ABSTRACT

The Implications of ICT in Surviving a Coup d’État for a Popular Regime

Andrés Cruz

Director: Richard Jordan, Ph.D.

An analysis of four cases has revealed that modern information and communication technology (ICT) provides an increasing advantage to popular regimes. The first two cases deal with coups that took place before modern ICT, and the second two with coups that took place after. For Algeria in 1961, the regime had, in addition to both enough popularity and legitimacy, the opportunity to make an appeal to the people with contemporary ICT. The regime's appeal kept support for the coup low enough to easily suppress it. The Turkish regime in 1980 had no popularity and chronic instability that was linked to a lack of legitimacy. Even if the regime had been able to reach out to the people, their appeal would have been ignored. Consequently, the regime fell. In Egypt in 2013, the regime had no popularity, and its legitimacy had worn out. The government reached out to the people using modern ICT, but their appeal fell on deaf ears. The coup ultimately succeeded. In Turkey in 2016, the regime had popularity, and legitimacy. In addition to the police and the military, the people answered the president's call to oppose the coup. This mobilization led to the defeat of the coup. Essentially, if the regime enjoys enough popularity and has the opportunity, ICT will facilitate outreach to the people that would, in turn, consolidate the position of the regime.

APPROVED BY DIRECTOR OF HONORS THESIS

______

Dr. Richard Jordan, Department of Political Science

APROVED BY THE HONORS PROGRAM

______

Dr. Elizabeth Corey, Director

DATE:______

THE IMPLICATIONS OF ICT IN SURVIVING A COUP D’ÉTAT FOR A

POPULAR REGIME

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of

Baylor University

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the

Honors Program

By

Miguel Andrés Cruz

Waco, Texas

May 2019

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ...... iii Table of Figures ...... iv Introduction ...... 1 Chapter One: Algeria 1961 ...... 5 Chapter Two: Turkey 1980 ...... 17 Chapter Three: Egypt 2013 ...... 27 Chapter Four: Turkey 2016 ...... 43 Conclusion ...... 54 Appendix ...... 59

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to first and foremost thank Dr. Richard Jordan. Without his guidance,

I never would have finished this project. He’s been an excellent director, and I’m

fortunate to have worked with him. I’d also like to thank Matthew Walker and Olivia

Perez for their insightful suggestions at our meetings. Thank you to Dr. Ivy Hamerly and

Dr. Sergiy Kudelia for serving on my committee. I’d like to thank my family for their

support and encouragement. I also want to thank my roommates for listening to me

ramble about the ideas I would ultimately put in this thesis. Finally, I’d like to thank my

best friend in Turkey, who watched the 2016 coup unfold with me. Without that

experience, I would not have picked this topic.

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TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: The ability of modern ICT to frustrate attempted coups is conditional on the popularity of the regime ...... 3, 54 Figure 2: Understanding how ICT maximizes survival odds ...... 57

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INTRODUCTION

During the failed coup d’état in Turkey in 2016, I watched dumbfoundedly as

President Erdoğan addressed the nation by calling a news anchor on FaceTime. I sighed

in annoyance every time I received a mass text from the government asking for my

support. However, the next morning, Erdoğan and his supporters had defeated the coup.

That morning I remembered my grandfather saying, “It isn’t stupid if it works.” Ivan

Perkins pointed out that between 1961 and 2011, every independent country, bar twenty- two, underwent a coup attempt.1 Specifically, the majority of Perkins’ non-coup free

zones would not have had the ability to reach out using every platform on social media

available. Erdoğan, however, managed to harness the power of modern Information and

Communication Technology (ICT) to stay in power. More specifically, almost

exclusively the regime can benefit from it.

No factor has provided more impetus to the collapse of democratic governments

than the coup.2 As Perkins pointed out, only twenty-two states did not undergo an attempt at the single biggest factor that leads to a democracy’s collapse. To start with, Edward

Luttwak provides a definition saying, “a coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government

1 Ivan Perkins, “Staying Power,” August 6, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-08-06/staying-power.

2 Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans, “Coups and Democracy,” British Journal of Political Science 44, no. 4 (October 2014): 799–825, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123413000264.

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from its control of the remainder.”3 Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer found good quality

statistical evidence linking the following four factors with coups: “Participation in

war/military defeat, strength of civil society, regime legitimacy, and past coups.”4 In view of these numbers, understanding how to increase a regime’s chances of survival in a coup

carries positive implications for democracy.

UNESCO defines ICT as, “Diverse set of technological tools and resources used

to transmit, store, create, share or exchange information.”5 UNESCO specifies that technologies include both live and recorded broadcasting technologies, the internet, and telephony. Of course, the level of ICT available depends on the year in which the coup attempt took place. It may seem self-evident, but regimes can only act with the means in their possession. So, a regime facing a coup in 1971 could clearly not rely on Twitter to help defeat the putschists. Erdoğan, in 2016 managed to harness both his popularity and the ICT at hand to rally support.

Defining popularity, however, creates some complications. In the United States,

examining polling from Gallup and other organizations would provide an indication of

the president’s popularity. First, not every state has organizations that conduct such polls.

Second, not every state would produce accurate polling information. Citizens living in a

regime with authoritarian tendencies may falsify their preferences to avoid getting

3 Edward N. Luttwak, Coup d’État: A Practical Handbook, Revised Edition, 2 edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016).

4 Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 5 (2003): 594–620.'

5 “Information and Communication Technologies (ICT),” May 2, 2017, http://uis.unesco.org/en/glossary-term/information-and-communication-technologies-ict.

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arrested as dissenters. Consequently, assuming the state in question has elections, the

ballot box seems to provide the clearest, if most obvious, indicator of approval. However, barring the existence of other indicators, such as a mass petition to remove the head of state’s legitimacy and have early elections, then election results still serve as the most concrete indicator of popularity.

Information and communication technology can directly contribute to an improvement in the ability of a popular regime to stay in power. An unpopular regime with low legitimacy can only count upon itself for survival. Before the advent of modern

ICT, popular regimes could only hope that they had the opportunity to attempt to mount opposition to the coup. With ICT, regimes can communicate with citizens through a plethora of methods including mass text messages, Tweets and Facebook posts, and even a variety of television channels. That said, the regime requires the opportunity to use this technology. If the putschists do not allow the opportunity to reach out, ICT will prove ineffective. For a regime, the opportunity to ensure continued contact with citizens grants the ability to appeal for help; an appeal which citizens in a popular regime with legitimacy will answer.

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Popular Unpopular

Internet Era ICT The coup fails The coup succeeds

Modern ICT gives the Reaching out creates no popular regime the best benefit for the unpopular chance to rally support regime

EX. Turkey 2016 EX. Egypt 2013

Pre-Internet Era ICT The coup may fail The coup succeeds

Popularity boosted A lack of popularity made chances of survival with reaching out a futile the tools at hand endeavor

EX. Algeria 1961 EX. Turkey 1980

Figure 1: The ability of modern ICT to frustrate attempted coups is conditional on the popularity of the regime

Out of the four case studies picked for this thesis, Algeria 1961, Turkey 1980,

Egypt 2013, and Turkey 2016, all four tick off a variety of Belkin and Schofer’s boxes.

Each of them had undergone a coup previously. Turkey 2016 had a relatively strong civil society. Algeria 1961 came in the middle of an armed conflict. With the exception of

Turkey in 2016, the regimes all had legitimacy issue. The Algerian Coup of 1961, the

Turkish coup of 1980, the Egyptian Coup of 2013, and the Turkish Coup of 2016 do have similarities. All four coup attempts took place in majority Muslim countries around the

Mediterranean. Algeria and Turkey 2016 ended well for the government, whereas the

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other two ended well for the putschists. Then, obviously, the two during the twenty-first

century enjoy access to modern technology.

In three cases, the regime’s survival strategy heavily involved contemporary ICT.

In Turkey in 2016, President Erdoğan used FaceTime and his Twitter account to reach the public and call them to the streets to oppose the coup. President Erdoğan maybe

would have survived without his tweets and FaceTime call, but his mobilizing the people

helped give him a decisive advantage. On the other hand, Morsi’s regime made several

key mistakes to erode the confidence of the Egyptian people. Morsi achieved this both by

forcing through a constitution with an Islamist bent with emergency powers and also

repressing the media like Mubarak did. Instability and a lack of confidence in the

government, and also Morsi, contributed to making attempts to use social media to

preserve his regime ineffective. Charles de Gaulle used both television and the transistor radio, to calm the people of France, and also make an appeal to the troops to not support the coup. Conversely, the Turkish government in 1980 had no opportunity to attempt to reach out to the people.

Essentially, for a state with popular, credible leaders, and a modicum of legitimacy, ICT serves as a tool to increase the odds of political survival. An unpopular leader, like Morsi, will not have anyone respond to an appeal for help. Popular leaders like de Gaulle and Erdoğan, on the other hand, will likely find success in an appeal to their people for help.

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CHAPTER ONE

Algeria 1961

For the first case, the Algiers Putsch of 1961, we must examine it in view of two

questions. First, to what extent did the regime enjoy popularity? The French government

in 1961 did in fact enjoy widespread popularity. More specifically, President Charles de

Gaulle enjoyed popular approval. Following his appointment as President at the

conclusion of the May 1958 Crisis, de Gaulle to both successfully pass a new constitution

with a large margin and win the presidency. Second, to what extent did the regime have access to ICT? The multi-day nature of the coup meant that the regime had opportunity to react effectively to the coup attempt. President de Gaulle gave a speech the day after the coup, calling the nation and the army to oppose the coup. His great popularity meant that the Frenchmen and Frenchwomen he appealed to answered him. The regime’s effective use of ICT directly contributed to the government’s survival.

Background on the Plot

The 1961 Putsch in Algiers, also known as the Generals’ Putsch, was an attempt by four generals to depose President Charles de Gaulle and restore order to the situation in French Algeria. In order to understand the putsch, more background is required than for the others.

France has traditionally had some issues with regime instability; at no time was this truer than during decolonization. Giving up colonial holdings was a drawn out and controversial process for France. The Algerian War, precisely over the question of

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decolonization, lasted from 1954 to 1962.1 Between 1956 and 1960, France had given up

every colony in Africa with the exception of Algeria, Comoros, and Djibouti.2 Part of the

difficulty was that France did not consider Algeria as just a colony: Algeria became a

department3 of France in 1848. Furthermore, outside of the Maghreb, France primarily

used the model of Exploitation Colonialism, which focuses on maximizing the economic

benefit derived from the colony at the cost of everything else. Not so in Algeria.4 Even in the Maghreb, only Algeria attracted large numbers of colons. In 1962, approximately

10%, slightly over 1.2 million, of the population of French Algeria came from European descent.5. The large number of Europeans, known as Pieds-Noir in Algeria only strengthened their resolve to maintain control of it.

The impact of the 1958 crisis on the attempted coup in 1961 is critical.

Considering that the French 4th Republic had twenty-one prime ministers between 1947

and 1958, instability permeated French civil society. With the situation in Algeria at the

forefront, amid the series of cabinet crises, both the Pieds-Noirs and the military began to

lose confidence in the government’s ability to resolve the crisis. Most importantly, they

1 “Algerian War,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed April 11, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/event/Algerian-War.

2 Sujata Moorti, “Africa Decolonization Timeline | The Global Sixties,” accessed April 11, 2019, http://sites.middlebury.edu/global60s/2013/09/26/africa-decolonization- timeline-2/.

3 Just as the United States is divided into states, France is divided into departments.

4 R. Healy, E. Dal Lago, and Enrico Dal Lago, The Shadow of Colonialism on Europe’s Modern Past (Springer, 2014).

5 “French Who Fled Algeria Return to Their Roots,” Reuters, September 10, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-algeria-france-piedsnoirs-idUSTRE5892OI20090910.

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feared that, like in Indochina, France would abandon part of herself for the sake of

political practicality.6 To put a halt to the betrayal of French Algeria by the government,

the former governor-general of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, recruited several high-ranking

military officers including Generals Edmond Jouhaud and Raoul Salan. They aimed to

restore General de Gaulle to power.7 Upon seizing control in Algiers, General Salan

created the “Committee of Public Safety,” which General Jacques Massu chaired. They demanded from René Coty’s government the appointment of General de Gaulle as Prime

Minister.8 In what was ultimately the dying gasp of the 4th Republic, President René Coty

ultimately conceded and appointed the General instead of risking the continued existence

of the state.9 The National Assembly confirmed him and gave a six-month period to write

another constitution. Four months later, a referendum created the 5th Republic, which had

a strong executive branch.10 Unsurprisingly, General de Gaulle received the first mandate

to take the office of president.11

6 “Could Vietnam Have Been Nuked in 1954?,” May 5, 2014, sec. Magazine, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-27243803.

7 Adam Gopnik, “How Charles de Gaulle Rescued France,” August 13, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/08/20/how-charles-de-gaulle-rescued- france.

8 Spencer C. Tucker, Modern Conflict in the Greater Middle East: A Country-By-Country Guide (Santa Barbara, UNITED STATES: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2017), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bayloru/detail.action?docID=4827391.

9 “France - The Fourth Republic,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed April 12, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/France.

10 “1958: De Gaulle Returns to Tackle Algeria,” June 1, 1958, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/1/newsid_2995000/2995283.stm.

11 Ibid.

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It is within that context that we must examine the Algiers Putsch of 1961. The specific

reason that these men had picked de Gaulle for the job was that they counted on his right-

wing policies to align with their plans for Algeria.12 Upon discovering that Prime

Minister Michel Debré’s government was to open secret negotiations with National

Liberation Front’s (FLN) government in exile, the plotting began. The putschists from

1958 felt not only like they had been betrayed, but that the people of Algeria had been betrayed. On January 25th, Colonel Antoine Argoud threatened Michel Debré with a coup

if the government attempted to continue negotiations.13

The Putsch Begins

Early in the morning on April 22nd, 1961, retired Generals Maurice Challe,

Edmond Jouhaud, and André Zeller14 took control of Algiers. Two of them already had

experience meddling with French governments. Over the course of nearly four hours

during the night, the 1st Foreign Parachute Regiment, part of the Foreign Legion, took control of the strategic points in Algiers.15 This included the governor’s residence, along

with the governor, the radio headquarters, and the post office. Over the course of the

night, several military units had suggested they would support the coup. At 6:45 the

12 Tucker, Modern Conflict in the Greater Middle East.

13 Ghislain Dubois, Argoud, de Gaulle: le duel (Editions Dricot, 1996).

14 General Raoul Salan was still in Spain at the time. His involvement was only announced later.

15 Edgar O’Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection: 1954-62 (Archon Books, 1967).

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following morning, Radio Algiers, which had undergone a spontaneous name-change to

Radio France, announced the coup.16

General Challe prepared the first communiqué to announce the intent of the putschists. He wanted to clarify that they had not launched the coup for the purpose of political power. They simply wished to ensure that France honored her “pledge that the army would keep Algeria so that out dead have not died for nothing.”17 While no conclusive evidence exists because the coup failed, all indicators point to the generals indeed having had no desire for personal power. While describing putschists as having acted in good faith seems nonsensical, nothing suggests that they acted inconsistently

Technically, General Salan commanded the coup, but since he was still in Madrid,

General Challe served as the ranking officer.18 The initial message was intended for a limited audience. Instead of targeting the general public, or even soldiers in mainland

Europe, General Challe gave this message with the other military units in Algeria in mind.19 Specifically, the senior officers in such units, which were likely to share the hardline views of the four generals.

16 Ibid.

17 “Gen. Maurice Challe Dead at 73; Led 1961 Coup Against de Gaulle,” The New York Times, January 20, 1979, sec. Archives, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/01/20/archives/gen-maurice-challe-dead-at-73-led-1961- coup-against-de-gaulle.html.

18 O’Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection.

19 Martin Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (Oxford, UNITED KINGDOM: Oxford University Press USA - OSO, 2011), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bayloru/detail.action?docID=829443.

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Several of the coup plotters had already engaged in, and would continue to engage

in, rebellious activities. Just earlier in 1961, General Salan, along with Jean-Jacques

Susini, had formed the Secret Armed Organization20 (OAS). Due to their experience in

counter-insurgency, they were able to organize the OAS in a way that mirrored the

FLN.21 General Salan’s participation in both the coup and the OAS would have been

particularly hurtful as he was the most decorated soldier in French history at the time.22 In

addition to feeling betrayed by de Gaulle for negotiating giving up Algeria, many

Frenchmen such as Susini, or General Jouhaud, who joined after the putsch failed, had

been born in Algeria. For them and many other putschists, maintaining France’s honor

and seeing out the fight they’d been engaged in for the last several years came as a

secondary consideration. They cared about keeping control of an area of France that was

home for them. While an oversimplification, it almost compares to an American born in

Hawaii not wanting to give Hawaii independence.

In France, President de Gaulle took a casual view of the situation. At his cabinet

meeting, he announced, “Gentlemen, what is serious about this is that it isn’t serious at

all.”23 Perhaps his statement was only one of bravado, but it is important to note that this

20 The name « Organisation de l’Armée Secrète » was a call back to the « Armée Secrète, » which was the armed wing of the French Resistance during World War II. This connotation would have been understood nearly universally.

21 Evans, Algeria.

22 “Raoul Salan | French General,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed April 12, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Raoul-Albin-Louis-Salan. 23 “Putsch et putschistes,” April 11, 2011, https://www.lemonde.fr/livres/article/2011/04/11/putsch-et- putschistes_1505885_3260.html.

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putsch was less organized than that of 1958. Furthermore, he had a point. While the four

generals had control of Algiers, and in theory the Sahara, they had trouble securing

support from Constantine and Oran, which are the other major cities in Algeria.24

Bravado notwithstanding, President de Gaulle declared a state of emergency.

This was one of the initial failings of the coup. The nature of a coup limits the possible number of participants in the planning stage. It may seem self-evident, but the delicate nature of plotting against President de Gaulle in particular made a wide range of co-conspirators prohibitive. The soldiers knew the four generals themselves suitably well, but the multi-day nature of this attempted putsch gave more room for thought. Coups require total commitment. Luttwak points out that, “if the general principle of tactics is the application of force at the right place, the coup achieves this with surgical precision by striking at the organizational heart of the whole state; if speed is very often important in military operations, in the coup it is an essential requirement.”25 Giving officers

several days to reflect upon which side they would join allowed them to weight their

options and ultimately side with the winning side. The word “putsch” in German

translates to “thrust” or “blow.” Likewise, in French, the word “coup” means “strike” or

“blow,” and “coup d’état” literally means “blow of state.” That is to say, these words

allude to swift, aggressive actions for a good reason. There is no such thing as a “gentle

push of state.”

24 Evans, Algeria.

25 Luttwak, Coup d’État.

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It was on April 23rd that General Salan came to Algeria from Spain to join the putschists. Later on that very day, President de Gaulle put his World War II uniform on and made an appeal to the people. Disparaging the putschists, he said, “Those guilty of this usurpation have exploited the passion of officers of certain special units, the inflamed support of one part of the population of European origin, misguided by fears and myths, the impotence of authorities overwhelmed by the military conspiracy.”26 This statement not only asserts that the scope of the putsch is limited, but it also attempts to remove any legitimacy given by General Challe. The claim that the putschists are deluded, specifically deluded in their belief that the government has no power, would seriously undermine any actions carried out during the coup. Even with the best of intensions, their delusions made them miss the mark. Also, the General describes the plotters as “partisan, ambitious, and fanatical.”27 As with the previous statement, President de Gaulle insinuates that, since partisanship and acting in the nation’s best interests tend not to fit together, then their partisanship precludes the putschists from worker for the good of

France.

Beyond undermining their authority, President de Gaulle makes an appeal to the people of France. He commands them, “In the name of France, I order that all means— I say all means— be employed everywhere to bar the route to these men, until they are subjugated. I forbid any Frenchmen, and first of all any soldier, to execute any of their

26 Institut National de l’Audiovisuel-Ina.fr, “Message radiodiffusé et télévisé,” Ina.fr, accessed April 13, 2019, http://www.ina.fr/video/CAF88026998.

27 Ibid.

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orders.”28 In addition to the power of the office of the president, General de Gaulle draws upon his credibility as the leader of the Free French during World War II. Liberating

Paris in 1944 had provided President de Gaulle with an astronomical amount of popularity. His next claim relies upon the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. He declares,

“In this way, I confirm myself in the French and republican legality which was conferred upon me by the nation and which I will maintain no matter what happens until the end of my term, or until I lack either force or life.”29 As a war hero, the General telling the people of France that he would fight for the nation until he could no longer fight, would have carried extraordinary poignancy. He communicates that he has put his life on the line for France before, and he will again. His final appeal goes to the people of France, not just to soldiers: “Frenchwomen, Frenchmen, help me.”30

General de Gaulle’s speech only carried as much credibility as he himself had.

Interestingly he references the power that the new Constitution conferred upon him.

While technically, touching upon the Constitution should fit under the category of best practices for embattled leaders a two-year-old Constitution, seems significantly less sacred than at first impression. While the length of time in effect shouldn’t determine the authority of the Fifth Republic’s Constitution, France had a history of constitutions coming and going. Originally written as an interim constitution, the Third Republic’s

Constitution lasted for 70 years; the longest lasting republican constitution in France’s

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

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history.31 De Gaulle had successfully passed a referendum two-and-a-half years earlier,

receiving a powerful mandate from the people of France. The new constitution he had

proposed received 82.6 percent of the vote with a voter turnout of 79.8%.32 Despite what

sounds like an incredible victory, not much has surfaced to suggest electoral fraud except

in Niger. France probably manipulated election results there.33 Besides the somewhat

debatable mandate, he did not have much to lean on besides his own personal popularity.

Before de Gaulle began his speech, several things had gone wrong for the

putschists. Notably, General Massu had resisted several overtures to join the plot. One of the leaders of the 1958 crisis, General Massu had accepted the inevitability of Algerian

Independence.34 While not conclusive, hardliners such as General Massu having

determined that Algeria would ultimately become independent suggests a misreading of

the prevalent attitudes concerning French Algeria. The inability to spark widespread

revolt against de Gaulle’s government in the military further confirms this. Also, the

French government had already arrested the plotters in Metropolitan France the day of

the putsch’s announcement.35 Finally, Metropolitan France demonstrated clear opposition

31 Lorraine Boissoneault, “Why Is France in Its Fifth Republic?,” Smithsonian, accessed April 13, 2019, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/why-france-its-fifth-republic- 180962983/.

32 Dieter Nohlen and Philip Stöver, Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook (Nomos, 2010).

33 Klaas van Walraven, “Decolonization by Referendum: The Anomaly of Niger and the Fall of Sawaba, 1958-1959,” The Journal of African History 50, no. 2 (2009): 269–92.

34 O’Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection.

35 Dubois, Argoud, de Gaulle.

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to the coup. Amid fears of an invasion from Algeria, André Malraux, the minister of

culture, and independently of him, the Communist Party, called for volunteers to oppose

any attempt at a landing from Algeria.36 The “sworn enemies of Gaullism” taking a stand

in favor of the Fifth Republic makes a strong statement of opposition to the coup.

After President de Gaulle’s speech, the putsch subsisted on borrowed time. The

popularity of the transistor radio meant that even conscripts heard both General Challe

and President de Gaulle’s speeches. In effect, this created a direct competition between

their ideas. President de Gaulle had already won the popularity contest before either spoke a word, and General Challe further hurt his cause by tailoring his appeal too narrowly. Instead of only reaching out to officers, General de Gaulle reached out to

conscripts when he forbade all Frenchmen, but especially soldiers, from aiding them, and

ordered all soldiers to impede their progress. The rank and file soldiers evidently heard

his appeal, as out of 400,000 troops, only 25,000 participated in the putsch; also, out of

30,000 officers, only 600 took part in the putsch.37 Probably not even enough to carry out a sustained revolt. Just as importantly, the people of France answered his call. The following day, April 24th, an hour-long general strike against the coup was held. That

evening, General Salan gave a speech in Algiers promising to keep Algeria part of

France.38 Despite a turnout of close to 100,000, the balance had already tipped too far in

the government’s favor.

36 Evans, Algeria.

37 Jean-Louis Dufour, “Avril 1961 - Le Putsch d’Alger,” Historia N/A, no. 652 (January 4, 2001): 40–44.

38 Dubois, Argoud, de Gaulle.

16

Following the putsch, de Gaulle’s government moved rapidly to arrest

participants. General Challe and General Zeller both turned themselves in and received

fifteen-year sentences.39 General Jouhaud and General Salan managed to evade arrest for

around a year as they continued armed resistance with the OAS; they both received death sentences.40 President de Gaulle released all four of these generals between 1966 and

1968. Then, in 1968, a general amnesty pardoned them and the other putschists.

Interestingly, President Georges Pompidou rehabilitated many of the putschists in the

‘70s. Algeria ultimately won its independence in 1962.

Essentially, de Gaulle and the fifth Republic ensured political survival by virtue of both de Gaulle and the regime’s popularity, and also the ability to reach out to the masses with ICT. Had the putschists known about Luttwak’s advice, they perhaps would

not have planned to take several days executing the coup. That extended period of time

not only meant that the military had time to wait and see how the coup would go, but that

President de Gaulle and General Challe, and also General Salan, would have to step up

and provide leadership. The Generals had the respect of their troops, but the President

had their adoration. President de Gaulle’s popularity meant that soldiers disobeyed their officers on his orders. While impossible to ascertain for certain, the putschists would have likely enjoyed a higher chance of success to overthrow nearly any other head of state in French history.

39 Evans, Algeria.

40 Ibid.

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CHAPTER TWO

Turkey 1980

For the second case, the Turkish Coup of 1980, we must examine it in view of our two questions. First, to what extent did the regime enjoy popularity? The Turkish government in 1980 enjoyed no popularity. Rife instability in the country had left the people with a general lack of confidence in the regime’s ability to solve pressing issues.1

Economic issues caused concern, but the social unrest caused by violence between leftists and nationalists presented a greater threat to national stability. Furthermore, three minority governments in as many years, each of which collapsed quickly, exacerbated the issue. Second, to what extent did the regime have access to ICT? The Turkish regime in

1980 suffered from a lack of access to ICT. While they had access to the current technology of 1980, the swift nature of the coup meant that the regime had no opportunity to use it. Furthermore, it remains doubtful that the people would have answered any appeal for help made by the regime.

Background on the Coup

On September 12, 1980, the Turkish armed forces successfully overthrew the government. After a year of planning, the heads of each branch of the military, along with

1 Tanel Demirel, “The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980,” Armed Forces & Society (0095327X) 29, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 253–80, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X0302900206.

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the Chief of the General Staff2, deposed Süleyman Demirel. The military junta, officially known as the “National Security Council,” ruled the country for the next three years.

Turkey before the September 12 coup already had two coup indicators: previous coups, and a lack of regime legitimacy.3 Turkey had two coups in 1971 and 1960. The nine years since the previous coup had lacked all forms of stability. The 1977 parliamentary election had left no party able to form a majority government. A conservative coalition of parties continued to govern until enough MPs defected to the progressive party in 1978. 1979 saw the progressive coalition lose its support and the conservative coalition return. Furthermore, high inflation and a stagnant economy had caused mass dissatisfaction.4

Social unrest, as opposed to political instability, proved a bigger issue in the late

1970s. Between 1977 and the end of 1978, the infighting between ultranationalists and leftists manifested itself in the form of several high-profile attacks. The first, the Taksim

Square Massacre, took place at Istanbul’s May Day rally of 1977. During the annual event, shots fired from surrounding buildings resulted in 34 killed and many more injured in the ensuing pandemonium.5 A bomb attack in Istanbul in March of 1978 killed seven

2 The “Chief of the General Staff” is similar to the “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” except the Turkish counterpart has operational authority.

3 Belkin and Schofer, “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk.”

4 Demirel, “The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene.”

5 Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com), “Police Confront May Day Protesters in Istanbul’s Taksim Square | DW | 01.05.2017,” DW.COM, accessed March 29, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/police-confront-may-day-protesters-in-istanbuls-taksim- square/a-38651303.

19

leftist students injured 41.6 On October 9th, in Ankara, members of the Grey Wolves ultranationalist group, led by Abdullah Çatlı7 executed seven students who were members

of the Workers’ Party in the Bahçelievler neighbourhood of Ankara.8 The worst

massacre, however, took place in Maraş in December of 1978. The attack killed,

according to official reports, at least 111 Alevis9 and left over a thousand injured. During

the resulting trial, three of the lawyers representing the victims were killed, and several

defendants received life sentences. However, a subsequent court order in 1982 released

everyone convicted.10 This massacre prompted the declaration of a state of emergency in eastern Turkey. With the exception of the Maraş Massacre, no arrests happened in response to these killings; even in the case of Maraş, those arrested had participated in as opposed to orchestrating the attack. Speaking after the Taksim Square Massacre, Prime

Minister Bülent Ecevit accused, “an organization inside the state, but outside the state’s

6 “16 Mart Katliamı Davası Düştü - Türkiye Haberleri - Radikal,” accessed March 29, 2019, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/16-mart-katliami-davasi-dustu-904309/.

7 Çatlı, a wanted hitman on Interpol’s red list, was killed in a car crash in 1996. The head of the Istanbul Police Academy, and a member of parliament were his fellow passengers in the car. They were found with fake government-issued identification, diplomatic credentials, and a cache of weapons, money, and drugs. The ensuing scandal confirmed for many the existence of a “deep state,” and indicated that Operation Counter-Guerrilla – The Turkish counterpart of Operation Gladio – had been expanded beyond the Cold War.

8 Dogan Yurdakul Soner Yalcýn, Reis. Gladio’nun Turk Tetikcisi (Kirmizi Kedi, 2016).

9 Alevis are a religious minority

10 “Thirty Years after the Maraş Massacre,” Bianet - Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi, accessed March 29, 2019, https://www.bianet.org/english/human-rights/111609-thirty-years-after- the-maras-massacre.

20

control,” of having carried out the attack. Twenty days later, a police officer nearly assassinated Ecevit.11

Exploring the possibility of a coup initially materialized in September of 1979.

The Chief of the General Staff, Kenan Evren, ordered his second-in-command, General

Haydar Saltık, to write a report concerning the need for and feasibility of a coup.12 Three months later, a meeting at the War Academy concluded with the General Staff deciding that at the minimum, the government needed a stern warning. The Staff had their warning delivered to the leaders in Parliament, and later published in the newspapers. Their warning asserted that, considering the political turbulence in the country, the government should set aside partisan divisions in favor of the nation’s interests.13 The idea of the

military publicly warning Parliament should normally give cause for caution. However,

the fact the military cited the same law that justified the 1971 coup when providing

justification for warning the government makes this not only a warning, but also a

threat.14

The putschists took great pains to maintain both impartiality in their coup and as

much legitimacy as possible. At the same War Academy meeting, Admiral Bülent Ulusu,

11 “A Beginner’s Guide to Ergenekon, Trial of the Century,” August 10, 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20090810073651/http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/det aylar.do?load=detay&link=163143.

12 Göze Orhon, The Weight of the Past: Memory and Turkey’s 12 Septembercoup (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015).

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

21

the commander of the Navy,15 asked if General Evren believed the warning would cause

Parliament to change. General Evren indicated that he didn’t believe the warning would cause change, but rather, making the warning means they will have done their due diligence.16 Furthermore, the General Staff feared that the perception of complacency on

the part of the military’s leadership would cause senior officers to act hastily and plan the

removal of the government themselves like in 1960. General Evren wanted to avoid a

repetition of the 1960 coup, orchestrated by Colonel Alparslan Türkeş17, which resulted

in the execution of the deposed Prime Minister.18 Furthermore, the importance of

impartiality prompted the General Staff to delay the coup from the first week of July until

September 12th.19 The putschists had initially planned to execute the coup in July, but

because the government survived a vote of confidence on July 3rd, General Evren ordered

a delay. He rationalized that such a mandate from Parliament necessitated waiting to see

the if the vote catalyzed positive change.20

15 Quite like the Chief of the General Staff, all of the Turkish Service Chiefs have operational command.

16 “AKSİYON DERGİSİ | Www.Aksiyon.Com.Tr | HAFTALIK HABER DERGİSİ,” September 12, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20080912021540/http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/detay.php?id=3 1053.

17 By 1980, Col. Alparslan Türkeş had been the leader of the nationalist party for eleven years. The Grey Wolves, mentioned in connection with Abdullah Çatlı and the Bahçelievler killings, were the paramilitary wing of Türkeş’s nationalist party.

18 Ibid.

19 Interestingly, despite the fact that the coup plan was distributed in July, there is no evidence that news of the coup lacked outside of the military.

20 Demirel, “The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene.”

22

The Putsch Begins

On September 12th, the soldiers executed the coup flawlessly. The operation

began at 3:00 am with the simultaneous seizure of political leaders and infrastructure targets such as the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) and the postal service. Continuing the efforts to avoid past mistakes, General Evren soldiers to treat detainees gently.21 The military went so far as to send soldiers in civilian clothing to

arrest senior political figures. According to General Evren, they didn’t want to worry

anyone.22,23 By daybreak, the military had completed the coup, and Turks awoke to a

coup declaration repeatedly playing on the radio.24

Through a combination of organization and meticulous planning, the putschists

succeeded. For instance, Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MİT) failed to inform

the prime minister of the upcoming coup.25 In fact, not only did they not inform Demirel

of the plotted coup, but MİT agents knowingly distributed putsch plans on behalf of the

21 “12 Eylül 1980 Darbesi Nasıl Yapıldı? | Kenan Evren Anlatıyor | 32. Gün Arşivi - YouTube,” accessed April 4, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lWsz5Q6OvA4.

22 Ibid.

23 Naturally, Evren would attempt to portray himself in as favourable of a light as possible. However, there is no evidence that prisoners were mistreated that night. Generally speaking, political figures escaped mistreatment. Sadly, many ordinary citizens detained in the aftermath of the coup ultimately faced torture.

24 Ibid.

25 “What’s next for Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency?,” Hürriyet Daily News, accessed April 4, 2019, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/abdulkadir- selvi/whats-next-for-turkeys-national-intelligence-agency-117302.

23

General Staff.26 Furthermore, General Evren’s continued emphasis on the non-partisan nature of the coup served to allay the fears of Turks. In fact, upon waking up the next morning, Turks celebrated the coup, hoping that the political and economic situations would improve.27 That same day, General Evren addressed the country. He first outlined why the military had seized power, emphasized that the putsch represented a unified operation from the military’s high command,28 declared martial law, and asked Turks to stay indoors and continue to respect the rule of law.29

General Evren’s speech highlighting issues in the government would have encouraged the Turkish people.30 The speech served the dual purpose of providing an account, and also allaying fears. He said toward the end:

“My dear countrymen … The Turkish armed forces, in order to restore the prosperity and happiness granted by right to the Turkish people, the unity of the people and nation, and the increasingly ignored ideals bestowed upon us by Atatürk, as well as to strengthen democracy and the lost authority of the government to a solid footing, have been obliged to seize control of the state.”31

26 Ibid.

27 “12 Eylül 1980 Darbesi Nasıl Yapıldı? | Kenan Evren Anlatıyor | 32. Gün Arşivi - YouTube.”

28 As opposed to the earlier coup of 1961 in which colonels had taken the initiative. This coup quickly turned bloody.

29 “Kenan Evren’in Türkiye’yi karanlığa taşıyan darbe açıklaması,” T24, accessed April 5, 2019, https://t24.com.tr/haber/kenan-evrenin-turkiyeyi-karanliga-tasiyan-darbe- aciklamasi,296157.

30 “12 Eylül 1980 Darbesi Nasıl Yapıldı? | Kenan Evren Anlatıyor | 32. Gün Arşivi - YouTube.”

31 Ibid.

24

Appealing to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk32, specifically, carried a lot of weight. The respect

accorded to Atatürk as the founder of the Turkish Republic borders on a cult of

personality. All four successful coups in Turkey since the 1920s have invoked his

name.33 Atatürk catalyzed the reforms that transformed the Turkish Republic into a

modern, secular state. His reforms included changing the alphabet to the Latin script,

abolishing the caliphate, giving women both suffrage and equal rights.34 Framing a

putsch as a return to his legacy evokes a direction many would find it difficult to disagree

with. In fact, those who disagree with him must take care as insulting the memory of

Ataturk can lead to up to six years in prison.35

Thus far, the 1980 coup in Turkey has demonstrated a clear lack of ICT; however,

contemporary ICT would not have made a difference. As opposed to the four generals’

gentle push of state, the Turkish coup d’état wasted no time whatsoever. The swift nature

of the operation meant that even a concerted effort to warn the people of Turkey would

not have functioned as a viable strategy to ensure political survival. Putsch planners pick

early morning hours precisely because they hope that by the time anyone rouses

themselves from sleep, the putschists will have already consolidated power. Had

President Demirel attempted to appeal for help, it would have had no value. As opposed

to now, when a regime can reach every single person in the country with a cell phone, the

32 Atatürk translates literally to “Father of the Turks.”

33 “A Secularist’s Lament,” The Economist, February 25, 2012, https://www.economist.com/europe/2012/02/25/a-secularists-lament.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

25

technology in 1980 limited the potential audience of an appeal to those watching

television or listening to the radio. President Demirel would have needed several key

items to fall into place to even make an appeal: a warning of the coup before the military

arrived to arrest him, arriving at the studio before the military seized control of it, and

broadcasting a message to the people of Turkey without interruption. Even with all of

these pieces coming together, it remains difficult to believe that many people would be

watching television or listening to the radio at 3:00 am. Today’s technology, on the other

hand, would expand that audience significantly. Even cell phones can give out a national

alert that would wake people sleeping.36

Even if Demirel had made an appeal to the people, he would have been ignored.

In addition to preserving the appearance of political neutrality, General Evren delayed the coup in order to allow the political situation in Turkey to reach a tipping point.37 By

September of 1980, the General Staff firmly believed that the country had reached that tipping point, and the majority of civilians agreed at least tacitly with the military’s perspective.38 They also believed with certainty that elites would at least tacitly support

the legitimacy of the coup.39 While debating the “legitimacy” of the military seizing

control of the government sounds unbelievable, evidence points to that belief, along with

36 Karen Zraick, “‘Presidential Alert’ Goes to Millions of Cellphones Across the U.S.,” The New York Times, October 4, 2018, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/03/us/presidential-alert-trump.html.

37 Goze Orhon, “Official Memory of the 1980 Coup in Turkey. Story of a Downfall,” Ethnologia Balkanica 16 (January 2012): 146–56.

38 Orhon.

39 Demirel, “The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene.”

26

the regime’s lack of popularity, having doomed it. If Turks perceived the coup as more legitimate than the government, then any appeal the government could have made would have proven ineffective.

Essentially, a lack of both popularity and legitimacy ended up costing the government dearly. Considering the reputation of the military as the guardians of democracy and Kemalism40, the people had no serious concerns about a military intervention to restore order. Indeed, they welcomed what appeared to them a rebalancing of the country. In addition to lacking popular support, the regime lacked support from within. For instance, MİT, officially a civilian agency under the Prime Minister’s office, took part in the coup. Simply popular belief in the illegitimacy of a regime, and in some cases, a basic dislike for the regime, would have complicated political survival. Internal belief in the illegitimacy of the regime alone would have also complicated survival.

Finally, the military’s belief in the illegitimacy of the regime by itself would have also complicated survival. However, the combination of all of these factors made the regime’s continued survival in the face of the coup practically impossible.

40 The ideology of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

27

CHAPTER THREE

EGYPT 2013

For the third case, the Egyptian Coup of 2013, we must examine it in view of the same two questions. First, to what extent did the regime enjoy popularity? Mohamed Morsi and his regime enjoyed limited popularity across fragments of the Egyptian population.

Despite having only held the Presidency for a year, Morsi had eroded his popularity by attempting to push through overtly Islamic reforms. Second, to what extent did the regime have access to ICT? The Egyptian government not only had access to ICT, but also the opportunity to use it. Morsi’s government enjoyed full-use of social media and a variety of television channels, but his lack of popularity made it ineffective. Morsi and the military both reached out to the people to make an appeal, but the people sided with the military. As a result, the military successfully overthrew President Mohamed Morsi.

Background on the Coup

The Arab Spring in 2011, resulted in the ousting of Hosni Mubarak, destabilized

Egypt significantly. His absence after thirty-years left a conspicuous vacancy in the presidency.1 In June of 2012, Egyptians voted Mohammed Morsi as president. President

Morsi probably enjoyed his most popular day in office on the day of his inauguration.

Roughly a year later, the military overthrew President Morsi.

1 Peter Hessler, “Egypt’s Failed Revolution,” December 26, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/02/egypts-failed-revolution.

28

The mechanics of this coup were simple. The Egyptian military seized the

opportunity to take control of the state during a Constitutional crisis. Harnessing the

unrest, they essentially gave Morsi an ultimatum: either make concessions or we will

resign you.2 This plan almost had an air of honesty about it. The military informed the

regime of their intention in advance and acted in accordance with that warning. Instead of

taking a covert approach, they required the President to enact a list of reforms. Of course,

failing to enact these reforms would result in drastic action by the military; he would at

best face removed from office and at worst killed. For their plan, a monopoly on

information carries less significance. The military knew they enjoyed a unified front, and

also did not anticipate President Morsi to have defenders outside of his party. Morsi

lacked popularity to an extent that the military felt safe telegraphing the potential coup.3

Morsi could pick either the carrot or the stick.

The years preceding the coup explain why the fledgling democracy had

conditions ripe for a coup. As Belkin and Schofer point out, strength of civil society,

regime legitimacy, and past coups serve as strong indicators of coup risk. Egypt had

undergone past coups, had a regime that had lost its mandate, and had serious issues with

civil society.4 In 1981, only eight days after the assassination of Anwar Sadat, Hosni

Mubarak launched a coup to seize power in Cairo. The people then forced Mubarak to

2 Matt Bradley and Reem Abdellatif, “Egypt Army Issues Ultimatum,” Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2013, sec. World, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323297504578578991289439784.

3 “The Second Time Around,” The Economist, July 6, 2013, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2013/07/06/the-second-time-around.

4 Belkin and Schofer, “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk.”

29

resign on February 11th, 2011 after a thirty-year presidency. In May and June of 2012, the

people of Egypt went to the polls. For only the second time in Egyptian history, the

Presidential Election had more than one candidate running.5 Furthermore, the election

results showed a close finish. Morsi won the second round with 51.73% of the vote.6

Previous elections took place in the style of a referendum, where the ballot simply asked,

“do you support the presidency of Gamel Abdel Nasser?” The voter checks either yes or no and the entire plebiscite seems to always overwhelmingly affirm the incumbent.

Egyptians only recently truly regained the right to suffrage.

Roughly nine months after Mubarak’s resignation, the Egyptian Constituent

Assembly controversially passed an unpopular and possibly illegitimate constitution.

District courts initially dissolved the first assembly on the grounds that it did not including enough minority voices.7 The court’s decision came after a boycott of the

assembly by a fourth of its members. The second assembly fared marginally better.

However, the continued inclusion of many MPs from the Muslim Brotherhood, the ruling

party, remained an issue which the courts needed to adjudicate.8 On November 22nd,

President Morsi declared that he haf seized emergency powers in order to continue to

5 Tamara Cofman Wittes, “The 2005 Egyptian Elections: How Free? How Important?,” Brookings (blog), August 24, 2005, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-2005- egyptian-elections-how-free-how-important/.

6 “Presidential Election in Egypt” (The Carter Center, June 2012).

7 William Partlett, “Constitution-Making by ‘We the Majority’ in Egypt,” Brookings (blog), 30 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2012/11/30/constitution- making-by-we-the-majority-in-egypt/.

8 Partlett.

30

serve as a “defender of the revolution.”9 His announcement also declared the Constituent

Assembly immune from dissolution until January. Interestingly, these new emergency

powers gave him supremacy over any court in the land, including the Supreme

Constitutional Court.10 Only eight days later, just ahead of when the Constitutional Court

delivered a ruling on the dissolution of the second Constituent Assembly11, the assembly

hastily voted the new constitution through.

In addition to the political controversy, the new constitution sparked controversy

for much of the public. Leftists, progressives, Christians, and secularists all opposed what

they considered an overtly Islamist constitution.12 Morsi’s announcement on November

22nd sparked protests that continued off and on until the next summer.13 Although nothing

could change the fact that Morsi won the 2012 election, he essentially lost his mandate by

forcing through Islamic policies. Egyptians had learned with Mubarak that their

9 David D. Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, “Voting Begins in Egypt’s Presidential Runoff Election,” The New York Times, June 16, 2012, sec. Middle East, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/world/middleeast/egyptians-vote-in-presidential- runoff-election.html.

10 Partlett, “Constitution-Making by ‘We the Majority’ in Egypt.”

11 The court later delivered the opinion that the assembly should have been dissolved, but it was too late by then.

12 Partlett, “Constitution-Making by ‘We the Majority’ in Egypt.”

13 “Egypt’s Leader Declares Emergency after Clashes,” Reuters, January 27, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-anniversary-idUSBRE90N1E620130127.

31

demonstrations could spark real change.14 It seems likely that their previous success

emboldened them to demonstrate against Mohammad Morsi.

Amidst concern from the Egyptian people, public support of Morsi’s actions

waned, and protests continued. The draft constitution successfully passed a referendum

that took place between the 15th and 22nd of December. Passing the referendum hardly qualifies the constitution as a true success: despite passing with of 63.8% of the vote, a

voter turnout of only 32.9% leaves many doubts.15 While Egypt did not have a minimum threshold of voter turnout for the validity of the referendum, a turnout of 33% does not

suggest sufficient investment by the nominal electorate. In that same way, a turnout of

33% does not suggest that an existential threat to the Constitution would provoke strong

feelings towards it. While the assembly penned the draft constitution, however, concerning developments had reemerged under Morsi’s regime concerning the media.

Less than two months after Morsi’s election, an Egyptian court charged Islam Afifi, the editor-in-chief of Al Dostour, an influential opposition newspaper, with insulting the president.16 This return to Mubarak Era repression of the press only augmented fears that

the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to crackdown on the press in an effort to consolidate

14 Guardian Staff, “Egypt Protests: ’Something Has Changed in the Egyptian Psyche ’,” The Guardian, January 28, 2011, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/28/egypt-protests-frontline-reports-cairo.

15 “Voters Back Egyptian Constitution,” December 25, 2012, sec. Middle East, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20842487.

16 Egypt Source, “Top News: Egyptians Challenge Islamist President, Some Scuffle,” Atlantic Council, accessed April 25, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/top-news-egyptians-challenge- islamist-president-some-scuffle.

32

control over Egypt.17 This, along with the concerns about the new constitution concerned many Egyptians enough to use their newly discovered ability to protest.

At the end of June, the protesters sought Morsi’s resignation. For many Egyptians, the situation had passed a point of no return. Twenty-two million18 Egyptians had signed a

petition of no confidence in Morsi.19 According to reports, more people, fourteen million,

turned out to protest Morsi’s regime than turned out before Mubarak’s resignation.20 The protests began to turn bloody as skirmishes broke out involving police, Muslim

Brotherhood supporters, and also anti-Morsi protesters.21 Effectively, all of the external

factors suggested that Morsi faced long odds. By the time that the military made their 48-

hour ultimatum, Morsi had faced concerted protests, the press wanted him gone, and

distrust of the Muslim Brotherhood had spread.

17 “Egypt’s Mursi Accused of Stifling Dissent in Media Crackdown,” Reuters, August 17, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-media/egypts-mursi-accused-of-stifling- dissent-in-media-crackdown-idUSBRE87G0XQ20120817.

18 The elections themselves only had a turnout of 25 million. This means that 22 million signed a petition to lose his legitimacy and only 13 million voted for him in the first place.

19 Gamal Nassar, “Coup in Turkey and Egypt: Internal and External Dynamics,” Insight Turkey; Ankara 18, no. 3 (Summer 2016): 55–69. 20 “The Second Time Around.”

21 Shreeya Sinha and Erin Banco, “Timeline of Turmoil in Egypt From Mubarak and Morsi to Sisi,” accessed October 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/07/02/world/middleeast/03egypt-timeline- morsi.html.

33

The Military’s Announcement

On July 1st, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the minister of defense, announced on state television that the government had 48 hours to redress some of the protestors’ demands. “If the people’s demands are not met, the military, which is forced to act according to its role and duty, will have to disclose its own future plan. These steps will include discussions between all political powers, specifically the youth, who were and continue to be the spark of the revolution. No one party will be excluded or marginalized.”22 At face value, this statement suggests that the military probably broadly

favored the demands made by the protesters. Essentially, the military had publicly thrown

in their lot with the opponents of the regime. Under normal circumstances, a public threat

to seize power seems like an extremely risky move on the military’s part. That said,

General al-Sisi making his threats to the government on state-run television gives a

strong indication that the military had at least a moderate amount of confidence in their

ability to successfully overthrow Morsi’s regime. Perhaps even confidence that Morsi had

no meaningful way to counter their actions.

The President’s office attempted to fight back on social media using Facebook.

President Morsi’s government first claimed that President Obama had called him to offer

his support.23 This attempt to lean on President Obama legitimacy seems to indicate the

regime’s understanding that its constituents lacked confidence in it. The regime

considering President Obama the best authority to lean on for support demonstrates deep

issues. After all, strong regimes do not need to lean on another country’s president for

22 Bradley and Abdellatif, “Egypt Army Issues Ultimatum.” 23 Bradley and Abdellatif.

34

popular support. After appealing to President Obama, their next post appealed for the

Egyptian people to stand by their constitution and democratically elected government. It

also asserted that the military had made their televised statement without the approval of

the government and that the statement therefore carried no legitimacy.24 Perhaps with a

more popular Constitution, Egyptians would have felt more compelled to defend it.

However, the 33% turnout in the constitutional referendum, and the widespread petition

to remove Morsi’s legitimacy did not bode promising for widespread support. The

Muslim Brotherhood also called for counter-protests in favor of President Morsi.

Following the military’s announcement on July 1st, it quickly became apparent

that President Morsi had lost the support of his government. Six cabinet ministers

resigned, and the minister of interior publicly supported the military’s decision to

intervene. By now, the majority of Morsi’s cabinet believed in the inevitability of a

military intervention.25 The minister of interior’s decision to support the intervention meant that the ministry responsible for the national police had also officially thrown its lot in with the military.

On Tuesday, July 2nd, President Morsi met with General al-Sisi in what became a

last-ditch effort to maintain power. Morsi first offered concessions to the opposition26,

24 Ibid.

25 ERIC TRAGER, “The Rebellion,” in Arab Fall, How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days (Georgetown University Press, 2016), 205–26, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1g69zqg.18.

26 Trager believes that the opposition rejected the concessions because they hoped the military would just depose Morsi. However, al-Sisi rejected concessions because he believed that the people would not be satisfied.

35

which they rejected, and then to al-Sisi, which he also rejected.27 According to reports,

President Morsi offered, among others, the following concessions: The formation of a neutral committee to change the constitution, the formation of a national government representing all parties, call on the constitutional council to speed up the law on parliamentary elections, and an attorney general to replace the recently departed one.28

Shortly after midnight, in the early morning of July 3rd, President Mohamed Morsi gave a

defiant speech in which he vowed to keep control of the power legitimately bestowed

upon him by the people in the last plebiscite. President Morsi vehemently rejected the

ultimatum, vowing, “If the price for legitimacy is my blood, then I am prepared to

sacrifice my blood to legitimacy and my homeland.”29

At the same time that the president promised to lay down his life in favor of

democracy, bigger demonstrations than those that toppled Mubarak rocked Cairo.30 Ever since the military had announced their ultimatum, both the anti-Muslim Brotherhood and the pro-Muslim Brotherhood protests had grown. Morsi still had the Muslim Brotherhood

with him, but they faced a range of opponents from leftists, to Mubarak supporters, to

moderates, and to moderates.31 Morsi’s position seemed untenable in the face of such

27 TRAGER, “The Rebellion.”

28 Ibid.

29 Abby Ohlheiser, “The Egyptian Army’s Deadline Nears as Anti-Morsi Protests Continue,” The Atlantic, July 2, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/egyptian-armys-deadline- nears-anti-morsi-protests-continue/313686/.

30 “The Second Time Around.”

31 Patrick Kingsley, “How Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s First Elected President, Ended up on Death Row,” The Guardian, June 1, 2015, sec. World news,

36

widespread opposition. Perhaps the military had indeed planned to actually negotiate

concessions to allow Morsi to maintain power. Foreign diplomats who knew al-Sisi suggested that he had no plans to seize power initially.32 Just as plausibly, as in Turkey in

1980, the military simply wished to conduct due diligence before staging a coup.

As the deadline approached on Wednesday, July 3rd, the military and the

government engaged in an information battle. Despite sporadic reports of violence and

fatalities, but everything seemed largely peaceful. President Morsi’s Republican Guard

controlled the state-run media’s headquarters, but the Facebook page of the military

announced that the people should expect an announcement right after the deadline.33 By this point, the police has started more openly supporting the protesters and supposedly the went so far as to pass out juice to the protesters at Tahrir Square.34 At 2:52 PM, President

Morsi’s Facebook page issued a statement condemning the steps taken to lead Egypt

down an illegitimate and undemocratic path. His statement asserted that the legitimate

government believed in a collaborative process to rebuild Egypt at the ballot box.35 At

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/mohamed-morsi-execution-death- sentence-egypt.

32 Hessler, “Egypt’s Failed Revolution.”

33 Matthew Weaver and Tom McCarthy, “Egyptian Army Suspends Constitution and Removes President Morsi – as It Happened,” The Guardian, July 3, 2013, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2013/jul/03/egypt- countdown-army-deadline-live.

34 Weaver and McCarthy.

Posts,” accessed - ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪﺙ ﺍﻟﺮﺳﻤﻰ ﺑﺎﺳﻢ ﺍﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﺔ . Egypt Presidential Spokesman“ 35 April 27, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/egpres.sm/posts/686985537985194?comment_id=7998137& offset=0&total_comments=193.

37

this point, the president understood precisely the precariousness of his situation, and he

seemed focused on taking precautions with this statement. Interestingly, while not a

concession, this suggests that Morsi believed the military had the upper hand. Essam el-

Haddad’s Facebook statement further confirms this. One of Morsi’s senior foreign policy advisors El-Haddad, stated at 15:47 that, “As I write these lines, I am fully aware that these may be the last lines I get to post on this page. For the sake of Egypt and for historical accuracy, let’s call what is happening by its real name: Military coup.”36 By the

afternoon of July 3rd, the regime had embraced attempts to contain the damage.

Morsi’s government attempted to engage the people through these Facebook

posts, but it fell on deaf ears. They wished to use Facebook to spin any potential action as

a military coup and therefore illegitimate. At 6:39 PM, Mohamed Beltagy, a senior

Muslim Brotherhood MP, went on the Egyptian edition of Al-Jazeera to deliver what

hindsight has shown as a last-ditch effort to prevent President Morsi from a seemingly

inevitable deposition. He warned that military coups, including the upcoming one, do

nothing but threaten democracy and destroy faith in institutions.37 Perhaps President

Morsi had seen the writing on the wall and understood that he didn’t have a chance. The

final rhetoric from the government had already conceded victory to the military, and

showed a complete lack of confidence by the regime in its ability to survive.

36 “Office of Assistant to President of Egypt on Foreign Relations - Official - Posts,” accessed April 27, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/Foreign.Relations.President.Asst.Egy/photos/the-egyptian- presidencyoffice-of-the-assistant-to-the-president-on-foreign-relat/618096081548153/. 37 David D. Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, “Morsi Faces Ultimatum as Allies Speak of Military ‘Coup,’” The New York Times, July 2, 2013, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/world/middleeast/egypt-protests.html.

38

At 7:00 PM, the state-run newspaper Al-Ahram announced the end of Mohamed

Morsi’s tenure as President and the beginning of the military’s control.38 Several minutes later, General al-Sisi announced, in a speech televised on the state-run television, the new plan for Egypt. In his short address that has similarities to Turkey in 1980 and Algeria in

1961, he said:

The Egyptian Armed Forces first declared, is still declaring and will always declare that it stands distant from political forces. The Armed Forces, based on its insightfulness, has been called by the Egyptian people for help, not to hold the reins of power, yet to discharge its civil responsibility and answer demands of responsibility. This is the message received by the EAF and heard in all of the country. In turn this call was heeded by the EAF, and it has understood the essence of this message. Before it has come close to the political scene adhering to its responsibility, the EAF over the past month has inserted efforts, direct and indirect to contain the situation within and achieve national reconciliation among all institutions, including the presidency. Since the past, the army has called for national dialogue, yet it was rejected by the presidency in the last moment. Many calls, initiatives followed until to date. The EAF similarly on more than one occasion presented a strategic assessment domestically and internationally, which contained the most eminent (this part unclear). The EAF as a patriotic institution to contain division and confront challenges and perils to exit the current crisis. As we closely monitored the current crisis, the command of EAF met with the president on June 2nd where it presented the opinion of the AF on the state of (the country) and (relayed) the cause of masses and Egyptian people. Hopes were all pinned on national conciliation. Yet, the address of the president yesterday and before the expiry of the 48-hour ultimatum did not meet the demands of the people. As a result, it was necessary for the EAF to act on its patriotic and historic responsibility without sidelining, marginalizing any party, where during the meeting a road map was agreed upon which includes the following: Suspending the constitution provisionally; The chief justice of the constitutional court will declare the early presidential elections; Interim period until president elected. Chief Justice will have presidential powers; A technocrat, capable

38 “Egypt Military Unveils Transitional Roadmap - Politics - Egypt - Ahram Online,” accessed April 27, 2019, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/75631.aspx.

39

national government will be formed; The committee will offer all its expertise to review the new constitution; The Supreme Constitutional Law will address the draft law and prepare for parliamentary elections; Securing and guaranteeing freedom of expression, freedom of media. All necessary measures will be taken to empower youth so they can take part in decision making processes. The EAF appeal to the Egyptian people with all its spectrum to steer away from violence and remain peaceful. The Armed Forced warn it will stand up firmly and strictly to any act deviating from peacefulness based on its patriotic and historic responsibility. May God save Egypt and the honorable, defiant people of Egypt. The Egyptian Armed Forces first declared, is still declaring and will always declare that it stands distant from political forces. The Armed Forces, based on its insightfulness, has been called by the Egyptian people for help, not to hold the reins of power, yet to discharge its civil responsibility and answer demands of responsibility. This is the message received by the EAF and heard in all of the country.39

General al-Sisi’s statement shares key aspects with the previous coup declarations discussed. Reading the coup declaration, the military must transition quickly from dismantling the state to preserving it. The General’s speech did not point the finger at a certain group, and it emphasized non-partisanship. He began with the claim concerning the military’s continued political neutrality. The speech did not even mention Mohamed

Morsi or the Muslim Brotherhood, and so it obviously did not blame them for the crisis.

Blaming them could only create further divisions in Egyptian society. In a simple declaration, he asserted that the crisis had reached a point where the military heard the demands of the people and had to act on its “patriotic and historic responsibility.” The coup declaration announced a reset to Egyptian politics. This speech definitely resembled both the Algeria 1961 and Turkey 1980 declarations. The military hit the talking points

39 “Transcript: Egypt’s Army Statement,” accessed November 26, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/201373203740167797.html.

40

necessary to allay fears. Of course, considering the widespread lack of support for

Morsi’s government, a speech condemning the ex-President with fire and brimstone may have received a fantastic reception from some part of Egypt.

Following al-Sisi’s speech, a diverse assortment of voices provided military’s intervention with public support. Directly after General al-Sisi spoke, Ahmed el-Tayeb, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, took the podium and lent his support to the new plan for

Egypt and encouraged Egyptians to fix their differences.40 Following the Imam’s address,

one Morsi’s opponent in the last election, Mohammad el-Baradei spoke, urging the

Egyptian people to reconcile their differences before anything else.41 Next, the Coptic

Pope Tawadros II echoed Imam al-Azhar’s sentiments. Other notable supporters of

Morsi’s deposition included the second-largest Muslim group in Egypt, behind the

Muslim Brotherhood, and Tamarod, the grassroots movement which had helped to

organize the protests.42 The vast differences in those lending support to the military’s

actions speaks to the unpopularity of Morsi’s regime. The highest authorities in the

country of Islam and Christianity providing a unified front against a public figure who

had run out of widespread public support.

Even after the speeches, the Muslim Brotherhood continued unsuccessful attempts

to reach out. General al-Sisi’s apparent neutrality in his speech did lend credibility to the

military’s actions domestically. Amidst such widespread disapproval, refusing to lay the

40 TRAGER, “The Rebellion.”

41 “Egypt Military Unveils Transitional Roadmap - Politics - Egypt - Ahram Online.”

42 TRAGER, “The Rebellion.”

41

blame at the feet of Morsi and the Brotherhood may have spared many lives. Not forty-

five minutes after General al-Sisi took the podium, Morsi’s official Facebook page

declared that he remained president and that any actions taken by the military directly

contradicted democracy.43 Right after the hour, at 8:06 pm there emerged reports of pre-

recorded Morsi speeches being broadcasted in certain neighborhoods of Cairo.44 At this point, Morsi had already lost. Outside of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptians had demonstrated their unwillingness to come to his defense. Considering the multi-day nature of this coup, Morsi’s inability to mobilize public support proved fatal. Morsi did not get on television to rouse his supporters in the same way that President Erdoğan did.

Essentially, Morsi could not rouse popular support through social media in the same way that President Erdoğan did either. His lack of popularity limited the support he and his constitution received in their hour of need.

The Egyptian coup has several lessons. ICT did not help Mohamed Morsi retain the presidency. He had the means in his possession to reach out to nearly every Egyptian, but it proved worthless. His rhetoric, while filled with bravado, served no purpose. His lack of personal popularity, along with widespread discontent within his regime, meant that his appeals to the public remained widely unanswered. In fact, is rhetoric probably did little to nothing to galvanize his supporters as the Muslim Brotherhood had already demonstrated a willingness to back him unconditionally. The military also had no trouble whatsoever portraying themselves as having control. Also, Morsi and his supporters did

43 Weaver and McCarthy, “Egyptian Army Suspends Constitution and Removes President Morsi – as It Happened.”

44 Ibid.

42

an excellent job of portraying the military as having control also. Appearing on state

television and announcing that, “the government has 48 hours to make concessions or

else,” sends an indubitably strong message. Morsi gave his defiant midnight speech, but

he just seemed to fade away and General al-Sisi made the next appearance on television

to read the coup declaration.

Morsi inherited a difficult situation, but he managed to make the worst of it.

Egypt did not have strong enough institutions to protect the presidency. Coups definitely

harm democracy, but the Egyptian people believed that Morsi also harmed democracy.

Egyptians had voted in a presidential election with more than one candidate for the

second time ever in the 2012 election.45 That election took place less than a full eighteen

months after Egyptians forced a thirty-year dictator to resign. Morsi may have won the

majority in the elections, but his subsequent actions caused his support to collapse.

Everything from repressing the media to forcing the constitution through to seizing emergency powers displeased a vast number of Egyptians. Mubarak’s resignation empowered Egyptians and taught them of the power the people held when it came to

mass demonstrations.46 A lack of personal popularity, much of which he inflicted upon

himself, doomed his presidency. Had Morsi secured widespread support from Egyptian

society, the military may not have felt so comfortable deposing him. However, his lack of

personal popularity meant that the military faced minimal resistance from the people, and

Morsi’s political survival had no chance.

45 “Presidential Election in Egypt.”

46 “The Second Time Around.”

43

CHAPTER FOUR

Turkey 2016

For the fourth case, the Turkish coup attempt of 2016, we must examine it in the same

light. First, to what extent did the regime enjoy popularity? The Turkish government in

2016 enjoyed wide, but not universal popularity. Furthermore, democracy in Turkey had become a point of pride for the people. Even the regime’s political opponents preferred to defend the existing regime and spark change at the ballot box as opposed to allowing

regime change friendly to them. Second, to what extent did the regime have access to

ICT? The Turkish government in 2016 had the most comprehensive access to ICT discussed so far. In addition to social media and television channels, Recep Tayyip

Erdoğan’s regime made effective use of unconventional communication technology such as the loudspeakers at mosques. President Erdoğan’s personal popularity allowed the regime to harness all of the ICT they had access to. The supporters answered the appeal and saved the regime from being overthrown.

Background on the Coup Plan

The regime accused a wide variety of military leaders of involvement in the putsch. General Akın Öztürk, the previous commander of the Air Force, and a member of

the Supreme Military Council at the time, allegedly directed the operation aspect of

44

coup.1 Indictments in March of 2017 named a cabal of 38, including Brigadier-General

Semih Terzi, former Commander of the 1st special forces brigade, and Major-General

Mehmet Dişli, as responsible.2 President Erdoğan accused the Muslim Cleric Fethullah

Gülen of masterminding the coup.3 4 Under different circumstances, perhaps in another regime, the post-putsch arrests would indicate the responsible parties. Considering that the Turkish government arrested over 6,000 people for putsch-related activities in the aftermath of the coup, questions remain.5 Specifically, questions as to who the regime

arrested for direct participation in the coup and who President Erdoğan saw the

opportunity to purge simply for general opposition to his regime.

The putschists had several goals. First, they sought control of Ankara, the capitol.

Primary targets in Ankara included the presidential palace, the house of Parliament, the

1 “What to Know About the General Blamed for the Failed Coup in Turkey,” Time, accessed April 27, 2019, http://time.com/4410330/turkey-coup-recep-tayyip-erdogan- akin-ozturk/.

2 “Prosecutors Reveal Junta behind Turkey’s Coup Attempt - Turkey News,” Hürriyet Daily News, accessed April 27, 2019, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/prosecutors- reveal-junta-behind-turkeys-coup-attempt-110431.

3 Ezgi Basaran, “Who Was behind Attempted Turkey Coup?,” July 16, 2016, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36815476.

4 Erdoğan and Gülen have been engaged in a feud since 2013. Erdoğan has seized Gülen’s assets and closed his schools down, and Gülen has released evidence of Erdoğan’s and several cabinet officials’ corruption.

5 Patrick Kingsley, “Turkey Detains 6,000 over Coup Attempt as Erdoğan Vows to ‘Clean State of Virus,’” The Guardian, July 17, 2016, sec. World news, 000, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/17/us-turkey-coup-attempt-fethullah-gulen.

45

national police headquarters, and the national intelligence headquarters.6 As a part of this

first goal, the putschists hoped to arrest7 President Erdoğan. Leaders such as the president

wield great authority, and often have a significant amount of charisma. The Turkish

military in 2016 needed to hold Erdoğan securely for at least the duration of the coup to

prevent him from exerting his influence.8 Second, they wanted to control Istanbul. As

opposed to political targets, seizing control of Istanbul was vital due to the economic

influence and soft power interest of the city.9

Importantly, the government knew of the coup in advance. The intelligence

apparatus received concrete information on the coup no later than 2:20 pm on the day of

the coup.10 The putschists planned to induce senior military officials to defect, and if they refused, detain them, in order to allow the aforementioned renegade faction to seize full control of the military.11 An unscheduled meeting between the director of the National

Intelligence Organization, Hakan Fidan, and the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff,

6 M. Hakan Yavuz and Bayram Balci, Turkey’s July 15th Coup: What Happened and Why (Salt Lake City, UNITED STATES: University of Utah Press, 2018), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bayloru/detail.action?docID=5314713.

7 If they had been unable to arrest President Erdoğan, killing him would have served as a suboptimal means of achieving this goal.

8 Luttwak, Coup d’État.

9 Yavuz and Balci, Turkey’s July 15th Coup.

10 Maximilian Popp, “The Chronicle of a Long Night: Revisiting Turkey’s Failed Coup Attempt,” Spiegel Online, July 6, 2017, sec. International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/turkey-coup-a-chronology-of-events-a- 1155762.html.

11 Yavuz and Balci, Turkey’s July 15th Coup.

46

Hulusi Akar, suggested to the putschists that the regime suspected something.12 Due to

the putschists’ suspicions of the regime’s suspicions, they decided to stage the coup six

hours earlier than planned. The change in time meant that the coup would commence at

9:00 on Friday night instead of 3:00 on Saturday morning. Essentially, this became a

prime-time coup: prime for television audiences, not for covert action to overthrow a

government.

Staging a prime-time coup directly contributed to President Erdoğan’s ability to

call upon the Turkish people to save the republic. Due to the early hour, concerned Turks

could stay up to watch the coup unfold on television. Over the course of the night, events

made it clear that the regime had survived the attempt. The Directorate of Religious

Affairs went so far as to order mosques to issue a call for civilian opposition to the coup.13 President Erdoğan managed to address the nation via an unconventional speech

transmitted on CNN Turkey. The regime’s ability to rely on the people for help served to

ensure its political survival.

The Putsch Begins

The coup unfolded in three acts; the first act began in an attempt to seize

President Erdoğan. Indeed, the putschists probably considered that striking during the

president’s vacation would lessen the degree of difficulty involved with securing him.

After all, a hotel on the Riviera probably has less security than the presidential palace. In

12 Popp, “The Chronicle of a Long Night.” 13 Serhat Aslaner, “The Role of Turkey’s Diyanet During the July 15 Coup Attempt,” The New Turkey, July 15, 2018, https://thenewturkey.org/the-role-of-turkeys-diyanet-during- the-july-15-coup-attempt.

47

what posterity will rightfully portray as an enormous error in planning, the putschists

only attacked President Erdoğan’s hotel about twenty minutes after he had left.14 About the same time, the putschists attempted to recruit General Akar to lead the coup. His refusal resulted in his immediate arrest.15 General Akar refusing to join the coup created a set-back, albeit one with a contingency plan. The Turkish military absolutely had capable officers who possessed the skills to carry out a coup. However, no one in the Turkish

government enjoyed a stature anywhere near President Erdoğan. Failing to secure him proved practically calamitous and they had no plan to fall back on.

Following the two setbacks, the putschists abandoned secrecy and began the operation openly. The commanders mobilized troops to take control of the previously mentioned strategic control points, and around 10:30 pm civilians began to notice their presence.16 The official coup declaration only came after midnight, but the people of

Turkey must receive a modicum of credit. Recognizing the unannounced presence of

tanks on the Bosporus Bridge in Istanbul as a potential coup attempt is not a major

stretch. Quite frankly, the task of preventing the people of Turkey from noticing this coup

attempt at 10:30 pm, would have bordered on Herculean. Instead, the rebels probably

14 Constanze Letsch Philip Oltermann in Berlin, “Turkey Arrests 11 Soldiers over Alleged Erdoğan Kidnap Bid,” The Guardian, August 1, 2016, sec. World news, 11, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/01/turkey-arrests-11-soldiers-over-alleged- erdogan-kidnap-bid.

15 Faruk Kaymakcı, “We Know Who Tried to Overthrow the Turkish Government,” POLITICO, December 21, 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-coup-opinion- fethullah-gulen-adil-oksuz/. 16 “TIMELINE-Turkey’s Attempted Coup,” Reuters, July 16, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-security-timeline/timeline-turkeys-attempted- coup-idUSL8N1A158X.

48

planned on alerting the people. A military force attempting stealth would not fire live

ammunition, fly low and create sonic booms, and also use missiles.17 Perhaps a form of

shock and awe tactics. In the digitally connected world of 2016, this news inevitably

spread like wildfire on Twitter and other social media platforms.

Once the government acknowledged the existence of the putsch, both they and the

putschists sent out conflicting messages in an attempt to secure control of the state. As

the putschists began firing with live ammunition, they began a concerted effort to seize

control of the state television channel.18 Just after 11:00 pm, Prime Minister Binali

Yıldırım announced the attempt by rogue elements of the military to overthrow the

government. He confirmed the military’s newly granted mandate to use whatever means

necessary to counter the coup.19 Twenty-three minutes later, the military released a

statement claiming to have taken power in order to protect constitutional order in Turkey.

Almost as a counter to the military’s declaration, CNN Turk announced President

Erdoğan’s safety at 11:38 pm.20 The putschists countered by seizing control of the

Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) and forced the anchor to read a

declaration of martial law at 00:05. TRT stopped broadcasting and would only show a loop of the declaration for over an hour.21

17 Popp, “The Chronicle of a Long Night.”

18 Ibid.

19 “TIMELINE-Turkey’s Attempted Coup.”

20 Ibid.

21 Popp, “The Chronicle of a Long Night.”

49

Erdoğan’s Speech Turns the Tide

In the most pivotal move of the night, President Erdoğan called CNN Türk on

FaceTime and addressed the nation. He first condemned the small cadre of officers had carried out this attempt to subvert the unity of the Turkish people. Next, he vowed to make them pay a heavy price for their crimes, take any and all necessary steps to preserve the state, and bring about a quick resolution to the coup attempt.22 Thus far, his speech follows the pattern set by de Gaulle in 1961 of downplaying the risk of the coup, but also promising a swift response from the government. However, President Erdoğan surpassed de Gaulle when he went beyond simply ordering soldiers to oppose the coup. He said, “I am inviting the people of Turkey to go out into the squares, and to go to the airports.23

Let us gather together in the squares and at the airports. This renegade faction’s tanks and bullets will be left powerless when faced with the might of the people.”24 President

Erdoğan’s supporters complied with his admonition, and indeed took to the streets to defend his regime. Interestingly, President Erdoğan himself made no claims about defending democracy. One of the CNN Türk anchors initially made the claim, and that narrative has stuck ever since.25

22 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan açıklama yaptı,” CNN Türk, accessed April 24, 2019, https://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-aciklama-yapti.

23 President Erdoğan may have specifically mentioned the airports in hope that the people would drive the soldiers out and he could land his presidential plane with relative ease.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

50

Immediately after the president’s speech, the balance began to tip, imperceptibly

at first, in the government’s favor. The putschists at this point controlled the major infrastructure in both Ankara and Istanbul. They controlled the TRT and the airport.26

The president managed to call in on FaceTime and galvanize the people into action.

Unfortunately, at this time the coup began to turn bloody. Sitting in front of the tv during my vacation on the Aegean in Turkey, I initially reacted to President Erdoğan’s call by asking, “Is he crazy? This could start a civil war.” The president could not stay on CNN

Turk forever, but his official account tweeted a reminder of his invitation the Turkish people to the streets and airports to take back their democracy and demonstrate our national will. President Erdoğan had mass texts sent out, calling the on the people to resist.27 He even had the Ministry of Religious Affairs order imams to call for mobilization from the minarets of mosques all over the country.28 The government

successfully harnessed every tool at its disposal to ensure that the coup’s defeat seemed

like an inevitability. The perception that the government had to win became self-

perpetuating as it encouraged wider support from the Turkish people.29

Once President Erdoğan mobilized the people, the coup’s defeat truly became

inevitable. As people took to the streets, government forces began to engage the

26 Popp, “The Chronicle of a Long Night.”

27 Andrew Liptak, “Turkish Government Asked Public to Resist Coup in Text Message,” The Verge, July 16, 2016, https://www.theverge.com/2016/7/16/12205698/turkey- uprising-text-message-sms-streets-democracy.

28 Aslaner, “The Role of Turkey’s Diyanet During the July 15 Coup Attempt.”

29 Zack Beauchamp, “Why Turkey’s Coup Failed, According to an Expert,” Vox, July 16, 2016, https://www.vox.com/2016/7/16/12205352/turkey-coup-failed-why.

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putschists in firefights and in the air.30 Tanks fired upon parliament as gunfire became increasingly audible. In the ensuing fighting, government forces shot down a pro-putsch helicopter, pro-government and rebel forces engaged in firefights at airports, and bombs exploded in downtown Ankara.31 The fighting continued the entire night, and toward dawn it became crystal clear that the government would ultimately remain in control.

President Erdoğan arrived at the airport in Istanbul at 4:00 am and declared that no power could overcome the national will.32 Later, at 6:39 am, the president declared the coup all but finished, but exhorted the people to stay on the streets until the authorities unquestionably restored order.33 About three minutes later, the final soldiers holding out surrendered on the Bosporus Bridge.

This coup has several important lessons. The president’s successful use of ICT to communicate with the people directly facilitated with his survival. The invention of applications like Skype or FaceTime in 2010 allowed President Erdoğan to communicate efficiently with CNN. His rhetoric notwithstanding, the ability to communicate with the people through mass texts as well as Twitter played a key role. On the night of the coup,

Twitter usage among Turks surpassed 35 times the normal rate.34 His personal popularity meant that the people demonstrated a willingness to risk their personal safety for the government. Second, the putschists made some important miscalculations. They

30 Popp, “The Chronicle of a Long Night.”

31 “TIMELINE-Turkey’s Attempted Coup.”

32 Popp, “The Chronicle of a Long Night.”

33 Ibid.

34 Yavuz and Balci, Turkey’s July 15th Coup.

52

underestimated the lack of popular support for their coup, as they based their analysis of bygone years. Firing on the people only served to galvanize the narrative that the putschists were the enemies of the people of Turkey. They seemed more interested in scaring people into staying home than gathering popular support. Had everything gone according to plan and the coup started at 3:00 am then public opinion may not have caused a difference. President Erdoğan may not have managed to successfully reach out to the Turkish people at 3:00 am. Public opinion, however, did matter for a prime-time coup.

The 2016 coup had key differences from the successful coup of 1980. President

Erdoğan had enjoyed slightly over thirteen years as the head of state, and the military had no grounds to make any accusations of incompetence like in 1980. In fact, just the previous November, the AK party had secured 49.5% of the vote and established their biggest ever Parliamentary majority with 317 out of 550 seats. Such a party not only clearly still enjoyed wide popular support, but it also seems less believable that the will of the people would be to have them removed only nine months on. Political memories of the aftermath of previous coups would have also caused concern. Many Turks would remember living under martial law, especially in the aftermath of the 1980 coup. They would not view the three-year period where a military junta ruled very favorably.

Although President Erdoğan did not explicitly mention the old junta, the harsh treatment received by his constituents at that time may have sparked a significant portion of the population with apprehension. Turkey had been enjoying a period of relative stability,

Turks would not have been in a hurry to return to “the bad old days.”

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At the bottom line, the putschists weren’t able to create the monopoly on information necessary for success.35 Oftentimes, making it seem like the coup is succeeding convinces either unaligned or opposition members to defect. In this case, because the coup took place when practically the entire country watched television, the monopoly on information had an even more vital role than usual. Only the national public television channel went off air, whereas both privately owned channels continued broadcasting and access to the internet remained. The ability of the regime to reach out and call upon the people to resist, when combined with President Erdoğan’s personal popularity proved fatal to the ambitions of the putschists. The regime successfully turned the narrative about the inevitability of the coup’s defeat into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

35 Beauchamp, “Why Turkey’s Coup Failed, According to an Expert.”

54

CONCLUSION

These four cases represent clear attempts at a minority group to displace the government by lodging itself into critical parts of the apparatus. Presidents de Gaulle and

Erdoğan both survived, whereas Presidents Demirel and Morsi did not. Both sides display an even split between having ICT.

Popular Unpopular

Modern ICT The coup fails The coup succeeds

Modern ICT gives the Reaching out creates no popular regime the perfect benefit for the unpopular chance to rally support regime

EX. Turkey 2016 EX. Egypt 2013

No ICT The coup may fail The coup succeeds

Popularity boosted A lack of popularity made chances of survival with reaching out a futile the tools at hand endeavor

EX. Algeria 1961 EX. Turkey 1980

Figure 2: The ability of modern ICT to frustrate attempted coups is conditional on the popularity of the regime

55

All four countries had undergone coups in the past. Three presidents had the

chance to use ICT to frustrate an attempted coup, but only two found success. The two

that found success enjoyed significant personal popularity. Frankly, the broad similarities

end here. Turkey in 2016 enjoyed relative stability in comparison to the other cases, but

Erdoğan did not make an appeal relating to stability. Also, undergoing coup attempts

rarely come hand-in-hand with stability. The two successful coups displayed unified

armed forces carrying out coups, but both failures had predecessors where small

segments of the armed forces successfully dislodged the government. In every case, the

military attempted to portray their coup as a non-partisan reset. Quite frankly, their

announcements seemed to all try to tick off boxes on the same checklist.

The appeal to the public, or lack thereof, played a key role in determining political

survival. When President Erdoğan called upon the public, they responded because they

wanted to protect their institutions against what he successfully portrayed as an attack on

their democracy. When President de Gaulle called upon the people of France, they

responded out of the desire to protect France from the delusions of a retired quartet of generals. He vowed to lay down his life in defense of the Republic, and de Gaulle’s personality caused others to join him. When President Morsi called upon Egyptians, he did not receive a widespread response. He tried, but to no avail. Morsi did not successfully portray the military’s coup as an attack on Egyptian democracy, and a significant portion of Egyptians seemed prepared for him to go. President Demirel, on the other hand, did not enjoy the same popularity as de Gaulle or Erdoğan, and he also had no chance to reach out to the people of Turkey.

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For those concerned about surviving a coup, this thesis carries the following

implication. First, popularity matters. Without popularity, ICT cannot carry a significant impact in terms of political survival. Second, the opportunity must present itself. If the coup plotters strike swiftly, and the opportunity to reach out does not present itself, ICT cannot create a significant impact either. For a popular leader with the opportunity to reach out, ICT should improve odds of political survival:

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Are you popular?

Yes No

No benefit derived Do you have the for political

ability to use ICT? survival

No

Yes

No benefit derived for political survival

Your odds of political survival have increased

Figure 2: Understanding how ICT maximizes survival odds

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Those concerned with surviving a coup should consider following Erdoğan’s

route. Charles de Gaulle also did many things right in his counter-coup speech. He did well to call upon the people of France to defend the Fifth Republic, and also to make assertions as to the delusions of the putschists. However, leaders would do well to ensure they do not fall short in imitating his appeal due to missing a key aspect: not being

Charles de Gaulle. Without the credibility brought by liberating France from occupation,

asking the people to fight with you again rings hollow. Instead, take Erdoğan’s route: use

the platform to rouse the people to defend their democracy. Continually claim that the

government maintains control in the hopes that the claim becomes self-fulfilling. Reach

out across as many platforms as possible to ensure maximum mobilization. If all goes

well, the elevated costs involved will cause the putschists to stand down.

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APPENDIX

Hulusi Akar: The Chief of the General Staff at the time of the 2016 coup, General Akar

resisted the putschists offer to let him lead the coup and refused to cooperate with signing

the order for martial law. Akar is currently the Minister of Defense.

Antoine Argoud: A colonel who specialized in counter-insurgency and also a member of the OAS, Argoud was arrested after the failed plot to assassinate de Gaulle in 1962. His

revelations allowed the capture of the other plotters.

Mohamed el-Baradei: A prominent Egyptian legal-scholar, he served as Director-

General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for three terms. He was

awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work at the IAEA.

Abdullah Çatlı: A hitman and ultranationalist, Çatlı later turned out to be working for

the government.

Maurice Challe: An air force general who was one of the four generals who participated

in the 1961 Algiers putsch.

Michel Debré: He was a French government official who served as Prime Minister under

Charles de Gaulle for three years. He served in a variety of positions and spent twenty-six

years in the national assembly.

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Süleyman Demirel: Demirel served as Prime Minister on five separate occasions. He

also served as President for one term. In addition to being overthrown in the 1980 coup,

he was ousted in the 1971 coup.

Mehmet Dişli: A major-general in the Turkish Army who was allegedly one of the architects of the 2016 coup. As of November 2018, he is still on trial.

Bülent Ecevit: He served as Prime Minister on four separate occasions. He was the leader of the opposition during the 1980 coup.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: The Prime Minister of Turkey from 2003 – 2014 and the

President from 2014 – present. The fusion of liberal economic policies and conservative politics with his cult of personality have been described as Neo-Ottoman.

Kenan Evren: Served as President between 1980 and 1989. In 2014, he was demoted all the way to private and sentenced to life-imprisonment. He died less than a year later.

Hakan Fidan: The Director of the National Intelligence Service (MİT) from 2010 – present. MİT was involved both in the 1971 and 1980 coups in Turkey.

Charles de Gaulle: The President of France from 1959 to 1969. He was also the leader of the Free French during World War II. Considered one of the greatest Frenchmen of all time along leaders such as Charlemagne or Napoléon.

Fethullah Gülen: A Turkish-born Muslim cleric who was allies with Erdoğan until around 2013. Ever since then, they have been trading covert blows which ranged from businesses being seized to incriminating information being leaked. He’s currently in exile in Pennsylvania. Erdoğan maintains that he caused the coup to happen.

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Adem Huduti: A Kosovo-born Turkish major-general who was the commander of the

Second Army at the time of the coup. He is currently serving the first year of a fifteen-

year sentence.

Edmond Jouhaud: A decorated general who was one of the four generals. He joined the

OAS after and continued to fight for French Algeria for a limited time.

Mohamed Morsi: A former MP, Morsi is an engineer who, as the Muslim Brotherhood’s

candidate, was elected president in 2012. His social policies were quite conservative with

an Islamist bent, and under his rule the economy performed very poorly. However, many

of the reasons for the poor economy were not his fault.

Hosni Mubarak: A career Air Force officer who rose to the rank of Marshal, Mubarak

seized power in Egypt in 1981 eight days after Anwar Al-Sadat was killed. It was only

during the Arab Spring in 2011 that he lost power. Mubarak’s Egypt had a secular

government with liberal economic policies and a poor human rights record.

Jacques Massu: A highly decorated soldier, General Massu had seen action during

World War II, the Suez Crisis, the war in Indochina, and also commanded French forces

in the Battle of Algiers. He took part in the 1958 coup, but refused to take part in 1961.

Akın Öztürk: The former commander of the Air Force and one of the members of the

Supreme Military Council, General Öztürk was accused of being the mastermind behind

the 2016 coup attempt. Prosecutors are seeking aggravated life-sentences in his trial that was still ongoing as of November 2018.

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Raoul Salan: He was one of the four generals. In addition to being the most decorated soldier in the entire French Army, General Salan founded the OAS. People still bring flowers to his grave every year on his birthday.

Haydar Saltık: General Saltık served under Kenan Evren and was ordered to deliver a report as to the feasibility of the coup.

Abdel Fattah al-Sisi: Elected president by a landslide 97% of the vote in 2014, he was reelected in 2018 with 98% of the vote. A secularist who undid a lot of Morsi and the

Muslim Brotherhood’s policies inspired by religion, al-Sisi has also managed to improve the economy during his tenure.

Jacques Soustelle: Retired governor of Algeria and member of the OAS. Soustelle strongly believed in French Algeria.

Jean-Jacques Susini: Susini was another one of the founders of the OAS. He took part in the Algerian conflict.

Pope Tawadros II: Pope Tawadros II is the leader of the Coptic Church of Alexandria.

There are between 15 and 18 million Coptic Christians in Egypt.

Semih Terzi: He was a major-general who was killed while trying to take over the central command during the 2016 putsch.

Ahmed el-Tayeb, Grand Imam of el-Azhar: One of the more moderate Sunni clerics in

Egypt, el-Tayeb is the Grand Imam of one of the biggest mosques in Egypt. Along with the Grand Mufti, he is the foremost Islamic Authority in Egypt.

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Alparslan Türkeş: Was a colonel who served as deputy-prime minister twice. He also served as the head of the nationalist party for 28 years. Also, he was one of the founders of Operation Counter-Guerilla, which is the Turkish version of Operation Gladio.

Bülent Ulusu: Served as prime minister under the 1980 junta in Turkey. He had been the service chief of the Navy before retiring to become PM.

Binali Yıldırım: A career civil-servant, Yıldırım was Prime Minister at the time of the

2016 coup. He was also the last-ever PM as he co-led with Erdoğan the effort to transition to a presidential system in 2017. After the abolition of the role of Prime

Minister, he became Speaker of the National Assembly and he remains in that role.

André Zeller: One of the four generals who acted to overthrow de Gaulle in 1961.

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