2020 Post- Election Analysis

May 2021

THIRDWAY THECOLLECTIVE LATINO VICTORY POLITICALACTIONCOMMITTEE Project Overview

The fundamer ballot in 2020 ?

2 ProjectOverview

be a standoutin the last half- centuryof congressionalgains for A Message from Marlon Marshall and Lynda Tran Democratsand approachedour analysiswith tempered expectationsabout what should ” have happenedacrossthe Our team set out to conduct a postmortemanalysis of the 2020 battlegroundmaps. Lastly, we were consciousof the ongoing cycle that would offer an honest and data-driven look at both what debatearound pollingaccuracyand effectiveness, and we worked well for Democrats runningfor the U.S. House evaluatedthe publicand proprietarypolling we received Representativesand the U.S. Senate and where the challenges accordingly. our candidatesexperiencedcall for meaningfulsolutionsbefore voters head back to the ballot box in just two short years. Over 6 months , we explored the national and regional message themes that played out in the campaigns ' own media and other While we did not embark on the project with preconceived notions assets , reviewed the infrastructure and ecosystem that about what strategies , tactics , or issues impacted electoral supported these campaigns , and conducted our own deep dive outcomes , we believe we performed our work with eyes wide open into the data and analytics using both final state voter files and to the public discourse and historic health and economic crises that public and proprietary polling . While we intentionally devoted touched every major campaign - and every individual in America - the bulk of our time and effort to gathering first -person in 2020. We knew it was important to explore the COVID -19 pandemic and its impact on everything from how campaigns observations based on the campaigns ' lived experience , reached their supporters to whether and how voters were able to throughout the , we continually sought out additional make their voices heard . And we were professionally and data , integrated new analyses of 2020 demographics and outcomes , and incorporated the wisdom and experience of personally conscious of the heightened role that race played in these elections - both in the GOP's bold -faced efforts to divide expert voices from across the Democratic political spectrum . Americans and in helping to drive civic engagement and voter Althoughwe explicitlyfocusedour efforts on answeringthe enthusiasm in critical races nationally . questionof " What happenedin 2020? rather than prescribing what should happen next, we hopethis analysis informs We also went into the analysis grounded in many cycles of DemocraticParty and broadermovementleadersas they experience and data on voter participation and longitudinal turnout begin planningfor 2022and beyond. trends. As such , we understood the " blue wave 2018 elections to

3 Wash

Maine Mont N.D. .

Minn Ore .

Idaho Wis Mass S.D.

Conn Wyo Mich R.I.

lowa Neb NJ

Ohio What We Found Ind Del W.Va. Calif. Kan. Va Mo. Ky

N.C.

Tenn

Ariz Okla

Ark S.C.

Ala Ga . Miss

Texas La

Fla . Alaska

Hawaii

4 What We Found Our findings

1 Voters of color are persuasionvoters who needto be Our findings convinced

2 . Republican attemptsto brand Democrats as " radicals worked

3 Polling was a huge problem - even after 2016 adjustments

4 . COVID-19 affectedeverything

5 . Year round organizing worked, as did cross- Party collaboration

6 . Our hopes for 2020 werejust too high

5 1.Voters of color are persuasion voters who need to be convinced

6 Our Findings Voters of color are persuasion voters

Our assumptions about Dem support among voters of color Our and the lack of differentiation in our messaging and outreach approach within demographic groups - cost us support in key races As in previous cycles, Democrats generally treated Black, Latino, and AAPI to voters of voters as GOTV targets, concentrating outreach efforts closer to Election Day and in some cases after early vote was already underway Despite historic turnout, even where Black voters were key to Democratic color successes this past cycle - including in GA, AZ, and MI - the data show drop off in support in 2020 compared to 2016 and 2018 significantly Drop- off in support among Latino and Hispanic voters were the lynchpin in Democratic losses in races in FL, TX, and NM - especially among working class and non- college voters in these communities hurt our Drop- off in AAPI support fueled losses in key races in CA, especially among Vietnamese and Filipino voters outcomes Campaign messaging to these groups typically did not account for differing perceptions among gender , age groups, educational attainment , geography , or country of origin and there was a dearth of message research on Black voters in particular Black, AAPI, and Latino and Hispanic voters were targeted by misinformation and disinformation efforts both online and on- the-ground - yet campaigns were largely unableto either assess the reach or respond in real time

7 Our Findings Voters of color are persuasion voters

We heard that there were substantial Party and campaign The Party misfires for engaging key demographic groups as a monolith - most notably Latino and Hispanic voters treated National strategy failed to take into account regional and local differences, socioeconomic status, urbanicity, or country of origin - despite higher voters of support for Democrats among voters from Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican compared to Cuban- American voters

Latino and Hispanic voters were broadly treated as GOTV targets rather color as a than audiences for persuasion earlier in the cycle, and the modeling, polling, and subsequent campaign decision making reflected this assumption

monolith Campaign messaging didn't always reflect the differing values and priorities of urban Hispanic voters vs. rural Hispanic voters, much less account for what would most persuade Hispanic men in the Rio Grande especially Valley, oil and gas workers in New Mexico, or Latinas in South Florida Latino voters

8 Our Findings Voters of color are persuasion voters

Turnout among Latino voters grew dramatically in 2020 - rising Latino voters by more than 30% compared to 2016 Latino support was critical for the top of the ticket but especially in tight made a states like AZ, PA, and NV where the margin of victory among Latino voters exceeded Biden's win margin with the overall electorate

Latinovoterswerealso a lynchpinin Sen. Kelly'swin in Arizonawherehis difference in supportnearlymatched2016 levels Bidensaw heavierlossesamong Latinovoters, indicatingthat somesplit ticketvotingtook place top races Despite increased Latino turnout overall , Democrats saw a significant dip in support in places with high concentrations of Latino and Hispanic voters including in south FL and west TX

Part of the underperformancein 2020 is a reflection of Clinton's strength with Latino voters in 2016, when she outperformed Obama's 2012 support

In FL- 26 , Republicans took a big lead in voter registrationin 2020, saw higher turnout among Latino voters, and netted more of their support

InTX- 23, despitegrowingtheir shareof the overallelectorate, support amongrural Latinovotersshiftedright by 13 pointsin 2020, mostlydue to higherturnoutamongLatinoRepublicans Our Findings Voters of color are persuasion voters

Latinos continue to be 10 points more Dem than the rest of the electorate, but our advantage has shrunk

Latino voters have grown their share of the electorate in recent cycles , but in 2020 Democratic support among Latino voters dropped in South Florida and parts of Texas

FL - 26 TX-23 Latino Precincts ( 80% ) Maj. LatinoPrecincts

66 % 64 % 65 % 58 % 59%

52 %

40% 40 % 38% 34%

'16 CD CD CD '12 CD CD '20 '18 '20

*Source: Immigration Hub Analysis on Latino Voters in 2020 10 Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters

Evenin Arizona where Mark Kellyretainedsupportfrom Latinovoters, Republicansmadeinroadsat the top of the ticket

Presidential + 2020 Senate Special Support-wise, Sen. Kelly was able to retain near 2016 level Dem vote share by demo composition support among Latino voters, while Biden saw heavier losses among Latinos than Kelly - indicating some split White Precincts(>90%) Latino Precincts (>60%) ticket voting took place

79% 77% 75% 77%

39% 39% 37% 34%

'12 '16 '20 SEN '20 '12 '16 '20 SEN '20

11 Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters

InFL-26,DemocraticregistrationamongLatinonewregistrantsdroppedby 8 points since2016,while Republicanssaw a 13-pointincrease

Meanwhile, Latino voters across Miami-Dade were less likely to identify as Democrats in 2020 relative to 2016 and more likely to identify with neither party

PartyRegistrationin 2016 PartyRegistrationin 2020 New Registrants NewRegistrants

DEM OTHER REP DEM OTHER REP

OUTER R ING SUB URB S 27% 43% 30% OUTER R ING SUB URB S 34% 48% 18%

INNER RING SUBURBS 30% 43% 27% INNER RING SUBURBS 37% 46% 16%

UR BAN M IAM I-DADE 25% 44% 32% UR BAN M IAM I-DADE 33% 49% 18%

FL KEYS 23% 43% 34% FL KEYS 25% 35% 40%

WHI TE 26% 46% 29% WHI TE 25% 38% 37%

BL AC K 64% 33% BL AC K 67% 29%

LATINO 32% 49% 19% LATINO 24% 44% 32%

LATINO (CUBAN) 30% 48% 22% LATINO (CUBAN) 21% 42% 37%

LATINO (NON-CUBAN) 33% 50% 17% LATINO (NON-CUBAN) 26% 45% 29%

12 Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters

The data show that strongvote share amongBlack voters – Black voters despitesome downwardtrends – likely madethe differencein top races made a Dramaticshifts in the electoratehelpedmany Tier 1districts becomebluer in 2020 – but Bidenwas moresuccessfulin cementingthis baseline difference in support whilemany Congressionalcandidateslaggedbehind, includingin CA-39,TX-23, andTX-24

AlthoughDemocratssaw a modestdip in support amongBlack voters top races (particularlyin VA-07 and the NC Senate race),Blackvoter turnout increasedsubstantiallynationally— resultingin more net Democratic votes from Black voters in 2020 than in 2016 Blackvoters were criticalto Democrats’victories in the Georgiarunoffs — with higher turnout and less drop-off than other groups headingfrom the generalinto the runoff elections

13 Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters

Black voters were criticalto Democrats’victoriesin the Georgia runoff electionsand helpedcement Democraticcontrolof the U.S.Senate

Although turnout among Black voters dropped relative to 2016, Sen. Warnock overperformed both Clinton’s 2016 and Biden’s 2020 support, and performed similarly to Obama’s 2012 margin

GA: Presidential + 2021 Runoff Dem vote share by demo composition

White Precincts(>90%) Black Precincts (>90%) Lat-Am Precincts(>20%) AAPI Precincts(>20%) N=423 N=340 N=41 N=28

98% 96% 97% 95%

65% 61% 61% 57% 58% 59% 53%

41%

21% 21% 18% 19%

'12 '16 '20 '21 '12 '16 '20 '21 '12 '16 '20 '21 '12 '16 '20 '21

14 Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters

In2020, Blackvoterscomprised a smaller share of the overall Black voters electorate.A substantialboostinturnoutnettedDemocratsmore rawvotes from Black voters than 2016, but the explosive growthamong white voters in mostraces turned out in outpacedthese gains Despiteincreasedturnout,Democratssaw a modestdipinsupport big numbers – Inthe NorthCarolina Senate race, Black voters grew their share of the electorate in2020 and saw increasedturnoutover 2016 – but the GOP also saw a slight but their improvementamongBlackrural / exurbanvoters InVA-07, the turnout gap betweenall voters of color and white voters increased comparedto 2016, benefitingthe GOP. Democrats’supportalso fell in majority overall share Black precincts,althoughturnoutinthese areas was up relative to 2016

Still,Blackvoterswerecriticalto Democraticwinsinthe GA runoff dropped electionsand helpedcementDemocraticcontrolof the U.S.Senate

Turnout among Black voters dropped relative to 2016, but Sen. Warnock overperformed both Clinton’s 2016 and Biden’s 2020 support, and performed similarly to Obama’s 2012 margin

While turnout among all racial groups dropped heading into the runoffs, the drop- off was the least concentrated among Black voters

Drop-off was also less prominent among voters in urban/inner ring areas – key constituencies for both Dem candidates – while drop-off was steeper for white rural voters (which hurt Republican candidates)

15 Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters

InMI-08,Slotkinmadegains over 2016 Democraticsupport has slightly Demperformancein areas with more Despite eroded in majority-Blackprecincts voters of color,but lost some support in NC over the past three cycles robust sinceher first cycle in 2018

MI-08: Dem Support in NC Senate: Dem Support in Diverse Precincts Black Precincts (>75%) support from (Voters of Color >30%) Black voters, PRES CONG 95% 92% 91% 91%

80% there are 76% 78%

76% warning signs 73% for Dems

'16 '18 '20 '12 '16 '20 '20 Pres Sen

16 Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters

InNC,Republicansmadegreater gains amongBlack supporters,particularlyin non-urbanareas

Modeled Dem Turnout Prev Reg Modeled GOP Turnout Prev Reg

2016 TURNOUT 2020TURNOUT 2016 TURNOUT 2020TURNOUT

+1PP +6PP +9PP +11PP +2PP +5PP +7PP +8PP

74% 75% 72% 70% 68% 67% 67% 63% 64% 61% 61% 58% 55% 57% 51% 52%

BLACK BLACK BLACK BLACK BLACK BLACK BLACK BLACK URBAN SUB I NNER SUB OUTER RURAL URBAN SUB I NNER SUB OUTER RURAL

17 Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters

The data show risingelectoralparticipationfrom AAPIvoters AAPI voters likely madethe differencein top races – includingsome of the closestpresidentialconteststhis cycle made a AAPI voters saw significant growth in their electorates with large difference in increases in registration and turnout Over 4 million ballots were cast by AAPI voters in 2020 – a 47% increase top races over their 2.8 million turnout in 2016 and a substantially sharper rise than the 12% increase among all other voters

Georgia saw the second highest state-level increase in AAPI votes in the nation with the surge exceeding Biden’s win margin – AAPI votes grew by almost 62,000 votes over 2016 in a state where Biden won by just 12,000 votes

Arizona was among the top ten states that experienced a surge in AAPI voters

• In CA-39, AAPI voters now comprise a quarter of the electorate (a 6-point growth since 2016)

• While Biden grew support among this community since 2016 (three points in TX-24, one point in CA-39), congressional candidates underperformed him significantly in both districts

18 Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters

InCA-39,the share of AAPI new registrantshas beensteadilyincreasingsince 2016and in 2020 – now accountingfor nearly 1 in 3 new voters

Although Cisneros was unsuccessful in his re-election bid, the growth in registration and higher turnout among AAPI voters helped Biden improve on 2016 support

CA-39: Compositionof New RegisteredVoters, 2016-2020

< 30 30-39 40-49 50-64 65+ AAPI BLACK LATINO WHITE

2020 25% 18% 16% 24% 18% 28% 6% 31% 35%

2018 32% 19% 15% 20% 13% 25% 6% 32% 37%

2016 41% 17% 14% 17% 10% 21% 6% 32% 40%

AAPICOL AAPINON-COL WHCOL WHNON-COL AAPI-URB. AAPI-INNER WH-URB WH-INNER LATCOL LATNON-COL OTH LAT-URB LAT-INNER OTHER

2020 20% 8% 24% 12% 12% 19% 6% 9% 15% 15% 17% 18% 11% 15%

2018 22% 3% 31% 7% 10% 21% 6% 9% 13% 17% 19% 19% 10% 14%

2016 19% 2% 33% 7% 10% 22% 6% 8% 11% 19% 18% 21% 9% 13%

19 Our Findings | Voters of color are persuasion voters

InTX-24, growthin the AAPI InCA-39,althoughCisnerosimproved Congressional electoratedidnot translateinto votes on his 2018 supportin Asian American for Valenzuela,who underperformed precincts,he still receivedroughly candidates Biden 2020 andClinton2016 support 9 pointsless than Biden

TX-24: Dem Support CA-39: Dem Support underperformed in AAPI Precincts (>20%) in AAPI Precincts (>50%)

PRES CONG Biden with AAPI voters 63% 60% 59% 58% 59%

48%

50% 47%

39%

'12 '16 '20 '20 '16 '18 '20 Pres Pres Pres CD

20 2. Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked

21 Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked

Win or lose, self-described progressive or moderate, Democrats Messaging consistently raised a lack of a strong Democratic Party brand as a significant concern in 2020

Campaign public discourse – in paid media, earned media, and direct voter mattered – in contact – and message and opinion research indicated that voters recalled attacks related to “radical socialists,” “Defund the Police,” and related good ways messages In the districts we looked at, those in which “law and order” or “socialism” was a continued drumbeat also saw a higher share of Latino/AAPI/Black voters and bad who supported the GOP Districts with significant rural populations required in-person voter contact to effectively push back on these attacks, but most chose not to do so

Campaigns that were able to reach constituents with local messages – especially incumbents who could point to specific legislative wins – fared best Anecdotally, messages about jobs, the economy, and rebuilding post-COVID were most effective – but the GOP successfully branded Dems as the Party that would keep the economy shut down Republicans (Trump) successfully raised concerns about election security and VBM – potentially dampening their own voters’ enthusiasm GOP media organizations and overall structure made them more effective than Dems

22 Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked

Racewas a primaryfocus throughoutthe cycle – Campaignsand practitionerswidely described mostnotablyas BlackLivesMatterprotestsand 2020messagingas nationalizedwith Trump at the Defundthe Policemovementtook off in the the top of the ticket summerof 2020 • One theme that arose was Party messagingthat leanedtoo heavily on"anti-Trump"rhetoricwithout harnessinga strong • One candidate’sinternal campaignpollinginsummer2020 economic frame showedthat voters didn'tbelievethey "sharedtheir values," a As a formerMember of Congressdescribedthe issue, Democrats notable shift from earlierresearchthat they interpretedas a need • focused onarguingthat Trumpwas bad, not why a Democratic to addressthe Defundthe Policemovement– whichthey did in majority would help voters, “It was the lack of an economic plan ads featuringa former Republicanlawenforcementofficeras a that really hurt” validatorfor the candidate’svalues and character • Some campaignteams we spoke withfelt that the Party didn’t • In NY-02,when Jackie Gordonwas askedif she supported have a messagebeyond“DonaldTrump sucks,” andthis voidled defundingthe police,she respondedby pointingto herdecades to split-ticketvoting for Bidenat the top of the ticket and longcareerinlawenforcement,as a militarypoliceofficer, Republicansdownballot(leadingto split outcomesin16 districts workingwiththe police as a memberof the Babylontown nationwide) council,and thenas a guidancecounselor,invitingpoliceinto her o Inthis absence of strong party branding,the opposition school – internalpollingindicatedthatconstituentsdidn'tbuy this latchedon to GOP talking points,suggestingour candidates line of oppositionattack would “burndownyour house and take away the police.” • In NE-02,Kara Eastmanrefutedthe claimthat she wantedto o Dana Balter describedNY-24 not as a swingdistrict,but a defundthe policebothin debates and onsocial media,andcited splitticketdistrict,where "we vote Democratfor president herpastexperienceworkingwithpolicedepartmentsas a social and Republicanfor congress" worker,butshe didnotfeel her approachbluntedthe attacks

23 Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked

The top of the ticketultimatelymatteredthe most,butthe Candidates personalrecordand bio of federalcandidatesmattered,too – especiallywhere campaignshadearly funding mattered Consistentwith previouscycles,presidentialperformancehad the largest impact on down ballot races – just 16 of allfederal races in 2020 saw split- ticket outcomes

Most federal candidatesthat hadthe resourcesto offer uptheir bio earlier – andto maintaina bio track in their paidmedia for the durationof the cycle – fared best, winning by an average marginof D+1.8 (for Senate candidates)and D+5.4 (for House candidates)and some outperforming the top of the ticket

Candidateswho won districts that PresidentBidendid not reliedon local knowledge,a personalbio that resonatedwith voters (often with a backgroundin nationalsecurity), anddisciplinedcampaignsthat stayed on messageandseamlessly shiftedits operationsin a tumultuous campaigncycle

24 Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked

o The campaignwas disciplinedand focused on his bio for the Candidateswith strong,homegrownbiographies durationof the campaign,weavinginpositiveand negative that hadthe resourcesto stay on that message messagingcloser to ElectionDay throughouttheir campaignstendedto win

• In MI-08,CongresswomanElissaSlotkin’steam developedtheir messaginginJanuary of 2020 focusedonherbiographyand usedit to build a bridgeto the voters inher districtwhoweren’t predisposedDemocraticbase voters o Rep.Slotkinmessagedonhealthcare,sharingthe personal story abouthermother’scancerand lack of healthinsurance • In NY-19,CongressmanAntonioDelgadospent2019 doing33 townhalls across all 11 countiesinhis district,ensuringthatthe messageof beingavailableand workinghardfor his constituents was front and center o Whenthe pandemichit, the campaignstayedfocusedon Positive messaging and branding worked – meetingthe needs of constituents,which servedas a way to especially early on. Later in the cycle, the inoculatethemselvesfromoutsidenarratives narrative was too cemented to break through no • In the ArizonaSenaterace,SenatorMark Kelly’scampaignwent matter how much a campaign spent in its closing up early – the first full week of September– and focusedheavily days. onhis bio and appealingto multiple demographicsneededto win statewide o As one strategistnoted,peoplerespondedto differentparts of his story inextremelypositiveways: “Seniorslovedthat he is anastronaut,Latinoslovedhis commitmentto family, and non-collegeeducatedwhite menlovedthat he is a combatveteran”

25 “This election, Republicans tended to reach people and connect at an emotional level and Dems tried to connect with people at an intellectual level.” – National media consultant

26 Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked

Incumbent Democratic candidates focused their But Republicans successfully painted Democrats

COVID messaging on constituency services as the Party that wanted to keep the country shut down • In NY-19, the Delgado team called constituents to see what they needed rather than to ask for their vote • According to a leader of a national nonprofit organization, “We • In NJ-03, the focus was on being in this together, and were right to shut down the economy and mandate masks, but Representative Kim was able to visit small businesses (while we also needed to make clear that was because we stood for following COVID safety protocols) getting the economy, schools and stadiums open ASAP. There is • In MI-08, Representative Slotkin utilized messaging about PPE a line between being the adults in the room and being the nanny being “Made in America,” which was specific to her district state, and during the election cycle, we did not make clear that because of its industrial nature we were the party of solutions [in the way President Biden has • In GA-06, Rep. Lucy McBath’s campaign research showed that done so successfully since taking office.]” messaging on how the Congresswoman has delivered for • In FL-26, where a substantial portion of the population works on veterans by sponsoring the HAVEN Act to “stand up for our cruise ships, in hospitality, and in the tourism industry, veterans by amending current bankruptcy law and supporting constituents didn’t want to hear the message of “stay home,” but disabled veterans’ eligibility for relief during financial hardship” looked to leaders for answers on when they would be able to get resonated with voters back to work

When Democrats focused their COVID messaging solely on health care without talking about the economy, it exposed them to GOP attacks.

27 Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked

RepublicansuniversallyattackedDemocratswith the “socialist”label,and moderateDemocrats struggledto countersince some within the Party identifyas Democraticsocialists

• The socialismattack was called out by many Membersof Congress and candidateswho were notsuccessfulwho believeit hurt campaignsinstates and districtswithimmigrantpopulations that fledsocialistgovernments,includingamongVenezuelan, Cuban,Vietnamese,and Filipinovoters • In NJ-07,the TomMalinowskicampaignfocusedtheir messaging onissues and their Republicanopponent’srecordinthe state senate – but challengerState SenatorTomKean’scampaign promotedQAnonconspiracytheoristsand connectedMalinowski to pedophiles,drowningout any conversationsabout policy The “Dem potpourri” of attacks meant to brand • As the Malinowskicampaignreported,“We were talkingissues Democrats as “radical” was effective – andour opponent'srecordinthe state senate.They were talking especially where there wasn’t enough positive about pedophiles.QAnonbecamea huge presenceinour race, bio early and where campaigns failed to And drownedout conversationsaboutpolicy.Itfelt like respond to the lies. messagingbecamea wash. Ina districtas tight as this turningout the base is what mattered,andtheir motivatorwas partisanship”

28 Our Findings Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “ radicals worked

YvetteHerrell

Sponsored forby YVETTE4CONGRESS

ID : 313601906306024 DaleCrafts Sponsored forby Dale Crafts forCongress XochitlTorresSmall ranas a moderatebut voteslike a socialist! Chip in $5 ID : 347303449815154 or moreto getyour own“ Say NoTo Xocialism bumperstickertoday! I'm Dale Crafts. InCongress, I'll fight for our neighborhoods, and our families.

SAY NO TO IN NA WINT TO POLICE XOCIALISM

Paid byYvette4Congress AL

JARED GOLDEN SECURE.WINRED.COM SIDES WITH THEM Say NoTo Xocialism BumperSticker! Order your Say No To XocialismBumperStickerToday!

29 Our Findings Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “ radicals ” worked

While practically everyone candidates , • At oneendofthespectrum, candidateslikeRep. Spanberger ( VA -07) shared widely reported concerns that Republican efforts journalists , Party leaders, and pundits - has to paint all Democrats as socialists who would defund the police focused on the impact of Defund the Police a cost us multipleseats this cycle solo variable , it was just one of the multiple issues • Similarly, Cameron campaign( VA-05) constantlyhadto that Republicans used to paint Democrats as bat back claims that he supported defunding the police , even radicals after running ads that featured local law enforcement as validators , and after the paper of record , the Roanoke Times , debunked the claim . It was particularly difficult for candidates of • This “ potpourri” includedeffortsto tie candidatesto socialism , Medicare for All , the Green New Deal , Nancy Pelosi, color to avoid these race - based attacks AOC and “ the Squad " ( in these cases all framed as equally Inotherdistricts, DefundthePolicewasperceivedas a minorblip radical) . These attacks were used to a greater or lesser degree among the other “ Dem potpourri” attacks. For example, in FL- ,

depending on the unique constituencies of a given district attacks against former Rep. Debbie Mucarsel-Powell focused • There was no one best way to counter these attacks , nor was more on messages of socialism and support for women's choice - issues that were more effective with her Hispanic and Latino there clearagreementeventhat we shouldaddressthe issue in paid communications constituents • The GOP consistently framed the moment in and order • Andin someraces, suchastheNorthCarolinaSenaterace, Defund the Police " was in the bloodstream because it was part of terms, which resonated with voters on both the right and the left the presidential back and forth , " but it was never really a huge including Latino men and women, as the April 2021 EquisLabs report Portrait of a Persuadable Latino ” called out part of the Senate campaign messaging on either side

Based on interviews , data analysis , polling , and How much Defund the Police dominated public ads analysis , where Defund the Police had a discourse - and by extension how much it significant impact , it was as a part of culture required campaign resources to address the issue based attack on Democrats that sought to - varied widely by state and district stoke fears among voters about any candidate with a D' after their name

30 Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked

None of the candidatesor campaignsincludedin Some candidatesreportedthat it was difficultto this analysissupporteddefundingthe police,but determinewhether RepublicanDefundthe Police nearly allwere targetedwith paid ads claiming attackswere effectivelylanding– and that they did challengeimpactedwhether and how they responded • In our review of the 20 digital ads with the highest numberof impressions runby eachcandidate in19 races (760 total ads), 52 • Some campaignsthat did notspecificallytest “Defundthe Police” mentionedDefundthe Police – with 2 runby Democratsand 50 intheir pollingreportedtheir belief that other indicatorsthat they runby Republicans were tracking – suchas “shares my values” – were a proxy for how these attacks were impactingtheir overall favorability • Overall,Defundthe Police was mentionedin14%of the GOP digital ads with the highestnumberof impressionscomparedto among voters and made messagingdecisions accordingly just 1% of the Democraticdigital ads with the highestimpressions • CandaceValenzuela’spollinginTX-24 showedthat attacks relatedto Defundthe Policeweren’tany more impactfulthan • Even inraces where Defundthe Police did not appearin paid advertising,candidates reportedthat constituentsaskedaboutit other attacks,butthe candidatereportedthat “people are during campaignevents, indicatingthat the message was missingthe forest for the trees” and suspectedthese attacks breakingthroughinother channels were more perniciousanddamagingthan pollingindicated • One well-resourcedcampaignreportedthat while they believed that Defundthe Policeand some of the more extreme “radical Democrat”lines of attack mighthave resonatedwithvoters, they Whether and how candidates responded to ultimatelydid notuse their preparedresponseads, becausetheir these attacks depended on the interplay of opponentdidnotputmoney behindany of these attacks district and candidate demographics and • Some candidatesoptedagainst respondingdirectly to background Republicanassertions,believingthat addressingthis complicated issue would only give more oxygento a messagethat voters weren’tbuying,particularlywhenthat pushback mightalienate some of the candidates’activist bases who made up the majority of volunteers 31 Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked

• Manyconsultantsreinforcedthis conventionalwisdomthat Responses that featured endorsements from local candidatesshouldn’tgiveoxygento attacks,andcounseled law enforcement have been widely hailed as stickingtotheir core positivecampaignmessages– withthe notableexceptionof one pollster,who advocatedstronglyto “effective,” but in hindsight some candidates and candidatesthatthey shouldtacklethe issueheadon. As he putit, Party leaders expressed regret that there wasn’t a “Youhaveto showupto the debateif you'regoingto winit.” more forceful emotion- and values-based counter

Perceptions among voters on Defund the Police • Law-enforcement endorsement ads addressed the substance of the issue but avoided/missed the emotion of Republican attacks varied depending on how the issue was framed – and didn’t call them what they were – racist distractions from the in-cycle and post-election research has continued issues voters cared about most to show conflicted views across and within • Some Party leadership indicated they wished they had called out demographic groups Republicans for distracting from ACA and other important issues

• Polling conducted by Brilliant Corners’ Cornell Belcher last summer for Run For Something and the Collective PAC found that “defunding the police does not have wide appeal, but Black voters are divided on the issue,” however, the same poll found that “Reallocating police department funding is popular amongst Biden supporters and Black voters” • Similarly, findings from an Avalanche Research poll in April 2021 found that while 63% of voters disagree with “defunding the police,” 52% agree with “redirecting resources from police and funding community programs”

32 “The primary problem with Defund was not Defund, but the lack of an economic message. We became the party of shutting down the economy, the party of wearing masks, the party of taking kids out of school – not the party of solutions and science.” – Major Democratic funder

33 Our Findings | Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “radicals” worked

Guantanamo Bay as military police, responded to questions about Republicans used Defund the Police attacks to defunding the police with “I am the police.” Her ads similarly best effect against candidates of color in swing reinforced her background as a military police officer, without districts with large white populations addressing Defund the Police directly

• BothParty committees commissioned message research • Candidates we spoke to universally shared dismay and deep conducted by longtime Democratic strategists Cornell Belcher anguish in response to George Floyd’s murder, and supported and KarenFinney, provided these resources to all their widespread popular demands for criminal justice reform – and campaigns, and encouraged candidates to do follow up polling in many Frontline members expressed their desire to leverage their their districts. Many candidates chose not to, but likely would position to support these efforts have benefited from researchon messaging that would be • Sitting U.S. Representatives including Lauren Underwood (IL-14), effective in particularly challenging districts, either due to the Abigail Spanberger (VA-07), Debbie Mucarsel-Powell (FL-26), demographic makeup or other local dynamics Andy Kim (NJ-03), Elissa Slotkin (MI-08), Xochitl Torres Small (NM-02), and Gil Cisneros (CA-39) turned that energy into legislation and passed the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020

• Some candidates of color reported feeling particularly wary of amplifying discussion or debate of Defund the Police out of fear Responding to Defund the Police attacks was for their own safety most challenging and complicated for • Some candidates from more conservative districts, or who had candidates of color and they found generic law enforcement-related backgrounds, did respond directly to response strategies extremely frustrating attacks in paid communications – Sen. Ben Ray Lujan (NM), for example, ran ads featuring local law enforcement officers endorsing his candidacy

• Jackie Gordon (NY-02), a combat veteran who served at

34 Our Findings Republican attempts to brand Democrats as “ radicals ” worked

Some districts where law and order or “ socialism a drumbeat also saw a higher share of Latino/ AAPI/ Black voters who supported the GOP

GOP Support Among Voters of Color

2016- 2020

Latino Precincts AAPIPrecincts Black Precincts

( > 30% ) ( > 20 % ) ( > 50% )

60% 60%

53 % 50 % 48%

42% 41% 40 % 41% 36% . 34%35% 35% 31% 31% 31% avail 28 % not 25% 25% . . . . topline . 21% Pres CD CD Pres CD CD Pres CD CD Pres CD CD Pres CD CD Pres CD CD Pres CD CD 2016 2018 2020 2016 2018 2020 2016 2018 2020 2016 2018 2020 2016 2018 2020 2016 2018 2020 2016 2018 2020

TX- 23 FL- 26 NM- CA- 39 TX- 24 CA- 39 VA

35 " Republicans were going to churches and having pastors spread misinformation that Democrats were baby- killers, that we were in favor of killing babies right before a mother was giving birth, they were showing very graphic images...[ hen you hear it enough

JJ times, you start to believe it.

Former Rep. Debbie Mucarsel-Powell

36 3. Polling was a huge problem even after 2016 adjustments

37 Our Findings Polling was a huge problem

Campaigns and experts reported that polling was a problem Polling was a despite adjustments made after 2016 and was not alwayswell understoodby campaignsas tools for decision making

huge problem Polling failed to reach the right people especially white non- college voters and the methodology changes made in the wake of the 2016 cycle to weight for education level were insufficient to ensure accurate sampling

First- time candidates especially needed support in interpreting the content and implications for taking risks or being creative in a year that forced everyone to revise their campaign playbooks

These challenges led to an overly optimistic map and the Party chasing races that have not historically been in play, such as the lowa Senate seat

38 Our Findings Polling was a huge problem

Polling in the 2020 cycle was widely viewed as a • ThePartycommitteesinvestedtheirfinancialandstaffresources the top of the ticket catastrophic misfire from in statewide races and congressionaldistrictsthat wereeither down landslidevictories ( where additionalfundingwas not needed) or wide losses basedon close polling ( where additionalfunding Certainly , there were some examples where pre -election polls couldn't surmountdistrict-specific obstacles) aligned with the ultimate electoral performance polls quite Decliningresponserates furtherexacerbatedissues of non precisely predicted the outcome of the Warnock - Loeffler runoff response bias and led pollsters to miss Republicansupport election in Georgia and the Kelly race in Arizona . However , • Insufficient sample sizes of Latino voters in pre-election polls candidates , campaign and Party leadership , and leading greatly contributed to the Party failing to anticipate shifts in practitioners universally agreed that the dramatic overestimation of support Democratic support in both publicly - released and proprietary polls reviewed as part of this analysis had an indisputable impact on While Democraticpollingprofessionalsare continuingto evaluate races in every part of the country : what happenedin 2020 and importantly, are doing unprecedentedknowledgesharingacross the industryto inform

• InflatedpollingledDemocratsto believesomestretchraces future work ( Source: DemocracyDocketpost) - pollstersand operativesinterviewedfor this postmortemindicatedthey are were competitiveand to take for granted other races as easy consideringmethodologyand the uniquevariablesat play with wins, leading to an overly-expansive electoral map DonaldTrumpon the ballot. • Supporters poured resources into races where historical trends

showeda Democraticvictorywasunlikelybutpollingsuggested was winnable What's clear is the “ soul- searching that followedthe 2016 election • Campaignsmade budgetarydecisions based on polling - and in and precipitatedchangesfor the 2018 cycle ( such as increaseduse some cases were risk averse in their messaging , voter contact , of mobilenumbersover landlinesand more multi- modal surveys) did notchangethe fundamentalapproach. Current polling relies and media plans when they believed their races were especially heavily on past practices experiencedpollstersweighting close they thought they were winning by wide margins accordingto their assumptionsabout the electorate- which impactsboth the samplingand the outcome.

39 Our Findings Polling was a huge problem

The myth of the " Trump voter The 2020 election cycle reinforced concerns about non- response bias - especially among • Despite being debunked in 2016, the “ shy Trump voter theory white non- college educated voters that pollingissueswere due to Trumpsupporters' reluctanceto sharetheir honestopinionsleaptback on the scenein the 2020 • Thesuccessand accuracyof pollingis predicatedon the idea with so many polls showing Democrats with a wide lead cycle that the people who participate in a survey are an accurate • Following the 2016 election , the polling industry concluded that representation of the larger population - but as survey issues were caused by a lack of proper educational weights participation falls , concerns about the representativeness of applied on survey data and late movement among undecided those respondents increases voters • Over the course of the 2020 cycle, voters were inundated with • In 2020, pollsters reportedthat while Trump voters were not polling calls and texts particularly in competitivestates and , they also did not answer surveys and were consequently districts and decliningresponserates contributedto growing undercounted massively concernsof how representativethe survey was, especially in regions with large concentrationsof non- college educatedwhite

voters

• These declining responserates further exacerbated the issues of non - response bias, which led some pollsters into missing Polling misfires in 2020 laid bare a challenge Republican support ( Source: FiveThirtyEight that the survey research industry has feared for • In recent months, pollsters and academics have theorized that decades : there is a systematic difference the COVID-19 pandemic led Democrats to be overrepresented in between people who take surveys and those some polls - because Democrats are more likely to work who do not remotely than Republicansand their anti-Trump energy made them more likely to answer surveys further exacerbatingnon response bias issues

40 Our Findings | Polling was a huge problem

Latino voters are not a monolithic group and Challenges remain in the future of polling, should comprise a larger proportion of polling despite the adjustments made after 2016 samples • In 2020, despite the efforts undertaken by pollsters to ensure the proper educational composition of the electorate (particularly in • One of the most surprising findings of the 2020 election was Democrats’ underperformance with Latino voters relative to 2016 states and regions with high concentrations of non-college levels educated whites), these methodological adjustments proved insufficient to correct the continued underestimation of Trump • While the magnitude of the shift was beyond expectations, it was hinted at in pre-election polls which showed Trump faring and Republican support better among Latino voters than he did four years prior (Source: Matt Barretto, Latino Decisions)

• Although Latino voters as a whole tend to be more Democratic than Republican, they don’t vote as a single bloc and should no longer be targeted under this lens, particularly in pre-election polls – how Latinos vote in Florida can be very different from how Latinos in the Rio Grande Valley or on the West Coast vote, and Democratic support among Latinos can greatly vary by Polling errors made some campaigns run as if country of ethnicity they were winning – which led to more risk • Many polls conducted in the 2020 cycle did not take these factors into account, nor did they ensure that Latino voters aversion and less responsiveness to changing comprised a large enough share in their polling samples circumstances.

• These misfires in polling led campaigns and organizations to overlook gaps and drops in Latino support

41 Our Findings Polling was a huge problem

In VA- , polling showed a consistently tight race for Webb since early October and significantly underestimated his final margin

Ultimately, Good won by 6 points despite multiple public polls that showedWebb with a slight lead - a ten- point swing overall

VA - : Congressional Support Among Likely Voters

Good

( Margin) ( -6) ( -1) ( +3 ) ( +2 ) ( +3 ) ( -6)

53%

48% 47% 47% 46 % 45 %

47 % 46% 45%

42 % 43% 42 %

8/3 9/14 10/1 10/8 10/22 Final Election Result

42 4. A Unique 2020 Challenge : COVID- 19 affected everything

43 Our Findings COVID - 19 affected everything

COVID- 19 dramatically transformedcampaign strategy and the COVID - 19 suite of tactics employed by both Senate and Congressional campaigns affected The decision to stop canvassing and halt most in- person voter contact activities was weathered well by campaigns that were innovative making everything the pivot to virtual tactics quickly and later finding ways to be physically present in their districts with socially-distanced events Campaignsthat were unable to rely on virtual campaigningto reach voters - either due to broadbandconstraints, local expectations about in person outreach, a dearth of creativity, or a combination of factors concludedthe lack of canvassingwas a criticalfactor in their loss or tighter- than expected margin

Vote- by- maileducationand ballotchasebecamean exponentiallylarger budgetpriorityfor independentefforts in particular, with some organizationsinvestingtens of millionsof dollars in theseefforts

44 Our Findings COVID - 19 affected everything

COVID changed everything about health care Many Democrats missed the opportunity to talk conversations about COVID through an economic lens as the cycle progressed

• As soonas coronavirusdescendeduponthe U.S.and becamethe

dominant issue of 2020, candidates' messaging and campaign • As the cyclecontinuedinto the fall, many Democratsdid not activities focused on addressing the immediate health crisis and pivot along with public discourse when they spoke about the collapse of local healthcare systems as infections surged COVID , it was still in the context of access to PPE, wearing masks , around the country and trusting science , without further connecting those issues to • Of 740 digital ads that had the highest impressions for both the critical necessity of re- opening the economy DemocraticandGOPcandidates, 12% mentionCOVID, again • And some Democratic health coverage messaging that worked mostly run by Democraticcandidates well in 2018 fell flat despite the pandemic : “ People aren't worried • Amongall referencesto COVID-19 in thedigitaladsassessed, the about health insurance when they don't have jobs according to a vast majority( 70% ) were in ads run by Democrats formernationalPartyofficial • CandidateshostedPPEgive-away eventsand sharedthe latest • In someplaces, the GOP successfullyframedDemocratsas out of informationaboutthe pandemicfeaturing local doctors and touch on the economy because they prioritized messages about nurses staying home while most working -class jobs can't be done • But as school and job closures dragged on, much of the public remotely - especially in districts with larger Latino populations narrative around COVID shifted to the economic impact of the In DebbieMucarsel- Powell'sdistrict ( FL- 26) , Votersdidn't pandemic: When would schools re-open? When would workers want to hear stay home,' they wantedto hear whenam who couldn't work from home be able to go back to work? getting back to work ." Sen. Ben Ray Lujan's campaign attributes some of their success to emphasizing the economic impact of COVID, efforts to get PPP loans out the door to help businesses keep their doors open, and their plans to get constituents back to work

45 Our Findings COVID - 19 affected everything

COVID- 19 changed the way Democratic COVID- 19 changed the way Democratic campaigns and organizations reached voters campaigns raised money - potentially for the foreseeable future • WhilemostRepublicansquicklyresumedcanvassingand in personeventsafter a universalpausein Marchof2020, most Campaignsraised hugesums of moneythroughZoomfundraisers Democrats never returned to canvassing or in- person events that involvedall kindsof new donorstraditionallyleft out of this • Relationalorganizing and remote voter contact tactics absorbed criticalaspectof campaigning- bothfrom the perspectiveof the significantvolunteer capacity of this cycle hostingand attendingfundraisingevents youngpeople • Despite COVID- 19, many of the best- performingcandidates found and less- affluentvoterstakingpart in small- dollar gatheringsthat morecreativeways to safelyget back in front of voters in the providedaddedvalue to the campaignsbecausethey did not field from socially-distancedlive gatheringsheldoutdoorsin require the candidate to travel town squaresand parkinglots to drive-thru charityevents • Related, candidates raised money from all across the country • Whilenearlyevery campaign, organization, and political withoutincurringadditionalfinancialcost to the campaignor professional acknowledged that the decision not to canvass was burningthroughevery campaign'smostvaluableresource: the the right call given what we knew about coronavirus at the time , candidate'stime

many of those included in this analysis said in hindsight • Candidatesand campaignsuniversallyexpressedexcitement Democrats could have been on doors safely in more places - and aboutthe possibilityof continuingthesevirtualfundraisingevents Democrats would have won several close races if they had gone post- pandemic back on the doors either sooner or in a more robust way than they did It's impossible to evaluate the 2020 election cycle without acknowledging how COVID-19 dramatically impacted every aspect of every , up and down the ballot

46 5. Year-round organizing worked , as did cross -Party collaboration

47 Our Findings Year - round organizing and cross - Party collaboration worked

Races that did not have the benefit of longer -term Long-term infrastructure investments - voter registration, continual in person organizing and outreach - suffered most investment Where candidates had either started voter registrationbefore the pandemicor where state- based groups had invested long term in bringing produced more people into the democratic process Democratseither won or lost by narrow margins better results Consistent relationship - building through year - round organizing made a difference especially in communities of color, whether the organizers were Democrats ( as was the case in Georgia) or Republicans ( as was true of The LIBRE Initiative in Texas and Florida)

As one longtimeDemocraticoperativedescribedorganizingvoters of color, " It's not a side deal, it's got to be core

48 Our Findings Year - round organizing cross - Party collaboration worked

Georgia saw record setting turnout in both the presidential and runoff elections - nearly 5M in the general and 4.5M in the run- offs

In 2020 Georgia turnout far surpassed the 4 million who turned out in 2016 , and a big factor in this increased turnout was a

substantial increase in registration - 2 million voters were added to the voter file between 2016 and 2020

Georgia: Total new reg by month since 2016 presidential

MODEL DEM MODEL GOP

2018 GUB . CYCLE 2020 PRES . CYCLE

11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

49 Our Findings Year - round organizing and cross - Party collaboration worked

Democraticcoordinationin the face of a common nationalfoil The Party DonaldTrump - led to extraordinary collaborationacross the Party ecosystem coordinated LeadingDemocraticdonorsand funderstook part in collaborativetables in 2020 organizedaroundsupportingon- the- groundwork in battleground better than statesand districts

Similarly, funders proactively organized others in the space to resource anticipated voter education and voter protection needs the Count ever Every Vote movement in the face of threats to the democratic process telegraphed in advance by the Trump campaign organization

The 2020 cycle witnessed the first successful data sharing operation across organizing efforts on the hard and soft sides, with campaigns and external organizations consistently touting the value of the Democratic Data Exchange ( ) in generating efficient voter contact universes for persuasion, mobilization and ballot chase, and voter education

50 6. Our hopes for 2020 were just too high

51 Our Findings | Our hopes for 2020 were just too high

We heard that Dem expectations for pickups in the Senate and Our hopes for House – and for retaining seats won during the “blue wave” of 2018 – were too optimistic given historical trends for 2020 were presidential cycles • Inaccurate polling compounded these assumptions and broadened an already expansive map just too high Our extrapolations about the behavior of first-time voters incorrectly assumed Democratic support at proportionate rates to regular voters based on their demographics The map assumed The key challenge of 2020 – the coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent shutdown of American life – severely limited the toolkit available to the midterm Democrats, with the constraints on in-person events and canvassing electorate was harming first-time candidates the most predictive for 2020 We heard from campaign strategists that the Party drove up expectations by publicly signaling it expected to win everywhere it made a play

But our miscalculation likely benefited us as much as it hurt us

• The conventional wisdom that high turnout was a positive sign for Democrats informed GOP strategy as well – so Republicans put resources and energy into races that appeared close in polling but ultimately did not require their investment

52 “Our anchoring assumption is that we should’ve just kept everything that we got in 2018 and that was reinforced by the polls. But if you go down deeper at what seats we lost, we’re basically losing seats we shouldn’t have had.” – Veteran national political strategist

53 Our Findings | Our hopes for 2020 were just too high

o Yet despitehighturnout andenthusiasmamongthe Extraordinaryturnoutdrivenby increasedaccess Democraticbase,CisnerosunderperformedBidenacross all to VBM ballotsand excitementaboutthe racialgroups,particularlyAAPI voters whogrew theiroverall PresidentialelectionbenefitedRepublicans share of the electorateby 6 pointssince 2016

• In NM-02,a swell in Republicanvoterturnoutin 2020 ledto a Republicanvictory and the loss of FrontlineMemberXochitl Torres Small o TurnoutinNM-02jumped 9 pointswithalmost89,000 more votes castin 2020 than 2016 – however,itwas the Republicanbase that showedhigher levels of enthusiasm • While personalscandalwas likely a decidingfactorfor NCSenate candidateCal Cunninghamgivenhis steady strongperformancein internaland public pollingaheadof the news of his extramarital affair,increasedRepublicanturnoutinred areas far exceeded expectationsand eclipsedthe marginsthe campaignanticipated The2020 electionsmadeclear that turnout inits pathwayto victory efforts don’t just benefitDemocrats o Inthe NCSenaterace,althoughDemocratsgainedwith White urbanvoters,GOPimprovementamongruraland exurbanBlack voters gave Democratsa narrowedge but not enoughto flip the state • FormerRep.Gil Cisneros(CA-39)reportedthat becauseof the demographicmakeupof the district,his team focusedsignificant resourcesonturningout the voters of color whohad beenkey to his 2018victory – particularlyAAPI and Latino/Hispanic communities

54 “We always think that if turnout is up, that’s going to be beneficial for us. That’s not the case, Republicans vote too and they’re doing a very good job at it. So, when turnout is up, we need to ask who instead of just being excited about it.” – NC political operative

55 Our Findings | Our hopes for 2020 were just too high

In2020,two-thirdsof the votingeligiblepopulationvoted – morethan in any other electionin 120 years

Turnout was especially high in many battleground states and districts and grew by an average of 27% from 2016 across the Tier 1 races analyzed. Both parties benefited from this explosive growth in turnout.

Percent Increase in Votes Cast, by Party* 2016 – 2020

DEM GOP

63% 61% 62% 59% 55% 56% 55% 56% 52% 52% 49% 50% 51%

51% 50% 49% 48% 46% 48% 44% 44% 45% 44% 41% 39% 37% 38% 21%

Win/ AZ CA-39 FL-26 GA IL-14 ME-02 MI-08 NC NE-02 NJ-03 NM-02 TX-23 TX-24 VA-07 Loss

*Based on modeled party in most states 56 Our Findings | Our hopes for 2020 were just too high

o Frontlineincumbentsexpresseda rangeof feelingstowards Campaigns,strategists,andpollstersalikesaid the DCCC– some felt it wantedtoomuchinfluenceinon- pollingblind-spotsandmethodological the-grounddecision-making,while otherfreshman difficultiesledto an overlyoptimisticmap Membersexpressedthe desirefor moresupportand guidancefromthe DCCC • Pollingdifficulties,especiallyinruraldistricts where many FrontlineandRedto Blue candidatesare based,made these districts look morelikely to flip in2020 thanthe post-cycle data show o Electionforecastspredictedthe TX-23race to be inGina OrtizJones’ favor – withFiveThirtyEightforecastinga 6- pointadvantagefor the Democraticcandidate • These pollingdifficultiesfilteredtheir way downto the Redto Blue listand shiftedPartyresourcesto racesthat were ultimatelyunsuccessful,some by large margins • Some strategistsand campaignsreportedconcernthat the Partypublicly telegrapheda significantfocus on expandingthe Housemajorityinsteadof positioningthe electionas aneffort to protectFrontlinemembers,includingthose seats gainedin 2018 o While the DCCCspent$3millionmoreonthe Frontline programthan the Redto Blue program– investingearly in these districtsandaddingfieldorganizingstaff inspringof 2019 – severalFrontlinecandidatesand theirstaff expressedtheirbelief that protectingincumbentswas nota top priorityfor the DCCC

57 Our Findings | Our hopes for 2020 were just too high

The expansivemapandinaccuratepollingalso hurtRepublicans,who put moneyin non- competitiveracesanddivertedresourcesand attentionfromracesthey couldhavewon

• Withsucha largebattlegroundmap,campaignsand strategists indicatedthatRepublicans“followedus” to districtslike TX-23 andTX-24thatthe GOP alreadyheld,insteadof investingin other,moretraditionallyvulnerableareas for Democrats,like MichiganHouseraceswhere they mighthave pickedup seats • Givenheavy resourcingfor these unexpectedcampaigns reportedin numerousmediaoutlets from late summerinto the fall, Republicansspentless elsewhere,allowinga numberof vulnerableDemocraticFrontlineincumbentsto winclose races, Themap had important implicationsfor includingRep.AbigailSpanberger(VA-07),JaredGolden(ME- fundraising,staffing,and messagingthat 02), and Rep.ElissaSlotkin(MI-08) ultimatelyshifted the outcomesin severalkey • EveninNY-19,where Rep.AntonioDelgadoultimatelywonby races across the country.WhiletheParty nearly 12 points,lack of Republicanattentionwas a significant securedthe Presidency,welost FrontlineHouse factorina districtwithdemographicsthat couldhave madethe seats and were unableto closethegap in Congressmanvulnerable severalhigh-profileSenatecampaignsthat were o As one Partyexecutivesaid,“A canof coke with an R next widelyperceivedto be pick up opportunities. to its namecouldhave wonagainstDelgado,”but rosy predictionsaboutDemocraticgains in2020 kept Republicansfrom investingin the race or recruitinga strongchallenger

58 Conclusion cycle LIVES MATTER VOTE

0

59 Conclusion PartingThoughts from Marlonand Lynda

A FinalNote from the Authors Republicans would have found another racist dog whistle or fear mongering tool to paint Democrats as out of touch radicals who Throughoutthis analysis, one of the things we reflectedon most are trying to destroy the America we know and love . " was the impactand the implicationsof race in our political At the highest levels of the Party ecosystem , cultural competency discourse. During the courseof nearly 150 interviewsthat included electedand Party leaders, candidatesand donors, campaign was a continual concern in 2020. Campaigns shared anecdote after anecdote of the most well -intentioned Democratic supporters operativesand leading practitionersacross the Democratic displaying a stunning lack of cultural competency in an electoral ecosystem, the single most-cited challengeapart from the COVID 19 pandemicwas our inability- unwillingness to addressrace cycle where culture ” drove practically every outcome - from the head-on. suburban white women who berated a Black woman candidate for not attending the Black Lives Matter protest those women had

The Democratic Party needs to be unapologeticabout race. And organized , to political operatives who advised another Black woman candidate not to be overly concerned with responding to we need to explain to all Americans why doing so is beneficial to attacks on her “ Defund the Police ” stance , to Party Committee everyone. staffers pushing candidates of color to pump their networks” as if the same rolodex - driven approach to fundraising translates in a Those of us who have worked in and around politics know in our non- white , non -privileged world. bones that what we witnessed in 2020 was not new. Sadly , race baiting and fear mongering have long been part of the political maneuvering and cultural dynamics of this country . But 2020 We've seen the same tactic before. witnessed a revival of " dog -whistle politics and an overt racism In 2008 and 2012, the messages were centered that increasingly flourished under the candidacy and presidency of on governmenttakeover of health care and class Donald Trump . And where voters probably regularly default to warfare. In 2016, the messagewas " Build the voting based on culture over policy issues, 2020 whipped up Wall, which morphed into claims in 2018 that all stereotypes and caricatures to a level we haven't seen in recent Democratswanted to " Abolish ICE " open electoral cycles and undoubtedly had an impact on voting borders caravans of migrants. decisions around the country . As Dr. Cameron Webb's campaign " Defund the Police” was dog whistle . manager , Ben Young , put it , “ If it wasn't 'Defund the Police ,

60 Conclusion | PartingThoughtsfrom Marlonand Lynda

The good news is that the 2020 experience has shined a spotlight communicateacross these many-splendoredcommunities. on areas the Democratic Party and Democratic leaders can make gains in the future – from defining and sharing a vision on race and Commit to early investment and year-round organizing. Victories racial justice to grappling with the Democratic brand to shoring up in Georgia, Nevada, Arizona, and other states this cycle were built our small “d” democratic institutions for the future. At a minimum, on years of organizing and community servicing led by some of our this past cycle should make clear the urgency around combatting best political and labor organizers. This orientation is especially GOP voter suppression efforts, so often a thinly veiled attempt to critical in communities of color that we know value relationships exclude communities of color and in 2021 an open backlash to but whom we often treat in a transactional way, showing up every expanded early vote and vote-by-mail that made it easier for more 2-4 years instead of being continually present and engaged. If voters than ever before to make their voices heard. Democrats fail to organize communities of color – making the continual case for how we’re standing up for justice, jobs, health The opportunitycomingoff of 2020 is inhowwe deal withand care, a quality education and more – we can be sure Republicans definerace issuesinthe future.Hereare someideas: will fill that void.

Reimagine our Democratic Party message and narrative. The Reallocate our spending to reflect our commitment to the Republican Party has long had a collective gospel about having communities we rely on to win. It’s not just about investing in key small government, low taxes, and a strong military. Our gospel communities for Democrats – it’s also about ensuring a more should be about championing all working people – including but equitable allocation of our resources overall. As one longtime not limited to white working people – and lifting up our values of Latino elected leader put it, “It’s great that we spent more in 2020 opportunity, equity, inclusion. We need to make it exciting to be a on Latino voters than ever before. But what did we spend before?” Democrat and to ensure voters believe we not only mean well, but Or as Leslie Small, the Executive Director of America Votes in we understand their priorities and they trust we are actually Georgia told us, “We have, for years as the Democratic Party, have fighting for them – something that the series of focus groups with treated these mythical white voters as the panacea, and so if you swing voters recently conducted by Third Way shows continues to have ten dollars, they’re going to give nine and a half to try and get be a challenge. The only way to do this well is for the Party to do this white voter...For once, Georgia and voters of color were not more, better research with voters of color and, based on what we under invested in. And by investing in them at the level that they learn, to be more differentiated and targeted in how we should be invested in, you saw the results.”

61 Conclusion | PartingThoughtsfrom Marlonand Lynda

Endthe “persuasionvs. organizing”debateand focus on getting In 2021, we are more aware than ever of the disparate challenges votes, period.Campaignstypicallythink persuasionneedsto start for communities of color that are continuing to play out in the early andmobilizationshouldhappenrightaroundvotingtime.But aftermath of the Trump era – including the rising violence against thatapproachdoesn’twork,and it isn’t helpfulfor longtermParty- the AAPI community that is impossible to separate from the former building.Whenitcomesto persuasionandturnout, it’s “both-and” President’s insistence on calling COVID-19 the “China virus,” “Kung- butneeds to happenall the time. flu,” or the “Wuhan virus.” Despite the hope sprung by the verdict in the Derek Chauvin trial, Black men and women in every state are Too oftencampaignsview persuasionas a tactic to getwhite continuing to lose their lives to police violence and racial injustice Americanswhomay not be withus onour side,andturnoutas a that is far too often forgotten when today’s headlines line tactic to getour baseout(whichimplicitlymeanspeopleof color). tomorrow’s waste baskets. And Latino and Hispanic people remain We shouldbe tryingto persuadeall voters to supportthe ideaswe a political football, alternatively portrayed as an electoral prize or care about– andthatmeansengagingyear-round,especiallywith the infamous “Other” from which American communities must be communitiesof color. shielded.

Where we do need to focus on persuasion, it’s to make the The question is, what are we as a Party willing to do about it. unequivocal case that ending systemic racism is good for everyone. Right now, people think addressing racial injustice means they are losing something, or that someone is taking something “Diversityfor diversity’s sake is not the goal. away from them. Last year, when the conversation became about It’s about thecountry being a better country, “Defund the Police,” we were stuck on defense instead of telling a about the government being a better proactive story about necessary systemic changes to policing that government.” would stem the violence and still prioritize and provide public – QuentinJames, Founder and President,The safety. There’s a way for a “Defund the Police” advocate and CollectivePAC someone who isn’t convinced we should divert police funding to agree to disagree but to lift up the value of what everyone needs. We need to be on offense on what we care about, why this is important, and what we should be doing differently.

62 Appendices

63 Process & Approach

64 Appendix | Process & Approach

1. Live interviews with candidates and staff, Members, Party leaders, external Our approach organizations that were major players in the 2020 cycle, major funders, and top strategists and vendors

2. Review of publicly available polling and proprietary polling where possible

3. Content analysis of TV ads for priority races aired by the campaigns and independent expenditure efforts and broader online paid media spending by the campaigns

This study relied on 4. Independentassessmentof the data analyticsandmodelingusingthe final four categories of voter files releasedby the statesin early 2021 analysis

65 Appendix | Process & Approach

TIER 1

Tier 1 campaigns were selected by Third Way, Latino Victory, and the Collective PACto reflect a broadly representative set of the most competitive races inthe 2020 cycle, with candidates, District, and campaigndynamics designed to provide a better understanding of what happened across the political landscape. The groups aimed for regional and demographic representation,Districts with anticipatedvoter performance and electoral issues that were shared with other races beyondthis list, and politically-significant campaigns with a cross-sectionof bothwins and losses.

1. AZ Sen - Mark Kelly 11. NJ-03- Andy Kim 2. GA Sen - RaphaelWarnock 12. NM-02- XochitlTorresSmall 3. GA Sen - Jon Ossoff 13. NY-02- JackieGordon 4. NC Sen - Cal Cunningham 14. NY-19 - Antonio Delgado 5. CA-39- Gil Cisneros 15. NY-24- DanaBalter 6. FL-26 - DebbieMucarsel-Powell 16. TX-23 - Gina Ortiz Jones 7. IL-14- LaurenUnderwood 17. TX-24 - CandaceValenzuela 8. ME-02- JaredGolden 18. VA-05- CameronWebb 9. MI-08- ElissaSlotkin 19. VA-07 - AbigailSpanberger 10. NE-02- KaraEastman

66 Appendix | Process & Approach

TIER 2

For Tier 2 races, this analysis relied on a broader survey of the publicly-identifiedDCCC Frontline races and the DSCC Priority races to gather additional informationand capture commonthemes across the Party Committees’ highest priority campaigns. Inadditionto the multi-layeredresearchfor Tier 1 races, this postmortemincludes findings basedon informationreceivedfrom another 18 races. Their responses covered messaging, strategy, tactics, and the candidate’s personal observations about the races.

1. AK Sen - Alan Gross 11. IN-05- ChristinaHale 2. NMSen – Ben RayLujan 12. MN-02- Rep.AngieCraig 3. CA-10 - Rep. Josh Harder 13. NC-08- PatriciaTimmons-Goodson 4. CA-21- Rep. TJ Cox 14. NJ-02- Amy Kennedy 5. CA-25- ChristySmith 15. NJ-07- Rep.Tom Malinowski 6. CA-48 - Rep. HarleyRouda 16. NY-22- Rep. AnthonyBrindisi 7. FL-15- Alan Cohn 17. OH-01- KateSchroder 8. GA-06 - Rep.LucyMcBath 18. UT-04-Rep. BenMcAdams 9. IA-03- Rep. Cindy Axne 10. IL-06- Rep.Sean Casten

67 Appendix | Process & Approach

EquisLabs,Catalist,and Priorities USA.Where the findings in this The broaderDemocraticecosystem postmortemused informationfrom other research or studies that The teamspoke extensivelywith otherMembersof Congressacross were conductedpost-election,those sources are directly cited. the spectrumof Democraticideologyfromsomeof the Party’smost progressivevoices to “pragmaticmoderate”leaders – either 1:1or as partof listeningsessions organizedincollaborationwith CongressionalCaucus staff. We interviewedmembersof the leadershipteamat the Partycommittees,leadersat key outside organizationsthat ran8- and 9-figureindependentprogramsin 2020, stateorganizationsthat weremajorplayers,andleading practitionersacross the Democraticpoliticalspace – including pollsters,data scientists,digital strategists,andmessageandmedia experts.In total, this analysis involvedinterviewswith 143 individuals.The Membersfromthe NewDemocratCoalition,the CongressionalBlack Caucus,the CongressionalHispanicCaucus, andthe CongressionalAsian PacificAmericanCaucus and staff of the CBCPAC,CHC BOLD PAC,NewDemActionFund,andASPIRE PAC were especiallyinstrumentalinhelpingto shape this study, connectthe researchteamto candidatesandtheir campaignstaff, andprovidedimportantdata andfeedback aboutwhat they saw in the field.

Additionalinformativeresearch

Finally,the teamreviewedmajorpostmortemanalysesby other organizationsas they were releasedintothe publicdomain– includingthe Texas DemocraticParty,HigherGroundLabs,

68 Unprecedented Ad Spending

69 Appendix | Unprecedented Ad Spending

Spendingand raising money early created significant benefits for many candidates

• In Michigan, one longtime statewide political operative posited that it was difficult for Republicans to recruit strong Off-the-charts fundraising didn’t always ensure blowout victories – or victory candidates to run against Rep. Elissa at all – even if Democrats substantially outraised their opponents Slotkin (MI-08) or Rep. Haley Stephens

(MI-11) because these incumbents had Dem Candidate GOP Candidate already amassed formidable war chests early in the cycle 2020 Total Cash on Total Cash on Race Outcome Receipts Hand Receipts Hand • Multiple candidates reported their ability to go up on TV early in the cycle to highlight their bios and frame the VA-07 D+1.8 $8,494,948 $582,133 $3,670,266 $29,323 narrative was hugely valuable

• Strong campaign cash allowed Rep. IL-14 D+1.4 $7,862,425 $537,898 $3,297,857 $90,059 Lauren Underwood (IL-14) to hire field organizers early in the cycle and begin moving a locally-focused program led by both in-district and out-of-district staff who developed a deep knowledge of their turf

70 Appendix | Unprecedented Ad Spending

Senate Campaign + IE Ad Spend

Across the ecosystem – includingcandidate, coordinated,and issue groups - Democrats outspent Republicans in the Senate

SenateAd Spend,Candidate+ Coordinated+ IssueGroup (in millions)

DEM GOP

+ $41M + $40M + $112M

$182

$153

$112 $114

$74 $70

Win/Loss NC SENATE AZ SENATE GA SENATE

71 Appendix | Unprecedented Ad Spending

Congressional Campaign + IE Ad Spend

The following information regarding ad spend was available for the Tier 1 races [source: AdImpact report] Dems outspent Republicans in all races analyzed except for NY-24, where the GOP invested just as heavily as Dems

House Ad Spend, Candidate + Coordinated + Issue Groups (in millions)

DEM GOP

+$2M +$3M +$2M +$4M +$5M +$4M - +$4M +$3M +$6M +$4M

$12

$10 $9 $7 $6

$7

$2 $2 $16 $2 $3 $12 $12 $11 $10 $8 $7 $7 $4 $5 $6

Win/Loss FL-26 IL-14 ME-02 MI-08 NJ-03 NM-02 NY-24 TX-23 TX-24 VA-05 VA-07

72 Appendix | Unprecedented Ad Spending

o Senator RaphaelWarnock outspent Kelly Loeffler by over a Digitaladspendingincreasedsignificantlyin2020, 4:1 ratio, with over $4 million in spending to Loeffler’s withDemocratstypicallyoutspendingtheir $814,697, with no candidate spending outside of the Republicanopponents– but a higherspenddidnot 2020/2021 cycle alwaysmeanDemocraticvictory o Rep. Lauren Underwood outspent her Republicanopponent by a 14:1ratio,spending over $500,000 to Jim Oberweis’s Inthe 2016 electioncycle,2-3% of the totalpoliticalad spend • $35,318 across the coordinatedandindependentexpenditureefforts up • Although there are cases where Democrats were outspent online and down the ballotwentto digitalmedia – in2020,that spend o Gil Cisneros (CA-39) was outspent by Republicanopponent movedupto 18%. Approximately$700-800Mwas spentondigital Young Kim 2:1 on Facebook platforms,with Rep.Kim ads in the 2018cycle,while in2020,the spend was $1.6B[Forbes]. spending $834,337 to Cisneros’ $492,290 The 2020electionsaw digitaladspendingonFacebookreach o Dana Balter was outspent by her opponent $157,612 to $1.07Band $520Mon Google [AdImpactreport] $136,569 The Democraticcandidateswe evaluatedran hundreds– and in • Several Democrats who outspent their opponent online did not some cases thousands– of digitalads rangingin spendfromless • ultimately win – includingXochitl Torres Small, NM-02 and Dr. than$100per ad, upto $250,000on a single ad[Warnock] Cameron Webb, VA-05 – but nearly every Democrat who was o Every Democratincludedinthis reviewinvesteda minimum outspent in digital ads lost of $125,000on Facebookadvertisementsalone o Althoughit is impossibleto comparethat figureto previous cycles since 2020was the first timeFacebookand Google havemade full access to politicaladvertisingdata available, digitalspendingwidely increasedin 2020 • ManyDemocraticcandidatesoutspenttheir Republican opponentsindigitaladvertisinginthe Houseand Senate o SenatorJon Ossoff’s campaignFacebookpage ran more than $2.7 millioninads to DavidPerdue’s$537,686in the 2020cycle

73