Transatlantic Turbulence and European Security*

Transatlantic turbulence and European security*

Effects of President Trump’s foreign policy agenda and Brexit

Björn Fägersten (ed)

* This analysis has been conducted as part of an independent research project at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) with the financial support of the Swedish Armed Forces.

Introduction

The people in one of the European Union’s most powerful member states, the United Kingdom, have chosen to leave the EU and the President of the EU’s most powerful partner, the United States of America, has yet to show any sympathy for European integration.1 What does this dual shock of transatlantic turbulence – Brexit and President Donald Trump’s foreign policy – mean for European security?

A few years ago, it was suggested that Europe’s political situation could best be characterized as “crisis upon decline”.2 Crisis in the form of several structural problems that lacked effective common solutions – migration management, debt levels within the Eurozone, and mounting Russian aggressiveness are telling examples – and decline in the sense of other actors and other regions catching up or even overtaking the privileged positions of western states in the world system. The state of “crisis upon decline” was suggested to have a negative impact on Europe’s geopolitical influence.3

Since then, however, Europe’s geopolitics have suffered increasing uncertainty. Political turbulence in the UK and US has rocked the pillars of European security i.e. European integration and the transatlantic link as well as their institutional manifestations – The EU and NATO. The choice of the British to leave the European Union was seen as a dramatic challenge to the Eu- ropean project, especially at a time when the EU was already weakened following years of shoddy crisis management and mounting popular resistance towards European integration. The election of Donald Trump – whose campaign hinted at a more transactional and less sympa- thetic view on European states and their integration – was considered a threat within the EU bureaucracy. While some of his nominees – such as national security advisor H.R. McMaster and Secretary of Defense James Mattis – have tried to calm the Europeans, his first visit to Europe in May 2017 convinced them instead that caution was indeed warranted. As German Chancellor Angela Merkel summed up her impressions after a week of EU, NATO and G7 meetings, her message was that cooperation should be sought with the US and the UK but Europeans needed to take care of their own interests – it had become clear that others would not.4

The challenges posed by Brexit and the Trump administration are of course different – and the European Union members differ, to some extent, on their reading of these events. To start with, Brexit is not necessarily protectionist; it takes place within a functioning political system where the mainstream parties dominate over fringe parties. This is in bleak contrast to President Trump’s ‘Jacksonian’ protectionism and his “America First” policy, and all the challenges they create for the checks and balances of the American political system and the way his movement has taken a firm grip on the hitherto established and predictable Republican party.

But the events of Brexit and Trump’s rise also have similarities and are to some extent interrelated: Trump signalled support for Brexit and his position vis-à-vis the UK on areas such as trade might affect the political calculations of other EU members hesitant to proceed with further European integration. Also, the effects of the UK leaving the EU are tied to the choices of the Trump administration on the US global role and the extent to which the American president will challenge the Europeans on areas such as security, trade and climate change policy. The rise of Donald Trump as well as Brexit is also ushering in an era of reinvention as elements of the political system thought to be broken – the political machinery in Washington and Brussels respectively – are to be fixed or abandoned. Interestingly, this happens as the European integration project is in a phase of reinvention in itself, partly as a response to the ‘crisis upon decline ‘mentioned above. This European process of reinvention is much affected both by the Trump administrations unwillingness to show global leadership and opportunities that are thought to be opened once the “awkward partner” – the UK – leaves the club. Considering these interrelated effects of current transatlantic turbulence, this collection of essays takes a broad view and aims to analyse European security within several domains while considering events on both sides of the Atlantic.

The collection is structured as follows:

In the two introductory essays, the main interests of the involved actors and the overall effects of their actions on European security are analysed. Daniel Hamilton explains the domestic roots of Donald Trump’s power and their implications for his foreign policy outlook. He places Trump within a Jacksonian tradition and discusses what this means for European partners within the EU and NATO. Claudia Major and Christian Mölling take a broad perspective on Brexit, outlining the various ways in which the choice and preferences of the UK might impact on European security and the various institutions involved.

In the following section, specific security domains are scrutinized in shorter insight pieces and possible effects of both Trump and Brexit are discussed. Björn Fägersten investigates intelligence and counter terrorism and its future considering current trends, while Christian Mölling and Claudia Major take a look at future scenarios of European defence while. Dan Hamilton then looks at the area of societal security and resilience in Europe and its nearby locales. Finally, Sarah Backman then analyses the cybersecurity challenges facing Europe today and the way the current transatlantic turbulence affects cooperation.

In a final essay, Björn Fägersten considers implications for the future of EU-UK security relations, for the prized goal of European autonomy and the prospect for regional security cooperation in Northern Europe.

Stockholm, June 2017

Endnotes

1 The author would like to thank Brandon Mok for excellent research assistance and editing in preparation of this report. 2 Youngs, Richard (2011), European foreign policy and the economic crisis: what impact and how to respond? FRIDE Working Paper 111, November 2011. 3 For an assessment, see Björn Fägersten, 'The Implications of the Euro Crisis for European Foreign Policy- Lessons from Crisis Management and International Trade' (2014) 19 Euro- pean Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 4, pp. 483–502 4 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/following-trumps-trip-merkel-says-europe-cant- rely-on-us-anymore/2017/05/28/4c6b92cc-43c1-11e7-8de1- cec59a9bf4b1_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.e2a9f621b9b2

Contents

Essays Trump's Jacksonian Foreign Policy and its Implications for European Security ...... 6 Brexit, Security and Defence: A political problem, not a military one ...... 16

Insights Intelligence: Safeguarding future cooperation ...... 28 Defence and crisis management: Scenarios and future development ...... 36 Resilience: Shared, and Forward ...... 42 Cybersecurity: The effects of Trump presidency and Brexit ...... 48

Implications Transatlantic turbulence – Implications for European security ...... 52

No.2 2017

PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WWW.UI.SE

Trump's Jacksonian Foreign

Policy and its Implications

for European Security

Daniel S. Hamilton

The Domestic Roots of Trump's Foreign Trump owes his election to a surge of Jack- Policy sonian anger. Understanding these traditions, particularly Jacksonianism, is key to To understand what is likely to drive understanding Trump. Trump, it is important to understand the domestic context in which he operates. Efforts Wilsonianism is the tradition most known to to categorize him as isolationist or interna- non-Americans. It is rooted in the belief that tionalist, hawk or dove, realist or idealist do the United States is a nation set apart by its little to help one understand Trump's do- values and principles, and that America best mestic political base, which serves as the advances the cause of peace by spreading starting point to understand his foreign and democratic values and institutions else- security policies. After all, it's the politics, where in the world – including by force, if stupid. necessary. During the post-Cold War pe- riod, Wilsonians embraced the opportunity Over the course of American history, four to work with allies and new democracies to great political traditions have shaped the enlarge the democratic space within Europe way Americans have tended to debate how where war simply doesn't happen. They fa- their country should relate to the rest of the vored the enlargement of the European Un- world.5 Two of these traditions – the Jack- ion and of NATO. Wilsonians believe that sonians and the Jeffersonians – look largely multilateral organizations, codes of interna- inward, whereas the other two – Wilsonians tional conduct and initiatives such as arms and Hamiltonians – gaze outward. control can extend such bedrock American

6 values as respect for human rights and the rights and civil society abroad ignores the rule of law. daily reality that such principles are hon- The Hamiltonian tradition is named after ored in the breach by racial segregation or Alexander Hamilton, the America’s first discrimination against Americans and oth- Secretary of the Treasury. Hamiltonians be- ers at home. They insist that the American lieve that the United States has a profound model will only be seen as relevant for other interest in maintaining a relatively open, in- people when others can see that America's ternational trading and financial order. model works for its own people. Hamiltonians are great-power international- ists who readily speak of the ‘national inter- Jeffersonians are not knee-jerk isolationists. est’ and ‘the balance of power’, and would They do not oppose peaceful commercial fit most readily in the ‘realist’ category. relations or mutually beneficial interactions Hamiltonians view open international com- with other nations. But they are preoccupied merce, framed by a predictable world order with the gap between America's aspirations based on international law, as a potential and its achievements. They believe liberty cause of peace. These beliefs have led Ham- can be subverted as easily from within as iltonians to champion US efforts to ensure from without. They fear excessive concen- freedom of the seas, freedom of the skies, tration of economic, military or potential an open door for American goods, and an power domestically as well as internation- international legal and financial order that ally. And they are worried that overstretch permits the broadest possible global trade. abroad can absorb needed resources for domestic challenges. They embrace Amer- The domestic alliance between Hamiltoni- ica’s system of checks and balances, consti- ans and Wilsonians – both of which look tutional restrictions on excessive power and outward to the world – has been a powerful the role of the Congress in foreign policy. force in U.S. foreign policy, but it has not This translates into support for a limited for- always carried the day. Two other traditions eign policy that defines US international in- have also been influential, each of which are terests narrowly. Barack Obama is at heart much more focused on the state of America a Jeffersonian, and he presided over a coa- at home than its position in the world. lition of Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians.

One of these traditions is named after Perhaps the least understood and most baf- Thomas Jefferson, America's third Presi- fling of the four American traditions for Eu- dent and the principal author of the Decla- ropeans – and the one where Donald Trump ration of Independence. Rather than acting is most at home – is Jacksonianism, named on the crusading impulse of the Wilsonians for Andrew Jackson, the country’s seventh to promote democratic revolutions abroad President, who in the 1820s upended the es- or on the Hamiltonian interest in construct- tablished political order by instituting uni- ing an ambitious global order, Jeffersonians versal white male suffrage, remade the believe that America is best suited to be an party system and introduced mass electoral exemplar for others by fulfilling the demo- politics. Jacksonianism is more an amor- cratic promise of its revolution at home. phous expression of antiestablishment pop- They argue that breathless talk of spreading ulist culture than an intellectual or political liberty, democracy, freedom of speech, civil movement. Jacksonians are sovereigntists

7 who assert that the prime goal of U.S. do- expression of the Jacksonian tradition, the mestic and foreign policy must be the phys- Tea Party movement, came to life about the ical security and economic prosperity of the same time as Barack Obama took office in American people. They are instinctively January 2009. It encompasses an inchoate democratic and populist, and skeptical of assemblage of individuals and groups that domestic or foreign ‘do-gooding’ (welfare range from center right to the far fringes of at home, foreign aid abroad), which causes American political life, but united under them to distrust federal authority, support a such slogans as ''America first.'' strong military, the death penalty, federal support for the middle class, and value Jacksonians view European allies as poten- highly the Bill of Rights – particularly the tial value-added partners when it comes to Second Amendment to the Constitution, confronting a hostile Russia or curbing which enshrines the right to bear arms as the Middle East security threats, but bristle 'citadel of liberty'. whenever they perceive Europeans free-rid- ing on American defense expenditures or Jacksonians believe that Americans must acting to bolster the liberal order, help remain vigilant and well-armed in a danger- America's enemies via trade or other means, ous world. They are ready and willing to do constrain American sovereignty or freedom whatever it takes to defend the United of action, or extend European ways to States. Jacksonians do not like limited wars American shores. for limited goals. Although they value allies and believe that the United States must Trump's Jacksonian Instincts honor its word, they do not believe in institutional constraints on America's freedom If Hillary Clinton had become the first fe- to act, unilaterally if necessary, in self-de- male president of the United States, she fense. They share the Jeffersonian prefer- would have preferred to preside over a coa- ence for selective or limited engagement lition of Wilsonians and Hamiltonians, with the outside world, but they are also much like her husband did – but the pull of least tolerant of Jeffersonian efforts to re- the Jeffersonian tradition, as personified by strict or limit American power. They do not both Barack Obama and Bernie Sanders, support free trade and are wary of the loss was very strong. In the end, she could not of economic autonomy implied by trade lib- bring those three disparate strands together, eralization and economic interdependence. and lost enough Jeffersonian voters to make They are least likely to support Wilsonian the difference for Trump. initiatives for a better world, have the least regard for international law and practice, Donald Trump mainly succeeded, however, and are the least willing to support Hamil- by tapping Jacksonian anger with his call to tonian strategies of balanced engagement. “build a wall” to keep out Mexican mi- grants, blasting free trade deals as ''sellouts'' The original ''American First'' movement to China and other countries, questioning formed in 1940 to keep the United States the need for alliances such as NATO, and out of yet another European war; their influ- scolding European, Japanese and Korean al- ence was significant until the Japanese at- lies as “free-riders” living off of the largesse tack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The modern of the American taxpayer. Trump's victory

8 has given voice and power to this American how they must be protected and advanced political tradition in ways that have mysti- in a world of diffuse power and intensified fied foreign observers. But the Jacksonian global competition. They have been able to tradition has always reflected a significant temper the President's instincts with regard minority opinion across the American polit- to NATO, Russia, China and the Middle ical landscape. In Trump, Jacksonianism is East. experiencing an historical revival. Second, the President is confronted by A Jacksonian foreign policy puts America members of Congress – both Democrats and first. It is unilateral at heart. It favors hard Republicans - who are fiercely committed power over soft power. It seeks to shed bur- to NATO, far tougher on Russia, far more dens, not to share them. Jacksonians are not supportive of Ukraine, and far less willing interested in the promotion of democracy or to gut key elements of U.S. foreign policy, multilateral processes. Trump wants to such as the State Department or develop- slash U.S. support for the United Nations, ment assistance. President Trump has also gut U.S. development assistance, and aban- run up against the power of the judiciary, don U.S. commitments under the Paris Cli- which has blocked the most egregious as- mate Change accord. He is wary of the per- pects of his efforts to impose travel bans on manent bureaucracy in Washington, and is foreign visitors. purposefully acting slowly to fill key administration positions. He will not support Third, Trump must face the ''Blob in the plurilateral trade deals, could start a trade Swamp'' -- the gaggle of Republican and war with China, and may challenge the Democratic former officials, media com- WTO. He will boost U.S. military spending mentators, opinion writers and think tankers considerably. He wants to restructure and who largely oppose the main lines of his downsize the State Department. One casu- evolving foreign policy. President Obama's alty is likely to be the State Department's former speechwriter Ben Rhodes referred to Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Opera- this Washington establishment derisively as tions, which means that such operations will ''the Blob,'' and President Trump was fall almost exclusively to the Pentagon. elected on a platform to ''drain the swamp'' of entrenched Washington interests. But the Instincts vs. Interests Blob in the Swamp has a hold on the media, the public, and elite opinion, and has been Understanding the domestic roots of successful in casting a spotlight on some of Trump's foreign policy also means under- Trump's more questionable activities, such standing that domestic factors may also as the nature of his campaign's ties to Rus- constrain some of Trump's more radical in- sia, or possible conflicts of interest related stincts. to his business operations.

First, other key officials in his administra- Finally, most Presidents have presided over tion, notably his national security adviser a coalition of at least two of the four tradi- H.R. McMaster and his Defense Secretary, tions outlined earlier. A Presidency, such as James Mattis, have a more conventional ap- Trump's, that rests on support of only one of preciation of U.S. interests and values, and

9 those four traditions is unlikely to be sus- highly improvisational and situational ap- tainable over time, and Trump already faces proach that could inject a risky unpredicta- considerable opposition from Wilsonians, bility into relations with friends and foes Hamiltonians, and Jeffersonians alike, alike. Trump's about-face on the Assad re- which is reflected in his low public approval gime demonstrates his volatile nature. “I ratings. This reality will limit his influence like to think of myself as a very flexible per- at home and frustrate his ambitions abroad. son,” he has said. “I don’t like to say where I’m going and what I’m doing.”78 For these These domestic considerations suggest that reasons, a clear ''Trump Doctrine'' is un- the foreign and security policies pursued by likely to emerge anytime soon. the Trump administration may ultimately turn out to be more conventional than his Implications for European Security nationalist supporters hope or his critics fear. He has conspicuously failed to follow This tension between temperance and tem- through on some of his most radical foreign perament is likely to characterize U.S. for- policy pledges. He has not ripped up the eign and security policy during the next four Iran nuclear deal. He has not moved the US years. It suggests a continued U.S. commit- embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. He has ment to NATO, including a forward U.S. switched from open hostility to the EU, military presence in Europe, but with which he likes to call ''the consortium,'' to greater pressure on European allies to step cautious support. He spent most of his cam- up their own efforts. It suggests greater bur- paign trail castigating NATO, only to em- dens for America's European allies and part- brace it shortly after his inauguration. He ners, and raises the possibility that impro- has not held a bromantic summit with Vla- vised responses to unanticipated events dimir Putin. The outcome of the first U.S.- could roil relations in unpredictable ways. China summit of the Trump years turned out to be more conventional than Trump's While Jacksonians approach Europe from a campaign rhetoric had suggested. Trump's very different perspective than Wilsonians, decision to unleash a volley of cruise mis- Hamiltonians or Jeffersonians, they share siles on Syria in response to the Assad enough similarities to shape a core consen- regime's use of chemical weapons was sus about U.S. interests with regard to Eu- roundly applauded by the “Blob in the rope. Swamp”, most of whom are united in the view that America’s willingness to use mil- First, there is widespread consensus that the itary power is crucial both to its global United States has an enduring interest in a standing and to the stability of the world or- Europe that is hospitable to freedom and der.6 open to American goods, investments, and ideas. Jacksonians are far less willing than In short, Trump's policies may be tempered others to invest significant energy or re- – but Trump himself will remain tempera- sources to advance this interest, but they mental. Even as he has opened the door to a recognize that America's democracy is more traditional American engagement likely to be more secure in a world in which with the world, he has demonstrated a other democracies also flourish.

10 Second, there is widespread consensus that First, the administration wants each NATO the United States has an interest in a Europe ally to produce by the end of 2017 a con- that is free of the kind of strife that drains crete plan demonstrating how and when it inordinate resources from the United States will spend 2% of GDP on defense, with and the rest of the world. Jacksonians would 20% allocated to the modernization of be the first to cheer if Europeans proved ca- equipment and infrastructure. Critical ally pable of resolving European conflicts on and partner capability shortfalls remain, in- their own. Unfortunately, this has not cluding strategic lift; intelligence, surveil- proven to be the case, as demonstrated by lance, and reconnaissance (ISR); deploya- the Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Geor- ble command and control; air to air refuel- gian conflicts, the Balkan wars of the 1990s, ing; and air and missile defense. and in America's military presence, its This will be the main take-away from the peacekeeping forces, and its efforts at rec- Summit, which is largely intended as a ''get- onciliation and reassurance that – at Euro- to-know-you'' event. Allied failure to agree pean invitation – continue today. All four to produce such plans by the end of the year, traditions perceive Moscow's defiance of however, is likely to cause a serious rift with Europe's prevailing security order as chal- the administration and could prompt unpre- lenging U.S. interests in a Europe at peace, dictable reactions from the President. even if they are at odds over what the United States should do about it. Second, the administration wants to priori- Third, there is common agreement that the tize the fight against terrorism in its efforts. United States has a keen interest in a confi- NATO has been engaged on this front, no- dent, capable, outward-looking Europe with tably in Afghanistan, but will need to which it can work to address a range of chal- sharpen its terrorist-fighting message. It can lenges that no nation can tackle effectively do so by reinforcing the Warsaw Summit alone. While Jacksonians are reluctant to in- decision to continue with Operation Reso- vest American energy or resources in global lute Support, including pledges already ex- do-gooding, they are not averse to seeing tended for financial assistance through other countries solve problems so that the 2020. The Pentagon has already requested American cavalry is not forced to come to greater U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan their assistance in the end. for training and ultimately as a rapid response force. NATO can also put the anti- terrorist tag on its Warsaw Summit decision The Agenda for NATO and Partners to boost cyber defenses and to put the concept of national resilience at the center of These core interests will continue to guide defense efforts. A third Warsaw Summit de- U.S. policies, although the Trump admin- cision, on defense capacity building, can istration comes to the issues differently also be framed as an anti-terrorism initia- from previous administrations. tive, with its emphasis on defense reform, The most important frame will be the training local forces, and defense education Trump administration's approach to NATO. in countries like Iraq and Jordan. Beyond Trump, Mattis and Tillerson have empha- these areas, the U.S. is likely to underscore sized two basic priorities in this regard. the need for the Alliance to develop a

clearer southern strategy, with new tools to

11 implement it and a better understanding of how NATO can fit within the broad array of It is likely that the administration will con- coalitions and groupings that are currently tinue U.S. efforts to implement other War- active fighting terrorism in Africa and the saw Summit decisions, such as improving Middle East. NATO's situational awareness and decision making in crisis and advancing NATO-EU This raises difficult issues with NATO ally partnership. The U.S. believes the next pri- Turkey. Relations between Washington and ority for the Alliance is to enhance the read- Ankara are strained by many issues, includ- iness and sustainability of national Follow- ing U.S. support for Kurdish groups on-Forces to deal with contingencies in the fighting ISIS when President Recep Tayyip east, and to strengthen the command struc- Erdogan is fighting his own war with Kurd- ture needed to manage such forces. These ish separatists in Turkey. Follow-on-Forces, if deployed, would most likely face an Anti-access Area-denial Other important NATO issues are below the (A2/AD) environment in which Russian Presidential radar screen, which means that combat aircraft, air defenses, submarines, continuity, rather than change, is likely to anti-ship cruise missiles, special forces, be the watchword. The administration has space and cyber assets would make it diffi- reinforced its commitment to the European cult for NATO’s reinforcing units to arrive Reassurance Initiative of $3.4 billion annu- and operate. ally, which has funded renewed U.S. forward presence in Europe, and to NATO's The major uncertainty remains the admin- Warsaw Summit initiatives, particularly istration's approach to Russia. U.S.-Russian forward deployment of NATO multina- ties are arguably the worst since before the tional battalions to the Baltic states and Po- Gorbachev era. U.S. and Russian leaders land. Two U.S. Brigade Combat teams are share limited amount of interests and very permanently deployed in Europe (in Ger- different world views of what drives the in- many and Italy). A third heavy U.S. Brigade ternational system. Despite Trump's reluc- Combat Team (BCT) is being forward de- tance to criticize Russia and his hints that he ployed to NATO's east on a heel-to-toe ro- might recognize Moscow's annexation of tational basis. Equipment for a fourth U.S. Crimea and review Ukraine-related sanc- BCT is also being forward deployed to Eu- tions as ways to pursue warmer ties with rope to facilitate reinforcement. Military ex- Putin, administration spokesmen have stuck ercises are near continual. The Ukrainian to more traditional approaches. Secretary of and Georgian militaries are receiving addi- State Tillerson, Secretary of Defense tional U.S. training. Continued congres- Mattis, and U.S. Ambassador to the UN sional support for ERI will enable EUCOM Nikki Haley have all called Russia's claims to continue its contribution to NATO’s Air on Crimea "illegitimate," stated that the Policing mission, provide for additional U.S. will continue to hold Russia accounta- anti-submarine warfare capabilities com- ble to its Minsk commitments, and that U.S. plementing maritime domain awareness as- sanctions against Russia will remain in sets in Iceland, and support rotational Ma- place until Moscow reverses the actions it rine units operating from Norway and the has taken there. They have also criticized Black Sea region.

12 Russian activities in Syria and in Afghani- to penetrate Russia’s sophisticated air de- stan, and Mattis has called out the Putin re- fenses. The U.S. is also likely to push ahead gime for "mucking around" in other peo- with plans to improve its air- and sea- ple's elections – a particularly notable claim launched conventional strike capabilities, coming at a time when federal and congres- including a conventional version of the sional investigators are probing alleged LRSO. Finally, it is also likely to consider Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. elec- ways to make available to more allies and tions. partners its Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM); the extended-range vari- Trump's view of Putin has also evolved, and ant of the missile, JASSM-ER; and Toma- he believes that in the current atmosphere – hawk sea-launched cruise missile with so much media scrutiny and ongoing (SLCM). probes into Trump-Russia ties and election meddling – it won't be possible to "make a Conclusion deal," as the President himself has framed it. The best that may be expected is agree- Americans and Europeans have become ac- ment to reduce the risk of inadvertent inci- customed to consulting and often acting to- dents that could lead to major conflict; to gether to address unpredictable countries manage differences in ways that do not al- and crises in many parts of the world. To- low them to erupt; and to contain other po- day, America and Europe themselves have tential disruptions from third issue areas. become unpredictable partners. Disruptive change is not unique to the United States; As the administration's approach to Russia Europe faces a conflation of crises – migra- continues to evolve, it is likely to be influ- tion, terrorism, Russian aggression, Brexit, enced by a U.S. decision whether to supply low and uneven growth, high youth unem- lethal defense aid to Ukraine, for which ployment and significant debt challenges in there is strong support in the Congress, and many countries, the cancer of ''illiberal de- debate over Russia's violation of the INF mocracy'' – that have unsettled European Treaty. polities, economies, and security policies. On both sides of the Atlantic, the traditional The U.S. has declared that Russia has de- political divisions between right and left ployed a land-based cruise missile that vio- have given way to divides between those lates the spirit and intent of the INF Treaty. seeking to open societies and reap benefits Prospects for Russia returning to compli- generated by greater international engage- ance are not good. The U.S. is likely to re- ment, and those who want to shield and pro- spond strongly by accelerating the modern- tect their societies from such forces, which ization of U.S. strategic delivery systems, they believe are disruptive and even subver- including a new ballistic missile submarine, sive. The potential for sudden and unantici- a new intercontinental ballistic missile, a pated challenges will remain high for the new strategic bomber (the B-21), and a new foreseeable future, and will test the resili- air-launched nuclear cruise missile (the ence of this transatlantic partnership. Long-Range Stand-off system, or LRSO) Daniel S. Hamilton is the Austrian Marshall which will provide the U.S. with the ability Plan Foundation Professor and Director of

13 the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Interna- tional Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins Uni- versity

5 These traditions have been captured well 6 See Gideon Rachman, '' How the Wash- by scholars such as Walter Russell Mead ington blob swallowed Donald Trump,'' Fi- in his book Special Providence: American nancial Times, April 10, 2017. Foreign Policy and How it Changed the 7 Peter Baker, '' The Emerging Trump Doc- World, or David Hackett Fisher in his book trine: Don’t Follow Doctrine,'' New York Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in Times, April 8, 2017. America.

15 No.3

2017

PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE

OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WWW.UI.SE

Brexit, Security and Defence:

A political problem, not a

military one

Claudia Major

Christian Mölling

Executive summary

In the realm of security and defense, Brexit potential outcome that there will be greater is likely to reduce the Europeans’ political political and military fragmentation in Eu- capacity to act.† However, their overall mil- ropean defence. The divide between the EU itary capacity to act (that is, the European as a security player and NATO as a defence set of armed forces) is unlikely to suffer actor might become stronger, which risks much. weakening the Europeans’ political capacity to act on the international scene, to im- Europeans have always managed their de- pact upon international policies, and to to fence via various channels: nationally, in shape regional order. To sum up, there is a the EU, through NATO, and in smaller for- risk that Brexit might create a more frag- mats (such as bilateral relationships). Brexit mented and inward-looking EU with less will change the way these formats function political unity and credibility. This poten- and how they interact. There is the negative tially reduces their capacity to shape political developments. However, the military

† This analysis builds upon interviews with Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, high level civil servants and think tankers Poland, Sweden, conducted in March and from Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, April 2017.

16 capacity of the European states that is, their more general political level. On the one military power, is likely to suffer less. hand, the EU loses a player with a strong Given the limited role of the EU in the area, global mind-set, diplomatic and strategic also Brexit is unlikely to change much. skills and the willingness to shape interna- Overall, the question of how to organise the tional order. On the other hand, the chang- future relationship between a post-Brexit ing balance of power within the EU also UK and EU member states will be crucial means that other countries will become for efficient cooperation in European secu- more important and that alliances might rity and defence matters, be it bilaterally, in shift. A new foreign policy may be focus the EU or in NATO. more on Europe’s south and southern neighbourhood. Yet, a more diverse EU in for- While Brexit is likely to negatively affect eign policy could also simply mean less EU almost all EU policy areas (for example, in in foreign policy. Eventually, Brexit will the form of more cumbersome regulations, adsorb administrative energy and bind po- economic repercussions, etc), security, and litical power in domestic struggles and in especially, defence are not likely to suffer ensuring political unity and compromise much. First, because security and defence among the remaining 27. have never been one of the core competen- cies of the EU, it will be easier to disentan- The potential positive side effects of Brexit gle the UK from the EU in this very area. in the area of institutional governance will EU structures in security and defence are only be able to compensate for the other two less legally complicated and organizational developments if the ongoing incremental ties are not so close between Brussels and improvement of CSDP procedures and co- other European capitals. Instead, defence operation incentives can materialize in real and security have often been organized projects that lead to real capabilities and through alternative channels, many bi-and power. So far, most of the current ideas are multilateral settings besides NATO. The not convincing in this regard. However, the only exception may be the defence indus- EU might initiate – via new research funds trial part, as this is a complicated part of the (European Defence Fund), review mecha- internal market, as well as of the intergov- nisms (Coordinated Annual Review of De- ernmental Common Security and Defence fence – CARD) and closer cooperation – Policy (CSDP) regime. better intra-EU governance and defence cooperation. As a result, Europe’s overall de- For the EU’s CSDP, negative impacts may fence capabilities – that is, its single set of include a theoretical loss of capabilities, a forces – would benefit. The states could use real loss of political power while a positive such an improved single set of forces in the impact would be a gain in more effective in- EU as well as in NATO or other formats. stitutional governance. While the UK has, on paper, contributed quite a lot of military The remaining EU27 are willing to handle capabilities, it has not brought these into Brexit in defence pragmatically. This may play in the CSDP context. Instead, London change if the overall climate turns sour. has developed into a real stumbling block, Moreover, many are willing to use the even for capability development within the Brexit as a positive catalyst to re-energize EU. Instead, the worrying effects are on the CSDP. However, this does not apply to all.

17 NATO might benefit from a greater UK Brexit deeply affects the way Europeans or- commitment, because it is the last remain- ganize their cooperation in almost all areas ing format in which the UK can shape col- of politics. Brexit questions the very logic lective answers to common security prob- and hitherto accepted truths and myths of lems, implement its “Global Britain” aspi- European integration: that it is irreversible, rations, and play a role as an international attractive to everybody, and only develops security actor. However, this also depends in one direction – deeper in each area that it upon the UK’s capacity to maintain its de- governs and further in expanding the num- fence budget. Again, one should not expect ber of areas that it comprises. Brexit ques- tectonic shifts. NATO itself has to manage tions these ideas, which were valid for dec- the interests of 29 members. In addition, ades, and therefore has forced all European smaller formats, such as bilateral and mini- Union members to reconsider the EU’s role lateral cooperation, can benefit. This partic- with regard to themselves and to Europe as ularly applies to the Franco-British Lancas- a whole. Overall, there is a high probability ter House treaties. Among the currently ex- that Brexit will negatively affect the UK isting multilateral formats, only few have and EU citizens alike, be it via economic re- moved beyond the level of rhetoric. percussions, cumbersome work and travel regulations or the complication of military The remaining EU 27 states share at least cooperation in the fight against terrorism. two things regarding Brexit: they regret that the UK is leaving the Union, and they are Yet, there is one area where the negotiations all willing to find pragmatic solutions to or- might be less fraught, and where the reper- ganise the future cooperation of the UK cussions might be less dramatic or might with the EU as early and as close as possi- show their effect only later –the area of se- ble. At the same time, only a few states curity and defence. This is due to the partic- (mainly the bigger ones) have started seri- ular nature of security and defence cooper- ously preparing for the Brexit in defence. ation in Europe. Firstly, security and defence cooperation in the EU is less inte- The EU’s power will suffer more in terms grated than other areas (trade, agriculture of defence than in overall military power as etc.), which means that the UK and EU have a result of Brexit. This is because military fewer legal obligations and structures to dis- power still results from national sources entangle. which are only loosely pooled in international organisations. Brexit could affect the Second, European countries have always role of the organisations more than the port- managed their security and defence via var- folio of the individual states. The division ious channels: nationally, in the EU, of labour could turn the EU into a defence through NATO and in smaller multilateral facilitator and a security actor, whereas formats. Thus, unlike other areas (such as NATO will remain the operational defence the single market), countries have alterna- actor. tives to EU cooperation when it comes to security and defence. This also means that Brexit’s overall effect on European Se- limiting the potential effect of Brexit in security and Defence curity and defence to the EU’s CSDP would actually miss the point. To assess Brexit’s

18 effect on security and defence in Europe to be reconsidered in the light of current and one has to look not only at the EU, but also future developments. at NATO and minilateral formats, too. Looking more into detail, Brexit is likely to From a methodological point of view, as- affect the EU, NATO, and other format in sessing Brexit’s impact on security and de- the following way: fence raises various challenges. One major issue is to distinguish Brexit’s repercus- Brexit’s effect on EU’s CSDP: a theoret- sions from those of other events, mainly the ical loss of capabilities, a practical loss of security policy of President Trump’s ad- political power and a gain in institu- ministration. Up to a certain degree, it is dif- tional governance ficult to assess whether recent pro–Euro- pean initiatives to deepen cooperation (such Contrary to the amount of discussion within as in CSDP via a Headquarters or Perma- the EU about the effects of Brexit on secu- nent Structured Cooperation) that some rity and defence, most EU states assume member states call for are a response to that the negative consequences of Brexit in Trump or Brexit or (most likely) to both. this area will a priori be limited for two reasons: Another challenge is the uncertain political environments of key European players. The Because cooperation in security and de- future course of Brexit depends largely on fence is less important, developed and inte- the results of the elections in France (the grated than in other EU areas, such as the new president Macron needs a parliamen- single market, trade or agriculture. The lat- tary majority to implement his program: ter are supranationally organized, which legislative elections will take place in June means that the states have delegated their 2017) and in Germany (September 2017). decision-making authority to EU institu- The UK and EU members alike perceive tions. CSDP, however, is intergovernmen- Germany as a key shaper of the Brexit tally organised. This means that states did agenda. If the rather pro-European president not delegate their decision-making author- Macron gets a stable government, Germany ity to a supranational EU institution. There and France are likely to fiercely defend the is no Commissioner on defense deciding in European acquis and give the UK a hard the name of all Europeans what to do. EU time, as already visible in the Council con- members still decide on a case-by-case ba- clusion of late April 2017. sis, for example, whether to launch an operation, and they pay largely for it with na- Yet another challenge is the unpredictable tional funds, instead of EU funds. Hence, economic development during and after the disentangling the UK from the CSDP will Brexit process. Economic problems will be easier, simply because there are fewer le- certainly affect the resources the UK can gal obligations and common structures to spend on defence, and hence its interna- leave. This also means that debates might be tional commitments. Thus, any assessment less contentious poisoned. This is at least on Brexit’s impact upon European security the hope that countries like France and Ger- and defence is a snapshot, which might need many maintain.

19 All states also agree that CSDP is not the The bigger ones (Germany, France) seem to major framework for their defense and se- be less worried. Without the UK, it becomes curity issues. No EU country heavily de- ever more illusory for the EU states to meet pends on the EU for its security or defence. the EU level of ambition (LoA) they agreed CSDP concentrates on military and civilian upon, that is, what the EU aims to be able to crisis management and security, such as carry out in terms of operations. The LoA training security forces in Mali. Defence in was already ambitious, but it the member a narrow sense – meaning the protection of states decided to increase the LOA even fur- populations, territorial integrity and of the ther with the new EU Global Strategy of functioning of the state- remains largely 2016, despite knowing already about Brexit NATO’s task. Therefore, Brexit will only and the loss of military might it would yield. have very limited effects for most countries’ Theoretically, the EU should thus lower security plans. those LoA, as it can no longer count on the UK’s capabilities. Yet, it is unlikely the Un- Likely repercussion on capabilities, politi- ion is going to accept it, as it would look like cal power and institutional governance a step backwards. Yet, this is to some extent a theoretical debate: the UK has always The Brexit will affect CSDP in terms of ca- been reluctant to put its defence power at pabilities, governance and policies. In mili- the EU’s disposal. It actually blocked CSDP tary terms, Brexit means a serious capabil- on different occasions, such as by vetoing ity crunch which risks damaging the EU’s an EU Headquarters and an increase of the credibility. A limitation in the EU’s military EDA’s budget. In the last years, it did not capabilities also limits the Union’s military launch meaningful initiatives, nor did it aspirations, and thus affects its broader am- consider the CSDP a core channel for its se- bitions. The UK is a military power – one of curity and defence policy. Although it con- only five EU states to have an Operational tributed personnel and equipment (such as Headquarters (OHQ) able to command an to Northwood HQ for the EU Operation At- operation, and it possesses high-end capa- alanta), these contributions were dispropor- bilities not many Europeans have, such as tionately small compared to what the UK ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnais- could have done with its military capabili- sance). On paper, the EU is losing the UK’s ties at hand. considerable military capabilities –which amount to about 20% of Europe’s overall The real and negative impact may be the capabilities and 25% key enablers – because one on the EU’s weight in general foreign of Brexit. policy and its strategic culture. The existing balance of power within the EUs CSDP The EU-Europeans are worried about how might also change. With Brexit, the EU to make up for the capability gaps the UK loses the UK’s voice, which had an im- will leave. The smaller and medium sized portant weight on the international scene. countries (Hungary, Poland) seem to be par- After Brexit, the EU and UK can of course ticularly worried about the shortfalls in support each other in areas of common in- practical operational capabilities, intelli- terest in foreign policy. However, it will gence and counter terrorism, and the effect take time to develop a new partnership that on Europe’s overall strategic autonomy.

20 the outside world will perceive as a power- terrorism at Europe’s southern border. At ful EU-UK alliance. So far, the Brexit nego- the same time, individual states can main- tiations signal to the outside world that a tain a considerable blocking power. Thus, a contentious divorce is ahead, not a new more diverse EU in CSDP may simply lead powerful EU-UK couple. to less CSDP in Europe. For the time being, Also difficult to assess will be the loss of especially for the smaller countries who strategic outlook for the EU due to Brexit. have been traditional partners of the UK, The UK brought a particular strategic cul- like Poland and Hungary, Brexit means a ture to the EU, characterised by a global major loss. Yet, they seem to regret rather outlook and a readiness to intervene. It is the loss of a political partner than the loss of difficult to measure the loss of such strate- the UK’s capabilities in the CSDP frame- gic thinking following Brexit. Yet, it is work. Other countries in the south and likely that it will not only affect the internal southeast see Brexit less as a problem: they debates on what the EU should do, and how, are more concerned with their own security but also the view that the outside world has problems: migration and economic struggle of the EU. In fact, a reduced strategic out- – two things on which the UK did not show look without the UKs strategic culture much solidarity. might inhibit the CSDP but also the wider foreign policy power of the EU. External Finally, there is a risk that Brexit might cre- actors might perceive the EU as being less ate a more fragmented and inward-looking ambitious, more inward-looking, and less EU. Not only will the implementation of willing and capable to act on the global Brexit occupy the EU and the UK for some stage. Here, France in particular is torn be- time and might affect mutual trust. Both tween two positions: worried to lose a stra- face domestic issues as well. The UK needs tegic ally, which is close to its strategic cul- to deliver on Brexit promises while keeping ture (closer than Germany, who is however, the Union together (Scotland, Wales, Paris’ most important European partner); Northern Ireland). The EU has to avoid fur- and relieved to lose a country that tradition- ther centrifugal tendencies and define its fu- ally resisted progress in EU cooperation. ture integration model, as the debates about differentiated integration show. It is likely While Brexit is unlikely to change the poli- to suffer from the political fallout from tics of CSDP, it might affect the balance of Brexit, that is, a lack of unity and doubts power within the CSDP and the foreign pol- about the EU project as such. Yet, political icy framework: new alliances will appear. agreement is the precondition for EU col- With the UK leaving, other countries like It- lective action. A Europe that is occupied aly could play a more important role than with itself risks paying less attention to ex- before. This could also mean that southern ternal threats and has less weight on the in- perspectives in security and defence gain in ternational stage. This is worrying in view importance; that is, the EU could become of existing challenges and the uncertainty even more southern looking. Whereas cen- about the US commitment to European de- tral and Eastern European members, like fence, which has questioned the viability of Poland, tend to worry more about territorial NATO and the EU. defence in the East, southern Europeans are more concerned about the instability and

21 Institutionally, the EU may improve its gov- Brexit as an opportunity for CSDP ernance once the UK has left. While funda- mental change is unlikely, stepwise modifi- Although most countries (France, Italy, cations are already under way. EU states Germany, Hungary, Poland) regret Brexit have already improved CSDP governance, because the EU loses a decisive player in such as by setting up a Military Planning the areas of security and defence, they claim and Conduct Capability for non-executive that the EU should make the best of this un- operations, a precursor for an HQ, in March fortunate situation by developing CSDP 2017. Particularly interesting is the devel- further. With different levels of enthusiasm, opment of additional instruments, at the EU EU member states agree that Brexit might level, to support member states in better be the badly needed opportunity to eventu- spending on and coordinating their defence ally improve the security and defence coop- activities. The Preparatory Action, launch- eration within the EU. After all, the UK had ing €90 million for CSDP-related research, profiled itself as fiercely critical voice to will start mid-2017 and will run until 2020. closer EU defence cooperation and vetoed It could pave the way for a European De- several developments. fence (Research) Budget under the EU Mul- tiannual Financial Framework. Together France, Germany and Italy in particular with Coordinated Annual review of De- openly admit that such a “new dynamic” ap- fence -CARD, the Defence Fund (EDF) and proach amounts to “making the best out of possibly Permanent Structured Cooperation a bad situation”: if the UK leaves, at least (PESCO, if wisely implemented, these in- try to find some benefit at the EU level. struments could nudge the Europeans into They have found it by claiming that CSDP, more meaningful and efficient cooperation. without the UK’s opposition to it, might fi- France and Germany in particular see here nally prosper. This explains the strong an opportunity for CSDP to make a qualita- Franco-German commitment since June tive step forward. 2016 in launching bilateral proposals to improve CSDP, and also the Italian non-paper. However, the benefits of such new governance structures will only materialise if the There have indeed been several initiatives, states will use these institutions to effec- since the Brexit vote, to take CSDP to the tively pursue security. For the time being, next level. At the September 2016 Brati- the institutional reorganization is more a slava summit, states agreed to strengthen theoretical exercise than a practical neces- EU cooperation on external security and de- sity: in the past, the member states pre- fence. At the December 2016 European vented CSDP from becoming a real political Council meeting they focused on three pri- actor, while still, furthering the procedures. orities: implementing the EU Global Strat- Hence, even if the procedures were to im- egy in security and defence; the Commis- prove, as long as EU member states remain sion’s European Defence Action Plan; and reluctant to use the EU for their security po- a follow-up of the EU-NATO Joint Decla- litical interests, things will not change ration, signed at the 2016 NATO Warsaw much. summit. In parallel, EU states exchanged non-papers on how to take the CSDP to the next level. Most states then rallied behind

22 the Franco-German ideas, which called to new governments will take up this respon- make better use of the treaties, such as by sibility. implementing Permanent Structured Coop- eration, setting up a European Medical Brexit and NATO – potential benefi- Command and starting a CSDP research ciary programme. However, one needs to be cautious when identifying / qualifying these in- The UK leaves the EU, but not Europe; se- itiatives as new: most of those ideas date curity problems in and around the continent back to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty but the will hence still affect Britain. However, if states were reluctant to implement them. after Brexit the UK can no longer shape collective answers to these challenges inside The hope that Brexit might allow to finally the EU, it is likely to turn to other formats. develop CSDP into a credible security and All states expect NATO to benefit from the defence player might be over-optimistic and Brexit, although they differ in their expec- ignores at least three things. First, the UK is tation on how big this benefit will be. not the only country sceptical of the useful- Smaller states expect bigger benefits, hop- ness of the CSDP. Others have been coming that the UK will refocus their capabili- fortable hiding behind the UK and must ties on the Alliance (Hungary), France and now speak up. Germany do not expect major change. Thus, NATO can benefit, as it will be the only de- Second, current proposals mainly target in- fence forum in Europe in which the UK can stitutions and governance procedures. Alt- still play a role, and which would allow hough they may improve CSDP’s practical London to underpin its “Global Britain” work, such as an HQ in the area of planning, ambitions called for by Prime Minister The- they do not address the political problem of resa May. a lacking support from the states. CSDP’s main problem is that Europeans have a Several countries, like France and Germany proven alternative for defence – NATO. fear a political UK overinvestment in Hence, there is little pressure to set up and NATO; which might lead to commitments agree on a defence policy within the EU. that not all allies share, such as those to CSDP’s limited success is not only due to Syria and Iraq, or just hectic activism with the British block on structural development. many initiatives. They are also worried that It results from a lack of trust of the Europe- the EU-NATO relations might suffer. Alt- ans in the capacity of the EU to deliver on hough they see them on a good track since defence. Moreover the EU has been ambig- the 2016 EU-NATO Joint Declaration at the uous about the role of defence: The 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, they fear that EUGS plays with the word by using it implementation, such as regarding the co- throughout the whole text, yet, the deeds are operation on cyber issues and resilience, still missing. might suffer if the climate in the EU would be negatively affected due to unpleasant Third, France and Germany are decisive in Brexit negotiations. Such a strained atmos- taking the EU forward. It remains to be seen phere could generally affect NATO’s polit- how the elections in both countries and the ical cohesion, which remains the crucial precondition for political agreement and

23 military action. They are also worried that the overall GDP shrinks. If the pound loses the issue of finding a way to associate the value, procurement abroad will be more ex- UK with the EU might open other dossiers: pensive, planned capabilities could become how to associate a non-EU but NATO unaffordable, or the timing and numbers of member to the EU re-opens the Turkish procurement could change. Finally, if the question, which Cyprus and Greece are UK’s unity were to be questioned from the likely to block. inside, such as through another Scottish independence referendum (as requested by Other countries, particularly smaller and Scotland in March 2017), budget priorities medium sized like Hungary and Poland, might shift. Therefore, it is not certain that welcome a stronger commitment of the UK the UK can implement its greater NATO within NATO but fear that the London has commitment into facts. other interests: a “global Britain” might be less interested in territorial defence in East- There are other limits due to NATO’s spe- ern Europe, and more in global affairs out- cial nature as an alliance of 28 states. In fact, side the continent. Even more, if the UK en- NATO has experienced even more than the gages in global security with more solid EU how difficult it is to find agreement. A commitments outside the Alliance, there strained atmosphere due to difficult Brexit will be less capacities available for NATO. negotiations will not help. In the Alliance, it is typically the US that forces the allies into The UK has already voiced its intent to an agreement – which is something that all strengthen its commitment in the Alliance, allies recognise (without always appreciat- yet without specifying what this means. It ing it). In addition, decision-making has be- stresses its unique position as a nuclear come so cumbersome at 28 that the Quad power, a close US ally, a member of the (US, UK, France, Germany) tends to pre- Quad and a country ready to use military prepare decisions that the other allies then force. So far, London has increased its per- mostly accept. Brexit does not change this sonnel in NATO and aims to take a political pattern. The change might actually come lead. It also refers to its contributions to from the US. Certainly, despite Trump’s NATO’s deterrence and defence measures, critical stance on the Alliance, US commit- such as the role as lead nation within ment on the ground has not changed. But NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. Yet, the lack of US interest in NATO, and in ex- London made these decisions prior to erting leadership within NATO, is affecting Brexit; they can thus hardly serve as a token political unity in the Alliance. It might make of a new commitment. it more difficult to get all allies to agree on decisions, to tame internal disputes, such as Besides, a stronger military role cannot be about Turkey’s role, or the south-east di- taken for granted: If the Brexit process af- vide. fects the economy, the UK’s ability to achieve its LoA and maintain its capabilities Nevertheless, there is a certain chance that – as set out in the 2015 Strategic Defence NATO could benefit from a potentially and Security Review – will suffer. Even if stronger UK commitment. The Alliance the UK sticks to the 2% of GDP spending could gain in importance as a platform for goal for defence, there will be less money if debates, policy, and capability development

24 among Europeans. In an ironic twist, alt- These frameworks have even more appeal hough it weakens the EU, Brexit could thus because they can serve as a link for the UK strengthen the European pillar in NATO. into the EU, and possibly as a way to channel some UK interests into EU debates. Co- Brexit effect on bi- and multilateral for- operation in small groups seems easier, yet mats the question is whether these groups risk undermining the EU and NATO in the long The second potential beneficiary is the bi- term, or act as a facilitator for decision shap- and multilateral defence cooperation frame- ing and taking in bigger format like NATO works outside the EU and NATO. This ap- (where decision-making is cumbersome), plies in particular to the Franco-British Lan- and transmission belt for various ideas. caster House Treaties, launched in 2010, which set up large-scale cooperation in var- A surprisingly united European ap- ious areas reaching from the nuclear realm, proach capabilities, up to industrial issues. Both states confirmed their wishes to deepen this Interestingly, the European countries under link, such as by launching specialised Cen- study here mostly agreed in their analysis tres of Excellence for missile technology in on what Brexit might mean for the EU and 2016. Moreover, both countries share an NATO, what the consequences might be, ambitious and outward-looking strategic and how one should react. There is no out- culture and rely on each other for issues right disagreement on anything, but there such as the fight against the so-called Is- remain subtle differences in their under- lamic State. According to France, Lancaster standings and willingness to implement House will of course continue and deepen, changes. The main differences lie in the pri- as set out. Yet, there does not seem to be a ority that EU countries give to Brexit, their stronger push due to Brexit – instead, there level of commitment to CSDP and the ex- has been a “carry on” approach. pectations they have regarding the UK’s future role in NATO. Also the UK and Germany aim to intensify their cooperation, such as in cyber security A second noticeable difference lies in the and maritime patrol. Yet, Germany makes it stage of preparation: While the bigger coun- very clear that this should in no way affect tries like Germany and France have already EU commitments. made up their mind about the defence and security implications, others either did not In terms of multilateral formats, the UK have the capacity, or felt that it would have aims to revive its cooperation in the North- been the wrong timing, especially in view ern Group, which comprises northern Euro- of the French elections. Southern Europe, pean countries, including Germany. So far, for example, does not give Brexit much of a it mainly exists only in rhetoric. London priority. This might also be because for also aims to further the Joint Expeditionary most EU-countries, the crucial issue within Force, which consists of Denmark, the Bal- Brexit is not security and defence but trade tics, the Netherlands, and Norway. and the future conditions of their citizens in the UK. Poland, Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands underlined the importance to

25 find a solution to their citizens living in the cerned about the repercussions on the de- UK. fence industrial realm than the other states. It fears that its defence industry, elements of All countries under study here agree in that which are closely linked to UK industries, they regret the UK’s decision to leave, and might suffer. Likewise, Italy expects that recognise that CSDP loses (in capabilities, the political balance of power might shift in strategic culture), but maintain that the EU two directions: First, Italy might get a should try to make the best of it. However, stronger voice in CSDP (and the EU as not all share the idea that this would best be such) than before, possibly forming a new done by launching new initiatives within “big three format” with France and Ger- CSDP. All suppose that the UK might need many, thereby filling the place the UK is to make up for the loss of policy shaping ca- emptying. Second, CSDP might turn even pacity in the EU by a stronger commitment more than now to the South, given that cred- in NATO, yet they differ in their assessment ible northern voices in the EU are lacking, on how much difference this will eventually for the countries in the north of Europe make in the Alliance, and how this will af- whether left CSDP (UK, Denmark), or are fect the EU-NATO relationship. While cautious (Sweden). some expect the UK to play a more promi- nent role in NATO (Poland, Hungary), Thus, for the time being, the preparation, other expect not much of a change because definition of preferences and setting is dif- the NATO structures hardly allow for it ferently developed. However, there seems (France). to be agreement among many smaller EU countries that they expect Germany and In view of the future relationship, most France to take the lead in the Brexit negoti- countries agree that it is in the interest of ations and the EU’s future development. both partners (EU and UK), to quickly find a pragmatic solution. According to coun- Outlook: the EU as a defence facilitator tries like Hungary, France, Germany, and Poland, the UK should not be able to veto Overall, because of Brexit, it is not so much any EU development, but should be associ- Europe’s military capacity that will suffer, ated with the EU as early as possible in or- but rather – as a result of political disunity - der to get London to participate in EU secu- its political capacity to shape regional order. rity action (from which London would also The main challenge for the Europeans, both benefit). Most countries insist on the prag- in the EU and NATO, is to avoid a poisoned matic aspects of the future relationship, be- atmosphere of revenge, and to assure polit- cause they recognize that a formalisation ical unity – which is the ultimate pre-condi- might open the thorny issue on how to deal tion for action, be it imposing sanctions on with those states who are NATO members, Russia or stabilizing the neighbourhood in but not EU members (like Turkey). the South or East. In addition, the Europe- ans should seek to avoid a likely increase in One difference lies in the assessment about bilateral and multilateral formats that will how much will change, within the EU, once affect the functioning of EU and NATO. the UK has left. Here, Italy seems more con- While negotiations among 27 or 28 governments are far more cumbersome – the

26 power of a consensus of 27 States is by far would allow for common ground on opera- stronger that any bilateral consensus. tions, industrial and capability cooperation to develop, which would be of mutual inter- In fact, it is very likely that Brexit will lead est. NATO would also benefit from a func- to a further differentiation of tasks between tioning EU-UK relationship, as it would NATO and the EU. This is what most coun- ease the implementation of the 2016 EU- tries hinted at when underlining the im- NATO Joint Declaration. portance of NATO for defence, and of the EU for crisis management. Rather than cre- Second, the next step is to conceptually re- ating a defence capacity inside the EU, the think European defence. Most Europeans future development steps of CSDP are tend to link the solutions to their security likely to increase crisis management capa- problems to institutions – mainly the EU bilities and capability cooperation, whereas and NATO. However, both have limita- NATO will stick to its (operational) defence tions. NATO remains a military alliance. tasks. Crucial tools that deal with non-military threats remain with the EU or the states. The Moreover, and here comes a novelty – if not CSDP offers a contribution to security, but a defence actor, the EU might develop into key instruments lie with the Commission a defence facilitator – which would be a tre- and the states. It is hence misleading to ask mendous step. If the EU – via new research which institution will organise European funding (European Defence Fund) with fi- defence. The key questions are how Euro- nancial incentives for cooperation, coordi- peans can ensure effective defence and how nated planning (such as CARD), closer co- they will identify the needed capabilities to operation (PESCO) and the opening of de- protect populations, states, and borders. The fence markets – were able to support capa- importance of institutions lies in the bun- bility development, Europe’s overall de- dling of forces and ideas, and fostering fence would benefit. It is up to the states to agreements where necessary. The states’ decide where they would use such an im- role is to ensure the coordination between proved single set of forces, in the EU or in the various formats, and to offer political NATO (and the UN, for that matter). leadership.

The main challenges for the UK-EU rela- Claudia Major is a senior associate for in- tionship will be to define the UK’s role and ternational security at the German Insti- to re-think European defence. First, for the tute for International and Security Affairs CSDP, the existing third-party agreement (SWP) (from which more than 40 non-EU states benefit) offers a starting point for future UK Christian Mölling is Deputy Director at contributions. It allows non-members to the Research Institute of the German join EU operations but gives them next to Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) no role in their design. It might be worth considering offering the UK a special status to involve them in planning processes earlier in order to provide incentives for UK contributions. A regular EU-UK dialogue

27 No.4

2017

PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WWW.UI.SE

Intelligence: safeguarding

future cooperation

Björn Fägersten

Intelligence cooperation is not only a field made up of autonomous members, com- of cooperation in its own right, but also a monly shared information lays the ground necessary contribution to areas of joint ac- for joint action. The push towards ‘strategic tion such as crisis management, counter-ter- autonomy’ in EU doctrine, in this sense, de- rorism and strategic planning. Both the US pends on production of and/or access to au- and the UK are strong intelligence actors tonomous European intelligence. Apart and have been influential in shaping Euro- from the need for common intelligence in pean intelligence cooperation. How does Brussels, EU member states are in need of the current transatlantic turbulence of Pres- shared intelligence in order to fulfil their na- ident Trump’s foreign policy and Brexit ef- tional security responsibilities. Organised fect on this cooperation and its future devel- crime, terrorists and foreign agents of influ- opment? ence are transboundary actors and can only

be stopped with transboundary intelligence Importance of intelligence for European work. Current events thus suggest a strong security and growing need for tighter European in-

telligence cooperation. And if history offers Access to correct and sometimes exclusive any pointers, similar needs for intelligence information is considered a force multiplier have in the past translated into deeper coop- for any security actor. Information power eration. The abandonment of internal bor- helps create more targeted policy and efficient operations. For a collective actor

28 ders in the EU prompted German Chancel- field of counter-terrorism, which acceler- lor Helmut Kohl to push for what later be- ated intelligence cooperation among Euro- came the Europol agency. The perceived pean security services – both as a way to be threat of Islamic terrorism – and the need to a more relevant partner to the US and as be able to produce an independent picture of way to produce a more independent assess- this threat – called for tighter security ser- ment of the terrorist threat. Hence, the idea vice cooperation in the Counter-Terrorism that Europe is only able to exercise a com- Group format following the 9/11 attacks. mon as well as somewhat autonomous for- And increasing levels of foreign policy am- eign and security policy only if it has access bition on behalf of the EU motivated the to its own threat analysis and intelligence build-up of what is today the EU Intelli- has been an important driver for coopera- gence and Situation Centre (IntCen). tion. Instances where US intelligence activ- Hence, intelligence is already important for ities have been seen as running counter to the EU, and all the factors that earlier have European interests – painfully illustrated by strengthened cooperation – the level of NSAs tapping Angela Merkel´s phone – threat, internal policy development and the have further highlighted this perceived need relation to other intelligence players – re- for more potent European intelligence ca- main valid today, which suggests further pacities. deepening of cooperation. But how can and will this play out in an era of transatlantic The UK has also played a key role in the turbulence? As will be discussed below, be- development of European intelligence, alt- cause both the US and the UK have been in- hough from the inside of the EU. When the strumental in shaping European intelligence first High Representative of EU foreign pol- cooperation, current political processes in icy – Javier Solana – informally queried the both countries will most likely affect the de- member states for intelligence analysis in velopment of future cooperation. order to make progress on his new post, it was the UK that took the lead in the devel- The role of UK and US in development opment and management of intelligence of European intelligence cooperation sharing. In the area of criminal intelligence – shared within Europol – the UK has over In the areas of foreign and security intelli- the years become a main contributor. The gence – the work of international-oriented agency is also currently managed by a Brit- intelligence agencies and domestic security ish person. According to a recent estimate, services respectively – the US has played an around 40% of data traffic through Europol important role as an instigator of intra-Eu- comes from the UK or concerns the country ropean cooperation. The anxiety over the and the UK police carry out 250,000 relative intelligence dominance of the US searches of Europol databases each year.9 over Europe that was showcased in the First The UK has also been vital in shaping the Gulf War and the Balkan Wars catalysed overall approach in the EU’s Justice and early moves towards intra-European intelli- Home Affairs field by pushing for the gence cooperation. Following the terror at- method of intelligence-led policing.10 tacks of 9/11 in 2001, the US put considerable pressure on Europe to deliver in the

29 In sum, both the US and the UK have been One is President Trump’s carelessness with central in shaping the development of Euro- secret information, and his disdain for US pean intelligence cooperation. Considering and allied intelligence services. During a the range of current security problems in May 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Min- and around Europe such cooperation will be ister Sergei Lavrov and Russian Ambassa- essential for the Europeans when develop- dor Sergey Kislyak, the President Trump ing their security policy How can the trans- disclosed intelligence about the Islamic atlantic turbulence of Brexit and the Trump State which the US had received from Is- presidency impact such cooperation and rael. The incident provoked the Israelis to what can be done to mediate the effects of adjust their intelligence sharing protocol, these geopolitical developments? whichmight impact the level of cooperation between the partners.13 Earlier in 2017, the Trump, trust and transatlantic intelli- Trump administration had given voice to gence cooperation the idea that the British signals intelligence agency GCHQ – the Government Commu- A central element in any exchange of se- nications Headquarter – had spied on Presi- crets is trust. Trust can be conceptualised as dent-elect Trump on behalf of the then Pres- the willingness to let your guard down even ident Obama. This provoked a rare public when this entails a risk – a trusting relation- reaction where British intelligence stated ship is one where Actor A trusts Actor B to that these accusations were “utterly ridicu- manage her interests and expects Actor B to lous and should be ignored”.14 To this one “do the right thing”. 11 The most obvious must add President Trump’s own conflicts risk to transatlantic intelligence cooperation with various US intelligence agencies over is the breach of trust among partners. On the their management of the lingering issue of most overarching level, such lack of trust Russian involvement in the US election. can be the cause of general political diver- The net effect of this is that US intelligence gence. Trump has shown little interest in the allies – in Europe and elsewhere – cannot rules-based, egalitarian international sys- assume that their secrets are safe with the tem facilitated by multilateral institutions – US President and that their US partner known as the liberal world order. If agencies may not have enough influence to Trump’s lack of goodwill towards this sys- discipline President Trump on intelligence tem is also a symptom of America´s in- modus operandi such as the third party creasing disdain for it, then allies will, over rule.15 The relationship between the Trump time, cease to trust the US to “do the right administration and Russia currently under thing”. The recent Canadian decision to scrutiny aggravates this risk, especially for spend more on defence in order to compen- US allies that have intelligence activities di- sate for faltering US global leadership is an rected towards Russia. indication of such logic.12 From an intelligence perspective, this would gradually hol- From a European perspective, this lack of low out important alliances from the top trust is most likely to have an effect on high down. While this is a distant, and highly un- level bilateral intelligence sharing. Firstly, certain prospect, other trust-related issues because of the sensitive nature of the intel- have more direct consequences. ligence that is shared in these formats, high level bilateral intelligence sharing is more

30 dependent on a trusting relationship. Sec- will want to show that the integration pro- ondly, bilateral intelligence sharing rela- ject still has momentum. The recent push to- tions are managed closer to the respective wards Permanent Structured Cooperation administrations and so are more exposed to (PESCO), the development of a planning political decisions and moods. This is in facility for military training missions, and contrast to multilateral sharing, such as the establishment of a new defence fund for within NATO or between the US and the research and acquisition are a few examples EU via Europol, which is less sensitive and of this development with further steps hav- takes place in far more institutionalized set- ing been promised. While there are several tings with several layers of bureaucracy other causes to this, there is no doubt a adding distance to politically-elected parts “Trump”-factor driving development at the of national administrations. In sum, eroded moment. 17 Internal policy development levels of trust as well as policy divergences within the EU has been one of the main on issues such as Russia and the Middle drivers of previous efforts to strengthen Eu- East risk raising the threshold for what in- ropean intelligence cooperation and there is telligence is shared in the transatlantic rela- no reason to assume that this should not be tion with sensitive bilateral relations being the case also this time. Indeed, the conflu- more at risk than data shared trough multi- ence of current trends – budget needs, in- lateral venues. creasing threat levels, internal EU strategy development, the need and possibility to A knock-on effect of President Trump’s for- showcase momentum in the face of Brexit, eign policy agenda is the prospect for as well as worries over American commit- tighter intra-European cooperation that it ments to European security – make security might trigger. This could happen in a direct policy development with increased intelli- and an indirect fashion. As a direct effect, gence requirements very likely. European nations could chose to increase intelligence sharing in order to compensate Brexit and the future of Anglo-Euro- for a more strained transatlantic intelli- pean intelligence cooperation gence-sharing climate. This seems unlikely as intelligence relations between European Security cooperation in general, and intelli- countries and the US have not yet degener- gence cooperation in particular, have been ated substantially, and Europeans would be suggested as one of the UK’s strongest hard pressed to compensate for the intelli- hands in the Brexit-negotiations. It was also gence the US offers. In an indirect way it is explicitly mentioned in Theresa May’s no- more likely to see an effect. As has hap- tification of Brexit to the European Council pened before in times of transatlantic diver- where she hinted that ‘a failure to reach gence, the Europeans are likely to respond agreement would mean our cooperation in to President Trump’s foreign policy by step- the fight against crime and terrorism would ping up their own foreign and security pol- be weakened’ which in some quarters was icy cooperation.16 This trend is accelerated interpreted as blackmail.18 Whatever her in- by the British choice to leave, which means tentions, this interpretation is not unresona- both that a brake on integration has been ble, considering the involvement of the UK lifted and that the remaining EU member in several EU venues for intelligence cooperation and the way this cooperation could

31 be affected by Brexit. The UK is one of the scenario, where Brexit leaves the UK and top three contributors to Europol where in- continental Europe on different and diverg- telligence is shared among national police ing geopolitical tracks the consequences forces and joint analysis is conducted.19 The would be worse and would also impinge on UK has been a driving actor in establishing bilateral intelligence cooperation. If, as an a pragmatic intelligence exchange in sup- example, the UK would side with the US port of the Common Foreign and Security administration on policy in the Middle East Policy which takes place within the EU In- and actively try to work against common telligence Analysis Centre (EUINTCEN). It European positions, that would obstruct in- also participates in the security service co- telligence cooperation top down, according operation CTG (the Counter Terrorism to the same logic discussed above in the US Group – which functions outside of the EU case. Another effect that goes beyond the but feeds analysis into the Union and sup- functioning of current cooperation arrange- ports its decision) and policy-making. Com- ments is that a more independent UK cut pared to other areas affected by Brexit that loose from EU supervision might develop might be more of a zero sum game – such an even more relaxed view on the work and as budget contributions and financing of mandates of its intelligence agencies. A re- joint projects – intelligence cooperation in cent ECJ preliminary ruling on the legality the forums above are more akin to a posi- of the GCHQ’s bulk interception of phone tive-sum game. 20 Europol Director Rob call records and online messages illustrates Wainwright argues that cybercrime, people the role hitherto played by the EU.23 smuggling, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking are areas where the UK The fact that a “hard Brexit” in the intelli- would struggle to maintain the current oper- gence field would be a clear negative for ational efficacy if it left the agency.21 Even everybody involved and that thoughts of with a partner arrangement with Europol protecting its reputation means that the UK similar to those established by US and even is unlikely to use security as a bargaining Denmark, the UK would lose the capacity chip means that pragmatism, instead of to do direct searches in Europol’s databases, emotional desires to inflict repercussions on which would severely hamper the speed of either side, will hopefully drive future de- police work. Likewise, the EU27 would velopments in this field. The different fields lose out in several areas if cut off from UK of intelligence cooperation explained above intelligence and analytical expertise. The come with different challenges when it same can be said about intelligence work comes to post-Brexit cooperation. within the EU INTCEN. This is obviously an area where the EU27 benefits from the In the case of Europol, the main hurdles are UK’s global intelligence presence and re- likely the role of the European Court of Jus- sources. However, it is also a way for the tice and budget contributions. 24 While UK to gain access to niche analytical com- budget contributions to future cooperative petences of partner countries, as well as an ventures can be managed in a variety of effective means to influence European pol- ways and thus are easier to manage, the role icy making.22 This discussion only relates of the ECJ is difficult to work around. The to the multilateral bodies for cooperation ECJ has an oversight role over data protec- that would suffer from Brexit. In a darker tion rules – for example, it invalidated the

32 EU-US Safe Harbour agreement due to con- ther be designed in a PESCO-like coopera- cerns over the quality of US measures to tion among devoted member states that protect the personal data of Europeans.25 It wish to take cooperation to a new level, ra- is also the mechanism of arbitration be- ther than a heavily institutionalized federal tween partners, for example when using the structure that might not deliver obvious co- European arrest warrant. Here, the EU27 operative gains. That would allow for Brit- and the UK will either have to find alterna- ish cooperation not only at the current level tive legal ways to safeguard data routines of integration but also participation in its fu- and compliance or the UK will have to ac- ture development. cept a limited role for the ECJ. Whatever path is chosen, agreement is made easier by Finally, the counter-terrorism intelligence the fact other sectors as well – such as future cooperation within the CTG will be largely trade with the EU27 – will demand high lev- unaffected by Brexit. Indeed, the CTG (and els of data protection rules in the UK. It the more general cooperation framework of should also be mentioned that the UK al- the Club de Berne 28 ) offer a beneficial ready has chosen to opt-in twice in Europol framework for post-Brexit intelligence co- so it clearly sees benefits of current cooper- operation. It is decentralised (and thus less ation.26 As long as these budgetary and le- sensitive to changing political moods) and gal aspects will find a solution, the EU27 does not function under any supranational would be well-advised to incorporate man- control function such as the ECJ. However, agers and analysts from the UK and to find it still influences European policy and strat- a bespoke arrangement allowing them di- egy making by several links into the EU rect access to each other’s databases in or- system. From the UK’s perspective, this of- der to maintain current levels of interaction. fers continuity as its membership will not be affected by Brexit while it will allows a In the case of intelligence in support of for- back door through which to influence the eign and security policy, a similar solution EU on matters such as counter-terrorism. is to allow the UK to keep staff within the Two possible effects will be important to IntCen, who could then feed intelligence consider in relation to this. First, the Euro- into the system and take part of the joint an- pean Commission has repeatedly tried to in- alytical products is possible. This arrange- tegrate the work of security services into the ment might be easier since the IntCen have EU.29 Their lack of success in doing so is a history of both informality (it was origi- now a benefit of this cooperation but mem- nally a private office of EU High Repre- ber states should be wary that these ambi- sentative) and hierarchy (not all member tions might resurface in times of intensified states was invited to participate at the European security cooperation. Keeping the start).27 The risk here is that the push for CTG out of formal EU structures makes it tighter intelligence cooperation will over easier to keep the UK in these European time result in a more formal “agency-like” counter-terrorism efforts. Second, the effort function in which it will be more difficult to to establish Europol as the main actor design a bespoke UK presence. In light of within European counter-terrorism efforts this, further development of intra-European have been obstructed by the fact that much strategic intelligence cooperation should ra- of the intelligence need for this task is in the hands of security services, not in those of

33 the police agencies cooperating within Eu- both the US and the UK have been influen- ropol. Much has been done to increase co- tial in the development of intelligence coop- operation between these professions with eration. The agenda and actions of President some success, although legal as well as cul- Trump risk undermining common interests tural barriers still impede cooperation. The and erode the level of trust that underlies in- combination of the UK becoming less intelligence cooperation. Even though strong volved in Europol while simultaneously fo- and common interests suggest that coopera- cusing more on the work within the CTG tion will be continued, the UK’s departure carries the risk of increasing fragmentation from the EU will threaten cooperation on a in the European counter-terrorism field. number of intelligence areas. Both Presi- Such a development would be harmful as dent Trump’s actions and Brexit have given successful cooperation between security momentum to the strengthening of Euro- services and police agencies are essential pean security cooperation which will likely for successful counter-terrorism measures. also spill over into stronger intra-European The solution here is to align the UK closely intelligence cooperation. In such a case, it is to the work of Europol to preserve also important that future intelligence coopera- cross-sectoral cooperation among security tion in Europe is designed in order to allow services and police forces. for UK participation without risking fragmentation of such cooperation. Conclusion Björn Fägersten is Senior Research Fellow This analysis has shown that different forms and Director of the Europe Program at the of intelligence cooperation play an im- Swedish Institute of International Affairs portant role in European security, and that (UI).

9 Boffey, Daniel. "Brexit: UK may have to 12 Freeman, Alan. "Minister: Canada will recognise ECJ court rulings to keep secu- build up its military as the U.S. pulls back rity cooperation." The Guardian. Guardian from world stage." The Washington Post. News and Media, 30 Apr. 2017. Web. 12 WP Company, 06 June 2017. Web. 12 June 2017 and Black, James, Alexandra June 2017. Hall, Kate Cox, Marta Kepe and Erik 13 Gramer, Robbie. "Israel Changed Intelli- Silfversten. Defence and security after gence Sharing With U.S. After Trump Brexit: Understanding the possible impli- Comments to Russians." Foreign Policy. cations of the UK's decision to leave the N.p., 24 May 2017. Web. 12 June 2017. EU — Overview report. Santa Monica, 14 Weaver, Courtney. “White House reas- CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. Page 17 sures UK it will not repeat Trump spying 10 See Gruszczak, Artur. "EU intelligence- claim.” Financial Times. 17 May 2017. led policing: The case of counter-terrorism Web. 12 June 2017. cooperation." (2013) and UK House of 15 Implying that it is up to the originator of Parliament shared information to decide on dissemina- 11 Elster, Jon (2007), Explaining Social Be- tion to third parties. havior More Nuts and Bolts for the Social 16 Strömvik, Maria (2005) To act as a Un- Sciences. New York: Cambridge. ion. Explaining the development of the

cop: How to keep Britain inside Europol" EU's collective foreign policy. Lund Uni- CER, London versity Press. 25 "EU Commission and United States 17 For an example, see Tcherneva, Mark agree on new framework for transatlantic Leonard & Vessela. "How Trump will save data flows: EU-US Privacy Shield." Euro- Europe." ECFR. N.p., 07 Feb. 1970. Web. pean Commission - Press release. 12 June 13 June 2017. 2017. 18 Asthana, Anushka, Daniel Boffey, 26 In 2014 and 2016, see ”Statewatch anal- Heather Stewart, and Peter Walker. "Don't ysis - The UK opt in to pre-Lisbon EU blackmail us over security, EU warns criminal law by Steve Peers, Professor of May." The Guardian. Guardian News and EU Law and Human Rights Law, Univer- Media, 30 Mar. 2017. Web. 12 June 2017. sity of Essex Introduction” for background 19 Home Affairs Committee Oral evidence: 27 Fägersten 2015. EU policing and security issues, HC 806 28 The Club de Berne is a long-standing co- Tuesday 7 March 2017. operation arrangement between European 20 Other areas of intelligence cooperation security services with a broad agenda cov- are clearly more transactional, where infor- ering issues such as counter-intelligence mation is offered in a quid pro quo fashion, and internal security. The CTG is a spin- but such intelligence trading is mostly re- off that brings together a similar clientele served for bilateral, not multilateral, rela- for joint work on Islamism terrorism. tions. 29 For an early attempt at this, see Euro- 21 Q 178 in Home Affairs Committee Oral pean Commission (2004) 'Paper on Terror- evidence: EU policing and security issues, ism to the Council Providing Input for the HC 806 Tuesday 7 March 2017. European Council'. 18 March. Document 22 Fägersten, Björn. Intelligence and deci- SEC(2004)348. sion-making within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (2015:22epa) 23 Lain, Sarah, and Veerle Nouwens. "The consequences of Brexit for European security and defence." Proc. of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Talking Brexit, Berlin. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Print. 24 For a good overview, see Camino Mortera-Martinez 2017 "Good cop, bad

No.5 2017

PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WWW.UI.SE

Defence and crisis

management: scenarios and

future development

Claudia Major

Christian Mölling

developments or their results. The objec-

tive is to raise awareness and stimulate This short paper looks into how defence and thought on these matters rather than to gen- crisis management in Europe are affected erate fully coherent scenarios or even strat- by the new US administration and Brexit. It egies on how to deal with the possible fu- turns out to be a rather complicated equa- tures. These developments are not exclusive tion: We have to look into the tripolar polit- to one scenario: they can also mix or over- ical relationship between the UK, the US lap. They can be seen rather as modules as and Europe/the EU. The move of one pole far as their development is not connected to closer to the other affects the relative rela- the tri-polar relationship – where every tions between all poles. At the same time, move by one has consequences for the other the triangular relationship related to defence but modules that describe external develop- and crisis management implies that the ments that could happen in all of the scenar- overall external environment will heavily ios. influence the development of the need for defence and crisis management, whether the Three scenarios outline possible futures and US, UK or Europe like it or not. address the added value of transatlantic co-

operation for European security. The fol- We use the style of scenarios to offer spot- lowing three key uncertainties define the lights on the causes that might drive these content of the scenarios:

36 3. The industrial dimension plays a se-  The future of transatlantic relations, rious role: not because of high vol- (how, in which constellation will umes in defence procurements but both sides of the Atlantic continue to because many European countries work together) are dependent on US supplies and  The future role of the EU (What role cooperation and may look to change will the EU play as a political frame- this if political ties deteriorate. In work for security and defence re- fact, many Europeans hoped to buy lated issues, especially the question US commitment when buying US of whether it can institutionalize products. consensus among 27 states) 4. A rift in the transatlantic partnership  As to the UK first, whether it will will expose the Europeans to the tend more to the US or the EU/the same risks as the US. But Europeans continent. This may well depend on may find an alternative to the US the policy and incentives both sides support in political, military and can offer. Second, if the UK can still technological areas. New partners of hold its level of capabilities or Europe do not have to be partners of whether the Brexit effects will the US. shrink the UK forces. 5. Russia can be a strong factor only if the currently existing system of se- We assume that the security environment of curity institutions is weak – and the Europe will deteriorate. This increases the US actively weakens the order need to do more and to spend more in secu- through bilateral deals that compro- rity and defence. mise on common security in Europe. 6. We may see a fast and serious de- The scenarios offer the following main cline of UK military power – which lessons: might mean it will no longer be able to operate East of the Baltic Sea and 1. The meaning and the importance of South of the Canary Islands. crisis management and territorial 7. China and the Middle East may soon defence can change rather fast. The be more important than Russia as distinction may become blurred and strategic actors and crisis spots re- external operations more important spectively. This might redirect at- than territorial defence – be it under tention, and turn it from Russia and a UN or US framework. the Northern region. 2. The question how crisis management and territorial defence will develop is less linked to sufficient military capabilities than to political A rational deal: several crises drive the unity within Europe, the relation- US back into cooperation with the EU ship with the US, and the EU-UK re- but sidelines the UK lationship. On Christmas Eve 2025, the US President declares the beginning of a new era in 300

37 year-long transatlantic relationship: “Broth- resources are being funnelled back into the ers on both sides of the Atlantic have to countries. stand together against the increasing threats around them”. On New Year’s Eve, leaders The only country not reacting to these de- in Europe welcome this US overture and re- velopments is the UK. It was taken by sur- spond jointly in the form of a unified mes- prise because its diplomatic staff, cut by sage issued by EU Council President An- 50% due to a budget crunch after Brexit, did gela Merkel. not see the crisis coming and was unable to react. In fact, the devastating loss of value In 2020, the US entered into several con- of the pound hit the country very hard in all flicts in the Middle East. Cooperation with areas. Public spending has been hit hard, es- its local partners, with which the US sought pecially the defence sector, which has had to build a coalition, is getting increasingly many of its projects stopped or abandoned difficult. The US needs increased legiti- again. As a result, the UK’s relevance as a macy in the area, and hopes to gain it by per- military capability provider has shrunk dra- suading more Europeans to join the coali- matically. Before Brexit, it had provided tion Washington has set up. As of 2019, the 20% of overall European capabilities; in Europeans are willing to send a unified 2019 it only provides about 8%. Its contri- force of 50.000 soldiers as a UN force into bution to the European pillar in NATO is a the former Syria to implement a regional running joke in Europe. It thus had to give peace agreement, which Russia backs. The up commitments to its partners in Europe EU is more directly affected than the US by and the US. the spillover effects from the violence in the Middle East and needs the US as a balancer Yet, as the (other) Europeans keep investing in Asia especially to increase the costs of 2% of their GDP into defense, they keep security for China and thus to slow down alive the defense industry in Europe, which their economic power. Costs for operations is even able to innovate in some areas. How- and deterrence contributions lie where the ever, innovation in new areas like cyber is fall. only possible with US companies. Here, at The EU of 2025 has become more federal- least some European companies (financially ized after Brexit and its move towards a supported by the European Commission) multiple-speed Europe (that is a Europe in have been able to successfully sideline clas- whichdifferent countries of the EU inte- sic US defense companies and strike deals grate at different levels and pace depending on innovation partnerships with Silicon on the political situation in each country). Valley actors. The multiple-speed Europe has established a two class EU , the avant guard which is EU turns into a Fortress Europe and highly integrated, and the second row or finds new friends outer circle of countries who were not willing or able to join the first group. In fact, Growing transatlantic political differences nobody wants to be part of the second class, and a US that has exhibited a more transac- as it smacks of being a loser. This has driven tional approach to the relationship have torn many countries to increase their national ef- apart the EU member states and the US. The forts and support for the EU. In return, more EU has started organizing security on its

38 own, rather than with the US. This has de- The EU cannot make up for the US invest- manded tough political compromises and fi- ments in defence via the “defence innova- nancial commitments, such as paying far tion initiative” – the follow up to the 3rd Off- more than in 2017 for security and defence. set initiative. But it ensures a serious level However, it has eventually been effective. of industrial base and technological auton- After high casualty terrorist attacks in War- omy through a 3% investment of GDP in se- saw and Rome, the EU member states curity and defence. A buy European act is agreed on more effective measures by set- introduced. US companies who are part of ting up a central security agency, vamping the supply chain for European systems have up Frontex and launching a growing exter- to re-negotiate their contracts for European nal security force – a type of European governments through the EU if they want to armed force. take part in future public procurement ten- ders. Especially, they have to allow technol- Europe sees a growing need to use crisis ogy transfer for those systems for which the management operations to fight terrorist Europeans have paid a share of the R&D. networks already in Africa, but also in the US companies find attractive offers from Middle East as a kind of forward defense. European governments and the EU. But Here, the EU clashes with the US which still they may have to fear negative reactions plays a dominant role in the region: while from the US side. the EU uses a comprehensive approach, the US backs a military heavy counter-terror- At the same time: As the US slides into a ism strategy of the Middle Eastern countries more isolated position regarding Europe, based on head counts. The EU sees its ap- other partners around the globe become proach undermined by the negative conse- more attractive. To gain access to technolo- quences the US approach has. gies and systems it no longer produces in- ternally, the EU has included security and France has vamped up its nuclear force, defence into its global trade agreements. It providing a minimal deterrent with nuclear now buys some parts of its technology and sharing across Europe. Costs for that as well components from South Korea and India in as for operations are covered by an EU exchange for nuclear and green technology. budget for those who pay 2% of GDP on de- It prepares for a major equipment deal on fense and 50% into this EU budget. How- attack helicopters either with China or Rus- ever, it is now under pressure from a US that sia. Joint exercises between Europeans, now describes the EU as a growing risk to China and Russia take place. US security because the Union has acquired new nuclear weapons. A split-up Europe meets a hegemonic US Other European countries like Norway and UK want to (re-)join as the EU has demon- A scandal involving the French president strated such effectiveness and as the costs has helped Marine Le Pen into the Elysée for being allied with the US is increasing in Palace earlier than expected. Her declara- terms of resources (large defence acquisition of national independence from the EU tions have to be US-built), and reputation has triggered the complete dissolution of the (US poodle). EU. While the economic union still exists,

39 the political union is history. This pushes Dependence has its merits: in terms of secu- the European security order based on insti- rity of supply and interoperability, the US tutions to shift over into a (military) power- will ensure harmonized standards. Moreo- based “concert of nations” type of order. ver, the US offers the framework for cooperation. Hence, much of the costs incurred The US in 2022 has about 35 bilateral secu- from political fights over the right frame- rity agreements with European States. work just disappear. However, there are These include Article 5-like protection, that also downsides. The US will hold the key to is, collective defence as it was previously the European national militaries. The lever- enshrined in the Washington Treaty which age for the Europeans when it comes to op- in good old times set out the core promises erations is limited. of the now obsolete NATO. Collective defence means that an attack against one ally Yet, Moscow has followed both develop- is considered as an attack against all allies. ments, the shifting political situation in The 35 new bilateral agreements have effec- France and in Europe as a whole, with huge tively hollowed out NATO’s political interest. It now sees the window of oppor- meaning and turned it into a coordination tunity opening to gain influence in Europe. agency for US-European Equipment. More- It reactivates its old ties with the US presi- over, the countries have agreed to buy US dent and proposes several bilateral deals, equipment to ensure interoperability with reaching from nuclear disarmament of IC- US and other friendly forces. BMs to peace agreements in the Middle East. This honeymoon questions the Article The US –“foreign military sales” instru- 5 commitments in Europe and their counter- ment tripled its turnover volume. Europe parts in the bilateral agreements. pays about 2% of its GDP for this. The US offers offsets to every country. European The UK (would) gain from this return of a national industries participate in the produc- concert as its relative power in Europe tion of parts in their countries. In some cases would increase. But its security would de- of larger European companies, these are al- pend whether it makes it dependent on the lowed to produce for the US market and US, on the Europeans, or on Russia. gain support by the US also for exports – with regulations in line with US ITAR- reg- Claudia Major is a senior associate for in- ulations. This way US companies make the ternational security at the German Insti- rest of the European defence industry either tute for International and Security Affairs American or turn them into elements of a (SWP) production chain with US-companies on top. Christian Mölling is Deputy Director at the Research Institute of the German Europe’s political leverage on the use of Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) armed forces is limited. The US asks the Eu- ropeans to conduct missions in Africa, under the command of US AFCOM. Remain- ing gaps in capabilities are filled by the US.

No.6 2017

PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WWW.UI.SE

Resilience : Shared, and

Forward

Daniel S. Hamilton

have similarly approved a strategy and im- The notion of ‘resilience’ is gaining cur- plementation plan to counter hybrid threats, rency in European and Euro-Atlantic secu- have created a Hybrid Fusion Cell, rity policy discussions. The European Un- launched contractual public-private partner- ion, NATO and their respective member ships for cybersecurity, and signed codes of states are each building the capacity to an- conduct with platform and social media ticipate, pre-empt and resolve disruptive companies to prevent radicalization. Resili- challenges to vital societal functions. New ence also features prominently in the EU's energy is apparent in efforts to advance 2016 Global Strategy document. Moreover, more effective NATO-EU cooperation in in a 2016 Joint Declaration NATO and the the field of resilience. But Brexit and the EU committed jointly to ''boost our ability election of Donald Trump as U.S. President to counter hybrid threats, including by bol- raise questions whether current patterns of stering resilience, working together on anal- cooperation will prevail or be changed in ysis, prevention, and early detection, some way. through timely information sharing and, to

the extent possible, intelligence sharing be- At the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit, allies tween staffs; and cooperating on strategic agreed to a set of seven baseline resilience communication and response.'' standards and made national pledges to meet those standards; they also each made a These are positive developments that can Cyber Defense Pledge to secure their na- and must be developed further, and work is tional cyber systems. EU member states

42 continuing to do just that. But there are within NATO channels, working with allies questions whether and how such coopera- and partners on good practice related to the tion may change due to Brexit and the ad- baseline requirements, and helping to for- vent of the Trump administration. mulate an allied agenda with regard to resilience. To the extent that allies and partners Brexit has raised questions on whether the can demonstrate that they are investing re- UK will continue resilience cooperation sources and attention to this aspect of the within EU channels, even though its NATO Warsaw agenda, they also underscore that credentials will still remain valid. The spate they are addressing terrorist threats and car- of terrorist attacks in the UK in spring 2017 rying an important share of the common de- has reinforced the determination of UK au- fense burden -- both important issues to the thorities to address terrorist threats, includ- Trump administration. ing through continued strong cooperation with EU partners. The UK is likely to re- Allies continue to be worried, however, main a key actor when it comes to advanc- whether President Trump is personally ing resilience -- at home and among socie- committed to Article 5 of the North Atlantic ties abroad. When it comes to situational Treaty. When he attended the May 2017 awareness and intelligence cooperation, NATO summit, he chose not to reiterate this however, the UK is more likely to turn to long-standing commitment of the United NATO channels than EU mechanisms. States. In this regard, the current trajectory When it comes to multilateral intelligence of NATO's resilience agenda could also be cooperation, the UK is likely to invest with worrisome, because the Warsaw commit- priority in NATO's Warsaw Summit deci- ment to the seven baseline requirements has sions related to intelligence cooperation, in- been justified under Article 3, rather than cluding through creation of an Assistant Article 5, of the North Atlantic Treaty. Ar- Secretary General for Intelligence, rather ticle 3, the so-called ''self-help'' provision of than EU channels, which will remain uncer- the Treaty, underscores that each ally's fore- tain throughout the Brexit negotiations, most duty is to ensure it can defend itself. which are likely to be fraught and conten- This is of course a sine qua non of effective tious. mutual defense. But by linking resilience primarily to Article 3, and creating an The same goes for the United States. De- agenda in which the seven baseline require- spite uncertainties related to the Trump ad- ments -- and resilience itself -- is treated on ministration's approach to Europe, the cur- a country-by-country basis, rather than as a rent U.S. government has been clear about shared endeavor, the Alliance may have its commitment to the NATO Warsaw created an ''Article 3 trap'' for itself at a time agenda, including its resilience component. when the U.S. commitment to the mutual President Trump has insisted that NATO do defense premise of the Alliance is under more in the fight against terrorism – greater question. NATO focus on resilience can be one important answer. The U.S. Department of For this reason alone allies should consider Homeland Security, and in particular the how to emphasize the shared nature of resil- Federal Emergency Management Agency ience. But substantive reasons related to the (FEMA), continue to be particularly active

43 resilience challenge itself should further un- projecting operational resilience procedures derscore the need to move along these lines. forward to key neighbors.

Current efforts among allies and partners to NATO allies and EU member states should build a resilience agenda should be under- identify—very publicly— their resiliency stood only as first steps toward a more ef- with that of others beyond the EU and fective and comprehensive resilience NATO, and share societal resilience ap- agenda. State-by-state approaches to resili- proaches, operational procedures and fore- ence are important, but insufficient in a sight analysis with partners to improve so- deeply interconnected world. Resilience cietal resilience to corruption, psychologi- must be shared, and it must be projected for- cal and information warfare, and intentional ward. or natural disruptions to cyber, financial and energy networks and other critical infra- No nation is alone in an age of potentially structures, with a strong focus not only on catastrophic terrorism, networked threats prevention, but also on response. Forward and disruptive hybrid attacks,. Few critical resilience should also enhance joint capac- infrastructures that sustain the societal func- ity to defend against threats to intercon- tions of an individual country are limited to- nected domestic economies and societies day to the national borders of that country. and resist Russian efforts to exploit weak- Social cohesion within a given country can nesses of these societies to disrupt them and be affected by flows of goods, services, put them under its influence. money, data, energy or simply people -- whether refugees or radical elements who Forward resilience should also consider cooperate and operate across borders. timely response as a crucial component through better shared coordination with re- This means that traditional notions of terri- gard to early warning and foresight analy- torial security must be supplemented with sis, as well as 'bounce back' capacities well actions to address flow security - protecting in advance so as to deter attacks or disrup- critical links that bind societies to one an- tions to our societies' weak links. other. Governments accustomed to protecting their territories must also focus on pro- In sum, effective resilience should encom- tecting their connectedness. This requires pass a spectrum that embraces national, greater attention to shared resilience. None shared and forward strategies, and which it- of NATO's seven baseline requirements for self is an integral part of broader ''full spec- resilience, for instance, can be met without trum'' efforts at deterrence, defense and attention to shared resilience. emergency management. A Resilience 2.0 agenda that not only incorporates but also NATO and EU members also share a keen goes beyond current state-by-state efforts to interest in projecting resilience forward, encompass both shared and forward resili- since robust efforts by one country may ence is likely to be welcomed by the Trump mean little if its neighbors' systems are Administration as well as the British Gov- weak. NATO and EU member states have a ernment. It would also go far to enhance vested interest in sharing approaches and Euro-Atlantic security, and would offer new avenues of allied-partner and NATO-EU

44 cooperation. Such an agenda might give Develop and expand the cyber defense consideration to the following elements: agenda. At Wales, cyber defenses were cat- egorized as collective defense.It was noted Develop and expand the Intelligence- that certain cyberattacks could constitute an Sharing Agenda set at Warsaw. Slow deci- Article 5 attack. At Warsaw: 1) cyber was sion-making based on incomplete or differ- classified as a separate “domain” which ing intelligence assessments is beginning to could have significant long term conse- be addressed by the Alliance. Improved quences for NATO’s command structure; 2) Joint Information Surveillance and Recon- nations made a “cyber pledge” to better de- naissance (JISR) capabilities decided at fend their own networks (which has been Warsaw are focusing in the first instance on the most vulnerable element of NATO’s the most ready forces, such as the NRF. network); NATO is primarily responsible NATO is creating a new Assistant Secretary for defending its own network and this General for Intelligence and Security who pledge should expand cyber protection pro- will run a new Division in the International vided by individual nations), and 3) Staff. But problems related to situational NATO’s cyber range will be expanded to awareness and rapid decision making are give nations practice in defending against deep. Brexit will tilt British preferences to cyber threats. For the future, NATO will NATO channels over those of the EU when need to more clearly define how it is pre- it comes to intelligence-sharing. Improved pared to use the offensive cyber capabilities NATO-EU mechanisms in this regard of member stated to enhance cyber deter- might be the next best channel to ensure rence. A Cyber Coordination Center and continued strong UK participation in intel- eventually a NATO Operational Cyber ligence-sharing arrangements beyond Forces HQ will be needed. Both the UK and NATO. And the next step for NATO would the U.S. are likely to support such efforts. be to create an Intelligence Committee somewhat similar to the Military Commit- Establish special cyber support teams that tee, consisting of national intelligence offic- can be deployed to partner countries to in- ers from each mission.30 crease interoperability, improve infor- - Establish genuine multilateral intel- mation-sharing and coordinate responses to ligence training. The EU IntCen cyber crisis. Establish individually-tailored should scale up training modules not projects and expand existing projects in ac- just to new EU intelligence analysts, cordance with interests and capacities of but also to non-intelligence officers partners to enhance their cyber security and within the EU bureaucracy as well defense. Prospective cooperation areas in as NATO officials, to familiarize cyber defense include increasing interoper- them with each other's systems, and ability, sharing strategic and technical infor- to some extent, to analysts from se- mation and threat assessments, coordinating curity agencies in partner countries. responses to cyber crisis, and engaging part- Similarly, NATO should consider ners into NATO’s education, exercises and opening its training modules to rele- training activities. vant EU officials. - To support NATO allies’ resilience in the cyber security context, cyber experts should be included within

45 NATO Force Integration Units could be collocated with NATO Force Inte- (NFIU). This would help assess vul- gration Units, and help national responses nerabilities, increase preparedness with NATO military activities including es- and interoperability in regards with pecially special operations activities. crisis response. - Pool EU and NATO resources for - Assess the levels of the existing ma- Forward Resilience Advisory Sup- turity of cyber security and defense port Teams. They might be used to capacity in partner countries. Coor- address the highest priority needs in dinate and synchronize mutual train- countries where both the EU and ing and assistance projects with the NATO are each engaged in project- EU in order to avoid overlapping. ing resilience beyond their borders, The Partnership Review and Plan- for example in Ukraine and in the ning Process (PARP) should include western Balkans. cyber defense elements as part of - Host nations could be encouraged to broader resilience efforts, and plan- establish working group-type secre- ning should to be aligned with the tariats to coordinate defense activi- NATO Defense Planning Process ties with overlapping civil authority (NDPP). and private sector key critical infra- - Partners would benefit from the de- structure functions to enhance na- velopment of minimal requirements tional capacity to anticipate, pre- for the protection of their critical in- vent, respond and recover from dis- frastructure and in regards with ruptive scenarios and to provide a cyber defense. key point of contact for Forward Re- silience Advisory Support Teams. Create Forward Resilience Advisory Sup- port Teams. NATO has periodically used Include Finland and Sweden as full part- Advisory Support Teams for civilian emer- ners in these efforts. Both countries have gency planning purposes. The resilience significant traditions of total defense and commitments made at the Warsaw Summit societal security, and would bring signifi- will require a revitalization and expansion cant added value and experience to these ef- of these Advisory Support Teams in such forts. Finnish experience with territorial de- areas of emergency preparedness including fense, border guards, and whole-of-govern- assessments; intelligence sharing, support ment approaches to societal security, for ex- and analysis; border control; assistance to ample, or Swedish expertise with address- police and military in incident management ing asymmetrical dependencies on external including containing riots and other domes- resource flows, may mean that these coun- tic disturbances; helping effectuate cross- tries could be leaders in cooperative efforts border arrangements with other NATO as neighbors seek to enhance their efforts in members; providing protection for key crit- such areas. ical infrastructures including energy; and, in - Forward resilience should be inte- the cyber arena, support to and enhance- grated as a high-priority element of ment of NATO’s Cyber Response Team. each country's Enhanced Opportu- Efforts to build these teams should be accel- nities Partnership (EOP). erated. In certain countries, such Teams

46 - NATO should also intensify work in Daniel Hamilton is the Austrian Marshall the 28+2 format connected to Civil Plan Foundation Professor and Director Emergency Planning, which has not of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at advanced as far as the 28+2 in the the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced In- military and political arenas. ternational Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University.

30 Hans Binnendijk, NATO'S Future - A Tale of Three Summits. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2016, http://transatlanticrelations.org/publica- tion/natos-future-tale-three-summits-hans- binnendijk/.

No.7 2017

PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WWW.UI.SE

Cybersecurity: the effects of

Trump presidency and Brexit

Sarah Backman increase in volume, scope and financial

damage combined with the asymmetric risk The cybersecurity challenges facing Europe that characterizes cybercrime has reached today and in the future are many and com- such a level that in some EU countries cy- plex. The British exit from the EU (usually bercrime may have surpassed traditional referred to as “Brexit”), in combination crime in terms of reporting”. At the same with the presidency of Donald Trump has time, European critical infrastructure has forced European security cooperation into a proved vulnerable to cyberattacks that seek phase of uncertainties and turbulence, financial gain, with the WannaCry ransom- whose outcome is still unknown. At the ware attacks on hospitals and organizations same time, Europe faces unprecedented dig- during May 2017 – the most extensive at- ital threats. tack ever of its kind – setting a fearsome ex-

ample. Moreover, in late 2016, security re- The transboundary nature of cyber threats searchers uncovered “Operation Cloud in combination with increasing societal de- Hopper” – a cyber espionage campaign con- pendence on cyberspace makes it hard to ducted by a China-based threat actor, which fully grasp their potentially disruptive im- targeted managed IT service providers pact. Cyber incidents affect individuals, (MSPs), allowing the attackers unprece- businesses and nations alike, and the fre- dented potential access to sensitive data and quency of these incidents is increasing rap- intellectual property. 2016 also marked a idly. Cybercrime “as a service” has become shift in the cyberattack landscape towards more and more common. EC3 (European campaigns designed to influence political Cybercrime Centre) stated in its annual outcomes, such as disinformation cam- threat report from 2016 that “the additional paigns. Generally, the use of offensive

48 cyber power has become more and more most important EU measures regarding cy- likely a result of an increasing number of at- bersecurity, which has resulted in several tacks for subversive purposes. new EU cybersecurity collaboration initiatives such as the CSIRT network – consist- On the 8th of May 2017, the European Po- ing of Member State CSIRTs (Computer litical Strategy Centre (European Commis- Security Incident Response Teams) and sion) issued a Strategic Note called “Build- CERT-EU (Computer Emergency Re- ing an Effective European Cyber Shield – sponse Team of the EU institutions), the taking EU Cooperation to the Next Level.” Cooperation Group (consisting of repre- It clearly states that Europe is currently in- sentatives of Member States, European sufficiently prepared to successfully meet Agency of Network and Information Secu- the requirements of cybersecurity in the pre- rity (ENISA) and the European Commis- sent cyber threat and risk landscape. It em- sion) and a new public private partnership phasizes the importance and urgency of the on cybersecurity (with ECSO, European European Union and its Member States to Cyber Security Organization). make cyber capability a political priority, quickly scale up European cybersecurity Considering the grave situation regarding cooperation and individual Member State cyber threats and the dire need for improved cybersecurity capabilities, and anticipate a European cybersecurity collaboration, how plan “for hitherto unimaginable scenarios in will Brexit affect European cybersecurity which they would be put under severe and the EU cybersecurity initiatives? [cyber] attack”. A swift roll out of the recent NIS (Network and Information Security) - It is clear that the UK has strong incentives Directive, aiming to improve cyber capabil- to continue promoting increasing cyberse- ities and cooperation across the EU, will be curity capabilities, cooperation and infor- important, says the strategic note – but the mation sharing within Europe, not least due EU and Member States must already con- to the cross-border nature of cyber threats sider enhancing competence sharing be- and the likeliness of a domino-effect should yond that. Europe faces great challenges in a major cyber crisis hit the continent. Cy- improving the currently uneven cyber capa- bersecurity is indeed one of the areas spe- bilities across the continent, lacking infor- cifically mentioned by the UK as an im- mation sharing and cooperation between portant area of continuous cooperation various stakeholders, as well as a still lack- when leaving the EU.31 Thus, it is likely that ing general awareness of cyber threats and we will see the UK still supporting EU ini- their possible implications. tiatives and objectives regarding cybersecurity and cybersecurity collaboration. It is In this new and darker phase of digital de- difficult at this point to foresee exactly how velopment, horizontal collaboration (such post-Brexit UK-EU cooperation on cyber- as between states and between private and security will look like. Naturally, the UK public actors), as well as vertical collabora- will lose some of its current influence re- tion between, for example, the technical and garding EU cybersecurity laws and policies. strategic levels is key. Strengthening inter- New agreements between the EU and the national collaboration and information shar- UK will also have to be negotiated. The ing has long been considered one of the new EU privacy-regulation GDPR (General

49 Data Protection Regulation) which has to be likewise by new agreements on closer EU- implemented into Member State law by NATO cybersecurity cooperation. For ex- May 2018 will most likely continue be im- ample, the NATO-EU joint declaration pre- plemented in British law, which will ease sented at the NATO Warsaw summit 2016, cooperation and trade. EU and NATO states its intentions to strengthen their relationship by introducing However, information sharing and capabil- (for the first time in the EU-NATO rela- ity sharing between the UK and the EU will tions) an official set of interlinked and com- probably decrease as a result of UK’s di- plementary activities in cyber defence and minished role in EU cybersecurity collabo- cybersecurity. 33 Moreover, proposals for ration initiatives and institutions like the increased information sharing have been CSIRT-Network and the EC3 (European discussed at high level staff dialogues be- Cybercrime Centre). Moreover, interopera- tween EU and NATO. 34 bility might suffer as a result of less interaction between key cybersecurity personnel. However, the question remains: to what extent will increased cyber information shar- As a result of Brexit, the UK will likely pro- ing within Europe be achieved? Cybersecu- mote European cybersecurity more through rity information is often sensitive in nature, NATO, for example via CCDCOE (The which creates a natural reluctance to share NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre it. In order to enhance information sharing, of Excellence) and will work towards in- trust has to be further developed. The pre- creasing EU-NATO collaboration on cyber- conditions for such trust to develop among security matters. Signs of the British move European actors has certainly been severely towards promoting cooperation between the weakened by Brexit and the Eurosceptic two are already visible. In March 2017, Ste- winds connected to it, regardless of closer phen Lovegrove, the British Defence Min- EU-NATO cybersecurity cooperation and istry’s permanent secretary, called for the UK’s motivation to continue its cyber- greater NATO-EU cooperation on cyberse- security cooperation with the EU. And curity at the Atlantic Council. That same without continuous development of trust, month Michel Fallen, British Defence Sec- cybersecurity cooperation at the European retary urged the EU to “cooperate more level may stall, with the result that bilateral closely with NATO, to avoid unnecessary or regional structures will instead be the set- duplication and to work together on new tings of deep cybersecurity cooperation in threats, including cyber.” at a meeting of Europe. EU defence ministers in Brussels.32 NATO, especially in case of weakened support from When it comes to the effects of the Trump the US, might in return benefit greatly from presidency on European cybersecurity, the the UK (being one of the most cybersecurity aspect of trust is central as well. Trump’s mature countries in Europe and, arguably, protectionism and Jacksonian unilateral fo- the world) stepping up its commitment to cus, as well as his favoring of “hard power” NATO cybersecurity issues and pushing over “soft power”, lead us to expect that he NATO-EU cyber collaboration forward. will promote the narrative of cybersecurity The prospects for a closer collaboration had as a defence and individual national security indeed been strengthened by Brexit, but

50 issue. This is in contrast to the EU’s narra- oped in addition to international cybersecu- tive of cybersecurity as a shared challenge rity priorities. This strategy will give more which requires extensive and rather deep in- clarity in President Trump’s ambitions and ternational collaboration and information what we can expect in the next few years sharing. regarding US-Europe cybersecurity collaboration. President Trump has continuously discussed the importance of cybersecurity, However, it is clear that President Trump calling it one of the US’ most critical na- takes cybersecurity seriously and will try to tional security concerns. Showing his com- enhance the United States cybersecurity mitment to enhancing US cybersecurity, level generally. It is also clear that he aims Trump issued an executive order the 11th of to enhance the US offensive cyber capabili- May 2017 called “Strengthening the Cyber- ties and that he views cyber capability as a security of Federal Networks and Critical “hard power”, with less emphasis on inter- Infrastructure”, which presents cybersecu- national collaboration. President Trump has rity as a national security priority and tasks also shown little interest in increasing or the DHS to assess and report on a number deepening security cooperation within of key actions in order to, among other NATO or with the EU, a stance which will things, secure critical infrastructures. probably include cybersecurity. In line with our expectations on his focus on “hard power”, Trump has continuously em- This may lead to a more cyber-resilient and phasized the need for the US to gain in- cyber-secure United States, but it might also creased cyber counterattack capabilities, lead to a more hostile international cyber which would include greater retaliation environment with increased tensions and against (especially state-sponsored) at- risk for cyber conflict. It will definitely pre- tacks.35 sent a challenging international environment for Europe to develop trust, cyberse- It remains to be seen exactly how the Trump curity collaboration and common capabili- administration will engage in international ties in. cybersecurity collaboration and develop cybersecurity policy. As part of the executive Sarah Backman is a cyber security consult- order issued in May, an international cyber- ant at the PWC and research analyst at security engagement strategy will be devel- Stockholm University (SU)

31 https://www.ft.com/content/2deb3c7c- 34 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquar- 0ca7-11e7-b030-768954394623 ters/headquarters-homep- 32 http://www.atlantic- age_en/15917/NATO%20and%20EU%20 council.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/british- press%20ahead%20with%20coopera- official-calls-for-greater-nato-eu-cyberse- tion%20on%20cyber%20defence curity-cooperation 35 Little, Seifert, Gorman “Cybersecurity 33 http://www.consilium.eu- under the Trump Administration”, Bruns- ropa.eu/en/press/press-re- wick 2016 leases/2016/12/06-eu-nato-joint-declaration/

No.8 2017

PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WWW.UI.SE

Transatlantic turbulence –

implications for European

security

Björn Fägersten

European security cooperation – are con- This report has illuminated the driving stantly in motion, this should be seen as a forces and logic behind two separate but in- tentative analysis highlighting areas of rele- terlinked events: the Trump administra- vance for future strategic planning.36 tion’s foreign policy agenda and the UK’s decision to leave the European Union. To- Diverging geopolitical outlooks gether, these developments have rocked the two pillars of European security: the trans- The single most serious effect of the current atlantic link and European integration. In transatlantic turbulence on European secu- order to gauge the breadth of possible ef- rity is the divergence within the West con- fects, as well as possible ways to mitigate cerning overall geopolitical outlook. The these effects, four security domains were liberal world order – an international system then analysed in relation to Brexit as well as based on the liberal democratic state’s inter- the Trump administration: defence, cyber nal characteristics: market economy, rule of security, Intelligence cooperation and resil- law and individual freedom – is the guiding ience. In this final section, overarching principle holding the West together. The re- trends and possible spin-off effects will be luctance of the American President to un- discussed with a specific eye on security in derwrite this order and his obvious igno- northern Europe. Considering that all three rance of the benefits it has delivered to the variables in the analysis – the priorities of US dwarfs any other concerns Europeans the Trump administration, the meaning of Brexit and the development of

52 might have over his policy preferences. In- as a force in global politics but its role will deed, the major worries that European states be severely weakened as long as this diver- have raised concerning President Trump – gence prevails. his disdain for the European Union, his unwillingness to reassure NATO allies of US This divergence between Europe and the commitment to article 5 and his uncritical US is of course painful for the European stance on Vladimir Putin and other authori- Union, which embodies the characteristics tarian leaders – can all be seen as symptoms of the liberal world order and which has for his inability and/or reluctance to believe been instrumental in preserving this form of in this order. Multilateral commitments and international relations in Europe, especially a rule-based order, in his view, limits the at a time when internal development in gains that the US could extract out of inter- countries such as Poland and Hungary ques- action with other players in the system. His tions these values and principles from national security advisor H.R. McMaster within. But it is potentially even worse for and his national economic advisor Gary the UK whose exit from the European Un- Cohn put this appreciation of a Hobbesian ion was premised on the liberal order: only order in plain text a few days after Trumps under that system could a medium sized May 2017 visit to Europe: player like the UK hope to negotiate trade arrangements and “go global” with the The president embarked on his first foreign backing of a functioning system of trade trip with a clear-eyed outlook that the world and arbitration. In Trump’s preferred sys- is not a “global community” but an arena tem of transnationalism, protectionism and where nations, nongovernmental actors and short-sighted competition, the UK has less businesses engage and compete for ad- to gain from cutting itself lose from the vantage. We bring to this forum unmatched Continent. Having decided to do so, the UK military, political, economic, cultural and might have to adjust its policy stances just moral strength. Rather than deny this ele- to accommodate the US so as to not isolate mental nature of international affairs, we itself further. Changing positions on Is- embrace it.37 rael/Palestine, being quick to visit Washing- ton, refusing to discuss the US election with The problem here is that since World War its EU partners and avoiding to speak out II, the West has invested in and benefitted against Trump on other issues can be seen from an alternative order where Hobbesian as indicative of such geopolitical hedging. competition built on strength alone has been complemented by regions of peaceful inter- In sum, the most serious risk of current action and absolute gains, by alliances and transatlantic turbulence is that the EU, the relationships built on shared values and by UK and the US are drawn apart in their ge- specific domains – such as the climate – opolitical outlooks. From the perspective of which increasingly are managed by a European security, such strategic diver- “global community”. Writing of even the gence would make it harder to unite on is- aspiration to a liberal and cooperative sys- sues such as Russia, the conflicts in the tem based on Hobbesian principles amounts MENA region as well as Europe’s role in its to an abdication from global leadership. regions security. If European states are keen This does not imply that ‘the West’ is over to mitigate this risk, or at least alleviate its

53 consequences a few strategies are conserv- At the same time, the EU has made consid- able which will be discussed below. erable headway the last year concerning different areas of security cooperation such as Division of tasks among security institu- research and development, capacity devel- tions opment and governance. Brexit has been a factor here – both in the sense that the re- Another effect that might be viewed more maining 27 needed to show progress within as an opportunity than a risk is an increas- a challenged Union but also since the UK ingly clear division of tasks between the in- had put a break on development for many stitutional platforms used to provide for Eu- years – as has President Trump. Notably ropean security. While Trump has failed to however, none of the advances have in prac- signal a strong commitment to NATO allies tice impinged on NATOs role as Europe’s on the political level, his administration has territorial defender. On the contrary, continued – and even increased – reassur- measures such as the new military planning ance measures in Europe in face of Russian and conduct capability (MPCC) increases aggression. The fact that the US has troops the efficiency of the EU’s out-of-area mis- on the ground in the Baltic nations and con- sions and PESCO as well as the new de- tinuously trains and prepares for joint action fence fund will help Europeans to shoulder adds credibility to the US’ commitment to their pre-existing commitments within being presence and its resolve, despite Pres- NATO as well as the EU. Even the rhetoric ident Trump’s own signals. The lukewarm surrounding this development has been support from President Trump also implies largely void of the traditional calls for a Eu- that European allies that worry about Rus- ropean army and rather the complementary sian behaviour will have to double down on nature of EU security measures has been their commitments to territorial defence (as stressed. This does not imply that the EU well as lend symbolic support to Trumps does not have a relevant role for the secu- preferred focus area of fighting terrorism). rity of Europe, on the contrary, it shows that The forward presence of the US in the Eu- its methods lie in the areas of crisis manage- ropean theatre is also relevant for its projec- ment, counter-terrorism, comprehensive en- tion of power elsewhere in the region, gagement in the neighbourhood, and resili- which is in line with the Trump administra- ence building at home and abroad – not de- tion’s ambition to bring military strength to terrence and traditional defence. This divi- the competition with other nations as de- sion of tasks has been cemented by Brexit scribed in the quote above. But while terri- since the possible deterrence capacity of the torial defence backed by the US thus seems EU without the UK will be reduced and UK to prevail as NATO’s prime function, other reinvestment in NATO to showcase Euro- areas might have to be carried out with less pean engagement will strengthen the core US support. Considering the transactional task of territorial defence in that alliance. perspective of President Trump, Libya-style operations in Europe’s neighbourhood Future of European autonomy where vital US interests are not evident will be a hard sell for European allies. The political meaning of autonomy is that Europeans should be vested with some among of security policy “actorness” that is

54 not dependent on American support. This a stronger military Germany has tradition- requires material capacities (tangible mili- ally worried several European partners but tary forces and strategic enablers such as now seems to be a joint European interest. airlift and intelligence), decision-making, The UK, for long a sceptical observer in the planning- and command structures (national field is now stepping down from its veto- or centralized) and the political will for col- position and might very well appreciate a lective European action. The idea of Euro- more capable EU when it does not fear be- pean autonomy has long lingered in the ing forced into any future European army. background as initiatives to strengthen the And finally the US, with a President that by EU as a security actor have been discussed. example reminds the Europeans why it It was a factor in the reinvention of the might be a good idea to be able to act inde- Western European Union and the Peters- pendently of the US. berg tasks in the 1990s and the later transfer of these tasks to the new Common Security Will these changes on the continent, in the and Defence Policy of the EU. The 1998 St, UK, and in the US lead to a more autono- Malo declaration of France and the UK mous EU? A likely scenario is that the level struck a balance between ambitions of au- of autonomy within the EU will grow with tonomy and ambitions to preserve the trans- the current momentum but that its different atlantic security link for years to come. 38 components (material resources, planning Although the US sequentially dropped its and decision structures and political will) hesitation to the idea of European autonomy will not develop in sync which decreases (as it can be seen as a way of European the output within the policy field. Brexit shouldering more of the responsibility – and and President Trump’s foreign policy costs – of their own security) progress has agenda will also lead to fragmentation of of been slow. Recent efforts to boost auton- European security. Without the UK, the EU omy have focused on specific elements (the will not be the platform on which Europe- European Commission has for example ans can enjoy strategic autonomy, at least in highlighted the role of a strong and compet- terms of demanding military tasks. How- itive European armaments industry) 39 or ever, with Trump in the White House, coun- has qualified the application of autonomy tries such as France and Germany will be (the 2013 European Global Strategy Report hesitant to invest in such a manner for the for example suggested the concept of re- European pillar of NATO to be the platform gional strategic autonomy). The importance for the exercise of European autonomy. of autonomy was highlighted by Federica Barring these alternatives, real European Mogherini’s European Union Global Strat- strategic autonomy will in the medium term egy of 2016. Recent events now seem to add only materialize in coalitions in which big to the momentum towards autonomy. players in European security have aligned France, traditionally a supporter of Euro- interests. The extents to which these coun- pean autonomy (but also a fierce guardian tries will agree are then tied to the develop- of its own sovereignty) now has a government of overall geopolitical outlooks, as ment with a strong focus on the EU and an discussed above. This scenario, of course, apparent ambition to strengthen the French- carries consequences for smaller countries German axis of policy making. The role of

55 because they will have less of a role in shap- between two non-aligned states. This coop- ing security policy under such conse- eration has been closely followed and en- quences. couraged by the UK, and has resulted in the imminent membership of two Nordic coun- Risk and opportunity of European mini- tries in the British-led Joint Expeditionary lateralism Force.

A likely effect of Brexit is the increased fo- These cooperation formats offer added cus on sub-regional, bilateral and minilat- value in the security realm –especially for eral groupings, as suggested by Christian countries that build their security on the Mölling and Claudia Major.40 These group- premise of offering and receiving help in ings offer clear benefits as they can push co- case of security challenges. In case of the operation further among like-minded ac- UK (especially considering its exit from the tors, and could affect larger multilateral EU) caution is warranted. In a positive sce- groupings such as the EU and NATO. In nario, where Brexit has not resulted in geo- some cases, these groupings are less geopo- political drift between the UK and the con- litically charged than larger formal alli- tinent, cooperation in sub-regional, bilat- ances. For the UK, engagement in or with eral and minilateral groupings will be an ef- smaller groupings offer additional benefits: fective way to “keep the UK close” in mat- cooperation with specific partners can be ters of European security. This will be a way sustained after Brexit; the possibility to in- of compensating for the fact that the UK fluence EU via these formats; and a way to will no longer be part of the EUs solidarity link the continent with the US (the latter two clauses – which is a potential security loss, benefits constituting an important geopolit- especially for the EU’s non-NATO member ical task within its special relationship with states. In a negative scenario, the UK might the US). take on a role of spoiler rather than con- structive partner in relation to European in- Northern Europe houses several of these tegration. Bi- and minilateral formats then smaller cooperation formats with varying become potential mechanisms with which degrees of activity within them. The Nor- continental Europe might become divided dic-Baltic cooperation spans several portfo- (but not ruled). The Anglo-French Lancas- lios ranging from EU coordination to secu- ter House cooperation offer one way to bal- rity policy and transatlantic affairs. 41 The ance the German-French axis of European Northern Group, started by the then-Secre- affairs (and the French would probably see tary of Defence of the UK, Liam Fox, aims benefits as it allows them to gate-keep Brit- to facilitate greater partnership between the ish influence over Europe). Engagement UK and the Nordic and Baltic states, in ad- with internal policy outliers such as Hun- dition to Germany and Poland. Activity has gary and Poland would offer other balanc- been sparse but the format has the potential ing opportunities against the European core to bring together NATO and EU members. and its institutions. 42 UK-Nordic engage- Bilaterally, Sweden and Finland has gone ment could also divert resources away from far in its security relationship, which now EU27-cooperation. resembles something close to an alliance

56 However, in reality, the choice is not binary of cooperation. In the second basket one and cooperation will produce effects in both could place an overarching deal for UK in- directions. As a rule of thumb, members of volvement in the CFSP and CSDP, includ- the EU that see a value in EU cohesion ing permanent deliberation and policy- should make sure that cooperation with the shaping roles within the Political and Secu- UK in bi- and minilateral formats comple- rity Committee (PSC) and expertise within ment rather than compete with aspects of the External Action Service. This could lead EU integration. to a general policy alignment that in turn would increase the utility and functioning of A new Anglo-European security and sol- more practical areas of cooperation. Lastly, idarity pact? in the final basket, one could place practical sectoral cooperation on the issues named Several of the essays in this report hint at above – for example, by regulating UK ac- possible areas of fruitful security coopera- cess to Europol databases, financial contri- tion between the EU27 and post-brexit UK. butions and cyber threat sharing protocols. Resilience-building, counter-terrorism, in- Taken together, an Anglo-European secu- telligence sharing, cyber security and crisis rity and solidarity pact like this would offer management are examples that have been the best guarantee that both partners could discussed. While this is all good, a range of enjoy mutually beneficial security coopera- more or less informal arrangements without tion. A bespoke deal like this would any framework or superstructure that offer acknowledge the UK’s importance, in- direction or ensure that different measures crease security for all European countries, are in sync risks delivering suboptimal re- and allow the UK to avoid deeper entangle- sults. Just as the various EU-UK trade and ment within this field while not creating un- investment agreements will most likely be necessary risk for contagion. Indeed, it grouped in a future comprehensive free seems farfetched that members without the trade agreement after Brexitit would be UK’s specific ideational background would helpful to group and develop future security prefer an agreement that essentially mirrors cooperation within a dedicated framework EU membership without voting rights. too. Such a framework could include three vital functions or baskets; a political mani- European integration and national secu- festation of solidarity and cooperative ben- rity positions efits; structures for decision making and policy planning; and finally, formats for op- Finally, current transatlantic turbulence erational cooperation and coordination. In puts several national security policy posi- the first basket, the UK and the EU could, at tions under stress. The overarching effects the very least, issue a guiding declaration of of Brexit and the Trump administration on solidarity and shared interests. A more am- the US, the UK and the EU27 have been dis- bitious alternative would be to find ways for cussed in previous essays as well as above. the UK and the EU to sign a solidarity However, individual European countries clause mirroring the substance (but not the will see their positions challenged as a con- processes) of the two existing solidarity sequence. Countries that depend heavily on clauses of the EU. This would bring mean- their bilateral ties to either the US or the UK ing and direction to more practical aspects will have to hedge if the one of the more

57 dramatic scenarios of geopolitical drift set this area up for rapid policy develop- and/or spoiler tendencies materializes. EU- ment. Adding to this, there is strong support NATO relations will likely be affected as for the development of the EU’s role in the indicated above. This might motivate a re- security realm. 43 This confluence of push calibration and adjustment of engagement factors, in addition to a high level of politi- and investments by member states in gen- cal symbolism, and considerable public eral but in particular by states that are only support increases the political cost for mem- members of one of the two organisations. ber states that seek to obstruct cooperation. Finally, the topic of this report – transatlan- EU member states hesitant towards deeper tic turbulence – is only one of several fac- cooperation and supranational elements tors now driving EU security integration. within the security and defence field will Indeed, it is the confluence of current trends thus have to calculate the cost of obstruction – economies of scale arguments prompted in a post-UK EU as well as balance the by austerity, the increasing levels of threats value of securing their preferred level of in- in the neighbourhood, internal strategy de- tegration in relation to the value of EU unity velopment in the form the European Union within security and defence. Global Strategy, the need to showcase union in the face of Brexit, new opportunities Björn Fägersten is Senior Research Fellow to develop cooperation now that a some- and Director of the Europe Program at the times obstructive UK is leaving the union as Swedish Institute of International Affairs well as a need for Europeans to take a more (UI) active role in catering for the regions security under the Trump administration – that

36 This essay has been enriched by inter- 41 For an overview, see http://www.atlan- views and discussions at the Defense Com- ticcouncil.org/images/files/publica- mittee of the UK Parliament, the Foreign tion_pdfs/403/090711_ACUS_NordicBal- Affairs Committee of the UK Parliament, tic.PDF the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 42 A strategy discussed in and the Centre for European Reform https://www.ft.com/content/7742a102- (CER) in May 2017. 4132-11e7-82b6-896b95f30f58 37 https://www.wsj.com/articles/america- 43 See Special Eurobarometer 461 - De- first-doesnt-mean-america-alone- signing Europe’s future Security and De- 1496187426 fence 38 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-Brit- ish%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint- Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf 39 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52013DC0542 40 See “Brexit, Security and Defence: A political problem, not a military one” in this collection.

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