The Enemy Is the Network

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The Enemy Is the Network The Enemy is the Network Name: Marcel Sütterlin Supervisor: Benjamin Hof Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 1 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik Overview . The NSA in 2013-2014 . Mass Surveillance and Passive Attacks . An Overview of known Mass Surveillance Programs . How the NSA Programs work together . Conclusion Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 2 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik NSA Leakage in 2013-2014 . Edward Snowden purloined a massive file portfolio of disclosed files from the NSA . Published by Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald . Well-known terms: . PRISM . NSA Files Figure 1. Edward Snowden Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 3 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik An Overview of known NSA Mass Surveillance Programs Overview . Interaction between all programs . Name of whole process: TURBULENCE . TURMOIL: passive apparatus . TURBINE: active apparatus Figure 2. How the NSA programs interact with each other Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 6 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik An Overview of known NSA Mass Surveillance Programs PRISM . Passive data collection from selected providers . Goal: E-Mail, Chat, Media Files, VoIP, Video Conferences . Legal access . Data access upon request Request must be for an individual Figure 3. Dates when PRISM collection began for each Provider person! Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 7 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik An Overview of known NSA Mass Surveillance Programs TUMULT & TURMOIL TUMULT: Hardware device to mirror fiber-optic traffic Forwards traffic to TURMOIL . TURMOIL: Passive collection apparatus . Distributed network of TURMOIL programs . Located at ISP backbones, international gateways, .. Operates on packet level, allows for efficient scanning . Includes fiber-cables of ISPs (RAMPART-A), undersea cables (RAMPART-M), land-based cables (RAMPART-T) Tips TURBINE if suspicious data found Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 8 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik An Overview of known NSA Mass Surveillance Programs WINDSTOP & TURBINE . GCHQ WINDSTOP: accesses Yahoo’s and Google’s datacenters Contains MUSCULAR & INCENSER . TURBINE: Active decision-taking apparatus . Triggered by TURMOIL . Contains QUANTUM and QUANTUMTHEORY techniques . A set of exploits to attack a target . Officer can influence further proceeding Responsible for analysis and decision-taking Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 9 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik An Overview of known NSA Mass Surveillance Programs X-KEYSCORE & TRAFFICTHIEF & TAO . X-KEYSCORE: A dynamic database to temporarily store relevant internet traffic . Data is collected by TURMOIL . Capable of saving five days full take internet traffic . Meta-data is stored 30 days . TRAFFICTHIEF: The metadata database in X-KEYSCORE . TURBINE and TAO unit uses it for decision-taking . TAO: Targeted Access Operations Unit Network Specialists, responsible for accessing difficult targets TAO Server contains QUANTUM(THEORY) implants Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 10 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik How the NSA Programs Work Together The TURBULENCE Apparatus: Passive Data Collection . TUMULT mirrors fiber-optic traffic . WINDSTOP contributes data from GCHQ . Access to Google & Yahoo datacenters . RAMPART programs contribute data with the help of sub- programs Figure 4. How TURBULENCE works Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 11 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik How the NSA Programs Work Together The TURBULENCE Apparatus: Passive Data Collection . HAMMERSTEIN: Exploits & accesses VPN traffic . HAMMERCHANT: Exploits & accesses VoIP traffic . TURMOIL analyses data . Saves it to X-KEYSCORE . Metadata to TRAFFICTHIEF . If suspicious data found, triggers TURBINE Figure 4. How TURBULENCE works Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 12 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik How the NSA Programs Work Together The TURBULENCE Apparatus: Automated Active Attack . TURBINE gets data from X- KEYSCORE and TRAFFICTHIEF . If desired, officer can influence decision . Implant is selected from TAO servers (QUANTUM & QUANTUMTHEORY implants) Automated injection process Figure 4. How TURBULENCE works Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 13 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik How the NSA Programs Work Together The TURBULENCE Apparatus: Automated Active Attack . Data from databases X- KEYSCORE & TRAFFICTHIEF sent via TURBINE to officer . Data from target sent via TURBINE to officer Officer is presented a portfolio of target Figure 4. How TURBULENCE works Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 14 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik Conclusion .NSA has a distributed portfolio of programs All shown modules are working together .All traffic, including VoIP and VPN gets analyzed NSA has access to many major ISP’s Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 15 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik Thank you for your attention! Questions? Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 16 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik References Figure 1: http://time.com/3010649/nsa-sexually-explicit-photographs-snowden/, last accessed: 12.01.2014. Lehrstuhl für Netzwerkarchitektur und 19.01.2015 17 Netzdienste - TUM Informatik.
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