate review of the yet received. § 209.11. FRA could amend § 209.11 to submitted plans. Accordingly, FRA expects that FRA-monitored paragraph (e) requires that all materials include this requirement. However, FRA laboratory or field testing or an submitted in accordance with this does not believe it to be necessary at independent third party assessment may subpart be in the English language, or be this time. be necessary to support conclusions translated into the English language and FRA is allowing the submission of an made and included in a railroad’s attested as true and correct. adequate GIS shapefile to fulfill some of submitted PTCDP or PTCSP. This issue Under subpart H of this part, a the PTCIP content requirements under is addressed in paragraph (f). The railroad may seek confidential treatment § 236.1011. However, with respect to procedural requirements to effectuate for what it deems to be trade secrets, requesting confidential treatment of either of those requirements can be commercial, or financial information specific information contained in a GIS found in §§ 236.1035 and § 236.1017, that is privileged or confidential under shapefile, which includes primarily respectively. Exemption 4 of the Freedom of map data, FRA recognizes that visually Paragraph (g) makes clear that FRA Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. blocking out the information would approval of a plan submitted under 552(b)(4), or the Trade Secrets Act, 18 defeat the purpose. For instance, a black subpart I may be contingent upon any U.S.C. 1905, and submit such requests dot over a particular map location, or a number of factors and that, once the in accordance with § 209.11. A railroad black line over a particular route, would plan is approved, FRA maintains the may request similar confidential actually reveal the location. Thus, FRA authority to modify or revoke the treatment under subpart I. As with expects that a railroad seeking resulting Type Approval or PTC System subpart H, should a FOIA request be confidential treatment for portions of a Certification. Under paragraph (g)(1), made for information submitted under GIS shapefile will submit three versions FRA reserves the right to attach this rule for which the submitting party of the shapefile to comply with additional requirements as a condition has requested confidential treatment, paragraph (e). Alternatively, a single for approval of a PTCIP, or issuance of the submitting company will be notified shapefile can include three separate a Type Approval or PTC System of the request in accordance with the layers each representing the three levels Certification. In the preparation of any submitter consultation provisions of the of confidentiality, with specific of these plans, railroads may have Department’s FOIA regulations (§ 7.17) instructions indicating which elements inadvertently failed to fully address and will be afforded the opportunity to are being displayed and how to handle hazards and risks associated with all of submit detailed written objections to the the file for confidentiality purposes. these components. release of information as provided for in FRA also expects that the version for FRA believes that paragraph (g)(1) § 7.17(a). FRA strongly encourages public consumption would not include will make the regulatory process more submitting parties to request the information for which the railroad is efficient and stable. Rather than reject a confidential treatment only for those seeking confidential treatment. railroad’s plan completely, and

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consequently delay the railroad’s in operation. FRA expects that, if it based rule. While performance-based implementation of its PTC system, FRA places a condition on PTC system rules provide maximum flexibility to would prefer to add additional operations, each railroad will have a railroads and vendors or suppliers, they conditions during the approval process predefined process and procedure in also introduce a degree of ambiguity. to address these oversights. When place that would allow continued FRA, in consultation with the RSAC determining whether to attach railroad operations, albeit under PTC Working Group, has developed and conditions to plan approval, FRA will reduced capability, until appropriate vetted model templates for both the consider whether: (1) The plan includes mitigations are in place, and the system PTCIP and the risk prioritization a well-defined and discrete technical or can be restored to full operation. In scheme to provide some degree of security issue that affects system safety; certain dire situations, FRA may specificity without unnecessary (2) the risk or safety significance of an actually order the suspension or constraints. It should be carefully noted issue can be adequately determined; (3) discontinuation of operations until the that these templates are, by necessity, the issue affects public health and root cause of the situation is understood general in nature and must be safety; (4) the issue is not already being and adequate mitigations are in place. customized by the individual railroad to processed under an existing program or FRA believes that suspending a Type reflect its individual operations. What process; and (5) the issue cannot be Approval or a PTC System Certification may be applicable for one railroad may readily addressed through other pending a more detailed analysis of the not be applicable to another. FRA has regulatory programs and processes, situation may be appropriate, and that also provided vetted guidance as to existing regulations, policies, guidance, any such suspension must be done acceptable design, verification and or voluntary industry initiatives. without prejudice. FRA expects to take validation, and human factors in the Paragraph (g)(2) provides FRA the such an action only in the most extreme appendices to this part. Again, given the right to reconsider an issued Type circumstances and after consultation wide variety of potential solutions that Approval or PTC System Certification as with the affected parties. may be adopted by various railroads, a consequence of the discovery of After reconsidering its issuance of a FRA is reluctant to provide more potential error, fraud or new Type Approval or PTC System detailed guidance. However, if a PTCIP information regarding system safety that Certification, under paragraph (g)(4), content requirement under § 236.1011 is was not previously identified. FRA FRA may either dismiss its fulfilled in a submitted GIS shapefile, issuance of each Type Approval or PTC reconsideration and continue to then the written PTCIP should simply System Certification under recognize the existing FRA approved cross-reference appropriately. performance-based regulations assumes Type Approval or PTC System Paragraph (h) relates to FRA’s that the model of the train control Certification, allow continued authority to conduct inspections to system and its associated probabilistic operations with certain conditions ensure that a railroad is in compliance data adequately accounts for the attached, or order the railroad to cease with subpart I. FRA inspections may be behavior of all design features of the applicable operations by revoking its required to determine whether a system that could contribute to system Type Approval or PTC System particular railroad has implemented a risk. Different system design approaches Certification. If FRA dismisses its PTC system where necessary. For may result in different levels of detail reconsideration and continues to instance, FRA may need to confirm introducing different approximations or recognize the Type Approval, any whether a track segment is subject to errors associated with the safety conditions required during the five million gross tons or more of annual performance. There are some reconsideration period would no longer railroad traffic, PIH materials, or characteristics for which modeling be applicable. If FRA will allow passenger traffic. FRA may also need to methods may not fully capture the continued operations, FRA may order inspect locomotives to determine behavior of the system, or there may be the continuation of conditions that were whether they are equipped with a PTC elements of the system for which required during the reconsideration onboard apparatus or to review historical performance data may not be period or impose additional conditions. locomotive logs to determine whether currently available. These potential FRA expects that revocation of a Type the locomotive has entered PTC inconsistencies in the failure analysis Approval or PTC System Certification territory. Paragraph (h) simply reiterates could introduce significant variations would occur in very narrow FRA’s statutory authority to inspect the between the predicted and actual circumstances, where the risks to safety railroads and gather information performances. Because of the design appear insurmountable. Regrettably, necessary to enforce its regulations. complexity associated with train control there may be a few situations in which In order to maintain an open systems, FRA recognizes that these the inconsistencies are the result of marketplace, this final rule has been inconsistencies may not be the result of deliberate fraudulent representations. In drafted to allow domestic railroads to deliberate acts by any individuals or such situations, FRA may also seek purchase PTC systems from outside of organizations, but simply reflect the criminal or civil penalties against the the United States. FRA recognizes that level of analytical detail, the availability entities involved. PTC systems have been used in revenue of comprehensive information, the APTA submitted comments asserting service across the globe and that qualification and experience of the that the NPRM offered minimal acceptable products may be available in analyst team, and the railroad’s and guidance on what criteria FRA will use other countries. FRA also recognizes FRA’s resource limitations. in accepting or rejecting a railroad’s that such use may fall under the In paragraph (g)(3), FRA indicates that plan. Therefore, APTA asserted that jurisdiction of a foreign regulatory entity the railroad may be allowed to continue FRA should draft and vet criteria that much like FRA. Accordingly, under operations using the system, although accomplishes the basic purposes of PTC, paragraph (i), in the event information such continued operations may have while allowing for innovation in relating to a particular PTC system has special conditions attached to mitigate meeting the performance requirements been certified under the auspices of a any adverse consequences. It is FRA’s envisioned in the proposed regulation. regulatory entity in a foreign intent, to the maximum extent possible FRA believes that this concern arises government, FRA is willing to consider and when consistent with safety, to from the fact that this regulation, like that information as independently assist railroads in keeping the systems subpart H of this part, is a performance- Verified and Validated to support the

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railroad’s PTCSP development. The same technical standards as used in may be required to take and the type of phrase ‘‘under the auspices’’ intends to earlier PTC system approvals. FRA has system the railroad intends to reflect the possibility of certification also taken steps to ensure that it has implement, complete adherence to the contractually performed by a private sufficient people, with the appropriate template will not guarantee FRA entity on behalf of a foreign government skills, to ensure proper safety oversight approval of the submitted PTCIP. agency. However, the foreign regulatory of this new process. A task analysis to FRA expects each PTCIP to include entity must be recognized by the determine the desired skills, as well as various highly specific and descriptive Associate Administrator. A railroad appropriate placement within the elements relating to each railroad’s seeking to enjoy the benefits of agency of additional staff members has infrastructure and operations. FRA paragraph (i) must communicate that been completed The RSIA08 authorizes recognizes manual assembly of each interest in its PTCSP, and is strongly an additional 200 full time positions to piece of data into a PTCIP may be encouraged to communicate such a FRA, and FRA is ready to recruit the exceptionally onerous and time desire well before submission of the necessary technical staff as consuming and may make the PTCIP PTCSP for approval. appropriations permit. prone to errors. In light of the foregoing, Finally, the AAR noted that, unlike and due to the statutory requirement the precedent set by subpart H and the Section 236.1011 PTC Implementation that Congress be apprised on the RSIA08, FRA did not include time Plan Content Requirements progress of the railroad carriers in frames for the agency to respond to the This section describes the minimum implementing their PTC systems, FRA submissions of the PTCDP or PTCSP. required contents of a PTC believes that electronic submission of The AAR urged FRA to include specific Implementation Plan. A PTCIP is a much of this information may be deadlines for these filings to ensure a railroad’s plan for complying with the warranted and preferred. To facilitate common understanding of the time installation of mandatory PTC systems collection of this data, FRA will accept allotted to carry out the regulatory required by RSIA08. The PTCIP consists the submission of this data in electronic responsibilities. Accordingly, AAR of implementation schedules, format. proposed that FRA agree to respond narratives, rules, technical FRA believes that the preferred, least within 60 and 120 days of the documentation, and relevant excerpts of costly, and least error-prone method to submission of a PTCDP and PTCSP, agreements that an individual railroad comply with this section is for railroads respectively. This 180-day approval will use to complete mandatory PTC to submit an electronic geographic period for both the development and implementation. FRA will measure the digital system map containing the safety plans is consistent with existing railroad’s progress in meeting the aforementioned segment attribute subpart H, which allows 180 days for required implementation date based on information in shapefile format, which approval of a product safety plan. the schedule and other information in is a data format structure compatible FRA agrees that the railroads need, for the PTCIP. While the final rule does not with most Geographic Information their planning purposes, an estimated specify or mandate any specific System (GIS) software packages. Using amount of time within which FRA will organization for the PTCIP, it must at GIS provides an efficient means for provide a response regarding the least clearly indicate which portions organizing basic transportation-related acceptability of their PTCSP intend to address compliance with the geographic data to facilitate the input, submission. FRA also believes that this various plan requirements under this analysis, and display of transport information would be appropriately section. The PTCIP must also clearly networks. Railways around the world placed in § 236.1009. Accordingly, FRA identify each referenced document and rely on GIS to manage key information is adding paragraph (j) to this section, either include a copy of each document for rail operations, maintenance, asset which contains target deadlines for FRA (or its applicable excerpt) or indicate management, and decision support review. FRA will acknowledge receipt where FRA and the public may view systems. FRA believes that the railroads of a PTCDP or PTCSP submission that document. Should FRA not be able may have already identified track within 30 days. Depending upon the to readily determine adequate response segments, and their physical and complexity of the system and the to the required information, FRA will operational characteristics, in shapefile amount of participation by FRA in the assume that the information has not format. Accordingly, each shapefile PTCDP or PTCSP development process, been submitted, and will handle the document must provide the following FRA will endeavor to approve, approve document accordingly. The lack of the identifiable information for each track with conditions, or deny approval of the required information may result in segment: Owning railroad(s); distance; PTCDP and PTCSP within 60 and 180 FRA’s disapproval of a PTCIP. To signal system; track class; subdivision; days, respectively. If FRA is unable to facilitate timely and successful number and location of sidings; complete its review of the PTCDP or submittals, FRA, through assistance maximum allowable speed; number and PTCSP within these estimated time from a PTCIP Task Force drawn from location of mainline tracks; annual periods, FRA will advise the submitter the PTC Working Group, developed a volume of gross tonnage; annual number accordingly. template that can be used to format the of cars carrying hazmat; annual number When reviewing the procedural documents that must be submitted. of cars carrying PIH; passenger traffic requirements contained in the proposed FRA, however, wishes to emphasize that volume; average daily through trains; rule, the RLO expressed concern that the use of such a template is strictly WIUs; switches; and at-grade rail-to-rail this streamlined process may result in voluntary, and encourages railroads to crossings. degradation of safety and significant prepare and submit the documents in Paragraph (a) cites the minimum concern with the ability of FRA to the structure most economical for the requirements that must be addressed in adequately staff the oversight process railroad. FRA does not believe it is the PTCIP. However, given the wide with a sufficient number of people with necessary to require that the railroads diversity of railroads and their operating the requisite skill sets. FRA appreciates expend their limited resources in environments, FRA recognizes that these concerns, and is undertaking reformatting documents when such an additional factors may arise that reflect plans to ensure that this new process activity adds no real value. However, the unique operational characteristics of does not result in any degradation of while the template may be a useful tool, a particular railroad. It is beholden to safety. FRA will continue to apply the in light of the various forms a PTCIP each railroad to carefully analyze the

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circumstances associated with its understood. Taking syntactic and and community partnerships, either operations and address any of these semantic interoperability together, FRA domestic or international, usually elements that may affect expects each PTC system to provide sponsor standard workgroups to define implementation planning. During its services to, and accept services from, a common standard to provide system review of a PTCIP, FRA will carefully other PTC systems and to use those intercommunications for a specific evaluate the plan to determine if the services exchanged to enable the PTC purpose. At times, an industry or submitting railroad(s) have indeed systems to operate effectively together community will sub-profile an existing addressed unique railroad issues. FRA and to provide the intended results. The standard produced by another wishes to make clear that in those degree of interoperability should be organization to reduce options and thus situations, where additional factors that defined in the PTCIP when referring to making interoperability more are unique to a railroad have not been specific cases. achievable. Thus, in each PTCDP, the addressed, FRA will return the PTCIP Interoperability is achieved through railroad must discuss how it developed unapproved. four interrelated means: Product testing, or adopted a standard commonly Paragraph (a)(1) requires that the industry and community partnership, accepted by that partnership. railroad describe the functional common technology and intellectual In the proposed rule, FRA noted that requirements that the technology will property, and standard implementation. means of achieving interoperability employ in its PTC system. Here, FRA Product testing includes conformance include having the various entities broadly defines the term ‘‘technology’’ to testing and product comparison. involved using the same PTC system include all applicable tools, machines, Conformance testing ensures that the product or obtaining its components methods, and techniques. product complies with an appropriate from the same developer. In its Paragraph (a)(2) requires that the standard. FRA recognizes that certain comments, NICTD expressed its belief railroad describe how it will address standards attempt to create a framework that this conclusion does not meet fulfilling the requirements associated that would result in the development of RSIA08’s interoperability requirements. with the submittal of an NPI (see 49 CFR the same end product. However, many According to NICTD, while the freight 236.1009(c)) temporarily in lieu of a standards apply only to core elements railroads are free to choose their own PTCDP and the requirements associated and allow developers to enhance or supplier, their essential monopoly with a PTCSP (see 49 CFR 236.1009(d)). otherwise modify products as long as power has the potential to force In RSIA08, § 20157(a)(2) requires that they adhere to those core elements. commuter railroads to use the same a railroad describe how it will ‘‘provide Thus, if an end product is developed in supplier and thereby prevent commuter for interoperability of the system with different ways to conform to the same railroads from meeting the requirement movements of trains of other railroad standard, there may still be to use open competitive bids from carriers over its lines.’’ discrepancies between each multiple suppliers for a system. Since Practically speaking, this means that instantiation of the end product due to the quantity of units required from the each locomotive operating within PTC the existence of variables outside of the commuter railroads is substantially less territory must be able to communicate core elements. Accordingly, FRA than those required for the freight with, and respond to, the PTC systems believes that comparison testing must railroads, NICTD asserts this greatly installed on each PTC territory’s track also occur to ensure that each reduces the ability of the commuter and signal system, except in those instantiation of the same product, railroads to obtain system components limited situations established elsewhere regardless of the means upon which it that meet their specific operating needs, in this final rule. For this reason, is created to meet the same standard, is as the single supplier will not have the paragraph (a)(3) requires that the PTCIP ultimately identical. In regards to PTC resources available to support those describe how the PTC system will systems, such comparison testing must needs. NICTD also believes that this is provide for interoperability of the occur on all portions that relate to each in direct contrast with the FRA system between the host and all tenant system’s interoperability with other statement relating to performance railroads on the lines required to be systems. Thus, it is also important that standards: ‘‘FRA intends the proposed equipped with PTC systems under this the PTC system be formally tested in a rule to accelerate the promotion of, and subpart. production scenario—as they will be not hinder, cost effective technological Interoperability means the ability of finally implemented—to ensure that it innovation by encouraging an efficient diverse systems and organizations to will actually intercommunicate and utilization of resources, an increased work together (inter-operate), taking into interoperate with other PTC systems as level of competition, and more account the technical, operational, and advertised and intended. innovative user applications and organizational factors that may impact To reach interoperability between the technological developments.’’ system-to-system performance. FRA various applicable PTC systems, each Safetran also believes that each expects each PTC system required by PTCDP must also show that the systems railroad should be free to choose a subpart I to exhibit syntactic share common product engineering. supplier. According to Safetran, the interoperability—so that it may Product engineering refers to the freight railroads through their successfully communicate and exchange common standard, or a sub-profile implementation and development plans data with other PTC systems—and thereof, as defined by the industry and could specify a specific product or semantic interoperability—so that it community partnerships, specifically supplier preventing other railroads from may automatically, accurately, and intended to achieve interoperability. using open competitive bids from meaningfully interpret the exchanged Without common product engineering, multiple suppliers for a system and information to prove useful to the end the systems will be unable to achieving the cost savings of user of each communicating PTC intercommunicate or otherwise interact competitive bidding. Safetran urges FRA system. To achieve semantic as necessary to comply with the to accept PTCIPs and PTCDPs that interoperability, both sides must defer proposed rule. require public disclosure of all to a common information exchange FRA expects that each interoperability information needed to enable reference model. In other words, the standard for PTC systems will be development of PTC components from content of the information sent must be developed by a partnership between multiple suppliers. This does not the same as what is received and various industry participants. Industry require disclosure of proprietary

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information, but does require disclosure divide the track into smaller impact safety, such as unusual ruling of interface specifications as well as ‘‘management units.’’ Typically, grades and other track geometries. In required functional attributes, assigned segment’s boundaries are established at cases where deployment of the PTC safety attributes and stimulus/response point of switch (POS) locations, but may system cannot be accomplished in order attributes. also be located at mile markers, grade of areas with the greatest risk to areas While FRA does not necessarily crossings, or other readily identifiable with the least risk, paragraph (a)(9) require this approach—since the agency locations. Inspection, condition requires that the railroad explain why seeks to maintain an open and assessment, and maintenance planning such a deployment was not practical competitive marketplace—FRA believes is performed individually on each and the steps that will be taken to that this is a suitable means to achieve segment. After the track network minimize adverse consequences to the interoperability. This technique may hierarchy is established, the attribute public until the track segment can be provide similar technical results when information associated with each track equipped. using PTC system products from is defined. This attribute information Paragraphs (a)(6) and (a)(7) require the different vendors or suppliers relying on describes the track layout (e.g., curves PTCIP to include information regarding the same intellectual property. FRA and grades), the track structure (e.g., rail the rolling stock and wayside devices recognizes that certain developers with weights and tie specifications), track that will be equipped with the an intellectual property interest in a clearance issues, and other track related appropriate PTC technology. For a PTC particular technology may provide a items such as turnouts, rail-to-rail at- system to work as intended, PTC system non-exclusive license of its intellectual grade crossings, highway-rail grade components must be installed and property to another entity so that the crossings, drainage culverts, and operated in all applicable offices and on licensee may introduce into the bridges. Inventory information about all applicable onboard and wayside marketplace a substantially similar these track attributes can be quite subsystems. Accordingly, the PTCIP product reliant on that intellectual detailed. The benefits of a complete and must identify which technologies will property. In such a case, FRA foresees accurate track inventory provides a be installed on each subsystem and that the use of a common PTC system record of the track network’s properties when they are scheduled to be installed. technology—even if it is proprietary to and information about the existing track Under paragraph (a)(6), each host a single or multiple entities and materials at the specific locations when railroad filing the PTCIP must include a licensed to railroads—could reduce the maintenance or repair is necessary. comprehensive list of all rolling stock variability between components, thus upon which a PTC onboard apparatus providing for a more efficient means to Paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(5) require the must be operative. FRA understands achieve interoperability. railroad to put its entire implementation that, in most situations, the rolling stock In order for interoperability to plan into an understandable context, referenced in paragraph (a)(6) may only actually occur between multiple primarily as it relates to the sequence apply to controlling locomotives. entities’ PTC systems, there must be and schedule of track segment However, in the interest of not some standard to which they all adhere. implementation events. Under RSIA08, hindering creative technological Thus, FRA also expects that each 49 U.S.C. 20157(a)(2), Congress requires innovations, FRA presumes the PTCDP will provide assurances of a each subject railroad to describe in its possibility that PTC system technology common interoperability standard PTCIP how it shall, to the extent may also be attached to additional agreed to between all entities using PTC practical, implement the PTC system in rolling stock to provide other functions, systems that must interoperate. a manner that addresses areas of greater including determining train capacity Since each of these interrelated means risk before areas of lesser risk. and length or providing certain has an important role in reducing Accordingly, under paragraph (a)(4), the acceptable and novel train controls. To variability in intercommunication, each PTCIP must discuss the railroad’s areas be kept apprised of these possibilities, railroad’s PTCIP must clearly describe of risk and the criteria by which these FRA is requiring in paragraph (a)(6) that the elements required under paragraph risks were evaluated and prioritized for each PTCIP include a list of all rolling (a)(1)–(3). PTC system implementation. To this stock equipped with PTC technology. During review of the NPRM, AAR end, the railroad must clearly identify FRA believes that the PTCIP should also noted paragraph (a)(3)(i) had not been all track segments that must be identify any risks associated with trains updated to reflect an RSAC agreement. equipped, the basis for that decision for operated by tenant railroads and not FRA agrees and has revised paragraph each segment (which might be done by equipped with PTC system technology (a)(3)(i) to include the language: categories of segments), and, as and the efforts that the host railroad has ‘‘include relevant provisions of provided in paragraph (a)(5), the dates made to establish the extent of that risk. agreements, executed by all applicable that implementation of each segment FRA understands that a host railroad railroads, in place to achieve will be completed, taking into account may not receive cooperation from a interoperability.’’ the time necessary to fulfill the tenant railroad in collecting the Much of the remaining information procedural requirements related to necessary rolling stock information. required in a PTCIP under this final rule PTCSP submission, review, and Nevertheless, FRA expects each host relies on the location, length, and approval. At a minimum, the railroad to make a good faith effort. characteristics of each track segment. deployment decisions must be based on Identification of those tenant railroads Therefore, a common understanding of segment traffic characteristics such as from whom the host railroad attempted a track segment is necessary. A track is passenger and freight traffic volumes, to obtain the requisite and applicable the main designation for describing a the quantity of PIH and other hazardous information from, but failed to address physical linear portion of the network. materials, current methods of a host railroad’s written request, may Each line of railroad has a station operations, existence of block signals establish a good faith effort by the host location referencing system, which and other traditional train control railroad. serves to locate inventory features and technologies, the number and class of One railroad has requested that FRA defects along the length of the track. tracks, authorized and allowable speeds eliminate the requirement for a power Because some tracks can be very long, for each segment, and other unusual (locomotive) equipage plan in the PTCIP track or line segments are established to characteristics that may adversely to avoid the need for updates to the

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PTCIP. Instead of requiring such a plan, distribute the required information. As FRA recognizes the potential for the railroad recommends that FRA rely such, a PTC system cannot properly technological improvements that may on railroad scheduling and good faith operate without properly functioning modify the number and types of WIUs effort to drive installations during the WIUs to provide and receive status required. FRA also recognizes that period 2012 through 2015. FRA information and react appropriately to during testing and installation, it may be carefully considered this proposal, but control information. discovered that additional WIU has rejected it. Without an It is commonly understood that a WIU installations may be necessary. In either understanding of what portion of the device is capable of communicating case, the railroad will be required to locomotive fleet has been equipped and directly to the office, train, or other submit an RFA in accordance with what portion remains to be equipped, wayside unit. FRA recognizes that there § 236.1021 indicating how the railroad FRA cannot accurately assess the extent may not be the same number of WIUs intends to appropriately revise its to which PTC could be used in revenue and devices that they monitor. schedule to reflect the resulting service. FRA is required to make regular Depending on the architecture and necessary changes. Nevertheless, reports to Congress on the status of technology used, a single WIU may regardless of whether FRA approves or industry compliance and the communicate the necessary information disapproves the RFA, if a railroad is operational capability of existing PTC as it relates to multiple devices. FRA is required to submit its PTCIP by April systems. Since PTC is an integrated comfortable with this type of 16, 2010, implementation must still be system, which requires both wayside consolidation provided that, in the completed by the statutory deadline of and onboard equipment to be installed event of a failure of any one of the December 31, 2015. and operational, evaluation of the state devices being monitored, the most One railroad recommended that of system deployment requires restrictive condition will be transmitted paragraph (a)(7) should be revised to knowledge of the state of both to the train or office, except where the require railroads to identify each PTC subsystems. system may uniquely identify the failed subsystem and assembly and the Furthermore, the elimination of the device in a manner that will provide estimated number of each subsystem equipage plan does not appear to safe movement of the train when it required for each track segment. provide any significant advantages to reaches the subject location. However, FRA does not believe that this the railroad. Regardless of whether the change is required. First, FRA believes Because of the critical role that WIU’s railroad is required to maintain an that the discussion of WIU requirements play in the proper and safe operation of equipage schedule for the PTCIP, or rely in paragraph (a)(7) is already PTC systems, paragraph (a)(7) requires on railroad scheduling and good faith generalized and implementation that the railroad identify the number of efforts, the railroad will still need to independent. Second, this final rule WIU’s required to be installed on any maintain some type of schedule to already provides for corrections in given track segment and the schedule ensure the completion of required PTC inventory count by submission of an for installing the WIU’s associated with installations by 2015. FRA believes that RFA with the revised count. Therefore, that segment. This information is formalizing the schedule provides a FRA has not adopted this planning tool that should facilitate necessary to fully and meaningfully recommendation. completion of the installation process. If fulfill the RSIA08 requirement that by Under paragraph (a)(8), each railroad the equipage plan were unalterable, December 31, 2012, Congress shall must also identify in its PTCIP which of FRA could understand the railroad’s receive a report on the progress of the its track segments are either main line concerns about being locked into an railroad carriers in implementing PTC or not main line. This list must be made unrealistic and unobtainable schedule. systems. See 49 U.S.C. 20157(d). To based solely on the statutory and However, FRA believes these concerns comply with this statutory requirement, regulatory definitions regardless of are unfounded because any plan in the each railroad must determine the whether FRA may later deem a track PTCIP, including the equipage plan, can number of WIUs it will need to procure segment as other than main line. If a be adjusted to reflect changing and the location—as defined by the railroad has a main line that it believes circumstances. applicable subdivision—where each should be considered not main line, it Paragraph (a)(7) requires the railroad WIU will be installed. FRA believes may file with the PTCIP a main line to provide the number of wayside that, if a railroad does not perform these track exception addendum (MTEA) in devices required for each track segment traditional engineering tasks, it will risk accordance with § 236.1019, as further in its PTCIP and an installation exceeding the statutory implementation discussed below. Each track segment schedule for the completion of wayside deadline of December 31, 2015. FRA included in the MTEA should be equipment installation by December 31, considers this information an integral indicated on the list required under 2015. The selection and identification of part of the PTCIP that must be paragraph (a)(8), so that the PTCIP a technology discussed in the PTCIP submitted to FRA for approval. accounts for each track segment with an will also, to a great extent, determine NYSMTA asserts that the requirement appropriate cross-reference to the the distribution of the functional in paragraph (a)(7) to include the subject MTEA. behaviors of each of the PTC subsystems quantities of devices for each track Paragraph (a)(9) requires that the plan (e.g., office, wayside, communications, segment in the PTCIP requires prior call out the basis for a railroad’s and back office). The WIU is a type of completion of the full design of the PTC determination that risk-based remote terminal unit (RTU) that is part system. However, NYSMTA asserts that prioritization required by paragraph of a larger PTC system, which is a type it is not feasible to complete all of the (a)(4) of this section is not practical. of SCADA. As a whole, the safe and survey and design necessary to meet FRA recognizes that there may be efficient operation of a SCADA—a this requirement by April 2010. situations where risk is somewhat centralized system that covers large Therefore, NYSMTA suggested that the evenly distributed and where other areas, monitors and control systems, requirement be reworded to read as factors related to practical and passes status information from, and follows: ‘‘Identification of each PTC considerations—such as the need to operational commands to, RTUs—is subsystem and major assembly, and an establish reliable operation of the largely dependent on the ability of each estimated number of each required for system in less complex environments of its RTUs to accurately receive and each line segment.’’ before installation in more complex

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environments—may be the prudent example is not likely to be present to to the presence of PIH traffic, FRA course. However, the burden of any significant extent under current cannot verify that this is the case in establishing the reasonableness of this conditions. However, should the Class I every instance. approach would be on the railroad, railroads raise freight rates making rail FRA concludes that the mandated starting with a showing that risk does transportation prohibitively expensive deployment of PTC will leave some not vary substantially among the track and accordingly eliminating PIH traffic, substantial gaps in the Class I route segments in question. the issue would be presented as a structure, including gaps in some major As mentioned elsewhere in this substantial one. Most of the urban areas. FRA believes that these document, various railroads incorrectly transportation risk—including hazards gaps will, over time, be ‘‘filled in’’ by asserted that they would not have to to train crews and roadway workers and voluntary actions of the Class I railroads ‘‘turn on’’ their respective PTC systems exposure to other hazardous materials if as they establish the reliability of their until December 31, 2015. FRA released—would remain, but not the PTC systems, verify effective recognizes that, although an approved few carloads of PIH. FRA believes that interoperability, and begin to enjoy the PTCIP will include a progressive roll- the intent of Congress with respect to safety and other business benefits from out schedule, a PTC system cannot be deployment of PTC might be defeated, use of these systems. FRA fully operated in revenue service until it even though the minimum requirements understands both the desire of the labor receives PTC System Certification. To related to passenger and PIH traffic stakeholders in the PTC Working Group avoid the possibility of a delayed plan would be satisfied. Other lines carrying to see a broader build-out of PTC submission that would frustrate the very heavy volumes of bulk systems than that ‘‘minimally’’ required schedule, FRA has added paragraph commodities such as coal and by RSIA08 and the concerns of the Class (a)(10), which requires the railroad(s) to intermodal traffic may or may not I railroads’ representatives who noted set its own due dates for such include PIH traffic. Putting aside the the extreme challenge associated with submissions. The ultimate due date, of risk associated with PIH materials, equipping tends of thousands of course, is subject to FRA’s approval of significant risk exists to train crews and wayside units, some 20,000 the PTCIP. persons in the immediate vicinity of the locomotives, and their dispatching Paragraph (b) of § 236.1011 contains right-of-way if a collision or other PTC- centers’ back offices within the statutory provisions related to further PTC preventable accident occurs. Any place implementation period. deployment by the Class I railroads. As on the national rail system is a potential The Congress recognized that all of noted in the NPRM, the specific roadway work zone, but special these issues are legitimate concerns and characteristics of the PTC route challenges are presented in providing so mandated the establishment of Risk structure, with the focus on PIH traffic for on-track safety where train Reduction Programs under the same as an indicator of risk, was a late movements are very frequent or legislation. Section 103 of RSIA08 addition to the bill that would become operations are conducted on adjacent specifically requires, within the Risk RSIA08, not having appeared in either tracks. Reduction Program, a Technology the House or Senate bills until the final Risk on the larger Class II and III Implementation Plan to address package was assembled using railroads’ lines is also a matter of technology alternatives, including PTC. consultations between the committee concern, and the presence of significant Accordingly, the PTC and Risk staffs in lieu of a formal committee of numbers of Class I railroad trains on Reduction provisions in RSIA08 are conference. Although the statutory some of those properties presents the clearly aligned in purpose; and there are construct (Class I rail line with 5 million opportunity for further risk reduction, also references in the technology plan gross tons and some PIH materials) since over the coming years virtually all elements of the Risk Reduction language adequately defines most of the core of Class I railroad locomotives will be that address installation of PTC by other the national freight rail system, it is a equipped with PTC onboard apparatus’. railroads. Further, FRA has been construct that will introduce distortions Examples include trackage and haulage charged with a separate rulemaking at both ends of the spectrum of risk. rights retained over Class II and III under section 406 of RSIA08 regarding On one hand, a line with a maximum railroads following asset sales in which risk in non-signaled (dark) territory that speed limit of 25 miles per hour ending the Class I railroads divested the subject significantly overlaps the issue set in at a grain elevator that receives a few lines. Other prominent examples this rulemaking and the Risk Reduction cars of anhydrous ammonia per year is involve switching and terminal section. Use of technologies that are a ‘‘main line’’ if it has at least 5 million railroads, the largest of which are integral to PTC systems constitute the gross tons of traffic (a very low owned and controlled by two or more best response to hazards associated with threshold for a Class I railroad). This is Class I railroads and function, in effect, non-signaled lines. Switch position not a line without risk, particularly if it as extensions of their systems. Conrail monitoring systems, track integrity lacks wayside signals, but FRA analysis Shared Assets, a large regional circuits, digital data links and other shows that the potential for a switching railroad that is owned by NS technology used to address dark catastrophic release from a pressure and CSXT and is comprised of major territory issues should be and, as tank car is very low at an operating segments of the former Conrail, then a presently conceived, are forward- speed of 25 miles per hour, and the low Class I railroad, is perhaps the classic compatible with PTC. In paragraph (b), tonnage is likely associated with example. FRA intends to dovetail these relatively infrequent train movements— FRA notes that there has also been a requirements by requiring that each limiting the chance of a collision. trend, only recently and temporarily Class I railroad include in its PTCIP On the other end of the spectrum, abated by the downturn in the economy, deployment strategies indicating how it lines with greater risk may go toward higher train counts on some will approach the further build-out of unaddressed. For instance, a line non-signaled lines of the Class I full PTC, or partial implementation of carrying perhaps a much higher level of railroads. On a train-mile basis, these PTC (e.g., using PTC technology to train traffic and significant volumes of operations present about twice the risk prevent train-to-train collisions but other hazardous materials at higher as similar operations on signalized perhaps not monitoring all switches in speeds, without any PIH or passenger lines. These safety gaps need to be the territory; or using PTC to protect traffic, would not be equipped. This filled; and, while most will be filled due movements of the Class I over a

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switching or terminal railroad without cycle, the railroad is expected to submit railroads to maintain their most recent initially requiring all controlling a plan that requires little to no rework. PTC deployment plans in their PTCIPs locomotives of the switching or terminal A number of comments were until all PTC system deployments railroad to be equipped). These railroads submitted objecting to the potential required under the RSIA08 have been would then be required to include in the assessment of civil penalties based on a completed. technology elements of their initial Risk railroad’s failure to timely file a PTCIP. Section 236.1013 PTC Development Reduction plans a specification of While FRA is unwilling to revise its Plan Content Requirements and Type which lines will be equipped and with position on this issue, FRA will exercise Approval what PTC system elements. Paragraph prosecutorial discretion in the (b) makes clear that there would be no assessment of civil penalties. As noted in the discussion above expectation regarding additional lines APTA submitted comments regarding § 236.1009, each PTCSP must being equipped until those mandated by suggesting that the language in be submitted with a Type Approval subpart I have been addressed. FRA paragraph (c) of this section be amended number identifying a PTC system that shares the view of the Class I railroads to allow at least 90 days—the time FRA believes could fulfill the and the passenger railroads that the allotted for FRA plan review—for requirements of subpart I. Under December 31, 2015, deadline already railroads to correct deficiencies and re- § 236.1009, a railroad may submit an presents a substantial challenge for submit their plans. In a similar vein, existing Type Approval number in lieu railroads, suppliers, and the employees NYSMTA submitted comments of a PTCDP if the PTC system it intends affected. asserting that the amount of time to implement and operate is identical to One railroad objected to the allotted to correct deficiencies should be the one described in that Type requirement to describe the strategy and based on to the extent of the needed Approval’s associated PTCDP. In the plan for complete build out and correction. On the other hand, NYSMTA event, however, that a railroad intends characterized it as premature, proposed that penalties could be to install a system for which a Type unwarranted, and inconsistent with the involved if railroads submit plans Approval number has not yet been RSIA08. FRA strongly disagrees for the deemed to be superfluous. Again, the assigned, or to use a system with an reasons previously set forth and has law requires that both the railroads and assigned Type Approval number that retained the requirement specified in FRA work quickly to get plans in place. may have certain variances to its safety- paragraph (b). As the entity at the receiving end of critical functions, then the railroad must Paragraph (c) codifies in regulation multiple filings, FRA will no doubt have submit a PTCDP to obtain a new Type the statutory mandate that FRA review every reason to handle these matters Approval number. the PTCIP and determine, within 90 with a spirit of cooperation where best The PTCDP is the core document that days upon receipt of the plan, whether efforts have been made to fulfill the provides the Associate Administrator to provide its approval or disapproval. statutory requirements. sufficient information to determine FRA believes that it is also important to As noted previously, subpart I applies whether the PTC system proposed for provide procedural rules to to each railroad that has been mandated installation by the railroad could meet communicate approval or disapproval. by Congress and FRA to install a PTC the statutory requirements for PTC Thus, under paragraph (c), any approval system. A railroad that is not required systems specified by RSIA08 and the or disapproval of a PTCIP by FRA will to install a PTC system may still do so regulatory requirements under subpart I. be communicated by written notice. In under its own volition. In such a case, Issuance of a system Type Approval the event that FRA disapproves of the it may either seek approval of its system number is contingent upon the approval PTCIP, the notice will also include a under either subpart H or I. Paragraph of the PTCDP by the Associate narrative explaining the reasons for (d) intends to make this choice clear. Administrator. While filing of a PTCDP disapproval. Once the railroad receives Paragraph (e) responds to comments is optional in the sense that the railroad notification that its PTCIP has been by labor organizations in the PTC may proceed directly to submission of disapproved by FRA, it will have 30 Working Group. These employee the PTCSP by the April 16, 2010, days to resubmit its PTCIP for review representatives sought the opportunity deadline (see § 236.1009), FRA and approval. While FRA may provide to comment on major PTC filings. encourages railroads engaged in joint assistance to remedy a faulty PTCIP, it Paragraph (e) provides that, upon operations to file a PTCDP. Approval of is ultimately the railroad’s receipt of a PTCIP, NPI, PTCDP, or the PTCDP, and issuance of a Type responsibility and burden to develop PTCSP, FRA will post on its public Web Approval, presents the opportunity for and submit a PTCIP worthy of FRA site notice of receipt and reference to other railroads to reduce the effort approval. FRA understands the the public docket in which a copy of the required to obtain a PTC System railroads’ desire to extend the period of filing has been placed. FRA may Certification. If a Type Approval for a time for corrections of any issues in the consider any public comment on these PTC system exists, another railroad may PTCIP, especially in circumstances that documents to the extent practicable also use that Type Approval provided the railroad believes are out of its within the time allowed by law and there are no variances in the system as control. However, the 30-day period is without delaying implementation of described in the Type Approval’s a statutory requirement. FRA has little PTC systems. The version of any filing PTCDP. In such cases, the other railroad leeway in this regard. FRA will try to initially placed in the public docket, for may avoid submitting its own PTCDP by work, within the limits of available FRA which confidential treatment has been simply incorporating by reference the resources, with railroads in reviewing requested in accordance with § 209.11, supporting information in the Type draft versions of the PTCIP before April would be the redacted copy as filed by Approval’s PTCDP and certifying that 16, 2010. Early identification of the railroad. If FRA later determined no variances in the PTC system have potential issues should reduce, and that additional material was not been made. possibly eliminate, rework that a deserving of confidential treatment, that This section describes the contents of railroad might need to address during material would be subsequently added the PTCDP required to obtain FRA the 30-day correction period. However, to the docket. approval in the form of issuance of a regardless of any early FRA Paragraph (f) has been added to this Type Approval number. This section participation in the document review section in the final rule to require requires each PTCDP to include all the

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elements and practices listed in this FRA appreciates the concerns as representing the expenditure of section to provide reasonable assurance expressed regarding a de-facto significant resources by the vendor, the that the subject PTC system will meet monopoly and the possible adverse railroad, or both. However, the statutory requirements and are consequences on system deployments. interoperability requirements between developed consistent with generally- FRA, however, must defer to the railroads require some disclosure of accepted principles and risk-oriented Departments of Justice and Commerce information between railroads and proof of safety methods surrounding regarding issues of alleged monopolistic vendors or suppliers. This should not this technology. FRA believes that it is behavior. require disclosure of proprietary necessary to include the provisions In subparts H and I, FRA has information, but does require disclosure contained in this section in order to encouraged the use of publicly available of interface specifications, as well as provide reasonable assurance that the standards in the design, required functional attributes, assigned PTC system, when developed and implementation, and testing of PTC safety attributes and stimulus/response deployed, will have no adverse impact systems. FRA does not mandate the use attributes. FRA believes such disclosure on the safety of railroad employees, the of any particular standard by a railroad, of the latter is in the best interest of the public, and the movement of trains. vendor, or supplier, but rather has railroad, vendor, and supplier FRA recognizes that much of the adopted a policy of allowing the communities and strongly encourages information required by § 236.1013 marketplace to decide what standard(s) the free exchange of this information. normally resides with the PTC system’s should be used, provided the end In §§ 236.1013 and 236.1015, various developer or supplier and not the client result—a suitable safe product—is adjectives precede several of the railroad. While FRA expects that each obtained. Specification of government requirements. For instance, certain railroad and its PTC system supplier standards is only appropriate where paragraphs require ‘‘a complete may jointly draft a PTCDP, the railroad there has been a failure of the description,’’ ‘‘a detailed description,’’ or has the primary responsibility for the marketplace. It has not yet been simply a ‘‘description.’’ These phrases safety of its operations and for established that such marketplace are inherited from subpart H of this part. submitting to FRA the information failure has occurred. Even if such a Their inclusion in subpart I are required under this section. marketplace failure were deemed to similarly not to imply that any Accordingly, each railroad required to have occurred, it is extremely unlikely description should be more or less submit a PTCDP under subpart I should that FRA would be able to complete the detailed or complete than any other make the necessary arrangements to development of appropriate standards description required. By contrast, they ensure that the requisite information is before current industry efforts with the are included merely for the purposes of readily available from the supplier for ITC specifications are finalized and emphasis. submission to the agency. FRA believes made publicly available. FRA Paragraph (a)(1) requires that the that suppliers and railroads will understands the railroads’ concerns and PTCDP include system specifications develop a PTCDP for most products that will monitor the situation. that describe the overall product and adequately address the requirements of FRA hastens to add that, since the identify each component and its the new subpart without substantial publication of the NPRM, it has become physical relationship in the system. additional expense. As part of the clear that ITC standards may not be FRA will not dictate specific product design and evaluation process, it is completed and validated prior to the architectures, but will examine each essential to ensure that an adequate end of 2010. FRA has requested that the PTC system to fully understand how its analysis of the features and capabilities ITC railroads accelerate this process in various parts interrelate. Safety-critical is made to minimize the possibility of the interest of compliance with the law, functions in particular will be reviewed conflicts resulting from any use or and has added the Notice of Product to determine whether they are designed feature, including a software fault. Since Intent as a means of bridging to the to be fail-safe. FRA would like to this analysis is a normal cost of software point where standards are available. emphasize that the PTCDP information engineering development, FRA does not Looking forward to mid-2010, FRA will provided in accordance with the believe this requirement imposes any assess the situation with respect to requirements of this paragraph should additional significant costs beyond what delivery of open standards and their be as railroad independent as possible. should already be done when adoption by the AAR. Should it appear This will allow the product’s PTCDP, developing safety-critical software. that a timely delivery will not be made, and any associated Type Approval, to be The passenger and public commuter FRA reserves the right to take further shared by multiple railroads to the railroads who submitted comments regulatory action. That action could maximum extent possible. FRA believes expressed significant concern that the include a proposal for adoption of that the PTCDP information provided in Class I railroads’ choice of a single mandatory interoperability standards, accordance with this provision will play vendor or supplier for the onboard likely in the form of existing American an important role in FRA’s components of the PTC systems, Railway Engineering and Maintenance determination as to whether safety will coupled with the RSIA08 requirement Association standards that have already be maximized and if regulatory for interoperability, creates a de-facto been developed through the leadership compliance of the system is obtainable. monopoly, with associated adverse of the major international signal Paragraph (a)(2) requires a description impacts on costs and schedule. These suppliers. FRA believes that such action of the operation where the product will commenters recommended that FRA should not be necessary and looks be used. Upon receipt of this take positive steps to ensure that forward to the timely completion of ITC information within a PTCDP, FRA will sufficient information is made available standards. have better contextual knowledge of the to allow the railroads to source One vendor pointed out that a product as it applies to the type of components from multiple vendors or significant portion of the work operation on which it is designed to be suppliers. The suggested actions ranged associated with PTC system is used. Where operational behaviors are from disapproving any PTCIP/PTCDP commercially sensitive. FRA is not applicable to a particular railroad, or that is not based on open standards to committed to appropriate protection of the product design is not intended to expediting Interoperable Train Control both railroad and vendor intellectual address a particular operational (ITC) specification documentation. property. Its development is recognized behavior, FRA would expect a short

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statement indicating which operational approach to the location where failure to perform. For each HMI, the characteristics do not apply and why approach locking is used. FRA intends PTCDP should address the proposed they are not applicable. to use this information to determine basis of assumptions used for selecting Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the whether all the safety-critical functions each such interface, its potential effect PTCDP include a concept of operations, have been included. Where such upon safety, and all potential hazards a list of the product’s functional functionalities are not clearly associated with each interface. Where characteristics, and a description determined to exist as a result of more than one employee is expected to explaining how various components technology development, FRA will perform duties dependent upon HMI within the system are controlled. FRA expect the reasoning to be stated and a input or output, the analysis must expects that the information provided justification provided describing how address the consequences of failure by under paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) will that technology provides the required one or multiple employees. FRA intends together provide a thorough level of safety. Where FRA identifies a to use this information to determine the understanding of the PTC system. FRA void in safety-critical functions, FRA proposed HMI’s effect upon the safety of will review this information—primarily may not approve the PTCDP until railroad operations. The preliminary by comparing the subject PTC system’s remedial action is taken to rectify the human factors analysis must propose functionalities with those underlying concern. how the railroad or its PTC system principles contained in standards for FRA recognizes that the information supplier plans to address the HMI existing signal and train control required under paragraph (a)(4) may criteria listed in Appendix E to this part systems—to determine whether the PTC have already been provided pursuant to or any alternatives proposed by the system is designed to account for all paragraph (a)(1). In such a case, the railroad and deemed acceptable by the relevant safety issues. While FRA does railroad shall cross reference where both Associate Administrator. The design not intend to prescribe PTC system paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(4) have been criteria for Appendix E were first design standards, FRA does expect that jointly satisfied in the PTCDP. developed and subsequently adopted by each applicant will compare the Paragraph (a)(4) requires that each FRA as an element of subpart H of this concepts contained in existing PTCDP address the minimum part. As the criteria in Appendix E are standards to the operational concepts, requirements under § 236.1005 for generally technology neutral, FRA has functionalities, and controls development of safety-critical PTC adopted them with minor changes, for contemplated for the PTC system in systems. FRA expects the information use with both subpart H of this part and order to determine whether a sufficient provided under paragraph (a)(4) to these proceedings. level of safety will be achieved. For cover: identification of all safety Paragraph (a)(5) also requires that the example, existing requirements requirements that govern the operation PTCDP explain how the proposed HMI prescribe that where a track relay is de- of a system; evaluation of the total will affect interoperability. RSIA08 energized, a switch or derail is system to identify known or potential requires that each subject railroad improperly lined, a rail is removed, or safety hazards that may arise over the explain how it intends to obtain system a control circuit is opened, each signal life-cycle of the system; identification of interoperability. The ability of a train governing movements into the subject all safety issues during the design phase crew member to operate another block occupied by a train, locomotive, of the process; elimination or reduction railroad’s PTC system significantly or car must display its most restrictive of the risks posed by the hazards depends upon a commonly understood aspect for the safety of train operations. identified; resolution of safety issues HMI. The HMI provides the end user The principle behind the requirement is presented; development of a process to with a method of interacting with the that, when a condition exists in the track progress; and development of a underlying system and accessing the operating environment, or with respect program of testing and analysis to PTC functionality. FRA expects that to the functioning of the system, that demonstrate that safety requirements are each railroad will adopt an HMI entails a potential hazard, the system met. standard that will ensure ease of use of will assume its most restrictive state to FRA has considered the railroads’ the PTC system both within, and protect the safety of train operations. concerns, and agrees that the selection between, railroads. Paragraph (a)(4) requires that each of the safety assurance concepts that any Paragraph (a)(6) requires an analysis PTCDP include a document that particular railroad may impose on its regarding how subparts A through G of identifies and describes each safety- vendor or supplier might possibly differ, part 236 apply, or no longer apply, to critical function of the subject PTC based on the railroad’s operational the subject PTC system. FRA recognizes system. The product architecture philosophy and tolerance for risk. that, while a PTC system may be includes both hardware and software Accordingly, FRA removed proposed designed in accordance with the aspects that identify the protection paragraph (a)(5) from the final rule as an underlying safety concepts of subparts developed against random hardware element of the PTCDP, and has made A through G, the specific existing faults and systematic errors. Further, the the requirement to describe the safety requirements contained in those document should identify the extent to assurance concepts an element of the subparts are not necessarily applicable. which the architecture is fault tolerant. PTCSP (see § 236.1015(d)(2)). In any event, the PTCDP must identify FRA intends to use this information to Paragraph (a)(5) requires a submission each pertinent requirement considered determine whether appropriate safety of a preliminary human factors analysis to be inapplicable, fully describe the concepts have been incorporated into that addresses each applicable human- alternative method used to fulfill that the proposed PTC system. For example, machine interface (HMI) and all underlying safety concept, and explain existing regulations require that when a proposed product functions to be how the proposed PTC system supports route has been cleared for a train performed by humans to enhance or the underlying safety principle. FRA movement, it cannot be changed until preserve safety. FRA expects this notes that certain sections in subparts A the governing signal has been caused to analysis to place special emphasis on though G of this part may always be display its most restrictive indication proposed human factors responses—and applicable to PTC systems certified and a predetermined time interval has the result of any failure to perform such under subpart I. expired, in those scenarios where time a response—to safety-critical hazards, FRA is concerned about all locking is used or where a train is in including the consequences of human dimensions of system security. Thus,

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paragraph (a)(7) requires the PTCDP to impact specific implementation accordance with § 236.1021. In its include a description of the security decisions. These fundamental request for waiver or request for measures necessary to meet the assumptions usually come in the form amendment, the railroad should address specifications for each PTC system and of data (e.g., facts collected as the result any new risks associated with the life- the prioritized restoration and of experience, observation or cycle extension. mitigation plan as required under experiment, or processes, or premises) Paragraph (a)(8) also requires § 236.1033. Security is an important that can be randomly sampled. FRA specification of the target safety levels. element in the design and development does not expect to audit all of the This includes the identity of each of PTC systems and covers issues such fundamental assumptions on which a potential hazard and how the events as developing measures to prevent PTC system has been developed. leading to a hazard will be identified for hackers from gaining access to software Instead, FRA envisions sampling and each safety-critical subsystem; the and to preclude sudden system reviewing fundamental assumptions proposed safety integrity level of each shutdown, mechanisms to provide prior to product implementation and safety-critical subsystem, and the message integrity, and means to after operation for some time. FRA proposed means that accomplishment of authenticate the communicating parties. expects that the data sampled may vary, these targets will be evaluated. This Safety and security are two closely depending upon the PTC system. It is paragraph also requires identification of related topics. Both are elements for not possible to provide a single set of the proposed backup methods of ensuring that a subject is protected and quantitative numbers applicable to all operation and safety-critical without risk of harm. In the industrial systems, especially when systems have assumptions regarding availability of marketplace, the goals of safety and yet to be designed and for which the the product. FRA believes this security are to create an environment fundamental assumptions are yet to be information is essential for making protecting assets from hazards or harm. determined. Quantification is part of the determinations about the safety of a While activities to ensure safety usually risk management process for each product and both the immediate and relate to the possibility of accidental project. FRA believes that the actual long-term effect of its failure. FRA harm, activities to ensure security performance of the system observed contends that availability is directly usually relate to protecting a subject during the pre-operational testing and related to safety to the extent the backup from intentional malicious acts such as post-implementation phases will means of controlling operations espionage, theft, or attack. Since system provide indications of the validity of the involves greater risk (either inherently performance may be affected by either fundamental assumptions. FRA requires or because it is infrequently practiced). inadvertent or deliberate hazards or that this review process occur for the Paragraph (a)(9) requires a complete harms, the safety and security involved life of the PTC system (i.e., as long as description of how the PTC system will enforce all pertinent authorities and in the implementation and operation of the product is kept in operation). The block signal, cab signal, or other signal a PTC system must both be considered. depth of details required will depend related indications. FRA appreciates Integrated security recognizes that upon what FRA observes. The range of that not all PTC system architectures optimum protection comes from three difference between a PTC system’s will seek to enforce the speed mutually supporting elements: Physical predicted and actual performance may restrictions associated with intermediate security measures, operational indicate to FRA the validity of the signals directly, but nevertheless a clear procedures, and procedural security underlying fundamental assumptions. description of these functions is measures. Today, the convergence of Generally, if the actual performance information and physical security is necessary for clarity and evaluation. matches the predicted performance, being driven by several powerful forces, Paragraph (a)(10) requires that, if the FRA believes that it will not have to including: interdependency, efficiency railroad is seeking to deviate from the extensively review the fundamental and organizational simplification, requirements of section 236.1029 with assumptions. If the actual performance security awareness, regulations, respect to movement of trains with does not match predicted performance, directives, standards, and the evolving onboard equipment that has failed en FRA may need to more extensively global communications infrastructure. route using the flexibility provided by review the fundamental assumptions. Physical security describes measures paragraph (c) of that section, a that prevent or deter attackers from FRA expects each subject railroad to justification must be provided in the accessing a facility, resource, or confirm the validity of initial PTCDP. As proposed, paragraph (c) of information stored on physical media assumptions by comparing them to § 236.1029 provided that, in order for a and guidance on how to design actual in-service data. FRA is aware that PTC train that operates at a speed above structures to resist various hostile acts. mechanical and electronic component 90 miles per hour to deviate from the Communications security describes failure rates and times to repair are operating limitations contained in measures and controls taken to deny easily quantified data, and usually are paragraph (b) of that section, the unauthorized persons information kept as part of the logistical tracking and deviation must be described and derived from telecommunications and maintenance management of a railroad. justified in the FRA approved PTCDP or ensure the authenticity of such FRA believes that this criterion will PTCSP, or by reference to an Order of telecommunications. Because of the enhance the quality of risk assessments Particular Applicability, as applicable. integrated nature of security, FRA conducted pursuant to this subpart by For instance, if Amtrak wished to expects that each PTCDP will address forcing PTC system designers and users continue to operate at up to 125 miles security as a holistic concept, and not be to consider the long-term effects of per hour with cab signals and automatic restricted to limited or specific aspects. operation over the course of the PTC train control in the case of failure of Paragraph (a)(8) requires system’s projected life-cycle. If a PTC onboard ACSES equipment, Amtrak documentation of assumptions system can be used beyond its design would request to do so based on the concerning reliability and availability life-cycle, FRA expects that any applicable language of the Order of targets of mechanical, electrical, and continued use would only occur Particular Applicability that required electronic components. When building a pursuant to a waiver provided in installation of that system on portions of PTC system, designers may make accordance with 49 CFR part 211 or a the Northeast Corridor. Similarly, a numerous assumptions that will directly PTCDP or PTCSP amended in railroad wishing more liberal

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requirements for a high-speed rail Provided that at least one product is proposed system will integrate with the system on a dedicated right-of-way certified within the 5 year period after existing signal and train control system. could request that latitude by explaining issuance of the Type Approval, the Type Section 236.1015 PTC Safety Plan how the safety of all affected train Approval remains valid until final Content Requirements and PTC System movements would be maintained. retirement of the system. The main Certification During the comment period and PTC purpose of this requirement is to Working Group discussion, Amtrak incentivize installation, not just The PTCSP is the core document that continued to press its case for greater creation, of a PTC system. This provides the Associate Administrator flexibility, noting the long routes paragraph would also allow FRA to the information necessary to certify that prevalent on its intercity network and periodically clean out its records the as-built PTC system fulfills the the trip time penalty that could be relating to Type Approvals and PTCDPs required statutory PTC functions and is incurred with failed equipment. for obsolete PTC systems. in compliance with the requirements of Paragraph (a)(10) has been revised in the Former paragraphs (d) and (e) in this this subpart. Issuance of a PTC System final rule to reflect the fact that the section have been moved to § 236.1015 Certification is contingent upon the development plan would contain in the final rule. Therefore, former approval of the PTCSP by the Associate justification for any requested deviation paragraph (f) has been redesignated as Administrator. Under this final rule, the from the requirements of § 236.1029, paragraph (d) in the final rule. filing and approval of the PTCSP and and that section has been further revised Paragraph (d) discusses the Associate issuance of a PTC System Certification to permit the agency to receive and Administrator’s ability to impose any is a mandatory prerequisite for PTC consider specific requests and conditions necessary to ensure the system operation in revenue service. supporting information regarding safety of the public, train crews, and Each PTCSP is unique to each railroad and must addresses railroad-specific latitude such as that sought by Amtrak train operations when approving the implementation issues associated with without regard to speed. Instead, PTCDP and issuing a Type Approval. the PTC system identified by the paragraph (a)(10) requires the railroad to While FRA expects that adherence to submitted Type Approval. Paragraph (a) include a justification in its PTCDP, if the remainder of this section’s provides language explaining these the railroad is seeking to deviate from requirements should justify issuance of the requirements of § 236.1029 with meanings and limits. a Type Approval, FRA also recognizes Paragraph (b), which reflects the respect to movement of trains with that there may be situations where other onboard equipment that has failed en contents of proposed paragraphs (d) and unaccounted for variables may reduce (e) in proposed § 236.1013, establishes route. the Associate Administrator’s Paragraph (a)(11) requires a complete the conditions under which a Type confidence in the PTC system, its Approval may be used by another description of how the PTC system will manufacturer, supplier, vendor, or appropriately and timely enforce all railroad. Paragraph (b)(1) requires the operator. hazard detectors that are interconnected railroad to maintain a continually The required contents of the NPI are with the PTC system in accordance with updated PTC Product Vendor List § 236.1005(c)(3), as may be applicable. specified in paragraph (e). As stated (PTCPVL) pursuant to § 236.1023 to Paragraph (b) specifies the approval earlier, FRA expects submission of an enable the railroad and FRA to standard that will be employed by the NPI temporarily in lieu of a PTCDP only determine the appropriate vendor to Associate Administrator. APTA asserted when the railroad is unable to obtain all contact in the unlikely event of a safety that the NPRM offered minimal of the information required for a PTCDP. critical failure. guidance on the criteria FRA will use to This will enable railroads to submit a The safety critical nature of PTC accept or reject a system. Thus, APTA PTCIP on or before the statutory systems imposes strict quality control suggested that FRA should draft and vet deadline of April 16, 2010. FRA believes requirements on the design and criteria that accomplishes the basic that, given the various options available manufacturer of the system. While FRA purposes of PTC while allowing for to the railroads, there are few, if any, believes that in the vast majority of innovation in meeting the performance valid reasons for not meeting the April cases, the vendor or supplier requirements envisioned in the 16, 2010, deadline for submission. community from whom the railroads regulation. The elements that make up the NPI will procure PTC system components The PTCDP is not expected to provide were carefully chosen to strike a balance have established the appropriate quality absolute assurance to the Associate between the ability of a railroad that is control systems, there will be a very Administrator that every potential unable to complete a full PTCDP and small minority who have not. Paragraph hazard will be eliminated with complete FRA’s need to fully understand the (b)(2) is intended to mitigate against any certainty. It only needs to establish that railroad’s proposed system and the such occurrence, to ensure that PTC the PTC system meets the appropriate reasonableness of the PTCIP contents. system components meet the same, statutory and regulatory requirements FRA believes that the NPI information uniformly high, standards. FRA is for a PTC system required under this would be required to have been requiring that the railroad ensure that subpart, and that there is a reasonable identified by the railroad in order to any vendor from whom they purchase chance that once built, it will meet the develop requests for proposal from the PTC system or components has an required safety standards for its vendor or supplier community. acceptable quality assurance program intended use. FRA emphasizes that Paragraph (e)(1) requires a description for both design and manufacturing approval of a PTCDP and issuance of a of the proposed operating environment. processes. Type Approval does not constitute final Paragraph (e)(2) requires a description FRA has considered comments approval to operate the product in of the concept of operations for any PTC submitted by GE, in which GE suggested revenue service. Such approval only system that will be procured by the language to further clarify paragraph comes when the Associate railroad. Paragraph (e)(3) requires a (b)(2) that the vendor quality control Administrator issues an applicable PTC description of the target safety levels processes for PTC systems must include System Certification. that the railroad expects the PTC system the process for the product supplier to Paragraph (c) establishes a time limit to meet, while paragraphs (e)(4) and promptly report any safety relevant on the validity of a Type Approval. (e)(5) require an explanation of how the failure and previously unidentified

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hazards to each railroad using the the PTCSP are the same elements as the Paragraph (d)(1) requires that the product. FRA believes that this PTCDP (and are described more fully in PTCSP include a hazard log suggested language clearly specifies the the section-by-section analysis of comprehensively describing all hazards importance of this requirement to § 236.1013). If the railroad has already to be addressed during the life-cycle of suppliers who may not already have the submitted, and FRA has already the product, including maximum appropriate quality control processes in approved, the PTCDP, then attachment threshold limits for each hazard. For place. Accordingly, FRA has added the of the PTCDP to the PTCSP should unidentified hazards, the threshold recommended language. fulfill this requirement. shall be exceeded at one occurrence. In Paragraph (b)(3) requires the railroad FRA recognizes the possibility that other words, if the hazard has not been to provide licensing information. The between PTCIP or PTCDP approval, and predicted, then any single occurrence of list should include all applicable prior to PTCSP submission, there may that hazard is unacceptable. The hazard vendors or suppliers. Through the be changes to the former two log addresses safety-relevant hazards, or requirements set forth in paragraph documents. While such changes may incidents or failures that affect the (b)(3), FRA intends to ensure only be made in accordance with safety and risk assumptions of the PTC implementation of the proper § 236.1021, documentation of those system. Safety relevant hazards include technology, as opposed to changes may not be readily apparent to events such as false proceed signal implementation of an orphan product the reader of the PTCSP. Further, indications and false restrictive signal that uses similar, yet different, changes in the PTCIP may impact the indications. If false restrictive signal technology. When a railroad submits a contents of the PTCDP and vice versa. indications occur with any type of previously approved Type Approval for Accordingly, paragraph (c)(1) requires frequency, they could influence train its PTC system, FRA expects that all the the railroad to submit the approved crew members, roadway workers, proper licensing agreements will PTCDP (or Type Approval) with the dispatchers, or other users to develop an provide for continued use and corresponding PTCSP. apathetic attitude towards complying maintenance of the PTC system in place. AAR asserted that the main purpose with signal indications or instructions To bolster FRA’s confidence in this area, of the PTCIP is to document the from the PTC system, creating human FRA will require each Type Approval deployment plan and that the PTCIP factors problems. submission to include the relevant will be of little value once the Incidents in which stop indications licensing information. FRA recognizes implementation is complete. are inappropriately displayed may also that there may be various licensing Accordingly, AAR asserts that there is necessitate sudden brake applications arrangements available relating to the no need to include the PTCIP when that may involve risk of derailment due exclusivity and sublicensing of filing either a PTCDP or PTCSP. The to in-train forces. Other unsafe or manufacturing or vending of a particular AAR also asserted that since the PTCSP wrong-side failures that affect the safety PTC system. There may be other justifies that the PTC system was built of the product will be recorded on the intellectual property variables that may in accordance with the PTCDP, hazard log. The intent of this paragraph make arrangements even more complex. submission of the PTCIP information is to identify all possible safety-relevant To adequately capture all applicable should not be required. hazards that would have a negative arrangements, FRA is requiring the FRA agrees with AAR that the main effect on the safety of the product. submission of ‘‘licensing information.’’ purpose of the PTCIP is to document the Right-side failures, or product failures A more specific request may preclude deployment plan and that the PTCIP that have no adverse effect on the safety FRA’s ability to collect information will essentially become a historical of the product (i.e., do not result in a necessary to fulfill its intent. If any of document when the railroad has hazard) would not be required to be this information were to change, either completed its PTC implementation. recorded on the hazard log. through any type of sale, transfer, or Therefore, until all PTC system Paragraph (d)(2), which has been sublicense of any right or ownership, installations have been completed, FRA added to the final rule, requires that then FRA would expect the railroad to will require the PTCIP to be kept current each railroad identify the PTC system’s submit a request for amendment of its with the railroad’s deployment plan. safety assurance concepts. When PTCDP in accordance with § 236.1021. However, in response to the AAR’s identifying the safety assurance FRA recognizes that this may be comments, FRA has revised paragraph concepts used, FRA expects the difficult for a railroad to accomplish, (c) by removing the proposed information provided pursuant to given the fact that the railroad may not requirement to submit the PTCIP with paragraph (d)(2) will reflect the safety be privy to any intellectual property the PTCDP and PTCSP. requirements that govern the operation transactions that may occur outside its FRA expects that each PTCSP shall of a system; the identify of known or control. In any event, FRA would expect include a clear and complete potential safety hazards that may arise that a railroad will ensure, either description of any such changes by over the life-cycle of the system; safety through contractual obligation or specifically and rigorously documenting issues that may arise during the design otherwise, that its vendor or supplier each variance. Paragraph (c)(2) also phase of the process; elimination or will provide it with updated licensing requires that the PTCSP include an reduction of the risks posed by the information on a continuing basis. explanation of each variance’s hazards identified; resolution of safety When filing a PTCSP, paragraph (c) significance. To ensure that there are no issues presented; development of a requires each railroad to include the other existing variances not documented process to track progress; and applicable and approved PTCDP or, if in the PTCSP, the railroad must attest development of a program of testing and applicable, the FRA issued Type that there are no further variances. For analysis to demonstrate that safety Approval. In addition, the railroad must the same reason, paragraph (c)(3) requirements are being met. describe any changes subsequently requires that, if there have been no In the proposed rule, this information made to the PTC system that would changes to the plans or to the PTC was required as part of the PTCDP. One require amendment of the PTCDP or system as intended, the railroad must railroad recommended that this assure FRA that the PTC system built is attest that there are no such variances. information requirement be completely the same PTC system described in the The additional required railroad eliminated as redundant because it is PTCDP and PTCSP. Some elements of specific elements are as follows: covered as part of the product safety

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requirements. FRA agrees that this failures, which are completely avoidable eliminate, and mitigate hazards. Under information should not be a required using current technology, can result in certain circumstances, FRA may require element of the PTCDP; this information unnecessary and risky penalty brake an independent third party assessment should be provided as an element of the applications. in accordance with proposed § 236.1017 railroad specific PTCSP, since FRA agrees that wrong side failures to review these methods as a individual railroads may elect to require introduce an element of risk in the prerequisite to FRA approval. different safety assurance concepts from operation of a system. Therefore, the Paragraph (d)(5) also requires that the their vendors or suppliers. This very extent of that risk and the consequences PTCSP address safety Verification and same information is an integral element of the failure must be identified and Validation procedures as defined under of the railroad specific Product Safety carefully analyzed. It is for that very part 236. FRA believes that Verification Plan required by subpart H of this part. reason that FRA is requiring that the and Validation for safety are vital parts Accordingly, FRA has revised this hazard log identify all such potential of the PTC system development process. requirement. However, FRA does not failures. The hazard mitigation analysis Verification and Validation require believe that this information is required in paragraph (d)(4) must forward planning. Consequently, the redundant. The safety assurance identify how each hazard in the hazard PTCSP should identify the testing to be concepts imposed on the vendor or log will be mitigated. While FRA agrees performed at each stage of development supplier are procedural requirements the majority of wrong side failures can and the levels of rigor applied during that drive vendor or supplier system be eliminated through the application of the testing process. FRA will use this design and mitigation strategies. FRA technology, FRA believes that the information to ensure that the adequacy believes that the importance of the generalization that all wrong side and coverage of the tests are safety assurance concepts merits clear failures can be eliminated is not valid. appropriate. identification. Paragraph (d)(4) requires that the Paragraph (d)(6) requires the railroad Paragraph (d)(3) requires that a risk PTCSP include a hazard mitigation to include in its PTCSP the training, assessment be included in the PTCSP. analysis. The hazard mitigation analysis qualification, and designation program FRA will use this information as a basis must identify the techniques used to for workers regardless of whether those to confirm compliance with the investigate the consequences of various railroad employees will perform appropriate performance standard. A hazards and list all hazards addressed in inspection, testing, and maintenance performance standard specifies the the system hardware and software tasks involving the PTC system. FRA outcome required, but leaves the including failure mode, possible cause, believes many benefits accrue from the specific measures to achieve that effect of failure, and remedial actions. A investment in comprehensive training outcome up to the discretion of the safety-critical system must satisfy programs and are fundamental to regulated entity. In contrast to a design certain specific safety requirements creating a safe workforce. Effective standard or a technology-based standard specified by the system designer or training programs can result in fewer that specifies exactly how to achieve procuring entity. To determine whether instances of human casualties and compliance, a performance standard these requirements are satisfied, the defective equipment, leading to sets a goal and lets each regulated entity safety assessor must determine that: (1) increased operating efficiencies, less decide how to meet that goal. An Hazards associated with the system troubleshooting, and decreased costs. appropriate performance standard have been comprehensively identified; FRA expects any training program will should provide reasonable assurance of (2) hazards have been appropriately include employees, supervisors, and safe and effective performance by categorized according to risk (likelihood contractors engaged in railroad making provision for: (1) Considering and severity); (3) appropriate techniques operations, installation, repair, the construction, components, for mitigating the hazards have been modification, testing, or maintenance of ingredients, and properties of the device identified; and (4) hazard mitigation equipment and structures associated and its compatibility with other systems techniques have been effectively with the product. and connections to such systems; (2) applied. See Leveson, Nancy G., Paragraph (d)(7) requires the railroad testing of the product on a sample basis Safeware: System Safety and to identify specific procedures and test or, if necessary, on an individual basis; Computers, (Addison-Wesley equipment necessary to ensure the safe (3) measurement of the performance Publishing Company, 1995). operation, installation, repair, characteristics; and (4) requiring that the FRA does not expect that the safety modification and testing of the product results of each or of certain of the tests assessment will prove that a product is in its PTCSP. Requirements for required show that the device is in absolutely safe. However, the safety operation of the system must be conformity with the portions of the assessment should provide evidence succinct in every respect. The standard for which the test or tests were that risks associated with the product procedures must be specific about the required. Typically, the specific process have been carefully considered and that methodology to be employed for each used to design, verify and validate the steps have been taken to eliminate or test to be performed that is required for product is specified in a private or mitigate them. Hazards associated with installation, repair, or modification and public standard. The Associate product use need to be identified, with the results thereof must be documented. Administrator may recognize all or part particular focus on those hazards found FRA will review and compare the repair of an appropriate standard established to have significant safety effects. The and test procedures for adequacy against by a nationally or internationally risk assessment provided under existing similar requirements prescribed recognized standard development paragraph (d)(4) must include each for signal and train control systems. organization. hazard that cannot be mitigated by FRA intends to use this information to Labor expressed concern during this system designs (e.g., human over- ascertain whether the product will be rulemaking regarding FRA’s position on reliance of the automated systems) no properly installed, maintained, tested, the treatment of wrong side failures. matter how low its probability may be. and repaired. Wrong side failures, which occur when After the risk assessment, the designer Paragraph (d)(8) requires that each a PTC system fails to properly identify must take steps to remove them or railroad develop a manual covering the the track occupied by a train, should not mitigate their effects. Hazard analysis requirements for the installation, be considered an acceptable risk. Such methods are employed to identify, periodic maintenance and testing,

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modification, and repair for its PTC information to ascertain whether the In the past, little attention was given system. The railroad’s Operations and product will be properly installed, to formalizing incursion protection Maintenance Manual must address the maintained, and tested. FRA also procedures. Training for crews has also issuance of warnings and describe the believes that configuration management not been uniform among organizations, warning labels to be placed on each should reduce disarrangement issues. and has frequently received inadequate piece of PTC system equipment as Further, configuration management will attention. As a result, a variety of necessary. Such warnings include, but reduce the cost of troubleshooting by procedures and techniques evolved are not limited to: Means to prevent reducing the number of variables and based on what has been observed or unauthorized access to the system; will be more effective in promoting what just seemed correct at the time. warnings of electrical shock hazards; safety. This lack of structure, standardization, cautionary notices about improper Paragraph (d)(11) requires the railroad and formal training is inconsistent with usage, testing, or operation; and to provide a complete description of the the goal of increasing safety and configuration management of memory particulars concerning measures regulatory efficiency. and databases. The PTCSP should required to assure that the PTC system, As proposed, paragraph (d)(14) would provide an explanation justifying each once implemented, continues to provide have required a more detailed such warning and an explanation of the expected safety level without description of any alternative why there are no alternatives that would degradation or variation over its life- arrangements provided under mitigate or eliminate the hazard for cycle. The measures specifically provide § 236.1011(a)(10), pertaining to at grade which the warning will be given. the prescribed intervals and criteria for rail-to-rail crossings. APTA noted that Paragraph (d)(9) requires that the the following: testing; scheduled the reference in this paragraph should PTCSP identify the various configurable preventive maintenance requirements; be revised, as section 236.1011(a)(10) applications of the product, since this procedures for configuration does not exist. The correct reference is rule mandates use of the product only management; and procedures for § 236.1005(a)(1)(i). in the manner described in its PTCDP. modifications, repair, replacement and As previously mentioned, Given the importance of proper adjustment of equipment. FRA intends § 236.1005(a) requires each applicable configuration management in safety- to use this information, among other PTC system to be designed to prevent critical systems, FRA believes it is data, to monitor the PTC system to train-to-train collisions. Under that essential that railroads learn of and take assure it continually functions as section, FRA has established various appropriate configuration control of intended. requirements that would apply to at- hardware and software. FRA believes Paragraph (d)(12) requires that each grade rail-to-rail crossings, also known that a requirement for configuration PTCSP include a description of each as diamond crossings. While the final management control will enhance the record concerning safe operation. rule text includes certain specific safety of these systems and ultimately Recordkeeping requirements for each technical requirements, it also provides provide other benefits to the railroad as product are discussed in § 236.1037 of the opportunity for each subject railroad well. Pursuant to this paragraph, to submit an alternative arrangement railroads will be responsible—through this part. providing an equivalent level of safety its applicable Operations and Paragraph (d)(13) requires a safety as specified in an FRA approved PTCSP. Maintenance Plan and other supporting analysis of unintended incursions into a Accordingly, under paragraph (d)(14), if documentation maintained throughout work zone. Measuring incursion risks is the system’s life-cycle—for all changes a key safety risk assumption. Failing to the railroad intends to utilize alternative to configuration of their products in use, identify incursion risk can have the arrangements providing an equivalent including both changes resulting from effect of making a system seem safer on level of safety to that of the table maintenance and engineering control paper than it actually is. The provided under § 236.1005(a)(1)(i), each changes, which result from requirements set forth in this paragraph PTCSP must identify those alternative manufacturer modifications to the attempt to mandate design arrangements and methods, with any product. Since not all railroads may consideration of incursion protection at associated risk reduction measures, in experience the same software faults or an early stage in the system its PTCSP. hardware failures, the configuration development process. The totality of the Paragraph (d)(15) requires a complete management and fault reporting arrangements made to prevent description of how the PTC system will tracking system play a crucial role in the unintended incursions or operation at enforce mandatory directives and signal ability of the railroad and the FRA to higher than authorized speed within the indications, unless already addressed in determine and fully understand the work zone must be analyzed. That is, in the PTCDP. Paragraph (d)(16) refers to risks and their implications. Without an addition to the functions of the PTC the requirement of § 236.1019(f) that the effective configuration management system, the required actions for PTCSP is aligned with the PTCIP, tracking system in place, it is difficult, dispatchers, train crews, and roadway including any amendments. if not impossible, to fairly evaluate risks workers in charge must be evaluated. Under § 236.1007, FRA requires associated with a product over its life- Regardless of whether a PTC system has certain limitations on PTC trains cycle. been previously approved or operating over 90 miles per hour, Paragraph (d)(10) requires the railroad recognized, FRA will not accept a including compliance with to develop comprehensive plans and system that allows a single point human § 236.1029(c). Under § 236.1029(c), FRA procedures for product implementation. failure to defeat the essential protection provides railroads with an opportunity Implementation (field validation or intended by the Congress. See NTSB to deviate from those limitations if the cutover) procedures must be prepared in Recommendations R–08–05 and R–08– railroad describes and justifies the detail and identify the processes 06. FRA believes that exposure should deviation in its PTCDP, PTCSP, or by necessary to verify that the PTC system be identified because increases in risk reference to an Order of Particular is properly installed and documented, due to increased exposure could be Applicability, as applicable. Thus, including measures to provide for the easily distinguished from increases in paragraph (d)(17) reminds railroads that safety of train operations during risk due solely to implementation and this is one of the optional elements that installation. FRA will use this use of the proposed PTC system. may be included in a PTCSP. This need

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may also be addressed through review It is FRA’s understanding that PTC railroad should affirmatively address of the PTCDP. systems may be categorized as one of how training and oversight—including Railroads are required under the following four system types: non- programs of operational testing under 49 § 236.1005(c) to submit a complete vital overlay; vital overlay; stand-alone; CFR 217.9—will reduce the potential for description of their compliance and mixed. Initially, however, all PTC inappropriate reliance by those charged regarding hazard detector integration systems will have some features that are with functioning in accordance with the and under §§ 236.1005(g)–(k) to submit not fully fail-safe in nature, even if underlying method of operation. a temporary rerouting plan in the event onboard processing and certain wayside The 80% reduction in risk for PTC of emergencies and planned functions are fully fail-safe. Common preventable accidents must be maintenance. Sections 236.1007 and causes include surveying errors of the demonstrated by an appropriate risk 236.1033 also require the submission of track database, errors in consist weight analysis acceptable to the Associate certain documents and information. or makeup from the railroad information Administrator and must address all Paragraphs (d)(18), (d)(19), and (d)(20) technology systems, and the crew input intended track segments upon which remind railroads that such requirements errors of critical operational data. To the the system will be installed. Again, FRA must be fulfilled with the submission of extent computer-aided dispatching does not expect, or require, that these the PTCSP. For example, under systems are the only check on potential types of systems will prevent all wrong paragraph (d)(19), FRA expects each dispatcher error in the creation or side failures. However, FRA expects that temporary rerouting plan to explain the inappropriate cancellation of mandatory the systems will be designed to be host railroad’s procedure relating to directives, some room for undetected robust, all pertinent risk factors detouring the applicable traffic. In other wrong-side failure will continue to exist (including human factors) will be fully words, FRA expects that each temporary in this function as well. addressed, and that no corners will be cut to ‘‘take advantage’’ of the nominal rerouting plan address how the host Paragraph (e)(1) specifies the required allowance provided for non-vital railroad will choose the track that traffic behavior for non-vital overlay systems. approaches. FRA also encourages those will be rerouted onto. The plan should Based on previous experience with non- using non-vital approaches to preserve explain the factors that will be vital systems, FRA believes it is well as much as possible the potential for a considered in determining whether and within the technical capability of the how the railroad should take advantage transition to vital processing. railroads to reduce the level of risk on The Rail Labor Organizations believe of temporary rerouting. FRA remains any particular track segment to a level that FRA’s position is inconsistent with concerned about the unnecessary of risk 80% lower than the level of risk safety. Wrong side failures occur when commingling of PTC and non-PTC prior to installation of PTC on that a PTC system fails to properly identify traffic on the same track and expects segment. For subsequent PTC system the track occupied by a train. According each temporary rerouting plan to installations on the same track segment, to the RLO, such failures, which are address this possibility. More FRA recognizes that requiring an completely avoidable using current specifically, each plan should describe additional 80% improvement may not technology, can result in unnecessary how the railroad expects to make be technically or economically practical. penalty braking applications that risk decisions to reroute non-PTC train Therefore, FRA is only requiring that an causing train handling derailments due traffic onto a PTC line, especially where entity installing or a modifying an to in-train forces and may also cause a another non-PTC line may be available. existing PTC system demonstrate that PTC system to fail to enforce a necessary While FRA recognizes each railroad the level of safety is equal to, and stop. As such, the RLO believe that may seek to use the most cost effective preferably greater than, the level of wrong side failures should not be route, FRA expects the railroad to also safety of the prior PTC system. The risk considered an acceptable risk. Again, consider the level of risk associated that must be reduced is the risk against FRA is sympathetic in principle to the with that route. which the PTC functionalities are RLO concern. However, no signal or In paragraph (e), FRA states the directed, assuming a high level of train control system is wholly without criteria to which FRA will refer when availability. Note that the required the potential for a wrong side failure; evaluating the PTCSP, depending upon functionalities themselves do not call and the key to limiting their occurrence the underlying technical approach. for elimination of all risk of mishaps. It is identifying the potential and crafting Whereas in subpart H of this part, the is scope of risk reduction that the mitigations where possible. Built on the safety case is evaluated to determine functionalities describe that becomes foundation of existing methods of whether it demonstrates, with a high the 100% universe which is the basis of operation, PTC systems will drastically degree of confidence, that relevant risk comparison. Although it is understood reduce unsafe events by providing a will be no greater under the new that the system will endeavor to safety net for occasional human errors. product than previously, the statutory eliminate 100% of this risk—meaning It would be unwise to defer the promise mandate for PTC calls for a different that if the system worked as intended of PTC technologies by demanding approach. In crafting this approach, every time and was always available, perfection and thereby permit accidents FRA has attempted to limit 100% of the target risk would be and casualties to continue. requirements for quantitative risk eliminated—the analysis will need to Paragraph (e)(2) addresses vital assessment to those situations where the account for cases where wrong side overlays. Unlike a non-vital system, the technique is truly needed. Regardless of failure of the technology is coincident vital system must be designed to the type of PTC system, the safety case with a human failure potentially address, at a minimum, the factors for the system must demonstrate that it induced by reliance on the technology. delineated in Appendix C. The railroad will reliably execute all of the functions Since, within an appropriate and their vendors or suppliers are required by this subpart (particularly conservative engineering analysis (i.e., encouraged to carry out a more thorough those provided under proposed pro forma analysis), non-vital design analysis addressing any other §§ 236.1005 and 236.1007). With this processing has the theoretical potential potential product specific hazards. FRA foundation, the additional criteria that to result in more failures than will cannot overemphasize that vital overlay must be met depend upon the type of typically be experienced, a 20% margin system designs must be fully designed PTC technology to be employed. is provided. In preparing the PTCSP, the to address the factors contained in

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Appendix C. The associated risk require that the system perform the PTC cannot expect to be, static. Rather, FRA analysis supporting this design analysis requirements set forth in §§ 236.1005 policy may evolve as railroad operations demonstrating compliance may be and 236.1007. evolve, operating rules are refined, accomplished using any of the risk Paragraph (f) discusses the factors that related hazards are addressed (e.g., analysis approaches in subpart H, the Associate Administrator will broken rails), and other readily available including abbreviated risk analysis. consider in reviewing the PTCSP. In options for risk reduction emerge and Paragraph (e)(3) addresses stand-alone general, PTC systems will have some become more affordable. FRA embraces PTC systems that are used to replace features that are not fail-safe in nature. the concept of progressive improvement existing methods of operations. The Examples include surveys of the track and expects that when new systems are PTCSP design and risk analysis database, errors in consist data from the installed to replace existing systems that submitted to the Associate railroad such as weight and makeup, actual safety outcomes equal or exceed Administrator must show that the and crew input errors. FRA those for the existing systems. system does not introduce any new participation in the design and testing of Finally, paragraph (h) emphasizes the hazards that have not been acceptably the PTC system product helps FRA to need for the PTCSP to carefully mitigated, based upon all proposed better understand the strengths and document all potential sources of error changes in railroad operation. GE weaknesses of the product for which that can be introduced into the system proffered the suggestion that when the approval is requested, and facilitates the and their corresponding mitigation stand-alone system is created using approval process. strategies. FRA reserves the right to proven principles of vital signaling, The railroad must establish through require quantitative, as opposed to assessing the system risk is safety analysis that its assertions are qualitative risk assessments, especially straightforward and not significantly true. This standard places the burden on in cases where there is significant different than with the vital overlay the railroad to demonstrate that the residual risk or changes to the method system. The importance of system safety analysis is accurate and of operations. availability and risk under operations in sufficiently supports certification of the Section 236.1017 Independent Third contingent mode become more PTC system. The FRA Associate Party Review of Verification and significant factors. FRA agrees, but Administrator will determine whether Validation believes that the one of the fundamental the railroad’s case has been made. As issues that the agency must reconcile is provided in subpart H, FRA believes As previously noted in the discussion the value of appropriately capturing that final agency determinations under regarding § 236.1009(e), FRA may these principles in new systems and this new subpart I should also be made require a railroad to engage in an with new technologies without at the technical level, rather than the independent assessment of its PTC artificially restricting their use. FRA policy level, due to the complex and system. In the event an independent must accordingly exercise great care sometimes esoteric subject matters assessment is required, this section when evaluating the safety cases associated with risk analysis and describes the applicable rules and presented to it, regardless of the type evaluation. This is particularly procedures. (overlay, stand-alone, or mixed). appropriate in light of the RSIA08’s Paragraph (a) establishes factors While FRA believes that a designation of the Associate considered by FRA when requiring a comprehensive safety analysis will be Administrator for Railroad Safety as the third-party assessment. FRA will required for all systems, since it must Chief Safety Officer of FRA. When attempt to make a determination of the provide sufficient information to the considering the PTC system’s necessary level of third party Associate Administrator to make a compliance with recognized standards assessment as early as possible in the decision with a high degree of in product development, FRA will approval process. However, based on confidence, the required analysis for weigh appropriate factors, including: issues that may arise during the stand-alone systems is much more the use of recognized standards in development and testing processes, or comprehensive than that required for system design and safety analyses; the during the detailed technical reviews of vital overlay systems because it must acceptable methods in risk estimates; the PTCDP and PTCSP, FRA may deem provide sufficient information to the the proven safety records for proposed it necessary to require a third party Associate Administrator to make a components; and the overall complexity assessment at any time during the decision with a high degree of and novelty of the product design. In review process. confidence. FRA will therefore exercise those cases where the submission lacks Paragraph (b) is intended to make it greater oversight when it uniquely and information the Associate Administrator clear that it is FRA that will make the separately considers each request for deems necessary to make an informed determination of the acceptability of the stand-alone operations, and will render safety decision, FRA will solicit the data independence of the third party to avoid decisions in the context of the proposed from the railroad. If the railroad does any potential issues downstream operation and the associated risks. FRA not provide the requested information, regarding the acceptability of the recognizes that application of this FRA may determine that a safety hazard assessor’s independence. If a third party standard to a new rail system for which exists. Depending upon the amount and assessment is required, then each there is no clear North American scope of the missing data, PTCSP railroad is encouraged to identify in antecedent could present a conceptual approval, and the subsequent system writing what entity it proposes to utilize challenge. certification, may be denied. as its third party assessor. Compliance Paragraph (e)(4) addresses mixed While paragraph (f) summarizes how with paragraph (b) is not mandatory. systems (i.e., systems that include a FRA intends to evaluate the risk However, if FRA determines that the combination of the systems identified in analysis, paragraph (g) applies railroad’s choice of a third party does paragraphs (e)(1) through (e)(3). Because specifically to cases where a PTC system not meet the level of independence of the inherent complexity of these has already been installed and the contemplated under paragraph (c), then systems, FRA will determine an railroad subsequently wants to install in the railroad will be obligated to have the appropriate approach for demonstrating a new PTC system. Paragraph (g) re- assessment repeated, at its expense, compliance after consultation with the emphasizes that FRA policy regarding until it has been completed by a third railroad. Any approach will, of course, the safety of PTC systems is not, and party suitable to FRA.

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Paragraph (c) provides a definition of discretion provided under 49 U.S.C. for such designation in accordance with the term ‘‘independent third party’’ as 20157(i)(2)(B). paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section. used in this section. It limits In accordance with the authority Paragraph (b) specifically addresses independent third parties to those that provided by the statute and with the conditions for relief for passenger are compensated by the railroad or an carefully considered recommendations and commuter railroads with respect to association on behalf of one or more from the RSAC, FRA will consider passenger-only terminal areas. As noted railroads that is independent of the PTC requests for designation of track over previously in the analysis of system supplier. FRA believes that which rail operations are conducted as § 236.1005(b), any track within a yard requiring the railroad to compensate a ‘‘other than main line track’’ for used exclusively by freight operations third party will heighten the railroad’s passenger and commuter railroads, or moving at restricted speed is excepted interest in obtaining a quality analysis freight railroads operating jointly with from the definition of main line. In and will avoid ambiguous relationships passenger or commuter railroads. Such those situations, operations are usually between suppliers and third parties that relief may be granted only after request limited to preparing trains for could indicate possible conflicts of by the railroad or railroads filing a transportation and do not usually interest. PTCIP and approval by the Associate include actual transportation. This Paragraph (d) explains that the Administrator. automatic exclusion does not extend to minimum requirements of a third party Paragraph (a), therefore, requires the yard or terminal tracks that include audit are outlined in Appendix F and submittal of a main line track exclusion passenger operations. Such operations that FRA has discretion to the limit the addendum (MTEA) to any PTCIP filed may also include the boarding and extent of the third party assessment. As by a railroad that seeks to have any disembarking of passengers, heightening the criteria in Appendix F are, for the particular track segment deemed as FRA’s sensitivity to safety. Moreover, most part, technology neutral, FRA has other than main line. Since the statute while FRA could not expend its limited adopted them with minor changes, for only provides for such regulatory resources to review whether a freight- use with both subparts H and I of this flexibility as it applies to passenger only yard should be deemed other than part. FRA intends to limit the scope of transportation routes or segments where main line track, FRA believes that the the assessment to areas of the safety limited or no freight railroad operations relatively lower number of passenger Verification and Validation as much as occur, only a passenger railroad may file yards and terminals would allow for possible, within the bounds of FRA’s an MTEA as part of its PTCIP. This may such review. Accordingly, FRA believes regulatory obligations. This will allow include a PTCIP jointly filed by freight that it is appropriate to review these reviewers to focus on areas of greatest and passenger railroads. In fact, FRA circumstances on a case-by-case basis. safety concern and eliminate any expects that in the case of joint During the PTC Working Group unnecessary expense to the railroad. In operations, only one MTEA should be discussions, the major passenger order to limit the number of third-party agreed upon and submitted by the railroads requested an exception for assessments, FRA first strives to inform railroads filing the PTCIP. After tracks in passenger terminal areas the railroad as to what portions of a reviewing a submitted MTEA, FRA may because of the impracticability of submittal could be amended to avoid provide full or conditional approval for installing PTC. These are locations the necessity and expense of a third- the requested exemptions. where signal systems govern movements party assessment altogether. However, Each MTEA must clearly identify and over very complex special track work FRA wishes to make it clear that define the physical boundaries, use, and divided into short signal blocks. Appendix F represents minimum characterization of the trackage for Operating speeds are low (not to exceed requirements and that, if circumstances which exclusion is requested. When 20 miles per hour), and locomotive warrant, FRA may expand upon the describing each track’s use and engineers moving in this environment Appendix F requirements as necessary characterization, FRA expects the expect conflicting traffic and restrictive to enable FRA to render a decision that requesting railroad or railroads to signals. Although low-speed collisions is in the public interest (i.e., if FRA is include copies of the applicable track do occasionally occur in these unable to certify the system without the and signal charts. Ultimately, FRA environments, the consequences are additional information). expects each MTEA to include low; and the rate of occurrence is very information sufficiently specific to low in relation to the exposure. It is the Section 236.1019 Main Line Track enable easy segregation between main nature of current-generation PTC Exceptions line track and non-main line track. In systems to use conservative braking The RSIA08 generally defines ‘‘main the event the railroad subsequently algorithms. Requiring PTC to govern line’’ as ‘‘a segment of railroad tracks requests additional track to be short blocks in congested terminals over which 5,000,000 or more gross tons considered for exclusion, a well-defined would add to congestion and frustrate of railroad traffic is transported MTEA should reduce the amount of efficient passenger service, in the annually. See 49 U.S.C. 20157(i)(2). future information required to be judgment of those who operate these However, FRA may also define ‘‘main submitted to FRA. Moreover, if FRA railroads. The density of wayside line’’ by regulation ‘‘for intercity rail decides to grant only certain requests in infrastructure required to effect PTC passenger transportation or commuter an MTEA, the portions of track for functions in these terminal areas would rail passenger transportation routes or which FRA has determined should also be exceptionally costly in relation segments over which limited or no remain considered as main line track to the benefits obtained. FRA agrees that freight railroad operations occur.’’ See can be easily severed from the MTEA. technical solutions to address these 49 U.S.C. 20157(i)(2)(B); 49 CFR Otherwise, the entire MTEA, and thus concerns are not presently available. 1.49(oo). FRA recognizes that there may its concomitant PTCIP, may be entirely FRA does believe that the appropriate be circumstances where certain disapproved by FRA, increasing the risk role for PTC in this context is to enforce statutory PTC system implementation of the railroad or railroads not meeting the maximum allowable speed (which is and operation requirements are not its statutory deadline for PTC presently accomplished in cab signal practical and provide no significant implementation and operation. territory through use of automatic speed safety benefits. In those circumstances, For each particular track segment, the control, a practice which could continue FRA will exercise its statutory MTEA must also provide a justification where already in place).

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If FRA grants relief, the conditions of as trains are prepared for transportation. the risk to the passenger operation is no paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3), as FRA has not included a request by greater than if the passenger and freight applicable, as well as conditions Amtrak (discussed below) to allow trains were operating under temporal attached to the approval, must be movements within major terminals at separation or with all trains limited to strictly adhered to. up to 30 miles per hour in mixed restricted speed. For an exception to be Under paragraph (b)(1), relief under passenger and freight service, which made under paragraph (c)(3), FRA paragraph (b) is limited to operations appears in FRA’s judgment to fall requires a risk analysis jointly agreed to that do not exceed 20 miles per hour. outside of the authority to provide and submitted by the applicable freight The PTC Working Group agreed upon exclusions conferred on FRA by the law. and passenger services. This ensures the 20 miles per hour limitation, instead Paragraph (c) provides the conditions that the risks and consequences to both of requiring restricted speed, because under which joint limited passenger and parties have been fully analyzed, the operations in question will be by freight operations may occur on defined understood, and mitigated to the extent signal indication in congested and track segments without the requirement practical. FRA would expect that the complex terminals with short block for installation of PTC. Under moving party would elect a base case lengths and numerous turnouts. FRA § 236.1003 (Definitions), ‘‘limited offering the greatest clarity and justify agrees with the PTC Working Group that operations’’ is defined as ‘‘operations on the selection. the use of restricted speed in this main line track that have limited or no Comments on the proposed rule environment would unnecessarily freight operations and are approved to generally supported the aforementioned exacerbate congestion, delay trains, and be excepted from this subpart’s PTC exclusions or were silent. diminish the quality of rail passenger system implementation and operation In its comments on the NPRM, service. requirements in accordance with Amtrak requested further relief relating Moreover, when trains on the § 236.1019(c). This paragraph provides to lines requiring the implementation excluded track are controlled by a five alternative paths to the main line and operation of a PTC system due locomotive with an operative PTC exception, three of which were solely to the presence of light-density onboard apparatus that PTC system contained in the proposed rule and a passenger traffic. According to Amtrak, component must enforce the regulatory fourth and fifth that responds to the defining characteristic of light- speed limit or actual maximum comments on the proposed rule. density lines is the nature of the train authorized speed, whichever is less. The three alternatives derived from traffic; light-density patterns on these While the actual track may not be the NPRM are set forth in paragraph lines lead to a correspondingly low risk outfitted with a PTC system in light of (c)(1). First, under paragraph (c)(1), an of collision. Amtrak also asserted that, an MTEA approval, FRA believes it is exception may be available where both due to relatively limited wear and tear nevertheless prudent to require such the freight and passenger trains are from lower traffic densities, these lines enforcement when the technology is limited to restricted speed. Such often have fewer track workers on site, available on the operating locomotives. operations are feasible only for short further reducing the chance of collisions This can be accomplished in cab signal distances, and FRA will examine the and incursions into work zones. Thus, territory using existing automatic train circumstances involved to ensure that states Amtrak, one of the principal stop technology and outside of cab the exposure is limited and that reasons for installing PTC—collision signal territory by mapping the terminal appropriate operating rules and training avoidance—is a relatively low risk on and causing the onboard computer to are in place. many light density lines. With only enforce the maximum speed allowed. Second, under paragraph (c)(1)(ii), marginal safety benefits anticipated FRA also limits relief under paragraph FRA will consider an exception where from PTC use in such applications, (b)(2) to operations that enforce temporal separation of the freight and Amtrak believed that there may be interlocking rules. Under interlocking passenger operations can be ensured. A minimal justification for installing PTC rules, trains are prohibited from moving more complete definition of temporal on certain light-density lines. in reverse directions without dispatcher separation is provided in paragraph (e). Amtrak further noted that FRA itself permission on track where there are no Temporal separation of passenger and had concluded that the costs of PTC signal indications. FRA believes that freight services reduces risk because the generally exceed its benefits, and such a restriction will minimize the likelihood of a collision is reduced (e.g., Amtrak urged that this may be even potential for a head-on impact. due to freight cars engaged in switching more so on light-density lines. Amtrak Also, under paragraph (b)(3), such that are not properly secured) and the believed that Congress understood this operations are only allowed in yard or possibility of a relatively more severe issue and thus created the regulatory terminal areas where no freight collision between a passenger train and flexibility for the definition of ‘‘main operations are permitted. While the much heavier freight consist is obviated. line’’ for passenger routes found at 49 definition of main line may not include Third, under paragraph (c)(1)(iii), U.S.C. 20157(i)(2)(B) as a means to yard tracks used solely by freight FRA will consider commingled freight allow the Secretary to exempt certain operations, FRA is not extending any and passenger operations provided that routes from the PTC mandate. relief or exception to tracks within yards a jointly agreed risk analysis is provided According to Amtrak, this provision or terminals shared by freight and by the passenger and freight railroads, essentially allows the Secretary to passenger operations. The collision of a and the level of safety is the same as that define certain passenger routes with passenger train with a freight consist is which would be provided under one of limited or no freight traffic as other than typically a more severe condition the two prior options selected as the ‘‘main line,’’ thereby effectively because of the greater mass of the freight base case. FRA requested comments on exempting such lines from the reach of equipment. However, FRA did receive a whether FRA or the subject railroad the PTC mandate because the mandate comment suggesting some latitude should determine the appropriate base only applies to railroad operations over within terminals when passenger trains case, but received none. FRA recognizes ‘‘main line[s].’’ Said another way, urged are moving without passengers (e.g., to that there may be situations where Amtrak, the provision allows the access repair and servicing areas). FRA temporal separation may not be Secretary the freedom to decide in what agrees that low-speed operations under possible. In such situations, FRA may circumstances such routes should be those conditions should be acceptable allow commingled operations provided considered ‘‘main lines’’ and thus be

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required to install PTC–pursuant to passenger service as ‘‘main lines.’’ freight operations are also suitably whatever factors the Secretary deems Amtrak stated that this subsection limited and the circumstances could appropriate through the rulemaking would arguably require installation of lead to significant hardship and cost process. PTC on most of the trackage and that might overwhelm the value of the Amtrak urged that the Secretary locomotives of the Terminal Railroad passenger service provided. Paragraph should use this flexibility to limit which Association of St. Louis (TRRA) unless: (c)(2) deals with lines where the host is passenger routes it defines as ‘‘main (1) The entire terminal operates at not a Class I freight railroad, describing lines’’ to those deemed to warrant the restricted speed (which TRRA is characteristics of track segments that use of PTC using the FRA’s usual risk- unlikely to agree to); (2) passenger and might warrant relief from the based approach to safety regulation and freight trains are temporally separated requirement to install PTC. Paragraph traditional measures of reasonableness, (which would not be practical on TRRA, (c)(2)(i) pertains to passenger service costs, and benefits. Amtrak posited that and is unlikely to be practical on any of involving up to four regularly scheduled such a risk-based analysis by FRA the light-density lines over which passenger trains during a calendar day would likely lead to the conclusion that Amtrak operates, due to the 24/7 nature over a segment of unsignaled track on PTC is simply not needed on many of railroad operations); or (3) a risk which less than 15 million gross tons of light-density lines over which passenger mitigation plan can be effected that freight traffic is transported annually. trains currently operate. Amtrak would achieve a level of safety not less Paragraph (c)(2)(ii) pertains to passenger therefore asked that FRA exercise this than would pertain if all operations on service involving up to twelve regularly authority by working with Amtrak and TRRA were at restricted speed or subject scheduled passenger trains during a the rail industry to exempt certain light to temporal separation. Accordingly, calendar day over a segment of signaled density freight lines which host Amtrak recommended: (a) That the FRA track on which less than 15 million passenger traffic from the obligation to adopt a risk analysis-based definition of gross tons of freight traffic is transported install PTC where operating and safety ‘‘main line’’ passenger routes that annually. In FRA’s experience, four conditions do not warrant an advanced excludes light-density lines on which trains per day in unsignaled territory signal system. the installation of PTC is not warranted; and twelve trains per day in signaled Should FRA choose not to exempt and (b) with respect to freight terminal territory can be expected to be handled some of these light density freight lines areas in which passenger trains operate, safely in combination with 15 million over which passenger trains operate, that the FRA modify the limited gross tons of freight traffic if the Amtrak felt that the high costs of full operations exception in subsection operations are carefully scrutinized and PTC systems will be passed on to the 236.1019(c) to require that all trains be appropriate mitigation measures are passenger and freight operators of these limited to 30 miles per hour rather than taken to accommodate the particular routes. According to Amtrak, this to restricted speed, or that non-PTC operating environment in question. obligation could threaten the equipped freight terminals be deemed as Paragraph (c)(2) derived indirectly from continuation of intercity passenger rail other than ‘‘main lines’’ so long as all discussions in the RSAC in response to service on several routes, including passenger operations are pursuant to comments by Amtrak set forth above. lines in California, Colorado, Kansas, signal indication and at speeds not The PTC Working Group proposed an Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, greater than 30 miles per hour (with exception that might have been Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, speeds reduced to not greater than available anywhere an intercity or North Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia, on restricted speed on unsignaled trackage commuter railroad operated over a line what are potentially light density lines. or if the signals should fail). with 5 million gross tons of freight Additionally, states Amtrak, this FRA believes that Amtrak’s request is traffic, including Class I lines and the obligation, where it can be financed, much broader than contemplated by the lines of the intercity or commuter could force the diversion of significant law. FRA notes that TRRA is a very busy railroad. This would have opened the capital dollars away from essential terminal operation. FRA does not potential for a considerable exception safety investments in track and other believe that the ‘‘limited freight for lines with very light freight density infrastructure improvements, which are operations’’ concept is in any way under circumstances not thoroughly typically the leading safety risks for applicable under those circumstances. explored in the short time available to such light-density operations. Nor is there any indication in law that the working group (e.g., on commuter According to Amtrak, the cost of PTC FRA was expected to fall back to installation on these lines may be so out traditional cost-benefit principles in rail branch lines, low density track of proportion to the benefit that relation to PTC and scheduled segments on Class I railroads, etc.). Amtrak’s service will need to be passenger service. However, there are a Subsequent to the RSAC activities, rerouted onto a different line (e.g., to a number of Amtrak routes with limited Amtrak notified FRA that its Class I line with PIH materials) if a freight operations that will not conversations with Class II and III reroute option exists, or eliminated otherwise be equipped with PTC railroads, whose lines have been at the entirely because there is no feasible because they are operated by other than root of the Amtrak comments, revealed alternate route and no party is willing Class I railroads. Further, there are some that some of the situations involved or able to bear the cost of installing PTC Class I lines with less than 5 million freight traffic exceeding 5 million gross on the existing route. The defining gross tons, or no PIH, that also warrant tons, potentially rendering the characteristic of light-density lines is individualized review to the extent exception ineffective for this purpose. the nature of the train traffic: Low Amtrak and the host railroad might elect At the same time, FRA noted that the density patterns on these lines lead to to propose it. policy rationale behind the proposed a correspondingly low risk of collision. Accordingly, in response to the additional exception was related as According to the Amtrak testimony, Amtrak comments, paragraphs (c)(2) much to the inherent difficulty the ‘‘limited operations exception’’ in and (c)(3) have been added to the final associated with PTC installation during subsection 236.1019(c) of the NPRM did rule to provide an option by which the initial period defined by law, given not provide a practical solution to the certain additional types of limited that the railroads identified by Amtrak problem created by defining all light- passenger train operations may qualify were for the most part very small density routes and terminal areas with for a main line track exception where operations with limited technical

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capacity and limited safety exposure. It exception for Class I lines carrying no direction). The Passenger Task Force was clear that in these cases care would more than four intercity or commuter agreed. The UTA also supported the need to be taken to analyze collision passenger trains per day and cumulative temporal separation exception under risk and potentially require annual tonnage of less than 15 million former paragraph (d), having stated that mitigations.7 Accordingly, FRA has gross tons, subject to FRA review. The temporal separation is important in the endeavored to address the concern limit of four trains takes into operations of many commuter and brought forward by Amtrak with a consideration that it is much less intercity passenger railroad carriers. provision that is broad enough to permit burdensome to equip the wayside of a Paragraph (f) (paragraph (e) in the consideration of actual circumstances, Class I rail line than to install a full PTC proposed rule) ensures that by the time limit this particular exception to system on a railroad that would not the railroad submits its PTCSP, no operations over railroads that would not otherwise require one. Again, the unapproved changes have been made to otherwise need to install PTC (e.g., Class exception is not automatic, and FRA’s the MTEA and that the PTC system, as II and III freight railroads), provide for approval of a particular line segment implemented, reflects the PTCIP and its a thorough review process, and make would be discretionary. Any Class I line MTEA. Under this final rule, the PTCSP explicit reference to the potential carrying both 5 million gross tons and must reflect the PTCIP, including its requirement for safety mitigations. In PIH traffic would, of course, not be MTEA, as it was approved or how it has this regard, FRA has chosen 15 million eligible for consideration.8 been modified in accordance with gross tons as a threshold that should The new paragraph (d) makes clear § 236.1021. FRA believes that it is also accommodate situations where Amtrak that FRA will carefully review each important that the railroad attest that no trains will, in actuality, face few proposed main track exception and may other changes to the documents or to the conflicts with freight movements (i.e., require that it be supported by PTC system, as implemented, have been requiring trains to clear the main line appropriate hazard analysis and made. for meets and passes or to wait at mitigations. FRA has previously vetted FRA understands that, as a railroad junctions) and where mitigations are in through the RSAC a Collision Hazard implements its PTC system in place or could be put in place to Analysis Guide that can be useful for accordance with its PTCIP or even after establish a high sense of confidence that this purpose. If FRA determines that it receives PTC System Certification, the operations will continue to be freight operations are not ‘‘limited’’ as a railroad may decide to modify the scope conducted safely. FRA believes that less matter of safety exposure or that of which tracks it believes to be other than 15 million gross tons represents a proposed safety mitigations are than main line. To effectuate such fair test of ‘‘limited freight operations’’ inadequate, FRA will deny the changes, paragraph (g) requires FRA for these purposes, with the further exception. review. In the case that the railroad caveat that specific operating Paragraph (e) (formerly paragraph (d) believes that such relief is warranted, arrangements will be examined in each in the proposed rule) provides the the railroad may file in accordance with case. FRA emphasizes that this is not an definition of temporal separation with § 236.1021 a request for amendment of entitlement, but an exclusion for which respect to paragraph (c)(2). The the PTCIP, which will eventually be the affected railroads will need to make temporal separation approach is incorporated into or referenced by the a suitable case. currently used under the FRA–Federal PTCSP upon PTCSP submission. Each Amtrak also provided to FRA a Transit Administration Joint Policy on request, however, must be fully justified spreadsheet identifying each of its route Shared Use, which permits co-existence to and approved by the Associate segments with attributes such as route of light rail passenger services (during Administrator before the requested length, freight tonnage, number of the day) and local freight service (during change can be made to the PTCIP. If Amtrak trains, and numbers of the nighttime). See Joint Statement of such a RFA is submitted simultaneously commuter trains. FRA further reviewed Agency Policy Concerning Shared Use with the PTCSP, the RFA may not be this information in light of Amtrak’s of the Tracks of the General Railroad approved, even if the PTCSP is request for main track exceptions. FRA System by Conventional Railroads and otherwise acceptable. A change made to noted a number of segments of the Light Rail Transit Systems, 65 FR 42,526 an MTEA subsequent to FRA approval Amtrak system on Class I railroads (July 10, 2000); FRA Statement of of its associated PTCIP that involves Agency Policy Concerning Jurisdiction where the number of Amtrak trains was removal or reduction in functionality of Over the Safety of Railroad Passenger low and the freight tonnage was also the PTC system will be treated as a Operations and Waivers Related to low (less than 15 million gross tons). material modification. In keeping with Shared Use of the Tracks of the General Each of these lines, with the exception traditional signaling principles, such Railroad System by Light Rail and of one 33-mile segment, is signalized. requests must be formally submitted for Conventional Equipment, 65 FR 42,529 FRA further noted that, with both review and approval by FRA. (July 10, 2000). Conventional rail Amtrak and Class I railroad locomotives technology and secure procedures are Section 236.1021 Discontinuances, equipped for PTC, use of partial PTC used to ensure that these services do not Material Modifications, and technology (e.g., monitoring of switches commingle. Amtrak representatives in Amendments where trains frequently clear) should be the PTC Working Group were confident FRA recognizes that, after submittal of available as a mitigation for collision that more refined temporal separation a plan or implementation of a train risk. Accordingly, in paragraph (c)(3), strategies could be employed on smaller control system, the subject railroad may FRA has provided a further narrow railroads that carry light freight volumes have legitimate reasons for making and few Amtrak trains (e.g., one train changes in the system design and the 7 An example of an existing mitigation, which is provided to support service quality but also per day or one train per day in each locations where the system is installed. supports safety, is the practice of one Class III In light of the statutory and regulatory Amtrak host and its connecting freight partner to 8 Freight tonnage on Amtrak lines varies from mandates, however, FRA believes that hold out fleeted empty coal trains off the Class III zero on two segments to over 150 million gross the railroad should be required to property during the period that Amtrak is running. tons. On a per-mile basis, 15 million gross tons falls While not constituting strict ‘‘temporal separation,’’ into the twenty-first percentile of Amtrak track request FRA approval prior to it does significantly reduce collision risk over the miles. The candidate lines on the Class I system effectuating certain changes. Section route. comprise about 6% of Amtrak’s route structure. 236.1021 provides the scope and

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procedure for requesting and approving railroad wishes to change and of the may only be required upon request, FRA those changes. For example, all requests change’s potential impact. urges each railroad to include this for covered changes must be made in a Under paragraph (b), once the RFA is information in its RFA to help expedite request for amendment (RFA) of the approved, the railroad shall adopt those the review process. subject PTC system or plan. While changes into the subject plan and FRA believes that paragraphs (d)(2) § 236.1021 includes lengthy immediately ensure that its PTC through (d)(6) are self-explanatory. descriptions of what changes may, or complies with the plan, as amended. However, according to paragraph (d)(7), may not, require FRA approval, there FRA expects that each PTC system FRA may require with each RFA an are various places elsewhere in subpart accurately reflects the information in its explanation of whether each change to I that also require the filing of a RFA. associated approved plans. FRA the PTCSP is planned or unplanned. Paragraph (a) requires FRA approval believes that this requirement will also Planned changes are those that the prior to certain PTC system changes. incentivize railroads to make approved system developer and the railroad have FRA expects that if a railroad wants to changes as quickly as possible. included in the safety analysis make a PTC system change covered by Otherwise, if a railroad delays in associated with the PTC system, but subpart I, then any such change would implementing the changes reflected in have not yet implemented. These result in noncompliance with one of the an approved RFA, FRA may find it changes provide enhanced functionality railroad’s plans approved under this difficult to enforce its regulations until to the system, and FRA strongly subpart. For instance, if a railroad seeks implementation is completed, since the encourages railroads to include PTC to modify the geographical limits of its plans and PTC system do not accurately system improvements that further PTC implementation, such changes and adequately reflect each other. In increase safety. A planned change may would not be reflected in the PTCIP. such circumstances, a railroad may be require FRA approved regression testing Accordingly, under paragraph (a), after assessed a civil penalty for violating its to demonstrate that its implementation a plan is approved by FRA and before plan or for falsifying records. has not had an adverse affect on the any change is made to the PTC system’s Any change to a PTCIP, PTCDP, or system it is augmenting. Each planned PTCSP, which may include removal or development, implementation, or change must be clearly identified as part discontinuance of any signal system, operation, the railroad must file a RFA of the PTCSP, and the PTCSP safety may not take effect until after FRA has to the subject plan. analysis must show the affect that its approved the corresponding submitted implementation will have on safety. FRA considers an amendment to be a or amended PTCIP, PTCDP, or PTCSP. Unplanned changes are those either formal or official change made to the FRA may provide partial or conditional not foreseen by the railroad or PTC system or its associated PTCIP, approval. Until FRA has granted developer, but nevertheless necessary to PTCDP, or PTCSP. Amendments can appropriate relief or approval, the ensure system safety, or are unplanned add, remove, or update parts of these railroad may not make the change, and functional enhancements from the documents, which may reflect proposed once a requested change has been made, original core system. The scope of any changes to the development, the railroad must comply with additional work necessary to ensure implementation, or operation of its PTC requested change. safety may depend upon when in the system. FRA believes that an amending FRA recognizes that a railroad may development cycle phase the changes procedure provides a simpler and wish to remove an existing train control are introduced. For instance, if the cleaner option than requiring the system due to new and appropriate PTC PTCDP has not yet been submitted to railroad to file an entirely new plan. system implementation. For train FRA, no FRA involvement is required. While the railroad may develop a RFA control systems existing prior to However, if the PTCDP has been without FRA input or involvement, FRA promulgation of subpart I, any request submitted to FRA, or if the change believes that it is more advantageous for for a material modification or impacts the safety functionality of the the railroad to informally confer with discontinuance must be made pursuant system once a Type Approval has been FRA before formally submitting its RFA. to part 235. Paragraph (c), however, issued, and a PTCSP has not yet been If FRA is not involved in the drafting provides the railroads with an submitted, the railroad must submit a process, FRA may not have a complete opportunity to instead request such RFA requesting and documenting that understanding of the system, making it changes in accordance with proposed change. Once FRA approves that RFA, difficult for FRA to evaluate the impact § 236.1021. FRA believes that this FRA expects the subsequently filed of the proposed changes on public requirement will reduce the number of PTCSP to account for the change in safety. After RFA submission, all required filings and would otherwise analysis. applicable correspondence between simplify the process requesting material If the change is made after approval FRA and the railroad must be made modifications or discontinuances. of the PTCSP and the system has been formally in the associated docket, as Paragraph (d) provides the minimum certified by FRA, a RFA must be further discussed below. In such a information required to be submitted to submitted to FRA for approval. Because situation, FRA’s review may take a FRA when requesting an amendment. this requires significant effort by FRA significantly longer time than usual. If While the procedural rules here are and the railroad, FRA expects that every FRA continues to not understand the different than those in part 235, FRA effort will be made to eliminate the need impact, it may request a third party expects that the same or similar for unplanned changes. If the railroad audit, which would only further delay information be provided. Accordingly, and the vendor or supplier submit a decision on the request. Accordingly, under paragraph (d)(1), the RFA must unplanned safety related changes that FRA believes it is more advantageous contain the information required in FRA believes are a significant amount or for the railroad drafting an RFA to 235.10. Paragraph (d)(1) also requires inordinately complex, FRA may revoke informally confer with FRA before its the railroad to submit, upon FRA any approvals previously granted and formal submission of the change request, certain additional information, disallow the use of the product until request. The railroad would then be including the information referenced in such time the railroad demonstrates the provided an opportunity to discuss the § 235.12. Paragraphs (d)(2) through product is sufficiently mature. details of the change and to assure (d)(7) provide further examples of such Paragraph (e) provides that if a RFA FRA’s understanding of what the information. While such information is submitted for a discontinuance or a

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material modification to a portion or all Paragraph (i) provides the exceptions contained in paragraph (k)(6) and of its PTC system, a notice of its from the requirement for prior approval § 236.1009(a)(2)(ii)(B). In light of the fact submission shall be published in the in cases where the discontinuance of a that FRA considers it necessary to file Federal Register. Interested parties will system or system element will be treated an RFA if the railroad intends to install be provided an opportunity to comment as pre-approved, as when a line of new track for which installation of a on the RFA, which will be located in an railroad is abandoned. PTC system is required, FRA has not identified docket. Paragraph (j) provides exceptions for included proposed paragraph (k)(6) in Paragraph (f) makes it clear that FRA certain lesser changes that are not the final rule. will consider all impacts on public expected to materially affect system risk, such as removal of an electric lock Section 236.1023 Errors and safety prior to approval or disapproval Malfunctions of any request for discontinuance, from a switch where speed is low and modification, or amendment of a PTC trains are not allowed to clear. Often it is only after the product has system and any associated changes in The AAR submitted comment that been placed in field service for an the existing signal system that may have paragraphs (j)(2) and (j)(3) should be extended period of time before the been concurrently submitted. While the revised to recognize the allowance for accuracy of the assumptions regarding economic impact to the affected parties removal of a signal used in lieu of an errors and malfunctions can be may be considered by FRA, the primary electric or mechanical lock in the same validated. Accordingly, the reporting and final deciding factor on any FRA manner as removal of the electric or and recording of errors and decision is safety. FRA will consider not mechanical lock. These two paragraphs malfunctions takes on critical only how safety is affected by are intended to recognize that where importance. If the number of errors and installation of the system, but how train speed over the switch does not malfunctions exceeds those originally safety is impacted by the failure modes exceed 20 miles per hour, or where anticipated in the design, or errors and of the system. trains are not permitted to clear the malfunctions that were not predicted main track at the switch, removal of the are observed to occur, the validity of the The Southern California Regional Rail devices intended to provide the system design assumptions and the Authority submitted comments necessary protection should not require accuracy of the performance predictions requesting ‘‘easy streamlined approval’’ the submission of a filing for FRA becomes suspect. The requirements of of incremental changes and additions to approval. this section provide the process and the plans based on procurement and The regulation requiring the procedures for tracking, reporting, and type approval of vendor or supplier installation of an electric or mechanical correction of errors and malfunctions. products. However, FRA would like to lock identifies the allowance for a signal The final rule reflects the requirements point out that, where lines change used in lieu thereof (see § 236.410). FRA of the NPRM, but has been reorganized during or subsequent to the railroad’s agrees with the AAR that when the for greater clarity. submission of its PTCIP, the railroad requirement for an electric or Paragraph (a) of this section contains merely needs to identify its plan for mechanical lock, or a signal used in lieu the requirement for all railroads implementation on such lines in its thereof, are eliminated, the removal of operating a PTC system to establish and RFA. This does not appear to be an any of these devices in their entirety maintain a PTCPVL. The PTCPVL list overly burdensome task. without filing for approval is ensures that the railroad can quickly The purpose of paragraph (g) is to appropriate. FRA has therefore revised determine the vendor of the product emphasize the right of FRA to paragraphs (j)(2) and (j)(3) to clarify that has experienced an error or unilaterally issue a new Type Approval, these allowances. malfunctioned, and then be able to with whatever conditions are necessary Paragraph (k) provides additional report the occurrence of the error or to ensure safety based on the impact of exceptions consisting of modifications malfunction in a timely and accurate the proposed changes. associated with changes in the track manner to the appropriate entity In paragraph (h), FRA makes clear structure or temporary construction. responsible for the design and that it considers any implemented PTC FRA notes that only temporary removal manufacture of the product. FRA access system to be a safety device. of the PTC system without prior FRA to the PTCPVL of each railroad enables Accordingly, the discontinuance, approval is allowed to support highway FRA to quickly identify all railroads that modification, or other change of the rail separation construction or damage may potentially be affected by the error implemented system or its geographical to the PTC system by catastrophic malfunction, thereby allowing FRA to limits will not be authorized without events. In both cases, the PTC system better understand the implications of prior FRA approval. While this must be restored to operation no later the condition on the industry. Not all requirement primarily applies to safety than 6 months after completion of the railroads using the same product or critical changes, FRA believes that they event. processes may experience the same should also apply to all changes that Caltrain submitted comments stating software errors or hardware failures, will affect interoperability. The that proposed paragraph (k)(6) and even if the cause of the error or failure principles expressed in the paragraph § 236.1009(a)(2)(ii)(B) appear to address is systemic to the design, and an parallel those embodied in part 235, the installation of new track in an individual railroad may not have the which implements 49 U.S.C. 20502(a). inconsistent manner. While proposed resources to determine if there are any Railroads may need to review paragraph (k)(6) states that it will not be industry-wide implications. The § 236.1005(b)(4) and supply the required necessary to file an RFA for the requirement for creating and information in an RFA submission. installation of new track, maintaining the PTCPVL was originally That said, FRA recognizes that there § 236.1009(a)(2)(ii)(B) states that an RFA proposed in paragraph (c) of the NPRM. are a limited number of situations where must be filed if railroad intends to add, Paragraph (b)(1) establishes a changes of the PTC system may not have subtract, or otherwise materially modify requirement that the railroad specify in an adverse impact upon public safety. one or more lines of railroad for which its PTCSP all contractual arrangements Specific situations where prior FRA installation of a PTC system is required. with their vendors or suppliers for approval is required are provided in FRA agrees that there appears to have immediate notification of safety-critical paragraphs (h)(1) through (h)(4). been a conflict between the provisions upgrades made to the product by the

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vendors or suppliers. FRA is not Paragraph (e) requires the railroad to action were to take a significant amount interested in the commercial terms of maintain a database of all safety- of time, FRA would expect the railroad any such contractual arrangement, only relevant hazards identified in its PTCSP, to provide FRA with periodic frequent that the contractual arrangement is in as well as all safety-relevant hazards progress reports. place for notification and provision of that were not previously identified. FRA Paragraph (g) establishes a reporting safety-critical changes from a vendor or believes that the requirement to report requirement for railroads and vendors or supplier to the railroad. Paragraph (b)(2) any safety-relevant hazard that was not suppliers to provide to the Associate levies the requirement on the vendor or previously identified in the PTCSP is Administrator on request the results of supplier to report to all railroads using self evident, in that it clearly represents any investigation of an accident or the product any safety-critical failures an unknown and unplanned failure service difficulty report that shows the reported. Paragraph (b)(3) levies a mode. Without this database, a railroad PTC system, subsystem, or component requirement on the vendor or supplier will be unable to determine if the is unsafe because of a manufacturing or to provide accurate and adequate number of particular failures has risen design defect. In addition, the railroad information of the circumstances to a level above the thresholds set forth and its vendor or supplier may be surrounding the reported failure to any in the PTCSP. If the frequency of the required to report on any action taken potentially affected railroad, as well as safety-relevant hazards exceeds the or proposed to correct the defect. recommended mitigating actions that thresholds set forth in the PTCSP, the Paragraph (h) imposes a direct should be taken until the situation is railroads shall take the following obligation on suppliers to report safety- resolved. The text of paragraph (b) has specific actions as prescribed in this relevant failures or defective conditions, been modified slightly from that of the section: Notify the applicable vendor or previously unidentified hazards, and NPRM to more accurately reflect FRA’s supplier and the FRA; keep the recommended mitigation actions in expectation in this regard. applicable vendor or supplier and the their PTC system, subsystem, or Paragraph (c)(1) levies the FRA apprised of the status of any and component to each railroad using its requirement on the railroad to specify in all subsequent failures; and, take product. Each applicable supplier is its PTCSP the process and procedures prompt countermeasures to eliminate or also required to notify FRA of the safety- the railroad will implement when a reduce the frequency below the relevant failure, defective condition, or safety-critical upgrade or failure threshold identified. Until the corrective previously unidentified hazard notification is received from the vendor action is complete, the railroad is discovered by the vendor or supplier or supplier. This requirement is required to take measures to ensure the and the identity of each affected and necessary regardless of whether the safety of train operations, roadway notified railroad. FRA believes that it railroad itself discovers the problem or workers, on track equipment, and the should be informed to ensure public safety in any case where a commercial the vendor or supplier notifies the general public. railroad of the problem. Paragraph (c)(2) dispute (e.g., over liability) might requires the railroads to identify the While the preceding paragraphs dealt disrupt communication between a associated configuration management with the establishment of a framework railroad and supplier. process they will use to identify safety- to address errors and malfunctions, GE submitted a comment on this critical failures and mitigations. FRA paragraphs (f) through (g) deal with the section, in which it raised an objection believes it to be essential, given the actual handling and reporting of errors to the direct imposition by FRA of a potential impact on safety of a safety- and malfunctions within that reporting obligation on PTC suppliers. critical failure, that the railroads have framework. Paragraph (f) establishes GE believes this requirement is the necessary planning and mechanisms time limits for reporting failures and unwarranted for three reasons. First, the in place to promptly address the malfunctions to the product vendor or railroad is the primary entity having situation. Each railroad’s and vendor’s supplier and the FRA as well as knowledge of such a failure and already or supplier’s development processes, minimum reporting requirements. The has the obligation to report a failure configuration management programs, period for notification has been within strict guidelines. Second, even if and fault reporting tracking systems lengthened from that proposed in the the PTC supplier becomes aware of a play a crucial role in the ability of both NPRM to 15 days. FRA wishes to failure, the PTC supplier may not have parties and the FRA to determine and emphasize that it is more interested in sufficient understanding of the failure to fully understand the risks and timely notifications, and accordingly, determine whether it is truly safety- implications. Without an effective has not established a specific format for related in nature without talking to the configuration management tracking the reports. FRA will accept any report railroad. Third, there already exist system in place, it is difficult, if not format, provided it contains at least the sufficient legal incentives for a supplier impossible, to fairly evaluate PTC minimal information required by this to quickly resolve any safety-related system risks during the system’s life- section. FRA will accept delivery of failure that might occur. GE believes cycle. these reports by commercial courier, that railroads’ regulatory compliance Paragraph (d) requires that the fax, and e-mail. However, with respect responsibilities should not be delegated railroad provide to its vendor or to information that is not immediately to suppliers. Ultimately, GE asserts that supplier the railroad’s processes and available, paragraph (f) has been this requirement unnecessarily procedures for addressing safety-critical amended to require railroads to submit complicates the task of deploying PTC failure, malfunction, and fault issues. supplemental reports with the and is unwarranted. FRA believes that by providing this previously unavailable information. GE proposed alternative language at information to the vendor or supplier, FRA requires this information to the RSAC PTC Working Group meeting the vendor or supplier will be able to determine the full impact of the held August 31–September 2, 2009, that more efficiently and effectively provide problem, and to determine if any removed the supplier’s obligation to notification to the appropriate railroad additional restrictions or limitations on directly report to FRA by deleting personnel. The net result FRA is seeking the use of the PTC system may be proposed paragraphs (a) and (f) of this is that potential delays in identifying or warranted to ensure the safety of the section and adding language to correcting safety-critical faults will be general public and the railroad § 236.1015(b)(2). In this proposed minimized. personnel. If the correcting or mitigating alternative language, GE recommended

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that FRA require suppliers to include a users of safety-related issues and, there is nothing in those provisions process for promptly reporting any therefore, to maintain a list of product restricting FRA’s jurisdiction over other safety relevant failure and previously users. entities or persons. unidentified hazard to each railroad FRA has also considered GE’s FRA has previously applied its using the product in the quality control argument that the railroad is the jurisdiction over suppliers. Under systems maintained by suppliers for primary entity having knowledge of § 236.907(d), suppliers must perform PTC system design and manufacturing. safety-related failures and already has certain notification responsibilities. FRA carefully considered GE’s an obligation to report the failure within While that paragraph concerns recommendation. In § 236.907(d), FRA strict guidelines. Thus, even if the PTC notification by the supplier to the has previously established for PTC supplier becomes aware of the failure, railroad, there is nothing preventing systems that are voluntarily the supplier may not have sufficient FRA from requiring the supplier to also implemented by railroads, under the understanding of the failure to notify FRA. In fact, as a practical matter, provisions of subpart H of this part, a determine whether it is safety-related in FRA believes that reporting failures requirement that the vendor/supplier nature without talking to the railroad. directly to FRA is necessary here. Under and railroads establish mutual reporting GE’s assertion that the supplier may not subpart H, the absence of direct and relationships for promptly reporting any recognize that a failure is safety related timely access to product notices has safety-relevant failures and previously without talking to the railroad also continued to be an issue for FRA. This unidentified hazards. FRA seeks to applies equally to the converse concern will only become greater as the continue this relationship requirement situation. A railroad may report a failure subject technology becomes more for mandatory PTC system installations to the vendor or supplier that the complex. under the provisions of this subpart. railroad may not recognize as safety RSI also noted that, ‘‘the scope of the As noted in the preamble discussion critical, and it is only the vendor’s or signal and train control provision at Part of § 236.907(d), FRA clearly indicated supplier’s detailed knowledge of the 236 explains that this entire part, which that if there was ‘‘a breakdown in product that enables recognition of the will include the proposed regulations communications that could adversely failure as safety critical. for § 236.1023, applies only to the affect public safety’’, FRA would take FRA is consequently unmoved by the railroads.’’ Indeed, § 236.0(a) currently appropriate action as necessary. See 70 assertion that the imposition of a states, ‘‘Except as provided in paragraph FR 11,052, 11,074. FRA also noted that requirement that a vendor or supplier the language of § 236.907 ‘‘place[d] a (b) of this section, this part applies to all notify FRA upon discovery of a safety railroads.’’ While that paragraph direct obligation on suppliers to report critical problem would be unduly safety-relevant failures, which would indicates that the part applies to all burdensome. railroads, it does not limit application to include ‘wrong-side failures’ and In view of the preceding, FRA has left failures significantly impacting on ‘‘only’’ railroads, as misstated by RSI. In this paragraph unchanged in principle. any event, to avoid confusion, FRA is availability where the Product Safety FRA has, however, made editorial Plan indicates availability to be a modifying § 236.0(a) to apply to all changes to more clearly define the railroads and persons as indicated in material issue in the safety performance responsibilities of the parties involved of the larger railroad system.’’ 70 FR this part. For instance, ‘‘person’’ is and to clearly indicate the acceptability defined in § 236.0(f) when referencing 1 11,052, 11,074. This provision was of incremental reporting as more necessary to ensure public safety in the U.S.C. 1 (which includes manufacturers information becomes available. and independent contractors) and event where a commercial dispute (e.g., RSI made many statements similar to railroad is defined in subpart G of part over liability) might disrupt those of GE and also asserts that the 236. communications between a railroad and notification requirement on suppliers Paragraph (i) addresses situations its supplier. would not enhance safety, but would which are clearly not the result of a FRA believes that the requirement create the potential for redundant, design or manufacturing issue, and that a product supplier notify FRA, in premature, potentially misleading, and limits unnecessary reporting. If the addition to the affected railroads, of burdensome reports to FRA. RSI cites failure, malfunction, or defective safety-relevant failures of the PTC various statutes and regulations, condition was the result of improper product discovered by the supplier does including RSIA08 and the existing part operation of the PTC system outside of not add to the complexity or cost of PTC 236, that apply ‘‘exclusively’’ to the design parameters or of non- system deployment. The addition of ‘‘railroads’’ and ‘‘railroad carriers.’’ compliance with the applicable FRA to the list of entities that must be However, according to 49 U.S.C. 20103, operating instructions, FRA believes notified in the unlikely event of a which continues to be referenced in part that compliance with paragraph (e) is product failure that has been identified 236’s Authorities section: by the product supplier adds only not necessary. Instead, FRA expects and marginally to the level of effort required (a) Regulations and orders.—The Secretary requires the railroad to engage in more of the product supplier. As a condition of Transportation, as necessary, shall narrow remedial measures, including prescribe regulations and issue orders for of providing PTC systems pursuant to every area of railroad safety supplementing remedial training by the railroad in the subpart H of this part, the product laws and regulations in effect on October 16, proper operation of the PTC system. supplier must already maintain a list of 1970. When prescribing a security regulation Similarly, once a problem has been parties that require such notification. As or issuing a security order that affects the identified to all stakeholders, FRA does GE noted, even if there were no safety of railroad operations, the Secretary of not believe it is necessary for a regulatory requirement for a mutual Homeland Security shall consult with the manufacturer to repeatedly submit a reporting relationship between product Secretary. formal report in accordance with suppliers and railroads, there are Thus, FRA has jurisdiction ‘‘for every paragraph (h). In either situation, already legal incentives for a supplier to area of railroad safety.’’ Subpart I however, FRA expects that all users of quickly resolve any safety related supplements the laws and regulations in the equipment will be proactively and failure. FRA believes that these legal effect on October 16, 1970. Moreover, timely notified of the misuse that incentives should motivate the product while the U.S.C. provisions cited by RSI occurred and the corrective actions supplier to promptly notify product apply to railroads and railroad carriers, taken.

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Such reports, however, do not have to automated fashion, without the direct Paragraph (b) provides requirements be made within fifteen days of involvement of a dispatcher. for modifications of excluded PTC occurrence, as required for other For subpart I, FRA intends to retain systems. At some point when a change notifications under paragraph (f), but the exception referred to in § 236.911 for results in degradation of safety or in a within a reasonable time appropriate to CAD systems not associated with a PTC material increase in safety-critical the nature and extent of the problem. system. Many smaller railroads use CAD functionality, changes to excluded PTC Paragraph (j) has been added to the systems to good effect, and there is no systems or subsystems may be final rule to require that, when any reason to impose additional regulations significant enough to require safety-critical PTC system, subsystem, where dispatchers contemporaneously application of subpart I’s safety or component fails to perform its retain the function of issuing mandatory assurance processes. FRA believes that intended function, the railroad is directives. However, in the present all modifications caused by unforeseen required to determine the cause and context, it is necessary to recognize that implementation factors will not perform necessary adjustment, repair, or PTC systems utilize CAD systems as the necessarily cause the product to become replacement of any faulty product ‘‘front end’’ of the logic chain that subject to subpart I. These types of without undue delay. Paragraph (j) also defines authorities enforced by the PTC implementation modifications will be reminds railroads that, until corrective system, particularly in non-signaled minor in nature and be the result of site action has been completed, a railroad is territory. specific physical constraints. However, required to take appropriate action to Accordingly, paragraph (a) provides FRA expects that implementation ensure safety and reliability as specified for the potential exclusion of certain modifications that will result in a within its PTCSP. office systems technologies from subpart degradation of safety or a material In paragraph (k) of the final rule, FRA I compliance. These existing systems increase in safety-critical functionality, intends to make it absolutely clear that have been implemented voluntarily to such as a change in executive software, the reporting requirements of part 233 enhance productivity and have proven will cause the PTC system or subsystem are not a substitute for the reporting to provide a reasonably high level of to be subject to subpart I and its requirements of this subpart, nor are the safety, reliability, and functionality. requirements. FRA is concerned, reporting requirements of this subpart FRA recognizes that full application of however, that a series of incremental considered to be a substitute for the subpart I to these systems would present changes, while each individually not reporting requirements of part 233. Both meeting the threshold for compliance sets of reporting requirements apply. the rail industry with a tremendous burden. The burdens of subpart I may with this subpart, may when aggregated FRA would like to clarify that both result in a product which differs requirements apply. In the case of a discourage voluntary PTC implementation and operation by the sufficiently so as to be considered a new failure meeting the criteria described in product. Therefore, FRA reserves the § 233.7, FRA would not expect the smaller railroads. right to require products that have been railroad to wait for the frequency of However, subpart I applies to those incrementally changed in this manner to such occurrences to exceed the subsystems or components that perform comply with the requirements of this threshold reporting level assigned in the safety critical functions or affect the subpart. Prior to FRA making such a hazard log of the PTCSP, but will expect safety performance of the associated determination, the affected railroad will the railroad to report the occurrence as PTC system. The level and extent of be allowed to present detailed technical required by § 233.7. safety analysis and review of the office systems will vary depending upon the evidence why such a determination Section 236.1027 PTC System type of PTC system with which the should not be made. This provision Exclusions office system interfaces. For example, to mirrors paragraph (d) of existing This section retains similarities to, but prevent the issuance of overlapping and § 236.911. also establishes contrasts with, inconsistent authorities, FRA expects Paragraph (c) addresses the § 236.911, which deals with exclusions that each PTC system demonstrate integration of train control systems with from subpart H. In particular, sufficient credible evidence that the other locomotive electronic control § 236.911(c) offers reassurance that a requisite safety-critical, conflict systems. The earliest train control stand-alone computer aided dispatching resolution (although not necessarily systems were electro-mechanical (CAD) system would not be considered vital) hardware and software functions systems that were independent of the a safety-critical processor-based system of the system will work as intended. discrete pneumatic and mechanical within the purview of subpart H. CADs FRA also expects that the applicable control systems used by the locomotive have long been used by large and small PTCDP’s and PTCSP’s risk analysis will engineer for normal throttle and braking railroads to assist dispatchers in identify the associated hazards and functions. Examples of these train managing their workload, tracking describe how they have been mitigated. control systems included cab signals information required to be kept by Particularly where mandatory directives and ACS/ATC appliances. These regulation, and—most importantly— and work authorities are evaluated for systems included a separate antenna for providing a conflict checking function use in a PTC system without separate interfacing with the track circuit or designed to alert dispatchers to oral transmission from the dispatcher to inductive devices on the wayside. Their incipient errors before authorities are the train crew or employee in charge— power supply and control logic were delivered. Even § 236.911, however, with the opportunity for receiving separate from other locomotive states that ‘‘a subsystem or component of personnel to evaluate and confirm the functions, and the cab signals were an office system must comply with the integrity of the directive or authority displayed from a separate special- requirements of this subpart if it received and the potential for others purpose unit. Penalty brake applications performs safety-critical functions overhearing the transmission to note by the train control system bypassed the within, or affects the safety performance conflicting actions by the dispatching locomotive pneumatic and mechanical of, a new or next-generation train center—FRA will insist on explanations control systems to directly operate a control system.’’ FRA continues to work sufficient to provide reasonable valve that accomplished a service with a vendor or supplier on a simple confidence that additional errors will reduction of brake pipe pressure and CAD that provides authorities in an not be introduced. application of the brakes as well as

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reduction in locomotive tractive power. interfaced or commingled, that PTC Railroads are allowed, and encouraged, In keeping with this physical and requirements could be extended into the to adopt more restrictive rules that functional separation, train control locomotive control system. They assert increase safety. equipment on board a locomotive came non-safety-critical data can be passed Paragraph (a) requires that, in the under part 236, rather than the between the systems using appropriate event of the failure of a component locomotive inspection requirements of interfaces without any impact on safety essential to the safety of a PTC system part 229. and without triggering a need to extend to perform as intended, the cause be Advances in hardware and software PTC requirements into the control identified and corrective action taken technology have allowed the various system. without undue delay. The paragraph PTC systems’ and components’ original FRA agrees that there are also states that until the corrective equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to implementation techniques that allow action is completed, the railroad is repackage individual components, for locomotive control systems to required, at a minimum, to take eliminating parts and system function passively receive information from a appropriate measures, including those control points access. Access to control train control system, and the train specified in the PTCSP, to ensure the functions became increasingly restricted control and locomotive control systems safety of train movements, roadway to the processor interfaces using are not tightly coupled. FRA expects workers, and on-track equipment. This proprietary software. While this resulted that in such situations the safety case for requirement mirrors the current in significant simplification of the the train control system clearly and requirements of § 236.11, which applies previously complex discrete pneumatic unequivocally demonstrates that the to all signal and train control system and mechanical control train and train control system is not tightly components. Under paragraph (a), FRA locomotive control systems into fewer, coupled with the locomotive control intends to apply to PTC systems more compact and reliable devices, it system, and that failures in the provided PTC System Certification also creates significant challenges with locomotive control system have under subpart I the same standard in respect to compatibility of the absolutely no adverse consequences on current § 236.11. application programs and configuration the safe operation of the train control Paragraph (b) provides the management. system. Likewise, FRA expects that the circumstance where a PTC onboard FRA encourages such enhancements, safety analysis for the locomotive apparatus on a controlling locomotive and believes that, if properly done, they control system clearly and that is operating in or is to be operated can result in significant safety, as well unequivocally demonstrates that the within a PTC system fails or is as operational, improvements. train control system is not tightly otherwise cut-out while en route. Under Locomotive manufacturers can certainly coupled with the locomotive control paragraph (b), the subject train may only provide secure locomotive and train system, and that failures in the train continue such operations in accordance controls, and it is important that they do control system have absolutely no with specific limitations. An en route so if locomotives are to function safely adverse consequences on the safe failure is applicable only in instances in their normal service environment. operation of the locomotive control after the subject train has departed its FRA highly encourages the long-term system. If the safety analysis cannot initial terminal, having had a successful goal of common platform integration. convincingly demonstrate to FRA that initialization, and subsequently However, when such integration occurs, the train control and locomotive control rendering it no longer responsive to the it must not be done at the expense of systems are loosely coupled, then FRA PTC system. For example, FRA believes decreasing the safe and reliable will require that the safety analysis for that an en route failure may occur when operation of the train control system. the PTC system include the applicable the PTC onboard apparatus incurs an Accordingly, FRA expects that the elements of the locomotive control onboard fault or is otherwise cut out. complete integrated system will be system, and vice versa. Under subpart H, existing § 236.567 shown to have been designed to fail-safe Finally, paragraph (d) clarifies the provides specific limitations on each principles, and then demonstrated that application of subparts A through H to train failing en route in relation to its the system operates in a fail-safe mode. products excluded from compliance applicable automatic cab signal, train Any commingled system must have a with subpart I. These products are stop, and train control system. FRA manual fail-safe fall back up that allows excluded from the requirements of believes that it would be desirable to the engineer to be brought to be a safe subpart I, but FRA expects that the impose somewhat more restrictive stop in the event of an electronic system developing activity demonstrates conditions given the statutory mandate failure. This analysis must be provided compliance of products with subparts A and the desire to have an appropriate to FRA for approval in the PTCDP and through H. FRA believes that railroads incentive to properly maintain the PTCSP as appropriate. This provision not mandated to implement PTC, or that equipment and to timely respond to en mirrors the heightened scrutiny called are implementing other non-PTC related route failures. For instance, FRA for by § 236.913(c) of subpart H for processor based products, should be recognizes that the limitations of commingled systems, but is more given the option to have those products § 236.567 do not account for the explicit with respect to FRA’s approved under subpart H by statutory mandates of the core PTC expectations. The provision in general submitting a PSP and otherwise safety functions. accords with the requirements for complying with subpart H or by During the PTC Working Group locomotive systems that are currently voluntarily complying with subpart I. meetings prior to issuance of the NPRM, under development in the RSAC’s This provision mirrors § 236.911(e) of no consensus was reached on how to Locomotive Safety Standards Working subpart H. regulate en route failures on PTC Group. territory. However, FRA subsequently GE generally agreed with the Section 236.1029 PTC System Use and received several comments that the en preceding discussion about separate En Route Failures route failure requirements and the regulatory treatment of PTC and the This section provides minimum restrictive operational conditions locomotive control systems. However, requirements, in addition to those found imposed by paragraph (b) are they strongly disagree with any in the PTC system’s plans, for each PTC burdensome and overly restrictive. implication, if the two systems were system with a PTC System Certification. When the PTC Working Group was

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reconvened following the Public supplementary procedures to heighten train hauling any amount of PIH Hearing and the NPRM comment awareness and provide operational material), it may only proceed at a speed period, the PTC Working Group formed control (limiting the frequency of unsafe not to exceed 30 miles per hour. three separate task forces for the events) and by restricting the speed of Paragraph (b)(3)(ii) requires that where purpose of discussing and resolving the failed train (reducing the potential a block signal system is in use, a several specific issues. One such task severity of any unsafe event). passenger train may proceed at a speed force, deemed the Operational Paragraph (b)(1) allows the subject not to exceed 59 miles per hour and a Conditions Task Force, was assigned the train to proceed at restricted speed—or freight train may proceed at a speed not task of resolving the issues associated at medium speed if a block signal to exceed 49 miles per hour. Paragraph with operational limitations presented system is in operation according to (b)(3)(iii) requires that, except as in the proposed rule associated with signal indication—to the next available provided in paragraph (c), where a cab temporary rerouting within § 236.1005, point where communication of a report signal system with an automatic train unequipped trains operating within a can be made to a designated railroad control system is in operation, the train PTC system within § 236.1006, and en officer of the host railroad. The intent of may proceed at a speed not to exceed 79 route failures within § 236.1029. this requirement is to ensure that the miles per hour. The proposed rule provided occurrence of an en route failure may be The Rail Labor Organizations believe allowances for deviations from the appropriately recorded and that the that the rule is too permissive for en restrictions of operations exceeding 90 necessary alternative protection of route failures of a PTC system where an miles per hour if such deviations were absolute block is established. underlying signal system is not presented and justified in an FRA NYSMTA provided comments governing train movements, as they approved plan. At the PTC Working recommending that paragraph (b)(1) of assert that any train invisible to the PTC Group meeting, it was recommended this section cite 40 miles per hour as the system in PTC territory presents an that the procedure allowing for such maximum permissible speed within a unacceptable risk. Instead, asserts the deviations equally apply to all other failed PTC system where a block signal RLO, treatment of en route failures operations, regardless of the speed of system is in operation because some should parallel the restrictions required the operations. railroads, such as the LIRR and Metro- when a train experiences a signal Upon presentation of these North, have defined medium speed failure, such as a switch position that is recommended revisions to the PTC lower than what the FRA regulation unknown or when a route is not known Working Group, Amtrak and NJ Transit would permit. FRA defines medium to be clear. While the NPRM proposed withheld consensus, requesting rather to speed in § 236.811 as ‘‘A speed not to allow a passenger or PIH PTC train state on the record that they believed exceeding 40 miles per hour.’’ Thus, we in dark territory to traverse a switch in the requirement for the establishment of believe the rule is clear in terms of the an unknown position at medium speed an absolute block was overly applicable maximum speed limit and or 30 miles per hour, the RLO asserts burdensome and unnecessary, and the consistent with the suggestions made by that such trains should be limited to operational limitations were too NYSMTA. While a particular railroad restricted speed or other methods, such restrictive in areas where an underlying may internally define ‘‘medium speed’’ as temporal separation. block signal system and/or cab signal differently, the definitions contained in FRA appreciates the RLO’s concerns. system with train stop/train control part 236 control the meaning of the However, FRA believes that the functions remained in place. They terms used therein. proposal to limit operations to restricted further suggested that the operational After a report is made in accordance speed, or employ other protective restrictions for en route failures should with paragraph (b)(1), or made methods such as temporal separation, be solely presented and described electronically and immediately by the would be too burdensome and within a railroad’s PTCDP and PTCSP, PTC system itself, paragraph (b)(2) unwarranted. FRA has elected to keep which would then be applicable to a allows the train to continue to a point the language of the NPRM in this final particular PTC system. where an absolute block can be rule for several reasons. First, it is FRA appreciates the concerns established in advance of the train in expected that failures en route presented. However, FRA remains accordance with the limitations that addressed by this rule, as well as convinced that the rule text must follow in paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (ii). temporary rerouting that could result in provide a ‘‘baseline’’ for operational Paragraph (b)(2)(i) requires that where its application, will not occur on any restrictions associated with en route no block signal system is in use, the frequent basis. Experience and failures within all PTC systems, with train may proceed at restricted speed. requirements of other portions of this the recognition of the allowance for a Alternatively, under paragraph (b)(2)(ii), subpart would preclude this from being railroad to submit a request for the train may proceed at a speed not to the case. Second, the assertion that ‘‘any deviation from those requirements, with exceed medium speed where a block train invisible to the PTC system in PTC justification, within their PTCDP and signal system is in operation according territory presents an unacceptable risk’’ PTCSP for FRA approval. Accordingly, to signal indication. is inaccurate. Such a train would not in FRA has substantially adopted into Paragraph (b)(3) requires that, upon fact be ‘‘invisible’’ to the PTC system as paragraphs (b) and (c) the text proposed the subject train reaching the location there remains in place some type of at the PTC Working Group meeting. where an absolute block has been authority for the train’s movement, and Section 236.1029, and in particular established in advance of the train, the all authorities of other trains that would paragraph (b), purposefully parallels the train may proceed in accordance with be PTC-equipped would be enforced by limitations contained in § 236.567. In the limitations that follow in paragraphs the system. Additionally, the maximum other words, FRA intends that § 236.567 (b)(3)(i), (ii), or (iii). Paragraph (b)(3)(i) speed of 30 miles per hour established and paragraph (b) of this section will requires that where no block signal by FRA for these situations is based on share the common purpose of system is in use, the train may proceed extensive analysis of past accident and maintaining a level of safety generally in at medium speed; however, if the incidence data, which has shown that accord with that expected with the train involved train is a train which is that of train accidents at or below 30 miles per control system fully functional. This is the criteria requiring the PTC system hour have not resulted in breach or accomplished by requiring installation (i.e., a passenger train or a compromise of cars carrying hazardous

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materials. FRA has elected to keep this normal safety-critical functioning of the information (and provides language of the NPRM in this final rule. system. This provision parallels current acknowledgment back to the Paragraph (c) requires that, in order § 236.4, which applies to all systems. By dispatcher), transcribes hand written for a PTC train to deviate from the requiring this paragraph, FRA also copies, and provides those copies to the operating limitations contained in intends to clarify that the standard in engineer and other crew members (in paragraph (b) of this section, the current § 236.4 also applies to subpart I lieu of stopping if engineer only). Each deviation must be described and PTC systems. crew member keeps these copies in justified in the FRA approved PTCDP or Paragraph (f) requires that each front of them (usually on a desk) for PTCSP. Amtrak had presented member of the operating crew has ready reference to approaching speed comments regarding the NPRM, as well appropriate access to the information restrictions and working limits of as within the PTC Working Group task and functions necessary to perform his roadway workers. Upon these force assigned to address comments or her job safely when products are documents, crew members make hand received regarding this section, asserting implemented and used in revenue written notes and are required to write that the operational limitations of service. FRA expects paragraph (f) to ‘‘void’’ across superseded or expired failure en route were too restricting and automatically require each engineer movement authorities. In case any unwarranted. Directly in response to operating the controlling locomotive to questions pertaining to crew those comments, FRA may allow for have access to the PTC display performance arise later, each deviation from the identified limitations providing such information. Paragraph crewmember keeps these copies. of the rule if that deviation is described (f) also applies to other crew members Particularly, in a PTC overlay system, and justified in the applicable and FRA assigned duties in the locomotive cab. which by definition depends upon approved PTCDP, PTCSP, or Order of The rule is a performance standard continued performance of all of the Particular Applicability. Furthermore, which can be met in several different safety-related functions of the the speed threshold of 90 miles per hour ways. underlying system of operation, all of proposed in the NPRM has been Train crews perform as a team and are these functions must continue to be removed. FRA will consider deviation required by railroad and FRA rules to do performed either as they are now or in proposals for conventional operations, so. The importance of having assigned an equivalent manner. Removing or as well as high-speed operations. FRA crew members fully involved in train impairing any of those functions will continues to anticipate that existing operations is also clearly the intent of diminish safety. operations on the Northeast Corridor Congress in the RSIA. The Congress The conductor is responsible for will not be adversely impacted, since mandated the certification of the determining the train consist and for failure of one component of the onboard conductor to work in concert with the ensuring compliance with hazardous train control system will permit the already federally-certified locomotive materials train placement requirements. remaining portion to function and engineer. For the conductor and The conductor is also responsible for provide for a reasonable level of safety. engineer to fulfill the expectations of determining whether one or more cars Paragraph (d) requires that the Congress, it is necessary for both in the train is restricted (e.g., railroad operate its PTC system within crewmembers to have sufficient requirement regarding appropriate the design and operational parameters information to perform their duties. For placement in the train or speed specified in the PTCDP and PTCSP. the conductor to be able to fulfill the restriction limiting the train’s speed to Railroads will not exceed maximum assigned obligations, the conductor avoid a derailment hazard).9 Conductors volumes, speeds, or any other parameter must have ready access to certain are regularly disciplined in certain provided for in the PTCDP or PTCSP. information, including the authority situations, including when the limits of On the other hand, a PTCDP or PTCSP information being received from the authorities are violated or maximum could be based upon speed or volume dispatcher. As described below, FRA speed limits are exceeded. parameters that are broader than the believes that safety would be materially Moreover, in present cab signal intended initial application, so long as diminished if the conductor in freight territory, multiple crew members rely the full range of sensitivity analyses is operations were denied access to the on the information provided by the cab included in the supporting risk same information in the same format as signal display, typically mounted in the assessment. FRA feels this requirement the engineer. center of the cab or other conspicuous will help ensure that comprehensive For instance, under the operating location. ACSES displays have also been rules or special instructions of the major product risk assessments are performed centrally mounted in passenger and freight railroads, each train crew before products are implemented. freight cabs for clear visibility.10 Under Paragraph (e) sets forth the member in the performance of his or her this final rule, cab signals may continue requirement that any testing of the PTC duties receives copies of a fair amount to operate independently of the PTC system must not interfere with its of paperwork that includes the train display of the locomotive cab. However, normal safety-critical functioning, consist, which provides the number, based upon RSAC discussions, FRA is unless an exception is obtained loading, locations, and hazardous confident that PTC displays may (and pursuant to 49 CFR § 236.1035, where materials contents of cars, the length special conditions have been and weight of the train, General Orders, 9 Enforcement of a speed restriction associated established to protect the safety of the which provide loose footing issues, the with a particular car is not a mandated PTC public and the train crew. Otherwise, safety rules of the day or week, security function, but is an important function that will be paragraph (e) requires that each railroad reminders, temporary speed restrictions, provided within the Interoperable Train Control ensure that the integrity of the PTC and the locations of maintenance of way architecture for the general freight system. 10 ITCS displays in freight locomotives have not system not be compromised, by crews performing track repairs. This been mounted so as to be clearly visible to freight prohibiting the normal functioning of paperwork provides the train crew with crews. The subject line is principally used for such system to be interfered with by the work plan necessary to operate the passenger service, and the number of freight testing or otherwise without first taking assigned train during their tour of duty. locomotives involved has been very small. ITCS has been permitted to operate under waiver, and FRA measures to provide for the safety of Once the crew is underway, the freely concedes that the issue of freight crew train movements, roadway workers, and conductor receives from the dispatcher, display visibility had not been clearly joined to this on-track equipment that depend on the via radio, updates to the above point.

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probably will) supplant current cab case that FRA had previously blessed major freight railroads have still not signal displays and utilize the cab signal the implementation of PTC technology issued interoperability standards. Even code as an input to the PTC display.11 that would permit electronic delivery of if FRA were able to accept some of the Section 236.515 has long provided that mandatory directives while arguments proffered in regard to the ‘‘The cab signals shall be plainly visible discontinuing the delivery of printed or need for access to PTC information, to a member or members of the voice transmitted directives. However, addressing this issue through review of locomotive crew from their stations in that is not the case. individual railroad plans would not be the cab.’’ Positive train control systems The system to which AAR refers— feasible. This issue needs to be settled will play a role very similar to, but in BNSF’s ETMS I configuration—was ‘‘up front’’ in order to support an orderly fact even more important than, qualified under subpart H, which only implementation. automatic cab signals have played in the requires that the system be at least as The testimony and written filings in territories where installed. In addition safe as existing systems and the this docket reflected a serious to providing current displays (or approval was limited in material ways misunderstanding regard the ‘‘targets’’) for signal indications, FRA the AAR failed to mention. Subpart I, distinctions noted above and the expects that PTC will also display in however, requires that non-vital overlay posture of the BNSF Product Safety Plan graphic form slow orders and other systems reduce the likelihood of PTC review. The AAR and CSXT both mandatory directives. preventable accidents by at least 80%. asserted that FRA has approved use of FRA recognizes that PTC systems are Subpart H does not address or require a single screen in the form of BNSF being designed to move much of this interoperability, but subpart I requires ETMS I configuration. More remarkably, information into an electronic format. interoperability. BNSF itself testified at the public The intent of utilizing electronic The BNSF ETMS I configuration hearing that, ‘‘As approved by FRA, our transmission of authorities is to reduce concept of operations was a pure non- locomotive cab configuration includes human error associated with listening, vital overlay on the existing method of one display screen, which is positioned copying, and reading back of updates operations. The safety analysis for that on the dashboard of the engineer.’’ system assumed that the conductor over voice channels while the train crew Comment of BNSF Railway Company, would continue to receive mandatory is en route. Regardless if the information Docket FRA–2008–0132.0011.1 (Aug. directives in the normal manner. BNSF, is transmitted digitally or verbally, the 19, 2009); Positive Train Control the only railroad to obtain authority for goal is to prevent the train from Systems: Hearing Before the Fed. use of a first-generation freight PTC occupying the main track without Railroad Admin. (Aug. 13, 2009) system, very heavily justified its safety authority, to prevent most over-speed (statement of Mark Schulze, Vice case on the assumption that issues, and to stop short of misaligned President, BNSF Railway Company). switches if the crew fails to follow the crewmembers would intervene should In fact, FRA’s decision letter for that rules. While FRA supports this the PTC system experience a wrong-side transition to digital communications, failure (which could occur due to a system stated as follows: this final rule does not require it. software error, hardware malfunction, 7. Prior to any further ETMS In the event that a certified PTC database error, or combination of these Configuration I operations, BNSF must system does use digital transmissions to factors). This system was justified as an either comply with 49 CFR § 236.515 provide communications and ‘‘overlay’’ on the existing method of (Visibility of cab signals), or submit a acknowledgement of mandatory operations; while there would be only risk-based justification as to why the directives between the dispatcher and one PTC display screen, it was requirements of this rule should be conductor, to allow the conductor to contended that most wrong-side errors waived. The justification shall be electronically input the train consist would be caught by crewmembers submitted in accordance with the PSP into the PTC system, or otherwise holding mandatory directives in paper amendment procedures in 49 CFR similarly modify a crew member’s form. This type of existing PTC system, § 236.913. (FRA Docket No. 2006– responsibilities, FRA expects under which has only been deployed by BNSF 23687, Document No. 0021.) paragraph (f) that the subject crew on a few lines and with very few The subject approval remains member will be afforded appropriate locomotives equipped, precludes one- contingent as of the date of preparation access to the PTC system display to half of the train crew from having any of this final rule, since the railroad has fulfill those responsibilities. access to the information for which they not submitted the required In its comments, the AAR also are held accountable. This has been justification.12 indicated that railroads have been tolerable only because both crew planning to put a single display in members do have a full set of printed or 12 Prior to enactment of the RSIA08, FRA had locomotive cabs for the engineer in written directives. taken significant steps to encourage voluntary PTC systems which FRA has already Note that basic interoperability is deployment, including offering the inducement of exceptions from traditional train control approved and that this requirement was potentially a concern with respect to the requirements. Had BNSF submitted a detailed redundant and excessive, referring to human-machine interface and the justification for the single display visible only to the the BNSF ETMS system. The AAR means by which FRA addresses it. To locomotive engineer, it is entirely possible that it questioned the need for a conductor to the extent a locomotive from a railroad would have been approved, since the performance standard under subpart H presents a very low bar have access to a PTC display. The Class which uses only voice transmission of for a reasonably competent train control system I railroads have attempted to present the mandatory directives were to travel on when applied in non-signaled or traffic control a railroad using electronic transmission territory and since under the ETMS PSP the 11 In vital applications, reliance on these displays of mandatory directives, it would need conductor would either continue to receive will be authorized and required. Although initially to be equipped for the other railroad. mandatory directives in writing or would copy in-block signal upgrades may not be permitted to mandatory directives transmitted verbally by the be acted upon, except in cab signal territory, FRA Yet none of the major freight railroads dispatcher via radio. 49 CFR 236.909(a). The point has no doubt that the ability to upgrade between has conducted a revenue demonstration here is that, if the railroad had indeed conducted wayside signals will be requested as the technology of a system that relies exclusively on adequate human factors analysis, it had not been is proven reliable. According to the major railroads electronic transmission of authorities; submitted to FRA; and no implications should be involved in the Interoperable Train Control effort, drawn with respect to this very different context, most Class I locomotives will need to be configured and, after more than two decades of wherein interline operation of locomotives is at to operate essentially in any territory on the system. development and demonstrations, the Continued

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The AAR also misstates the extent of engineer and conductor perform at a offset to some extent the risk reduction the Volpe Center’s review of ETMS. level no less safe than they would have resulting from PTC systems. From the Volpe Center’s review: ‘‘The had there not been a PTC system. The AAR argues that the requirement in purpose of the analysis was to assess the PTC systems proposed for freight § 236.1029(f) pertaining to distraction of extent to which the ETMS system railroads are overlay systems. In an the locomotive engineer should be follows accepted human factors design overlay system, the railroad adds a layer deleted. The AAR claims that FRA does guidelines that are likely to catch and of safety to the existing operation. The not offer any study showing that safety correct potential human performance risk assessment then is relatively easy, is jeopardized by assigning the engineer problems.’’ Volpe did not perform a because it is easy to show that the new PTC-related duties. FRA has directly ‘‘thorough human factors analysis’’ as system adds safety, reducing the risk of observed engineers exceeding posited by AAR. Rather, Volpe focused certain accidents, while not adding any authorities while attempting to respond on the user interface for locomotive new risk. The key assumption of the risk to PTC system requirements on tests of engineers, identifying issues within the assessment is no degradation of the existing PTC systems. In those cases, the existing design (which was still under underlying safety system, and the engineer was attempting to respond to development) and within the concept of performance of crewmembers is a key digitally transmitted authority while the operations as defined by the railroad. element of that safety system. train was in motion and was plainly Once all of the paperwork is moved It is impossible at present to quantify distracted from safety-critical duties. into electronic transmissions (which has the additional risk associated with FRA does not need a study to verify the been neither formally requested nor in adding a task which compromises the possibility of that which it has observed any way justified under existing safe operation of the train by the directly. regulations), in the absence of an engineer or conductor, even if only for The AAR also raises an issue of accuracy in transmitting and receiving available display one-half of the train a short time. Engineers and conductors mandatory directives, and appears to crew would not have the ability to have an excellent record of avoiding make the argument that because review and receive updates while en- accidents. PTC seeks to improve upon electronic transmission of mandatory route, or keep records of the movement that excellent record. The existing directives is likely to be much more authorities and restrictions for future human factors literature leads one to accurate than voice communication of use. PTC is currently an imperfect believe that entering complex mandatory directives, that all will be technology fed by databases that can be acknowledgements into a PTC system safer if mandatory directives are corrupted. Mandatory directives will while the train is in motion is a very continue to be issued by dispatchers transmitted electronically. FRA agrees significant risk. To quantify that risk, with limited conflict checking using that the electronic transmission is likely one would have to put it into the non-vital computer-aided dispatching to be more accurate, but does not agree context of comparative safety using a systems. As the point paper orders are that accurate transmission is the only human factors model far more complex no longer provided, and mandatory safety issue. FRA is concerned with and accurate than any of which FRA is directives are issued electronically en procedures which might distract the aware. Also note that PTC does not route, there would be no general engineer from his duties. There is no address all accident scenarios, many of broadcast on the ‘‘road channel’’ that problem if the railroad intends to have which are often avoided by timely could lead to other train crews or engineers receive, review, and locomotive engineer intervention. The roadway workers identifying a defective acknowledge mandatory directives, authority (e.g., a mandatory directive to timeliness of such intervention is unless the railroad wants the engineer to traverse a track segment already dependent on situational awareness, perform that task with the train in occupied by another train). None of the which would be negatively impacted if motion, and provided the engineer can freight railroads has yet demonstrated the engineer were distracted. Reading take the time to brief other crew how the transition to full electronic text on a PTC screen appears to be as members, who under current railroad delivery of mandatory directives will be distracting as reading text on a cell operating rules would need to copy and accomplished. FRA believes that the phone or PDA and texting in reply. In retain the orders. transition will eventually be made, but order for FRA to accept the diversion of All systems of which FRA is aware in the initial period it is critical that the engineer’s attention which would will require the crew to acknowledge existing provisions for safety—which come from having the engineer review the mandatory directives. FRA has seen work very well a very high percentage and accept the mandatory directives system designs that would permit of the time—not be prematurely while the train is motion, FRA would acknowledgement by simply pressing a abandoned; these provisions include need a process different from the button. There is no reason to believe appropriate access to the PTC system current risk assessment methodology. that simply pressing a button display. Although FRA agrees that That in turn would require FRA to demonstrates understanding of a transmission of valid authorities should impose a specification standard, instead mandatory directive, and FRA does not be more secure, and thus the trade-off is of a performance standard. Were FRA intend to approve such systems because likely to be favorable, FRA sees no issuing only a specification standard, they will not provide an adequate level reason at this time to take a second or FRA would require the second display of safety. Simply pressing a button does third crew member out of the loop or to and input unit. not provide the evidence of load on the engineer the responsibility In short, the rule as it stands relies on comprehension and mutual for both receiving mandatory directives comparing system risk, which is easy if understanding currently provided by and briefing the second or third crew the engineer is not distracted by the the practice of reading mandatory member who will be expected under the system, but impossible if the engineer directives back to the dispatcher over railroad’s rules to comply. might be distracted. What we do know the radio. Even if this means of FRA believes it is important to the with certainty is that having the acknowledgment is elected and risk assessment process that the engineer read and respond to lengthy approved by FRA, it would be necessary written messages on the PTC screen for an engineer receiving such a stake and several major railroads clearly wish to would be a distraction resulting in directive to read it and consider its abandon traditional means of delivering authorities. greater risk exposure which would relevance to the current situation. This

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could distract the engineer from actions errors, or erroneous mandatory (number of locomotives and cars, needed to address other restrictions or directives. tonnage, length of train) is provided in an emerging situation on the railroad The purpose of paragraph (f) is to ETMS from the company’s management (e.g., need to warn equipment or ensure that those assigned tasks in the information system). That information is personnel unexpectedly fouling the cab are able to perform those tasks, essential to the braking computation track ahead, requirement to manage a including constructive engagement with onboard. But this is often the intended train over undulating terrain to avoid the PTC system. Furthermore, while the consist, and the actual consist may vary. excessive in-train forces, emergency use train is moving, the locomotive engineer Having the crew member responsible for of the train horn because of vehicle would be prohibited from performing the accuracy of the consist enter or storage on the tracks in a quiet zone). functions related to the PTC system that confirm the consist in the PTC system FRA believes that simply referencing have the potential to distract the will avoid one opportunity for error the default PTC display screen will be locomotive engineer from performance each time this is accomplished (which, consistent with good situational of other safety-critical duties. According in the case of a road switching awareness and should not present a to the public comments, that would assignment, may be several times during problem. However, excessive make it impractical for certain freight a duty tour). engagement with the PTC onboard railroads not to equip its locomotives The NPRM proposed, and the final computer while underway can distract a with a second, interactive, display. rule requires, that the onboard locomotive engineer from current AAR says that FRA cannot point to apparatus be arranged so that each crew duties. While acknowledgment by use of any computer-related activities that member assigned to perform duties in a single soft key may limit the could result in distraction of the the locomotive cab could view a PTC distraction associated with engineer. The 2009 FRA report entitled display and execute any functions manipulation of the device, it does not Technology Implications of a Cognitive necessary to that crew member’s duties. address whether the directive was Task Analysis for Locomotive Engineers This provision does not require multiple understood. It is also possible to create touches on this. For example, the report screens, per se, nor does it require that ‘‘ greater interaction with the onboard states: Sources of new cognitive more than one employee must be computer while causing distraction and demands include constraints imposed assigned to a crew. In fact, the proposed yet still not ensure that the directive is by the PTC braking profile that require and final rules are technology neutral. locomotive engineers to modify train understood. For instance, a system FRA is aware of multiple ways that handling strategies; increases in tested by one railroad required an eight paragraph (f) may be satisfied in the information and alerts provided by the digit acknowledgment code to confirm event multiple crew members are in the in-cab displays that require locomotive receipt of a mandatory directive. In cab and need access to the information prototype testing locomotive engineers engineers to focus more attention on in- cab displays versus out the window, provided by the PTC system. Each attempting to enter the code have alternative has its own advantages and exceeded their authority, because and requirements for extensive interaction with the PTC systems (e.g., difficulties. FRA is ultimately entering a code is a distraction similar concerned that the crew members to text messaging (a prohibited to initialize it—to acknowledge messages and alerts) that impose new receive the same information displayed practice).13 in the same manner. I.e., if an engineer In those cases where train consist sources of workload.’’ This suggests that, unless task sequencing is managed is looking at a graphic on a screen, a information needs to be adjusted and conductor in the same cab should be confirmed in the PTC system, having wisely, interaction with PTC can distract the engineer from looking looking at the same graphic on whatever that done by the conductor will device the conductor is using. eliminate a potential source of error. outside the cab and attending to other duties important in train operation For instance, there can be a single (Provision of input capability on the large display placed in a location within conductor’s terminal will also (if so safety. Over the years, FRA has conducted the cab making it accessible to all crew elected) avoid delays in train starts significant human factors research members in the cab (as is done by associated with multiple crews related to supervisory train control Amtrak in the ACSES system used on attempting to work out consist systems such as PTC. In the course of the Northeast Corridor). A single display information over the radio or a cell that research, it has been noted that the (similar to traditional cab signals) could phone link to the central office.) Having human-machine interface (HMI) should be used if sufficiently large to provide the conductor observe displayed PTC be configured to avoid task overload and adequate resolution of details. If the system data should also provide an to permit the locomotive engineer to railroad opts to use a PTC system that additional opportunity for early attend to the safe movement of the train includes the added functionality of identification of problems with during all times when it is in motion. digital transmissions for these purposes, mandatory directives and displayed This may require responding to a single screen placed between the crew information that may derive from obstacles on the railroad ahead (e.g., members may be appropriate. corrupted databases, computational vandalism, cars stored on grade A configuration may also include two crossings, unsecured equipment that has fixed screens; one for the locomotive 13 The response to this kind of concern is typically that the PTC system will enforce, which rolled out, personnel in the foul without engineer and another for other crew was its purpose to start with. However, even vital prior notice to train crews), without members. In providing cost estimates for electronics sometimes fail in other than a safe regard to risk of collision with other this rulemaking, the Class I railroads mode, and in that case the crew performance is trains. Further, FRA has noted from its have assumed that this approach would relied upon to backstop the system (rather than the opposite)—assuming that the crew has information experience with the initial freight be employed and that the display would that it needs to do so. Further, if the engineer is implementations of PTC systems that be associated with an interactive distracted even for relatively few seconds the having the second crew member, where terminal. FRA does not question the danger exists that the engineer will not take other applicable, directly interact with the rationale in this manner and has necessary actions (sounding the horn at a crossing, monitoring the condition of the brake pipe and PTC system may offer the best approached costs estimates in the setting the train up for an upcoming slow order to likelihood of its safe functioning. For Regulatory Impact Analysis with this avoid excessive in-train forces, etc.). instance, train consist information assumption.

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The railroads have also discussed the For all of the systems proposed thus procedure (e.g., pressing a single soft possibility that, where the locomotive far, crewmembers must actively review key) that was designed to hasten the engineer may have his or her own fixed and acknowledge mandatory directives task and limit distraction. The problem screen, the other crew members could in order for the system to provide the with such a procedure is that (i) there make use of individual ‘‘heads-up’’ required level of safety. Where is no assurance that the engineer would displays or personal hand-held or mandatory directives are transmitted by understand what was being received, (ii) portable wired or wireless devices with voice over the radio, which is the there is little chance that the engineer train control software, which could be current practice for freight railroads, the would identify any authority or slow set up as an interactive terminal. conductor would typically be able to order that was not appropriate to the Through its Office of Research and copy and acknowledge the transmission situation, and (iii) there would be no Development, FRA has developed while the train is in motion. Passenger reasonable way to convey the personal digital assistant (PDA) software train engineers would have to be mandatory directive to the other crew for management of roadway worker stopped (e.g., at a station) in order to member without stopping the train and authorities at a reasonable cost (at copy and acknowledge the mandatory copying it off the screen. This would be approximately one-quarter of the cost of directive. See 49 CFR 220.61(b)(2). a perfect prescription for exclusive a second dash-mounted display), and FRA is aware of three ways to receive, reliance on technology, which is ill- doing the same for a crew remote safely review, and acknowledge advised and which the railroads claim terminal should be just as practical. The mandatory directives. First, the engineer will not be done (i.e., these are said to vendor for the on-board portion of the could receive, review, and acknowledge be ‘‘overlay’’ systems that cannot detract ITC system already provides a router authorities while the train is stopped. from the underlying methods of port, and routers are inexpensive. FRA Second, the conductor could receive, operation). assumes that there would be some review, and acknowledge voice Again, the railroads are perhaps additional costs related to replacement transmissions of mandatory directives, correct that safety might still be of misplaced or damaged devices and whether or not the train is moving. improved under this fourth option, at changing of batteries, but those costs Third, the conductor could receive, least as to the operations under PTC should be reasonable. Under paragraph review, and acknowledge authorities control, but that is not the question here. (f), hand-held or portable devices could through a device which combines The question is whether technology will be implemented and would have the display and data entry capabilities, be employed that primarily protects same advantages as a fixed terminal. whether or not the train is moving. The against human error on board, or FRA does not require that the display be first option is likely how passenger whether technology will be employed permanently affixed to the locomotive. railroads will comply with the that protects most of the time but The advantage of this approach would requirements. Such railroads have only induces human error on other be a lesser initial cost, likely about one- one crewmember in most cabs. This is occasions. Every day in the United fourth of the fixed terminal. likely not to be extremely burdensome States there are thousands of train starts Disadvantages include logistics of on most passenger trains, as the and hundreds of thousands of handling (loss, damage). engineer can receive, review, and opportunities for human error in train acknowledge mandatory directives at operations. Yet well-trained crews rise The major freight railroads point to passenger station stops. Thus, FRA is to these challenges, and as a result each passenger service as evidence that a not being illogical, as AAR asserts, by year there are approximately 50 to 60 ‘‘second display’’ is not required, but permitting passenger operations with a train collisions on the main lines, a their arguments are inapposite. Crew single cab occupant. What would be small number of overspeed derailments responsibilities and interactions on illogical would be to require a second and work zone violations, and a handful passenger trains are historically display where only one crewmember is of movements through misaligned main different than is the case with freight present. Freight locomotives with only track switches. Accordingly, a relatively crews, and thus crew resource one crewmember present would also be small number of wrong-side errors in management will not be undercut by likely to use the first option, although the operation of the PTC system use of a single display. For instance, in the cab may be equipped with a second accompanied by any diminishing of the case of a passenger train with a display. The second option would only vigilance on the part of train crew single locomotive engineer, the engineer require a display be within a members could easily cause results from will have the opportunity to initialize conductor’s view, but would be much PTC implementation to fall short of the the system at the point of departure by lower cost. The third option, which FRA risk reduction identified in FRA’s making a relatively easy selection for believes may be the norm for freight analysis. With time and refinement of class of train (if this is not done locomotives, may require the technology and databases, there may be automatically). Moreover, unlike in aforementioned second fixed screen, significant adjustments that can be freight operations, crew members for heads-up display, or handheld or made in current operating rules and passenger operations do not need to portable device. FRA does not believe it procedures. But existing PTC enter or confirm detailed consist would be practical for one terminal to technology for the general freight system information for a heavy train that may serve both crewmembers if both may be has not yet been proven at that level, have a wide variety of loaded and empty required to enter or access data. and it will be some years before that cars. If it is necessary for the locomotive It should be noted that employing a will be the case. In the meantime, it will engineer to take a mandatory directive fourth option, implied in railroad be crucial that informed and well through the PTC terminal, that can be testimony, would be problematic on coordinated crews maintain engagement done with the train stopped at a many fronts. That option would in the management of mandatory passenger station, as is the case today presumably involve a single display in directives and compliance with wayside using the voice radio. Passenger front of the locomotive engineer. The or cab-displayed signal indications. railroads will almost certainly elect to train would receive electronic Accordingly, FRA remains convinced use vital on-board processing, so the authorities exclusively through that that each crew member should have relative chance of an on-board computer device, and the engineer would access to, and engagement with, error will be less. acknowledge receipt using a simple information and requirements pertinent

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to the operations for which they are will likely not require additional system without engaging the responsible. This third option, hardware to meet the requirement due participation of each assigned crew combined with electronic transmission to the nature of their operations. FRA member. We conclude that no such of mandatory directives, would pay for does not disagree with the AAR and possibility has been demonstrated. itself in a very short time. Assuming railroad unit cost estimates, as long as Further, based upon FRA’s knowledge that a train has to be stopped twice each what AAR refers to is the type of unit of railroad operations and experience day for the engineer to acknowledge a that has input capabilities. FRA with oversight of existing and emerging directive, and that such a stop results in recognizes that the cost is actually for an train control technologies, FRA a cost of at least, and probably a lot additional ‘‘terminal’’ versus simply a determines that it is essential for safety more than, $80 to account for additional display and that it must be made rugged that each assigned crew member be braking and trip time as well as missed for the locomotive cab operating provided the information and access to opportunity for meets and passes, the environment. The AAR and other system inputs required to fulfill the cost of implementing this option would railroads objecting to these requirements crew member’s respective duties. surpass the cost of installing a second maintain that there will be little safety AAR again raises the issue of single terminal in just 50 days of service as the benefit to the requirements, and that the occupant cabs as an issue of ‘‘crew controlling locomotive. Assuming the benefits would be far less than the costs. resource management’’ best left to the locomotive is in the lead one-fourth of However, in the long run, FRA believes railroads. FRA maintains that these the time it is in service, the avoided cost that the additional cost for installing a operators will only be authorized to of stopping would be $8,000, the cost of second terminal would be justified by receive, review, and acknowledge an additional terminal, in 200 days. In the aforementioned business benefits as mandatory directives or similarly other words, the device will return its well as the safety assurance. interact with the PTC systems when cost in much less than a year. FRA is not altering the cost estimates their trains are not in motion. Of course, the business benefits of a for PTC from those in the analysis of the In the NPRM, FRA noted: second terminal are not as great if the NPRM, because the costs of the second [T]he principles of crew resource railroad does not adopt electronic terminal were already reflected. management and current crew briefing transmission of mandatory directives. FRA notes that estimated cost of the practices in the railroad industry require that However, FRA believes that railroads second display will be about 4% of the all members of a functioning team (e.g., will adopt electronic transmission of total initial costs of PTC deployment. engineer, conductor, dispatcher, roadway mandatory directives as rapidly as FRA has narrowly construed the PTC worker in charge) have all relevant possible. They would benefit from being mandate to avoid separate monitoring of information available to facilitate able to give roadway workers much switches in signal territory, to avoid constructive interactions and permit more rapid access to track, as well as by significant costs and potential delay incipient errors to be caught and corrected. being able to reduce the dispatchers’ related to following train collisions at Retaining and reinforcing this level of workload. Further, the business benefits low speed, and to provide generous cooperation will be particularly crucial during the early PTC implementation as envisioned in Appendix A require more exceptions where allowed by law errors in train consist information, errors efficient dispatching, which would rely (restricted speed in yards and terminals, generated in onboard processing, delays in on electronic transmission of mandatory passenger exceptions, Class II/III delivery of safety warnings due to radio directives, as well as managerial locomotives in limited operations on frequency congestion, and occasional errors directives related to train pacing and PTC lines, etc.)—actions that will save in dispatching challenge the integrity of PTC meet-pass planning. one or more billions of dollars during systems even as the normal reliability of day- The railroads have made no this initial implementation. If FRA to-day functioning supports reductions in convincing argument that providing a believed a deviation from historic train vigilance. Loss of crew cooperation could second display would be harmful, as control practice was warranted here to easily spill over to other functions, including such. Rather, they argue that the cost is save 4% of the initial cost, we would switching operations and management of emergency situations. excessive in relation to any expected happily provide it. We do not. FRA benefits. The AAR and several Class I believes that the PTC systems Commenters generally made scant freight railroads commented that the contemplated today will, at some point reference to this point. The AAR did cost to install a second display in the in the future, all accept electronic include an attachment to its testimony locomotive would be approximately transmission of mandatory directives. captioned with reference to this point, $8,000 per locomotive. According to The cost of providing a terminal to the but it begins with a summary task AAR estimates, 29,461 locomotives second crewmember, where applicable, analysis to the effect that ‘‘the conductor would need to be equipped. This would reflects that reality. Were railroads not is responsible for assisting in the translate into an initial installation cost planning to have conductors operation.’’ How the conductor will of $235,688,000. However, AAR acknowledge mandatory directives, the assist without a copy of the requisite overestimated the number of railroad could provide the conductor orders available, when the duty to copy locomotives, based on the document it with a screen without input devices, or mandatory directives is eliminated (as cites. In that document, FRA estimated a clearer view of the engineer’s screen, the AAR assumes it will be), is left that 27,598 freight locomotives would which have a much lower unit cost. unexplained. be equipped with VTMS technology FRA has placed in the docket of this This is a ‘‘far cry’’ from section 402 of only, and an additional 100 freight rulemaking a document prepared by the RSIA08, which requires that FRA locomotives would be equipped with FRA’s Office of Research and adopt regulations for the certification of both VTMS and ACSES technology, for Development, referencing available train conductors. In FRA’s experience as a total of 27,698 locomotives, which, at human factors literature. Although FRA the agency responsible for oversight of a unit cost of $8,000 per terminal type has addressed this issue from the point railroad operating rules and practices, display, implies a total cost of of view of whether the cost is justified, the conductor plays a key role in rail $221,584,000. AAR did not include the FRA wishes to emphasize that, at freight over-the-road operations by, inter locomotives which would have both bottom, it is most crucial whether it alia, determining the train consist, VTMS and ACSES installed, and would be possible to responsibly ensuring compliance with hazardous included passenger locomotives that implement PTC on the national rail materials placement and documentation

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requirement, calling or acknowledging assigned, and all persons employed operator occupies the compartment, signals, receiving mandatory directives, thereon are subject to their and; (b) the PTC operator displays in conducting frequent briefings with the instructions.’’ train operator compartments in a locomotive engineer to ensure Each railroad is free, within the consist, other than those from which the compliance with movement restrictions, constraints of the Railway Labor Act as train is operated from, are not to display and intervening through use of the to staffing, and subject to oversight by PTC information while the train is en conductor’s brake valve if the engineer FRA with respect to safety, to determine route. The MTA railroads have been is unresponsive or incapacitated. A its operating rules and assignment of repeatedly reassured on this point, and conductor may be disciplined with the responsibilities to its personnel. we are pleased to do so once again here. locomotive engineer if a signal is Nevertheless, FRA remains concerned As previously noted, on September violated or if a slow order or other that railroad operating crews function as 25, 2009, FRA entered into the docket mandatory directive is disobeyed, and a team, discharging their responsibilities to this rulemaking a compendium of this regularly occurs. The conductor on the basis of adequate information human factors literature relevant to the plays the determinative role in and using their knowledge of the HMI regulations and compiled by FRA’s switching operations, issuing the operating situation to identify safety Office of Research and Development. directions for operation of the concerns and resolve them. Within this AAR then submitted late-filed locomotive(s) so as to accomplish safely framework, each crew member must supplemental comments—which posted the placement or pick-up of rail cars at remain able to respectfully and to the docket on October 20, 2009, customer locations, the making up and helpfully question a judgment by approximately two months after the another crew member. This general breaking up of trains, and the conduct closing of the comment period and three approach is known as ‘‘crew resource of brake tests when mechanical weeks after FRA entered the management’’ (CRM), a concept personnel are not available. compendium into the docket— perfected in aviation and urgently Again, the major freight railroads have addressing various portions of the pressed on the railroad industry by the said that their PTC systems will compendium. FRA believes that this National Transportation Safety Board ‘‘overlay’’ existing methods of final rule already addresses each one of and the FRA. See NTSB operations. Those existing methods are AAR’s substantial concerns in its Recommendation R–99–13 (July 29, defined in their books of rules, supplemental comments. AAR also 1999). Major railroads have included timetables and special instructions. The states that it ‘‘has been deprived of the General Code of Operating Rules, CRM in their training programs. The fear with respect to a diminution opportunity to consider its comments in applicable to most railroad operations in a deliberative fashion.’’ Supplemental the western U.S., provides at section of crew integrity and efficiency associated with asymmetrical Comment of the Association of 1.47 that ‘‘The conductor and engineer distribution of current operational data American Railroads, Docket FRA–2008– are responsible for the safety and is that, not only may opportunities be 0132–0055.1, at 3 (Oct. 20, 2009). protection of their train and observance lost to correct errors within PTC However, contrary to AAR’s suggestion, of the rules.’’ It further provides that operations, but also that the conductor’s the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) ‘‘The conductor supervises the operation lack of engagement will transfer to does not require that FRA provide and administration of the train.’’ ‘‘The operations on lines not equipped with additional time to comment on the conductor must remind the engineer PTC. Further, any reduction in ability to compendium. See, e.g., Credit Union that the train is approaching an area function as a team could transfer, as Nat. Ass’n v. National Credit Union restricted by: Admin., 57 F.Supp.2d 294, 302 (E.D. Va. • well, to road and yard switching Limits of authority. operations. Should this occur, the price 1995) (agency complied with the APA’s • Track warrant. notice and comment requirements, • paid for PTC would include additional Track bulletin. casualties and property damage where despite not disclosing certain data or PTC is not available as a safety net. A related to the rulemaking, because the • ’’ Radio speed restriction. substantial portion of the Class I freight agency had provided a reasonable The rule continues: ‘‘To ensure the train network, and much of the switching and opportunity to participate in the is operated safely and rules are terminal railroad mileage over which rulemaking process); see also observed, all crew members must act Class I crews also operate, will not be Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 579 responsibly to prevent accidents or rule equipped under the current mandate F.2d 846, 853 (4th Cir. 1978) (despite violations. Crew members in the engine and perhaps not for many years. How agency’s failure to provide notice of control compartment must crews are conditioned to function certain data in advance of public communicate to each other any together will influence their behavior hearings, interested parties were restrictions or other known conditions both within and outside of the PTC- sufficiently advised of the scope and that affect the safety operation of their equipped network. In summary, FRA basis of the rulemaking to enable them train sufficiently in advance of such believes that maintaining the to comment intelligently and condition to allow the engineer to take involvement of all assigned crew meaningfully). Instead, the APA simply proper action.’’ The rule further requires members in operating and responding to states that an agency must publish ‘‘the communication of signals and enjoins the PTC system is necessary to achieve terms or substance of the proposed rule crew members to ‘‘take action to ensure the desired risk reduction expected of or a description of the subjects or issues safety, using the emergency brake valve PTC systems and is also necessary to involved.’’ 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3). To meet to stop the train, if necessary.’’ avoid degrading crew performance the requirements of section 553, an The NORAC Operating Rules, outside of PTC territory and during agency ‘‘must provide sufficient factual applicable to a number of eastern U.S. switching operations. detail and rationale for the rule to railroads, provides at Rule 94 for general NYSMTA requested clarification that permit interested parties to comment crew responsibilities similar to those in a multiple unit passenger train meaningfully.’’ Florida Power & Light quoted above. In addition, Rule 941 consist: (a) A second PTC display in Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 765, 771 provides that ‘‘Conductors have general every train operator compartment is not (DC Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. charge of the train to which they are required inasmuch as only the train 1045 (1989).

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FRA has provided that opportunity in FRA also recognizes that certain PTC Paragraph (e) requires that, to the this proceeding. The research recited in systems may currently operate in extent that the PTC system proposed for the compendium simply provided for revenue service with FRA approval implementation under this subpart is the benefit of interested parties through the issuance of a waiver or different in significant detail from the additional information that had order. Paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) intend system previously approved or previously been made public, FRA’s to cover those systems. recognized, the changes shall be fully views on the import of the research If a PTC system complying with analyzed in the PTCDP or PTCSP as were aired during RSAC meetings and paragraph (a)(1) is provided expedited would be the case absent prior approval are expressed at various points in the certification, the system plans should or recognition. FRA understands that NPRM, and the railroads obviously had ultimately match the criteria required the PTC product for which expedited sufficient time to prepare 16 pages of for each PTCDP and PTCSP. As Type Approval and PTC System comments on the compendium itself. previously noted, a railroad may seek to Certification is sought may differ in Clearly, the commenters were not use a PTC system that has already terms of functionality or prejudiced by the inclusion of the received a Type Approval. To extend implementation from the PTC product compendium in the docket. this benefit as it applies to previously previously approved or recognized by used systems for which expedited FRA. In such a case, the service history Section 236.1031 Previously Approved certification is provided, paragraph (b) PTC Systems and analysis may not align directly with gives the Associate Administrator the the new variant of the product. FRA recognizes that substantial effort ability to provide a Type Approval to Similarly, the available service history has been voluntarily undertaken by the systems receiving expedited and analysis associated with a PTC railroads to develop, test, and deploy certification in accordance with product may be inconclusive about the PTC systems prior to the passage of the paragraph (a)(1). reliability of a particular function. It is RSIA08, and that some of the PTC FRA recognizes that certain systems because of these possible situations that systems have accumulated a significant eligible for expedited certification may FRA can not unequivocally promise that history of safe and reliable operations. not entirely comply with the all requests for expedited Type In order to facilitate the ability of the subsequently issued statutory mandate. Approval and PTC System Certification railroads to leverage the results of PTC Accordingly, under paragraph (c), FRA submitted by a railroad under this design, development, and is compelled to require that before any subpart will be automatically granted. implementation efforts that have been Type Approval or expedited FRA will, however, apply the available previously approved or recognized by certification may be provided, the PTC service history and analytical data as FRA prior to the adoption of this system must be shown to reliably credible evidence to the maximum subpart, FRA is proposing an expedited execute the same functionalities of extent possible. FRA believes that this certification process in this section. every other PTC system required by still greatly simplifies each railroad’s Under paragraph (a), each railroad subpart I. Nothing in this abbreviated task in making its safety case, since the that has a PTC system that may qualify process should be construed as additional testing and analysis required for expedited treatment would have to implying the automatic granting by FRA need only address those areas for which submit a Request for Expedited of a Type Approval or PTC System credible evidence is insufficient. To Certification (REC) letter. Products that Certification. Each expedited request for reduce the overall level of financial have not received approval under the a Type Approval or PTC System resources and effort necessary to obtain subpart H, or have that have not been Certification must be submitted by the sufficient credible evidence to support previously recognized by FRA, would railroad under this abbreviated process the claims being made for the safety be ineligible. The REC letter may be and, as required under subpart I, must jointly submitted by PTC railroads and demonstrate that the system reliably performance of the product, FRA also suppliers as long as there is at least one enforces positive train separation and encourages each railroad to share with PTC railroad. A PTC system may qualify prevents overspeed derailments, other railroads a system’s service history for expedited certification if it fulfills at incursions into roadway worker zones, and the results of any analysis, even in least one of the descriptions proposed in and movements through misaligned the case where the shared information paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3). While switches. does not fully support a particular these descriptions are objective in Under paragraph (d), FRA encourages railroad’s safety analysis. nature, FRA intends them to cover railroads, to the maximum extent Paragraph (f) defines terms used only ETMS, ITCS, and ACSES, respectively. possible, to use proven service history in this section. ‘‘Approved’’ refers to The versions or configurations data to support their requests for Type approval of a PSP under subpart H. As recognized would depend upon the Approval and PTC System Certification. this final rule was being prepared, only status at the time of the request. While proven service history cannot be BNSF ETMS I configuration had been so Paragraph (a)(1) applies to systems considered a complete replacement for approved, but other systems were under that have been recognized or approved an engineering analysis of the risks and development. ‘‘Recognized’’ refers to by FRA after submission of a PSP in mitigations associated with a PTC official action permitting a system to be accordance with subpart H. Subpart I product, it provides great creditability implemented for control of train generally reflects the same criteria for the accuracy of the engineering operations under an order or waiver, required for a PSP under subpart H. analysis. Testing and operation can only after review of safety case Thus, FRA believes that most of the show the absence or mitigation of a documentation for the implementation. PTCDP and PTCSP requirements in particular failure mode, and FRA As this NPRM was being prepared, only subpart I can be fulfilled with the believes that there will always be some ACSES I had been recognized under an submission of the existing and approved failure modes that may only be order of particular applicability, and PSP. However, FRA notes that the determined through analysis. Due to ACSES II was under review for potential subject railroad will also need to submit this inherent limitation associated with approval. Only one system, the ITCS in the information required in a PTCDP testing and operation, FRA also strongly place on Amtrak’s Michigan line, had and PTCSP that is not in the current encourages the railroads to also submit been approved for unrestricted revenue PSP. any available analysis or information. service under waiver.

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FRA was unable to fashion an outright Section 236.1033 Communications data integrity and the entity wanting to ‘‘grandfathering’’ of equipment and Security Requirements be assured of data integrity. previously used in transit and foreign Authentication is the act of service. FRA does not have the same Subpart I provides specific establishing or confirming something (or communications security requirements degree of direct access to the service someone) as authentic. Various systems for PTC system messages. Section history of these systems. Transit have been invented to provide a means 236.1033 originated from the radio and for readers to reliably authenticate the systems—except those that are communications task force within the connected to the general railroad sender. In any event, the PTC Working Group. The objectives of communication must be properly system—are not directly regulated by the requirements are to ensure data protected; otherwise, an eavesdropper FRA. FRA has had limited positive integrity and authentication for can simply copy the relevant data and experience eliciting safety communications with and within a PTC later replay it, thereby successfully documentation from foreign authorities, system. masquerading as the original, legitimate particularly given the influence of In data communications, ‘‘cleartext’’ is entity. national industrial policies. a message or data in a form that is Sender authentication typically finds However, FRA believes that, while immediately comprehensible to a application in two primary contexts. complete exclusion may not be available human being without additional Entity identification serves simply to in those circumstances, procedural processing. In particular, it implies that identify the specific entity involved, simplification may be possible. FRA is this message is transferred or stored essentially in isolation from any other considering a procedure under which without cryptographic protection. It is activity that the entity might want to the railroad and supplier could establish related to, but not entirely equivalent to, perform. The second context is data safety performance at the highest level the term ‘‘plaintext.’’ Formally, plaintext origin identification, which identifies a specific entity as the source or origin of of analysis for the particular product, is information that is fed as an input to a given piece of data. This is not entity relying in part on experience in the a cryptographic process, while identification in isolation, nor is it other service environments and showing ‘‘ciphertext’’ is what comes out of that process. Plaintext might be compressed, entity identification for the explicit why similar performance should be purpose of enabling some other activity. expected in the U.S. environment. encrypted, or otherwise manipulated before the cryptographic process is Rather, this is identification with the Foreign signal suppliers should be in a intent of statically and irrevocably good position to marshal service applied, so it is quite common to find plaintext that is not cleartext. Cleartext binding the identified entity to some histories for these products and present material is sometimes in plain text form, particular data, regardless of any them as part of the railroad’s PTCSP. meaning a sequence of characters subsequent activities in which the entity For any change, the applicant must without formatting, but this is not might engage. Cryptographically based provide additional information that will strictly required. The security signatures provide nearly irrefutable enable FRA to make an informed requirements are consistent with the evidence that can be used subsequently decision regarding the potential impact Department of Homeland Security to prove to a third party that this entity of the change on safety. This (DHS) guidance for SCADA systems and did originate—or at least possess—the data. information must include, but is not the National Institute of Standards and Paragraph (b)(1) requires that limited to, the following: (1) A detailed Technology guidance. FRA has cryptographic algorithms and keys used description of the change; (2) a detailed coordinated this final rule with DHS. description of the hardware and to establish integrity and authenticity be Paragraph (a) establishes the approved by either the National software impacted by the change; (3) a requirement for message integrity and Institute of Standards & Technology detailed description of any new authentication. Integrity is the assurance (NIST) or a similar standards functional data flows resulting from the that data is consistent and correct. organization acceptable to FRA. As a change; (4) the results of the analysis Generally speaking, in cryptography and practical matter, cryptographic used to verify that the change did not information security, integrity refers to algorithms can be believed secure by introduce any new safety risks or, if the the validity of data. Integrity can be competent, experienced, and practicing change did introduce any new safety compromised through malicious cryptographers. This requires that the risks, a detailed description of the new altering—such as an attacker altering an algorithms be publicly known and have safety risks and the associated risk account number in a bank transaction, been seriously studied by working mitigation actions taken; (5) the results or forgery of an identity document—or cryptographers. Algorithms that have of the tests used to verify and validate accidental altering—such as a been approved by NIST (or similar the correct functionality of the product transmission error, or a hard disk crash. standards bodies) can be assured of after the change has been made; (6) a A level of data integrity can be achieved being both publicly known and detailed description of any required by mechanisms such as parity bits and seriously studied. modifications in the railroad training cyclic redundancy codes. Such Paragraph (b)(2) allows the use of plan that are necessary for continued techniques, however, are designed only either manual or automated means to safe operation of the product after the to detect some proportion of accidental distribute keys. Key distribution is the change; and (7) a detailed description of bit errors; they are powerless to thwart most important component in secure any new test equipment and deliberate data manipulation by a transmissions. The general key maintenance procedures required for determined adversary whose goal is to distribution problem refers to the task of the continued safe operation of the modify the content of the data for his or distributing keys between her own gain. To protect data against communicating parties to provide the product. this sort of attack, cryptographic required security properties. Frequent In the same vein, paragraph (g) techniques are required. Thus, key changes are usually desirable to encourages re-use of safety case appropriate algorithms and keys must limit the amount of data compromised documentation previously reviewed, be employed and commonly understood if an attacker learns the key. Therefore, whether under subpart H or subpart I. between the entity wanting to provide the strength of any cryptographic system

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results with the key distribution cryptographic problems. These different types of material. Paragraph (e) technique, a term that refers to the primitives provide fundamental requires that cleartext stored means of delivering a key to two parties properties, which guarantee one or more cryptographic keys be protected from that wish to exchange data without of the high-level security properties. In unauthorized disclosure, modification, allowing others to see the key. Key paragraph (e)(1), FRA makes it clear that or substitution. During key distribution can be achieved in a while providing for confidentiality of management, however, it may be number of ways. There are various message data is not a regulatory necessary to validate the accuracy of the combinations by which a key can be requirement, if confidentiality is elected key being entered, especially in cases selected manually or in automation to be implemented by a railroad, that where the key management process is amongst one or multiple parties. the same protection mechanisms being done manually. During the key Paragraph (b)(3) establishes the applicable to the cryptographic entry process, keys not encrypted to conditions under which cryptographic primitives that support integrity and protect against disclosures may be keys must be revoked. Paragraph authentication must also be provided for temporarily displayed to allow visual (b)(3)(i) addresses the situation when a the cryptographic primitives that verification. However, if the key has key has actually been found to have support confidentiality. been encrypted to protect against been compromised and when the It is only the difficulty of obtaining disclosure, then the cleartext version of possibility of key compromise exists. the key that determines security of the the key may not be displayed. This does Cryptographic algorithms are part of the system, provided that there is no not, however, preclude the display of ‘‘ foundations of the security house, and analytic attack (i.e., a structural the encrypted version of the key. any house with weak foundations will weakness’’ in the algorithms or protocols collapse. Adequate procedures should used), and assuming that the key is not In paragraph (f), FRA requires that be foreseen to take an algorithm out of otherwise available (such as via theft, each railroad implement a service service or to upgrade an algorithm extortion, or compromise of computer restoration and mitigation plan to which has been used beyond its systems). A key should therefore be address restoral of communications lifetime. large enough that a brute force attack services in the event of their loss or Paragraph (d) addresses physical (possible against any encryption disruption and to make this plan protection as applied to cryptographic algorithm) is infeasible, whereas the available to FRA. Loss of equipment. Compliance does not attack would take too long to execute. communications services reduces or necessitate locking devices within Under information theory, to achieve eliminates the effectiveness of a PTC mechanical safes or enclosing their perfect secrecy, it is necessary for the system and FRA requires that these electronics within thick steel or key length to be at least as large as the critical safety systems, once concrete shields (i.e., making them message to be transmitted and only used implemented, are restored to operation tamper-proof). Compliance does, once (this algorithm is called the one- as soon as practical. FRA believes that however, involve using sound design time pad). In light of this, and the the restoration plan must include testing practices to construct a system capable practical difficulty of managing such and validating the plan, communicating of attack detection by a comprehensive long keys, modern cryptographic the plan, and validating backup and range of sensors (i.e., tamper resistant). practice has discarded the notion of restoration operations. The level of physical security suggested perfect secrecy as a requirement for To ensure that these or any other should be such that unauthorized encryption, and instead focuses on procedures work in the railroad’s attempts at access or use will either be computational security. Under this operational environment, the railroad unsuccessful or will have a high definition, the computational must validate each procedure intended probability of being detected during or requirements of breaking an encrypted for implementation. The backup and after the event. Additionally, the text must be infeasible for an attacker. restoration plan should clearly describe cryptographic equipment should be Paragraph (e)(2) requires that in the who is to implement procedures and prominently situated in operation so event that a railroad elects to implement how they are to do it. The primary that its condition (outward appearance, confidentiality, the chosen key length information to be communicated indicators, controls, etc.) is easily should provide the appropriate level of includes: The team or person (specified visible to minimize the possibility of computational complexity to protect the as an individual or a role) that is undetected penetration. In any system information being protected, and that responsible for determining when containing detection and destruction this information be included in the restoration of service is required and the methods as described here, there is PTCSP. Both academic and private procedures to be used to restore service, naturally a cost penalty for providing organizations provide recommendations as well as the team or person very high levels of tamper resistance, and mathematical formulas to responsible for implementing due to construction and test approximate the minimum key size procedures for each restoration scenario; requirements by the manufacturer. It is requirement for security based on the criteria for determining which naturally important to analyze the risks mathematic attacks; they generally do restoration procedures are most of key disclosure against cost of not take algorithmic attacks, hardware appropriate for a specific situation; the protection and specify a suitable flaws, or other such issues into account. time estimates for restoration of service implementation. Paragraph (e)(2) has been revised in the in each restoration scenario; the Confidentiality has been defined by final rule to correct an erroneous cross- restoration procedures to be used, the International Organization for reference to the security requirements Standardization (ISO) as ‘‘ensuring that set forth in § 236.1013(a)(7). including the tools required to complete information is accessible only to those Key management—the process of each procedure; and the information authorized to have access.’’ handling and controlling cryptographic required to restore data and settings. Confidentiality, integrity, and keys and associated material during Finally, paragraph (g) makes clear that authentication all rely on the same basic their life cycle in a cryptographic railroads are permitted to implement cryptographic primitives—algorithms system—includes ordering, generating, more restrictive security requirements with basic cryptographic properties— distributing, storing, loading, escrowing, provided the requirements do not and their relationship to other archiving, auditing, and destroying the adversely impact the interoperability.

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FRA has received no comments on than requirements of part 236 must be Appendix B to Part 236—Risk § 236.1033 and has adopted it as submitted in accordance with the Assessment Criteria proposed. waiver processes specified by part 211. FRA hereby modifies Appendix B of Section 236.1035 Field Testing FRA has received no comments on part 236 to enhance the language for risk Requirements § 236.1035 and has adopted it as assessment criteria in light of the Initial field or subsequent regression proposed. experience gained during the initial stage of PTC system implementation testing of a PTC product on the general Sections 236.1037 Through 236.1049 rail system is often required before the under subpart H and to accommodate product has been certified in order to In subpart H, §§ 236.917 through the requirements of subpart I regulating obtain data to support the safety case 236.929 contain various requirements the use of mandatory PTC systems. As presented in the PTCSP. To ensure the that involve PSPs. FRA believes that modified, Appendix B includes certain safety of the public and train crews, these requirements should apply headings and new language in prior FRA approval is required to equally to PTC systems governed by paragraphs (a) through (h). Paragraph (a) reflects the change in conduct test operations on the general subpart I. FRA has included §§ 236.1037 the required length of time over which rail system. This paragraph provides an to 236.1049 to inform interested parties the system’s risk must be computed. alternative to the waiver process when how these elements would apply. FRA FRA replaces the requirement to assess only part 236 regulations are involved. intends that the meanings of those When regulations concerning track risk for the system ‘‘over the life-cycle of sections in subpart H, as described in 25 years or greater’’ with the safety grade crossing safety or when the preamble to its proposed and final operational rules are involved, however, requirement to assess risk ‘‘over the rules, would also apply equally in the designed life-cycle of the product.’’ FRA this process would not be available. context of this final rule. While FRA has Such testing may also implicate other believes that the language is consistent considered amending these sections in with the preamble discussion of the safety issues, including adequacy of subpart H to incorporate references to warning at highway-rail crossings subpart H final rule inasmuch that they subpart I, FRA believes such an attempt do not specify the length of a system’s (including part 234 compliance), and its results would be cumbersome qualification of passenger equipment life cycle, thereby providing flexibility and awkward. Thus, FRA has included (part 238), sufficiency of the track for new processor-based systems to have the provisions in subpart I for clarity. structure to support higher speeds or a life cycle other than 25 years. unbalance (part 213), and a variety of The Rail Labor Organizations have FRA hereby modifies paragraph (b) other safety issues, not all of which can expressed support for the training and only to clarify FRA’s intent. be anticipated in any special approval qualification provisions in §§ 236.1041, FRA hereby modifies the heading and procedure. Approval under this part for 236.1045, 236.1047, and 236.1049 and content of paragraph (c) to better testing does not grant relief from other support an expansion of PTC personnel identify the main purpose of this parts of this title and the railroads must training requirements, as necessary, requirement and to ensure its still apply for relief from the non-part based upon experience gained and any consistency with the associated 236 regulations under the discrete training deficiencies identified during requirements of §§ 236.909(c) and (d). special approval sections of those operations of these systems. The RLO FRA believes that previous paragraph regulations, the provisions of part 211 states that training on the PTC system is (c) and its heading did not fully support related to waivers, or both. essential for all employees who will or clarify the main intent of subpart H, The information required for this interface with this technology. While which requires that the total cost of filing is described in paragraphs the RLO supports the requirement that hazardous events should be the risk 236.1035(a)(1) through (a)(7). This employees must maintain the skill level measure for a full risk assessment and information is necessary in order for necessary to safely operate trains, they that the mean time to hazardous event FRA to make informed decisions urge FRA to consider that the ‘‘4 hour (MTTHE) calculations for all hazardous events should be the risk measure for regarding the safety of testing work period’’ of manual operation of a the abbreviated risk assessment. The operations. FRA would prefer that the train should be conducted not less often existing subpart H text asks for both the informational filings to test under this than once in any given tour of duty. base case and the proposed case to be part be accompanied by any requests for Considering that the maximum workday expressed in the same metrics. relief from non-part 236 regulations so (except in extreme emergencies) is 12 Paragraph (c) of this appendix, as that they may be considered as a whole. hours, the locomotive engineer will then Paragraph (b) provides notification written prior to the issuance of this final be manually operating the train at least that FRA may—based on the results of rule, did not fully reflect FRA’s intent 33% of the time. FRA has considered the review of the information provided that the same risk metric is to be used this suggestion for a change in the in paragraph (a) and in order to provide in the risk assessment for both the approach from subpart H. However, additional oversight to ensure the safety previous and current conditions (see FRA believes that this is an issue that of rail operations—impose special § 236.913(g)(2)(vii)). FRA believes that should be more specifically addressed conditions on the execution of the the revised title of this paragraph poses in the PTCSP for the system, should testing, including the appointment of an the right question and that its new FRA test monitor. When a test monitor automatic operation ever be proposed. language provides better guidance on is appointed, he or she has the authority Appendix A to Part 236—Civil Penalties how to perform risk assessment for to stop testing if unsafe conditions arise, previous and current conditions. require additional tests as necessary to Appendix A to part 236 contains a FRA hereby modifies the heading and demonstrate the safe operation of the schedule of civil penalties for use in text of paragraph (d) to create a system, or have tests rerun when the connection with this part. FRA is comprehensive and detailed list of results are in question. revising this schedule of civil penalties system characteristics that must be Paragraph (c) reemphasizes the earlier through issuance of the final rule to included in the risk assessment for each discussion that either temporary or reflect the addition of subpart I to this proposed PTC system subject to permanent requests for relief for other part. requirements of subpart H or subpart I,

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or both, as applicable. FRA believes that in the text of the final rule, especially the failure was caused by the fault of the the extended description of system counting the fact that FRA is not to be subsystem or component itself or by characteristics better suits the risk involved in all aspects of the design and errors of the operating agent (human assessment requirements of subpart H engineering associated with a product. factor associated with operation, and subpart I. For example, the Any guidance that FRA could provide maintenance or restoration of the revisions clarify that the risk assessment would not reflect the level of subsystem). FRA feels that replacing the must account for the total volume of understanding that the vendor(s) or enumerated in the original text types of traffic, the type of transported freight supplier(s) and system integrators of the faults ‘‘permanent, transient, and materials (PIH, TIH), and any additional product should have gained throughout intermittent’’ with the term requirements for PTC systems with the design and implementation process ‘‘contributory faults’’ will not assure that trains operating at certain speeds. that would enable them to specify, all types of faults will be accounted for. FRA hereby modifies paragraph (e) to evaluate and determine such critical FRA also notes that the derivation of clarify its intent and reflect the measures as MTTF, MTBF, and MTTHE. MTTHE for the operating system, industry’s experience in risk assessment There is a large body of publicly subsystem or component for which the techniques gained during the initial available work from the research and risk assessment is to be performed is a stage of PTC system implementation engineering community that addresses complex process which may require the under subpart H. In the language of various perspectives on determination use of Fault Tree Analysis or other paragraph (e), FRA provides more of appropriate methods of determining relevant techniques. These techniques specific guidance on how to derive the MTTHE and other related parameters. will use the probabilities of single point main risk characteristics, MTTHE, and Upon receipt of the risk assessment component failures identified for the what role reliability and availability documentation in the PTCSP, FRA will system. This process cannot lead to parameters, such as mean time to failure provide feedback on the appropriateness MTTHE of zero value. Neither can this (MTTF) or mean time between failures of a vendor, supplier, or railroad process result in MTTHE being equal to (MTBF), for different system selected methodology for determining infinity. The calculated probability of components can play while assessing MTTHE and the acceptability of the accidents (the inverse value of MTTHE) risk for vital and non-vital hardware or results of calculations based on that may be infinitely small to the extent that software components of the system. methodology with respect to regulatory the safety requirement of this Part is met FRA emphasizes that it is critical that acceptability. However FRA views the (i.e., during the entire life time of the each railroad and its vendors or specification and determination of system it is very unlikely for the suppliers include the software failure appropriate MTTHE and other design accident to occur), but rarely will the rates into risk assessments for the parameters as a fundamental probability of such events be zero in a system. FRA also finds it necessary to responsibility of the system integrator, practical world. Based on this advise each railroad and its vendors or vendor, or supplier that neither can nor reasoning, FRA retains the text in suppliers to include reliability and should be abrogated. proposed paragraph (f)(1). availability characteristics, such as FRA received comments on the last FRA hereby modifies paragraph (f)(2) MTTF or MTBF, into its risk assessment sentence in paragraph (f)(1) from HCRQ/ to reflect FRA’s understanding that a to account for potential system exposure CGI, in which HCRQ/CGI asserted that software failure analysis may not to hazards during system failures or ‘‘permanent’’ faults would result in an necessarily be based on MTTHE malfunctioning when the system MTTHE of zero. In addition, HCRQ/CGI ‘‘Verification and Validation’’ processes operates in its fall back mode—the back- asserted that ‘‘transient’’ by definition is and that MTTHE characteristics cannot up operation, as described in the something that comes and then goes be easily obtained for the system PTCSP, when the PTC system fails to away, which may never be detected. software components. The modification operate. Thus, HCRQ/CGI questioned how one intends to outline the significance of FRA believes that the modifications to could determine the rate of its detailed software fault/failure analysis paragraph (e) more accurately address occurrence. In order to address these and software testing to demonstrate the industry’s need for clarity in concerns, HCRQ/CGI recommended that repeatable predictive results that all interpretation and execution of the FRA revise the last sentence in software defects are identified and requirements related to risk assessment. paragraph (f)(1) to read as follows: ‘‘The corrected. FRA received comments from HCRQ/ MTTHE calculation must consider the FRA received comments from HCRQ/ CGI noting that the phrases ‘‘frequency rates of failures caused by contributory CGI on paragraph (f)(2), in which of hazardous events’’ and ‘‘failure faults accounting for the fault coverage HCRQ/CGI asserted that ‘‘proper’’ frequency’’, which were contained in of the integrated hardware/software assessment is open to interpretation, paragraph (e) of the proposed rule, are subsystem or component, phased while Real Time Operating System equivalent. HCRQ/CGI therefore interval maintenance, and restoration of (RTOS) ‘‘evaluation’’ is possible. HCRQ/ recommended that FRA revise the the detected failures.’’ CGI also asserted that the assessment of second sentence in paragraph (e) to read In response to this comment, FRA device driver software would require as follows: ‘‘The MTTHE is to be derived would like to reiterate that the main the source code, which is usually for both fail-safe and non-fail-safe intent of the requirement specified in proprietary. Thus, HCRQ/CGI subsystems or components.’’ FRA agrees paragraph (f)(1) was to request that the recommended that the assessment with this recommendation and has statistics on subsystem or component should include Commercial Off-The- therefore revised the second sentence of failures available for MTTHE Shelf (COTS) software, if incorporated, paragraph (e) accordingly. calculation must be used in its entirety. other than the operating system. HCRQ/ Several commenters questioned This means that all types of failures CGI asserted that FRA could make this whether additional guidance on (faults) observed during subsystem or change by revising the first sentence in acceptable methods for calculating component operation should be paragraph (f)(2) to read as follows: MTTHE values for processor-based accounted for, regardless of the types of ‘‘Software fault/failure analysis must be subsystems and components can be failures by their appearance to the based on the assessment of the design given by FRA. FRA believes it is observer (permanent, transient or and implementation of the application inappropriate to provide this guidance intermittent), and regardless of whether code, an evaluation of the operating/

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executive program and other COTS abbreviated risk assessment, rather than chosen by the railroad for the risk software components.’’ HCRQ/CGI also only documenting assumptions for other assessment is required by this commented that it is not possible to intermediate parameters, such as MTTF paragraph. demonstrate that all software defects and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), as Appendix C to Part 236—Safety have been identified with a high degree currently required. These two Assurance Criteria and Processes of confidence. HCRQ/CGI quotes a referenced parameters may or may not famous statement made years ago be relevant for the risk assessment. FRA hereby modifies Appendix C to (author unknown): ‘‘It is common in FRA received comments from HCRQ/ part 236 to enhance and clarify its industry to find a piece of software, CGI on paragraph (h)(1), in which language, reorganize the existing list of which has been subjected to a thorough HCRQ/CGI asserted that the first safe system design principles in and disciplined testing regime, has sentence should be its own paragraph. accordance with the well established serious flaws.’’ HCRQ/CGI asserted that However, HCRQ/CGI also asserted that models of system safety engineering, it is not clear what ‘‘high degree of the proposed rule text was unclear as to and augment the list of safe system confidence’’ implies. Therefore, HCRQ/ how the railroad would be expected to design principles with the principles CGI recommended that the last sentence comply with this requirement. related to safe system software design. A in paragraph (f)(2) be revised to read as FRA disagrees with the commenter safe state is a system state that the follows: ‘‘The software assessment that the paragraph (h)(1) should be system defaults to in the event of a fault process must demonstrate, through restructured and that further or failure or when unacceptable or repeatable predictive results, that the clarification is required for the process dangerous conditions are detected. The software operates as specified without of documenting all assumptions made safe state is a state when the hazardous error.’’ while deriving the risk metrics that are event cannot occur. This final rule In response to this comment, FRA to be used in the risk assessment for the revises proposed paragraph (a) to reflect revises paragraph (f)(2) to replace the product. In order for FRA to assess the the main purpose of this appendix in phrase ‘‘proper assessment’’ with the validity of risk assessment done by clear, accurate, and consistent language word ‘‘assessment,’’ and to specify that railroads for their particular products, that will be repeatedly used throughout ‘‘all safety-related software’’ should be all assumptions made by the railroad in the appendix. It also outlines that the included in the software fault/failure regards of deriving chosen risk metrics requirements of this appendix will be analysis including COTS software. shall be presented along with the risk applicable to each railroad’s PTCIP and However, FRA disagrees with the assessment. This is critical for the PTCSP, as required by subpart I. commenter that, in the requirement for further confirmation that the This final rule modifies and the software defects to be identified and assumptions made were correct based restructures paragraph (b) to corrected with the ‘‘high degree of on the following in-service experience. confidence,’’ the term ‘‘high degree of Documenting assumptions made in the consistently present a complete list of confidence’’ requires further process of risk analysis is rather safety assurance principles properly clarification. The definition of this term common procedure recommended by classified or categorized in accordance is already given in the preamble various studies in safety and reliability with well established system safety discussion for § 236.903 in subpart H of engineering. engineering principles that need to be this part. See 70 FR 11,052, 11,067 (Mar. In its comments, HCRQ/CGI also followed by the designer of the system 7, 2005). This term is widely issued in asserted that there is no need to specify to assure that all system components sections of this part related to safety and an ‘‘automated’’ process for comparing perform safely under normal operating risk assessment. Therefore, FRA leaves risk assessment assumptions with actual conditions and under failures, the last sentence of paragraph (f)(2) experience. This comment also was accounting for human factor impacts, unchanged. made for the similar text in paragraph external influencing, and procedures FRA hereby modifies paragraph (g) to (h)(3). Thus, HCRQ/CGI recommended and policies related to maintenance, clarify that MMTHE calculations should that FRA revise the last sentence of repair, and modification of the system. account for the restoration time after paragraph (h)(1) to read as follows: ‘‘The FRA also adds language indicating that system or component failure and that railroad shall document these these principles must also be applicable the system design must be assessed for assumptions in such a form as to permit to PTC systems designed and adequacy through the Verification and later comparisons with in-service implemented under the requirements of Validation process. experience.’’ FRA agrees with this subpart I. FRA’s intent in initially HCRQ/CG, in reference to paragraph comment and has therefore revised the promulgating Appendix C was to ensure (g)(1), repeated its comment given for last sentences of paragraphs (h)(1) and that safety principles are followed the last sentence in paragraph (f)(1) that (h)(3) accordingly. during the design stage and that relates to the types of faults (permanent, HCRQ/CGI also submitted comments Verification and Validation methods are transient). on paragraph (h)(4), asserting that the used to assure that the product meets FRA notes that the explanations language in this paragraph seems to the safety criteria established in provided in FRA’s response to this imply that a detailed document, § 236.909. The heading of this paragraph comment for paragraph (f)(1) are also separate from the fault trees themselves, and its subparagraphs are changed to applicable for this paragraph and is required, which would be very costly. more adequately and precisely capture therefore includes the text of proposed Therefore, HCGI/CGI recommended that this paragraph’s purpose. For instance, (g)(1) in the final rule. FRA revise paragraph (h)(4) to read as FRA hereby modifies the heading of FRA hereby modifies paragraph (h) to follows: ‘‘The railroad shall document paragraph (b)(1) to better suit the chosen emphasize the need to document all all of the identified safety critical fault base of classification for all safety assumptions made during the risk paths to a mishap.’’ principles under paragraph (b). assessment process. FRA believes that FRA does not see the need to HCRQ/CGI submitted comments the assumptions should be documented eliminate the clause in the first sentence asserting that the third sentence of while deriving the total cost of potential ‘‘as predicted by the safety analysis paragraph (b)(1) implies that the system accident consequences for full risk methodology,’’ but finds it necessary to will operate safely in the presence of assessment or MTTHE values for clarify that no additional tool to that human error. Questioning whether this

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would be possible, HCRQ/CGI unclear. In order to address this Based on this amendment, FRA also recommended deletion of this sentence. concern, HCRQ/CGI recommended that renumbers some of the remaining In order to avoid ambiguity in the last sentence in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) subparagraphs of paragraph (b) to follow interpreting the important requirement be revised to read as follows: the chosen scheme for the proper spelled out in the third sentence of this ‘‘Occurrence of credible single point classification and sequence of safety paragraph, FRA revises it to read as failures that can result in hazards must principles. follows: ‘‘The system shall operate safely be detected and the product must GE asserts that more detail is required even in the absence of prescribed achieve a known safe state before for the Human Factor Engineering operator actions or procedures.’’ inadvertently activating any physical Principle in paragraph (b)(5), which is With respect to the fifth sentence in appliance.’’ Similarly, HCRQ/CGI part of the section on ‘‘safety principles paragraph (b)(1), HCRQ/CGI asserted recommended that the last sentence in during product development.’’ There are that it is a rare situation when hazards paragraph (b)(2)(iv) be revised to read as two components to applied Human can be ‘‘eliminated.’’ Therefore, HCRQ/ follows: ‘‘If one non-self-revealing Factor engineering in system safety: The CGI recommended that FRA revise the failure combined with a second failure component of ergonomic design and the fifth and sixth sentences of proposed can cause a hazard that is categorized as system risk contribution of the human paragraph (b)(1) to read as follows: ‘‘The unacceptable or undesirable, then the interaction with the system, along with safety order of precedence is to second failure must be detected and the the degree of dependency on the eliminate hazards categorized as product must achieve a known safe state operator for safety coverage. According unacceptable or undesirable. If this is before inadvertently activating any to GE, the latter is missing from the not possible or practical, these hazards physical appliance.’’ discussion and is most relevant to the should be mitigated to acceptable levels FRA agrees with the commenter and safety principles section. as required by this part.’’ revises the referenced sentences in In response to this comment, FRA FRA agrees with the commenter that paragraphs (b)(2)(iii) and (b)(2)(iv) for would like to emphasize that the main the last clause in this paragraph the sentences to end with the following purpose of Appendix C is to provide discussing elimination of unacceptable clause: ‘‘* * * the product must achieve safety criteria and processes for design and undesirable hazards requires a known safe state that eliminates the of safe systems, or fail-safe, or vital modification and revises this clause by possibility of false activation of any signaling systems that by definition adding extra clarifying sentence in the physical appliance.’’ must exclude any hazards associated final rule for the entire clause to read as Under paragraph (b)(3), FRA amends with human errors. The ‘‘reliance factor’’ follows: ‘‘Hazards categorized as the definition of Closed Loop Principle or, in other words, the possibility of unacceptable, which is determined by to reflect its industry accepted hazards arising due to overreliance of hazard analysis, must be eliminated by definition provided by the AREMA the operator on the proper functioning design. Best effort must be made by the Manual. FRA believes that the previous of the system itself, which the designer to also eliminate by design the definition was too general and did not commenter is referring to, is an issue hazards categorized as undesirable. reflect the essence of the most solely relevant to the non-vital overlays Those undesirable hazards that cannot significant principles of safe signaling complementing existing method of be eliminated should be mitigated to the system design. operation. For non-vital signaling acceptable level as required by this HCRQ/CGI submitted comments on systems the designer must adhere to the part.’’ the last sentence of paragraph (b)(3), safety principles of Appendix C only to HCRQ/CGI submitted comments on asserting that the sentence is confusing the extent necessary to satisfy the safety the first and second sentences of because all system operation is a requirements of this part. Therefore FRA paragraph (b)(2)(ii), asserting that it is product of actions and decisions. In does not see a need for further not possible to implement a system that order to provide clarification, HCRQ/ modification of paragraph (b)(5). would continue to operate safely in the CGI recommended that FRA revise the This final rule amends paragraph (c) presence of multiple hardware failures. last sentence of paragraph (b)(3) to read to reflect the changes in recommended Therefore, HCRQ/CGI recommended as follows: ‘‘In addition, closed loop standards. For instance, the standard that FRA revise the first and second design requires that failure to perform a ‘‘EN50126: 1999, Railway Applications: sentences of paragraph (b)(2)(ii) to read single logical operation, or absence of a Specification and Demonstration of as follows: ‘‘The product must be shown single logical input, output or decision Reliability, Availability, Maintainability to operate safely under conditions of shall not cause an unsafe condition, i.e. and Safety’’ (RAMS) is superseded by random hardware failure. This includes system safety does not depend upon the the standard IEC62278: 2002 under the single failures and multiple hardware occurrence of a single action or logical same title. The standard ‘‘EN50128 (May failures where one or more failures.’’ decision.’’ 2001), Railway Applications: Software FRA agrees with the commenter that FRA has made an effort to perfect the for Railway Control and Protection the paragraph requires modification and definition of close loop principle in the Systems’’ is superseded by the Standard revises the first two sentences to read as NPRM and found it satisfactory to adopt IEC62279: 2002 under the same title. follows: ‘‘The product must be shown to the definition given in the 2009 issue of HCRQ/CGI submitted comments operate safely under conditions of AREMA Communication and Signal asserting that the U.S. Department of random hardware failures. This Manual of Recommended Practices. Defense Military Standard (MIL–STD) includes single hardware failures as FRA does not see the need for further 882C, ‘‘System Safety Program well as multiple hardware failures that enhancement of this definition. Requirements’’ (January 19, 1993) has may occur at different times but remain Under paragraph (b)(4), FRA adds a been superseded by U.S. Department of undetected (latent) and react in list of Safety Assurance Concepts that Defense Military Standard (MIL–STD) combination with a subsequent failure the designer may consider for 882C, ‘‘System Safety Program as a later time to cause an unsafe implementation to assure sail-safe Requirements’’, Notice 1 (January 19, operating situation.’’ system design and operation. These 1996)’’. HCRQ/CGI asserted that the meaning principles are predominantly applicable In the NPRM, FRA suggested that of each of the last sentences in for the safe system software design and railroads follow recommendations of paragraphs (b)(2)(iii) and (b)(2)(iv) was quoted from the IEEE–1483 standard. MIL–STD–882C of January 19, 1993

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issuance specifically. The notice issued safety-critical systems remains completeness and adequacy of the on January 19, 1996 does not contain unchanged. FRA’s recent experience required safety documents. material necessary for the risk analysis, confirms that this approach can enhance Paragraph (d) discusses the reviewer’s verification and validation processes. the quality of decision making by tasks at the functional level. Here, the Therefore FRA retains the former railroads and FRA. The potential for reviewer will analyze the supplier’s reference to MIL–STD–882C of January undergoing a third party audit provides methods to establish that they are 19, 1993. incentives to those who design and complete and correct. First, a Under paragraph (c)(3)(i), FRA produce safety-critical systems to more Preliminary Safety Analysis is references additional IEEE standards rigorously create and maintain safety performed in the design stage of a that have become available and will documentation for their systems. FRA product. In addition to describing support the designs of PTC systems that acknowledges that documentation, by system requirements within the context are widely using communications as itself, will not ensure a safe system. of the concept of operations, it attempts, their main component. In addition to However, the absence of documentation in an early stage, to classify the severity existing reference under paragraph will make it virtually impossible to of the hazards and to assign an integrity (c)(3)(i)(A) for IEEE–1483 Standard, the ensure the safety of the system level requirement to each major following standards are added to throughout its life-cycle. The third party function (in conventional terms, a paragraph (c)(3)(i): IEEE 1474.2–2003, also brings a level of technical expertise, preliminary hazard analysis). Again Standard for user interface requirements and a perspective that may not be there are many practices widely in communications based train control available on the staff of the railroad (or accepted within industry such as: (CBTC) systems; and IEEE 1474.1–2004, FRA)—effectively permitting the Hazard Analysis (HA), Fault Tree Standard for Communications-Based railroad (and thus FRA) to look behind Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode and Train Control (CBTC) Performance and claims of the vendor or supplier to Effects Analysis (FMEA), and Failure Functional Requirements. actual engineering practice. This may be Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis After an analysis of the current especially appropriate where the system (FMECA). Other simulation methods applicability of ATCS Specification 130 in question utilizes a novel architecture may also be used in conjunction with and 140, FRA believes that they are not or relies heavily on COTS hardware and the preceding methods, or by being used. Thus, FRA hereby removes software. themselves when appropriate. these standards from the list of Paragraph (b) establishes the Commonly practiced techniques and referenced standards. However, FRA requirements for independence of the methods include fault injection, a also adds the ATCS 200, Data third-party auditor. The text associated technique that evaluates performance by Communication standard that remains with the underlying principle of injecting known faults at random times relevant for communication segment of independence has simply been clarified during a simulation period; Markov PTC system designs. to indicate that there must be modeling, a modeling technique that FRA also considers it necessary to independence at all levels of the consists of states and transitions that reference several additional sections of product design and manufacture. This control events; Monte Carlo model, a the current AREMA 2009 situation has arisen where a third party simulation technique based on Communications and Signal Manual of wished to provide independent safety randomly-occurring events; and Petri- Recommended Practices. In addition to assessments of the system, but also net, an abstract, formal model of Section 17 of this manual referenced in provide technical support for the design information flow that shows static and a previous version of Appendix C, FRA of a component that would be used in dynamic properties of a system. hereby adds to the list of references the system being reviewed. FRA Paragraphs (e) and (f) address what Section 16 Vital Circuit and Software maintains that such practices, even if must be performed at the Design; Section 21 Data Transmission; the entity in question attempts to implementation level. At this stage, the and Section 23 Communication-Based firewall the parts of the organization product is beginning to take form. The Signaling. doing the respective tasks, represents a reviewer typically evaluates the conflict of interest and is unacceptable. software and, if appropriate or required, Appendix D to Part 236—Independent Paragraphs (c) through (f) discuss the the hardware. In the case of software, Review of Verification and Validation substance of the third-party assessment. the software will most likely be in There has been no change in the This assessment should be performed modular form, such that software underlying engineering principles on the system as it is finally configured, modules are produced in accordance to associated with Appendix D. The before revenue operations commence. a particular function. In the case of changes made in this final rule are The assessor should review the hardware, this may be at the component cosmetic, simply updating the supplier’s processes as set forth in the or line replaceable unit level. The Appendix so that it is applicable to both applicable documentation and provide reviewer must select a significant subpart H and I, and reducing the comments to the supplier. The reviewer number of modules to be able to workload on the vendor or supplier, the should be able to determine establish that the product is being railroad, and FRA. FRA determined that vulnerabilities in the supplier’s developed in a safe manner. it would have been more burdensome to processes and the adequacy of the safety Paragraph (g) discusses the reviewer’s refer to different Appendices that are analysis (be it in an RSPP and PSP or tasks at closure. The reviewer’s primary functionally identical, and whose only in a PTCDP and PTCSP) as they apply task at this stage is to prepare a final practical difference would be that one to the product. ‘‘Acceptable report where all product deficiencies are referred only to subpart H, and the other methodology’’ is intended to mean noted in detail. This final report may to subpart I of this part. standard industry practice, for example, include material previously presented to Paragraph (a) discusses the purpose of as contained in MIL–STD–882C. FRA is the supplier during earlier development an independent third-party assessment aware of many other acceptable industry stages. of product Verification and Validation. standards, but usage of a less common FRA received several comments on FRA’s position that the requirement for one in an analysis would most likely Appendix D related to the proper an independent third-party assessment require a higher level of FRA scrutiny. documentation to be reviewed by the is reasonably common in the field of In addition, the reviewer considers the third-party reviewer according to

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paragraph (d)(1), the scope of hazard (g) does not levy any new regulatory document, since the Hazard Log will analysis required to be reviewed by requirements. The requirements cited supersede the Preliminary Hazard paragraph (d)(2), and the methods of are mandatory FCC requirements for any Analysis on the final stage of the system software development techniques to be device that emits electromagnetic development process. reviewed according to paragraph radiation that the system designer must FRA agrees with the commenter that (f)(2)(vii). These comments are the same comply with. FRA is simply identifying the Hazard Log more accurately reflects as those submitted by the commenter on these requirements, as not all railroad the perceived risk in the as-built the text of Appendix F. Due to the wider product developers may be aware of condition and, therefore, has modified applicability of these comments to the them. paragraph (e) to read as follows: ‘‘The material presented in Appendix F, FRA reviewer shall analyze the Hazard Log Appendix F to Part 236—Minimum has provided a response to these and/or any other hazard analysis Requirements of FRA Directed comments in the section-by-section documents for comprehensiveness and Independent Third-Party Assessment of analysis for Appendix F. compliance with applicable railroad, PTC System Safety Verification and vendor, supplier, industry, national, and Appendix E to Part 236—Human- Validation international standards.’’ The Machine Interface (HMI) Design FRA has revised the title of Appendix commenter also suggested that this Appendix E provides human factors F in response to comments submitted by comment is equally applicable to former design criteria. Paragraphs (a) through GE, in which GE noted that, while FRA paragraph (d)(1) in the prior version of (f) cover the same material as was may require a railroad to engage in an Appendix D. FRA agrees and has previously contained in Appendix E. independent assessment of its PTC modified the various applicable phrases See 70 FR 11,107 (March 7, 2005). system based on the criteria set forth in in Appendices D and F accordingly. The However, Appendix E has been § 236.913, FRA is not requiring an commenter further suggested that in reformatted to support its use for independent assessment of every paragraph (f) the reviewer should be subparts H and I of this part and, with PTCSP. required to analyze samples of the a few exceptions, is textually the same. FRA received several comments from hazard analyses ‘‘for completeness, This Appendix still addresses the basic HCRQ/CGI on paragraphs (d), (e), (f), correctness, and compliance with human factors principles for the design and (i) of Appendix F. industry, national, or international and operation of displays, controls, The commenter asserted that the term standards,’’ as opposed to the proposed supporting software functions, and ‘‘acceptable methodology’’ used in the requirement to analyze ‘‘all’’ hazard other components in processor-based second sentence of paragraph (d) is not analyses such as Fault Tree Analyses signal or train control systems and clear and suggested that it be replaced (FTA), Failure Mode and Effects subsystems regardless if they are with the term ‘‘methodologies typical to Criticality Analysis (FMECA). The voluntarily implemented (as is the case safety-critical systems.’’ If revised in commenter asserted that it will be with systems qualified under subpart H accordance with this recommendation, ‘‘difficult and prohibitive’’ for both the of this part) or mandatorily the second sentence of paragraph (d) supplier and the reviewer to analyze implemented (as is the case with would read as follows: ‘‘At a minimum, ‘‘all’’ of these documents in their entire systems developed under subpart I of the reviewer shall compare the supplier length. The commenter also noted that this part). The HMI requirements in this processes with methodologies typical of these comments are applicable to Appendix attempt to capture the lessons safety-critical systems and employ any existing Appendix D, paragraph (d)(2). learned from the research, design, and other such tests or comparisons if they In response to this comment, FRA implementation of similar technology in have been agreed to previously with notes that there does not appear to be a other modes of transportation and other FRA.’’ In response to this comment, FRA need for additional clarification on the industries. The rationale for each of the notes that the term ‘‘acceptable depth of the quoted documents analysis requirements associated with methodologies,’’ by its very nature, by the reviewer. As FRA has already paragraphs (a) through (f) remains the includes methodologies typical of indicated in the section-by-section same as was presented in the former safety-critical systems. FRA believes analysis of § 236.1017, ‘‘FRA has the version of Appendix E. See 70 FR that the proposed modification may discretion to limit the extent of the third 11,107, 11,090–11,091 (Mar. 7, 2005). artificially limit the use of the atypical party assessment.’’ Moreover, the FRA has noted that products analysis methodologies that may section-by-section analysis of § 236.1017 implemented under the requirements of provide an equivalent, or better, goes on to state that ‘‘Appendix F subpart H of this part, or proposed analytical results. Therefore, FRA did represents minimum requirements and products that will be developed under not incorporate the proposed change. that if circumstances warrant, FRA may subpart I of this part, all have been However, in the interest of providing expand upon the Appendix F capable of generating electromagnetic clarification to reflect the main intent of requirements as necessary to render a radiation. Such emissions are strictly this paragraph, FRA has modified the decision that is in the public interest.’’ regulated by the Federal second and third sentences in paragraph FRA will, if appropriate, limit the scope Communications Commission for public (d) to read as follows: ‘‘At a minimum, of analysis. FRA notes the comment, safety and health, as well as to ensure the reviewer shall evaluate the supplier and will execute its regulatory that the limited electromagnetic design and development process discretion in this matter. spectrum is optimally utilized. FRA is regarding the use of an appropriate With respect to paragraph (i)(7), therefore adding a new paragraph (h) to design methodology. The reviewer may HCRQ/CGI points out that the text of Appendix E, which requires that as part use the comparison processes and test NPRM, while discussing methods of of the HMI design process, the designer procedures that have been previously safety-critical software development by must ensure that the product has the agreed to with FRA.’’ the manufacturer, enumerates examples appropriate FCC Equipment The commenter also asserted that, that, according to the commenter, are Authorization, and that the product with respect to paragraph (e), the not particular to the safety-critical meets FCC requirements for Maximum reviewer will be required to analyze a systems, which appears to be contrary to Permissible Exposure limits for field ‘‘Hazard Log,’’ as opposed to a the intent of this paragraph. The strength and power density. Paragraph ‘‘Preliminary Hazard Analysis’’ commenter recommends that FRA

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include in the text of the final rule an benefits from efficiency gains. The first locomotive cab have access to a display extended list of examples for methods of type would include safety benefits or adequate to perform assigned safety- software development instead of those savings expected to accrue from the related duties. FRA also believes that it cited in NPRM, for example, such reduction in the number and severity of acted with an appropriate level of methods as ‘‘system requirement casualties arising from train accidents discretion and flexibility in permitting analysis, requirements traceability to that would occur on lines equipped some operations of unequipped functional and derived safety with PTC systems. Casualty mitigation locomotives on PTC equipped routes. requirements, design analysis, estimates are based on a value of All of these responses are discussed in documented peer review,’’ etc. The statistical life of $6 million. In addition, detail above, in the Section-by-Section commenter also noted that this benefits related to accident preventions analysis. comment is equally applicable to would accrue from a decrease in The RIA presents a 20-year analysis of Appendix D, paragraph (f)(2)(vii). damages to property such as: the costs and benefits associated with FRA understands the commenter’s Locomotives, railroad cars, and track; this rule, using both 7 percent and 3 concern. FRA believes that the review equipment cleanup; environmental percent discount rates, and two types of should include any documentation damage; train delay resulting from track sensitivity analyses. The first is associated with the software closures; road closures; emergency associated with varying cost development that may reflect on, or response; and evacuations. Benefits assumptions used for estimating PTC address, the safety of the system. To more difficult to monetize—such as the implementation costs. The second takes address the commenter’s concern and to avoidance of hazmat accident related into account potential business benefits from realizing service efficiencies and more accurately reflect FRA’s position, costs incurred by federal, state, and related additional societal benefits from paragraph (i)(7) has been revised by local governments and impacts to local attainment of environmental goals and deleting the list of examples of methods businesses—will also result. FRA also an overall reduction in transportation of software development previously expects that once PTC systems are risk from modal diversion. proposed in the NPRM. FRA modifies refined, there would likely be the text of this paragraph to emphasize The 20-year total cost estimates are substantial additional business benefits $9.55 billion (PV, 7%) and $13.21 that the review on any documentation resulting from more efficient that may reflect on the safety of software billion (PV, 3%). Annualized costs are transportation service; however, such $0.87 billion (PV, 7%) and $0.88 billion design is required. As with the benefits are not included because of preceding comment, FRA will exercise (PV, 3%). Using high-cost assumptions, significant uncertainties regarding the 20-year total cost estimates would be its regulatory discretion with regards to whether and when individual elements the specific documentation based on the $16.25 billion (PV, 7%) and $22.54 will be achieved and given the billion (PV, 3%). Using low-cost system in question and public safety. complicating factor that some benefits FRA has also modified paragraph (i)(7) assumptions, the 20-year cost estimates might, absent deployment of PTC, be would be $6.73 billion (PV, 7%) and in Appendix D that discusses the same captured using alternative technologies issue. $9.34 billion (PV, 3%). The later the at lower cost. In the NPRM, FRA expenditures are made, the lower the VIII. Regulatory Impact and Notices requested comments on whether the discounted cost impact, which in any proposed regulation exercised the event is a very small portion of the total A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT appropriate level of discretion and PTC costs. This estimate is lower than Regulatory Policies and Procedures flexibility to comply with RSIA08 in the the cost estimate presented in the This final rule has been evaluated in most cost effective and beneficial NPRM. It reflects the low freight traffic accordance with existing policies and manner. The FRA received comments, volume exception for passenger train procedures, and determined to be discussed above in the section-by- routes and the de minimis exception for significant under both Executive Order section analysis, that FRA had exceeded freight railroads. These exceptions 12866 and DOT policies and its discretion, in general, in not creating result in lower wayside costs than procedures. 44 FR 11,034 (Feb. 26, a de minimis exception, in § 236.1005, estimated in the NPRM RIA. FRA has 1979). We have prepared and placed in by designating that the railroad base its not revised its locomotive cost estimates the docket a regulatory impact analysis system designation on 2008 base year to reflect reduced burden resulting from (RIA) addressing the economic impact traffic patterns; in § 236.1029, by the additional flexibility granted of this final rule. requiring that each crewmember because the magnitude of the reduction The costs anticipated to accrue from assigned to a cab have access to a is very small relative to the overall adopting this final rule would include: display adequate to perform assigned system cost. (1) Costs associated with developing duties safely, which the railroads Twenty-year railroad safety (railroad implementation plans and claimed meant that they have to install accident reduction) benefit estimates administrative functions related to the a second display; and in § 236.1006 associated with implementation of the implementation and operation of PTC (b)(4) in permitting Class II and Class III rule are $440 million (PV, 7%) and $674 systems, including the information railroads to operate locomotives million (PV, 3%). Annualized benefits technology and communication systems unequipped with PTC on Class I are $42 million (PV, 7%), and $45 that make up the central office; (2) railroad lines under certain conditions. million (PV, 3%). This estimate is lower hardware costs for onboard locomotive FRA believes that the agency interpreted than that estimated at the NPRM stage system components, including RSIA08 correctly in not granting AAR’s of the rulemaking. The estimate was installation; (3) hardware costs for very broad request for a de minimis lowered as a result of revisions made to wayside system components, including exception (however, FRA did craft a a study performed by Volpe Center installation; and (4) maintenance costs new de minimis exception in regarding the cost of PTC-preventable for all system components. § 236.1006(b)(4)(ii), discussed above in accidents. Some forecasts predict Two types of benefits are expected to the section-by-section analysis), in using significant growth of both passenger and result from the implementation of this the 2008 traffic patterns as a basis for freight transportation demands, and it is final rule—benefits from railroad designating the system and in requiring thus possible that greater activity on the accident reduction and business that each crewmember in the system could present the potential for

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larger safety benefits than estimated in of higher quality at less cost to the The table below presents cost and this analysis. The presence of a very sponsor of that service. Information is benefit estimates by element using a 3% large PTC-equipped freight locomotive not currently available to quantify that discount rate as well as a 7% discount fleet also supports the opportunity for benefit. rate. introduction of new passenger services

TOTAL 20-YEAR DISCOUNTED COSTS AND DISCOUNTED BENEFITS [At 3% and 7%]

Discount rate 3.00% 7.00%

Costs by Category: Central Office and Development ...... $283,025,904 $263,232,675 Wayside Equipment ...... 2,902, 751,825 2,414,794,033 On-Board Equipment ...... 1,613,568,678 1,390,618,364 Maintenance ...... 8,406,267,684 5,478,877,649

Total ...... 13,205,614,091 9,547,522,721

Benefits by Category: Fatalities ...... 268,999,278 175,541,848 Injuries ...... 203,984,196 133,114,717 Train Delay ...... 24,530,630 16,008,043 Property Damage ...... 159,149,846 103,857,000 Emergency Response ...... 431,143 281,353 Equipment Clean Up ...... 2,509,576 1,637,683 Road Closure ...... 580,664 378,926 Environmental Cleanup ...... 6,486,888 4,233,172 Evacuations ...... 7,129,699 4,652,654

Total Railroad Safety Benefits ...... 673,801,919 439,705,397

The Port Authority Trans Hudson monitoring of hazard detectors procedures, the more expensive (PATH), a commuter railroad, is protecting the mainline, but limiting it compliance becomes. In part, this is due apparently considering the system used to hazard detectors connected to the to supply elasticity being less over by the New York City Transit Authority signal system. FRA has also minimized shorter time periods. on the Canarsie line. This system, which costs related to diamond crossings, FRA is unable to estimate the is known as Communication-Based where a PTC equipped railroad crosses potential savings if Congress provided a Train Control, is not similar in concept a non-PTC equipped railroad at grade; longer implementation schedule or to any of the other PTC systems included exceptions to main track for provided incentives, rather than (including the CSX CBTC, with which passenger train operations, and mandates, for PTC system installation. its name might easily be confused), and provisions that would permit some In order to estimate the likely reduction would not be suitable, as FRA Class III railroad operation of trains not in costs in such situations, FRA would understands the system, except on a equipped with PTC over Class I railroad need to develop some other schedule for railroad with operating characteristics freight lines equipped with PTC. FRA implementation. The element least similar to a heavy rail mass transit has also added provisions to the final sensitive to an implementation’s system. FRA believes that, in absence of rule which will permit passenger schedule appears to be onboard costs. the statutory mandate or this railroads to exclude up to roughly 1,900 Each PTC system’s onboard equipment rulemaking, PATH would have adopted miles of track from the requirements to seems similar and is not very different PTC for business reasons. install PTC. Finally, FRA has provided from existing onboard systems. Further, Although costs associated with for de minimis exceptions for Class I the 2015 deadline is not so restrictive implementation of the final rule are freight lines with not passenger service that it would cause railroads to pull significant and such costs would far and negligible risk, avoiding any locomotives out of service just to install exceed the benefits, FRA is constrained expenses for right-of-way modifications on board PTC equipment. Locomotives by the requirements of RSIA08, which on about 300 miles, saving about $15 must be inspected thoroughly every 90 do not provide latitude for million, and reducing costs by about and more extensively every 360 days. implementing PTC differently. 80% on about 3,200 additional miles, The inspections can last from one to Nevertheless, FRA has taken several saving about $127 million. several days. Railroads usually bring steps to avoid triggering unnecessary RSIA08 requires the railroads to have locomotives into their shops to perform costs in the proposed rule. For instance, all mandatory PTC systems operational these inspections, during which time a FRA is not requiring use of separate on or before December 31, 2015. skilled and experienced team could monitoring of switch position in signal Members of the PTC Working Group, install the on board equipment for PTC. territory or that the system be designed especially railroad and supplier System development is much less to determine the position of the end of representatives, said that the timeframe certain, and more time would enable the train. FRA has also minimized costs, was very tight, and that the scheduled vendors or suppliers to develop, test, such as by requiring the monitoring of implementation dates would be difficult and implement the software at a more derails protecting the mainline, but to meet. In general, the faster a reasonable cost. Wayside costs are also limiting it to derails connected to the government agency requires a regulated sensitive to the installation timetable, as signal system; and by requiring the entity to adopt new equipment of the wayside must be mapped and

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measured, and then the railroads must industry and the railroads to focus on disproportionately more heavily on the install wayside interface units (WIUs). additional means of conserving diesel railroads. Wayside mapping and measurement fuel while minimizing in-train forces At present, the PTC systems takes a highly skilled workforce. A that can lead to derailments and delays contemplated by the railroads, with the larger workforce is necessary to timely from train separations (usually broken possible exception of PATH, would not implement the required PTC systems in coupler knuckles). Software programs increase capacity, at least not for some a shorter amount of time. WIU exist that can translate information time. If the locomotive braking installation is likely similar to existing concerning throttle position and brake algorithms need to be made more signal or communication systems use, together with consist information conservative in order to ensure that each installation, and is likely to involve use and route characteristics, to produce train does not exceed the limits of its of existing railroad skilled workers. The advice for prospective manipulation of authority, PTC system operation may shorter the installation time period, the the locomotive controls to limit in-train actually decrease rail capacity where more work will be done at overtime forces. Programs are also being applied in the early years. Further investment would be required to bring rates, which are, of course, higher. conceived that project arrival at meet FRA believes that lower costs could about the synergy that would result in points and other locations on the result from a longer installation period, capacity gains. A more significant railroad. These types of tools can be but FRA also believes that the business benefit of PTC system differences in costs would be within the consolidated into programs that either operation would be derived from range of the low costs provided in the coach the locomotive engineer regarding precision dispatching, which decreases main analysis of the proposed rule. The how to handle the train or even take the variance of arrival times of delivered 2004 report included some lower cost over the controls of the locomotive freight. To avoid the risk of running out estimates, but, in light of current under the engineer’s supervision. The of stock, shippers often overstock their discussions with railroads, the cost ultimate purpose of integrating this inventory at an annual cost of estimates in the 1998 report seem more technology is to conserve fuel use while approximately 25% of its inventory accurate. The lower estimates FRA handling the train properly and arriving value, regardless of the material being received in preparing the 2004 report at a designated location ‘‘just in time’’ stored. This estimate accounts for were both overly optimistic, and (e.g., to meet or pass a train or enter a shrinkage, borrowing costs, and storage excluded installation costs, as well as terminal area in sequence ahead of or costs. Of course, freight with more value higher costs which stem from meeting behind other traffic). Further integrating per unit of mass or volume tends to the performance standards. this technology with PTC have greater storage costs per unit. At Some of the costs of PTC communications platforms and traffic present, no rail precision dispatch implementation, operation, and planning capabilities could permit system exists. However, if a shipper maintenance may be offset by business transmittal of ‘‘train pacing’’ information would take advantage of precision benefits, especially in the long run, to the locomotive cab in order to dispatching, thus increasing freight although there is uncertainty regarding conserve fuel. Like the communications arrival time accuracy, then it could the timing and level of those benefits. backbone, survey data concerning route reduce its overstock inventory. Accurate Economic and technical feasibility of characteristics can be shared by both train data is a necessary, but not a the necessary system refinements and systems. The cost of diesel fuel for road sufficient condition, for precision modifications to yield the potential operations to the Class I railroads is dispatch. At least two of the Class I business benefits has not yet been approximately $3.5 billion annually and railroads have unsuccessfully attempted demonstrated. FRA analyzed business is gradually rising. If PTC technology to develop precision dispatch systems. benefits associated with PTC system helps to spur the growth and effective The mandatory installation of PTC implementation and presented its use of train pacing, fuel savings of 5% systems is likely to divert any resources findings in the 2004 Report. Due to the ($175,000,000 annually) or greater could that might have been devoted to aggressive implementation schedule for very likely be achieved. Clearly, if the precision dispatch, so these benefits are PTC and the resulting need to issue a railroads are able to conserve use of unlikely during the first several years of rule promptly, FRA has not formally fuel, they will also reduce emissions this rule. updated this study. Nevertheless, FRA and contribute to attainment of Applying current factors to the believes that there is opportunity for environmental goals, even before modal variables used in the 2004 Report to significant business benefits to accrue diversion occurs. Congress, the resulting analysis several years after implementation once indicates that diversion could result in the systems have been refined to the The improvements in dispatch and highway annual safety benefits of $744 degree necessary. Thus, FRA conducted capacity have further implications. With million by 2022, and $1,148 million by a sensitivity analysis of potential those improvements, railroads could 2032. Of course, these benefits require business benefits based on the 2004 improve the reliability of shipment that the productivity enhancing systems Report. arrival time and, thus, dramatically be added to PTC, and are heavily The 2004 Report included business increase the value of rail transportation dependent on the underlying benefits from improved or enhanced to shippers, who in turn would divert assumptions of the 2004 model. locomotive diagnostics, fuel savings certain shipments from highway to rail. Modal diversion would also yield attributable to train pacing, precision Such diversion would yield greater environmental benefits. The 2004 dispatching, and capacity enhancement. overall transportation safety benefits, Report estimated that reduced air Although railroads are enhancing since railroads have much lower pollution costs would have been locomotive diagnostics using other accident risk than highways, on a point- between $68 million and $132 million technologies, FRA believes that PTC to-point ton-mile basis. The total in 2010 (assuming PTC would be could provide the basis for significant societal benefits of PTC system implemented by 2010), and between gains in the other three areas. implementation and operation, $103 million and $198 million in 2020. In the years since the 2004 Report, following the analysis, would be much This benefit would have accrued to the developing technology and rising fuel greater than total societal costs, general public. FRA has not broken out costs have caused the rail supply although the costs would fall the pollution cost benefit of the current

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rule, but offers the estimates from the The Regulatory Flexibility Act overspeed derailments, incursions into 2004 Report as a guide to the order of requires an agency to review regulations established work zone limits, and the magnitude of such benefits. to assess their impact on small entities. movement of a train through a switch While railroads argued that many of An agency must conduct a Final left in the wrong position. the benefits identified in FRA’s 2004 Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) As discussed in more detail in section report were exaggerated, shortly after unless it determines and certifies that a I of the preamble, the RSIA08 mandates the publication of the report, several rule is not expected to have a significant that widespread implementation of PTC railroads began developing strategies for impact on a substantial number of small across a major portion of the U.S. rail PTC system development and entities. industry be accomplished by December implementation. This investment by the In the NPRM, we published an Initial 31, 2015. RSIA08 requires each Class I railroads would seem to illustrate that Regulatory Flexibility Assessment carrier and each entity providing they believe that there is some potential (IRFA) to aid the public in commenting regularly scheduled intercity or for PTC to provide a boost to railroad on the potential small business impacts commuter rail passenger transportation profits, beyond providing any of the of the proposals. FRA has considered all to develop a plan for implementing PTC aforementioned societal benefits. comments submitted to the docket and by April 16, 2010. The Secretary of Modal diversion is highly sensitive to at public hearings in response to the Transportation is responsible for service quality. Problems with terminal NPRM. FRA also worked with the PTC reviewing and approving or congestion and lengthy dwell times Working Group and its task forces in disapproving such plans. The Secretary might overwhelm the benefits of PTC or developing many of the facets of the has delegated this responsibility to FRA. other initiatives which the railroads final rule. We appreciate the This final rule details the process and have been pursuing (reconfiguration of information provided by the various procedure for obtaining FRA approval of yards, pre-blocking of trains, shared parties. The proposed rule, and the plans. As discussed earlier in the preamble, power arrangements, car scheduling, consequently the IRFA, included as part FRA is issuing this final rule to provide Automatic Equipment Identification, of the NPRM, have been modified as a regulatory guidance and performance etc.) that might actually work in synergy result, as described above. Due to the uncertainties associated with new standards for the development, testing, with PTC. It should also be noted that, implementation, and use of Positive in the years since the 2004 Report was product development and deployment, FRA has prepared a FRFA and will Train Control (PTC) systems for developed, the Class I railroads have railroads mandated by the Rail Safety shown an increased ability to retain issue a Small Entity Guidance document soon. Improvement Act of 2008 § 104, Public operating revenue as profit, rather than Law 110–432, 122 Stat. 4848, 4856, surrendering it in the form of reduced In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, a FRFA must contain: (Oct. 16, 2008) (codified at 49 U.S.C. rates. This was particularly true during 20157). the period prior to the current recession, (1) A succinct statement of the need when strained highway capacity favored for, and objectives of the rule; 2. Significant Issues Raised by Public (2) A summary of the significant the growth of rail traffic. The sensitivity Comment in Response to the IRFA issues raised by the public comments in analysis performed by FRA indicates response to the IRFA, a summary of the The only comment which directly that realization of business benefits assessment of the agency of such issues, referred to the IRFA was a comment could yield benefits sufficient to close and a statement of any changes made in from Class I railroad representatives the gap between PTC implementation the proposed rule as a result of such noting that the IRFA implied that Class costs and rail accident reduction comments. I railroads would pay for installation of benefits within the first 18 years of the (3) A description and an estimate of split point derails at railroad-railroad rule, applying a 3% discount rate, and the number of small entities to which crossings where a PTC equipped line by year 24 of the rule, applying a the rule will apply or an explanation of crosses a line not equipped with PTC. discount rate of 7%. Accordingly, the why no such estimate is available; FRA agrees with commenters that costs precise partition of business and (4) A description of the projected will be borne according to preexisting societal benefits cannot be estimated reporting, recordkeeping and other agreements and any other laws or with any certainty. compliance requirements of the final regulations that might affect which FRA recognizes that the likelihood of rule, including an estimate of the classes party is responsible for the costs business benefits is uncertain and that of small entities that will be subject to incurred and has modified its analysis the cost-to-benefit comparison of this the requirement and the type of accordingly. rule, excluding any business benefits, is professional skills necessary for Other comments which affect the not favorable. However, FRA has taken preparation of the report or record; and IRFA related to definition of main track measures to minimize the rule’s adverse (5) A description of the steps the for intercity and commuter operations impacts and to provide as much agency has taken to minimize the where freight densities are relatively flexibility as FRA is authorized to grant significant adverse economic impact on low. These comments, primarily from under RSIA08. small entities consistent with the stated Amtrak, not a small entity, directly referred to the proposed rule, and not to B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and objectives of applicable statutes, the IRFA. In response, FRA provided Executive Order 13272 including a statement of the factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting significant relief to Amtrak for To ensure potential impacts of rules the alternative adopted in the final rule operations over Class II and Class III on small entities are properly and why each of the other significant railroads, thus indirectly providing considered, we developed this rule in alternatives to the rule considered by relief to some of the Class II and III accordance with Executive Order 13272 the agency was rejected. 5 U.S.C. railroads, potentially allowing one or (‘‘Proper Consideration of Small Entities 604(a)(1)–(5). more to avoid PTC system installation. in Agency Rulemaking’’) and DOT’s The RSIA08 generally defines ‘‘main procedures and policies to promote 1. Need for, and Objectives of the Rule line’’ as ‘‘a segment of railroad tracks compliance with the Regulatory PTC systems will be designed to over which 5,000,000 or more gross tons Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.). prevent train-to-train collisions, of railroad traffic is transported

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annually. See 49 U.S.C. 20157(i)(2). MTEA should reduce the amount of efficient passenger service, in the However, FRA may also define ‘‘main future information required to be judgment of those who operate these line’’ by regulation ‘‘for intercity rail submitted to FRA. Moreover, if FRA railroads. The density of wayside passenger transportation or commuter decides to grant only certain requests in infrastructure required to effect PTC rail passenger transportation routes or an MTEA, the portions of track for functions in these terminal areas would segments over which limited or no which FRA has determined should also be exceptionally costly in relation freight railroad operations occur.’’ See remain considered as main line track to the benefits obtained. FRA agrees that 49 U.S.C. 20157(i)(2)(B); 49 CFR can be easily severed from the MTEA. technical solutions to address these 1.49(oo). FRA recognizes that there may Otherwise, the entire MTEA, and thus concerns are not presently available. be circumstances where certain its concomitant PTCIP, may be entirely FRA does believe that the appropriate statutory PTC system implementation disapproved by FRA, increasing the risk role for PTC in this context is to enforce and operation requirements are not of the railroad or railroads not meeting the maximum allowable speed (which is practical and provide no significant its statutory deadline for PTC presently accomplished in cab signal safety benefits. In those circumstances, implementation and operation. territory through use of automatic speed FRA will exercise its statutory For each particular track segment, the control, a practice which could continue discretion provided under 49 U.S.C. MTEA must also provide a justification where already in place). 20157(i)(2)(B). for such designation in accordance with If FRA grants relief, the conditions of In accordance with the authority paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section. paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3), as provided by the statute and with In § 236.1019(b), FRA specifically applicable, as well as conditions carefully considered recommendations addresses the conditions for relief for attached to the approval, must be from the RSAC, FRA will consider passenger and commuter railroads with strictly adhered to. requests for designation of track over respect to passenger-only terminal areas. In § 236.1019(b)(1), FRA specifies that which rail operations are conducted as As noted previously in the analysis of relief under paragraph (b) is limited to ‘‘other than main line track’’ for § 236.1005(b), any track within a yard operations that do not exceed 20 miles passenger and commuter railroads, or used exclusively by freight operations per hour. The PTC Working Group freight railroads operating jointly with moving at restricted speed is excepted agreed upon the 20 miles per hour passenger or commuter railroads. Such from the definition of main line. In limitation, instead of requiring relief may be granted only after request those situations, operations are usually restricted speed, because the operations by the railroad or railroads filing a limited to preparing trains for in question will be by signal indication PTCIP and approval by the Associate transportation and do not usually in congested and complex terminals Administrator. include actual transportation. This with short block lengths and numerous In § 236.1019(a), FRA requires the automatic exclusion does not extend to turnouts. FRA agrees with the PTC submittal of a main line track exclusion yard or terminal tracks that include Working Group that the use of restricted addendum (MTEA) to any PTCIP filed passenger operations. Such operations speed in this environment would by a railroad that seeks to have any may also include the boarding and unnecessarily exacerbate congestion, particular track segment deemed as disembarking of passengers, heightening delay trains, and diminish the quality of other than main line. Since the statute FRA’s sensitivity to safety. Moreover, rail passenger service. only provides for such regulatory while FRA could not expend its Moreover, when trains on the flexibility as it applies to passenger resources to review whether a freight- excluded track are controlled by a transportation routes or segments over only yard should be deemed other than locomotive with an operative PTC which limited or no freight railroad main line track, FRA believes that the onboard apparatus that PTC system operations occur, only a passenger relatively lower number of passenger component must enforce the regulatory railroad may file an MTEA as part of its yards and terminals would allow for speed limit or actual maximum PTCIP. This may include a PTCIP such review. Accordingly, FRA believes authorized speed, whichever is less. jointly filed by freight and passenger that it is appropriate to review these While the actual track may not be railroads. In fact, FRA expects that, in circumstances on a case-by-case basis. outfitted with a PTC system in light of the case of joint operations, only one During the PTC Working Group a MTEA approval, FRA believes it is MTEA should be agreed upon and discussions, the major passenger nevertheless prudent to require such submitted by the railroads filing the railroads requested an exception for enforcement when the technology is PTCIP. After reviewing a submitted tracks in passenger terminal areas available on the operating locomotives. MTEA, FRA may provide full or because of the impracticability of This can be accomplished in cab signal conditional approval for the requested installing PTC. These are locations territory using existing automatic train exemptions. where signal systems govern movements stop technology and outside of cab Each MTEA must clearly identify and over very complex special track work signal territory by mapping the terminal define the physical boundaries, use, and divided into short signal blocks. and causing the onboard computer to characterization of the trackage for Operating speeds are low (not to exceed enforce the maximum speed allowed. which exclusion is requested. When 20 miles per hour), and locomotive FRA also limits relief under describing each track’s use and engineers moving in this environment § 236.1019(b)(2) to operations that characterization, FRA expects the expect conflicting traffic and restrictive enforce interlocking rules. Under requesting railroad or railroads to signals. Although low-speed collisions interlocking rules, trains are prohibited include copies of the applicable track do occasionally occur in these from moving in reverse directions and signal charts. Ultimately, FRA environments, the consequences are without dispatcher permission on track expects each MTEA to include low; and the rate of occurrence is very where there are no signal indications. information sufficiently specific to low in relation to the exposure. It is the FRA believes that such a restriction will enable easy segregation between main nature of current-generation PTC minimize the potential for a head-on line track and non-main line track. In systems that they use conservative impact. the event the railroad subsequently braking algorithms. Requiring PTC to Also, under § 236.1019(b)(3), such requests additional track to be short blocks in congested terminals operations are only allowed in yard or considered for exclusion, a well-defined would add to congestion and frustrate terminal areas where no freight

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operations are permitted. While the between a passenger train and much issue and thus created the regulatory definition of main line may not include heavier freight consist is obviated. flexibility for the definition of ‘‘main yard tracks used solely by freight Third, under § 236.1019(c)(1)(iii), line’’ for passenger routes found at 49 operations, FRA is not extending any FRA notes that it will consider U.S.C. 20157(i)(2)(B) as a means to relief or exception to tracks within yards commingled freight and passenger allow the Secretary to exempt certain or terminals shared by freight and operations provided that a jointly agreed routes from the PTC mandate. passenger operations. The collision of a risk analysis is provided by the According to Amtrak, this provision passenger train with a freight consist is passenger and freight railroads, and the essentially allows the Secretary to typically a more severe condition level of safety is the same as that which define certain passenger routes with because of the greater mass of the freight would be provided under one of the two limited or no freight traffic as other than equipment. However, FRA did receive a prior options selected as the base case. ‘‘main line,’’ thereby effectively comment suggesting some latitude FRA requested comments on whether exempting such lines from the reach of within terminals when passenger trains FRA or the subject railroad should the PTC mandate because the mandate are moving without passengers (e.g., to determine the appropriate base case, but only applies to railroad operations over access repair and servicing areas). FRA received none. FRA recognizes that ‘‘main line[s].’’ Said another way, urged agrees that low-speed operations under there may be situations where temporal Amtrak, the provision allows the those conditions should be acceptable separation may not be possible. In such Secretary the freedom to decide in what as trains are prepared for transportation. situations, FRA may allow commingled circumstances such routes should be FRA has not included a request by operations provided the risk to the considered ‘‘main lines’’ and thus be Amtrak (discussed below) to allow passenger operation is no greater than if required to install PTC—pursuant to movements within major terminals at the passenger and freight trains were whatever factors the Secretary deems up to 30 miles per hour in mixed operating under temporal separation or appropriate through the rulemaking passenger and freight service, which with all trains limited to restricted process. appears in FRA’s judgment to fall speed. For an exception to be made Amtrak urged that the Secretary outside of the authority to provide under § 236.1019(c)(3), FRA requires a should use this flexibility to limit which exclusions conferred on FRA by the law. risk analysis jointly agreed to and passenger routes it defines as ‘‘main In § 236.1019(c), FRA provides the submitted by the applicable freight and lines’’ to those deemed to warrant the conditions under which joint limited passenger services. This ensures that the use of PTC using the FRA’s usual risk- passenger and freight operations may risks and consequences to both parties based approach to safety regulation and occur on defined track segments have been fully analyzed, understood, traditional measures of reasonableness, without the requirement for installation and mitigated to the extent practical. costs, and benefits. Amtrak posited that of PTC. Under § 236.1003 (Definitions), FRA would expect that the moving such a risk-based analysis by FRA ‘‘limited operations’’ is defined as party would elect a base case offering would likely lead to the conclusion that ‘‘operations on main line track that have the greatest clarity and justify the PTC is simply not needed on many limited or no freight operations and are selection. light-density lines over which passenger approved to be excepted from this Comments on the proposed rule trains currently operate. Amtrak subpart’s PTC system implementation generally supported the aforementioned therefore asked that FRA exercise this and operation requirements in exclusions or were silent. authority by working with Amtrak and accordance with § 236.1019(c).’’ This In its comments on the NPRM, the rail industry to exempt certain light paragraph provides five alternative Amtrak requested further relief relating density freight lines which host paths to the main line exception, three to lines requiring the implementation passenger traffic from the obligation to of which were contained in the and operation of a PTC system due install PTC where operating and safety proposed rule and a fourth and fifth that solely to the presence of light-density conditions do not warrant an advanced respond to comments on the proposed passenger traffic. According to Amtrak, signal system. rule. the defining characteristic of light- Should FRA choose not to exempt The three alternatives derived from density lines is the nature of the train some of these light density freight lines the NPRM are set forth in traffic; low-density patterns on these over which passenger trains operate, § 236.1019(c)(1). First, an exception may lines lead to a correspondingly low risk Amtrak felt that the high costs of full be available where both the freight and of collision. Amtrak also asserted that, PTC systems will be passed on to the passenger trains are limited to restricted due to relatively limited wear and tear passenger and freight operators of these speed. Such operations are feasible only from lower traffic densities, these lines routes. According to Amtrak, this for short distances, and FRA will often have fewer track workers on site, obligation could threaten the examine the circumstances involved to further reducing the chance of collisions continuation of intercity passenger rail ensure that the exposure is limited and and incursions into work zones. Thus, service on several routes, including that appropriate operating rules and states Amtrak, one of the principal lines in California, Colorado, Kansas, training are in place. reasons for installing PTC—collision Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Second, under § 236.1019(c)(1)(ii), avoidance—is a relatively low risk on Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, FRA notes that it will consider an many light density lines. With only North Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia, on exception where temporal separation of marginal safety benefits anticipated what are potentially light density lines. the freight and passenger operations can from PTC use in such applications, Additionally, states Amtrak, this be ensured. A more complete definition Amtrak believed that there may be obligation, where it can be financed, of temporal separation is provided in minimal justification for installing PTC could force the diversion of significant § 236.1019(e). Temporal separation of on certain light-density lines. capital dollars away from essential passenger and freight services reduces Amtrak further noted that FRA itself safety investments in track and other risk because the likelihood of a collision had concluded that the costs of PTC infrastructure improvements, which are is reduced (e.g., due to freight cars generally exceed its benefits, and typically the leading safety risks for engaged in switching that are not Amtrak urged that this may be even such light-density operations. properly secured) and the possibility of more so on light-density lines. Amtrak According to Amtrak, the cost of PTC a relatively more severe collision believed that Congress understood this installation on these lines may be so out

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of proportion to the benefit that than 30 miles per hour (with speeds under circumstances not thoroughly Amtrak’s service will need to be reduced to not greater than restricted explored in the short time available to rerouted onto a different line (e.g., to a speed on unsignaled trackage or if the the working group (e.g., on commuter Class I line with PIH materials) if a signals should fail). rail branch lines, low density track reroute option exists, or eliminated FRA believes that Amtrak’s request is segments on Class I railroads, etc.). entirely because there is no feasible much broader than contemplated by the Subsequent to the RSAC activities, alternate route and no party is willing law. FRA notes that TRRA is a very busy Amtrak notified FRA that its or able to bear the cost of installing PTC terminal operation. FRA does not conversations with Class II and III on the existing route. The defining believe that the ‘‘limited freight railroads whose lines had been at the characteristic of light-density lines is operations’’ concept is in any way root of the Amtrak comments revealed the nature of the train traffic: low applicable under those circumstances. that some of the situations involved density patterns on these lines lead to Nor is there any indication in law that freight traffic exceeding 5 million gross a correspondingly low risk of collision. FRA was expected to fall back to tons, potentially rendering the In its filing, Amtrak noted that it was traditional cost-benefit principles in exception ineffective for this purpose. currently assembling the details (e.g., relation to PTC and scheduled At the same time, FRA noted that the annual freight tonnage, frequency of passenger service. However, there are a policy rationale behind the proposed freight train operations) ‘‘for those lines number of Amtrak routes with limited additional exception was related as that it believes may qualify as light- freight operations that will not much to the inherent difficulty density, and will submit as a otherwise be equipped with PTC associated with PTC installation during supplement to these Comments a because they are operated by other than the initial period defined by law, given recommendation as to what criteria the Class I railroads. Further, there are some that the railroads identified by Amtrak FRA should adopt in determining what Class I lines with less than 5 million were for the most part very small light-density lines are other than ‘main gross tons, or no PIH, that also warrant operations with limited technical lines.’ ’’ Amtrak did subsequently file individualized review to the extent capacity, as well as limited safety data referred to below, but did not Amtrak and the host railroad might elect exposure. It was clear that in these cases propose criteria. to propose it. care would need to be taken to analyze Accordingly, in response to the collision risk and potentially require According to the Amtrak testimony, Amtrak comments, §§ 236.1019(c)(2) mitigations.14 Accordingly, FRA has the ‘‘limited operations exception’’ in and (c)(3) have been added to the final endeavored to address the concern subsection 236.1019(c) of the NPRM did rule to provide an option by which brought forward by Amtrak with a not provide a practical solution to the certain additional types of limited provision that is broad enough to permit problem created by defining all light- passenger train operations may qualify consideration of actual circumstances, density routes and terminal areas with for a main line track exception where limit this particular exception to passenger service as ‘‘main lines.’’ freight operations are also suitably operations over railroads that would not Amtrak stated that this subsection limited and the circumstances could otherwise need to install PTC (e.g., Class would arguably require installation of lead to significant hardship and cost II and III freight railroads), provide for PTC on most of the trackage and that might overwhelm the value of the a thorough review process, and make locomotives of the Terminal Railroad passenger service provided. In explicit reference to the potential Association of St Louis (TRRA) unless: § 236.1019(c)(2), FRA addresses lines requirement for safety mitigations. In (1) The entire terminal operates at where the host is not a Class I freight this regard, FRA has chosen 15 million restricted speed (which TRRA is railroad, describing characteristics of gross tons as a threshold that should unlikely to agree to), (2) passenger and line segments that might warrant relief accommodate situations where Amtrak freight trains are temporally separated from PTC. In § 236.1019(c)(2)(i), FRA trains will, in actuality, face few (which would not be practical on TRRA, addresses passenger service involving conflicts with freight movements (i.e., and is unlikely to be practical on any of up to four regularly scheduled requiring trains to clear the main line the light-density lines over which passenger trains during a calendar day for meets and passes or to wait at Amtrak operates, due to the 24/7 nature over a segment of unsignaled track on junctions) and where mitigations are in of railroad operations), or (3) a risk which less than 15 million gross tons of place or could be put in place to mitigation plan can be effected that freight traffic is transported annually. In establish a high sense of confidence that would achieve a level of safety not less § 236.1019(c)(2)(ii), FRA addresses operations will continue to be than would pertain if all operations on passenger service involving up to 12 conducted safely. FRA believes that less TRRA were at restricted speed or subject regularly scheduled passenger trains than 15 million gross tons represents a to temporal separation. Accordingly, during a calendar day over a segment of fair test of ‘‘limited freight operations’’ Amtrak recommended: (a) That the FRA signaled track on which less than 15 for these purposes, with the further adopt a risk analysis-based definition of million gross tons of freight traffic is caveat that specific operating ‘‘main line’’ passenger routes that transported annually. FRA derived arrangements will be examined in each excludes light-density lines on which § 236.1019(c)(2) indirectly from case.15 FRA emphasizes that this is not the installation of PTC is not warranted; discussions in the RSAC in response to and (b) with respect to freight terminal comments by Amtrak set forth above. 14 An example of an existing mitigation, which is areas in which passenger trains operate, The PTC Working Group proposed an provided to support service quality but also that FRA modify the limited operations exception that might have been supports safety, is the practice of one Class III exception in subsection 236.1019(c) to available anywhere an intercity or Amtrak host and its connecting freight partner to hold out fleeted empty coal trains off the Class III require that all trains be limited to 30 commuter railroad operated over a line property during the period that Amtrak is running. miles per hour rather than to restricted with 5 million gross tons of freight While not constituting strict ‘‘temporal separation,’’ speed, or that non-PTC equipped freight traffic, including Class I lines and the it does significantly reduce collision risk over the terminals be deemed as other than lines of the intercity or commuter route. ‘‘ ’’ 15 Freight tonnage on Amtrak lines varies from main lines so long as all passenger railroad. This would have opened the zero on two segments to over 150 million gross operations are pursuant to signal potential for a considerable exception tons. On a per-mile basis, 15 million gross tons falls indication and at speeds not greater for lines with very light freight density into the twenty first percentile of Amtrak track

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an entitlement, but an exclusion for includes not-for-profit enterprises that railroad crossings over lines required by which the affected railroads will need to are independently owned and operated, RSIA08 to have PTC. make a suitable case. and are not dominant in their field of The final rule will apply to small Amtrak also provided to FRA a operations within the definition of railroads’ tracks over which a passenger spreadsheet identifying each of its route ‘‘small entities.’’ Additionally, section railroad conducts intercity or commuter segments with attributes such as route 601(5) defines as ‘‘small entities’’ operations and locomotives operating length, freight tonnage, number of governments of cities, counties, towns, on main lines of Class I freight railroads Amtrak trains, and numbers of townships, villages, school districts, or required to have PTC and on railroads commuter trains. FRA further reviewed special districts with populations less conducting intercity passenger or this information in light of Amtrak’s than 50,000. commuter operations. The impact on request for main track exceptions. FRA The U.S. Small Business Class III railroads that operate on Class noted a number of segments of the Administration (SBA) stipulates ‘‘size I railroad lines required to be equipped Amtrak system on Class I railroads standards’’ for small entities. It provides with PTC will depend on the nature of where the number of Amtrak trains was that the largest a for-profit railroad such operations. Class III railroads often low and the freight tonnage was also business firm may be (and still classify make short moves on Class I railroad low (less than 15 million gross tons). as a ‘‘small entity’’) is 1,500 employees lines for interchange purposes. To the Each of these lines, with the exception for ‘‘Line-Haul Operating’’ railroads, and extent that their moves do not exceed of one 33-mile segment, is signalized. 500 employees for ‘‘Short-Line four per day or 20 miles in length of FRA further noted that, with both Operating’’ railroads. See ‘‘Table of Size haul (one way), Class III railroads will Amtrak and Class I railroad locomotives Standards,’’ U.S. Small Business be exempt from the requirement to equipped for PTC, use of partial PTC Administration, January 31, 1996, 13 equip the locomotives. However, some technology (e.g., monitoring of switches CFR part 121; see also NAICS Codes Class III railroads operate much more where trains frequently clear) should be 482111 and 482112. extensively on Class I railroad lines that available as a mitigation for collision SBA size standards may be altered by will be required to have PTC and will have to equip some of their locomotives. risk. Accordingly, in § 236.1019(c)(3) Federal agencies in consultation with It is likely that Class III railroads will FRA has provided a further narrow SBA, and in conjunction with public dedicate certain locomotives to such exception for Class I lines carrying no comment. Pursuant to the authority service, if they have not done so more than four intercity or commuter provided to it by SBA, FRA has already. FRA estimates that passenger trains per day and cumulative published a final policy, which formally approximately 55 small railroads will annual tonnage of less than 15 million establishes small entities as railroads have to equip locomotives with PTC gross tons, subject to FRA review. The that meet the line haulage revenue system components because they have limit of four trains takes into requirements of a Class III railroad. See trackage rights on Class I freight railroad consideration that it is much less 68 FR 24,891 (May 9, 2003). Currently, PIH lines that will be required to have burdensome to equip the wayside of a the revenue requirements are $20 Class I rail line than to install a full PTC PTC and will not be able to qualify for million or less in annual operating any of the operational exceptions system on a railroad that would not revenue, adjusted annually for inflation. otherwise require one. Again, the discussed. The $20 million limit (adjusted FRA further estimates that 10 small exception is not automatic, and FRA’s annually for inflation) is based on the approval of a particular line segment railroads have trackage rights on Surface Transportation Board’s intercity passenger or commuter would be discretionary. threshold of a Class III railroad carrier, The new § 236.1019(d), FRA makes railroads or other freight railroads which is adjusted by applying the clear that it will carefully review each hosting such operations, and will need railroad revenue deflator adjustment. proposed main track exception and may to equip some locomotives with PTC See also 49 CFR part 1201. The same require that it be supported by systems. Half of these will need to equip dollar limit on revenues is established appropriate hazard analysis and locomotives anyway, because they also to determine whether a railroad shipper mitigations. FRA has previously vetted have trackage rights on Class I railroads or contractor is a small entity. FRA uses through the RSAC a Collision Hazard that haul PIH and would otherwise be this definition for this rulemaking. Analysis Guide that can be useful for required to have PTC. The FRA’s ‘‘universe’’ of considered this purpose. If FRA determines that Thus, a total of 60 railroads will need entities generally includes only those freight operations are not ‘‘limited’’ as a to equip locomotives. FRA estimates small entities that can reasonably be matter of safety exposure or that that the average small railroad will need expected to be directly regulated by the proposed safety mitigations are to equip four locomotives, at a per final rule. One type of small entity is inadequate, FRA will deny the railroad cost of $55,000 each, totaling potentially affected by this final rule: exception. $220,000, and that the total cost for all railroads. The level of impact on small 60 small railroads which will need to 3. Description and Estimate of Small railroads will vary from railroad to equip locomotives will be $13,200,000. Entities Affected railroad. Class III railroads will be FRA further estimates that the annual ‘‘Small entity’’ is defined in 5 U.S.C. impacted for one or more of the maintenance cost will be 15% of that 601. Section 601(3) defines a ‘‘small following reasons: (1) They operate on total, equaling $33,000 per railroad or entity’’ as having the same meaning as Class I railroad lines that carry PIH $1,980,000 total for all small railroads. ‘‘small business concern’’ under section materials and are required to have PTC, In addition, 15 small railroads host 3 of the Small Business Act. This in which case they will need to equip commuter or intercity passenger includes any small business concern the portion of their locomotive fleet that operations on what might be defined as that is independently owned and operates on such lines; (2) they operate main line track under the accompanying operated, and is not dominant in its on Amtrak or commuter rail lines, rulemaking; however, only five of these field of operation. Section 601(4) including freight railroad lines that host railroads are neither terminal nor port such service; (3) they host regularly railroads, which tend to be owned and miles. The candidate lines on the Class I system scheduled intercity or commuter rail operated by large railroads or port comprise about 6.8% of Amtrak’s route structure. transportation; or (4) they have at-grade authorities, or subsidiaries of large short

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line holding companies with the railroads not affected by the will either face an initial cost of expertise and resources across the requirement to equip locomotives, $220,000 to equip locomotives, and an disciplines comparable to larger because railroads with equipped annual cost of $33,000 to maintain the railroads. Of those five railroads, only locomotives could simply use the PTC PTC systems on those locomotives, or one has trackage exceeding 3.8 miles. system and avoid the requirement to will face a per railroad cost of $80,000 The other four railroads may request slow down. to equip a diamond crossing, $12,000 that FRA define such track as other than This analysis yields a total of 65 per year to maintain a diamond main line after ensuring that all trains affected small entities that may be crossing, and $43,800 per year to slow will be limited to restricted speed. The impacted by implementation of the final at diamond crossings. No railroad will cost burden on the remaining railroad rule. FRA requested comments face both sets of costs, because if its will likely be reduced by restricting regarding this estimate of small entities locomotives are equipped, they will not speed, temporally separating passenger potentially impacted, and the only need to slow down at diamond train operations, or by passing the cost comment was that Class I railroads crossings, nor would the crossings need to the passenger railroad. Thus, the would not necessarily bear the cost of to be equipped with derails. expected burden to small entities equipping rail-to-rail crossings with derails. 5. Steps the Agency Has Taken To hosting passenger operations is Minimize Adverse Economic Impact on minimal. This impact will further be 4. Description of Reporting, Small Entities reduced by exclusion of track from the Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance main track under § 236.1019. FRA is unaware of any significant Requirements and Impacts on Small alternatives that would meet the intent At rail-to-rail crossings where at least Entities Resulting From Specific of RSIA08 and that would minimize the one of the intersecting tracks allows Requirements economic impact on small entities. FRA operating speeds in excess of 40 miles Class III railroads that host intercity or is exercising its discretion to provide per hour, the approaching non-PTC line commuter rail service will need to file the greatest flexibility for small entities must have a permanent maximum speed implementation plans, whether or not available under RSIA08 by allowing limit of 20 miles per hour and either they directly procure or manage operations of unequipped trains have some type of positive stop installation of the PTC system. FRA operated by small entities on the main enforcement or a split-point derail believes that, although the lines of Class I railroads, and by incorporated into the signal system on implementation plan must be jointly defining main track on passenger the non-PTC route. In the IRFA, FRA filed by the small host railroad and railroads to avoid imposing undue incorrectly assumed that the cost of the passenger tenant railroad, the cost of burdens on small entities. The derail would be borne by the PTC- these plans will be borne by the definition of passenger main track was equipped railroad, and that slowing to passenger railroads, because under adopted based on PTC Working Group 20 miles per hour reflects current typical trackage rights agreements, the recommendations that were backed practice at most diamond crossings. In passenger railroads are responsible for strongly by representatives of small response to comments from Class I any costs that would not exist in the railroads. FRA added further, more railroad representatives, FRA has absence of the passenger operations. expansive exclusions from main track revised its assumption and estimates Clearly, the Class III railroads would not for passenger railroads in the final rule. that roughly half of the cost of derails be required to install PTC in the absence The provisions permitting operations of will be borne by small entities. FRA of passenger traffic, so any costs the unequipped trains of Class I railroads estimates that five small railroads have Class III railroads bear initially will exceeded the maximum flexibility for rail-to-rail crossings, with two such eventually be passed on to the passenger which the PTC Working Group could crossings each, where the newly railroads operating on the Class III reach a consensus. FRA requested burdened small railroad will be slowing railroads’ lines. FRA believes that only comments on this finding of no to 20 miles per hour from a higher track one small entity, as described above, is significant alternative related to small speed. FRA estimates that the average likely to have PTC installed on its lines. entities, but received no such traffic on the newly burdened route is The implementation plan is likely to be comments. two trains per day, and that the cost to an extension of the passenger railroad’s The process by which this final rule slow from a higher track speed is $30 plan, and the marginal cost will be the was developed provided outreach to per train, for a total cost of $60 per cost of tailoring the plan to the host small entities. As noted earlier in the crossing per day, a per railroad cost of railroad, which will be borne by the preamble, this notice was developed in $120 per day, and a total national cost passenger railroad, and maintaining consultation with industry for all ten small railroads of $600 per copies of the plan at the host railroad, representatives via the RSAC, which day and an annual cost of $43,800 per which FRA estimates to be includes small railroad representatives. railroad and a total for all small approximately $1,000 per year. From January to April 2009, FRA met railroads of $219,000 per year. FRA The total cost to small entities will with the entire PTC Working Group five further estimates that small railroads include the initial cost of equipping times over the course of twelve days. will pay for derails at five of the ten locomotives, $13,200,000, and $400,000 This PTC Working Group established a impacted crossings, at a price per to equip diamond crossings; annual task force to focus on issues specific to crossing of $80,000, for two sets of costs of $1,980,000 for maintenance of short line and regional railroads. The derails, one on each side of the locomotive systems; $219,000 due to discussions yielded many insights and crossings, and a total cost of $400,000, operating speed restrictions at diamond this final rule takes into account the with annual maintenance costs of crossings; $60,000 to maintain diamond concerns expressed by small railroads $60,000 (15% of installation cost) total. crossings; and $1,000 to maintain a copy during the deliberations. The PTC The initial investment will therefore be of the PTC implementation plan. The Working Group had further discussions $400,000 and the total annual cost will total annual costs to small entities after after publication of the NPRM, on be $279,000. FRA estimates that only initial acquisition will be $2,260,000 August 31, 2009, and September 1 and five Class III railroads will be affected ($1,980,000 + $219,000 + $60,000 + 2, 2009, related to the impact on small by this provision, and that they will be $1,000). Individual railroads affected entities and on passenger railroads

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(small entities may be affected under the comments, to the benefit of small Office of Management and Budget final rule by their operations on entities. (OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction passenger railroads or as hosts of Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. The C. Paperwork Reduction Act passenger operations) and added new sections that contain the new exclusions from main track to the RSAC The information collection information collection requirements and recommendations. FRA extended these requirements in this proposed rule have the estimated time to fulfill each exclusions further, based on Amtrak been submitted for approval to the requirement are as follows:

Total annual Average time per Total annual burden CFR section Respondent universe responses response hours

234.275—Processor-Based Systems—Devi- 20 Railroads ...... 25 letters ...... 4 hours ...... 100 hours. ations from Product Safety Plan (PSP)— Letters. 236.18—Software Mgmt. Control Plan ...... 184 Railroads ...... 184 plans ...... 2,150 hours ...... 395,600 hours. —Updates to Software Mgmt. Control 90 Railroads ...... 20 updates ...... 1.50 hours ...... 30 hours. Plan. 236.905—Updates to RSPP ...... 78 Railroads ...... 6 plans ...... 135 hours ...... 810 hours. —Response to Request for Additional 78 Railroads ...... 1 updated doc ...... 400 hours ...... 400 hours. Info. —Request for FRA Approval of RSPP 78 Railroads ...... 1 request/modified 400 hours ...... 400 hours. Modification. RSPP. 236.907—Product Safety Plan (PSP)—Dev .. 5 Railroads ...... 5 plans ...... 6,400 hours ...... 32,000 hours. 236.909—Minimum Performance Standard —Petitions for Review and Approval ...... 5 Railroads ...... 2 petitions/PSP ...... 19,200 hours ...... 38,400 hours. —Supporting Sensitivity Analysis ...... 5 Railroads ...... 5 analyses ...... 160 hours ...... 800 hours. 236.913—Notification/Submission to FRA of 6 Railroads ...... 1 joint plan ...... 25,600 hours ...... 25,600 hours. Joint Product Safety Plan (PSP). —Petitions for Approval/Informational 6 Railroads ...... 6 petitions ...... 1,928 hours ...... 11,568 hours. Filings. —Responses to FRA Request for Fur- 6 Railroads ...... 2 documents ...... 800 hours ...... 1,600 hours. ther Info. After Informational Filing. —Responses to FRA Request for Fur- 6 Railroads ...... 6 documents ...... 16 hours ...... 96 hours. ther Info. After Agency Receipt of No- tice of Product Development. —Consultations ...... 6 Railroads ...... 6 consults ...... 120 hours ...... 720 hours. —Petitions for Final Approval ...... 6 Railroads ...... 6 petitions ...... 16 hours ...... 96 hours. —Comments to FRA by Interested Par- Public/RRs ...... 7 comments ...... 240 hours ...... 1,680 hours. ties. —Third Party Assessments of PSP ...... 6 Railroads ...... 1 assessment ...... 104,000 hours ...... 104,000 hours. —Amendments to PSP ...... 6 Railroads ...... 15 amendments ...... 160 hours ...... 2,400 hours. —Field Testing of Product—Info. Filings 6 Railroads ...... 6 documents ...... 3,200 hours ...... 19,200 hours. 236.917—Retention of Records. —Results of tests/inspections specified 6 Railroads ...... 3 documents/records 160,000 hrs.; 160,000 360,000 hours. in PSP. hrs.; 40,000 hrs. —Report to FRA of Inconsistencies with 6 Railroads ...... 1 report ...... 104 hours ...... 104 hours. frequency of safety-relevant hazards in PSP. 236.919—Operations & Maintenance Man. —Updates to O & M Manual ...... 6 Railroads ...... 6 updated docs ...... 40 hours ...... 240 hours. —Plans for Proper Maintenance, Repair, 6 Railroads ...... 6 plans ...... 53,335 hours ...... 320,010 hours. Inspection of Safety-Critical Products. —Hardware/Software/Firmware Revi- 6 Railroads ...... 6 revisions ...... 6,440 hours ...... 38,640 hours. sions. 236.921—Training Programs: Development .. 6 Railroads ...... 6 Tr. Programs ...... 400 hours ...... 2,400 hours. —Training of Signalmen & Dispatchers 6 Railroads ...... 300 signalmen; 20 40 hours; 20 hours .... 12,400 hours. dispatchers. 236.923—Task Analysis/Basic Require- 6 Railroads ...... 6 documents ...... 720 hours ...... 4,320 hours. ments: Necessary Documents. —Records ...... 6 Railroads ...... 350 records ...... 10 minutes ...... 58 hours. SUBPART I—NEW REQUIREMENTS 236.1001—RR Development of More Strin- 30 Railroads ...... 3 rules ...... 80 hours ...... 240 hours. gent Rules Re: PTC Performance Stds. 236.1005—Requirements for PTC Systems. —Temporary Rerouting: Emergency Re- 30 Railroads ...... 50 requests ...... 8 hours ...... 400 hours. quests. —Written/Telephonic Notification to FRA 30 Railroads ...... 50 notifications ...... 2 hours ...... 100 hours. Regional Administrator. —Temporary Rerouting Requests Due 30 Railroads ...... 760 requests ...... 8 hours ...... 6,080 hours. to Track Maintenance. —Temporary Rerouting Requests That 30 Railroads ...... 380 requests ...... 8 hours ...... 3,040 hours. Exceed 30 Days. 236.1006—Requirements for Equipping Lo- comotives Operating in PTC Territory.

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Total annual Average time per Total annual burden CFR section Respondent universe responses response hours

—Reports of Movements in Excess of 30 Railroads ...... 45 reports + 45 re- 8 hours + 170 ...... 8,010 hours. 20 Miles/RR Progress on PTC Loco- ports. motives. —PTC Progress Reports ...... 35 Railroads ...... 35 reports ...... 16 hours ...... 560 hours. 236.1007—Additional Requirements for High Speed Service. —Required HSR—125 Documents with 30 Railroads ...... 11 documents ...... 3,200 hours ...... 35,200 hours. approved PTCSP. —Requests to Use Foreign Service 30 Railroads ...... 2 requests ...... 8,000 hours ...... 16,000 hours. Data. —PTC Railroads Conducting Operations 30 Railroads ...... 4 documents ...... 3,200 hours ...... 12,800 hours. at More than 150 MPH with HSR–125 Documents. —Requests for PTC Waiver ...... 30 Railroads ...... 1 request ...... 1,000 hours ...... 1,000 hours. 236.1009—Procedural Requirements. —PTC Implementation Plans (PTCIP) ... 30 Railroads ...... 25 plans ...... 535 hours ...... 13,375 hours. —Host Railroads Filing PTCIP or Re- 30 Railroads ...... 1 PCTIP; 15 RFAs ..... 535 hours; 320 hours 5,335 hours. quest for Amendment (RFAs). —Jointly Submitted PTCIPs ...... 30 Railroads ...... 5 PTCIPs ...... 267 hours ...... 1,335 hours. —Notification of Failure to File Joint 30 Railroads ...... 25 notifications ...... 32 hours ...... 800 hours. PTCIP. —Comprehensive List of Issues Causing 30 Railroads ...... 25 lists ...... 80 hours ...... 2,000 hours. Non-Agreement. —Conferences to Develop Mutually Ac- 25 Railroads ...... 3 conf. calls ...... 60 minutes ...... 3 hours. ceptable PCTIP. —Type Approval ...... 30 Railroads ...... 10 Type Appr ...... 8 hours ...... 80 hours. —PTC Development Plans Requesting 30 Railroads ...... 20 Ltr. + 20 App; 10 8 hrs/1,600 hrs.; 6,400 96,160 hours. Type Approval. Plans. hours. —Notice of Product Intent w/PTCIPs 30 Railroads ...... 24 NPI; 24 IPs ...... 1,070 + 535 hrs ...... 38,520 hours. (IPs). —PTCDPs with PTCIPs (DPs + IPs) ..... 30 Railroads ...... 6 DPs; 6 IPs ...... 2,135 + 535 hrs ...... 16,020 hours. —Updated PTCIPs w/PTCDPs (IPs + 30 Railroads ...... 24 IPs; 24 DPs ...... 535 + 2,135 hrs ...... 64,080 hours. DPs). —Disapproved/Resubmitted PTCIPs/ 30 Railroads ...... 6 IPs + 6 NPIs ...... 135 + 270 hrs ...... 2,430 hours. NPIs. —Revoked Approvals—Provisional IPs/ 30 Railroads ...... 6 IPs + 6 DPs ...... 135 + 535 hrs ...... 4,020 hours. DP. —PTCIPs/PTCDPs Still Needing Re- 30 Railroads ...... 2 IPs + 2 DPs ...... 135 + 535 hrs ...... 1,340 hours. work. —PTCIP/PTCDP/PTCSP Plan Con- 30 Railroads ...... 1 document ...... 8,000 hours ...... 8,000 hours. tents—Documents Translated into English. —Requests for Confidentiality ...... 30 Railroads ...... 30 ltrs; 30 docs ...... 8 hrs.; 800 hrs ...... 24,240 hours. —Field Test Plans/Independent Assess- 30 Railroads ...... 150 field tests; 2 as- 800 hours ...... 121,600 hours. ments—Req. by FRA. sessments. —FRA Access: Interviews with PTC 30 Railroads ...... 60 interviews ...... 30 minutes ...... 30 hours. Wrkrs. —FRA Requests for Further Information 30 Railroads ...... 5 documents ...... 400 hours ...... 2,000 hours. 236.1011—PTCIP Requirements—Comment 7 Interested Groups ... 21 rev.; 60 com ...... 143 + 8 hrs ...... 3,483 hours. 236.1015—PTCSP Content Requirements & PTC System Certification. —Non-Vital Overlay ...... 30 Railroads ...... 2 PTCSPs ...... 16,000 hours ...... 32,000 hours. —Vital Overlay ...... 30 Railroads ...... 16 PTCSPs ...... 22,400 hours ...... 358,400 hours. —Stand Alone ...... 30 Railroads ...... 10 PTCSPs ...... 32,000 hours ...... 320,000 hours. —Mixed Systems—Conference with 30 Railroads ...... 3 conferences ...... 32 hours ...... 96 hours. FRA regarding Case/Analysis. —Mixed Sys. PTCSPs (incl. safety 30 Railroads ...... 2 PTCSPs ...... 28,800 hours ...... 57,600 hours. case). —FRA Request for Additional PTCSP 30 Railroads ...... 15 documents ...... 3,200 hours ...... 48,000 hours. Data. —PTCSPs Applying to Replace Existing 30 Railroads ...... 15 PTCSPs ...... 3,200 hours ...... 48,000 hours. Certified PTC Systems. —Non-Quantitative Risk Assessments 30 Railroads ...... 15 assessments ...... 3,200 hours ...... 48,000 hours. Supplied to FRA. 236.1017—PTCSP Supported by Inde- 30 Railroads ...... 1 assessment ...... 8,000 hours ...... 8,000 hours. pendent Third Party Assessment. —Written Requests to FRA to Confirm 30 Railroads ...... 1 request ...... 8 hours ...... 8 hours. Entity Independence. —Provision of Additional Information 30 Railroads ...... 1 document ...... 160 hours ...... 160 hours. After FRA Request. —Independent Third Party Assessment: 30 Railroads ...... 1 request ...... 160 hours ...... 160 hours. Waiver Requests.

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Total annual Average time per Total annual burden CFR section Respondent universe responses response hours

—RR Request for FRA to Accept For- 30 Railroads ...... 1 request ...... 32 hours ...... 32 hours. eign Railroad Regulator Certified Info. 236.1019—Main Line Track Exceptions. —Submission of Main Line Track Exclu- 30 Railroads ...... 30 MTEAs ...... 160 hours ...... 4,800 hours. sion Addendums (MTEAs). —Passenger Terminal Exception— 30 Railroads ...... 23 MTEAs ...... 160 hours ...... 3,680 hours. MTEAs. —Limited Operation Exception—Risk Mit 30 Railroads ...... 23 plans ...... 160 hours ...... 3,680 hours. —Ltd. Exception—Collision Hazard Anal 30 Railroads ...... 12 analyses ...... 1,600 hours ...... 19,200 hours. —Temporal Separation Procedures ...... 30 Railroads ...... 11 procedures ...... 160 hours ...... 1,760 hours. 236.1021—Discontinuances, Material Modi- 30 Railroads ...... 15 RFAs ...... 160 hours ...... 2,400 hours. fications, Amendments—Requests to Amend (RFA) PTCIP, PTCDP or PTCSP. —Review and Public Comment on RFA 7 Interested Groups ... 7 reviews + 20 com- 3 hours; 16 hours ...... 341 hours. ments. 236.1023—PTC Product Vendor Lists ...... 30 Railroads ...... 30 lists ...... 8 hours ...... 240 hours. —RR Procedures Upon Notification of 30 Railroads ...... 30 procedures ...... 16 hours ...... 480 hours. PTC System Safety-Critical Upgrades, Rev., Etc. —RR Notifications of PTC Safety Haz- 30 Railroads ...... 150 notifications ...... 16 hours ...... 2,400 hours. ards. —RR Notification Updates ...... 30 Railroads ...... 150 updates ...... 16 hours ...... 2,400 hours. —Manufacturer’s Report of Investigation 5 System Suppliers .... 5 reports ...... 400 hours ...... 2,000 hours. of PTC Defect. —PTC Supplier Reports of Safety Rel- 5 System Suppliers .... 150 reports + 150 rpt. 16 hours + 8 hours .... 3,600 hours. evant Failures or Defective Conditions. copies. 236.1029—Report of On-Board Lead Loco- 30 Railroads ...... 960 reports ...... 96 hours ...... 92,160 hours. motive PTC Device Failure. 236.1031—Previously Approved PTC Sys- tems. —Request for Expedited Certification 30 Railroads ...... 3 REC Letters ...... 160 hours ...... 480 hours. (REC) for PTC System. —Requests for Grandfathering on 30 Railroads ...... 3 requests ...... 1,600 hours ...... 4,800 hours. PTCSPs. 236.1035—Field Testing Requirements ...... 30 Railroads ...... 150 field test plans .... 800 hours ...... 120,000 hours. —Relief Requests from Regulations 30 Railroads ...... 50 requests ...... 320 hours ...... 16,000 hours. Necessary to Support Field Testing. 236.1037—Records Retention. —Results of Tests in PTCSP and 30 Railroads ...... 960 records ...... 4 hours ...... 3,840 hours. PTCDP. —PTC Service Contractors Training 30 Railroads ...... 9,000 records ...... 30 minutes ...... 4,500 hours. Records. —Reports of Safety Relevant Hazards 30 Railroads ...... 4 reports ...... 8 hours ...... 32 hours. Exceeding Those in PTCSP and PTCDP. —Final Report of Resolution of Incon- 30 Railroads ...... 4 final reports ...... 160 hours ...... 640 hours. sistency. 236.1039—Operations & Maintenance Man- 30 Railroads ...... 30 manuals ...... 250 hours ...... 7,500 hours. ual (OMM): Development. —Positive Identification of Safety-critical 30 Railroads ...... 75,000 i.d. compo- 1 hour ...... 75,000 hours. components. nents. —Designated RR Officers in OMM re- 30 Railroads ...... 60 designations ...... 2 hours ...... 120 hours. garding PTC issues. 236.1041—PTC Training Programs ...... 30 Railroads ...... 30 programs ...... 400 hours ...... 12,000 hours. 236.1043—Task Analysis/Basic Require- 30 Railroads ...... 30 evaluations ...... 720 hours ...... 21,600 hours. ments: Training Evaluations. —Training Records ...... 30 Railroads ...... 350 records ...... 10 minutes ...... 58 hours. 236.1045—Training Specific to Office Control 30 Railroads ...... 20 trained employees 20 hours ...... 400 hours. Personnel. 236.1047—Training Specific to Loc. Engi- neers & Other Operating Personnel. —PTC Conductor Training ...... 30 Railroads ...... 5,000 trained conduc- 3 hours ...... 15,000 hours. tors.

All estimates include the time for Organizations and individuals Washington, DC 20503, Attention: FRA reviewing instructions; searching desiring to submit comments on the Desk Officer. Comments may also be existing data sources; gathering or collection of information requirements sent via e-mail to the Office of maintaining the needed data; and should direct them to the Office of Management and Budget at the reviewing the information. Management and Budget, Office of following address: Information and Regulatory Affairs, [email protected].

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OMB is required to make a decision FRA has determined that this final no federalism implications, other than concerning the collection of information rule would not have substantial direct the preemption of state laws covering requirements contained in this direct effects on the states, on the relationship the subject matter of this final rule, final rule between 30 and 60 days after between the national government and which occurs by operation of law under publication of this document in the the states, nor on the distribution of 49 U.S.C. 20106 whenever FRA issues a Federal Register. Therefore, a comment power and responsibilities among the rule or order. Accordingly, FRA has to OMB is best assured of having its full various levels of government. In determined that preparation of a effect if OMB receives it within 30 days addition, FRA has determined that this federalism summary impact statement of publication. final rule, which is required by the Rail for this proposed rule is not required. FRA cannot impose a penalty on Safety Improvement Act of 2008, would E. Environmental Impact persons for violating information not impose any direct compliance costs collection requirements which do not on state and local governments. FRA has evaluated this final rule in display a current OMB control number, Therefore, the consultation and funding accordance with its ‘‘Procedures for if required. FRA intends to obtain requirements of Executive Order 13132 Considering Environmental Impacts’’ current OMB control numbers for any do not apply. (‘‘FRA’s Procedures’’) (64 FR 28,545 new information collection However, this final rule will have (May 26, 1999)) as required by the requirements resulting from this preemptive effect. Section 20106 of Title National Environmental Policy Act (42 rulemaking action prior to the effective 49 of the United States Code provides U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other date of this direct final rule. The OMB that States may not adopt or continue in environmental statutes, Executive control number, when assigned, will be effect any law, regulation, or order Orders, and related regulatory announced by separate notice in the related to railroad safety or security that requirements. FRA has determined that Federal Register. covers the subject matter of a regulation this final rule is not a major FRA action prescribed or order issued by the (requiring the preparation of an D. Federalism Implications Secretary of Transportation (with environmental impact statement or This final rule has been analyzed in respect to railroad safety matters) or the environmental assessment) because it is accordance with the principles and Secretary of Homeland Security (with categorically excluded from detailed criteria contained in Executive Order respect to railroad security matters), environmental review pursuant to 13132, ‘‘Federalism.’’ See 64 FR 43,255 except when the State law, regulation, section 4(c)(20) of FRA’s Procedures. In (Aug. 4, 1999). or order qualifies under the local safety accordance with section 4(c) and (e) of As discussed earlier in the preamble, or security exception to § 20106. The FRA’s Procedures, the agency has this final rule would provide regulatory intent of § 20106 is to promote national further concluded that no extraordinary guidance and performance standards for uniformity in railroad safety and circumstances exist with respect to this the development, testing, security standards. 49 U.S.C. regulation that might trigger the need for implementation, and use of Positive 20106(a)(1). Thus, subject to a limited a more detailed environmental review. Train Control (PTC) systems for exception for essentially local safety or As a result, FRA finds that this final rule railroads mandated by the Rail Safety security hazards, this final rule would is not a major federal action Improvement Act of 2008. establish a uniform federal safety significantly affecting the quality of the Executive Order 13132 requires FRA standard that must be met, and state human environment. to develop an accountable process to requirements covering the same subject ensure ‘‘meaningful and timely input by F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of matter would be displaced, whether 1995 State and local officials in the those state requirements are in the form development of regulatory policies that of a state law, regulation, order, or The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act have federalism implications.’’ Policies common law. Part 236 establishes of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4, 2 U.S.C. 1531) that have ‘‘federalism implications’’ are federal standards of care which preempt (UMRA) requires agencies to prepare a defined in the Executive Order to state standards of care, but this part written assessment of the costs, benefits, include regulations that have does not preempt an action under state and other effects of proposed or final ‘‘substantial direct effects on the States, law seeking damages for personal rules that include a federal mandate on the relationship between the national injury, death, or property damage likely to result in the expenditures by government and the States, or on the alleging that a party has failed to state, local or tribal governments, in the distribution of power and comply with the federal standard of care aggregate, or by the private sector, of responsibilities among the various established by this part, including a $100 million (adjusted annually for levels of government.’’ Under Executive plan or program required by this part. inflation with base year of 1995) or more Order 13132, the agency may not issue Provisions of a plan or program which in any one year. The value equivalent of a regulation with Federalism exceed the requirements of this part are $100 million in CY 1995, adjusted implications that imposes substantial not included in the federal standard of annual for inflation to CY 2008 levels by direct compliance costs and that is not care. The Locomotive Boiler Inspection the Consumer Price Index for All Urban required by statute, unless the Federal Act (49 U.S.C. 20701–20703) has been Consumers (CPI–U) is $141.3 million. government provides the funds held by the U.S. Supreme Court to The assessment may be included in necessary to pay the direct compliance preempt the entire field of locomotive conjunction with other assessments, as costs incurred by State and local safety; therefore, this part preempts any it is in this rulemaking. governments, or the agency consults state law, including common law, FRA is issuing this final rule to with State and local government covering the design, construction, or provide regulatory guidance and officials early in the process of material of any part of or appurtenance performance standards for the developing the regulation. Where a to a locomotive. development, testing, implementation, regulation has Federalism implications In sum, FRA has analyzed this final and use of PTC systems for railroads and preempts State law, the agency rule in accordance with the principles mandated by the Rail Safety seeks to consult with State and local and criteria contained in Executive Improvement Act of 2008 § 104, Public officials in the process of developing the Order 13132. As explained above, FRA Law 110–432, 122 Stat. 4854 (Oct. 16, regulation. has determined that this final rule has 2008) (codified at 9 U.S.C. 20157), to

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implement PTC systems. The RIA members in the locomotive cab so that name of the individual submitting the provides a detailed analysis of the costs they may perform their respective document (or signing the document), if of implementing PTC systems. This duties. Sometimes, this may require submitted on behalf of an association, analysis is the basis for determining installation of a second display unit. In business, labor union, etc.). Interested that, other than to the extent that this its analysis of § 236.1005(b), FRA parties may also review DOT’s complete regulation incorporates requirements provides sufficient justification for the Privacy Act Statement in the Federal specifically set forth in RSIA08, this baseline level based on the language in Register published on April 11, 2000 rule will not result in total expenditures the statute, the context of the legislative (65 FR 19,477) or visit http:// by state, local or tribal governments, in process, and Congress’ intent. If www.regulations.gov. the aggregate, or by the private sector of anything, FRA has reduced railroad $141.3 million or more in any one year. expenditures by, inter alia, providing a List of Subjects The vast bulk of costs associated with number of exceptions from the 49 CFR Part 229 this final rule are directly attributable to installation requirements and Event recorders, Locomotives, the statutory mandate. The only opportunities for plan amendments. Railroad safety. unfunded mandate attributable to this In any event, the aforementioned final rule that does not incorporate the costs borne by the railroads will not 49 CFR Part 234 requirements specifically set forth in exceed $141.3 million or more in any Highway safety, Penalties, Railroad RSIA08 is the cost pertaining to the one year. The costs indicated above— safety, Reporting and recordkeeping filing of paperwork to prove compliance totaling between $258,784,000 and requirements. with RSIA08. The effects are discussed $273,688,000, depending upon whether above and in the Regulatory Impact one relies on AAR’s or FRA’s second 49 CFR Part 235 Analysis, which has been placed in the screen estimates—would be incurred Administrative practice and docket for this rulemaking. over a period of several years. Even if procedure, Penalties, Railroad safety, FRA received comments asserting that FRA were to add the costs of paperwork Reporting and recordkeeping the rule extends beyond the filings, which FRA estimates to each requirements. congressional mandates communicated have a one time cost of approximately in RSIA08. Even if this assertion was $20,000, the annual monetary threshold 49 CFR Part 236 correct, the final rule alone would not will likely not be met. Penalties, Positive Train Control, create an unfunded mandate in excess G. Energy Impact Railroad safety, Reporting and of the threshold amount. For instance, recordkeeping requirements. some railroads believe that Executive Order 13211 requires § 236.1029(f)—which requires PTC Federal agencies to prepare a Statement IX. The Rule screen access to every person in the of Energy Effects for any ‘‘significant ■ In consideration of the foregoing, FRA locomotive cab—exceeds the statutory energy action.’’ 66 FR 28,355 (May 22, amends chapter II, subtitle B of title 49, requirements. Certain freight railroads 2001). Under the Executive Order, a Code of Federal Regulations as follows: have said that this provision requires a ‘‘significant energy action’’ is defined as second display unit, which will cost any action by an agency (normally PART 229—[AMENDED] published in the Federal Register) that $8,000. AAR estimates that ■ approximately 29,461 second display promulgates or is expected to lead to the 1. The authority citation for part 229 units would require installation, promulgation of a final rule or continues to read as follows: resulting in a cost of $235,688,000. FRA, regulation, including notices of inquiry, Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20133, however, believes that only 27,598 advance notices of proposed 20137–38, 20143, 20701–03, 21301–02, screens would require installation, rulemaking, and notices of proposed 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2401, note; and 49 CFR totaling $220,784,000. rulemaking: (1)(i) That is a significant 1.49(c), (m). Certain railroads have also contested regulatory action under Executive Order ■ 2. Section 229.135 is amended by § 236.1005(b)(2), which governs the 12866 or any successor order, and (ii) is revising paragraphs (b)(3)(xxv) and baseline information necessary to likely to have a significant adverse effect (b)(4)(xxi) to read as follows: determine whether a Class I railroad’s on the supply, distribution, or use of track segment shall be equipped with a energy; or (2) that is designated by the § 229.135 Event recorders. PTC system. Under that provision, Administrator of the Office of * * * * * initial PTC territory shall be determined Information and Regulatory Affairs as a (b) * * * based on 2008 traffic levels. CSXT significant energy action. FRA has (3) * * * asserts that this provision will cause it evaluated this final rule in accordance (xxv) Safety-critical train control data to install PTC on 844 miles of track with Executive Order 13211. FRA has routed to the locomotive engineer’s which will no longer meet the PIH determined that this final rule is not display with which the engineer is materials threshold or will no longer likely to have a significant adverse effect required to comply, specifically meet the 5 million gross tons threshold on the supply, distribution, or use of including text messages conveying in 2010. According to CSXT, the energy. Consequently, FRA has mandatory directives and maximum installation will cost $45,000 per mile determined that this regulatory action is authorized speed. The format, content, (the RIA uses an estimate of $50,000 per not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ and proposed duration for retention of mile) for a CSXT estimated cost of within the meaning of Executive Order such data shall be specified in the almost $38,000,000. 13211. Product Safety Plan or PTC Safety Plan As noted above, FRA believes that submitted for the train control system these requirements respond directly to H. Privacy Act under subparts H or I, respectively, of the requirements set forth in RSIA08. FRA wishes to inform all interested part 236 of this chapter, subject to FRA For instance, to effectuate Congress’ parties that anyone is able to search the approval under this paragraph. If it can intent to prevent incursions into electronic form of any written be calibrated against other data required roadway worker zones, it is necessary to communications and comments by this part, such train control data may, require PTC screen access to all crew received into any of our dockets by the at the election of the railroad, be

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retained in a separate certified the safety requirements are satisfied Temporary arrangements shall be crashworthy memory module. using alternative means. Deviation from removed within 6 months following (4) * * * those particular requirements is completion of construction. (xxi) Safety-critical train control data authorized if an adequate explanation is routed to the locomotive engineer’s provided, making reference to relevant PART 236—[AMENDED] display with which the engineer is elements of the applicable plan, and if ■ 7. The authority citation for part 236 required to comply, specifically the product satisfies the performance is revised to read as follows: including text messages conveying standard set forth in § 236.909 of this mandatory directives and maximum chapter. (See § 236.907(a)(14) of this Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20103, 20107, authorized speed. The format, content, chapter.) 20133, 20141, 20157, 20301–20303, 20306, and proposed duration for retention of 20501–20505, 20701–20703, 21301–21302, * * * * * 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 CFR such data shall be specified in the (f) Software management control for 1.49. Product Safety Plan or PTC Safety Plan certain systems not subject to a ■ 8. Section 236.0 is amended by submitted for the train control system performance standard. Any processor- revising paragraphs (a) and (c) through under subparts H or I, respectively, of based system, subsystem, or component (e) and by adding paragraph (i) to read part 236 of this chapter, subject to FRA subject to this part, which is not subject as follows: approval under this paragraph. If it can to the requirements of part 236, subpart be calibrated against other data required H or I, of this chapter but which § 236.0 Applicability, minimum by this part, such train control data may, provides safety-critical data to a signal requirements, and penalties. at the election of the railroad, be or train control system shall be included (a) Except as provided in paragraph retained in a separate certified in the software management control (b) of this section, this part applies to all crashworthy memory module. plan requirements as specified in railroads and any person as defined in * * * * * § 236.18 of this chapter. paragraph (f) of this section. * * * * * PART 234—[AMENDED] PART 235—[AMENDED] (c)(1) Prior to January 17, 2012, where a passenger train is operated at a speed ■ 3. The authority citation for part 234 ■ 5. The authority citation for part 235 of 60 or more miles per hour, or a freight continues to read as follows: continues to read as follows: train is operated at a speed of 50 or Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107; 28 Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107; 28 more miles per hour— U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 CFR 1.49. U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 CFR 1.49. (i) A block signal system complying with the provisions of this part shall be ■ 4. In § 234.275 revise paragraphs ■ 6. In § 235.7, revise paragraph (a)(4), installed; or (b)(1), (b)(2), (c), and (f) to read as add paragraph (a)(5), and revise (ii) A manual block system shall be follows: paragraphs (b)(2), (b)(3), and (c)(25) to placed permanently in effect that shall § 234.275 Processor-based systems. read as follows: conform to the following conditions: (A) A passenger train shall not be * * * * * § 235.7 Changes not requiring filing of (b) Use of performance standard application. admitted to a block occupied by another authorized or required. (1) In lieu of train except when absolutely necessary (a) * * * and then only by operating at restricted compliance with the requirements of (4) Removal from service not to this subpart, a railroad may elect to speed; exceed 6 months of block signal system, (B) No train shall be admitted to a qualify an existing processor-based interlocking, or traffic control system block occupied by a passenger train product under part 236, subparts H or necessitated by catastrophic occurrence except when absolutely necessary and I, of this chapter. such as derailment, flood, fire, or then only by operating at restricted (2) Highway-rail grade crossing hurricane; or speed; warning systems, subsystems, or (5) Removal of an intermittent (C) No train shall be admitted to a components that are processor-based automatic train stop system in block occupied by an opposing train and that are first placed in service after conjunction with the implementation of except when absolutely necessary and June 6, 2005, which contain new or a positive train control system approved then only while one train is stopped and novel technology, or which provide by FRA under subpart I of part 236 of the other is operating at restricted safety-critical data to a railroad signal or this chapter. speed; and train control system that is governed by (b) * * * (D) A freight train, including a work part 236, subpart H or I, of this chapter, (2) Removal of electric or mechanical train, may be authorized to follow a shall also comply with those lock, or signal used in lieu thereof, from freight train, including a work train, into requirements. New or novel technology hand-operated switch in automatic a block and then only when the refers to a technology not previously block signal or traffic control territory following train is operating at restricted recognized for use as of March 7, 2005. where train speed over the switch does speed. * * * * * not exceed 20 miles per hour; or (2) On and after January 17, 2012, (c) Plan justifications. The Product (3) Removal of electric or mechanical where a passenger train is permitted to Safety Plan in accordance with 49 CFR lock, or signal used in lieu thereof, from operate at a speed of 60 or more miles 236.907—or a PTC Development Plan hand-operated switch in automatic per hour, or a freight train is permitted and PTC Safety Plan required to be filed block signal or traffic control territory to operate at a speed of 50 or more miles in accordance with 49 CFR 236.1013 where trains are not permitted to clear per hour, a block signal system and 236.1015—must explain how the the main track at such switch. complying with the provisions of this performance objective sought to be (c) * * * part shall be installed, unless an FRA addressed by each of the particular (25) The temporary or permanent approved PTC system meeting the requirements of this subpart is met by arrangement of existing systems requirements of this part for the subject the product, why the objective is not necessitated by highway-rail grade speed and other operating conditions is relevant to the product’s design, or how crossing separation construction. installed.

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(d)(1) Prior to December 31, 2015, this part, including a plan or program (2) * * * where any train is permitted to operate required by this part. Provisions of a (i) In all cases exposure must be at a speed of 80 or more miles per hour, plan or program which exceed the expressed as total train miles traveled an automatic cab signal, automatic train requirements of this part are not per year over the relevant railroad stop, or automatic train control system included in the federal standard of care. infrastructure. Consequences must complying with the provisions of this (3) Under 49 U.S.C. 20701–20703, identify the total cost, including part shall be installed, unless an FRA issuance of these regulations preempts fatalities, injuries, property damage, and approved PTC system meeting the the field of locomotive safety, extending other incidental costs, such as potential requirements of this part for the subject to the design, the construction, and the consequences of hazardous materials speed and other operating conditions, is material of every part of the locomotive involvement, resulting from preventable installed. and tender and all appurtenances accidents associated with the (2) On and after December 31, 2015, thereof. function(s) performed by the system. where any train is permitted to operate ■ 9. Section 236.410 is amended by * * * * * at a speed of 80 or more miles per hour, removing the Note following paragraph ■ 11. Add a new subpart I to part 236 a PTC system complying with the (b), and republishing paragraphs (b) and to read as follows: provisions of subpart I shall be installed (c), to read as follows: and operational, unless FRA approval to Subpart I—Positive Train Control Systems § 236.410 Locking, hand-operated switch; Sec. continue to operate with an automatic requirements. cab signal, automatic train stop, or 236.1001 Purpose and scope. automatic train control system * * * * * 236.1003 Definitions. (b) Approach or time locking shall be 236.1005 Requirements for Positive Train complying with the provisions of this provided and locking may be released Control systems. part has been justified to, and approved either automatically, or by the control 236.1006 Equipping locomotives operating by, the Associate Administrator. operator, but only after the control in PTC territory. (3) Subpart H of this part sets forth 236.1007 Additional requirements for high- circuits of signals governing movement requirements for voluntary installation speed service. in either direction over the switch and of PTC systems, and subpart I of this 236.1009 Procedural requirements. which display aspects with indications part sets forth requirements for 236.1011 PTC Implementation Plan content more favorable than ‘‘proceed at requirements. mandated installation of PTC systems, restricted speed’’ have been opened 236.1013 PTC Development Plan and each under conditions specified in their directly or by shunting of track circuit. Notice of Product Intent content respective subpart. (c) Where a signal is used in lieu of requirements and Type Approval. (e) Nothing in this section authorizes electric or mechanical lock to govern 236.1015 PTC Safety Plan content requirements and PTC System the discontinuance of a block signal movements from auxiliary track to system, interlocking, traffic control Certification. signaled track, the signal shall not 236.1017 Independent third party system, automatic cab signal, automatic display an aspect to proceed until after train stop or automatic train control Verification and Validation. the control circuits of signals governing 236.1019 Main line track exceptions. system, or PTC system, without movement on main track in either 236.1021 Discontinuances, material approval by the FRA under part 235 of direction over the switch have been modifications, and amendments. this title. However, a railroad may apply opened, and either the approach locking 236.1023 Errors and malfunctions. for approval of discontinuance or circuits to the switch are unoccupied or 236.1025 [Reserved] material modification of a signal or train 236.1027 PTC system exclusions. a predetermined time interval has 236.1029 PTC system use and en route control system in connection with a expired. request for approval of a Positive Train failures. Control Development Plan (PTCDP) or * * * * * 236.1031 Previously approved PTC ■ 10. Section 236.909 is amended by systems. Positive Train Control Safety Plan 236.1033 Communications and security (PTCSP) as provided in subpart I of this adding four new sentences directly after the first sentence of paragraph (e)(1) and requirements. part. 236.1035 Field testing requirements. by revising paragraph (e)(2)(i) to read as * * * * * 236.1037 Records retention. follows: (i) Preemptive effect. (1) Under 49 236.1039 Operations and Maintenance Manual. U.S.C. 20106, issuance of these § 236.909 Minimum performance 236.1041 Training and qualification standards. regulations preempts any state law, program, general. regulation, or order covering the same * * * * * 236.1043 Task analysis and basic subject matter, except an additional or (e) * * * requirements. more stringent law, regulation, or order (1) * * * The total risk assessment 236.1045 Training specific to office control that is necessary to eliminate or reduce must have a supporting sensitivity personnel. an essentially local safety or security analysis. The analysis must confirm that 236.1047 Training specific to locomotive hazard; is not incompatible with a law, the risk metrics of the system are not engineers and other operating personnel. regulation, or order of the United States negatively affected by sensitivity 236.1049 Training specific to roadway workers. Government; and that does not impose analysis input parameters including, for an unreasonable burden on interstate example, component failure rates, Subpart I—Positive Train Control commerce. human factor error rates, and variations Systems (2) This part establishes federal in train traffic affecting exposure. In this standards of care for railroad signal and context, ‘‘negatively affected’’ means that § 236.1001 Purpose and scope. train control systems. This part does not the final residual risk metric does not (a) This subpart prescribes minimum, preempt an action under state law exceed that of the base case or that performance-based safety standards for seeking damages for personal injury, which has been otherwise established PTC systems required by 49 U.S.C. death, or property damage alleging that through MTTHE target. The sensitivity 20157, this subpart, or an FRA order, a party has failed to comply with the analysis must document the sensitivity including requirements to ensure that federal standard of care established by to worst case failure scenarios. * * * the development, functionality,

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architecture, installation, Interoperability means the ability of a PTC System Certification means implementation, inspection, testing, controlling locomotive to communicate certification as required under 49 U.S.C. operation, maintenance, repair, and with and respond to the PTC railroad’s 20157 and further described in modification of those PTC systems will positive train control system, including §§ 236.1009 and 236.1015. achieve and maintain an acceptable uninterrupted movements over property Request for Amendment (‘‘RFA’’) level of safety. This subpart also boundaries. means a request for an amendment of a prescribes standards to ensure that Limited operations means operations plan or system made by a PTC railroad personnel working with, and affected on main line track that have limited or in accordance with § 236.1021. by, safety-critical PTC system related no freight operations and are approved Request for Expedited Certification products receive appropriate training to be excluded from this subpart’s PTC (‘‘REC’’) means, as further described in and testing. system implementation and operation (b) Each railroad may prescribe requirements in accordance with § 236.1031, a request by a railroad to additional or more stringent rules, and § 236.1019(c); receive expedited consideration for PTC other special instructions, that are not Main line means, except as provided System Certification. inconsistent with this subpart. in § 236.1019 or where all trains are Restricted speed means, Speed, (c) This subpart does not exempt a limited to restricted speed within a yard restricted, as defined in subpart G of this railroad from compliance with any or terminal area or on auxiliary or part. requirement of subparts A through H of industry tracks, a segment or route of Safe State means a system state that, this part or parts 233, 234, and 235 of railroad tracks: when the system fails, cannot cause this chapter, unless: (1) Of a Class I railroad, as death, injury, occupational illness, or (1) It is otherwise explicitly excepted documented in current timetables filed damage to or loss of equipment or by this subpart; or by the Class I railroad with the FRA property, or damage to the environment. (2) The applicable PTCSP, as defined under § 217.7 of this title, over which Segment of track means any part of under § 236.1003 and approved by FRA 5,000,000 or more gross tons of railroad under § 236.1015, provides for such an traffic is transported annually; or the railroad where a train operates. exception per § 236.1013. (2) Used for regularly scheduled Temporal separation means that intercity or commuter rail passenger passenger and freight operations do not § 236.1003 Definitions. service, as defined in 49 U.S.C. 24102, operate on any segment of shared track (a) Definitions contained in subparts or both. Tourist, scenic, historic, or during the same period and as further G and H of this part apply equally to excursion operations as defined in part defined under § 236.1019 and the this subpart. 238 of this chapter are not considered process or processes in place to assure (b) The following definitions apply to intercity or commuter passenger service that result. terms used only in this subpart unless for purposes of this part. Tenant railroad means a railroad, otherwise stated: Main line track exclusion addendum other than a host railroad, operating on After-arrival mandatory directive (‘‘MTEA’’) means the document means an authority to occupy a track track upon which a PTC system is submitted under §§ 236.1011 and required. which is issued to a train that is not 236.1019 requesting to designate track Track segment means segment of effective and not to be acted upon until as other than main line. after the arrival and passing of a train, Medium speed means, Speed, track. or trains, specifically identified in the medium, as defined in subpart G of this Type Approval means a number authority. part. assigned to a particular PTC system Associate Administrator means the NPI means a Notice of Product Intent indicating FRA agreement that the PTC FRA Associate Administrator for (‘‘NPI’’) as further described in system could fulfill the requirements of Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer. § 236.1013. this subpart. Class I railroad means a railroad PTC means positive train control as Train means one or more locomotives, which in the last year for which further described in § 236.1005. coupled with or without cars. revenues were reported exceeded the PTCDP means a PTC Development threshold established under regulations Plan as further described in § 236.1013. § 236.1005 Requirements for Positive Train of the Surface Transportation Board (49 PTCIP means a PTC Implementation Control systems. CFR part 1201.1–1 (2008)). Plan as required under 49 U.S.C. 20157 (a) PTC system requirements. Each Cleartext means the un-encrypted text and further described in § 236.1011. PTC system required to be installed in its original, human readable, form. It PTCPVL means a PTC Product Vendor under this subpart shall: is the input of an encryption or encipher List as further described in § 236.1023. process, and the output of an decryption PTCSP means a PTC Safety Plan as (1) Reliably and functionally prevent: or decipher process. further described in § 236.1015. (i) Train-to-train collisions—including Controlling locomotive means PTC railroad means each Class I collisions between trains operating over Locomotive, controlling, as defined in railroad and each entity providing rail-to-rail at-grade crossings in § 232.5 of this chapter. regularly scheduled intercity or accordance with the following risk- Host railroad means a railroad that commuter rail passenger transportation based table or alternative arrangements has effective operating control over a required to implement or operate a PTC providing an equivalent level of safety segment of track. system. as specified in an FRA approved PTCSP:

Crossing type Max speed * Protection required

(A) Interlocking—one or more PTC ≤ 40 miles per hour ...... Interlocking signal arrangement in accordance with the requirements routes intersecting with one or of subparts A–G of this part and PTC enforced stop on PTC more non-PTC routes. routes.

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Crossing type Max speed * Protection required

(B) Interlocking—one or more PTC > 40 miles per hour ...... Interlocking signal arrangement in accordance with the requirements routes intersecting with one or of subparts A–G of this part, PTC enforced stop on all PTC routes, more non-PTC routes. and either the use of other than full PTC technology that provides positive stop enforcement or a split-point derail incorporated into the signal system accompanied by 20 miles per hour maximum al- lowable speed on the approach of any intersecting non-PTC route. (C) Interlocking—all PTC routes Any speed ...... Interlocking signal arrangements in accordance with the requirements intersecting. of subparts A–G of this part, and PTC enforced stop on all routes.

(ii) Overspeed derailments, including 49 miles per hour, respectively, in areas of the subject track segment from the derailments related to railroad civil without broken rail detection or PTCIP listing of lines to be equipped. engineering speed restrictions, slow equivalent safeguards. (3) Addition of track segments. To the orders, and excessive speeds over (b) PTC system installation. (1) Lines extent increases in freight rail traffic switches and through turnouts; required to be equipped. Except as occur subsequent to calendar year 2008 (iii) Incursions into established work otherwise provided in this subpart, each that might affect the requirement to zone limits without first receiving Class I railroad and each railroad install a PTC system on any line not yet appropriate authority and verification providing or hosting intercity or equipped, the railroad shall seek to from the dispatcher or roadway worker commuter passenger service shall amend its PTCIP by promptly filing an in charge, as applicable and in progressively equip its lines as provided RFA in accordance with § 236.1021. The accordance with part 214 of this in its approved PTCIP such that, on and following criteria apply: chapter; and after December 31, 2015, a PTC system (i) If rail traffic exceeds 5 million (iv) The movement of a train through certified under § 236.1015 is installed gross tons in any year after 2008, the a main line switch in the improper and operated by the host railroad on tonnage shall be calculated for the position as further described in each: preceding two calendar years and if the paragraph (e) of this section. (i) Main line over which is total tonnage for those two calendar (2) Include safety-critical integration transported any quantity of material years exceeds 10 million gross tons, a of all authorities and indications of a poisonous by inhalation (PIH), PTCIP or its amendment is required. wayside or cab signal system, or other including anhydrous ammonia, as (ii) If PIH traffic is carried on a track similar appliance, method, device, or defined in §§ 171.8, 173.115 and segment as a result of a request for rail system of equivalent safety, in a manner 173.132 of this title; service or rerouting warranted under by which the PTC system shall provide (ii) Main line used for regularly part 172 of this title, and if the line associated warning and enforcement to provided intercity or commuter carries in excess of 5 million gross tons the extent, and except as, described and passenger service, except as provided in of rail traffic as determined under this justified in the FRA approved PTCDP or § 236.1019; and paragraph, a PTCIP or its amendment is PTCSP, as applicable; (iii) Additional line of railroad as required. This does not apply when (3) As applicable, perform the required by the applicable FRA temporary rerouting is authorized in additional functions specified in this approved PTCIP, this subpart, or an accordance with paragraph (g) of this subpart; FRA order requiring installation of a section. (4) Provide an appropriate warning or PTC system by that date. (iii) Once a railroad is notified by FRA enforcement when: (2) Initial baseline identification of that its RFA filed in accordance with (i) A derail or switch protecting access lines. For the purposes of paragraph this paragraph has been approved, the to the main line required by § 236.1007, (b)(1)(i) of this section, the baseline railroad shall equip the line with the or otherwise provided for in the information necessary to determine applicable PTC system by December 31, applicable PTCSP, is not in its derailing whether a Class I railroad’s track 2015, or within 24 months, whichever is or protecting position, respectively; (ii) A mandatory directive is issued segment shall be equipped with a PTC later. associated with a highway-rail grade system shall be determined and (4) Exclusion or removal of track crossing warning system malfunction as reported as follows: segments from PTC baseline. required by §§ 234.105, 234.106, or (i) The traffic density threshold of 5 (i) Routing changes. In a PTCIP or an 234.107; million gross tons shall be based upon RFA, a railroad may request review of (iii) An after-arrival mandatory calendar year 2008 gross tonnage, the requirement to install PTC on a track directive has been issued and the train except to the extent that traffic may fall segment where a PTC system is or trains to be waited on has not yet below 5 million gross tons for two otherwise required by this section, but passed the location of the receiving consecutive calendar years and a PTCIP has not yet been installed, based upon train; or an RFA reflecting this change is filed changes in rail traffic such as reductions (iv) Any movable bridge within the and approved under paragraph (b)(4) of in total traffic volume or cessation of route ahead is not in a position to allow this section and, if applicable, passenger or PIH service. Any such permissive indication for a train § 236.1021. request shall be accompanied by movement pursuant to § 236.312; and (ii) The presence or absence of any estimated traffic projections for the next (v) A hazard detector integrated into quantity of PIH hazardous materials 5 years (e.g., as a result of planned the PTC system that is required by shall be determined by whether one or rerouting, coordinations, or location of paragraph (c) of this section, or more cars containing such product(s) new business on the line). Where the otherwise provided for in the applicable was transported over the track segment request involves prior or planned PTCSP, detects an unsafe condition or in calendar year 2008 or prior to the rerouting of PIH traffic, the railroad transmits an alarm; and filing of the PTCIP, except to the extent must provide a supporting analysis that (5) Limit the speed of passenger and that the PTCIP or RFA justifies, under takes into consideration the freight trains to 59 miles per hour and paragraph (b)(4) of this section, removal requirements of subpart I, part 172 of

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this title, assuming the subject route and has not yet been installed, based upon (5) Line sales. FRA does not approve each practicable alternative route to be the presence of a minimal quantity of removal of a line from the PTCIP PTC-equipped, and including any PIH hazardous materials (less than 100 exclusively based upon a representation interline routing impacts. cars per year, loaded and residue). Any that a track segment will be abandoned (A) FRA will approve the exclusion if, such request shall be accompanied by or sold to another railroad. In the event based upon data in the docket of the estimated traffic projections for the next a track segment is approved for proceeding, FRA finds that it would be 5 years (e.g., as a result of planned abandonment or transfer by the Surface consistent with safety as further rerouting, coordinations, or location of Transportation Board, FRA will review provided in this paragraph. new business on the line). Where the at the request of the transferring and (1) In the case of a requested request involves prior or planned acquiring railroads whether the exclusion based on cessation of rerouting of PIH traffic, the railroad requirement to install PTC on the line passenger service or a decline in gross must provide the information and should be removed given all of the tonnage below 5 million gross tons as analysis identified in paragraph (b)(4)(i) circumstances, including expected computed over a 2-year period, the of this section. The submission shall traffic and hazardous materials levels, removal will be approved absent special also include a full description of reservation of trackage or haulage rights circumstances as set forth in writing potential safety hazards on the segment by the transferring railroad, routing (e.g., because of anticipated traffic of track and fully describe train analysis under part 172 of this chapter, growth in the near future). operations over the line. This provision commercial and real property (2) In the case of cessation of PIH is not applicable to lines segments used arrangements affecting the transferring traffic over a track segment, and absent by intercity or commuter passenger and acquiring railroads post-transfer, special circumstances set forth in service. and such other factors as may be writing, FRA will approve an exclusion (B) Absent special circumstances relevant to continue safe operations on of a line from the PTCIP (determined on related to specific hazards presented by the line. If FRA denies the request, the the basis of 2008 traffic levels) upon a operations on the line segment, FRA acquiring railroad shall install the PTC showing by the railroad that: will approve a request for relief under system on the schedule provided in the (i) There is no remaining local PIH this paragraph for a rail line segment: transferring railroad’s PTCIP, without traffic expected on the track segment; (1) Consisting exclusively of Class 1 regard to whether it is a Class I railroad. (ii) Either any rerouting of PIH traffic or 2 track as described in part 213 of (6) New rail passenger service. No from the subject track segment is this title; new intercity or commuter rail justified based upon the route analysis (2) That carries less than 15 million passenger service shall commence after submitted, which shall assume that each gross tons annually; December 31, 2015, until a PTC system alternative route will be equipped with (3) Has a ruling grade of less than 1 certified under this subpart has been PTC and shall take into consideration percent; and installed and made operative. any significant interline routing (4) On which any train transporting a (c) Hazard detectors. (1) All hazard impacts; or the next preferred car containing PIH materials (including detectors integrated into a signal or train alternative route in the analysis a residue car) is operated under control system on or after October 16, conducted as set forth in this paragraph conditions of temporal separation from 2008, shall be integrated into PTC is shown to be substantially as safe and other trains using the line segment as systems required by this subpart; and secure as the route employing the track documented by a temporal separation their warnings shall be appropriately segment in question and demonstrated plan accompanying the request. As used and timely enforced as described in the considerations of practicability indicate in this paragraph, ‘‘temporal separation’’ applicable PTCSP. consolidation of the traffic on that next has the same meaning given by (2) The applicable PTCSP must preferred alternative route; and § 236.1019(e), except that the separation provide for receipt and presentation to (iii) After cessation of PIH traffic on addressed is the separation of a train the locomotive engineer and other train the line, the remaining risk associated carrying any number of cars containing crew members of warnings from any with PTC-preventable accidents per PIH materials from other freight trains. additional hazard detectors using the route mile on the track segment will not (C) FRA will also consider, and may PTC data network, onboard displays, exceed the average comparable risk per approve, requests for relief under this and audible alerts. If the PTCSP so route mile on Class I lines in the United paragraph for additional line segments provides, the action to be taken by the States required to be equipped with PTC where each such segment carries less system and by the crew members shall because of gross tonnage and the than 15 million gross tons annually and be specified. presence of PIH traffic (which base case where it is established to the satisfaction (3) The PTCDP (as applicable) and will be estimated as of a time prior to of the Associate Administrator that risk PTCSP for any new service described in installation of PTC). If the subject risk mitigations will be applied that will § 236.1007 to be conducted above 90 is greater than the average risk on those ensure that risk of a release of PIH miles per hour shall include a hazard PIH lines, and if the railroad making the materials is negligible. analysis describing the hazards relevant application for removal of the track (D) Failure to submit sufficient to the specific route(s) in question (e.g., segment from the PTCIP offers no information will result in the denial of potential for track obstruction due to compensating extension of PTC or PTC any request under this paragraph events such as falling rock or technologies from the minimum (b)(4)(ii). If the request is granted, on undermining of the track structure due required to be equipped, FRA may deny and after the date the line would have to high water or displacement of a the request. otherwise been required to be equipped bridge over navigable waters), the basis (B) [Reserved] under the schedule contained in the for decisions concerning hazard (ii) Lines with de minimis PIH risk. PTCIP and approved by FRA, operations detectors provided, and the manner in (A) In a PTCIP or RFA, a railroad may on the line shall be conducted in which such additional hazard detectors request review of the requirement to accordance with any conditions will be interfaced with the PTC system. install PTC on a low density track attached to the grant, including (d) Event recorders. (1) Each lead segment where a PTC system is implementation of proposed mitigations locomotive, as defined in part 229, of a otherwise required by this section, but as applicable. train equipped and operating with a

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PTC system required by this subpart (i) Is made without the benefit of the indication or as provided by operating must be equipped with an operative indications of a wayside or cab signal rule. event recorder, which shall: system or other similar appliance, (2) Operation of trains within the (i) Record safety-critical train control method, device, or system of equivalent limits of a joint mandatory directive. data routed to the locomotive engineer’s safety proposed to FRA and approved (g) Temporary rerouting. A train display that the engineer is required to by the Associate Administrator in equipped with a PTC system as required comply with; accordance with this part; or by this subpart may be temporarily (ii) Specifically include text messages (ii) Would create an unacceptable rerouted onto a track not equipped with conveying mandatory directives, risk. Unacceptable risk includes a PTC system and a train not equipped maximum authorized speeds, PTC conditions when traversing the switch, with a PTC system may be temporarily system brake warnings, PTC system even at low speeds, could result in rerouted onto a track equipped with a brake enforcements, and the state of the direct conflict with the movement of PTC system as required by this subpart PTC system (e.g., cut in, cut out, active, another train (including a hand- in the following circumstances: or failed); and operated crossover between main tracks, (1) Emergencies. In the event of an (iii) Include examples of how the a hand-operated crossover between a emergency—including conditions such captured data will be displayed during main track and an adjoining siding or as derailment, flood, fire, tornado, playback along with the format, content, auxiliary track, or a hand-operated hurricane, earthquake, or other similar and data retention duration switch providing access to another circumstance outside of the railroad’s requirements specified in the PTCSP subdivision or branch line, etc.). control—that would prevent usage of submitted and approved pursuant to (3) A PTC system required by this the regularly used track if: this paragraph. If such train control data subpart shall be designed, installed, and (i) The rerouting is applicable only can be calibrated against other data maintained to perform the switch until the emergency condition ceases to required by this part, it may, at the position detection and enforcement exist and for no more than 14 election of the railroad, be retained in a described in paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) consecutive calendar days, unless separate memory module. of this section, except as provided for otherwise extended by approval of the (2) Each lead locomotive, as defined and justified in the applicable, FRA Associate Administrator; in part 229, manufactured and in service approved PTCDP or PTCSP. (ii) The railroad provides written or after October 1, 2009, that is equipped (4) The control circuit or electronic telephonic notification to the applicable and operating with a PTC system equivalent for all movement authorities Regional Administrator of the required by this subpart, shall be over any switches, movable-point frogs, information listed in paragraph (i) of equipped with an event recorder or derails shall be selected through this section within one business day of memory module meeting the crash circuit controller or functionally the beginning of the rerouting made in hardening requirements of § 229.135 of equivalent device operated directly by accordance with this paragraph; and this chapter. the switch points, derail, or by switch (iii) The conditions contained in (3) Nothing in this subpart excepts locking mechanism, or through relay or paragraph (j) of this section are compliance with any of the event electronic device controlled by such followed. recorder requirements contained in circuit controller or functionally (2) Planned maintenance. In the event § 229.135 of this chapter. equivalent device, for each switch, of planned maintenance that would (e) Switch position. The following movable-point frog, or derail in the prevent usage of the regularly used track requirements apply with respect to route governed. Circuits or electronic if: determining proper switch position equivalent shall be arranged so that any (i) The maintenance period does not under this section. When a main line movement authorities less restrictive exceed 30 days; switch position is unknown or than those prescribed in paragraphs (ii) A request is filed with the improperly aligned for a train’s route in (e)(1) and (e)(2) of this section can only applicable Regional Administrator in advance of the train’s movement, the be provided when each switch, accordance with paragraph (i) of this PTC system will provide warning of the movable-point frog, or derail in the section no less than 10 business days condition associated with the following route governed is in proper position, prior to the planned rerouting; and enforcement: and shall be in accordance with (iii) The conditions contained in (1) A PTC system shall enforce subparts A through G of this part, unless paragraph (j) of this section are restricted speed over any switch: it is otherwise provided in a PTCSP followed. (i) Where train movements are made approved under this subpart. (h) Rerouting requests. (1) For the with the benefit of the indications of a (f) Train-to-train collision. A PTC purposes of paragraph (g)(2) of this wayside or cab signal system or other system shall be considered to be section, the rerouting request shall be similar appliance, method, device, or configured to prevent train-to-train self-executing unless the applicable system of equivalent safety proposed to collisions within the meaning of Regional Administrator responds with a FRA and approved by the Associate paragraph (a) of this section if trains are notice disapproving of the rerouting or Administrator in accordance with this required to be operated at restricted providing instructions to allow part; and speed and if the onboard PTC rerouting. Such instructions may (ii) Where wayside or cab signal equipment enforces the upper limits of include providing additional system or other similar appliance, the railroad’s restricted speed rule (15 or information to the Regional method, device, or system of equivalent 20 miles per hour). This application Administrator or Associate safety, requires the train to be operated applies to: Administrator prior to the at restricted speed. (1) Operating conditions under which commencement of rerouting. Once the (2) A PTC system shall enforce a trains are required by signal indication Regional Administrator responds with a positive stop short of any main line or operating rule to: notice under this paragraph, no switch, and any switch on a siding (i) Stop before continuing; or rerouting may occur until the Regional where the allowable speed is in excess (ii) Reduce speed to restricted speed Administrator or Associate of 20 miles per hour, if movement of the and continue at restricted speed until Administrator provides his or her train over the switch: encountering a more favorable approval.

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(2) In the event the temporary PTC lines that are equipped with shall be filed not later than December rerouting described in paragraph (g)(2) operative PTC onboard equipment. The 31, 2017 and, if all necessary of this section is to exceed 30 PTCIP shall include a brief but locomotives are not yet equipped, on consecutive calendar days: sufficient explanation of how those December 31, 2019. (i) The railroad shall provide a request goals will be achieved, including (c) When a train movement is in accordance with paragraphs (i) and (j) assignment of responsibilities within conducted under the exceptions of this section with the Associate the organization. The goals shall be described in paragraph (b)(4) of this Administrator no less than 10 business expressed as the percentage of trains section, that movement shall be made in days prior to the planned rerouting; and operating on PTC-equipped lines that accordance with § 236.1029. (ii) The rerouting shall not commence are equipped with operative onboard until receipt of approval from the § 236.1007 Additional requirements for PTC apparatus responsive to the high-speed service. Associate Administrator. wayside, expressed as an annualized (i) Content of rerouting request. Each (calendar year) percentage for the (a) A PTC railroad that conducts a notice or request referenced in railroad as a whole. passenger operation at or greater than 60 paragraph (g) and (h) of this section (2) Each railroad shall adhere to its miles per hour or a freight operation at must indicate: PTCIP and shall report, on April 16, of or greater than 50 miles per hour shall (1) The dates that such temporary 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, its progress have installed a PTC system including rerouting will occur; toward achieving the goals set under or working in concert with technology (2) The number and types of trains paragraph (b)(1) of this section. In the that includes all of the safety-critical that will be rerouted; event any annual goal is not achieved, functional attributes of a block signal (3) The location of the affected tracks; the railroad shall further report the system meeting the requirements of this and actions it is taking to ensure part, including appropriate fouling (4) A description of the necessity for achievement of subsequent annual circuits and broken rail detection (or the temporary rerouting. goals. equivalent safeguards). (j) Rerouting conditions. Rerouting of (3) On and after December 31, 2015, (b) In addition to the requirements of operations under paragraph (g) of this a train controlled by a locomotive with paragraph (a) of this section, a host section may occur under the following an onboard PTC apparatus that has railroad that conducts a freight or conditions: failed en route is permitted to operate in passenger operation at more than 90 (1) Where a train not equipped with accordance with § 236.1029. miles per hour shall: a PTC system is rerouted onto a track (4) A train operated by a Class II or (1) Have an approved PTCSP equipped with a PTC system, or a train Class III railroad, including a tourist or establishing that the system was not equipped with a PTC system that is excursion railroad, and controlled by a designed and will be operated to meet compatible and functionally responsive locomotive not equipped with an the fail-safe operation criteria described to the PTC system utilized on the line onboard PTC apparatus is permitted to in Appendix C to this part; and to which the train is being rerouted, the operate on a PTC-operated track (2) Prevent unauthorized or train shall be operated in accordance segment: unintended entry onto the main line with § 236.1029; or (i) That either: from any track not equipped with a PTC (2) Where any train is rerouted onto (A) Has no regularly scheduled system compliant with this subpart by a track not equipped with a PTC system, intercity or commuter passenger rail placement of split-point derails or the train shall be operated in accordance traffic; or equivalent means integrated into the with the operating rules applicable to (B) Has regularly scheduled intercity PTC system; and the line on which the train is rerouted. or commuter passenger rail traffic and (3) Comply with § 236.1029(c). (k) Rerouting cessation. The the applicable PTCIP permits the (c) In addition to the requirements of applicable Regional Administrator may operation of a train operated by a Class paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, a order a railroad to cease any rerouting II or III railroad and controlled by a host railroad that conducts a freight or provided under paragraph (g) or (h) of locomotive not equipped with an passenger operation at more than 125 this section. onboard PTC apparatus; miles per hour shall have an approved (ii) Where operations are restricted to PTCSP accompanied by a document § 236.1006 Equipping locomotives four or less such unequipped trains per (‘‘HSR–125’’) establishing that the operating in PTC territory. day, whereas a train conducting a ‘‘turn’’ system: (a) Except as provided in paragraph operation (e.g., moving to a point of (1) Will be operated at a level of safety (b) of this section, each train operating interchange to drop off or pick up cars comparable to that achieved over the 5 on any track segment equipped with a and returning to the track owned by a year period prior to the submission of PTC system shall be controlled by a Class II or III railroad) is considered two the PTCSP by other train control locomotive equipped with an onboard trains for this purpose; and systems that perform PTC functions PTC apparatus that is fully operative (iii) Where each movement shall required by this subpart, and which and functioning in accordance with the either: have been utilized on high-speed rail applicable PTCSP approved under this (A) Not exceed 20 miles in length; or systems with similar technical and subpart. (B) To the extent any movement operational characteristics in the United (b) Exceptions. (1) Prior to December exceeds 20 miles in length, such States or in foreign service, provided 31, 2015, each railroad required to movement is not permitted without the that the use of foreign service data must install PTC shall include in its PTCIP controlling locomotive being equipped be approved by the Associate specific goals for progressive with an onboard PTC system after Administrator before submittal of the implementation of onboard systems and December 31, 2020, and each applicable PTCSP; and deployment of PTC-equipped Class II or III railroad shall report to (2) Has been designed to detect locomotives such that the safety benefits FRA its progress in equipping each incursions into the right-of-way, of PTC are achieved through necessary locomotive with an onboard including incidents involving motor incremental growth in the percentage of PTC apparatus to facilitate continuation vehicles diverting from adjacent roads controlling locomotives operating on of the movement. The progress reports and bridges, where conditions warrant.

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(d) In addition to the requirements of (iii) Provide the Associate of receipt of that notification, the paragraphs (a) through (c) of this Administrator with a comprehensive list railroad or other entity that submitted section, a host railroad that conducts a of all issues not in agreement between the plan shall correct all deficiencies freight or passenger operation at more the railroads that would prevent the and resubmit the plan in accordance than 150 miles per hour, which is subject railroads from jointly filing the with this section and § 236.1011, as governed by a Rule of Particular PTCIP; and applicable. Applicability, shall have an approved (iv) Confer with the Associate (ii) If an update to a ‘‘Provisionally PTCSP accompanied by a HSR–125 Administrator to develop and submit a Approved’’ PTCIP is not received by the developed as part of an overall system PTCIP mutually acceptable to all subject Associate Administrator by the end of safety plan approved by the Associate railroads. the period indicated in this paragraph, Administrator. (b) Type Approval. Each host railroad, the ‘‘Provisional Approval’’ given to the (e) A railroad providing existing high- individually or jointly with others such PTCIP is automatically revoked. The speed passenger service may request in as a tenant railroad or system supplier, revocation is retroactive to the date the its PTCSP that the Associate shall file prior to or simultaneously with original PTCIP and NPI were first Administrator excuse compliance with the filing made in accordance with submitted to the Associate one or more requirements of this section paragraph (a) of this section: Administrator. upon a showing that the subject service (1) An unmodified Type Approval (d) PTCSP and PTC System has been conducted with a high level of previously issued by the Associate Certification. The following apply to safety. Administrator in accordance with each PTCSP and PTC System § 236.1013 or § 236.1031(b) with its Certification. § 236.1009 Procedural requirements. associated docket number; (1) A PTC System Certification for a (a) PTC Implementation Plan (PTCIP). (2) A PTCDP requesting a Type PTC system may be obtained by (1) By April 16, 2010, each host railroad Approval for: submitting an acceptable PTCSP. If the that is required to implement and (i) A PTC system that does not have PTC system is the subject of a Type operate a PTC system in accordance a Type Approval; or Approval, the safety case elements with § 236.1005(b) shall develop and (ii) A PTC system with a previously contained in the PTCDP may be submit in accordance with § 236.1011(a) issued Type Approval that requires one incorporated by reference into the a PTCIP for implementing a PTC system or more variances; PTCSP, subject to finalization of the required under § 236.1005. Filing of the (3) A PTCSP subject to the conditions human factors analysis contained in the PTCIP shall not exempt the required set forth in paragraph (c) of this section, PTCDP. filings of an NPI, PTCSP, PTCDP, or with or without a Type Approval; or (2) Each PTCSP requirement under Type Approval. (4) A document attesting that a Type § 236.1015 shall be supported by (2) After April 16, 2010, a host Approval is not necessary since the host information and analysis sufficient to railroad shall file: railroad has no territory for which a PTC establish that the requirements of this (i) A PTCIP if it becomes a host system is required under this subpart. subpart have been satisfied. railroad of a main line track segment for (c) Notice of Product Intent (NPI). A (3) If the Associate Administrator which it is required to implement and railroad may, in lieu of submitting a finds that the PTCSP and supporting operate a PTC system in accordance PTCDP, or referencing an already issued documentation support a finding that with § 236.1005(b); or Type Approval, submit an NPI (ii) A request for amendment (‘‘RFA’’) the system complies with this part, the describing the functions of the proposed Associate Administrator may approve of its current and approved PTCIP in PTC system. If a railroad elects to file an accordance with § 236.1021 if it intends the PTCSP. If the Associate NPI in lieu of a PTCDP or referencing Administrator approves the PTCSP, the to: an existing Type Approval with the (A) Initiate a new category of service railroad shall receive PTC System PTCIP, and the PTCIP is otherwise Certification for the subject PTC system (i.e., passenger or freight); or acceptable to the Associate (B) Add, subtract, or otherwise and shall implement the PTC system Administrator, the Associate materially modify one or more lines of according to the PTCSP. Administrator may grant provisional railroad for which installation of a PTC (4) A required PTC system shall not: approval of the PTCIP. system is required. (i) Be used in service until it receives (3) The host and tenant railroad(s) (1) A provisional approval of a PTCIP, from FRA a PTC System Certification; shall jointly file a PTCIP that addresses unless otherwise extended by the and shared track: Associate Administrator, is valid for a (ii) Receive a PTC System (i) If the host railroad is required to period of 270 days from the date of Certification unless FRA receives and install and operate a PTC system on a approval by the Associate approves an applicable: segment of its track; and Administrator. (A) PTCSP; or (ii) If the tenant railroad that shares (2) The railroad must submit an (B) Request for Expedited the same track segment would have updated PTCIP with either a complete Certification (REC) as defined by been required to install a PTC system if PTCDP as defined in § 236.1013(a), an § 236.1031(a). the host railroad had not otherwise been updated PTCIP referencing an already (e) Plan contents. (1) No PTCIP shall required to do so. approved Type Approval, or a full receive approval unless it complies with (4) If railroads required to file a joint PTCSP within 270 days after the § 236.1011. No railroad shall receive a PTCIP are unable to jointly file a PTCIP ‘‘Provisional Approval.’’ Type Approval or PTC System in accordance with paragraphs (a)(1) (i) Within 90 days of receipt of an Certification unless the applicable and (a)(3) of this section, then each updated PTCIP that was submitted with PTCDP or PTCSP, respectively, comply railroad shall: an NPI, the Associate Administrator will with §§ 236.1013 and 236.1015, (i) Separately file a PTCIP in approve or disapprove of the updated respectively. accordance with paragraph (a)(1); PTCIP and notify in writing the affected (2) All materials filed in accordance (ii) Notify the Associate Administrator railroad. If the updated PTCIP is not with this subpart must be in the English that the subject railroads were unable to approved, the notification will include language, or have been translated into agree on a PTCIP to be jointly filed; the plan’s deficiencies. Within 30 days English and attested as true and correct.

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(3) Each filing referenced in this (ii) Allow continued operations under § 236.1011 PTC Implementation Plan section may include a request for full or such conditions the Associate content requirements. partial confidentiality in accordance Administrator deems necessary to (a) Contents. A PTCIP filed pursuant with § 209.11 of this chapter. If ensure safety; or to this subpart shall, at a minimum, confidentiality is requested as to a (iii) Revoke the Type Approval or PTC describe: portion of any applicable document, System Certification and direct the (1) The functional requirements that then in addition to the filing railroad to cease operations where PTC the proposed system must meet; requirements under § 209.11 of this systems are required under this subpart. (2) How the PTC railroad intends to chapter, the person filing the document (h) FRA access. The Associate comply with §§ 236.1009(c) and (d); shall also file a copy of the original Administrator, or that person’s (3) How the PTC system will provide unredacted document, marked to designated representatives, shall be for interoperability of the system indicate which portions are redacted in afforded reasonable access to monitor, between the host and all tenant the document’s confidential version test, and inspect processes, procedures, railroads on the track segments required without obscuring the original facilities, documents, records, design to be equipped with PTC systems under document’s contents. and testing materials, artifacts, training this subpart and: (i) Include relevant provisions of (f) Supporting documentation and materials and programs, and any other agreements, executed by all applicable information. (1) Issuance of a Type information used in the design, railroads, in place to achieve Approval or PTC System Certification is development, manufacture, test, interoperability; contingent upon FRA’s confidence in implementation, and operation of the (ii) List all methods used to obtain the implementation and operation of the system, as well as interview any subject PTC system. This confidence interoperability; and personnel: (iii) Identify any railroads with may be based on FRA-monitored field (1) Associated with a PTC system for testing or an independent assessment respect to which interoperability which a Type Approval or PTC System agreements have not been achieved as of performed in accordance with Certification has been requested or § 236.1035 or § 236.1017, respectively. the time the plan is filed, the practical provided; or obstacles that were encountered that (2) Upon request by FRA, the railroad (2) To determine whether a railroad requesting a Type Approval or PTC prevented resolution, and the further has been in compliance with this steps planned to overcome those System Certification must engage in subpart. field testing or independent assessment obstacles; (i) Foreign regulatory entity (4) How, to the extent practical, the performed in accordance with verification. Information that has been PTC system will be implemented to § 236.1035 or § 236.1017, respectively, certified under the auspices of a foreign address areas of greater risk to the to support the assertions made in any of regulatory entity recognized by the public and railroad employees before the plans submitted under this subpart. Associate Administrator may, at the areas of lesser risk; These assertions include any of the Associate Administrator’s sole (5) The sequence and schedule in plans’ content requirements under this discretion, be accepted as which track segments will be equipped subpart. independently Verified and Validated and the basis for those decisions, and (g) FRA conditions, reconsiderations, and used to support each railroad’s shall at a minimum address the and modifications. (1) As necessary to development of the PTCSP. following risk factors by track segment: ensure safety, FRA may attach special (i) Segment traffic characteristics such conditions to approving a PTCIP or (j) Processing times for PTCDP and PTCSP. as typical annual passenger and freight issuing a Type Approval or PTC System train volume and volume of poison- or Certification. (1) Within 30 days of receipt of a PTCDP or PTCSP, the Associate toxic-by-inhalation (PIH or TIH) (2) After granting a Type Approval or shipments (loads, residue); PTC System Certification, FRA may Administrator will either acknowledge receipt or acknowledge receipt and (ii) Segment operational reconsider the Type Approval or PTC characteristics such as current method System Certification upon revelation of request more information. (2) To the extent practicable, of operation (including presence or any of the following factors concerning absence of a block signal system), the contents of the PTCDP or PTCSP: considering the scope, complexity, and novelty of the product or change: number of tracks, and maximum (i) Potential error or fraud; allowable train speeds, including (i) FRA will approve, approve with (ii) Potentially invalidated planned modifications; and conditions, or deny the PTCDP within assumptions determined as a result of (iii) Route attributes bearing on risk, 60 days of the date on which the PTCDP in-service experience or one or more including ruling grades and extreme was filed; unsafe events calling into question the curvature; safety analysis supporting the approval. (ii) FRA will approve, approve with (6) The following information relating (3) During FRA’s reconsideration in conditions, or deny the PTCSP within to rolling stock: accordance with this paragraph, the PTC 180 days of the date on which the (i) What rolling stock will be system may remain in use if otherwise PTCSP was filed; equipped with PTC technology; consistent with the applicable law and (iii) If FRA has not approved, (ii) The schedule to equip that rolling regulations and FRA may impose approved with conditions, or denied the stock by December 31, 2015; special conditions for use of the PTC PTCDP or PTCSP within the 60-day or (iii) All documents and information system. 180-day window, as applicable, FRA required by § 236.1006; and (4) After FRA’s reconsideration in will provide the submitting party with (iv) Unless the tenant railroad is filing accordance with this paragraph, FRA a statement of reasons as to why the its own PTCIP, the host railroad’s PTCIP may: submission has not yet been acted upon shall: (i) Dismiss its reconsideration and and a projected deadline by which an (A) Attest that the host railroad has continue to recognize the existing FRA approval or denial will be issued and made a formal written request to each approved Type Approval or PTC System any further consultations or inquiries tenant railroad requesting identification Certification; will be resolved. of each item of rolling stock to be PTC

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system equipped and the date each will (c) FRA review. Within 90 days of interoperability requirements on the be equipped; and receipt of a PTCIP, the Associate same; (B) Include each tenant railroad’s Administrator will approve or (6) An analysis of the applicability to response to the host railroad’s written disapprove of the plan and notify in the PTC system of the requirements of request made in accordance with writing the affected railroad or other subparts A through G of this part that paragraph (a)(6)(iii)(A) of this section; entity. If the PTCIP is not approved, the may no longer apply or are satisfied by (7) The number of wayside devices notification will include the plan’s the PTC system using an alternative required for each track segment and the deficiencies. Within 30 days of receipt method, and a complete explanation of installation schedule to complete of that notification, the railroad or other the manner in which those requirements wayside equipment installation by entity that submitted the plan shall are otherwise fulfilled; December 31, 2015; correct all deficiencies and resubmit the (7) A prioritized service restoration (8) Identification of each track plan in accordance with § 236.1009 and and mitigation plan and a description of segment on the railroad as mainline or paragraph (a) of this section, as the necessary security measures for the non-mainline track. If the PTCIP applicable. system; includes an MTEA, as defined by (d) Subpart H. A railroad that elects (8) A description of target safety levels § 236.1019, the PTCIP should identify to install a PTC system when not (e.g., MTTHE for major subsystems as the tracks included in the MTEA as required to do so may elect to proceed defined in subpart H of this part), main line track with a reference to the under this subpart or under subpart H including requirements for system MTEA; of this part. availability and a description of all (9) To the extent the railroad (e) Upon receipt of a PTCIP, NPI, backup methods of operation and any determines that risk-based prioritization PTCDP, or PTCSP, FRA posts on its critical assumptions associated with the required by paragraph (a)(4) of this public web site notice of receipt and target levels; section is not practical, the basis for this reference to the public docket in which (9) A complete description of how the determination; and a copy of the filing has been placed. PTC system will enforce authorities and (10) The dates the associated PTCDP FRA may consider any public comment signal indications; and PTCSP, as applicable, will be on each document to the extent (10) A description of the deviation submitted to FRA in accordance with practicable within the time allowed by which may be proposed under § 236.1009. law and without delaying § 236.1029(c), if applicable; and (b) Additional Class I railroad PTCIP implementation of PTC systems. (11) A complete description of how requirements. Each Class I railroad shall (f) The PTCIP shall be maintained to the PTC system will appropriately and include: reflect the railroad’s most recent PTC timely enforce all integrated hazard (1) In its PTCIP a strategy for full deployment plans until all PTC system detectors in accordance with deployment of its PTC system, deployments required under this § 236.1005(c)(3), if applicable. describing the criteria that it will apply subpart are complete. (b) If the Associate Administrator in identifying additional rail lines on its finds that the system described in the own network, and rail lines of entities § 236.1013 PTC Development Plan and PTCDP would satisfy the requirements that it controls or engages in joint Notice of Product Intent content for PTC systems under this subpart and operations with, for which full or partial requirements and Type Approval. that the applicant has made a reasonable deployment of PTC technologies is (a) For a PTC system to obtain a Type showing that a system built to the stated appropriate, beyond those required to be Approval from FRA, the PTCDP shall be requirements would achieve the level of equipped under this subpart. Such filed in accordance with § 236.1009 and safety mandated for such a system criteria shall include consideration of shall include: under § 236.1015, the Associate the policies established by 49 U.S.C. (1) A complete description of the PTC Administrator may grant a numbered 20156 (railroad safety risk reduction system, including a list of all PTC Type Approval for the system. program), and regulations issued system components and their physical (c) Each Type Approval shall be valid thereunder, as well as non-safety relationships in the subsystem or for a period of 5 years, subject to business benefits that may accrue. system; automatic and indefinite extension (2) In the Technology Implementation (2) A description of the railroad provided that at least one PTC System Plan of its Risk Reduction Program, operation or categories of operations on Certification using the subject PTC when first required to be filed in which the PTC system is designed to be system has been issued within that accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20156 and used, including train movement density period and not revoked. any regulation promulgated thereunder, (passenger, freight), operating speeds (d) The Associate Administrator may a specification of rail lines selected for (including a thorough explanation of prescribe special conditions, full or partial deployment of PTC under intended compliance with § 236.1007), amendments, and restrictions to any the criteria identified in its PTCIP. track characteristics, and railroad Type Approval as necessary for safety. (3) Nothing in this paragraph shall be operating rules; (e) If submitted, an NPI must contain construed to create an expectation or (3) An operational concepts the following information: requirement that additional rail lines document, including a list with (1) A description of the railroad beyond those required to be equipped complete descriptions of all functions operation or categories of operations on by this subpart must be equipped or that which the PTC system will perform to which the proposed PTC system is such lines will be equipped during the enhance or preserve safety; designed to be used, including train period of primary implementation (4) A document describing the movement density (passenger, freight), ending December 31, 2015. manner in which the PTC system operating speeds (including a thorough (4) As used in this paragraph, ‘‘partial architecture satisfies safety explanation of intended compliance implementation’’ of a PTC system refers requirements; with § 236.1007), track characteristics, to use, pursuant to subpart H of this (5) A preliminary human factors and railroad operating rules; part, of technology embedded in PTC analysis, including a complete (2) An operational concepts systems that does not employ all of the description of all human-machine document, including a list with functionalities required by this subpart. interfaces and the impact of complete descriptions of all functions

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that the proposed PTC system will applicable PTCDP from that as equipment manufacturer’s perform to enhance or preserve safety; described in the PTCSP, and attest that recommendations; (3) A description of target safety levels there are no other such variances; or (8) A complete description of any (e.g., MTTHE for major subsystems as (ii) Attest that there are no variances additional warning to be placed in the defined in subpart H of this part), between the PTC system and its Operations and Maintenance Manual in including requirements for system applicable operating conditions as the same manner specified in § 236.919 availability and a description of all described in the applicable PTCDP from and all warning labels to be placed on backup methods of operation and any that as described in the PTCSP; and equipment as necessary to ensure safety; critical assumptions associated with the (3) Attest that the system was (9) A complete description of the target levels; otherwise built in accordance with the configuration or revision control (4) A complete description of how the applicable PTCDP and PTCSP and measures designed to ensure that the proposed PTC system will enforce achieves the level of safety represented railroad or its contractor does not authorities and signal indications; and therein. adversely affect the safety-functional (5) A complete description of how the (d) A PTCSP shall include the same requirements and that safety-critical proposed PTC system will appropriately information required for a PTCDP under hazard mitigation processes are not and timely enforce all integrated hazard § 236.1013(a). If a PTCDP has been filed compromised as a result of any such detectors in accordance with and approved prior to filing of the change; § 236.1005(c)(3), if applicable. PTCSP, the PTCSP may incorporate the (10) A complete description of all PTCDP by reference, with the exception initial implementation testing § 236.1015 PTC Safety Plan content that a final human factors analysis shall requirements and PTC System Certification. procedures necessary to establish that be provided. The PTCSP shall contain safety-functional requirements are met (a) Before placing a PTC system the following additional elements: required under this part in service, the and safety-critical hazards are (1) A hazard log consisting of a appropriately mitigated; host railroad must submit to FRA a comprehensive description of all safety- PTCSP and receive a PTC System (11) A complete description of all relevant hazards not previously post-implementation testing (validation) Certification. If the Associate addressed by the vendor or supplier to Administrator finds that the PTCSP and and monitoring procedures, including be addressed during the life-cycle of the the intervals necessary to establish that supporting documentation support a PTC system, including maximum finding that the system complies with safety-functional requirements, safety- threshold limits for each hazard (for critical hazard mitigation processes, and this part, the Associate Administrator unidentified hazards, the threshold approves the PTCSP and issues a PTC safety-critical tolerances are not shall be exceeded at one occurrence); compromised over time, through use, or System Certification. Receipt of a PTC (2) A description of the safety after maintenance (adjustment, repair, System Certification affirms that the assurance concepts that are to be used or replacement) is performed; PTC system has been reviewed and for system development, including an (12) A complete description of each approved by FRA in accordance with, explanation of the design principles and record necessary to ensure the safety of and meets the requirements of, this part. assumptions; (b) A PTCSP submitted under this (3) A risk assessment of the as-built the system that is associated with subpart may reference and utilize in PTC system described; periodic maintenance, inspections, accordance with this subpart any Type (4) A hazard mitigation analysis, tests, adjustments, repairs, or Approval previously issued by the including a complete and replacements, and the system’s resulting Associate Administrator to any railroad, comprehensive description of each conditions, including records of provided that the railroad: hazard and the mitigation techniques component failures resulting in safety- (1) Maintains a continually updated used; relevant hazards (see § 236.1037); PTCPVL pursuant to § 236.1023; (5) A complete description of the (13) A safety analysis to determine (2) Shows that the supplier from safety assessment and Verification and whether, when the system is in which they are procuring the PTC Validation processes applied to the PTC operation, any risk remains of an system has established and can system, their results, and whether these unintended incursion into a roadway maintain a quality control system for processes address the safety principles work zone due to human error. If the PTC system design and manufacturing described in Appendix C to this part analysis reveals any such risk, the acceptable to the Associate directly, using other safety criteria, or PTCDP and PTCSP shall describe how Administrator. The quality control not at all; that risk will be mitigated; system must include the process for the (6) A complete description of the (14) A more detailed description of product supplier or vendor to promptly railroad’s training plan for railroad and any alternative arrangements as already and thoroughly report any safety- contractor employees and supervisors provided under § 236.1005(a)(1)(i). relevant failure and previously necessary to ensure safe and proper (15) A complete description of how unidentified hazards to each railroad installation, implementation, operation, the PTC system will enforce authorities using the product; and maintenance, repair, inspection, testing, and signal indications, unless already (3) Provides the applicable licensing and modification of the PTC system; completely provided for in the PTCDP; information. (7) A complete description of the (16) A description of how the PTCSP (c) A PTCSP submitted in accordance specific procedures and test equipment complies with § 236.1019(f), if with this subpart shall: necessary to ensure the safe and proper applicable; (1) Include the FRA approved PTCDP installation, implementation, operation, (17) A description of any deviation in or, if applicable, the FRA issued Type maintenance, repair, inspection, testing, operational requirements for en route Approval; and modification of the PTC system on failures as specified under (2)(i) Specifically and rigorously the railroad and establish safety-critical § 236.1029(c), if applicable and unless document each variance, including the hazards are appropriately mitigated. already completely provided for in the significance of each variance between These procedures, including calibration PTCDP; the PTC system and its applicable requirements, shall be consistent with (18) A complete description of how operating conditions as described in the or explain deviations from the the PTC system will appropriately and

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timely enforce all integrated hazard supporting risk assessment shall apply only to the extent that a detectors in accordance with § 236.1005; evaluate all intended changes in comparative risk assessment was (19) An emergency and planned railroad operations in relation to the required. To the extent practicable, FRA maintenance temporary rerouting plan introduction of the new system and makes this determination not later than indicating how operations on the shall examine in detail the direct and review of the PTCIP and the subject PTC system will take advantage indirect effects of all changes in the accompanying PTCDP or PTCSP. If an of the benefits provided under method of operations. independent assessment is required, the § 236.1005(g) through (k); and (4) Mixed systems. If a PTC system assessment may apply to the entire (20) The documents and information combining overlay, stand-alone, vital, or system or a designated portion of the required under § 236.1007 and non-vital characteristics is proposed, the system. § 236.1033. railroad shall confer with the Associate (b) If a PTC system is to undergo an (e) The following additional Administrator regarding appropriate independent assessment in accordance requirements apply to: structuring of the safety case and with this section, the host railroad may (1) Non-vital overlay. A PTC system analysis. submit to the Associate Administrator a proposed as an overlay on the existing (f) When determining whether the written request that FRA confirm method of operation and not built in PTCSP fulfills the requirements under whether a particular entity would be accordance with the safety assurance paragraph (d) of this section, the considered an independent third party principles set forth in Appendix C of Associate Administrator may consider pursuant to this section. The request this part must, to the satisfaction of the all available evidence concerning the should include supporting information Associate Administrator, be shown to: reliability and availability of the identified in paragraph (c) of this (i) Reliably execute the functions set proposed system and any and all safety section. FRA may request further forth in § 236.1005; consequences of the proposed changes. information to make a determination or (ii) Obtain at least 80 percent In any case where the PTCSP lacks provide its determination in writing. reduction of the risk associated with adequate data regarding safety impacts (c) As used in this section, accidents preventable by the functions of the proposed changes, the Associate ‘‘independent third party’’ means a set forth in § 236.1005, when all effects Administrator may request the technically competent entity of the change associated with the PTC necessary data from the applicant. If the responsible to and compensated by the system are taken into account. The requested data is not provided, the railroad (or an association on behalf of supporting risk assessment shall Associate Administrator may find that one or more railroads) that is evaluate all intended changes in potential hazards could or will arise. independent of the PTC system supplier railroad operations coincident with the (g) If a PTCSP applies to a system and vendor. An entity that is owned or introduction of the new system; and designed to replace an existing certified controlled by the supplier or vendor, (iii) Maintain a level of safety for each PTC system, the PTCSP will be that is under common ownership or subsequent system modification that is approved provided that the PTCSP control with the supplier or vendor, or equal to or greater than the level of establishes with a high degree of that is otherwise involved in the safety for the previous PTC systems. confidence that the new system will development of the PTC system is not (2) Vital overlay. A PTC system provide a level of safety not less than considered ‘‘independent’’ within the proposed on a newly constructed track the level of safety provided by the meaning of this section. or as an overlay on the existing method system to be replaced. (d) The independent third-party of operation and built in accordance (h) When reviewing the issue of the assessment shall, at a minimum, consist with the safety assurance principles set potential data errors (for example, errors of the activities and result in the forth in Appendix C of this part must, arising from data supplied from other production of documentation meeting to the satisfaction of the Associate business systems needed to execute the the requirements of Appendix F to this Administrator, be shown to: braking algorithm, survey data needed part, unless excepted by this part or by (i) Reliably execute the functions set for location determination, or FRA order or waiver. forth in § 236.1005; and mandatory directives issued through the (e) Information provided that has been (ii) Have sufficient documentation to computer-aided dispatching system), certified under the auspices of a foreign demonstrate that the PTC system, as the PTCSP must include a careful railroad regulatory entity recognized by built, fulfills the safety assurance identification of each of the risks and a the Associate Administrator may, at the principles set forth in Appendix C of discussion of each applicable Associate Administrator’s discretion, be this part. The supporting risk mitigation. In an appropriate case, such accepted as having been independently assessment may be abbreviated as that as a case in which the residual risk after verified. term is used in subpart H of this part. mitigation is substantial or the § 236.1019 Main line track exceptions. (3) Stand-alone. A PTC system underlying method of operation will be proposed on a newly constructed track, significantly altered, the Associate (a) Scope and procedure. This section an existing track for which no signal Administrator may require submission pertains exclusively to exceptions from system exists, as a replacement for an of a quantitative risk assessment the rule that trackage over which existing signal or train control system, addressing these potential errors. scheduled intercity and commuter or otherwise to replace or materially passenger service is provided is modify the existing method of § 236.1017 Independent third party considered main line track requiring operation, shall: Verification and Validation. installation of a PTC system. One or (i) Reliably execute the functions (a) The PTCSP must be supported by more intercity or commuter passenger required by § 236.1005 and be an independent third-party assessment railroads, or freight railroads conducting demonstrated to do so to FRA’s when the Associate Administrator joint passenger and freight operation satisfaction; and concludes that it is necessary based over the same segment of track may file (ii) Have a PTCSP establishing, with upon the criteria set forth in § 236.913, a main line track exclusion addendum a high degree of confidence, that the with the exception that consideration of (‘‘MTEA’’) to its PTCIP requesting to system will not introduce new hazards the methodology used in the risk designate track as not main line subject that have not been mitigated. The assessment (§ 236.913(g)(2)(vii)) shall to the conditions set forth in paragraphs

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(b) or (c) of this section. No track shall (i) If the segment is unsignaled and no (1) The railroad files a request for be designated as yard or terminal unless more than four regularly scheduled amendment (‘‘RFA’’) to the applicable it is identified in an MTEA that is part passenger trains are operated during a PTCIP, PTCDP, or PTCSP with the of an FRA approved PTCIP. calendar day, or Associate Administrator; and (b) Passenger terminal exception. FRA (ii) If the segment is signaled (e.g., (2) The Associate Administrator will consider an exception in the case equipped with a traffic control system, approves the RFA. of trackage used exclusively as yard or automatic block signal system, or cab (b) After approval of an RFA in terminal tracks by or in support of signal system) and no more than 12 accordance with paragraph (a) of this regularly scheduled intercity or regularly scheduled passenger trains are section, the railroad shall immediately commuter passenger service where the operated during a calendar day. adopt and comply with the amendment. MTEA describes in detail the physical (3) Not more than four passenger (c) In lieu of a separate filing under boundaries of the trackage in question, trains per day are operated on a segment part 235 of this chapter, a railroad may its use and characteristics (including of track of a Class I freight railroad on request approval of a discontinuance or track and signal charts) and all of the which less than 15 million gross tons of material modification of a signal or train following apply: freight traffic is transported annually. control system by filing an RFA to its (1) The maximum authorized speed (d) A limited operations exception PTCIP, PTCDP, or PTCSP with the for all movements is not greater than 20 under paragraph (c) is subject to FRA Associate Administrator. miles per hour, and that maximum is review and approval. FRA may require (d) An RFA made in accordance with enforced by any available onboard PTC a collision hazard analysis to identify this section will not be approved by equipment within the confines of the hazards and may require that specific FRA unless the request includes: (1) The information listed in § 235.10 yard or terminal; mitigations be undertaken. Operations of this chapter and the railroad provides (2) Interlocking rules are in effect under any such exception shall be FRA upon request any additional prohibiting reverse movements other conducted subject to the terms and information necessary to evaluate the than on signal indications without conditions of the approval. Any main RFA (see § 235.12), including: dispatcher permission; and line track exclusion is subject to (2) The proposed modifications; (3) Either of the following conditions periodic review. exists: (3) The reasons for each modification; (e) Temporal separation. As used in (4) The changes to the PTCIP, PTCDP, (i) No freight operations are this section, temporal separation means or PTCSP, as applicable; permitted; or that limited passenger and freight (5) Each modification’s effect on PTC (ii) Freight operations are permitted operations do not operate on any system safety; but no passengers will be aboard segment of shared track during the same (6) An approximate timetable for passenger trains within the defined period and also refers to the processes filing of the PTCDP, PTCSP, or both, if limits. or physical arrangements, or both, in the amendment pertains to a PTCIP; and (c) Limited operations exception. FRA place to ensure that temporal separation (7) An explanation of whether each will consider an exception in the case is established and maintained at all change to the PTCSP is planned or of a track segment used for limited times. The use of exclusive authorities unplanned. operations (at speeds not exceeding under mandatory directives is not, by (i) Unplanned changes that affect the those permitted under § 236.0 of this itself, sufficient to establish that Type Approval’s PTCDP require part) under one of the following sets of temporal separation is achieved. submission and approval in accordance conditions: Procedures to ensure temporal with § 236.1013 of a new PTCDP, (1) The trackage is used for limited separation shall include verification followed by submission and approval in operations by at least one passenger checks between passenger and freight accordance with § 236.1015 of a new railroad subject to at least one of the operations and effective physical means PTCSP for the PTC system. following conditions: to positively ensure segregation of (ii) Unplanned changes that do not (i) All trains are limited to restricted passenger and freight operations in affect the Type Approval’s PTCDP speed; accordance with this paragraph. require submission and approval of a (ii) Temporal separation of passenger (f) PTCSP requirement. No PTCSP— new PTCSP. and other trains is maintained as filed after the approval of a PTCIP with (iii) Unplanned changes are changes provided in paragraph (e) of this an MTEA—shall be approved by FRA affecting system safety that have not section; or unless it attests that no changes, except been documented in the PTCSP. The (iii) Passenger service is operated for those included in an FRA approved impact of unplanned changes on PTC under a risk mitigation plan submitted RFA, have been made to the information system safety has not yet been by all railroads involved in the joint in the PTCIP and MTEA required by determined. operation and approved by FRA. The paragraph (b) or (c) of this section. (iv) Planned changes may be risk mitigation plan must be supported (g) Designation modifications. If implemented after they have undergone by a risk assessment establishing that subsequent to approval of its PTCIP or suitable regression testing to the proposed mitigations will achieve a PTCSP the railroad seeks to modify demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the level of safety not less than the level of which track or tracks should be Associate Administrator, they have been safety that would obtain if the designated as main line or not main correctly implemented and their operations were conducted under line, it shall request modification of its implementation does not degrade safety. paragraph (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this section. PTCIP or PTCSP, as applicable, in (v) Planned changes are changes (2) Passenger service is operated on a accordance with § 236.1021. affecting system safety in the PTCSP segment of track of a freight railroad that and have been included in all required is not a Class I railroad on which less § 236.1021 Discontinuances, material analysis under § 236.1015. The impact than 15 million gross tons of freight modifications, and amendments. of these changes on the PTC system’s traffic is transported annually and on (a) No changes, as defined by this safety has been incorporated as an which one of the following conditions section, to a PTC system, PTCIP, integral part of the approved PTCSP applies: PTCDP, or PTCSP, shall be made unless: safety analysis.

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(e) If the RFA includes a request for (j) Changes not requiring the filing of parties of any and all safety-critical approval of a discontinuance or material an RFA. When the resultant change to software failures, upgrades, patches, or modification of a signal or train control the PTC system will comply with an revisions, as well as any hardware system, FRA will publish a notice in the approved PTCSP of this part, it is not repairs, replacements, or modifications Federal Register of the application and necessary to file for approval to decrease for their PTC system, subsystems, or will invite public comment in the limits of a system when it involves components. accordance with part 211 of this the: (2) A vendor or supplier, on receipt of chapter. (1) Decrease of the limits of a PTC a report of any safety-critical failure to (f) When considering the RFA, FRA system when interlocked switches, their product, shall promptly notify all will review the issue of the derails, or movable-point frogs are not other railroads that are using that discontinuance or material modification involved; product, whether or not the other and determine whether granting the (2) Removal of an electric or railroads have experienced the reported request is in the public interest and mechanical lock, or signal used in lieu failure of that safety-critical system, consistent with railroad safety, taking thereof, from hand-operated switch in a subsystem, or component. into consideration all changes in the PTC system where train speed over such (3) The notification from a supplier to method of operation and system switch does not exceed 20 miles per any railroad shall include explanation functionalities, both within normal PTC hour, and use of those devices has not from the supplier of the reasons for such system availability and in the case of a been part of the considerations for notification, the circumstances system failed state (unavailable), approval of a PTCSP; or associated with the failure, and any contemplated in conjunction with (3) Removal of an electric or recommended mitigation actions to be installation of the PTC system. The mechanical lock, or signal used in lieu taken pending determination of the root railroad submitting the RFA must, at thereof, from a hand-operated switch in cause and final corrective actions. FRA’s request, perform field testing in a PTC system where trains are not (c) The railroad shall: accordance with § 236.1035 or engage in permitted to clear the main track at such (1) Specify the railroad’s process and Verification and Validation in switch and use of those devices has not procedures in its PTCSP for action upon accordance with § 236.1017. been a part of the considerations for their receipt of notification of safety- (g) FRA may issue at its discretion a approval of a PTCSP. critical failure, as well as receipt of a new Type Approval number for a PTC (k) Modifications not requiring the safety-critical upgrade, patch, revision, system modified under this section. filing of an RFA. When the resultant repair, replacement, or modification. (h) Changes requiring filing of an arrangement will comply with an (2) Identify configuration/revision RFA. Except as provided by paragraph approved PTCSP of this part, it is not control measures in its PTCSP that are (i), an RFA shall be filed to request the necessary to file an application for designed to ensure the safety-functional following: approval of the following modifications: requirements and the safety-critical (1) Discontinuance of a PTC system, (1) A modification that is required to hazard mitigation processes are not or other similar appliance or device; comply with an order of the Federal compromised as a result of any change (2) Decrease of the PTC system’s Railroad Administration or any section and that such a change can be audited. limits (e.g., exclusion or removal of a of part 236 of this title; (d) The railroad shall provide to the PTC system on a track segment); (2) Installation of devices used to applicable vendor or supplier the (3) Modification of a safety critical provide protection against unusual railroad’s procedures for action upon element of a PTC system; or contingencies such as landslide, burned notification of a safety-critical failure, (4) Modification of a PTC system that bridges, high water, high and wide upgrade, patch, or revision for the PTC affects the safety critical functionality of loads, or dragging equipment; system, subsystem, component, product, any other PTC system with which it (3) Elimination of existing track other or process, and actions to be taken until interoperates. than a second main track; (i) Discontinuances not requiring the (4) Extension or shortening of a the faulty system, subsystem, or filing of an RFA. It is not necessary to passing siding; or component has been adjusted, repaired file an RFA for the following (5) The temporary or permanent or replaced. discontinuances: arrangement of existing systems (e) After the product is placed in (1) Removal of a PTC system from necessitated by highway-rail grade service, the railroad shall maintain a track approved for abandonment by separation construction. Temporary database of all safety-relevant hazards as formal proceeding; arrangements shall be removed within set forth in the PTCSP and those that (2) Removal of PTC devices used to six months following completion of had not previously been identified in provide protection against unusual construction. the PTCSP. If the frequency of the contingencies such as landslide, burned safety-relevant hazard exceeds the bridge, high water, high and wide load, § 236.1023 Errors and malfunctions. thresholds set forth in the PTCSP, or has or tunnel protection when the unusual (a) Each railroad implementing a PTC not been previously identified in the contingency no longer exists; system on its property shall establish appropriate risk analysis, the railroad (3) Removal of the PTC devices that and continually update a PTC Product shall: are used on a movable bridge that has Vendor List (PTCPVL) that includes all (1) Notify the applicable vendor or been permanently closed by the formal vendors and suppliers of each PTC supplier and FRA of the failure, approval of another government agency system, subsystem, component, and malfunction, or defective condition that and is mechanically secured in the associated product, and process in use decreased or eliminated the safety closed position for rail traffic; or system-wide. The PTCPVL shall be functionality; (4) Removal of the PTC system from made available to FRA upon request. (2) Keep the applicable vendor or service for a period not to exceed 6 (b)(1) The railroad shall specify supplier and FRA apprised on a months that is necessitated by within its PTCSP all contractual continual basis of the status of any and catastrophic occurrence such as arrangements with hardware and all subsequent failures; and derailment, flood, fire, or hurricane, or software suppliers or vendors for (3) Take prompt counter measures to earthquake. immediate notification between the reduce or eliminate the frequency of the

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safety-relevant hazards below the (j) When any safety-critical PTC adjusted, repaired, or replaced without threshold identified in the PTCSP. system, subsystem, or component fails undue delay. Until repair of such (f) Each notification to FRA required to perform its intended function, the essential components are completed, a by this section shall: cause shall be determined and the faulty railroad shall take appropriate action as (1) Be made within 15 days after the product adjusted, repaired, or replaced specified in its PTCSP. vendor, supplier, or railroad discovers without undue delay. Until corrective (b) Where a PTC onboard apparatus the failure, malfunction, or defective action is completed, a railroad shall take on a controlling locomotive that is condition. However, a report that is due appropriate action to ensure safety and operating in or is to be operated within on a Saturday or a Sunday may be reliability as specified within its PTCSP. a PTC system fails or is otherwise cut- delivered on the following Monday and (k) Any railroad experiencing a failure out while en route (i.e, after the train one that is due on a holiday may be of a system resulting in a more favorable has departed its initial terminal), the delivered on the next business day; aspect than intended or other condition train may only continue in accordance (2) Be transmitted in a manner and hazardous to the movement of a train with the following: form acceptable to the Associate shall comply with the reporting (1) The train may proceed at restricted Administrator and by the most requirements, including the making of a speed, or if a block signal system is in expeditious method available; and telephonic report of an accident or operation according to signal indication (3) Include as much available and incident involving such failure, under at medium speed, to the next available applicable information as possible, part 233 of this chapter. Filing of one or point where communication of a report including: more reports under part 233 of this can be made to a designated railroad (i) PTC system name and model; chapter does not exempt a railroad, officer of the host railroad; (ii) Identification of the part, vendor, or supplier from the reporting (2) Upon completion and component, or system involved, requirements contained in this section. communication of the report required in including the part number as applicable; paragraph (b)(1) of this section, or where (iii) Nature of the failure, § 236.1025 [Reserved] immediate electronic report of said malfunctions, or defective condition; (iv) Mitigation taken to ensure the § 236.1027 PTC system exclusions. condition is appropriately provided by safety of train operation, railroad (a) The requirements of this subpart the PTC system itself, a train may employees, and the public; and apply to each office automation system continue to a point where an absolute (v) The estimated time to correct the that performs safety-critical functions block can be established in advance of failure. within, or affects the safety performance the train in accordance with the (4) In the event that all information of, the PTC system. For purposes of this following: (i) Where no block signal system is in required by paragraph (f)(3) of this section, ‘‘office automation system’’ use, the train may proceed at restricted section is not immediately available, the means any centralized or distributed non-available information shall be speed, or computer-based system that directly or (ii) Where a block signal system is in forwarded to the Associate indirectly controls the active movement Administrator as soon as practicable in operation according to signal indication, of trains in a rail network. the train may proceed at a speed not to supplemental reports. (b) Changes or modifications to PTC exceed medium speed. (g) Whenever any investigation of an systems otherwise excluded from the accident or service difficulty report (3) Upon reaching the location where requirements of this subpart by this an absolute block has been established shows that a PTC system or product is section do not exclude those PTC unsafe because of a manufacturing or in advance of the train, as referenced in systems from the requirements of this paragraph (b)(2) of this section, the train design defect, the railroad and its subpart if the changes or modifications vendor or supplier shall, upon request may proceed in accordance with the result in a degradation of safety or a following: of the Associate Administrator, report to material decrease in safety-critical the Associate Administrator the results (i) Where no block signal system is in functionality. use, the train may proceed at medium of its investigation and any action taken (c) Primary train control systems or proposed to correct that defect. speed; however, if the involved train is cannot be integrated with locomotive a passenger train or a train hauling any (h) PTC system and product suppliers electronic systems unless the complete and vendors shall: amount of PIH material, it may only integrated systems: proceed at a speed not to exceed 30 (1) Promptly report any safety- (1) Have been shown to be designed relevant failures or defective conditions, miles per hour. on fail-safe principles; (ii) Where a block signal system is in previously unidentified hazards, and (2) Have demonstrated to operate in a use, a passenger train may proceed at a recommended mitigation actions in fail-safe mode; their PTC system, subsystem, or (3) Have a manual fail-safe fallback speed not to exceed 59 miles per hour component to each railroad using the and override to allow the locomotive to and a freight train may proceed at a product; and be brought to a safe stop in the event of speed not to exceed 49 miles per hour. (iii) Except as provided in paragraph (2) Notify FRA of any safety-relevant any loss of electronic control; and failure, defective condition, or (4) Are included in the approved and (c), where a cab signal system with an previously unidentified hazard applicable PTCDP and PTCSP. automatic train control system is in discovered by the vendor or supplier (d) PTC systems excluded by this operation, the train may proceed at a and the identity of each affected and section from the requirements of this speed not to exceed 79 miles per hour. notified railroad. subpart remain subject to subparts A (c) In order for a train equipped with (i) The requirements of this section do through H of this part as applicable. PTC traversing a track segment not apply to failures, malfunctions, or equipped with PTC to deviate from the defective conditions that: § 236.1029 PTC system use and en route operating limitations contained in (1) Are caused by improper failures. paragraph (b) of this section, the maintenance or improper usage; or (a) When any safety-critical PTC deviation must be described and (2) Have been previously identified to system component fails to perform its justified in the FRA approved PTCDP or the FRA, vendor or supplier, and intended function, the cause must be PTCSP, or the Order of Particular applicable user railroads. determined and the faulty component Applicability, as applicable.

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(d) Each railroad shall comply with (d) Previous approval or recognition during key entry when the cleartext all provisions in the applicable PTCDP of a train control system, together with keys and key components may be and PTCSP for each PTC system it uses an established service history, may, at temporarily displayed to allow visual and shall operate within the scope of the request of the PTC railroad, and verification. When encrypted keys or initial operational assumptions and consistent with available safety data, be key components are entered, the predefined changes identified. credited toward satisfaction of the safety cryptographically protected cleartext (e) The normal functioning of any case requirements set forth in this part key or key components shall not be safety-critical PTC system must not be for the PTCSP with respect to all displayed. interfered with in testing or otherwise functionalities and implementations (d) Access to cleartext keys shall be without first taking measures to provide contemplated by the approval or protected by a tamper resistant for the safe movement of trains, recognition. mechanism. locomotives, roadway workers, and on- (e) To the extent that the PTC system (e) Each railroad electing to also track equipment that depend on the proposed for implementation under this provide cryptographic message normal functioning of the system. subpart is different in significant detail confidentiality shall: (f) The PTC system’s onboard from the system previously approved or (1) Comply with the same apparatus shall be so arranged that each recognized, the changes shall be fully requirements for message integrity and member of the crew assigned to perform analyzed in the PTCDP or PTCSP as authentication under this section; and duties in the locomotive can receive the would be the case absent prior approval (2) Only use keys meeting or same PTC information displayed in the or recognition. exceeding the security strength required same manner and execute any functions (f) As used in this section— to protect the data as defined in the necessary to that crew member’s duties. (1) Approved refers to approval of a railroad’s PTCSP and required under The locomotive engineer shall not be Product Safety Plan under subpart H of § 236.1013(a)(7). required to perform functions related to this part. (f) Each railroad, or its vendor or the PTC system while the train is (2) Recognized refers to official action supplier, shall have a prioritized service moving that have the potential to permitting a system to be implemented restoration and mitigation plan for distract the locomotive engineer from for control of train operations under an scheduled and unscheduled performance of other safety-critical FRA order or waiver, after review of interruptions of service. This plan shall duties. safety case documentation for the be included in the PTCDP or PTCSP as implementation. required by §§ 236.1013 or 236.1015, as § 236.1031 Previously approved PTC (g) Upon receipt of an REC, FRA will applicable, and made available to FRA systems. consider all safety case information to upon request, without undue delay, for (a) Any PTC system fully the extent feasible and appropriate, restoration of communication services implemented and operational prior to given the specific facts before the that support PTC system services. March 16, 2010, may receive PTC agency. Nothing in this section limits re- (g) Each railroad may elect to impose System Certification if the applicable use of any applicable safety case more restrictive requirements than those PTC railroad, or one or more system information by a party other than the in this section, consistent with suppliers and one or more PTC party receiving: interoperability requirements specified railroads, submits a Request for (1) A prior approval or recognition in the PTCSP for the system. Expedited Certification (REC) letter to referred to in this section; or the Associate Administrator. The REC (2) A Type Approval or PTC System § 236.1035 Field testing requirements. letter must do one of the following: Certification under this subpart. (a) Before any field testing of an (1) Reference a product safety plan uncertified PTC system, or a product of (PSP) approved by FRA under subpart H § 236.1033 Communications and security an uncertified PTC system, or any of this part and include a document requirements. regression testing of a certified PTC fulfilling the requirements under (a) All wireless communications system is conducted on the general rail §§ 236.1011 and 236.1013 not already between the office, wayside, and system, the railroad requesting the included in the PSP; onboard components in a PTC system testing must provide: (2) Attest that the PTC system has shall provide cryptographic message (1) A complete description of the PTC been approved by FRA and in operation integrity and authentication. system; for at least 5 years and has already (b) Cryptographic keys required under (2) An operational concepts received an assessment of Verification paragraph (a) of this section shall: document; and Validation from an independent (1) Use an algorithm approved by the (3) A complete description of the third party under part 236 or a waiver National Institute of Standards (NIST) or specific test procedures, including the supporting such operation; or a similarly recognized and FRA measures that will be taken to protect (3) Attest that the PTC system is approved standards body; trains and on-track equipment; recognized under an Order issued prior (2) Be distributed using manual or (4) An analysis of the applicability of to March 16, 2010. automated methods, or a combination of the requirements of subparts A through (b) If an REC letter conforms to both; and G of this part to the PTC system that will paragraph (a)(1) of this section, the (3) Be revoked: not apply during testing; Associate Administrator, at his or her (i) If compromised by unauthorized (5) The date the proposed testing shall sole discretion, may also issue a new disclosure of the cleartext key; or begin; Type Approval for the PTC system. (ii) When the key algorithm reaches (6) The test locations; and (c) In order to receive a Type its lifespan as defined by the standards (7) The effect on the current method Approval or PTC System Certification body responsible for approval of the of operation the PTC system will or may under paragraph (a) or (b) of this algorithm. have under test. section, the PTC system must be shown (c) The cleartext form of the (b) FRA may impose additional to reliably execute the functionalities cryptographic keys shall be protected testing conditions that it believes may required by §§ 236.1005 and 236.1007 from unauthorized disclosure, be necessary for the safety of train and otherwise conform to this subpart. modification, or substitution, except operations.

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(c) Relief from regulations other than installation, maintenance, repair, control system subject to this subpart is from subparts A through G of this part modification, inspection, and testing of in use; that the railroad believes are necessary the PTC system and have them in one (4) Roadway workers whose duties to support the field testing, must be Operations and Maintenance Manual, require them to know and understand requested in accordance with part 211 readily available to persons required to how a train control system affects their of this title. perform such tasks and for inspection safety and how to avoid interfering with by FRA and FRA-certified state its proper functioning; and § 236.1037 Records retention. inspectors. (5) The direct supervisors of persons (a) Each railroad with a PTC system (b) Plans required for proper listed in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) required to be installed under this maintenance, repair, inspection, and of this section. subpart shall maintain at a designated testing of safety-critical PTC systems (b) Competencies. The employer’s office on the railroad: must be adequate in detail and must be program must provide training for (1) A current copy of each FRA made available for inspection by FRA persons who perform the functions approved Type Approval, if any, and FRA-certified state inspectors described in paragraph (a) of this PTCDP, and PTCSP that it holds; where such PTC systems are deployed section to ensure that they have the (2) Adequate documentation to or maintained. They must identify all necessary knowledge and skills to demonstrate that the PTCSP and PTCDP software versions, revisions, and effectively complete their duties related meet the safety requirements of this revision dates. Plans must be legible and to operation and maintenance of the subpart, including the risk assessment; correct. PTC system. (3) An Operations and Maintenance (c) Hardware, software, and firmware Manual, pursuant to § 236.1039; and § 236.1043 Task analysis and basic revisions must be documented in the (4) Training and testing records requirements. Operations and Maintenance Manual pursuant to § 236.1043(b). (a) Training structure and delivery. As according to the railroad’s configuration (b) Results of inspections and tests part of the program required by management control plan and any specified in the PTCSP and PTCDP must § 236.1041, the employer shall, at a additional configuration/revision be recorded pursuant to § 236.110. minimum: control measures specified in the (c) Each contractor providing services (1) Identify the specific goals of the PTCDP and PTCSP. relating to the testing, maintenance, or training program with regard to the operation of a PTC system required to be (d) Safety-critical components, target population (craft, experience installed under this subpart shall including spare equipment, must be level, scope of work, etc.), task(s), and maintain at a designated office training positively identified, handled, replaced, desired success rate; records required under § 236.1039(b). and repaired in accordance with the (2) Based on a formal task analysis, (d) After the PTC system is placed in procedures specified in the PTCDP and identify the installation, maintenance, service, the railroad shall maintain a PTCSP. repair, modification, inspection, testing, database of all safety-relevant hazards as (e) Each railroad shall designate in its and operating tasks that must be set forth in the PTCSP and PTCDP and Operations and Maintenance Manual an performed on a railroad’s PTC systems. those that had not been previously appropriate railroad officer responsible This includes the development of identified in either document. If the for issues relating to scheduled failure scenarios and the actions frequency of the safety-relevant hazards interruptions of service contemplated by expected under such scenarios; exceeds the threshold set forth in either § 236.1029. (3) Develop written procedures for the performance of the tasks identified; of these documents, then the railroad § 236.1041 Training and qualification shall: program, general. (4) Identify the additional knowledge, (1) Report the inconsistency in skills, and abilities above those required (a) Training program for PTC writing by mail, facsimile, e-mail, or for basic job performance necessary to personnel. Employers shall establish hand delivery to the Director, Office of perform each task; and implement training and Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, (5) Develop a training and evaluation qualification programs for PTC systems 1200 New Jersey Ave, SE, Mail Stop 25, curriculum that includes classroom, subject to this subpart. These programs Washington, DC 20590, within 15 days simulator, computer-based, hands-on, or must meet the minimum requirements of discovery. Documents that are hand other formally structured training set forth in the PTCDP and PTCSP in delivered must not be enclosed in an designed to impart the knowledge, §§ 236.1039 through 236.1045, as envelope; skills, and abilities identified as appropriate, for the following personnel: (2) Take prompt countermeasures to necessary to perform each task; (1) Persons whose duties include reduce the frequency of each safety- (6) Prior to assignment of related installing, maintaining, repairing, relevant hazard to below the threshold tasks, require all persons mentioned in modifying, inspecting, and testing set forth in the PTCSP and PTCDP; and § 236.1041(a) to successfully complete a (3) Provide a final report when the safety-critical elements of the railroad’s training curriculum and pass an inconsistency is resolved to the FRA PTC systems, including central office, examination that covers the PTC system Director, Office of Safety Assurance and wayside, or onboard subsystems; and appropriate rules and tasks for Compliance, on the results of the (2) Persons who dispatch train which they are responsible (however, analysis and countermeasures taken to operations (issue or communicate any such persons may perform such tasks reduce the frequency of the safety- mandatory directive that is executed or under the direct onsite supervision of a relevant hazard(s) below the threshold enforced, or is intended to be executed qualified person prior to completing set forth in the PTCSP and PTCDP. or enforced, by a train control system such training and passing the subject to this subpart); examination); § 236.1039 Operations and Maintenance (3) Persons who operate trains or (7) Require periodic refresher training Manual. serve as a train or engine crew member and evaluation at intervals specified in (a) The railroad shall catalog and subject to instruction and testing under the PTCDP and PTCSP that includes maintain all documents as specified in part 217 of this chapter, on a train classroom, simulator, computer-based, the PTCDP and PTCSP for the operating in territory where a train hands-on, or other formally structured

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training and testing, except with respect other onboard systems under that (A) Manual operation of a train for a to basic skills for which proficiency is person’s control; 4-hour work period; known to remain high as a result of (2) Any actions required of the (B) Simulated manual operation of a frequent repetition of the task; and onboard personnel to enable, or enter train for a minimum of 4 hours in a (8) Conduct regular and periodic data to, the system, such as consist data, Type I simulator as required; or evaluations of the effectiveness of the and the role of that function in the safe (C) Other means as determined training program specified in operation of the train; following consultation between the (3) Sequencing of interventions by the § 236.1041(a)(1) verifying the adequacy railroad and designated representatives system, including pre-enforcement of the training material and its validity of the affected employees and approved notification, enforcement notification, with respect to current railroads PTC by FRA. The PTCDP and PTCSP shall penalty application initiation and post- systems and operations. designate the appropriate frequency (b) Training records. Employers shall penalty application procedures; (4) Railroad operating rules and when manual operation, starting, and retain records which designate persons stopping must be conducted, and the who are qualified under this section testing (part 217) applicable to the train control system, including provisions for appropriate frequency of simulated until new designations are recorded or manual operation. for at least one year after such persons movement and protection of any unequipped trains, or trains with failed (d) Conductor training. Training leave applicable service. These records required under this subpart for a shall be kept in a designated location or cut-out train control onboard systems and other on-track equipment; conductor, together with required and be available for inspection and (5) Means to detect deviations from records, shall be integrated into the replication by FRA and FRA-certified proper functioning of onboard train program of training required under this State inspectors control equipment and instructions chapter. regarding the actions to be taken with § 236.1045 Training specific to office § 236.1049 Training specific to roadway control personnel. respect to control of the train and workers. (a) Any person responsible for issuing notification of designated railroad personnel; and (a) Roadway worker training. Training or communicating mandatory directives required under this subpart for a in territory where PTC systems are or (6) Information needed to prevent unintentional interference with the roadway worker shall be integrated into will be in use shall be trained in the the program of instruction required following areas, as applicable: proper functioning of onboard train control equipment. under part 214, subpart C of this chapter (1) Instructions concerning the (b) Locomotive engineer training. (‘‘Roadway Worker Protection’’), interface between the computer-aided Training required under this subpart for consistent with task analysis dispatching system and the train control a locomotive engineer, together with requirements of § 236.1043. This system, with respect to the safe required records, shall be integrated into training shall provide instruction for movement of trains and other on-track the program of training required by part roadway workers who provide equipment; 240 of this chapter. protection for themselves or roadway (2) Railroad operating rules applicable (c) Full automatic operation. The work groups. to the train control system, including following special requirements apply in (b) Training subject areas. (1) provision for movement and protection the event a train control system is used Instruction for roadway workers shall of roadway workers, unequipped trains, to effect full automatic operation of the ensure an understanding of the role of trains with failed or cut-out train control train: processor-based signal and train control onboard systems, and other on-track (1) The PTCDP and PTCSP shall equipment in establishing protection for equipment; and identify all safety hazards to be roadway workers and their equipment. (3) Instructions concerning control of mitigated by the locomotive engineer. (2) Instruction for all roadway trains and other on-track equipment in (2) The PTCDP and PTCSP shall workers working in territories where case the train control system fails, address and describe the training PTC is required under this subpart shall including periodic practical exercises or required with provisions for the ensure recognition of processor-based simulations, and operational testing maintenance of skills proficiency. As a signal and train control equipment on under part 217 of this chapter to ensure minimum, the training program must: the continued capability of the (i) As described in § 236.1043(a)(2), the wayside and an understanding of personnel to provide for safe operations develop failure scenarios which how to avoid interference with its under the alternative method of incorporate the safety hazards identified proper functioning. operation. in the PTCDP and PTCSP including the (3) Instructions concerning the (b) [Reserved] return of train operations to a fully recognition of system failures and the manual mode; provision of alternative methods of on- § 236.1047 Training specific to locomotive (ii) Provide training, consistent with track safety in case the train control engineers and other operating personnel. § 236.1047(a), for safe train operations system fails, including periodic (a) Operating personnel. Training under all failure scenarios and practical exercises or simulations and provided under this subpart for any identified safety hazards that affect train operational testing under part 217 of locomotive engineer or other person operations; this chapter to ensure the continued who participates in the operation of a (iii) Provide training, consistent with capability of roadway workers to be free train in train control territory shall be § 236.1047(a), for safe train operations from the danger of being struck by a defined in the PTCDP as well as the under manual control; and moving train or other on-track PTCSP. The following elements shall be (iv) Consistent with § 236.1047(a), equipment. addressed: ensure maintenance of manual train ■ 12. Amend Appendix A to part 236 by (1) Familiarization with train control operating skills by requiring manual adding entries for subpart I as follows: equipment onboard the locomotive and starting and stopping of the train for an the functioning of that equipment as appropriate number of trips and by one Appendix A to Part 236—Civil part of the system and in relation to or more of the following methods: Penalties 1

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Section Violation Willful violation

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Subpart I—Positive Train Control Systems

236.1005 Positive Train Control System Requirements: Failure to complete PTC system installation on track segment where PTC is required prior to 12/31/2015 16,000 25,000 Commencement of revenue service prior to obtaining PTC System Certification ...... 16,000 25,000 Failure of the PTC system to perform a safety-critical function required by this section ...... 5,000 7,500 Failure to provide notice, obtain approval, or follow a condition for temporary rerouting when required ...... 5,000 7,500 Exceeding the allowed percentage of controlling locomotives operating out of an initial terminal after re- ceiving a failed initialization ...... 5,000 7,500 236.1006 Equipping locomotives operating in PTC territory: Operating in PTC territory a controlling locomotive without a required and operative PTC onboard appa- ratus ...... 15,000 25,000 Failure to report as prescribed by this section ...... 5,000 7,500 Non-compliant operation of unequipped trains in PTC territory ...... 15,000 25,000 236.1007 Additional requirements for high-speed service: Operation of passenger trains at speed equal to or greater than 60 mph on non-PTC-equipped territory where required ...... 15,000 25,000 Operation of freight trains at speed equal to or greater than 50 mph on non-PTC-equipped territory where required ...... 15,000 25,000 Failure to fully implement incursion protection where required ...... 5,000 7,500 236.1009 Procedural requirements: Failure to file PTCIP when required ...... 5,000 7,500 Failure to amend PTCIP when required ...... 5,000 7,500 Failure to obtain Type Approval when required ...... 5,000 7,500 Failure to update NPI ...... 5,000 7,500 Operation of PTC system prior to system certification ...... 16,000 25,000 236.1011 PTCIP content requirements: Failure to install a PTC system in accordance with subpart I when so required ...... 11,000 16,000 236.1013 PTCDP content requirements and Type Approval: Failure to maintain quality control system ...... 5,000 7,500 Inappropriate use of Type Approval ...... 5,000 7,500 236.1015 PTCSP content requirements and PTC System Certification: Failure to implement PTC system in accordance with the associated PTCSP and resultant system certifi- cation ...... 16,000 25,000 Failure to maintain PTC system in accordance with the associated PTCSP and resultant system certifi- cation ...... 16,000 25,000 Failure to maintain required supporting documentation ...... 2,500 5,000 236.1017 Independent third party Verification and Validation: Failure to conduct independent third party Verification and Validation when ordered ...... 11,000 16,000 236.1019 Main line track exceptions: Revenue operations conducted in non-compliance with the passenger terminal exception ...... 16,000 25,000 Revenue operations conducted in non-compliance with the limited operations exception ...... 16,000 25,000 Failure to request modification of the PTCIP or PTCSP when required ...... 11,000 16,000 Revenue operations conducted in violation of (c)(2) ...... 16,000 25,000 Revenue operations conducted in violation of (c)(3) ...... 25,000 25,000 236.1021 Discontinuances, material modifications, and amendments: Failure to update PTCDP when required ...... 5,000 7,500 Failure to update PTCSP when required ...... 5,000 7,500 Failure to immediately adopt and comply with approved RFA ...... 5,000 7,500 Discontinuance or modification of a PTC system without approval when required ...... 11,000 16,000 236.1023 Errors and malfunctions: Railroad failure to provide proper notification of PTC system error or malfunction ...... 5,000 7,500 Failure to maintain PTCPVL ...... 2,500 5,000 Supplier failure to provide proper notification of previously identified PTC system error or malfunction ...... 5,000 7,500 Failure to provide timely notification ...... 5,000 7,500 Failure to provide appropriate protective measures in the event of PTC system failure ...... 15,000 25,000 236.1027 Exclusions: Integration of primary train control system with locomotive electronic system without approval ...... 5,000 7,500 236.1029 PTC system use and en route failures: Failure to determine cause of PTC system component failure without undue delay ...... 5,000 7,500 Failure to adjust, repair, or replace faulty PTC system component without undue delay ...... 5,000 7,500 Failure to take appropriate action pending adjustment, repair, or replacement of faulty PTC system com- ponent ...... 15,000 25,000 Non-compliant train operation within PTC-equipped territory with inoperative PTC onboard apparatus ...... 5,000 7,500 Interference with the normal functioning of safety-critical PTC system ...... 15,000 25,000 Improper arrangement of the PTC system onboard apparatus ...... 2,500 5,000

1 The Administrator reserves the right to assess a civil penalty of up to $100,000 per day for any violation where circumstances warrant. See 459 CFR part 209, Appendix A.

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Section Violation Willful violation

236.1033 Communications and security requirements: Failure to provide cryptographic message integrity and authentication ...... 5,000 7,500 Improper use of revoked cryptographic key ...... 5,000 15,000 Failure to protect cryptographic keys from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or substitution ...... 5,000 15,000 Failure to establish prioritized service restoration and mitigation plan for communication services ...... 5,000 7,500 236.1035 Field testing requirements: Field testing without authorization or approval ...... 10,000 20,000 236.1037 Records retention: Failure to maintain records and databases as required ...... 7,500 15,000 Failure to report inconsistency ...... 10,000 20,000 Failure to take prompt countermeasures ...... 10,000 20,000 Failure to provide final report ...... 2,500 5,000 236.1039 Operations and Maintenance Manual: Failure to implement and maintain Operations and Maintenance Manual as required ...... 3,000 6,000 236.1043 Task analysis and basic requirements: Failure to develop and maintain an acceptable training program ...... 10,000 20,000 Failure to train persons as required ...... 2,500 5,000 Failure to conduct evaluation of training program as required ...... 2,500 5,000 Failure to maintain records as required ...... 1,500 3,000 236.1045 Training specific to office control personnel: Failure to conduct training unique to office control personnel ...... 2,500 5,000 236.1047 Training specific to locomotive engineers and other operating personnel: Failure to conduct training unique to locomotive engineers and other operating personnel ...... 2,500 5,000 236.1049 Training specific to roadway workers: Failure to conduct training unique to roadway workers ...... 2,500 5,000

■ 13. Revise Appendix B to part 236 to of the potential numbers of accidents for a product, subsystem or component read as follows: assessed for both previous and new system included in the risk assessment, the railroad conditions must be computed for may use various techniques, such as Appendix B to Part 236—Risk comparison. An abbreviated risk assessment reliability and availability calculations for Assessment Criteria must, as a minimum, clearly compute the subsystems and components, Fault Tree MTTHE for all of the hazardous events Analysis (FTA) of the subsystems, and results The safety-critical performance of each identified for both previous and current of the application of safety design principles product for which risk assessment is required conditions. The comparison between MTTHE as noted in Appendix C to this part. The under this part must be assessed in for both conditions is to determine whether MTTHE is to be derived for both fail-safe and accordance with the following minimum criteria or other criteria if demonstrated to the product implementation meets the safety non-fail-safe subsystems or components. The the Associate Administrator for Safety to be criteria as required by subpart H or subpart lower bounds of the MTTF or MTBF equally suitable: I of this part as applicable. determined from the system sensitivity (a) How are risk metrics to be expressed? (d) What major system characteristics must analysis, which account for all necessary and The risk metric for the proposed product be included when relevant to risk well justified assumptions, may be used to must describe with a high degree of assessment? Each risk calculation must represent the estimate of MTTHE for the confidence the accumulated risk of a train consider the total signaling and train control associated non-fail-safe subsystem or control system that operates over the system and method of operation, as subjected component in the risk assessment. designated life-cycle of the product. Each risk to a list of hazards to be mitigated by the (f) How are processor-based subsystems/ metric for the proposed product must be signaling and train control system. The components assessed? (1) An MTTHE value expressed with an upper bound, as estimated methodology requirements must include the must be calculated for each processor-based with a sensitivity analysis, and the risk value following major characteristics, when they subsystem or component, or both, indicating selected must be demonstrated to have a high are relevant to the product being considered: the safety-critical behavior of the integrated degree of confidence. (1) Track plan infrastructure, switches, rail hardware/software subsystem or component, (b) How does the risk assessment handle crossings at grade and highway-rail grade or both. The human factor impact must be interaction risks for interconnected crossings as applicable; included in the assessment, whenever subsystems/components? The risk (2) Train movement density for freight, applicable, to provide the integrated MTTHE assessment of each safety-critical system work, and passenger trains where applicable value. The MTTHE calculation must consider (product) must account not only for the risks and computed over a time span of not less the rates of failures caused by permanent, associated with each subsystem or than 12 months; transient, and intermittent faults accounting component, but also for the risks associated (3) Train movement operational rules, as for the fault coverage of the integrated with interactions (interfaces) between such enforced by the dispatcher, roadway worker/ hardware/software subsystem or component, subsystems. Employee in Charge, and train crew phased-interval maintenance, and restoration (c) What is the main principle in behaviors; of the detected failures. computing risk for the previous and current (4) Wayside subsystems and components; (2) Software fault/failure analysis must be conditions? The risk for the previous (5) Onboard subsystems and components; based on the assessment of the design and condition must be computed using the same (6) Consist contents such as hazardous implementation of all safety-related software metrics as for the new system being material, oversize loads; and including the application code, its operating/ proposed. A full risk assessment must (7) Operating speeds if the provisions of executive program, COTS software, and consider the entire railroad environment part 236 cite additional requirements for associated device drivers, as well as where the product is being applied, and certain type of train control systems to be historical performance data, analytical show all aspects of the previous condition used at such speeds for freight and passenger methods and experimental safety-critical that are affected by the installation of the trains. performance testing performed on the product, considering all faults, operating (e) What other relevant parameters must be subsystem or component. The software errors, exposure scenarios, and consequences determined for the subsystems and assessment process must demonstrate that are related as described in this part. For components? In order to derive the frequency through repeatable predictive results that all the full risk assessment, the total societal cost of hazardous events (or MTTHE) applicable software defects have been identified and

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corrected by process with a high degree of appropriate. An analysis performed under Occurrence of credible single point failures confidence. this appendix must: that can result in hazards must be detected (g) How are non-processor-based (1) Address each of the safety principles of and the product must achieve a known safe subsystems/components assessed? (1) The paragraph (b) of this appendix, or explain state that eliminates the possibility of false safety-critical behavior of all non-processor- why they are not relevant, and activation of any physical appliance. based components, which are part of a (2) Employ a validation and verification (iv) If one non-self-revealing failure processor-based system or subsystem, must process pursuant to paragraph (c) of this combined with a second failure can cause a be quantified with an MTTHE metric. The appendix. hazard that is categorized as unacceptable or MTTHE assessment methodology must (b) What safety principles must be followed undesirable, then the second failure must be consider failures caused by permanent, during product development? The designer detected and the product must achieve a transient, and intermittent faults, phase- shall address each of the following safety known safe state that eliminates the interval maintenance and restoration of considerations principles when designing possibility of false activation of any physical operation after failures and the effect of fault and demonstrating the safety of products appliance. coverage of each non-processor-based covered by subpart H or I of this part. In the (v) Another concern of multiple failures subsystem or component. event that any of these principles are not involves common mode failures in which (2) MTTHE compliance verification and followed, the PSP or PTCDP or PTCSP shall two or more subsystems or components validation must be based on the assessment state both the reason(s) for departure and the intended to compensate one another to of the design for adequacy by a documented alternative(s) utilized to mitigate or eliminate perform the same function all fail by the verification and validation process, historical the hazards associated with the design same mode and result in unsafe conditions. performance data, analytical methods and principle not followed. This is of particular concern in instances in experimental safety-critical performance (1) System safety under normal operating which two or more elements (hardware or testing performed on the subsystem or conditions. The system (all its elements software, or both) are used in combination to component. The non-processor-based including hardware and software) must be ensure safety. If a common mode failure quantification compliance must be designed to assure safe operation with no exists, then any analysis performed under demonstrated to have a high degree of hazardous events under normal anticipated this appendix cannot rely on the assumption confidence. operating conditions with proper inputs and that failures are independent. Examples (h) What assumptions must be documented within the expected range of environmental include: The use of redundancy in which two for risk assessment? (1) The railroad shall conditions. All safety-critical functions must or more elements perform a given function in document any assumptions regarding the be performed properly under these normal parallel and when one (hardware or software) derivation of risk metrics used. For example, conditions. The system shall operate safely element checks/monitors another element (of for the full risk assessment, all assumptions even in the absence of prescribed operator hardware or software) to help ensure its safe made about each value of the parameters actions or procedures. The designer must operation. Common mode failure relates to used in the calculation of total cost of identify and categorize all hazards that may independence, which must be ensured in accidents should be documented. For lead to unsafe system operation. Hazards these instances. When dealing with the abbreviated risk assessment, all assumptions categorized as unacceptable, which are effects of hardware failure, the designer shall made for MTHHE derivation using existing determined by hazard analysis, must be address the effects of the failure not only on reliability and availability data on the current eliminated by design. Best effort shall also be other hardware, but also on the execution of system components should be documented. made by the designer to eliminate by design the software, since hardware failures can The railroad shall document these the hazards categorized as undesirable. Those greatly affect how the software operates. assumptions in such a form as to permit later undesirable hazards that cannot be (3) Closed loop principle. System design comparisons with in-service experience. eliminated should be mitigated to the adhering to the closed loop principle requires (2) The railroad shall document any acceptable level as required by this part. that all conditions necessary for the existence assumptions regarding human performance. (2) System safety under failures. of any permissive state or action be verified The documentation shall be in such a form (i) It must be shown how the product is to be present before the permissive state or as to facilitate later comparisons with in- designed to eliminate or mitigate unsafe action can be initiated. Likewise the requisite service experience. systematic failures—those conditions which conditions shall be verified to be (3) The railroad shall document any can be attributed to human error that could continuously present for the permissive state assumptions regarding software defects. occur at various stages throughout product or action to be maintained. This is in contrast These assumptions shall be in a form that development. This includes unsafe errors in to allowing a permissive state or action to be permit the railroad to project the likelihood the software due to human error in the initiated or maintained in the absence of of detecting an in-service software defect. software specification, design, or coding detected failures. In addition, closed loop These assumptions shall be documented in phases; human errors that could impact design requires that failure to perform a such a form as to permit later comparisons hardware design; unsafe conditions that logical operation, or absence of a logical with in-service experience. could occur because of an improperly input, output or decision shall not cause an (4) The railroad shall document all of the designed human-machine interface; unsafe condition, i.e. system safety does not identified safety-critical fault paths to a installation and maintenance errors; and depend upon the occurrence of an action or mishap as predicted by the safety analysis errors associated with making modifications. logical decision. methodology. The documentation shall be in (ii) The product must be shown to operate (4) Safety assurance concepts. The product such a form as to facilitate later comparisons safely under conditions of random hardware design must include one or more of the with in-service faults. failures. This includes single hardware following Safety Assurance Concepts as ■ failures as well as multiple hardware failures described in IEEE–1483 standard to ensure 14. Revise Appendix C to part 236 to that may occur at different times but remain that failures are detected and the product is read as follows: undetected (latent) and react in combination placed in a safe state. One or more different Appendix C to Part 236—Safety with a subsequent failure at a later time to principles may be applied to each individual Assurance Criteria and Processes cause an unsafe operating situation. In subsystem or component, depending on the instances involving a latent failure, a safety design objectives of that part of the (a) What is the purpose of this appendix? subsequent failure is similar to there being a product. This appendix provides safety criteria and single failure. In the event of a transient (i) Design diversity and self-checking processes that the designer must use to failure, and if so designed, the system should concept. This concept requires that all develop and validate the product that meets restart itself if it is safe to do so. Frequency critical functions be performed in diverse safety requirements of this part. FRA uses the of attempted restarts must be considered in ways, using diverse software operations and/ criteria and processes set forth in this the hazard analysis required by or diverse hardware channels, and that appendix to evaluate the validity of safety § 236.907(a)(8). critical hardware be tested with Self- targets and the results of system safety (iii) There shall be no single point failures Checking routines. Permissive outputs are analyses provided in the RSPP, PSP, PTCIP, in the product that can result in hazards allowed only if the results of the diverse PTCDP, and PTCSP documents as categorized as unacceptable or undesirable. operations correspond, and the Self-Checking

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process reveals no failures in either the educational, mental, and physical (B) EN50155:2001/A1:2002, Railway execution of software or in any monitored capabilities of the intended operators and Applications: Electronic Equipment Used in input or output hardware. If the diverse maintainers; the degree of required human Rolling Stock. operations do not agree or if the checking interaction with the component; and the (iii) ATCS Specification 200 reveals critical failures, safety-critical environment in which the product will be Communications Systems Architecture. functions and outputs must default to a used. (iv) ATCS Specification 250 Message known safe state. (6) System safety under external Formats. (ii) Checked redundancy concept. The influences. The product must be shown to (v) AREMA 2009 Communications and Checked Redundancy concept requires operate safely when subjected to different Signal Manual of Recommended Practices, implementation of two or more identical, external influences, including: Part 16, Part 17, 21, and 23. independent hardware units, each executing (i) Electrical influences such as power (vi) Safety of High-Speed Ground identical software and performing identical supply anomalies/transients, abnormal/ Transportation Systems. Analytical functions. A means is to be provided to improper input conditions (e.g., outside of Methodology for Safety Validation of periodically compare vital parameters and normal range inputs relative to amplitude Computer Controlled Subsystems. Volume II: Development of a Safety Validation results of the independent redundant units, and frequency, unusual combinations of Methodology. Final Report September 1995. requiring agreement of all compared inputs) including those related to a human Author: Jonathan F. Luedeke, Battelle. DOT/ parameters to assert or maintain a permissive operator, and others such as electromagnetic FRA/ORD–95/10.2. output. If the units do not agree, safety- interference or electrostatic discharges, or critical functions and outputs must default to (vii) IEC 61508 (International both; Electrotechnical Commission), Functional a known safe state. (ii) Mechanical influences such as (iii) N-version programming concept. This Safety of Electrical/Electronic/ vibration and shock; and concept requires a processor-based product Programmable/Electronic Safety (E/E/P/ES) (iii) Climatic conditions such as to use at least two software programs Related Systems, Parts 1–7 as follows: temperature and humidity. performing identical functions and executing (A) IEC 61508–1 (1998–12) Part 1: General (7) System safety after modifications. concurrently in a cycle. The software requirements and IEC 61508–1 Corr. (1999– Safety must be ensured following programs must be written by independent 05) Corrigendum 1—Part 1: General modifications to the hardware or software, or teams, using different tools. The multiple Requirements. both. All or some of the concerns identified independently written software programs (B) IEC 61508–2 (2000–05) Part 2: in this paragraph may be applicable comprise a redundant system, and may be Requirements for electrical/electronic/ depending upon the nature and extent of the executed either on separate hardware units programmable electronic safety-related modifications. Such modifications must (which may or may not be identical) or systems. (C) IEC 61508–3 (1998–12) Part 3: Software within one hardware unit. A means is to be follow all of the concept, design, requirements and IEC 61508–3 Corr. 1 (1999– provided to compare the results and output implementation and test processes and 04) Corrigendum 1—Part 3: Software states of the multiple redundant software principles as documented in the PSP for the requirements. systems. If the system results do not agree, original product. Regression testing must be (D) IEC 61508–4 (1998–12) Part 4: then the safety-critical functions and outputs comprehensive and documented to include all scenarios which are affected by the Definitions and abbreviations and IEC must default to a known safe state. 61508–4 Corr. 1 (1999–04) Corrigendum 1— (iv) Numerical assurance concept. This change made, and the operating modes of the changed product during normal and failure Part 4: Definitions and abbreviations. concept requires that the state of each vital (E) IEC 61508–5 (1998–12) Part 5: parameter of the product or system be state (fallback) operation. (c) What standards are acceptable for Examples of methods for the determination uniquely represented by a large encoded of safety integrity levels and IEC 61508–5 numerical value, such that permissive results Verification and Validation? (1) The standards employed for Verification or Corr. 1 (1999–04) Corrigendum 1—Part 5: are calculated by pseudo-randomly Examples of methods for determination of combining the representative numerical Validation, or both, of products subject to this subpart must be sufficient to support safety integrity levels. values of each of the critical constituent (F) IEC 61508–6 (2000–04) Part 6: parameters of a permissive decision. Vital achievement of the applicable requirements of subpart H and subpart I of this part. Guidelines on the applications of IEC 61508– algorithms must be entirely represented by 2 and –3. data structures containing numerical values (2) U.S. Department of Defense Military Standard (MIL–STD) 882C, ‘‘System Safety (G) IEC 61508–7 (2000–03) Part 7: with verified characteristics, and no vital Overview of techniques and measures. Program Requirements’’ (January 19, 1993), is decisions are to be made in the executing (H) IEC 62278: 2002, Railway Applications: recognized as providing appropriate risk software, only by the numerical Specification and Demonstration of analysis processes for incorporation into representations themselves. In the event of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and verification and validation standards. critical failures, the safety-critical functions Safety (RAMS); (3) The following standards designed for and outputs must default to a known safe (I) IEC 62279: 2002 Railway Applications: state. application to processor-based signal and Software for Railway Control and Protection (v) Intrinsic fail-safe design concept. train control systems are recognized as Systems; Intrinsically fail-safe hardware circuits or acceptable with respect to applicable (4) Use of unpublished standards, systems are those that employ discrete elements of safety analysis required by including proprietary standards, is mechanical and/or electrical components. subpart H and subpart I of this part. The authorized to the extent that such standards The fail-safe operation for a product or latest versions of the standards listed below are shown to achieve the requirements of this subsystem designed using this principle should be used unless otherwise provided. part. However, any such standards shall be concept requires a verification that the effect (i) IEEE standards as follows: available for inspection and replication by of every relevant failure mode of each (A) IEEE 1483–2000, Standard for the FRA and for public examination in any component, and relevant combinations of Verification of Vital Functions in Processor- public proceeding before the FRA to which component failure modes, be considered, Based Systems Used in Rail Transit Control. they are relevant. analyzed, and documented. This is typically (B) IEEE 1474.2–2003, Standard for user (5) The various standards provided in this performed by a comprehensive failure modes interface requirements in communications paragraph are for illustrative purposes only. and effects analysis (FMEA) which must based train control (CBTC) systems. Copies of these standards can be obtained in show no residual unmitigated failures. In the (C) IEEE 1474.1–2004, Standard for accordance with the following: event of critical failures, the safety-critical Communications-Based Train Control (CBTC) (i) U.S. government standards and functions and outputs must default to a Performance and Functional Requirements. technical publications may be obtained by known safe state. (ii) CENELEC Standards as follows: contacting the federal National Technical (5) Human factor engineering principle. (A) EN50129: 2003, Railway Applications: Information Service, 5301 Shawnee Rd, The product design must sufficiently Communications, Signaling, and Processing Alexandria, VA 22312. incorporate human factors engineering that is Systems-Safety Related Electronic Systems (ii) U.S. National Standards may be appropriate to the complexity of the product; for Signaling; and obtained by contacting the American

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National Standards Institute, 25 West 43rd processes. Finally, the reviewer shall (8) If deemed applicable by FRA, the Street, 4 Floor, New York, NY 10036. evaluate and document the adequacy of the methods employed by the product (iii) IEC Standards may be obtained by railroad’s manufacturer to develop safety-critical contacting the International Electrotechnical (1) RSPP, the PSP, and any other hardware by generally acceptable techniques; Commission, 3, rue de Varembe´, P.O. Box documents pertinent to a product being (9) Method by which the supplier or 131 CH—1211, GENEVA, 20, Switzerland. developed under subpart H of this part; or railroad addresses comprehensiveness of the (iv) CENLEC Standards may be obtained by (2) PTCDP and PTCSP for systems being product design which considers the safety contacting any of one the national standards developed under subpart I of this part. elements listed in paragraph (b) of appendix bodies that make up the European Committee (e) The reviewer shall analyze the Hazard C to this part. for Electrotechnical Standardization. Log and/or any other hazard analysis ■ 16. Revise Appendix E to part 236 to documents for comprehensiveness and (v) IEEE standards may be obtained by read as follows: contacting the IEEE Publications Office, compliance with applicable railroad, vendor, 10662 Los Vaqueros Circle, P.O. Box 3014, supplier, industry, national, and Appendix E to Part 236—Human- Los Alamitos, CA 90720–1264. international standards. Machine Interface (HMI) Design (vi) AREMA standards may be obtained (f) The reviewer shall analyze all Fault from the American Railway Engineering and Tree Analyses (FTA), Failure Mode and (a) This appendix provides human factors Maintenance-of-Way Association, 10003 Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA), and design criteria applicable to both subpart H Derekwood Lane, Suite 210, Lanham, MD other hazard analyses for completeness, and subpart I of this part. HMI design criteria 20706. correctness, and compliance with applicable will minimize negative safety effects by railroad, vendor, supplier, industry, national causing designers to consider human factors ■ 15. Revise Appendix D to part 236 to and international standards. in the development of HMIs. The product read as follows: (g) The reviewer shall randomly select design should sufficiently incorporate human various safety-critical software, and hardware factors engineering that is appropriate to the Appendix D to Part 236—Independent modules, if directed by FRA, for audit to complexity of the product; the gender, Review of Verification and Validation verify whether the requirements of the educational, mental, and physical (a) This appendix provides minimum applicable railroad, vendor, supplier, capabilities of the intended operators and requirements for independent third-party industry, national, and international maintainers; the degree of required human assessment of product safety verification and standards were followed. The number of interaction with the component; and the validation pursuant to subpart H or subpart modules audited must be determined as a environment in which the product will be I of this part. The goal of this assessment is representative number sufficient to provide used. ‘‘ ’’ to provide an independent evaluation of the confidence that all unaudited modules were (b) As used in this section, designer developed in compliance with the applicable means anyone who specifies requirements product manufacturer’s utilization of safety railroad, vendor, supplier, industry, national, for—or designs a system or subsystem, or design practices during the product’s and international standards. both, for—a product subject to subpart H or development and testing phases, as required (h) The reviewer shall evaluate and subpart I of this part, and ‘‘operator’’ means by any mutually agreed upon controlling comment on the plan for installation and test any human who is intended to receive documents and standards and the applicable procedures of the product for revenue information from, provide information to, or railroad’s: service. perform repairs or maintenance on a safety- (1) Railroad Safety Program Plan (RSPP) (i) The reviewer shall prepare a final report critical product subject to subpart H or I of and Product Safety Plan (PSP) for processor of the assessment. The report shall be this part. based systems developed under subpart H or, submitted to the railroad prior to the (c) Human factors issues the designers (2) PTC Product Development Plan commencement of installation testing and must consider with regard to the general (PTCDP) and PTC Safety Plan (PTCSP) for contain at least the following information: function of a system include: PTC systems developed under subpart I. (1) Reviewer’s evaluation of the adequacy (1) Reduced situational awareness and (b) The supplier may request advice and of the PSP in the case of products developed over-reliance. HMI design must give an assistance of the reviewer concerning the under subpart H, or PTCSP for products operator active functions to perform, actions identified in paragraphs (c) through developed under subpart I of this part, feedback on the results of the operator’s (g) of this appendix. However, the reviewer including the supplier’s MTTHE and risk actions, and information on the automatic shall not engage in any design efforts estimates for the product, and the supplier’s functions of the system as well as its associated with the product, the products confidence interval in these estimates; performance. The operator must be ‘‘in-the- subsystems, or the products components, in (2) Product vulnerabilities, potentially loop.’’ Designers must consider at a minimum order to preserve the reviewer’s hazardous failure modes, or potentially the following methods of maintaining an independence and maintain the supplier’s hazardous operating circumstances which active role for human operators: proprietary right to the product. the reviewer felt were not adequately (i) The system must require an operator to (c) The supplier shall provide the reviewer identified, tracked, mitigated, and corrected initiate action to operate the train and require access to any and all documentation that the by either the vendor or supplier or the an operator to remain ‘‘in-the-loop’’ for at reviewer requests and attendance at any railroad; least 30 minutes at a time; design review or walkthrough that the (3) A clear statement of position for all (ii) The system must provide timely reviewer determines as necessary to complete parties involved for each product feedback to an operator regarding the and accomplish the third party assessment. vulnerability cited by the reviewer; system’s automated actions, the reasons for The reviewer may be accompanied by (4) Identification of any documentation or such actions, and the effects of the operator’s representatives of FRA as necessary, in FRA’s information sought by the reviewer that was manual actions on the system; judgment, for FRA to monitor the assessment. denied, incomplete, or inadequate; (iii) The system must warn operators in (d) The reviewer shall evaluate the product (5) A listing of each applicable vendor, advance when it requires an operator to take with respect to safety and comment on the supplier, industry, national, or international action; adequacy of the processes which the supplier standard, procedure or process which was (iv) HMI design must equalize an applies to the design and development of the not properly followed; operator’s workload; and product. At a minimum, the reviewer shall (6) Identification of the software (v) HMI design must not distract from the compare the supplier processes with verification and validation procedures, as operator’s safety related duties. acceptable validation and verification well as the hardware verification validation (2) Expectation of predictability and methodology and employ any other such procedures if deemed appropriate by FRA, consistency in product behavior and tests or comparisons if they have been agreed for the product’s safety-critical applications, communications. HMI design must to previously with FRA. Based on these and the reviewer’s evaluation of the accommodate an operator’s expectation of analyses, the reviewer shall identify and adequacy of these procedures; logical and consistent relationships between document any significant safety (7) Methods employed by the product actions and results. Similar objects must vulnerabilities which are not adequately manufacturer to develop safety-critical behave consistently when an operator mitigated by the supplier’s (or user’s) software; performs the same action upon them.

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(3) End user limited ability to process with 7:1 preferred, and controls should be communication services (PCS) transmitters information. HMI design must therefore provided to adjust the brightness level and operating under Part 15, Subpart D of the minimize an operator’s information contrast level); rules. processing load. To minimize information (4) Display only the information necessary (iii) 47 Code of Federal Regulations Parts processing load, the designer must: to the user; 0 to 19. The FCC rules and regulations (i) Present integrated information that (5) Where text is needed, use short, simple governing PCS transmitters may be found in directly supports the variety and types of sentences or phrases with wording that an 47 CFR, Parts 0 to 19. decisions that an operator makes; operator will understand and appropriate to (iv) OET Bulletin 62 (December 1993) (ii) Provide information in a format or the educational and cognitive capabilities of Understanding The FCC Regulations for representation that minimizes the time the intended operator; Computers and other Digital Devices. This required to understand and act; and (6) Use complete words where possible; document has been prepared to provide a (iii) Conduct utility tests of decision aids where abbreviations are necessary, choose a basic understanding of the FCC regulations to establish clear benefits such as processing commonly accepted abbreviation or for digital (computing) devices, and includes time saved or improved quality of decisions. consistent method and select commonly used answers to some commonly-asked questions. (4) End user limited memory. HMI design terms and words that the operator will (2) Designers must comply with FCC must therefore minimize an operator’s understand; requirements for Maximum Permissible information processing load. (7) Adopt a consistent format for all Exposure limits for field strength and power (i) To minimize short-term memory load, display screens by placing each design density for the transmitters operating at the designer shall integrate data or element in a consistent and specified frequencies of 300 kHz to 100 GHz and information from multiple sources into a location; specific absorption rate (SAR) limits for single format or representation (‘‘chunking’’) (8) Display critical information in the devices operating within close proximity to and design so that three or fewer ‘‘chunks’’ of center of the operator’s field of view by the body. The Commission’s requirements information need to be remembered at any placing items that need to be found quickly are detailed in parts 1 and 2 of the FCC’s one time. in the upper left hand corner and items Rules and Regulations (47 CFR 1.1307(b), (ii) To minimize long-term memory load, which are not time-critical in the lower right 1.1310, 2.1091, 2.1093). The following the designer shall design to support hand corner of the field of view; documentation is applicable to recognition memory, design memory aids to (9) Group items that belong together; demonstrating whether proposed or existing minimize the amount of information that (10) Design all visual displays to meet transmitting facilities, operations or devices must be recalled from unaided memory when human performance criteria under comply with limits for human exposure to making critical decisions, and promote active monochrome conditions and add color only radiofrequency RF fields adopted by the FCC: processing of the information. if it will help the user in performing a task, (i) OET Bulletin No. 65 (Edition 97–01, (d) Design systems that anticipate possible and use color coding as a redundant coding August 1997), ‘‘Evaluating Compliance With user errors and include capabilities to catch technique; FCC Guidelines For Human Exposure To errors before they propagate through the (11) Limit the number of colors over a Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields’’, system; group of displays to no more than seven; (ii) OET Bulletin No 65 Supplement A, (1) Conduct cognitive task analyses prior to (12) Design warnings to match the level of (Edition 97–01, August 1997), OET Bulletin designing the system to better understand the risk or danger with the alerting nature of the No 65 Supplement B (Edition 97–01, August information processing requirements of signal; and 1997) and operators when making critical decisions; (13) With respect to information entry, (iii) OET Bulletin No 65 Supplement C and avoid full QWERTY keyboards for data entry. (Edition 01–01, June 2001). (2) Present information that accurately (g) With respect to problem management, (3) The bulletin and supplements offer represents or predicts system states. the HMI designer shall ensure that the: guidelines and suggestions for evaluating (e) When creating displays and controls, (1) HMI design must enhance an operator’s compliance. However, they are not intended the designer must consider user ergonomics situation awareness; to establish mandatory procedures. Other and shall: (2) HMI design must support response methods and procedures may be acceptable (1) Locate displays as close as possible to selection and scheduling; and if based on sound engineering practice. the controls that affect them; (3) HMI design must support contingency ■ 17. Add an Appendix F to part 236 to (2) Locate displays and controls based on planning. read as follows: an operator’s position; (h) Ensure that electronics equipment radio (3) Arrange controls to minimize the need frequency emissions are compliant with Appendix F to Part 236—Minimum for the operator to change position; appropriate Federal Communications Requirements of FRA Directed (4) Arrange controls according to their Commission regulations. The FCC rules and Independent Third-Party Assessment of expected order of use; regulations are codified in Title 47 of the PTC System Safety Verification and (5) Group similar controls together; Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Validation (6) Design for high stimulus-response (1) Electronics equipment must have compatibility (geometric and conceptual); appropriate FCC Equipment Authorizations. (a) This appendix provides minimum (7) Design safety-critical controls to require The following documentation is applicable to requirements for mandatory independent more than one positive action to activate obtaining FCC Equipment Authorization: third-party assessment of PTC system safety (e.g., auto stick shift requires two movements (i) OET Bulletin Number 61 (October, 1992 verification and validation pursuant to to go into reverse); Supersedes May, 1987 issue) FCC Equipment subpart H or I of this part. The goal of this (8) Design controls to allow easy recovery Authorization Program for Radio Frequency assessment is to provide an independent from error; and Devices. This document provides an evaluation of the PTC system manufacturer’s (9) Design display and controls to reflect overview of the equipment authorization utilization of safety design practices during specific gender and physical limitations of program to control radio interference from the PTC system’s development and testing the intended operators. radio transmitters and certain other phases, as required by the applicable PSP, (f) The designer shall also address electronic products and an overview of how PTCDP, and PTCSP, the applicable information management. To that end, HMI to obtain an equipment authorization. requirements of subpart H or I of this part, design shall: (ii) OET Bulletin 63: (October 1993) and any other previously agreed-upon (1) Display information in a manner which Understanding The FCC Part 15 Regulations controlling documents or standards. emphasizes its relative importance; for Low Power, Non-Licensed Transmitters. (b) The supplier may request advice and (2) Comply with the ANSI/HFS 100–1988 This document provides a basic assistance of the independent third-party standard; understanding of the FCC regulations for low reviewer concerning the actions identified in (3) Utilize a display luminance that has a power, unlicensed transmitters, and includes paragraphs (c) through (g) of this appendix. difference of at least 35cd/m2 between the answers to some commonly-asked questions. However, the reviewer should not engage in foreground and background (the displays This edition of the bulletin does not contain design efforts in order to preserve the should be capable of a minimum contrast 3:1 information concerning personal reviewer’s independence and maintain the

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supplier’s proprietary right to the PTC compliance with railroad, vendor, supplier, (2) PTC system vulnerabilities, potentially system. industry, national, or international standards. hazardous failure modes, or potentially (c) The supplier shall provide the reviewer (f) The reviewer shall analyze all Fault hazardous operating circumstances which access to any and all documentation that the Tree Analyses (FTA), Failure Mode and the reviewer felt were not adequately reviewer requests and attendance at any Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA), and identified, tracked or mitigated; design review or walkthrough that the other hazard analyses for completeness, (3) A clear statement of position for all reviewer determines as necessary to complete correctness, and compliance with railroad, parties involved for each PTC system and accomplish the third party assessment. vendor, supplier, industry, national, or vulnerability cited by the reviewer; The reviewer may be accompanied by international standards. (4) Identification of any documentation or representatives of FRA as necessary, in FRA’s (g) The reviewer shall randomly select information sought by the reviewer that was judgment, for FRA to monitor the assessment. various safety-critical software modules, as denied, incomplete, or inadequate; well as safety-critical hardware components (d) The reviewer shall evaluate with (5) A listing of each applicable vendor, if required by FRA for audit to verify whether respect to safety and comment on the supplier, industry, national or international the railroad, vendor, supplier, industry, adequacy of the processes which the supplier standard, process, or procedure which was national, or international standards were not properly followed; applies to the design and development of the followed. The number of modules audited (6) Identification of the hardware and PTC system. At a minimum, the reviewer must be determined as a representative software verification and validation shall evaluate the supplier design and number sufficient to provide confidence that procedures for the PTC system’s safety- development process regarding the use of an all unaudited modules were developed in critical applications, and the reviewer’s appropriate design methodology. The compliance with railroad, vendor, supplier, evaluation of the adequacy of these reviewer may use the comparison processes industry, national, or international standards procedures; and test procedures that have been (h) The reviewer shall evaluate and (7) Methods employed by PTC system previously agreed to with FRA. Based on comment on the plan for installation and test manufacturer to develop safety-critical these analyses, the reviewer shall identify procedures of the PTC system for revenue and document any significant safety service. software; and vulnerabilities which are not adequately (i) The reviewer shall prepare a final report (8) If directed by FRA, methods employed mitigated by the supplier’s (or user’s) of the assessment. The report shall be by PTC system manufacturer to develop processes. Finally, the reviewer shall submitted to the railroad prior to the safety-critical hardware. evaluate the adequacy of the railroad’s commencement of installation testing and Issued in Washington, DC, on December applicable PSP or PTCSP, and any other contain at least the following information: 30, 2009. documents pertinent to the PTC system being (1) Reviewer’s evaluation of the adequacy Joseph C. Szabo, assessed. of the PSP or PTCSP including the supplier’s Administrator. (e) The reviewer shall analyze the Hazard MTTHE and risk estimates for the PTC Log and/or any other hazard analysis system, and the supplier’s confidence [FR Doc. E9–31362 Filed 1–12–10; 11:15 am] documents for comprehensiveness and interval in these estimates; BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

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