sign in sign up
<<
Home , European integration, European Union, Schengen Area

POLICYBRIEF ISSUE 3 | 2018 ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: BY DIFFERENTIATION

Maria Demertzis A BARE-BONES PLUS CLUBS Deputy Director, Bruegel Common court system Jean Pisani-Ferry Mercator Senior Fellow at Club 1 Club 2 Club 3 Club 4 Bruegel Economic Migration, Security Other and Monetary Asylum and and foreign policies André Sapir Union Schengen policy Senior Fellow, Bruegel Common base (, Council, Commission, Parliament) Non-resident Fellow, Source: Bruegel Bruegel THE ISSUE Guntram Wolff Reforming the of the has become urgent for three reasons: Director, Bruegel to better deal with politically-sensitive topics, to manage greater external challenges and because future EU enlargement will increase the diversity of the bloc’s member- . The answer to disagreement typically has been qualified majority voting, but on sensitive topics, the EU has increasingly moved to unanimity and heavy involvement, which has often not delivered results. The alternative answer has been a Europe of multiple speeds of integration with one shared goal for all, increasing political tensions. A different approach is now needed to move Europe forward.

POLICY CHALLENGE Two options would be a Europe of concentric circles and a Europe of ‘clubs’, but the former would cement tensions between the inner and the outer circles, while the latter would to unclear structures and an end to cohesion. However, a governance model could combine the two approaches. The model would be based on a strong ‘bare-bones EU’ formed by the , and accompanying policies, the European institutions, , and a commitment to fundamental EU values. Three policy areas would be completely moved into ‘clubs’ while remaining based on the bare-bones legal and institutional structure: economic and monetary union; Schengen and asylum policy; and foreign and security policy and neighbourhood policy. Club membership would be optional but in, countries would have to accept the rules and there would be high hurdles to leaving. Finally, a ring of friends would surround the bare-bones EU, based on very close economic relationships and some multilateral discussion elements, but no formal votes. 2 POLICY BRIEF ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY DIFFERENTIATION

1 INTRODUCTION a dangerous global environment, The strong global anchor of which the Europe’s ability to remain in charge European Union has been part since its of its destiny might be compromised inception – rules-based by a failure to manage these issues – is unravelling. A multipolar regime is effectively. This has made it emerging faster than anybody antici- urgent to reform the EU to meet the pated. Will it be an international order? challenges of tomorrow. Ad-hoc Will it have rules, and if so who will solutions to the challenge of write them? Because of its size, Europe heterogeneity do not appear to be is bound to be one of its , but will enough, especially in a context of Europe be strong enough to shape its enlargement and deeper internal own future or will its future be deter- divisions. mined by others? In other words, will the EU be a sovereign player commen- 2 THE LEGACY surate with its size? These are questions Since the outset, the EU was conceived Europe must urgently answer. and designed as a single undertaking As if these global questions were in which all member countries would not hard enough, they arise at a eventually participate in full in all time when the EU is having doubts policies, though in some cases after about its own future. This is not just a transition period. Accordingly, the because of . Strong political acquis was regarded as indivisible forces in other member states, and participation in it was considered including the six original members, irreversible. For decades, indivisibility are questioning the direction, even and irreversibility provided extremely the principle of European integration. powerful lock-in mechanisms. Some basic tenets of EU treaties no Now, and as the EU has increased longer command consensus. Internal its membership, this unitary model is unravelling has become a real threat. being questioned by increasingly deep At one level this coexistence of divisions over the aims of European external and internal questioning integration. is paradoxical, because a strong, The unitary model is also brought united European stance is even more into question by the stalemate in required in a world in which global the accession process. Some current rules and institutions threaten to fall members have no appetite for enlarging apart. But at another level, it is logical: the EU to countries where the economic starts at home, and the and institutional level is such that their same isolationist forces that undermine participation in the EU could hamper the global multilateral order undermine deep integration and the strengthening the European multilateral order. This of the common regulatory framework, is the tension the EU must solve. If it could be the source of significant labour fails, it could lose its raison d’être. If it migration and could further dilute the succeeds, it could find a new purpose. incumbents’ institutional power within The issue of EU heterogeneity is the EU. The result is that, without an not new. In their contribution to the alternative multilateral framework for ‘Monitoring European Integration’ integration, these weak countries are left series, Dewatripont et al (1995) in a limbo. This is detrimental to their discussed exactly this problem. development and their stability. Some Similarly, the ’s might even turn their backs on the EU 2017 white paper on the future and look for alternative alliances. The 1. See: https://ec.europa.eu/ of Europe1 offered different scenarios, traditional answer to such challenges has commission/white-pa- motivated by the inability to establish been two-fold: multi-speed integration per-future-europe-reflec- consensus. But we emphasise the and majority rule. tions-and-scenarios-eu27_ en. urgency of the issue and how, in 3 POLICY BRIEF ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY DIFFERENTIATION

2.1 MULTI-SPEED INTEGRATION 27 members and half a dozen would-be First, it has been to stay the course but members converge on the same goal is buy time: to continue to call for an ever at odds with the large and increasing closer and ever wider union, in which all divergence of political pathways. The members eventually transfer sovereignty set of overlapping policy preferences to a federal level, while envisaging long has shrunk, followed inevitably by transition periods with the possibility for stasis and ineffectiveness. member states and applicants to proceed at different speeds, depending on their 2.2 MAJORITY RULE preferences and readiness. This brings us to the second answer to The strategy followed for currency the challenge of diversity. Historically, unification epitomises this multi-speed a way to deal with the stasis resulting approach – while also illustrating that from narrow overlapping policy pref- it has reached its limits. Twenty years erences in the areas where the EU has after it was launched in 1999, two of the been bestowed with policy competence then-15 EU members are still not part has been voting by majority in the of the (excluding the UK). Clearly, Council. This has been, for example, this reflects some loosening of the the basis for the common trade policy indivisibility principle on the part of (a field in which diversity was strong) the EU. Although all member countries and for the spectacular success of the were nominally committed to joining internal market. Those outvoted would the euro, some ( and the UK) accept the majority decision; but the benefitted from a formal derogation. winners also knew that they could be And as membership was based on outvoted in a coming decision. objective criteria some () were For decades, this approach has able to abstain from participating in worked well for the mainly economic the common currency by not fulfilling issues of market integration. There was one requirement. Some members have a strong enough consensus on what the also obtained opt-outs from justice fundamental goal was for all to abide cooperation and other areas. by the decisions taken. But we are now Such management by exception is forced to deal with policy areas and not sufficient anymore, because the priorities far removed from the mere European Union has become much economic sphere. Many of the present more diverse than it was in 1999. policy challenges are in areas that Enlargement has contributed to this touch on questions of constitutional evolution. Moreover, as security has rules and prerogatives, national become more relevant, rifts have sovereignty or national identity. This emerged because member states makes it nearly impossible to find do not necessarily have the same solutions among 27 member countries perceptions of threats, do not devote all resenting being outvoted or left the same resources to defence and out. Moreover, regular democratic security, and do not view the use of procedures tend to be substituted by military force the same way. Finally, intergovernmental negotiations. migration from third countries and the different political approaches to 2.3 INCREASING INEFFECTIVENESS address the asylum and refugee issue The limits to the traditional ways of have further exposed the depth of overcoming obstacles are apparent in differences. four major fields in which the EU has Such diversity has contributed to been confronted by the challenge of a growing mistrust between member heterogeneity: asylum, the euro, for- states and in the European institutions. eign and security policy, and external This in turn has made the goal of an economic relations: ever-closer, look more distant than ever. The vision of the • In terms of migration policy, a unitary structure of the EU in which all majority decision was taken on the 4 POLICY BRIEF ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY DIFFERENTIATION

distribution of refugees between foreign policy issue and institutional the 28 EU countries, but despite the responsibility for it lies with the Euro- EU Court of Justice judging it to be pean Commission. This state of affairs in line with EU law, is the decision is suboptimal because unilateral has not been fully implemented2. member state decisions can impact all Aiming to overcome the stalemate, and Europe’s hand externally is weak. the European Council has taken the This is why Chancellor Merkel has lead on the migration issue with a voiced the idea of creating a European 2. Despite the fact that the very substantial amount of time of Security Council6 that would drive the Treaty commits all member its discussion time devoted to the big strategic foreign policy choices7 states to a common asylum policy, Hungarian Prime topic in recent years. But the result- • Finally, while in external economic Minister Viktor Orbán has ing compromises remain ineffective relations (financial stability, ex- claimed there cannot be and institutionally fuzzy.3 change-rate policy, trade policy, compromise in the migrant • The euro presents a challenge of a international regulatory coordina- debate because “There is different nature. The problem with tion and the extraterritorial aspects no document that we are aware of which states that it arises at its core from the fact that of competition policy) the EU does if you enter the European is centralised while have a functioning decision-mak- Union you must become an fiscal policy is decided at national ing system and is able to make immigrant country”, a view level. And while national decisions its weight felt, its policy scope is which is clearly shared by are loosely coordinated, the con- incomplete. It does not cover in- other leaders in Europe. straints imposed by monetary union struments to deal with investments See Orbán (2018). are resented. This overlap between in security-relevant infrastructures 3. It remains unclear who is in EU and national competence opens or sectors, and it does not have a charge of negotiating with third countries on behalf the way to conflicts over the direc- functional framework for cyberse- of the EU. Meanwhile tion of policy. curity issues. Nor does the EU have the relationship between The governance of this incom- effective mechanisms to deal with national and European plete monetary union has evolved industrial policy strategies and institutions that deal with considerably since the crisis, with fiscal policy instruments to react to migrants is in constant flux. various institutions gaining and los- external trade and technology chal- Importantly, the very prin- ciple of a common asylum ing importance. It is fair to describe lenges. Moreover, the EU’s strength policy is rejected by some. the new system as increasingly in economic relations is clearly strengthening intergovernmental hampered by its weakness in foreign 4. Institutionally, the EEAS and the High Represent- institutions, such as the Europe- and security policy. ative are attached to both an Stability Mechanism. Still, this the European Commission trend is not uniform across policy In our view, the EU has reached the and the Council. areas. As a consequence, the overall limits of what it can sensibly achieve 5. For example, the war in governance picture has become within the framework of the current Libya – despite its massive extremely complex and the euro treaty order. The assumption that effects on all members of area’s institutional and democratic an ever-closer-union of 27, or more, the EU – was mostly driven foundations remain weak. There are member states will all reach the same by the actions of two EU member states. also a number of friction points be- final goal has, in itself, become a cause tween euro area and non-euro area of ineffectiveness. A new structure 6. See for example: https:// EU countries. is necessary for Europe to prevent www..com/ section/defence-and-se- • EU member states have committed internal stalemate and articulate its curity/news/germa- themselves to a common foreign political will effectively at global level. ny-ready-to-take-more-re- and security policy, coordinated and On one hand, heterogeneity sponsibility-in-euro- chaired by the High Representative, needs to be dealt with by accepting pean-defence-poli- supported by the European External and reflecting it in the institutional cy-says-merkel/. Action Service4. But despite this, key structure, not by trying to outvote or 7. Perthes (2018) even goes foreign and security policies continue outsmart member states. On the other as far as to say that the EU to be driven by member states acting hand, this requires member states mechanisms are largely pointless and the big three either separately or through coalitions to make tough choices and accept 5 countries should cooperate of the willing . Meanwhile, neigh- certain responsibilities. Participating instead. bourhood policy is not considered a in endeavours such as Schengen or 5 POLICY BRIEF ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY DIFFERENTIATION

the euro comes with the assumption tegration, an essential requirement of responsibility and shared is that spillovers are taken care of. sovereignty, including the possibility In other words there must be no of being outvoted. The core of the EU cherry-picking. The delineation of institutional debate should reflect indivisible complementarities is a exactly this tension between adapting prerequisite for more flexible Euro- institutions to deal with heterogeneity pean integration. and ensuring that member states live • Can some countries move back- up to their obligations and accept the wards? The Brexit referendum has inevitable transfer of sovereignty. shown that membership of the EU is not irreversible. Negotiations so 3 TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE far have been conducted under the INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE assumption that there is no middle The necessity of a more flexible struc- way between being in or out. But if ture is increasingly recognised, includ- a country can choose to leave, and ing by heads of state and assuming integration patterns be- such as President Macron of , come more flexible, why can it not who has called for a “Europe of several be allowed to withdraw from certain circles” (Macron, 2018). What insti- integration areas, for example, from tutional structures are necessary for security cooperation while remain- Europe to deal with global challenges ing part of the single market? The in an efficient and politically legitimate lock-in principle that has applied way? Any strategy for the future should to European integration so far is start from clear answers to three basic ill-suited to address the problems questions: that the demand for more - al autonomy raises. However, we • Is the acquis divisible? Although the acknowledge that a system without response so far has been that it is any lock-in, in which, say, changes not, in a culturally and politically in government trigger changes in varied Europe there is in fact no membership, would be clearly un- fundamental reason why the EU manageable and incompatible with should uphold the indivisibility European ambitions. principle. Naturally, there are sig- nificant complementarities across If one accepts that a unitary policies that must be preserved – structure is increasingly impossible to for example, between integration achieve in a diverse European Union within the single market, competi- that seems set to remain diverse, and tion, and core is possibly also not desirable, one social principles. But not all policy needs to design appropriate levels spheres are as tightly linked to each of flexibility. In order to design the other. It is for example perfectly necessary legal and institutional imaginable to have a common trade framework for flexible integration, policy but separate asylum policies. there is a choice to be made between • What are the key complementarities a concentric circles model and a clubs between the EU’s competences? In model. other words, which of the 35 chap- ters of the acquis can be separated 3.1 CONCENTRIC CIRCLES and which cannot? As the EU was In a model of concentric circles mem- conceived as a single undertaking, bers can choose – from a commonly this has not been written down: agreed set of possibilities – the level of the complementarities between its integration that corresponds to their competences have so far not been wishes at a certain point in time. This formalised. But if room is to be not preclude them from changing made for a more flexible mode of in- their minds, but there is no presump- 6 POLICY BRIEF ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY DIFFERENTIATION

tion that all should gradually move to- absence of a hierarchy of relationship wards closer integration. Whereas each intensity between the different clubs – level provides a possible stepping stone there is no inner circle of countries that to supplementary integration, it is somehow ‘owns’ the overall project and designed in such a way that it provides determines its overall direction. a basis for a self-contained, stable and Institutionally a club model is coherent arrangement. By the same harder to design and put in place token there could not be a menu of than a concentric circles model, first options to match different preferences because it risks inconsistency and within a given level of integration. In cherry-picking, and even more so this model, the inner circle would have because it might not be compatible the highest level of integration across with institutional . For example, it all policy areas, while the outer circle is difficult to say who should nominate would have the loosest. And there can the , elect the members be one or several circles between the of parliament and appoint the inner and outer circles. judges – or even what the role of the The great advantage of this Commission, the model is its legal and institutional and CJEU would be – in an EU in which simplicity. Importantly, it can preserve certain members would participate institutional unity in full, provided in a euro club, while others would the institution in charge participate in an asylum club. The risk the rights of the member states not of an arrangement of this sort is that participating in further levels of it could inevitably lead to a purely integration. This is for example what intergovernmental structure, with no the European Commission attempts role for European institutions. It might to do in relation to non-euro area also be politically harder to achieve member states – though not always to because the overall ownership of the their satisfaction. project might be missing. The downside of the concentric circles For a club model to be workable model is obviously that it offers only there should therefore at least be limited, and potentially insufficient, a common overall basis on which flexibility. In a context in which member to build. This basis should entail a states differ in their policy preferences, common treaty framework that would it might prove too rigid, especially when lay out the essential principles, cover a integration encompasses separate policy common set of fundamental policies in areas such as economic, security and which all countries would participate, migration policy8. and provide the common institutional Moreover, countries in the outer apparatus consisting of an , a circles might feel dominated by the inner parliament and a court of justice. There circle without having their say. should be no club membership without participation in this common basis. 3.2 A EUROPE OF CLUBS The Europe of Clubs has advantages A club model would be designed to in that it provides a higher degree offer exactly this greater degree of of flexibility to accommodate flexibility: it would consist of a limit- member states’ political preferences. ed number of stable, self-contained However, it would lead to patchwork and coherent arrangements in which of overlapping structures of a rather 8. There is no reason, for member states can participate. But voluntarist nature, and risk being at the example, to consider participating countries would be free whim of changing political climates. that all member states to choose to take part in certain clubs More importantly, it would lack a participating in a common asylum policy would also and disregard some others. A further clear structure that would enable it participate in the euro – important difference compared to a to engage and negotiate with third nor vice-versa. concentric circles model would be the countries in a meaningful manner. 7 POLICY BRIEF ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY DIFFERENTIATION

4 A PROPOSAL FOR A HYBRID MODEL and the ; third, foreign We have considered two models: a Eu- and security policy and and rope of concentric circles and a Europe judicial cooperation in criminal of clubs. matters. Disagreements between In what follows we offer a hybrid countries over these three sets of template that combines elements of policies typically occur more often these two models in order to overcome than over the single market, and these their respective weaknesses. Note that three sets of policies are not essential we do not here discuss how to manage to achieve economic integration9. transition from the current system to a We also think that the common base new one. Our aim in what follows is to should involve binding commitments foster debate. In practice, the starting to , the rule of law and point must always be the current of the person, institutional structure, which is strong the citizen and the worker. The EU and meaningful, but which we also was historically created as a political consider too rigid to be sustainable in project between countries that shared the long term. a common, adversarial history and regarded as essential the promotion 4.1 THE BASE: A BARE-BONES EU of democracy and rights. The first step would be to design Fundamental social rights, such as a basis for cooperation between equality between men and women or European countries that is able the freedom to participate in unions, to include many partners but is should also be regarded as part of the comprehensive and involves sufficient basic rights. These values would form commitment to ensure sustainable the basis of the bare-bones EU. performance. A bare-bones EU, We consider that such a bare- stripped of the non-essentials of the bones EU would be more inclusive of present union, should provide the willing partners in the continent, such basis of European cooperation. It as non-EU should consist of a set of policies and (EEA) countries. But for countries an institutional system in which all EU that do not want to participate in all members must participate. four freedoms of the single market, The bare-bones EU should be especially the free movement of labour, narrower in scope than today’s EU. It a different structure should be built around the customs would need to be created, a sort of union and the single market, together outer circle, in order to establish with the set of policies that are close economic relations but not indispensable to make them viable. participation in a political project. We Policies indispensable to the return to this idea below. functioning of the single market should certainly include consumer 4.2 THE TOP UP: CLUBS protection, competition policy, trade For countries that wish to maintain and policy, sectoral policies with a direct build a degree of integration beyond bearing on the functioning of the bare-bones , a market for goods and services – such as club approach appears promising. The transport and trans-European networks number of clubs needs to be strictly 9. Our bare-bones EU is – and arguably taxation. Regional limited, however, because otherwise therefore comparable to scenario 1 in the development should also be included. the would degenerate into Commission’s March 2017 Major policies excluded from a loose arrangement with members white paper (see footnote the common base would be: first, picking and choosing the policies that 1) or the first pillar of the the economic and monetary union suit them best. EU treaties without the and its flanking policies such as The clubs arrangement would rely economic and monetary union and the asylum and banking union and macroeconomic on the common substantive, legal Schengen policies. coordination; second, asylum policy, and institutional basis provided by 8 POLICY BRIEF ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY DIFFERENTIATION

the treaty governing the bare-bones apply their own policies. This would EU. Each club would be supported by depressurise the system and allow specific institutions – at minimum, smoother cooperation in areas where a Council formation based on the preferences align more closely. membership of the club and some form of secretariat/executive. This 4.3 A CONCRETE SCHEME secretariat would typically be provided We propose an architecture combining by the Commission and would be the bare-bones EU and four clubs to complemented by specific institutions/ deal with: agencies, as is the case for the euro club with the • Economic and Monetary Union and the European Stability Mechanism consisting of the euro and flanking (ESM). It could also be supplied by a policies, such as macroeconomic Council-based body, especially in the policy coordination and banking case of defence for which participating union; countries would presumably want to • Migration, asylum and Schengen: avoid sharing control of decisions with we regard these policy areas as non-participating countries. It would linked because an area without also be necessary, in certain areas, to internal controls cannot assign responsibility for oversight and be maintained between countries legislation to a sub-chamber of the whose immigration and asylum European Parliament composed of the policies differ markedly; MEPs from the participating countries. • Security and foreign policy The unity of the overall architecture arrangements; would be ensured by the breadth and • All the remaining, current EU strength of the legal and institutional policies not covered by the bare- basis provided by the bare-bones EU. bones set up. These would include It would be supported by a common policy areas in which today’s EU court system that would uphold the has only supporting or coordinating consistency of legal decisions taken competences. within the framework of the various clubs. The basis of the bare-bones EU Countries will choose to be part and of the clubs therefore would be the of the bare-bones EU alone, or to applicability of a single legal system participate in addition in one or more – which is indeed the core of the EU clubs. However, participation in the (Hallstein, 1969; Hallstein, 1973). And bare-bones set-up will not require while there would be institutional eventual participation in any of the continuity for the clubs in terms of the clubs. Implementing this proposal institutional base, they would have would ultimately require restructuring different decision-making processes, the EU treaties to separate out different executives and different lines provisions relevant to the bare- of accountability. bones EU and provisions relevant In many respects, the club structure to the four clubs, and to establish would resemble an advanced version the corresponding institutional of the EU’s architecture. framework. It would differ, however, For clubs to be effective, they will in terms of scale and in the fact that need to have strong and legitimate it would involve defining explicit and decision-making structures. The not necessarily identical institutional balance between Community and structures for each of the clubs. Intergovernmental methods will not The real added of establishing need to be the same for all clubs. The clubs would be to allow member is, for example, countries to opt out in cases of big better suited to governing the euro issues for which they might prefer to than to organising security policy 9 POLICY BRIEF ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY DIFFERENTIATION

cooperation. as we have defined it would have a In principle, nevertheless, it would significantly lower degree of political be desirable to rely in all cases on a clear ambition than the current EU, which double-hat institutional structure with is why we could imagine more coun- a Council and a Parliament, in each tries joining. In particular, the non-EU case formed only by the participating EEA countries would fare better inside member countries. These would be the the bare-bones EU than outside the co-legislators within the club structure, current EU since they would essential- and they would hold the executive of ly remain in the single market but ac- that club to account. This would be quire membership of the (bare-bones) a long-run federal vision – which we EU decision-making process. realise may raise deep constitutional The EU also needs to better concerns at the national level. manage its relationship with other In the foreseeable future, the clubs non-EU neighbours, such as , would therefore be based on , the Western Balkan different, more intergovernmental countries and the UK. For these and sometimes complex governance countries, the establishment of structures. Whenever resources from a structure that replicates some outside the EU budget are required, elements of membership might be decision-making processes might still the right way to form a partnership. need to rely on unanimity voting in Instead of a purely hub-and-spoke council formation – reflecting the fact structure, as is currently the case that national tax resources are on the with existing agreements, this new line. Only in the longer term could arrangement should be given a the development of own resources be participative form and a multilateral envisaged. structure, so that participating Also in terms of which executive countries inside and outside the acts in a particular matter, the different EU would be involved in policy- clubs would have different structures. shaping processes. However, they Overall, we would prefer a fairly should clearly not be allowed to unitary model with the Commission fundamentally interfere with the being by default the executive of the decision-making process of the bare- clubs. However, we realise that in the bones EU. foreseeable future, various agencies We therefore propose, as an outer might take charge of the execution of circle, a European partnership in the clubs’ key policies: for example which far less integration is achieved there would be a common agency but that would still involve multilateral for the protection of refugees, or features. If and when agreed, the a common agency – the ESM – for future framework for the relationship financial assistance to euro-area between the UK and the EU would countries. But the most important provide a natural basis for such a point is that each club would be based wider partnership, but there are other on the same bare-bones EU legal possible cooperation options for the system and would be subject to the outer ring of friends. same court – as is currently the case for This partnership would provide a the ESM which, although it is not based conduit to membership for candidate on the EU treaties but on a specific countries whose level of economic and treaty, falls under the of institutional development makes full the CJEU. participation in the EU questionable. It could also provide a framework for the 4.4 A WIDER EUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP relationship with Turkey, or How would this structure deal with other regional partners. countries outside the EU? For a start, we believe that the bare-bones EU 10 POLICY BRIEF ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY DIFFERENTIATION

4.5 TRANSITING IN AND OUT membership need to be substantial Managing this greater flexibility needs in order to ensure continuity and to come with clear answers to the fol- avoid capture in political cycles. lowing questions: Nevertheless, establishing clear processes for giving up member- • Who decides where each country ship reduces uncertainty and the belongs? In a permanent regime, risk pressure within inflexible deciding which club they wish to systems. Article 50 and the Brexit belong to would first and foremost jurisprudence would apply. be for the countries themselves. However, existing club members would also need to agree who 5 CONCLUSIONS joins. Establishing clear criteria As the world is changing, Europe has for entry and obligations for new to change. It can be a bystander or it members once they have joined can take action. Muddling through will be crucial. Getting rid of the will no longer be sufficient. To be presumption that all member effective the EU and Europe more states are ultimately expected to broadly must deal with Europe’s issue participate in all integration circles of heterogeneity in a structural man- would certainly help to enforce ner. This needs to be done by accept- strict decision-making procedures. ing that not all European countries As far as the bare-bones EU is wish to share all areas of integration concerned, the existing conditions that some see as desirable, or even ( criteria, accession necessary. The counterpart to this chapters) would apply. institutional flexibility should be an • Can countries exit a club? This acceptance by those members that do should be possible, because for participate that being in a club comes as long as nation states exist, an with responsibilities, not only rights. obligation to remain a member is A bare-bones EU coupled with a not credible. Moreover, the fear Europe of clubs would offer in our of long-term commitment might view scope for broad membership deter countries from joining alto- without stalling the process of gether. There should therefore be integration for those that wish clearly spelled-out exit procedures to pursue it. The bare-bones EU that could be activated by a coun- would need to include the rule of try itself or by its partners in case law and a commitment to common of lasting infringements of mem- values. In the economic field it bership obligations. However, the would encompass the single market level of institutional commitment and the necessary complementary that, for example, euro member- policies, including a single trade ship requires does not make such and investment policy. The bare- reversals operational policy choic- bones EU would be surrounded by es. These are decisions countries a “ring of friends” (Prodi, 2002) with should make in full knowledge of significantly less integration but still the need for generational commit- meaningful economic relations and a ments that are not meant to be re- framework for multilateral dialogue. versed. Enshrining club member- The clubs, in turn, would ship in national and entail constitutionally binding requiring that the be commitments by their members to changed before a request for exit share sovereignty in areas that are is made could be a way of ensuring politically more sensitive, such as the stability. euro, asylum policy and security and • Can a country exit a bare-bones foreign policy. Participation in clubs EU? The Brexit precedent shows would be voluntary, but movement that nothing is irreversible. How- in and out of clubs would face high ever, the hurdles for undoing barriers. 11 POLICY BRIEF ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY DIFFERENTIATION

Such a scheme would remove the within the European Council and all-or-nothing approach to European the increased predominance of the integration, which does not match unanimity rule. Greater internal all countries’ wishes and on which effectiveness would also make the progress has stopped. We believe bare-bones EU coupled with a Europe that it would also be an effective of clubs more effective externally, way of reinforcing democracy. In but only if its external representation the current system, the resistance of is upgraded and adapted to the new some member states often to structure. an increased reliance on negotiations 12 POLICY BRIEF ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BY DIFFERENTIATION

REFERENCES Dewatripont, M., F. Giavazzi, I. Harden, T. Persson, G. Roland, A. Sapir, G. Tabellini, and J. von Hagen (1995) Flexible Integration: Towards a More Effective and Democratic Europe, Monitoring European Integration 6, available at https://cepr.org/active/ publications/books_reports/viewreport.php?cvno=P076

Hallstein, W. (1969) Der unvollendete Bundesstaat, Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf

Hallstein, W. (1973) Die Europäische Gemeinschaft, Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf

Macron, E. (2018) ‘Conférence des ambassadeurs et des ambassadrices - Discours de M. , président de la République’, speech, 27 , available at https://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/vues/Kiosque/FranceDiplomatie/kiosque. php?fichier=bafr2018-08-27.html#Chapitre1

Orbán, V. (2018), ‘Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at a conference held in memory of ’, 16 June, available at http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/prime- minister-viktor-orbans-speech-at-a-conference-held-in-memory-of-helmut-kohl/

Perthes, V. (2018) ‘Sustaining Europe’s Security Trio’, Project Syndicate, 28 August, available at https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/france-germany- britain-security-cooperation-by-volker-perthes-2018-08

Prodi, R. (2002) ‘A Wider Europe – a proximity policy as the key to stability’, speech to the Sixth ECSA-World Conference, 6 December, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm

© Bruegel 2018. All rights reserved. Short sections, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted in the origi- nal language without explicit permission provided that the source is acknowledged. Opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) alone.

Bruegel, Rue de la Charité 33, B-1210 (+32) 2 227 4210 [email protected] www.bruegel.org