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Home , Atique Ahmed, Babu Gulabrai, Bharatiya Kranti Dal, Chittu Pandey, Elections in Rajasthan, Harit Pradesh

A STUDY OF ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION OF IN SINCE 1996

Thesis

Submitted For the Award of the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy In Political Science

By

Mohammad Amir

Under The Supervision of

DR. MOHAMMAD NASEEM KHAN

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH ()

Department Of Political Science Telephone: Aligarh Muslim University Chairman: (0571) 2701720 AMU PABX : 2700916/27009-21 Aligarh - 202002 Chairman : 1561 Office :1560 FAX: 0571-2700528

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Mr. Mohammad Amir, Research Scholar of the Department of Political Science, A.M.U. Aligarh has completed his thesis entitled, “A STUDY OF ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION OF BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY IN UTTAR PRADESH SINCE 1996”, under my supervision. This thesis has been submitted to the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, in fulfillment of requirement for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. To the best of my knowledge, it is his original work and the matter presented in the thesis has not been submitted in part or full for any degree of this or any other university.

DR. MOHAMMAD NASEEM KHAN Supervisor All the praises and thanks are to almighty Allah (The Only God and Lord of all), who always guides us to the right path and without whose blessings this work could not have been accomplished.

Acknowledgements

I am deeply indebted to Late Prof. Syed Amin Ashraf who has been constant source of inspiration for me, whose blessings, Cooperation, love and unconditional support always helped me. May Allah give him peace. I really owe to Prof. Ummehani Ashraf who always inspires me a lot.

I’m extremely grateful to my supervisor, Dr. MOHAMMAD NASEEM KHAN Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, for suggesting this topic and for helping me to acquire the confidence to embark upon this work. I owe him more supports, ideas and thoughts than it can be given due credit here. From inception to conclusion, this study owes so much to him.

I convey my sincere thanks to the Chairman, Professor Mirza Asmer Beg, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, for providing necessary research facilities.

I also extend my profound thanks to Prof. Arif Hameed, Prof. Mohd. Abid, Prof. Nafees Ansari, Dr. Farhana Kausar, Mr. Aftab Alam, Dr. Naghma Farooqui and all other teachers of the Department whose valuable guidance and good wishes helped me considerably in the pursuit of my work.

I extend my deep appreciation and special thanks to my senior Dr. Leyaqat khan and Dr. Jamaluddin Chaudhry for their guidance, encouragement and moral support throughout this tenure.

I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to my friends and well wishers for their moral support and encouragement during the tenure of this work, especially Naushad Bhai, Ayaz, Aijaz, Tauseef, Shahid, Sarim , Tahseen, Ilham, Kaify, Umair, Adnan, Hamza, Zain whose fraternization and affability helped me at the moments of distress and exhaustion.

A special thanks however, goes to my non teaching staff of the Department of Political Science, A.M.U. Aligarh especially Mr. Hammad, Mr. Asaf, Mr. Sulaiman, Mr. Muqeet.

I shall be failing in my duty if I don’t put on record my wholehearted gratitude to my father Late Aziz Ur Rab and beloved mother Raheen Fatima without their encouragement and affection it would not have been possible for me to complete this work. My brothers Kashif and Ali, Cousin brothers Mnazir, Tahir, Shadab, Sikander, Javed, Adeeb and uncles Khaliur Rab, Abdali, Madni, Suhail, Seman, Akmal, Arshad, Shabbu and Hamid have been great motivation and understanding it would have been impossible for me to finish my research work.

I would also like to thank each and everybody who have been directly or indirectly involved in or have been the part of my research work, and who has contributed in any way in completing my work. Every help counts and sometimes the little thing in life bring a lot change. Thanks to everyone!

Mohammad Amir Abstract

ABSTRACT

In modern democracies, political parties play a vital role in formation of government and formulation of public policies. Throughout the world political parties have become an indispensible part of contemporary political analysis as well as instruments of government making. The ideology and organisational structure of a political party are vital for its performance. All political parties have their constitutions which give in detail the organisational structure, the underlying ideology and the basic thrust of the parties. However in practice most of them may not adhere to what their party constitutions proclaim. The parties bring out election manifestoes which make several big promises to the people but in reality the main purpose is to capture power. The parties in their propagandas generally declare to be truly secular parties and work for all sections of the society without any partial policies.

The study is solely based on empirical analysis of the beliefs, orientations and perceptions of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in the state of Uttar Pradesh which especially focuses on the role of this segment in the political system at micro level. Special focus is given on the transformation and changes that have been occurred in the participation process of the political party during the last few decades. In fact, with the advent of Bahujan Samaj Party in the state of Uttar Pradesh, a new epoch has been started in the history of electoral participation in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh that made them highly active citizens in the political process. The research explored that the Bahujan Samaj Party having its constitution in place and it declares its ideology as social transformation of the society that the and other exploited sections of society can get equal rights. It was formed mainly to represent Bahujans ("People in majority"), referring to people from the Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) as well as minorities. The party claims to be inspired by the philosophy of B. R. Ambedkar.

The Bahujan Samaj Party has its main base in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. The major political movements started in independent India, which includes backward caste and politics and the rise of Hindutva largely developed or have significantly impinge on it. Economic backwardness and political populism are the main factors intertwined with the recent . These trends were followed by the Dalit Movement that began in Uttar Pradesh during the late 1970s and 1980s, and accentuated during the 1990s. Uttar Pradesh had not responded much to

1

Abstract the Dalit Movement in the pre and early post independence periods. However, during the late 1970s and 1980s, things changed dramatically and the state witnessed a resurgence of the Dalit Movement with a clear political agenda for social change. The movement had leading objective to capture state power for the Dalits. This objective was equipped with the expectation that once Dalits get enough economic and political benefits using state power, it would automatically improve their social status and economic conditions. Enhanced economic and political status has continuously provided enormous power to the upper castes and ensured them a dominant social position. To make this happen, the Dalit political forum, Bahujan Samaj Party, was formed in 1984 and it is now considered as one of the chief political parties in Uttar Pradesh politics.

Although Dalit Movement of northern India puts Bahujan Samaj Party‟s political project as a top priority, the ideological concepts, such as „social mobility‟, „relative deprivation‟ and „reference group‟, remain central to the Dalits‟ social, economic and political status. Orthodox Hindu culture and traditions are recognised by the Dalit leaders as the main factors responsible for the marginalisation of Dalits. This ideological stand of the Dalit Movement has influenced its developmental and political priorities and in maintaining Hinduism and the upper castes as its foes. The formation of the Bahujan Samaj Party as a political party was a strategic part of the Dalit Movement and was expected to continue to be the spearhead of the movement. The Bahujan Samaj Party is being as a harbinger of major changes in the fundamental ideological propositions of the Dalit Movement which was supposed to be espoused by the protagonists of the movement. In the mid-1990s and the first decade of 21st century, the Bahujan Samaj Party brought major changes in the nature and ideology of the Dalit Movement in Uttar Pradesh in terms of setting up political coalitions first with Hindu minded political parties like the Bhartiya and later it formed a coalition with its all-time opponents, the Brahmins through „social engineering‟. The latter is being posed by the Bahujan Samaj Party as a social coalition rather a political tie. This development brought about vivid changes in the Bahujan Samaj Party with major changes in the social development policies during party empower.

One important reason for not letting the Dalit Movement take the floor in Uttar Pradesh was the social structure based on Hindu traditions and beliefs. The norms and values of Hindu society to a great extent determine the distribution of

2

Abstract opportunities to ownership of land and they have influenced the economic and political relation of people in Uttar Pradesh. Though social and economic relationships based on the religious interpretations have not been accepted by the Dalits they were deeply internalised by them. The second important reason was that Dalits, floating from bondage to one landowner to others could not develop a solid base in rural Uttar Pradesh. This restricted the ability of the Dalits in raising and maintaining a movement against the well established social hierarchy. This was a strategic and organised technique to procede the Dalit Movement. After leveling the ground for his progress to the political arena, in 1981, Kanshi Ram established the Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti, popularly known as DS-4, which was a political organisation.

In 1984, Kanshi Ram turned the DS-4 into a full-fledged political party, the Bahujan Samaj Party, launched on Ambedkar‟s birthday with the slogan ‘vote hamara, raj tumhara; nahi chalega, nahi chalega’ (we vote but you rule, it won‟t continue). The goal was based on an axiom of Ambedkar that political power is the key to all problems. The establishment of the Bahujan Samaj Party as a political party was part of a broader Dalit Movement initiated by Kanshi Ram in northern India mainly in Uttar Pradesh. In the late 1980s, at one point of time Kanshi Ram was heading four Dalit organisations, i.e., the All India Backward and Minorities Communities Employees Federation, Buddhist Research Centre, DS-4 and Bahujan Samaj Party. All these organisations were considered as different parts of a complete Dalit Movement. The Bahujan Samaj Party has been considered as main organisation that would fulfil the political goals of Dalit. The Bahujan Samaj Party has been very successful in converting the Dalits votes in Uttar Pradesh in favour of the party as envisaged by its leaders.

At the beginning of its political career, the Bahujan Samaj Party could make its presence felt only marginally, but very soon it occupied an influential place in state politics. When the Bahujan Samaj Party contested the election for the first time, it had already nearly 10 percent of the votes as its social base. The Assembly elections in 1993 proved a turning point for the Bahujan Samaj Party when it made a political coalition with the to prevent the Bhartiya Janata Party from coming to power. The rise of the Hindutva politics of the Bhartiya Janata Party, violent communal tension for building a temple in and the announcement of the

3

Abstract

Mandal Commission report‟s recommendations, all set the stage for the polarisation of communities along caste and religious lines.

The Bahujan Samaj Party was successful in increasing its social base continuously over successive elections. The Party‟s political strategy was mainly based on caste rather than class, even if it claims that the party works for the lower class people. However it was heavily dependent on the lower castes and could garner political support only from the Scheduled Castes and not other sections of society. This development restricted the expansion of the Bahujan Samaj Party‟s electoral base. Therefore, the Party brought a decisive and surprising shift in its basic ideology and electoral strategy. Thus the Bahujan Samaj Party espoused „social engineering‟ to bring Brahmins and other upper castes together through the policy of Sarvajan.

Though the Bahujan Samaj Party claims in all public forums and political manifestos that this policy brings the Dalits and upper castes together, it included only Brahmins in its political strategy with explicit reasons. This social engineering brought Dalit and Brahmins together, which resulted in a huge victory for the Bahujan Samaj Party in the 2007 state Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh. The Party organised several “Brahmin Jodo Sammelan” in different parts of the state, and also formed “Bhaichara Committees” in every district for developing cordial relations between the Brahmins and the Dalits. The logic offered to rationalise this peculiar coalition was that if both castes could remain on one political platform, the atrocities and deprivation of the Dalits could be stopped.

Bahujan Samaj Party has been successful in expanding its political arena in the national politics too. During the past three and half decades of its journey into national politics it could attain considerable reputation in the Indian political scenario. In the 1989 national election it contested for 245 seats and win three seats, two from Uttar Pradesh and one from . At the same time it could score 2.07 percent votes. In the 10th elections of 1991 the party contested for 231 seats and won one seat from and one from Uttar Pradesh. Similarly, in the 11th Lok-Sabha elections of 1996 the Bahujan Samaj Party contested for 210 seats and won 12 seats; 3 from Punjab, 2 from Madhya Pradesh and 6 seats from Uttar Pradesh. As far as the national elections are concerned the Bahujan Samaj Party is not lagged behind in the electoral participation. Its Dalit politics and the shifted ideology of

4

Abstract

Sarvajan Samaj have been working in accumulating public support in the politics of India. In the elections of 2004 Bahujan Samaj Party contested for 435 seats and were successful in winning 19 seats though all these seats were in Uttar Pradesh itself. The party surprised all in 2009 by electing 21 Congressmen as Members of Parliament (MPs) when many thought that the Congress party was in terminal decline in Uttar Pradesh.

Thus, with political changes the geographical and socio-economic nature of the state of Uttar Pradesh has been transformed, people have become more socially and economically conscious as the gap between the upper and lower castes has been reduced. The long term one party dominance of has been overthrown. Since the mid-1990s the pattern shows that while the strength of parties is no longer dependent on any one single region, yet for each party some regions continue to contribute substantially to their vote shares. The Bahujan Samaj Party has also expanded its arena of political activity in many of the Indian states like Madhya Pradesh, , , , , Punjab, , Himachal Pradesh, and the national capital region of .

It is true that though Bahujan Samaj Party started as Dalit party, yet later on it included other castes and religions on its political agenda. Under the leadership of , the party is playing caste politics and strongest party in Uttar Pradesh. Mayawati has also emerged in the state with a new strategy Sarvajan Samaj. Its electoral success in the 2007 Assembly elections proved that its strategy of Sarvajan Samaj rightly worked among the various communities, which so far had been hostile to the party.

However, more studies are required in this field so that political culture and political behaviour of such segmented society can be exposed. If further analyses are made properly people will be informed about influence and democratic power of the marginalised sections like Dalit will be estimated. A really welfare society can only be established through promoting such lower class, caste, religion or marginalised population based party is impartially analysed. In order to make more efficient party, all internal institutional infra-structure of Bahujan Samaj Party should be more democratic in nature. As the party is recognised widely for its administrative efficiency, anti-communalism, anti-political nepotism and the like matters the leaders should try to make the more transparent in its administrative activities.

5

Content

Page No.

Certificate

Acknowledgements

Abbreviation

Introduction 1-8

The State of Uttar Pradesh 9-50

Electoral Politics: Theoretical Framework 51-89

Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Its Dalit Politics 90-120

Electoral Politics of BSP in 1990s Elections 121-151 Electoral Participation of BSP in the Post 2000 Period 152-186

Conclusion 187-195

Bibliography 196-208

Appendix ABBREVIATION

AIBMAC All India Movement Action Committee

AIKS

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASP Ambedkar Samaj Party

AVP Ambedkar Village Programme

BAMCEF All India Backward and Minorities Communities Employees Federation

BAMCGF Backward and Minority Central Government Federation

BD Bajarang Dal

BJP

BKD Bharatiya Kranti Dal

BKD Bahujan Kisan Dal

BJS

BKU Bharatiya Kisan Union

BLD Bhartatiya

BPL Bilow Poverty Line

BSP Bahujan Samaj Party

BSS Bahujan Swayamsevak Sangathan

CBI Central Bureau of Investigation

CSDS Centre for the Study of Developing Societies

CM Chief Minister

CPI

CPI (M) Communist Party of India (Marxist)

CRY Child Right and Youth

DM District Magistrate DS4 Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti

EC Election Commission

EU European Union

EVM Electronic Voting Machines

GO Government Order

IAS Indian Administrative Services

ICT Information and Communication Technology

IOU Congress (I) (Indira), Congress (O) (Organisation), Congress (U) (Urs)

ILP Independent Labour Patry

INC Indian National Congress

JBSP Jantantrik Bahujan Samaj Party

JD

JDS Janata Dal Socialist

JKP Jan Kranti Party

JP Janata Party

KMBP Kisan Mazdoor Bahujan Party

KMPP Kisan Mazdoor Parja Party

LBSP Loktantrik Bahujan Samaj Party

LD Lok Dal

LJP

LS Lok Sabha

LPP Lok Parivartan Party

MBCs Most Backward Classes

MRBCs More Backward Classes

MLA Member of Legislative Assembly

MP Member of Parliament NCRB National Crime Record Bureau

NDA National Democratic Alliance

NHRM National Rural Health Mission

NSCC National Scheduled Caste Commission

OBCs Other Backward Classes

PCR Protection of Civil Rights (Act)

PM Prime Minister

POTA Prevention of Terrorism Act

PPI Peace Party of India

PSP Parja Socialist Party

PWD Public Welfare Department

RCP Rashtravadi Communist Party

RJD

RLD

RKP Rashtriya Kranti Party

RPI Republican Party of India

RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

SAARC South Asian Association for Rigional Cooperation

SBSP Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party

SCF Scheduled Castes Federation

SCRB State Crime Record Bureau

SEZ Special Economic Zone

SIMI Student Islamic Movement of India

SJP Samajwadi Janata Party

SSMY Saubhagwati Surakshit Matretv Yojna

SCs Scheduled Castes

SP Samajwadi Party STs Scheduled Tribes

UF United Front

UP Uttar Pradesh

UPA United Progressive Alliance

UPUDF Uttar Pradesh United Democratic Front

UPRSP Uttar Pradeh Revolutionary Socialist Party

USP United Socialist Party

VHP Vishwa Hindu Parishad

Introduction

Introduction

INTRODUCTION

Comparative politics encompasses a number of issues and subjects that become helpful in evaluating political culture along with its level of orientation, political socialisation of a community along with its steps towards modernisation and the like burning phenomenon which have impetus role in our day to day lives. So, in the cotemporary era importance of electoral participation especially of caste, and religion-based minorities for a viable democratic polity is being increasingly realised in all over the world. To empower them socially, economically, educationally and politically there is an ardent need to assess their decision making capabilities.

Electoral participation involves all those voluntary involvement of individuals or groups at various levels of political process that attempt to influence the structure of government, the selection of government authorities, or the policies of government. These activities either may be supportive of the existing politics, authorities, or structure, or they may seek to change any or all of these. In this way the study of electoral politics is an interesting topic due to its practical applications. In urban and rural areas of especially developing countries like India, citizens have different wants and needs which are acquired by arguments, persuasion, threats, flattery and other forces. Citizens are constantly interacting with each other, and since the satisfaction of many of a person’s needs depends upon the relationships he establishes with others, the preferences and interests of some individuals will inevitably come into opposition with the preferences and interests of others. This opposition of preferences and interests may result in competition or conflict and in attempts by those concerned to reach some sort of accommodation, varying from elimination of the competitor to a reconciliation of differences.

The present study is an effort in the context of electoral participation of Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in the state of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) since 1996. The study is solely based on empirical analysis of the beliefs, orientations and perceptions of the Bahujan Samaj Party in the state of Uttar Pradesh especially focusing on the role of this segment in the political system at micro level. Special focus is given on the transformation and changes that have occurred in the participation process of the political party during the last two decades. With the advent of Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh, a new epoch has been started in the history of electoral participation in 1 Introduction the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh that made them highly active citizens in the political process.

Keeping all the aspects of electoral participation of Dalits, lower castes as well as other minorities and electoral politics of Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh, I have realised that a research work is to be done on “Electoral Participation of Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh since 1996”. I think this will be a suitable topic for research work and will benefit the future researchers and people interested in the political culture and participation in the third world countries where segmented political culture is prevalent. To make my research work precise I have divided it into five chapters and hence, the topic of this research focused on: (1) To highlight Socio-Economic, Geo-Political and Historical growth and development of Indian state of Uttar Pradesh.

(2) To discuss Conceptual and Theoretical Framework of Electoral Participation in order to see its adaptability in the underdeveloped society like Uttar Pradesh.

(3) To study and analyse “Electoral Participation of Bahujan Samaj Party in the State of Uttar Pradesh Since 1996” from all possible aspects.

Under the above circumstances, the research work focuses on the following matters in different chapters-

The first chapter deals with a brief introduction of the state of Uttar Pradesh; its geographical location, history, people’s socio-cultural, religious and linguistic orientations. The state of Uttar Pradesh is the sentinel of northern India and the gateway to northern and eastern states with diverse population. It occupies a strategic position in the political map of India. The state has multicultural, multiracial, fabulous wealth of nature-hills, valleys, rivers, forests, and vast plains. It is the fifth largest state in the country in terms of area and first in terms of population. With over 200 million inhabitants as of 2011 census, it is the most populous country subdivision in the world. Presently, Uttar Pradesh is made up of 75 administrative districts, which are grouped into 18 divisions.

The electoral participation of Uttar Pradesh can be divided into two phases- the phase of Congress domination from 1952 to 1989 and the non-Congress phase of

2 Introduction coalition governments from 1989 to 1999 characterised by the three political formations, viz., the Samajwadi Party (SP), the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). The second phase of the state's politics is marked by political competition among the political parties based on caste and communal factors. However, an interesting and unexpected development that has started taking place in the politics of the state during the second phase is that most parties have come to realise the limitation of 'exclusive politics' that is the inadequacy of caste or religion to be the only basis for a political formation and have tried to cross-expand their social base and steadily move to 'inclusive politics' that is the necessity to attract all sections of the society, irrespective of caste or religion, to the party fold. Since independence, Uttar Pradesh as constituted as well as mirrored the trends and patterns of national politics. The chapter also focuses on the historical background of the electoral participation of political parties in Uttar Pradesh from 1952 to 1999.

In the second chapter of this research work, “A Theoretical Framework of Electoral Participation” is drawn which would be helpful to understand the subsequent chapters. Theories of electoral participation along with tracing out some electoral models are discussed in this chapter for focused analysis of electoral participation and voting behaviour. Electoral participation is a participatory play in governing process through elections in which both voters and politicians want to achieve power, ‘to control the behaviour of others through force, threats, or withholding of resources’. Study of electoral participation renders an understanding of how government’s policies, political parties’ strategies about elections operates and how people behave. The study also involves the investigation of citizens interacting with each other. Electoral participation has different dimensions of socio-political nature, tenants-landlords relations and parties’ electoral play. Political parties used influential people amongst the third world societies to win elections and these influential people used political parties to get power within their constituencies over the administrations from top to bottom for the fulfilment of their own interests. Therefore, apart from discussing the relationship between Electoral Participation and Political Organisations, I have also traced on electoral participation and political participation. Attempts have also been made to analyse basic practices in electoral participation along describing the brief history of electoral participation.

3 Introduction

The third chapter is an attempt to analyse Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and its Dalit Politics. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) is a centrist national political party in India with socialist leanings. It was formed mainly to represent Bahujans ("People in majority"), referring to people from the Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) as well as minorities. The party claims to be inspired by the philosophy and ideas of B. R. Ambedkar.

The BSP has its main base in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. BSP started as Dalit party but later on included other castes and religions as well. This chapter aims to examine the different issues of segmented political parties and the deviation of the BSP from the fundamental ideological position of the Dalit Movement. This relationship is looked at from two levels - firstly the BSP’s ability to fulfil the goals of the Dalit Movement through its political and developmental agenda while it had been in power, especially, after the introduction of its ‘social engineering’ project, and secondly, the perception of BSP cadres at the local level about considering the BSP as a part of the Dalit Movement.

The fourth chapter is about Electoral Participation of BSP in 1990s Elections. The electoral political arena of BSP in this period has witnessed greater participation and more intense politicisation than before. The last decade of 20th century represents the full unfolding of the contradiction between the logic of political equality and that of social inequality, something that Ambedkar had warned against in the Constitution assembly itself. The changing outcome of the electoral game in this decade is seen as the reflection of a fundamental transformation in the terrain of politics which in turn is anchored in the process of social change.

Bahujan Samaj Party has been playing significant role in the electoral participation in both the national as well as state politics in India. Moreover, the party has upgraded its position in the electoral participation in the13th Lok Sabha election of 1999 and contested for 225 seats in the country. The party won 14 seats from Uttar Pradesh alone with attaining 9.97 percent votes from where it contested election. Apart from this Bahujan Samaj Party also strived to influence electoral participation in a number of states like Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, Bihar, Maharashtra, Uttarakhand, etc. in different state-Vidhan Sabha elections during 1990s. The party could influence greatly the electoral process of Uttar Pradesh and come into power

4 Introduction though with the alliance with other political parties. Its primary motive was to explore Dalit votes and it was successful to a great extent, in this regard. Moreover, Bahujan Samaj Party could achieve support of Other Backward Classes and .

The fifth Chapter of the research work intends to discuss Electoral Participation of BSP during the First Decade of 21st Century. Here I propose to have a discussion on Bahujan Samaj Party deviation from its mainstream political agenda. BSP, under the leadership of Mayawati started preaching people other than Dalits like Thakurs and other upper classes. After stepping down from the state power in 2003, the BSP started to mobilise Brahmins under the slogan of 'Brahmin jodo.' Mayawati for the first time addressed the state-level Brahmin mahasammelan in 2005, as a result of long-time endeavour. Satish Chandra Mishra, a Brahmin leader, emerged in the party as the most trusted, 'Mayawati's right-hand man', along with Ramveer Upadhyaya, another Brahmin. The party fostered leaders from various background including Muslim and OBC. Its electoral success in the 2007 Assembly elections proved that its strategy of Sarvajan Samaj rightly worked among the various communities, which so far had been hostile to the party. When campaigning for the 2007 election, the BSP shifted its electoral strategy. While the BSP did advocate its usual caste dominated political aspirations, it instead used the idea more of as a metaphor in order to create and cement grassroots alliances. These grassroots efforts were built heavily on the premise of showing that the concerns of lower castes were valued by the party just as much as the concerns of other communities.

At last but not the least is the concluding part of the entire study, where the major observations and findings of the strategic agendas, tactics, electoral participation and performances of BSP in the state of Uttar Pradesh are summed up.

The Research Questions

The general questions examined in the study emphasise BSP’s changing position, perception and policy with regard to electoral participation in various states of India especially in Uttar Pradesh. Moreover, the study tries to examine, why BSP made a policy-shift on upper castes? And what are the prospective dimensions of “Social Engineering Formula” adopted by BSP?

5 Introduction

Review of Literature

Review of literature is an essential part of any serious and systematic research work. It has become an imperative one since it helps:-

1. To develop a general explanation for observed variations in a behaviour or phenomenon. 2. To identify the potential relationship between concepts and to identify reasonable hypotheses. 3. To learn how others have defined and measured key concepts. 4. To identify data sources that other researchers have used. 5. To develop alternative research designs. 6. To discover how a research work is related to the work of others. Sudha Pai in her book, Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution: The Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh examines the emergence, ideology and programmes, mobilisation strategies and electoral progress of the Bahujan Samaj Party, against the backdrop of the phenomenon of Dalit assertion, both historically, and particularly, the strong wave witnessed in recent years, which has taken two forms: electoral and grassroot activism. While highlighting its considerable achievements, the study explores the reasons for the failure of the Bahujan Samaj Party to harness the rising wave of Dalit assertion, evident in U.P. society today. It examines how empowering the BSP experience has actually been for the vast majority of subaltern Dalits. It provides an understanding of the impact of the BSP, on both U.P. and Indian politics. S.K. Khanna in his book, Caste in Indian Politics, analyses the role of religion, caste, regionalism and political parties in the context of Indian polity. The Bahujan Samaj Party has its roots in The All India Backward and Minorities Communities Employees Federation (BAMCEF) – a non political organisation floated by Kanshi Ram. The BSP entered election fray for the first time in Bijnore in 1985. The author describes the electoral performance of BSP till 1993 Lok Sabha and Assembly elections of Uttar Pradesh.

6 Introduction

Kanchan Chandra’s Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India, develops a theory explaining when and why voters and elites in patronage democracies privilege ethnic identities in their vote-giving and vote- seeking strategies. The focus of this study is on the Bahujan Samaj Party during the years of 1984-1998. Author describes that BSP as a multiethnic rather than an ethnic party on the grounds that it brings together several individual castes within the category Scheduled Castes, such as Chamars, Balmikies etc and analyses the role of the BSP in various elections especially in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. According to the author between 1984 and 1998, Scheduled Caste voters preferred the BSP than the other parties in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh because the BSP had a monopoly on the representation of Scheduled Caste elites.

K.C.Das Indian Dalits: Voices, Visions and Politics, is an analytical study of socio-political and cultural consciousness of Indian Dalit community. Dalit consciousness is a reflection of the troubled socio-cultural relationship in Hindu Caste hierarchy. Author examines the role of Ambedkar, Gandhi and Dalit movements in the eradication of untouchability. He also highlights the role of the Kanshi Ram and the BSP to create the consciousness among the Indian Dalits in the contemporary India. Today Dalit politics under the leadership of BSP is at crossroads. BSP has constructed a strong Dalit movement based upon identity and consciousness in a state like U.P. which still has a rigid and conservative social structure.

Susan Bayly’s Caste, Society and Politics in India, is an effort to interpret the phenomenon of caste in the Indian subcontinent. The period of this study is from the mid-18th century to the present day. This study argues that caste has been for many centuries a real and active part of Indian life. The norms and conventions of caste have had a pervasive presence in the historical literature and even today caste has continued to be a major theme in Indian political debate. This study has argued that caste is the only or even the most important element of Indian life, let alone that caste as a ‘system’ has been the immutable core of Indian civilisation since ancient times.

7 Introduction

Methodology

The proposed study has been made relying on the case study method. However, as per the requirements of the different context, a few other methods have also been resorted to. For instance, Document Analysis Method has been adopted while examining various reports and related documents of the Election Commission of India and Uttar Pradesh. Besides, as the study otherwise demanded, historical and analytical methods have also been considered.

8

The State of Uttar Pradesh

Chapter -1

The State of Uttar Pradesh

Introduction:

The state of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) is the sentinel of northern India and the gateway to northern and eastern states with diverse population. It occupies a strategic position in the political map of India. The state has multicultural, multiracial, fabulous wealth of nature-hills, valleys, rivers, forests, and vast plains. It is the fifth largest state in the country in terms of area and first in terms of population. Uttar Pradesh (which has the literary meaning as "Northern Province"), or U.P., is a state that has always been under the importance of rulers and foreign invaders throughout the history. It was created on 1st April 1937 as the United Provinces, and was renamed Uttar Pradesh in 1950. is the and is the commercial capital and the largest city of Uttar Pradesh. On 9th November 2000, a new state, Uttarakhand, was carved from the mountainous Himalayan region of Uttar Pradesh.1

Uttar Pradesh is viewed as the largest tourist destination in India. The seventh most populated state of the world, Uttar Pradesh can lay claim to be the oldest seat of India's culture and civilisation. Uttar Pradesh is studded with places of tourist attractions across a wide spectrum of interest to people of diverse interests. It has been characterised as the cradle of Indian civilisation and culture because it is around the Ganga that the ancient cities and towns sprang up. Uttar Pradesh played the most important part in India's freedom struggle and after independence it remained the strongest state politically. Uttar Pradesh is the fourth largest Indian state by economy, with a GDP of Rs.7080 billion (US$110 billion). Agriculture and service industries are the largest parts of the state's economy. The service sector comprises travel and tourism, hotel industry, real estate, insurance and financial consultancies. Prior to going in detail about the population, history and political culture of the state it is essential to have a glance on its geographical location and natural resources of the state as these factors have very important role in formulating electoral political culture of a political community.

Geographical Location:

The state of Uttar Pradesh is situated on the northern spout of India and shares an international boundary with and is bordered by the Indian states of

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Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Delhi, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, , Jharkhand and Bihar. The Himalayas border of the state on the north, but the plains that cover most of the state are distinctly different from those of high mountains.2 The state can be divided into two distinct hypsographical (altitude) regions. The larger Gangetic plain region is also in the north; it includes the - , the Ghaghra plains, the Ganges plains and the .3 It has fertile alluvial soil and a flat topography (with a slope of 2 m/km) broken by numerous ponds, lakes and rivers. The smaller Vindhya Hills and plateau region is in the south. It is characterised by hard rock strata and a varied topography of hills, plains, valleys and plateaus; limited availability of water makes the region relatively arid.

Uttar Pradesh is between latitude 24°-31°N and longitude 77°-84°E. The Gangetic plain occupies three quarters of the state with a total area of 243,290 square kilometres (93,935 sq miles). The Bhabhar tract gives place to the Terai area which is covered with tall elephant grass and thick forests interspersed with marshes and swamps. The sluggish rivers of the Bhabhar deepen in this area, their course running through a tangled mass of thick under growth. The Terai runs parallel to the Bhabhar in a thin strip. The entire alluvial plain is divided into three sub-regions.4 The eastern tract, consisting of 14 districts is subject to periodical floods and droughts and has been classified as scarcity areas. These districts have the highest density of population which gives the lowest per capita land. The other two regions, the central and the western are comparatively better with a well-developed irrigation system. They suffer from water logging and large-scale user tracts. In addition, the area is fairly arid. The state has more than 32 large and small rivers; of them, the Ganges, Yamuna, Saraswati, Sarayu, Betwa, and Ghaghara are larger and of religious importance in Hinduism.5

Cultivation in Uttar Pradesh is intensive. The valley areas have fertile and rich soil. There is intensive cultivation on terraced hill slopes, but irrigation facilities are deficient. The Siwalik Range which forms the southern foothills of the Himalayas, slopes down into a boulder bed called 'Bhabhar'. The transitional belt running along the entire length of the state is called the Terai and Bhabhar area. It has rich forests, cutting across it are innumerable streams which swell into raging torrents during the monsoon.6

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Climate: The entire state, except for the northern region, has a tropical monsoon climate. In the plains, January temperatures range from 12.5°C-17.5°C and May records 27.5°-32.5°C, with a maximum of 45°C. Rainfall varies from 1,000- 2,000 mm in the east to 600-1,000 mm in the west. As Uttar Pradesh has a humid subtropical climate and so experiences four seasons. The winter in January and February is followed by summer between March and May and the monsoon season between June and September. Summers are extreme with temperatures fluctuating anywhere between 20°C and 45°C in parts of the state. The Gangetic plain varies from semiarid to sub-humid. The mean annual rainfall ranges from 650 mm in the southwest corner of the state to 1000 mm in the eastern and south-eastern parts of the state.7 Primarily a summer phenomenon, the Bay of branch of the Indian Monsoon is the major bearer of rain in most parts of the state. It is the South-West Monsoon which brings most of the rain here, although rain due to the western disturbances and north-east Monsoon also contribute small quantities towards the overall precipitation of the state.8

The rain in the state can vary from an annual average of 170 cm in hilly areas to 84 cm in Western U.P. Given the concentration of most of this rainfall in the 4 months of Monsoon period, excess rain can lead to floods and shortage to droughts. As such, these two phenomena, floods and droughts, commonly recur in the state. The climate of the Vindhya Range and plateau is subtropical with a mean annual rainfall between 1000 and 1200 mm, most of which comes during the monsoon. Typical summer months are from March to June, with maximum temperatures ranging from 30 to 38 °C (86 to 100 °F). There is low relative humidity of around 20% and dust- laden winds blow throughout the season. In summers, hot winds called “loo” blow all across Uttar Pradesh.9

Natural Resources: The state has an abundance of natural resources. As of 2011, the recorded forest area in the state is 16,583 km2 (6,403 sq. miles) which is about 6.88% of the state's geographical area. In spite of rapid deforestation and poaching of wildlife, a diverse flora and fauna continue to exist in the state. Several species of trees, large and small mammals, reptiles, and insects are found in the belt of temperate upper mountainous forests. Medicinal plants are found in the wild and are also grown in plantations. The Terai-Duar savanna and grasslands support cattle.

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Moist deciduous trees grow in the upper Gangetic plain, especially along its riverbanks. This plain supports a wide variety of plants and animals.10

The Ganges and its tributaries are the habitat of large and small reptiles, amphibians, fresh-water fish, and crabs. Scrubland trees such as the babool and animals such as the chinkara are found in the arid Vindhyas. Tropical dry deciduous forests are found in all parts of the plains. Since much sunlight reaches the ground, shrubs and grasses are also abundant. Large tracts of these forests have been cleared for cultivation. Tropical thorny forests, consisting of widely scattered thorny trees, mainly babool are mostly found in the south-western parts of the state. These forests are confined to areas which have low annual rainfall (50–70 cm), a mean annual temperature of 25-27 °C and low humidity.11

Uttar Pradesh is also known for its extensive avifauna. The most common birds which are found in the state are doves, peacocks, jungle fowl, black partridge, house sparrows, songbirds, blue jays, parakeets, quails, bulbuls, comb ducks, kingfishers, woodpeckers, snipes, and parrots. Bird sanctuaries in the state include Bakhira Sanctuary, National Chambal Sanctuary, Chandra Prabha Sanctuary, Hastinapur Sanctuary, Kaimoor Sanctuary, and Sanctuary.12

Other animals in the state include reptiles such as lizards, cobras, kraits, and gharials. Among the wide variety of fishes, the most common ones are mahaseer and trout. Some animal species in Uttar Pradesh have gone extinct in recent years, while others, like the lion from the Gangetic Plain and the rhinoceros from the Terai region, have become endangered. Many species are vulnerable to poaching despite regulation by the government.13

Administrative Divisions: With over 200 million inhabitants as of 2011 census, it is the most populous country subdivision in the world. Presently, Uttar Pradesh is made up of 75 administrative districts, which are grouped into 18 divisions.

Agra Division-, Etah, Mahamaya Nagar () and .

Aligarh Division-Aligarh, , .

Allahabad Division-, Kaushambi, Fatehpur and Pratapgarh.

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Azamgarh Division-, , Mau

Bareilly Division-, Badaun, , .

Basti Division-Basti, , Sant Kabir Nagar.

Chitrakoot Division-Banda, Chitrakoot, Hamirpur, .

Devipatan Division-Gonda, , Shravasti, .

Faizabad Division-, Ambedkar Nagar, Barabanki, Sultanpur.

Gorakhpur Division-, (), Devaria, Maharajganj.

Jhansi Division-, , Lalitpur.

Kanpur Division-Kanpur Nagar, Kanpur Dehat (Akbarpur District), , , , Auraiya.

Lucknow Division-Lucknow, Hardoi, Lakhimpur , , , .

Meerut Division-, , Gautam Buddha Nagar, , Bagpat.

Mirzapur Division-Mirzapur, Sant Ravidas Nagar ( District), Sonbhadra.

Moradabad Division-, , Rampur, Jyotiba Phule Nagar.

Saharanpur Division-, .

Varanasi Division-, , , Jaunpur.14

Each district is governed by a district collector or District Magistrate, appointed either by the Indian Administrative Service or Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission. Each district is divided into subdivisions, governed by a sub-divisional magistrate, and again into Blocks. Blocks consist of panchayats (village councils) and town municipalities. These blocks consist of urban units’ viz. census towns and rural units called as gram panchayats.15

Cities of Uttar Pradesh: Uttar Pradesh has more metropolitan cities than any other state in India. The absolute urban population of the state is 44.4 million, which constitutes 11.8% of the total urban population of India, the second highest of any state. According to the 2011 census, there are 15 urban agglomerations with a

13 Chapter -1 population greater than 500,000.16 There are 14 municipal corporations, while is specially administered by a statuary authority. In 2011, state's cabinet ministers headed by the then Chief Minister Mayawati announced the separation of Uttar Pradesh into four different states of , , Avadh Pradesh and Paschim Pradesh with twenty eight, seven, twenty three and seventeen districts respectively, later the proposal was turned down when Akhilesh lead Samajwadi Party came to power in the 2012 election.17

Demographics: Uttar Pradesh is the most populous state in India, with a population of 199,581,477 million people as of 1st March 2011. If it were a separate country Uttar Pradesh would be the world's fifth-most-populous nation, trailing only China, India, the United States of America and Indonesia. Thus, Uttar Pradesh has a large population and a high population growth rate. From 1991 to 2001 its population increased by over 26%. The state contributes 16.16% of India's population. The population density is 828 people per square kilometre, making it one of the densest states in the country.18

The sex ratio as of 2011, at 908 women to 1000 men, is lower than the national figure of 933.19 The state's 2001–2011 decennial growth rate (including Uttarakhand) was 20.09%, higher than the national rate of 17.64%. Uttar Pradesh has a large number of people living below the poverty line. Estimates released by the Planning Commission for the year 2004-05 revealed that Uttar Pradesh had 59 million people below the poverty line, the most for any state in India.20 As of the 2001 Indian census, about 80% of Uttar Pradesh's population is Hindu, while Muslims make up around 18.4%, being the second-largest community and the largest minority group. The remainders consist of , Buddhists, Christians, and Jains. Uttar Pradesh has also many Hindu Temples at Varanasi, Allahabad, Ayodhya, Mathura and Gorakhpur. 21

The literacy rate of the state according to the 2011 census is 70%, which is below the national average of 74%. While the literacy rate for men is at 79%, it is 59% for women. In 2001, the literacy rate in Uttar Pradesh stood at 56.27% overall, and 67% and 43% for men and women, respectively.22

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The western part of the state, and the upper Doab, is home to the speakers of Khari Boli. The lower Doab, which is referred as Braj Bhumi, or the land of Braj, is home to the speakers of Braj Bhasha. Further south, the Bundelkhand region people speaks Bundelkhandi. In central Uttar Pradesh, people speak the Awadhi dialect and Bhojpuri is spoken in the east. Indian states are defined on the they spoke, and eastern Uttar Pradesh primarily speaks Bhojpuri and their culture is identical to Bihar. This creates no central identity of Uttar Pradesh. has been declared as a secondary official language by the government of Uttar Pradesh in 1989. The official state notifications are mandatory to be published in Urdu. The official Gazette, circulars, notifications, acts of state legislature are required to be published in Urdu. In addition a number of district administrations are required to publish all information in Urdu along with . These include Meerut, Bareilly, , Lucknow, Muzaffarnagar and others.23

Brief Historical Sketch:

Uttar Pradesh was home to powerful empires of ancient and , including , Nanda, Mauryan, Sunga, Kushan, Gupta, Gurjara, Rashtrakuta, Pala and Mughal empires. The state has several historical, natural, and religious tourist destinations, such as the , Varanasi, , Kaushambi, Kanpur, Ballia, Shravasti, Kushinagar, Lucknow, Chitrakoot, Jhansi, Allahabad, Budaun, Meerut and Mathura.

The epics of Hinduism, the and the , were written in Uttar Pradesh. Uttar Pradesh also had the glory of being home to Lord Buddha. It has now been established that spent most of his life in eastern Uttar Pradesh, wandering from place to place preaching his sermons. The empire of Chandra Gupta Maurya extended nearly over the whole of Uttar Pradesh. Epics of this period have been found at Allahabad and Varanasi. After the fall of the Mauryas, the present state of Uttar Pradesh was divided into four parts: Surseva, North Panchal, Kosal, and Kaushambi.24

However, Archaeological finds have indicated the presence of Homo sapiens hunter-gatherers in Uttar Pradesh between around 85 and 72 thousand years old. Other pre-historical finds have included Middle and Upper Palaeolithic

15 Chapter -1 artifacts dated to 21–31 thousand years old and /Microlithic hunter- gatherer's settlement, near Pratapgarh, from around 10550–9550 BC. Villages with domesticated cattle, sheep, and goats and evidence of agriculture began as early as 6000 BC, and gradually developed between century 4000 and 1500 BC beginning with the Indus Valley Civilisation and Harappa Culture to the ; extending into the .25

Vedic Period: There is hardly any mention of the area comprising present Uttar Pradesh in Vedic hymns. Even the sacred rivers, the Ganges and Yamuna, appear only on the distance horizon of the land of the Aryans. In the later Vedic age, the importance of Sapta Sindhu recedes and Brahmarshi Desh or Madhya Desh assumes significance. The region comprising Uttar Pradesh at that time became a holy place of India and foremost center of Vedic culture and knowledge.

The new states of Kuru-Panchal, Kashi and Kosal find mention in late-Vedic texts as prominent centers of Vedic culture. The people of Kuru-Panchat were regarded as the best representatives of Vedic culture. The scholars from Kuru-Panchal were specially visited by the Videsh king on the occasion of Ashwamedh Yajna.26 The Panchal king Pravahan Jaivali himself was a great thinker who was praised even by Brahmin scholars like Shilik, Dalabhya, Shvetketu and his father Uddalak Aruni. Ajatshatru of Kashi was another great philosopher king whose superiority was acknowledged by Brahmin scholars like Dripti, Valhaki, Gargya etc. Literature in various disciplines was authored on an extensive scale during this age culminating in the Upanishads. They signify the highest reach of imagination. The Upanishad literature was the product of meditation in the Ashrams of the sages, several of which were in Uttar Pradesh, Eminent sages like Bharadwaj, Yajnavalkya, Vashishta, Valmiki and Atri have either their Ashrams here or were otherwise connected with this state. Some Aranyans and Upanishads were, in written in the Ashrams located in this state.27

Post-Vedic Period: The cultural heritage of Uttar pradesh was maintained in the period of the Ramayan and Mahabharat i.e. the epic period. The story of Ramayan revolves round the Ikshwaku dynasty of Kosal and of Mahabharat around the 'Kuru' dynasty of Hastinapur. Local people firmly believe that the Ashram of Valmiki, the author of Ramayan, was in Brahmavart ( in Kanpur District) and it was in the

16 Chapter -1 surroundings of Naimisharany (Nimsar-Misrikh in ) that Suta narrated the story of Mahabharat as he had heard it from Vyasji. Some of the Smritis and Puranas were also written in this state. Gautam Buddha, Mahavir, Makkhaliputta Goshal and great thinkers brought about a revolution in Uttar Pradesh in 6th century B.C. Out of these, Makkhaliputta Goshal, who was born at Shravan near Shravasti, was the founder of Ajivika sect.28

Mahavir, the 24th Trithankar of Jains was born in Bihar but had a large number of followers in Uttar Pradesh. He is said to have lived twice during rainy season in this state-once in Shravasti and the second time in Padrauna near Deoria. Pawa proved to be his last resting place. In fact, had entrenched itself in this state even before the arrival of Mahavir. Several Tirthankars such as Parshwanath, Sambharnath and Chandraprabha were born in different cities in this state and attained 'Kaivalya' here. Jainism must have retained its popularity in this state in subsequent centuries also. This fact is borne by the ruins of several ancient temples, buildings, etc. The remains of a magnificient Jain Stupa have been dug out near Kankali Tila in Mathura, while Jain shrines built in early Middle Age are still preserved in Deogarh, Chanderi and other places.29

The Age of Buddha: The founder of , Gautam Buddha, was born in Lumbini in Nepal. His father, King Shuddodhan, was the ruler of a small state, Kapilvastu (now in ). His mother, Maya, belonged to the ruling family of another small state, Deodah (now in ).30

Buddha attained Enlightenment at Bodh Gaya in Bihar but it was in Isipattan or Mrigdav in in U.P. that the preached his first sermon and laid the foundation of his Order. From this point of view, Sarnath has the distinction of being the birth place of 'Dhamma' and 'Sangha', the two elements of the Holy Trinity of Buddism,the third being the Buddha himself. Other notable places in Uttar Pradesh followed by Buddha's association are Kushinara of Kushinagar (in Deoria district) where he attained 'Mahaparinirvana, Shravasti the capital of Kisal where he performed a great miracle, and Sankashyar Sankisa (in ) where another miracle of his life occured. The rulers of several states in the then Uttar Pradesh were greatly influenced by the teaching of Buddha.31

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The People of the state also did not lag behind in showing love and devotion to the Tathagat, greater part of whose monastic life was spent in Uttar Pradesh. Thus it will be no exaggeration to describe Uttar Pradesh as the cradle of Buddhism. Besides Buddhism and Jainism, Pauranic Brahmanism also had deep roots in the state. Ancient images of Gods and Goddesses of Brahmanical order, a temple of Kushan period has been found which alludes to Brahmanism. In fact, Mathura can be said to be the birthplace of Indian sculpture. Other temples of this faith built in different periods are in Varanasi, Allahabad, Ballia, Ghazipur, Jhansi and Kanpur.

Idle Age of Synthesis: In successive centuries after Buddha, Ayodhya, Prayag, Varanasi, Mathura and several other cities continued to play important role in the making of religious and cultural history in India. Several kings who ruled the region became immortal because of Vedic rituals performed by them and patronage extended by them to learning. Scholars like Ashwaghosh, Kalidas, Ban, Mayur, Diwakar, Vakpati, Bhavbhuti, Rajshekhar, Laxmidhar, Sri Harsh and Misra adorned their courts. Yuan-chwang says that the people of Uttar Pradesh were full masters of the language and spoke it correctly, there pronunciation was like that of the Devas, elegant, beautiful, and their intonation clear and district, worthy of emulation by others, the rules framed be these people were accepted by all. Rajashekhar of Pratihar also pays homage in the similar vein to the people and poets of Panchal.32

Varanasi continued to be a prominent centre of learning as in the past. Ayodhya and Mathura acquired famous birth places of Ram and Krishna. Pilgrims from every corner of the country continued to throng to Prayag and as such it was called the Tirtharaj similarly, the north mountain region, where Kailash and Mansarovar are situated and from where the holy rivers of the country originate, also remained sacred for the pilgrims. The Shankaracharya established one of the four prominent sacred Dhams in Badrikashram in this region.33

Middle Age: The liberal traditions continued to flourish in Uttar Pradesh in the Middle Age as well. Varanasi remained a prominent centre of Hindu learning and Jaunpur, under the Sharqi rulers, a prominent center of Islamic culture. Jaunpur was describing as the 'Shiraz' of India. The Sharqi rulers were patrons of music also and there were many famous musicians in their court. Brij region was an important center of devotional music in those days. It was in Uttar Pradesh that 'Sufis' took inspiration

18 Chapter -1 from Hindu thought and philosophy.34 Ramanand and his famous disciple Kabir and other saints like Ravidas, Darya Shah and Guru Gorakhnath were some of the great men of those times who gave a new direction to the life and culture of this state.

The Hindu teachers laid emphasis on monotheism (oneness of God) and focused attention on the meaninglessness of the caste system. The Muslim Sufis were greatly influenced by mysticism. All these saint-poets contributed to the enrichment of both Hindi and Urdu literature. A notable contribution was made by Sultan Feroz Tughlaq who got Sankrit works translated into Persian among the authors of this age, Zia-ud-din Barni will always be held in high esteem. The tradition of cultural synthesis, which was started by the Sufis and saints during the rule of Sultans received great impetus during the reign of wise Mughals. It was a time when a distinct liberal outlook was discernible in all the spheres of human life such as religion, art and literatures.

Many Madarsas and Maktabs were opened for muslim education and Varanasi became the traditional center of Hindu education. Hindi and Urdu literatures developed further and work of translation of books into Persian gained nomentum. Tulsidas, Surdas, Keshavdas, Bhushan, Malik Mohammad Jayasi, Raskhan, Matiram, Ghananand, Bihari, Dev and Giridhar Kavirai were some of the great poets who brought into being laurels to Uttar Pradesh. After the disintegration of the , smaller states which came also pursued a policy of giving patronage to poets and musicians.35

The Mauryan Period: With the emergence of the Mauryans in 3rd century B.C., a new chapter was opened in the history of Art. It is said that Ashok visited Sarnath and Kushinagar and had personally ordered for construction of Stupas and Viharas at these two sacred places. Their traces have disappeared but the remnants of stone pillars found at Sarnath, Allahabad, Meerut, Kaushambi, Sankisa and Varanasi give us an idea of the excellence of Mauryan Art. All the Ashokan pillars have been built with Chunar stones. The Lion Capital of Sarnath is without doubt and excellent specimen of Mauryan Art. There was considerable artistic activity in Uttar Pradesh during Shung-Satvahan Period. A large number of architectural and other fragments found in the ruins of Sarnath tell us the story of buildings, etc. built during this period. The remains of a semi-circular temple of this period are now represented only by its

19 Chapter -1 foundation wall. During those days Mathura was a prominent centre of Bharhut- Sanchi School of Art.36

The Golden Age: The Gupta Period is known as the Golden Age in the history of Indian Art. Uttar Pradesh did not lag behind any of the country in artistic endeavor. The stone temple of Deogarh (Jhansi) and brick temple at in Kanpur district is famous for their artistic panels. Some other specimens of ancient art and craft are images, the standing statue of the Buddha in Mathura and the seated image of Tathagat in Sarnath museum. Both the Mathura and Sarnath schools of Art reached their zenith during the Gupta Period. Elegance and balance were the special features of the architecture of this period while the sculptures were characterised by physical charm and mental peace. Uttar Pradesh witnessed unprecedented advancement in iconographic forms and decorative motives during this period.37 Some excellent specimens of artistic statues made not only of stone but terra cotta as well, have also been found in Rajghat (Varanasi), Sahet-Mahet (Gonda- Bahraich), Bhitargaon (Kanpur) and Ahichhatra (Bareilly). Kumar Devi, the consort of Gaharvar king Govind Chandra had constructed a very grand building at Sarnath known as Dharm-Chakra Jain Vihar.38

The artistic beauty of Mathura temples was such that even the iconoclast Mahmud of Ghazni had praised them. The Chandel rulers of southern Uttar Pradesh were also great patrons of Art. Their building activities were mostly centered around Khajuraho in Madhya Pradesh but remains of temples and ponds constructed by contemporary architects have been found in Mahoba, Rasin, Rahilia and other places in modern Bundelkhand as well. The fort built by them at Kalingar was impregnable from defence point of view. The temples and divine images in hill areas of Uttar Pradesh represent a special Art tradition of its own.

The Dark Period: So far as Uttar Pradesh is concerned, the Sultanate period is known as a dark age in the realm of Art. The Sultans confined their building activities mainly to Delhi, although they constructed mausoleums and mosques here and there in Uttar Pradesh also. After the advent of Sharqi rulers in Jaunpur, a new life was infused in art activities. Under their patronage famous mosques like Atala, Khalis-Mukhis, Jhanjihri and Lal Darwaza were constructed. The grandest and the biggest of them all is the Jama Masjid. The Atala Masjid built by Ibrahim Sharqi in

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1408 AD became a model for the construction of other mosques in Jaunpur. It is an exquisite specimen of and Muslim architecture reflecting both vigour and grace in style of construction. The Jaunpur mosques have certain special features. These mosques have facilities for women to offer prayers. For this, beautiful galleries surrounded by artistic walls were constructed. The fort in Jaunpur constructed in Uttar Pradesh early in the mediaeval period has an importance of its own. Although it is in a dilapidated state now, when it was in good shape, its bold and graceful style was universally praised and widely followed. Today only its eastern gateway and a few extent are there to remind us of its past glory and splendor.39

The Mughal Period: The composite Indian and Muslim style of architecture reached its climax during the Mughal Period. The Taj Mahal described as a dream in marble is a living example of this style. Innumerable forts and places, mosques and mausoleum and baths and tanks were constructed during this period, known for their bold, graceful and grand style. No doubt, Babar the founder of the Mughal dynasty, constructed the mosques at Ayodhya and but the Mughal architecture is mainly associated with his two descendants- and Shahjahan.40

The Mughal architecture was marked by its grandeur during the reign of Akbar and by its lyrical quality during the reign of Shahjahan. The monuments built by Akbar in Sikri, and in Agra and Delhi by Shahjahan, reflect their mental attitudes. So long as Shahjahan did not shift his capital to Delhi, Agra and its neighbourhood remained the main centre of Mughal architectural activity. Prominent buildings constructed in Uttar Pradesh in the Mughal Period include the city built in Sikri by Akbar, the and buildings within the mausoleum of Akbar in Sikandra and of Etmad-ud-Daula n Agra, the Akbar's fort in Allahabad and mosques constructed by in Mathura, Varanasi and Lucknow.

Undoubtedly, the most magnificent among them is the Taj Mahal which can appropriately be described as India's tribute to the grace of womanhood and a memorial to the romantic love of an emperor wrought in marble. Several grand temples and were also constructed during this period at Mathura, and many other places. The special features of Mughal architecture were use of marble, smooth and colourful floors, delicate stone tracery and inlay work and happy blending of Indian and Muslim styles. The Sikri walls not only depict line drawings

21 Chapter -1 but also human and animal forms. Garhwal also developed its own school of painting during this period.41 The Mughal architecture can be divided into two categories. Under the first category some of the buildings constructed with marble according to the Royal Firman of Shahjahan. The uses of valuable marble of soft hues by Shahjahan in place of gaudy red colour used during Akbar reign allude to the diverse personalities of Akbar and Shahjahan. The fort of Agra is an example of architecture in time. Built on a grand scale, it represents a fusion of both Indian and Muslim styles of architecture. Akbar also built a fort in Allahabad which enjoyed the same importance as that of the Agra Fort during his reign. The buildings at Fatehpur- Sikri can be divided into two classes-religious and secular. The former include the shrine of Sheikh Salim Chishti and the great mosque, while the latter include the palace of Jodhabai, the Mariam-ki-Kothi, the Sunahra Makan and the Panch Mahal. A fusion of the architectural styles of Akbar and Shahjahan is found in the tomb of Nurjahans father Etmad-ud-Daula at Agra. This mausoleum is unique in the sense that it appears to give a new interpretation of contemporary architectural style. Not built on a grand scale, its object was to preserve delicacy, grace and beauty of contemporary architectural workmanship.42

The Pinnacle: The Mughal style of architecture reached its pinnacle during the reign of Shahjahan. It was the age of marble and its natural beauty could be fully brought out due to the aesthetic taste of the Emperor. A new fluidity was seen in the drawings, designs and forms due to the appropriate changes effected in style and technique of construction. This changed style can be seen even in the Agra Fort. Several red sandstone buildings constructed by Akbar were demolished and rebuilt with marble. In this connection mention may be made of Diwan-e-Am and Diwan-e- Khas. The Nagina Masjid, Musamman Burj and Moti Masjid are some of the exquisite examples of matchless taste and superb workmanship. But Taj Mahal stands out among them all. It was built by Emperor Shahjahan in memory of his beloved Queen . Constructed entirely of white Makrana marble, it is capped with extremely shapely dome, culminating in the best creation of Mughal architecture. Its delicate workmanship, grace, Iyricism and purity of form invest it with a dreamy beauty which can be compared to the reflection of a delicate and beautiful rose in moonlight. Besides monuments and mausoleums built by the Mughals, local rulers also constructed notable buildings at several places in the state. These buildings

22 Chapter -1 constructed in Jaunpur and Lucknow styles are specially attractive and charming but on the whole they lack the vastness and splendour of the Mughal monuments.43

Encouragement by Nawabs of Avadh: There was a sudden stalemate in the field of architecture after Shahjahan's death. But the Nawabs of Avadh kept alive some of the old traditions of buildings construction. They built many places, mosques, gates, gardens and Imambaras. In the beginning, the buildings constructed by them were confined to Faizabad alone, but later on the main centre of their architectural activity shifted to Lucknow. Among them, famous buildings are the Ashaf-ud-Daula Imambara, the Mausoleum in Kiserbagh, Lal Baradari, the Residency, Shahnazaf, Husainabad Imambara, Chhatr Manjil, Moti Mahal, Kaiserbagh Place, Dilkusha Gardens and Sikandarabagh. The style of these buildings may be decadent and hybrid but it has its own special characteristics such as fish motif at the gates, domes with golden umbrellas, vaulted halls, arcaded pavilions, underground chambers, and labyrinths. The Bara Immabara built by Asaf-ud-Daula is both dignified and imposing. Its vaulted hall is typical of pure Lucknow style and is said to be the biggest hall of its kind in the world. Some of the Buildings of this style are, as a matter of fact, beautiful creations of art. A notable change was brought about in the policy of providing State patronage to Art during the British Rule and thereafter.44

Modern-Colonial Period: Starting from Bengal in the later half of the 18th century, a series of battles for North Indian lands finally gave the British accession over this state's territories – including the territories of Bundelkhand, Kumaon and Banaras rulers – and the last Mughal territories of Doab and Delhi. When the Company included and kingdoms in this northern territory, they named it the "North-Western Provinces" (of Agra). Today, the area may seem large compared to several of the Republic of India's present 'mini-states' – no more than the size of earlier 'divisions' of the British era – but at the time it was one of the smallest British provinces. Its capital shifted twice between Agra and Allahabad.45

Due to dissatisfaction with British rule, a serious rebellion erupted in various parts of ; Meerut 's Sepoy, , is widely credited as its starting point. It came to be known as the . After the revolt failed the British attempted to divide the most rebellious regions by

23 Chapter -1 reorganising the administrative boundaries of the region, splitting the Delhi region from ‘NWFP of Agra’ and merging it with Punjab, while the Ajmer- region was merged with and Oudh was incorporated into the state. The new state was called the 'North Western Provinces of Agra and Oudh', which in 1902 was renamed as the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. It was commonly referred to as the United Provinces or its acronym Uttar Pradesh. In 1920, the capital of the province was shifted from Allahabad to Lucknow. The high court continued to be at Allahabad, but a bench was established at Lucknow. Allahabad continues to be an important administrative base of today's Uttar Pradesh and has several administrative headquarters.

Uttar Pradesh continued to be central to Indian politics and was especially important in modern Indian history as a hotbed of both the Indian Independence Movement and the Movement. Nationally known figures such as were among the leaders of the movement in Uttar Pradesh. The All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS) was formed at the Lucknow session of the Indian National Congress on 11th April 1936 with the legendary nationalist Swami elected as its first President, in order to address the long standing grievances of the peasantry and mobilise them against the zamindari landlords' attacks on their occupancy rights, thus sparking the Farmers' movement in India. During the of 1942, overthrew the colonial authority and installed an independent administration under . Ballia became known then as Baghi Ballia (Rebel Ballia) for this significant contribution in India's freedom movement.46

Post-independence: Modern-day Uttar Pradesh saw the rise of important freedom fighters on the national scenario. Lal Bahadur Shastri, Jawaharlal Nehru, , Chaudhary and Chandra Shekhar were only a few of the important names who played a significant role in India's freedom movement and also rose to become the Prime Ministers of this great nation.

After independence, the state was renamed Uttar Pradesh ("northern province") by its first Chief Minister, . Pant was well acquainted to Jawaharlal Nehru (the first Prime Minister of free India) and was also popular in the Congress Party. He established such a good reputation in Lucknow that Nehru called him to Delhi, the capital and seat of Central Government of the country, to

24 Chapter -1 make him Home Minister of India in 27th December 1954. He was succeeded by Sampoornanand, a classicist Sanskrit scholar. Following a political crisis in Uttar Pradesh, initiated by Kamlapati Tripathi and C.B.Gupta, was asked to resign as CM in 1960 and sent to Rajasthan as the Governor of Rajasthan, paving the way for Gupta and Tripathi to become Chief Ministers. served as India's first woman Chief Minister from October 1963 until March 1967, when a two- month long strike by state employees caused her to step down. After her, assumed the office of Chief Minister with Laxmi Raman Acharya as Finance Minister, but the government lasted for only two years due to the confusion and chaos which ended only with the defection of Charan Singh from the Congress with a small set of legislators. He set up a party called the Jana Congress, which formed the first non-Congress government in U.P. and ruled for over a year. Hemvati Nandan Bahuguna was Chief Minister for Congress Party government for part of the 1970s.47 He was dismissed by the Central Government headed by Indira Gandhi, along with several other non-Congress Chief Ministers, shortly after the imposition of the widely unpopular Emergency, when Narain Dutt Tewari – later became Chief Minister of Uttarakhand. The Congress Party lost heavily in 1977 elections, following the lifting of the Emergency, but romped back to power in 1980, when Indira Gandhi handpicked the man who would later become her son's principal opposition, V.P. Singh, to become Chief Minister.48

Creation of the state of Uttarakhand: On 9th November 2000, the Himalayan portion of the state, comprising the Garhwal and Kumaon divisions and , was formed into a new state 'Uttaranchal', now called Uttarakhand, meaning the 'Northern Segment' state.

Arts & Culture of Uttar Pradesh:

The handicrafts of Uttar Pradesh have earned a reputation for themselves over the centuries. The traditional handicrafts are of a vast variety such as textiles, metal ware, woodwork, ceramics, stonework, dolls, leather products, ivory articles, papier- mâché, articles made of horns, bone, cane and bamboo, perfume, and musical instrument. These cottage crafts are spread all over the state but the more important centers are located at Varanasi, Azamgarh, Maunath Bhanjan, Ghazipur, Meerut, Muradabad, and Agra.

25 Chapter -1

Carpets from Bhadohi and Mirzapur are prized worldwide. Silks and brocades of Varanasi, ornamental brassware from Muradabad, chickan (a type of embroidery) work from Lucknow, ebony work from Nagina, glassware from Firozabad, and carved woodwork from Saharanpur also are important. The traditional pottery centers are located at , Chunar, Lucknow, Rampur, Bulandshahr, Aligarh, and Azamgarh. Khurja's dishes, pitchers, and flower bowls in blazed ceramic in blue, green, brown and orange colors are the most attractive. Muradabad produces exquisite brass utility articles. Besides, minakari on silver, gold, and diamond-cut silver ornaments have made Varanasi and Lucknow world famous.49

Music & Dance: The state is known for pioneering the development of musical instruments, which find mention in ancient Sanskrit literature. Music is also known to have flourished in the Gupta Period (c. 320-540), and much of the musical tradition in Uttar Pradesh was developed during the period. The musicians Tansen and Baiju Bawra, two of the Navaratnas (Nine Jewels) of the court of the Mughal emperor Akbar, are still immortal for their contribution in the field of music.50

The sitar (a stringed instrument of the lute family) and the tabla (consisting of two small drums), the two most popular instruments of Indian music, were developed in the region during this period. Uttar Pradesh has produced musicians, including Anup Jalota, Baba Sehgal, Girija Devi, Gopal Shankar Misra, Hari Prasad Chaurasia, Kishan Maharaj, Naushad Ali, Ravi Shankar, Shubha Mudgal, Siddheshwari Devi, Talat Mehmood, and Ustad Bismillah Khan. The Ghazal singer Begum Akhtar was a native of Uttar Pradesh. The region's folk heritage includes songs called rasiya (especially popular in Braj), which celebrate the divine love of Radha and Krishna. Other forms of music are kajari, sohar, qawwali, rasiya, thumri, birha, chaiti, and sawani. Traditional dance and musical styles are taught at the Bhatkhande Music Institute University in Lucknow, named after the musician Pandit Vishnu Narayan Bhatkhande.51

The Kathak style of classical dance, which originated in Uttar Pradesh in the 18th century as a devotional dance in the temples of Vrindavan and Mathura, is the most popular form of classical dance in northern India. There are also local songs and dances of the countryside, and the most popular of the folksongs are seasonal. The songs and dances of the countryside are significant features of local culture. They

26 Chapter -1 include the kajari of Mirzapur and Varanasi; the Alha Udal, a folk epic; and various village dances.

Fairs and Festivals: Uttar Pradesh has a long list of fairs and festivals. More than 2,230 festivals are held annually. Some are organized at several places simultaneously while others have only local importance. Festivals and feasts are linked with the golden harvest - the sensuous spring, the reverence for mythology, religion or in honour of the past great men. Diwali (celebrated between mid-October and mid-December) and Navami are popular festivals in Uttar Pradesh. Kumbh Mela, organised in the month of Maagha (February-March), is a major festival held every three years in rotation at Allahabad, Haridwar, Ujjain, and Nasik on the river Ganges. Lath mar Holi is a local celebration of the Hindu festival of Holi. It takes place well before the actual Holi in the town of Barsana near Mathura. Taj Mahotsav, held annually at Agra, is a colorful display of the culture of the Braj area. Buddha Purnima, which marks the birth of Gautama Buddha, is a major Hindu and Buddhist festival, while Christmas is celebrated by the minority Christian population. Other festivals are Vijayadashami, Makar Sankranti, Vasant Panchami, Ayudha Puja, Ganga Mahotsava, Janmashtami, Sardhana Christian Fair, Maha Shivaratri, Mahavir Jayanti, Moharram, Bārah Wafāṭ, Eid, Bakreed, Chhath puja, Lucknow Mahotsav, Kabob and Jayanti. These are zestfully celebrated with song, dance, and merriment; others with solemnity, fervor, fast, or feast. These fairs and festivals help the people keep the culture vibrant and promote artistic activities.52

Language and literature: Several texts and hymns of the Vedic literature were composed in Uttar Pradesh. The festival of Guru Purnima is dedicated to Sage Vyasa, and also known as Vyasa Purnima as it is the day which is believed to be his birthday and also the day he divided the Vedas. There is a long literary and folk Hindi language tradition in the state. In the 19th and 20th century, was modernised by authors such as Jaishankar Prasad, Maithili Sharan Gupt, Munshi Premchand, Suryakant Tripathi Nirala, Babu Gulabrai, Sachchidananda Hirananda Vatsyayan 'Agyeya', Rahul Sankrityayan, Harivansh Rai Bachchan, Dharamvir Bharati, Subhadra Kumari Chauhan, Mahavir Prasad Dwivedi, Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, Dushyant Kumar, Hazari Prasad Dwivedi, Acharya Kuber Nath Rai,

27 Chapter -1

Bharatendu Harishchandra, Kamleshwar Prasad Saxena, Shivmangal Singh Suman, Mahadevi Varma, and Vibhuti Narain Rai.

The people of U.P. regard their language a very important part of their cultural identity. Hindi is spoken as the first language by 89.43% of the population. Most people in Uttar Pradesh speak a dialect of Hindustani, which in its written forms is referred to as Urdu and Hindi. The state is sometimes called the 'Hindi heartland of India'. Hindi became the language of state administration with the Uttar Pradesh official language Act of 1951. A 1989 amendment to the act added Urdu as another native language of the state. Linguistically, the state spreads across the Central, East- Central, and Eastern zones of the Indo-Aryan languages, the major native languages of the state being Awadhi, Bundeli, Braj Bhasha, Kannauji and the vernacular form of Khariboli. 53

POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLARISATION

The electoral politics of Uttar Pradesh can be divided into two phases- the phase of Congress domination from 1952 to 1989 and the non-Congress from 1989 to 2012 characterised by the three political formations, viz., the SP, the BJP and the BSP. The second phase of the state's politics is marked by political competition among the political parties based on caste and communal factors. However, an interesting and unexpected development that has started taking place in the politics of the state during the second phase is that most parties have come to realise the limitation of 'exclusive politics'. The inadequacy of caste or religion to be the only basis for a political formation and have tried to cross-expand their social base and steadily move to 'inclusive politics' that is the necessity to attract all sections of the society, irrespective of caste or religion, to the party fold.

Since independence, Uttar Pradesh as constituted as well as mirrored the trends and patterns of national politics. The era of Congress dominance the first challenge by opposition in the late 1960s, there constitution of a new Congress and its rout at the hands of the Janata Party, the return of the Congress in the 1980s and the challenge by the Janata Dal: this could be the summary overview of Indian politics and equally a summary overview of the political development in Uttar Pradesh. The period under review in this research work broke off from this established pattern.

28 Chapter -1

While it shared the trajectory of the rest of the north Indian states till the decline of the Congress around 1990, it charted a very different and unique course since then.54

Hence, Uttar Pradesh politics since 1989 has been under social polarisation along caste-community lines in the state. Elections became the occasion for furthering this polarisation. But, once these leading formations achieved a high degree of consolidation of their home constituent the logic of the first-past-the-post elections in single member constituency started unfolding. All the political actors realised that they had reached a point of saturation and that even the most intense polarisation was not enough to yield a majority in the state. Thereafter, the parties started searching for ways to break loose from their self-imposed limits of exclusivist politics. Consequently a new range of strategies to expand the social base are being tried out by all the main actors, though these have not yet had a major effect on the electoral outcome. There are certain reasons of this polarisation. Diversity is spread evenly throughout the state of Uttar Pradesh. This is the most important environmental factor in Uttar Pradesh politics'.55 However, efforts have been made from time to time to come out with some sort of regional classification for the State. Until the carving out of Uttarakhand region and the formation of a new Uttaranchal State, Uttar Pradesh had 83 districts which were divided into 85 Parliamentary and 425 Assembly constituencies (Till the third General Elections in 1962, U.P. had 86 Lok Sabha seats and 430 Assembly seats). The l3 northern districts now form the state of Uttarakhand.

In Western U.P., the demand for a separate state has been going on for quite some time. But the demand is politically motivated and the economically prosperous Jats of U.P. feel that owing to their smaller numbers as well as confinement to the western parts of the state, they can be no match for the other dominant peasantry caste the and hence, they have no chance of political empowerment in the state. A separate state is the only ray of hope for them.56 Similarly, there is a movement - though mild - for the formation of a separate Bundelkhand state. But except some self-styled groups, no political party seems to be interested in the demand. Occasionally, we hear about the demand for a Poorvanchal state too. Such a demands are seen by the people more as political than real.

There is a plethora of castes and sub-castes out of which Schedule Castes (SCs) (21.4 percent) form an important group; Schedule Tribes (STs) area minuscule.

29 Chapter -1

Caste and religion are the two basic social divisions in U.P.57 Both and Muslims are divided into innumerable castes and sub-castes. The SCs include Chamars, Pasis, Dhobis, Balmikis, Arikhs and others. Chamars (Jatavs) are numerically the largest. The backward castes are (Yadavs), , Lodh, Koeri, Gujar, Kahar, Gadaria, Teli, Barahi, Kachi, Kewat, Nai, etc. Ahirs and are considered to be economically well off and politically influential. The Ahirs are fairly well distributed while the Kurmis have their strength in the eastern and north-central districts. Lodhs (or Lodhi , as they prefer being called) are a large landowning group in south-central part, while the Gujars are concentrated in western district. At the top are the upper castes- Brahmin, Thakur, Bania and Kayastha. Brahmin and Thakur are the dominant land owning castes in most of the state, but Jats in Western U.P. and Bhumihars in eastern U.P. constitute the exception. The Banias are businessmen, traders and money-lenders, while the Kayasthas are prominent in all modern professional occupations. Muslims too are divided into several castes of which the politically prominent are Syed, Sheikh, Pathan, Ansari or Julaha.58 The political significance of this kind of diversity, is that there are no regional identifications within the state. Diversity is spread evenly throughout Uttar Pradesh. This is the most important factor that constrains politics of social mobilisation in Uttar P radesh.59

Almost everywhere, the state faces an agrarian situation in which a clearly superior class of tenure-holders maintains a monopoly over title to land. Though, legally, their control over both the land and the cultivating classes had been circumscribed, the village and Chaudharis use to exercise tremendous control over village affairs and over the land-tenants, owing to their pre-eminent position in the rural social structure. Their continued influence in the countryside is an important factor in contemporary party politics in U.P. However, owing to the Green Revolution, a rich peasant class has emerged which wields great political clout in the state. And, no political party can ignore the political clout of the rising rich peasant class; in fact, they all attempt in various ways to gain their support.61

Era of Congress Dominance (1952-1989): Uttar Pradesh politics can be broadly divided into three main phases: from independence to 1967, from 1967 to 1989, and from 1989 onwards. It has been argued that these three phases can be distinguished on the basis of the progressive emergence of new economic classes on

30 Chapter -1 the political scene and the ensuing shifting strategies of sections of the dominant class. In short, the three periods portray Congress-mediated transition towards the Green Revolution dynamics; the emergence of the middle and rich peasants as a contending force; and the further downward spread of the political agency to the OBC and SC leadership and the accompanying attempts at Hindutva building.62

Since Independence, the electoral politics in Uttar Pradesh, as also in other states of the Indian Union, has been very heavily dependent on the caste factor. However, during the fifties and until the late sixties, the political behaviour of the electorate in U.P. represented a kind of caste-class combine, and people of all castes and classes continued to be under the Gandhian and the Nehruvian spell of the Indian National Congress (INC). The over arching ideology of the INC could transcend the class-caste barriers and keep the electorate intact under the Congress umbrella, This period was, by and large, and with brief patches of non-Congress coalitions, completely dominated by the Congress. The challenges to the dominance of the Congress appeared as early as 1967 culminating in 1977 when the Congress was totally humbled in the backdrop of the Emergency excesses. However, Congress quickly regained in 1980 and dominated the scene till the holding of 1989 elections. Hence, the period can be divided into two segments-(i) the one party dominance up to 1961, and (ii) the Congress alliance 1967- 1989.

During 1952-1967, the socialist parties did show signs of strength, but the constant bickering and factionalism on petty issues harmed the socialist movement in Uttar Pradesh in particular and in India in general. The Socialist Party and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP) of Acharya Kriplani fought elections separately in 1952, but merged thereafter to form the Praja Socialist Party (PSP). The two socialist splinters- Socialist Party (Lohia) and the PSP merged in U.P. in 1962 to form a United Socialist Party in the Legislative Assembly. The merger paved the way to the formation of the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) at the national level in 1964. However, in 1965 the PSP again established its separate identity and the socialist movement again suffered a jolt in Uttar Pradesh. The issues of language policy, reservation and co-operation with the Bhartiya Jana Sangh (BJS) were the immediate causes of the rupture in the socialist ranks. The PSP fought for granting 'bhumidhari' rights of land-ownership to 'Sirdars', land ceiling of 20 acres, nationalisation of sugar and power industry and protection and encouragement to Urdu. The Communist Party

31 Chapter -1 of India (CPI) did put up some fight in U.P., but fast degenerated after the 1961 elections.63

Since the fourth general elections in 1967, some fragmentation of the electorate in U.P. took place on class lines under the leadership of Charan Singh who engineered defection enmasse from the Congress and formed a new political party, the Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD). The BKD represented the rich landed peasantry. For about two decades from 1967 to 1989 the class cleavage in U.P. electorate acquiring some sharpness, and it appeared that the middle and the lower peasantry too were joining the rich peasantry. In fact, the rise of Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD)- (BLD)-Lok Dal (LD)- Janata Dal Socialist (JDS) during the period 1967- 1989 only showed that such a hypothesis was coming true. The trend culminated in the Janta Dal (JD) getting almost half the seats in the 1989 U.P. Assembly elections (208/425). The peasantry honeymoon was soon over, and the JD performed poorly in the subsequent Assembly elections. Uttar Pradesh went to a mid-term poll in February 1969.64

In the 1971 Lok Sabha elections, the Congress seemed to have redeeming its old glory by capturing 73 seats with 48.5 percent votes the – highest after the 1952 elections. These results led to a spate of defections from the several constituents supporting the T.N. Singh government in U.P. – the SSP, Congress (O), Swatantra, BKD and BJS – leading to its downfall, and the installation of a Congress government led by Kamalapati Tripathi on April 4, 1971. The Congress, thereafter; comfortably ruled the state till 30th April 1977 under the Chief Ministership of Tripathi.65 Earlier, in the 1974, Assembly elections were held in U.P. and the main players- Congress the BKD and the BJS- only marginally improved their positions. But, the 1977 Lok Sabha elections, held against the backdrop of the emergency (1975-77) and the excesses committed by the Congress governments in Uttar Pradesh, proved to be the nadir of Congress which failed to get even a single seat in U.P. What harmed the Congress most and benefitted the Janata Party- in 1977 was the swing and IOU [Congress (I), Congress (O) and Congress (U)] factors combining against the Congress. Within a couple of years in 1980, when these two factors combined in favour of the Congress, the party was back with full gusto winning 5l Lok Sabha seats (35.86 percent votes) and 309 (37.7 percent votes) Assembly seats. The hero of 1977 elections - the Janata Party had completely disintegrated and became a non-entity in the subsequent

32 Chapter -1 elections. The only component of this party worth the name was the Janata (Secular) led by Charan Singh (erstwhile BLD). All other parties were completely marginalised thereafter.

The 1984 Lok Sabha election in U.P. was an all time high performance for the Congress by winning almost all seats except two, both of which went to the Lok Dal (LD) (of which one was the party president Charan Singh from ). The Congress recorded a positive swing of 15.1 percentage points by polling 51.0 percent – the highest after the 1952 elections. The lower IOU and a massive swing towards the Congress enabled the party to sweep polls in Uttar Pradesh.66 In the subsequent Assembly elections in 1985, the Congress managed 269 seats (39.25 percent votes) and the LD got 84 seats (21.3 percent votes). The elections were held against the backdrop of Indira Gandhi's assassination; but the Congress could not capitalise on the sympathy wave. The Congress could not even retain its 1980 Assembly strength of 309 seats. Other parties like the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Janata Party were totally marginalised. Meanwhile the emergence of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) on the politics of Uttar Pradesh signalled a very quick and strong consolidation of the Schedule Castes (commonly called Dalits)- who once constituted a very strong vote-bank of the INC. Another strong caste group - Brahmins- too became restless in U.P. since the departure of Narayana Dutt Tewari as the Chief Minister (December 4, 1989), U.P. had not had a Brahmin Chief Minister. The Brahmins too broke away from the Congress and largely shifted to the BJP - a successor of the erstwhile Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS). Latter, the Ayodhya episode helped consolidate the Brahmin votes for the BJP. The intermediary castes- called the Other Backward Castes (OBCs), which mainly included the Yadav, Kurmis, Koeris, etc., started consolidating and rallied round the personality of , an old socialist. Besides the caste fragmentation, the Congress also suffered the communal fragmentation in its vote bank; the Muslims in U.P. suddenly found a new savior in the person of Mulayam Singh Yadav, and lent strong support to him. Thus, the electorate in U.P. initially fractured on the class lines, later on the caste lines, and further on the communal lines. That greatly harmed the Congress, signalling its very sharp decline, and led to the rise of three very prominent and potential political players in the politics of Uttar Pradesh the BSP, the BJP, and Samajwadi Party (SP). The big picture, therefore, in Uttar Pradesh is the fragmentation of the electorate on

33 Chapter -1 the class, caste, and the communal lines leading to the eclipse of the Congress system and the emergence of the plurality of political players with typical caste communal orientations.

The fragmentation of the electorate in U.P., primarily on caste lines and its subsequent scattering in three different ideological positions- BSP, BJP, and SP lead to a very sharp decline in the Congress position. Overall, the first decade of post- Independence Congress politics was dominated by G.B. Pant, Sampurnanand and C.B. Gupta. The attitude of these Congressmen towards politics and governance was statusquoist. The departure of the socialists from the Congress in 1948 reinforced these tendencies. The dominant group within the Uttar Pradesh Congress soon managed to isolate and marginalise left-wing Congressmen led by Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and K.D. Malviya.67

In the 1960s, C.B. Gupta and Charan Singh were emerging as the leaders of the statusquoists and the reformists, respectively. The decline of the Congress marked the defeat of the reformists and their consequent dissociation from the Congress. Factionalism, however, does not provide an exhaustive framework for the analysis of U.P. politics.68 'For its core social base the Congress relied on a coalition of Brahmins, Scheduled Castes, and Muslims who together constituted 44 percent of the state population. At the same time, the party's leadership was much narrower than its electoral support. It was drawn from among the locally dominant classes in rural society and from the professionals and businessmen in the town. Even in terms of castes, leadership positions in the Congress have tended to be occupied mainly by the upper castes, mostly by Brahmins, Banias and Thakurs, while the midd le and backward castes were under-represented.69 It was this under-representation of the Scheduled Castes and the middle and the backward class in the leadership structure that gradually weaned them away from the Congress mainstream. The first fracture in the Congress electorate could be said to have been brought by Charan Singh in 196l when he broke with the Congress and formed a new political party, the BKD. 'Whilst the programme of Charan Singh was not markedly different in many respects from that of the Congress, he distinguished himself from the ruling party by his unambiguous support for the more prosperous peasants and farmers against urban interests'.70 However, his agrarian concerns found greater support in his own caste group - the Jats. The BKD tried to develop a coalition of rich middle castes in western

34 Chapter -1

U.P. and the less developed backward castes in the eastern region. However, party appeals to caste and community loyalty prevented the mobilisation of the lower class cutting across caste and religious lines. The Lok Dal (LD) tried to redo that by mobilising middle and backward class on socio-political issues, but without success. The BLD was also able to build an electoral identity that subsumed not only caste differences but also the differential levels of agricultural prosperity in the west and the east U.P. as well.71 After the death of Charan Singh in May 1987, the leadership rivalry between his son and the then leader of the LD in the U.P. Assembly Mulayam Singh Yadav led to the decline of and the split in the LD. The Mulayam Singh faction got integrated with the Janata Dal coalition, which stunned everyone by its splendid performance in the U.P. Assembly elections in 1989 (JD: 208 seats, 29.7 per cent votes). One study argues that the sudden rise of the JD in the politics of U.P. represented the coming together of the rich and the middle peasantry in medium and semi-medium size land holding areas due to the prosperity caused by Green Revolution.72

The decline of the Congress and, then of the LD-JD, created space that led to the emergence of the BJP, the SP and the BSP as distinct political formations. Some analysts have argued that the rise of Hindutva obstructed the consolidation of rural interests into effective electoral segments. Duncant argued that 'more recently the rise of Hindu nationalism and the Hindutva movement have been seen as powerful forces fracturing peasant solidarities and effective activism'. Hindu and Muslim identities have sharpened in recent years, and as these identities polarise and dominate the political sphere'...they can obstruct a sectoral or even populist construction of rural interests.73 But the rise of Hindutva and the consequent emergence of the BJP as a strong force in early 1990 could be attributed, precisely, to two quick developments- first, V.P. Singh's decision to implement the Mandal Commission Report on August 8, 1990, and, second, the use of harsh and repressive policies pursued by Mulayam Singh Yadav as Chief Minister of U.P. in the . The one led to the split in the Janata Dal and the alienation of the upper caste Hindus and the Rajputs from the party. They were sharply opposed to the implementation of the Mandal Commission report. It also led to loss of support from the Yadavs and some Other Backward Classes as Mulayam Singh Yadav opposed the Mandal Commission. A large segment of the peasantry also moved away from the JD owing to the support

35 Chapter -1 extended by Mahendra Singh Tikait to the BJP. All that broke the rural peasantry vote bank of the JD.75

It was due to the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report that the BJP came up with a policy of re-unifying the Hindu vote beyond caste barriers by using the Ayodhya issue. It provided a useful plank for the BJP, which seized it as a convenient political expedient for re-unifying the Hindu society through a common goal and against a common other, the Muslim. The OBCs and Dalits were invited to forget their sub-identities and merge themselves in the Hindu samaj or nation76 before the much-hyped Hindutva based support of the BJP. Instead of looking at the BJP only from a secular-communal frame, attention should be paid to the party's ideological imperatives, its sound cadre-base, the quality of governance in the BJP ruled areas, and its mass mobilisation especially in the rural areas of the state.

Polarisation and Deadlocks (1989-2002): Uttar Pradesh went to Lok Sabha elections five times (1989, 1991, 1996, 1998 and 1999) and Assembly elections four times (1989, 1991, 1993 and 1996) during the last decade of the 20th century. The Lok Sabha and Assembly elections in U.P. were held simultaneously in 1989 and 1991. The two issues which seem to have rocked the state during the decade figured quite early. The one pertained to the Ayodhya dispute, and the other was related to the issue of reservation for the OBCs. The Ayodhya issue did figure during the 1989 elections, but acquired a national colour only in 1991 general elections. The excesses committed by the government of Mulayam Singh during his first tenure as Chief Minister of U.P. not only brought the Ayodhya issue to the fore but proved to be politically advantageous to the BJP which, for the first time, came to power in U.P. and also significantly improved its seats in Lok Sabha (from 8 to 52 seats) and vote share (from I6 percent in 1989 to 32.8 percent in 1991). It was generally believed that the unprecedented state violence against Kar-Sewaks led to a Hindu-backlash which was a manifestation of the integration of the otherwise badly divided Hindus on caste lines. The BJP tried to take political advantage of that when it arranged a Rath-Yatra by L.K. Advani from Somnath to Ayodhya in 1990.

The Ayodhya imbroglio culminated in the demolition of that disputed structure by a mob of fundamentalist Hindu organisations the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Bajrang Dal, Shiv Sena, etc.,- on December 6, 1992 during the Chief Ministership of

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Kalyan Singh ( BJP). Since then, the Ayodhya issue has affected almost all elections and the state politics in the U.P., as also in other parts of the country.

Another equally important issue to have influenced the electoral politics in U.P. was the 'Mandal Commission Report'. When V.P. Singh was the Prime Minister (Singh came from U.P.) he surprised everyone by extricating the Mandal Commission Report from the cold-storage and accepting it on August 8, 1990. The commission recommended reservation to the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in government jobs. The entire state witnessed anti-reservation rallies and riots, and there were confrontations between pro and anti-reservationists in Uttar Pradesh. V.P. Singh's decision virtually tried to undo what had been inadvertently done by Mulayam Singh. Mulayam's act had integrated the divided Hindus; V.P. Singh's act forced Hindus into two camps - the forwards and the backwards. Any division in the Hindu ranks threatens the BJP's agenda and, hence, the BJP as also all the other political parties were forced not to support the anti-Mandal agitationists. The BSP and the SP (then as JD) which tried to capitalise on the issue of reservations failed to brow beat the BJP politically, as the BJP, too, openly stood for the reservations of the Dalits and the OBCs. The BJP's political managers did not allow Mandal vs Kamandal conflict, the conflict between the backwards and the forwards – a conflict which was so assiduously built up by the Janata Dal's V.P. Singh, Chandrashekhar and Mulayam Singh, etc., In reality, the actual beneficiaries or losers owing to reservation or its abolition are very small (looking at the vast population of the state), but the issue is so emotionally surcharged that any opposition to the cause of reservation can only create a wide gulf between the Dalits and the OBC soon on the one hand and the party opposing it on the other. Inspite of that, the BSP has emerged as a representative of Dalit consciousness and the SP as that of the OBCs.

The Mandalisation of U.P. politics has since then affected electoral competition in the state. The JD got split in November 1990. Mulayam Singh Yadav formed the Samajwadi Janata Party (SJP), and later formed the Samajwadi Party (SP). Mulayam came from a Lohiaite socialist tradition of the SSP and was seeking to construct a quite different collective identity for the purpose of electoral mobilisation which had characterised the practice of the LD'.77 'His strategy was to revive the Lohiaite practice of alliances both with Dalit communities and organisations.78 In and with Muslims, and to place a far greater emphasis on the collective identity of

37 Chapter -1 backward classes, which did not include the Jats, than the Lok Dal had ever done.79 While the announcement to implement the Mandal Commission report consolidated the OBC segment of the SP, the Ayodhya dispute polarised the Muslim voters and put them on the side of the SP. The most important splinter of the electoral fragmentation had been the Dalits or the Scheduled Castes (SCs). The Dalits have not only consolidated themselves in Uttar Pradesh under the leadership of Mayawati, but have been able to reassert themselves in the electoral competition under the banner of the Bahujan Samaj Party. The BSP belongs to the Ambedkarite tradition, and, its origin can be traced to the formation of the Backward and Minority Central Government Federation (BAMCGF) in late 1970s. Kanshi Ram was the key figure in the federation, and had started a coordination committee of the Dalits in a government scientific research institute in in 1971. Kanshi Ram entertained political ambitions for the Dalits and formed DS-4 (Dalit Soshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti), and put up candidates in the Haryana elections in 1982. The BSP was officially formed in 1984 when Kanshi Ram found a new ally in Mayawati in Uttar Pradesh. In 1985, the BSP contested a majority of constituencies in the U.P. Assembly elections with no success. However, since then the BSP has emerged a very serious political force and electoral contender, and is doing very well in U.P. Assembly polls (1989-13 seats, l99l -12 seats, 1993- 67 seats, 1996 - 67 seats, 2002 – 98 seats, 2007 – 206 seats and 2012 – 80 seats) By aligning with different political parties the BSP has been able to catapult Mayawati to Chief Ministerial position. Thereafter, U.P. went into two quick rounds of assembly polls - one in December 1993 and the other in October 1996. The first was held against the backdrop of the demolition of the Babari Masjid leading to the dismissal of Kalyan's government and the imposition of President's rule, and the second was held in the backdrop of against infamous Circuit House incident at Lucknow, the fall of Mulayam Singh government, the installation of Mayawati as Chief Minister and subsequently the imposition of Presidents rule in U.P. The Lok Sabha elections had also been held in May 1996. In both these elections, the BJP, SP, BSP and the Congress maintained similar positions, with the BJP leading. The state witnessed a fresh spell of President's Rule after 1996 Assembly elections as no party could get a clear majority and the then Governor Romesh Bhandari did not invite the single largest party, the BJP, to form the government. Bhandari virtually forced a constitutional crisis by recommending President's Rule in Uttar Pradesh. President's

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Rule was terminated on March 27, 1991 when the BJP and the BSP reached an agreement to share power on a six monthly basis.

The Assembly was to complete its five year term in October, 200l. The Lok Sabha was also dissolved twice after 1996 elections, and mid-term polls were held in 1998 for the 12th and in 1999 for the . The BJP was put to great embarrassment wing to the damaging role played by , then BJP C.M. of U.P. owing to his ire over the denial of party ticket to his right hand Lodhi friend Sakshi Maharaj. Kalyan was later removed from Chief Ministership, and he quit BJP to form a new political outfit, the Rashtriya Kranti Party. Politics in U.P. during the last decade of 20th century has been long remembered for the sharp downfall of the Congress (rather its total eclipse), politics of polarisation and the unleashing of the consciousness of the Dalits, the downtrodden and the backwards, and also for an era of fractured mandates political deadlocks and the inevitability of coalition governments.

The collapse of the Congress is certainly owing to the loss of its traditional vote banks in U.P. The failure of the party to improve the quality of life of the poor and the downtrodden, all round conniption and criminalisation of the society and the politics under its regime, and the long innings of about forty years given to the Congress, completely unnerved the people and they turned to other possible alternatives. That really showed that the electorate was imbibing the essence of a democratic polity and beginning to explore the possibility of other democratic options. They started feeling that the non-Congress parties were not any more anti- national propositions.

Since 1989, the Congress has been relegated from number one to number four positions in the politics of Uttar Pradesh. Infact, the support base of the Congress and the BJP is more or less the same except, of course, the Muslims. So, if the BJP is not able to retain its voters, there may be a possibility of its voters changing over to the Congress. Hence, the Congress cannot be really permanently written off in the state politics, though presently it happens to be on the backbenches. Uttar Pradesh also witnessed the polarisation of the electorate on the caste and the communal lines. Most of the parties have taken a major caste-communal group with the party.

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The Assembly elections of 2002 in Uttar Pradesh provide rich survey data for studying the changing social profile of different political parties in the state. The erstwhile government of BJP headed by took initiative in providing reservations or the More Backwards Classes (MRBCs) and the Most Backwards Classes (MBCs), and the most-Dalits (which included 65 non-chamar Dalit castes) through legislation.80 The BSP resorted to a philosophical shift by renouncing the concept of Bahujan Samaj and accepting the concept of Sarvajan Samaj. The new concept gave the BSP a ground to open up the party for the upper castes and the Muslims in a big way. The SP and the Congress too seem to be redoing the same. The social engineering drive of political parties has taken them to inclusive politics and forced them to renounce exclusive politics. Some scholars also suspect that the bi- party system in U.P. may lead to greater communal polarisation. Others feel that on special occasions such as the Godhra and the , the inhibitions of castes may be swayed by the Hindutva in Uttar Pradesh too. While conjectures about the future political behaviour of the voters are a risky proposition, yet going by the past record of the voters in Uttar Pradesh we can safely say that the U.P. voter has not given any support to the BJP on the Hindutva plank and the graph of the party has been constantly declining since the demolition of the disputed structure at Ayodhya on 6th December 1992.

The decade of 1990s can also be seen as the decade of the rise of Dalit consciousness. Though the BSP had come into existence in the mid-1980s and even before, there had been efforts to consolidate the Dalits under the banner of the Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti (DS-4) and other outfits, but the real rise of the Dalits came from the state of Uttar Pradesh through the efforts of Mayawati and Kanshi Ram. Some feel that the Dalit agenda is coming in a big way in U.P. With the BSP at the helms of affairs in U.P. the Dalit agenda is bound to come and the BSP leadership is going all out to give an impression to the Dalit samaj in future. The party has only one open agenda - to get to power anyhow. The BSP has been organising big rallies in U.P. and now they have started concentrating on Maharashtra and Delhi. However, it is difficult to see any substantial difference in the pattern of development under the BSP leadership though under the fear of Mayawati, the bureaucracy has become a bit liberal to the Dalits so that even unlawful activities of the influential Dalits, viz., land grabbing, unlawful arms collection, undue interference in the

40 Chapter -1 disbursement of the developmental funds, arms twisting under the guise of the legal protection provided to them, etc., are being ignored by the officials at the district level.

Observers feel puzzled at the BSP's effort to combine the diametrically opposite streams of inclusive politics and populist politics. But the BSP is matchless; they may not belong to the sophisticated breed of politics and politicians, but the party must get some credit for tactfully and successfully combining its populist politics with its newfound philosophy of inclusive politics. Looking at the neighbouring states - Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi and Uttarakhand - it is rather curious that the BSP does not find any substantial following and support base in these states. The rise of Dalit consciousness in U.P. was joined by the rise of the backward class' consciousness. The OBCs have come upon a big way especially during the regime of the SP leader Mulayam Singh Yadav. Though the SP had been out of power in U.P. for about eight years (since June 1995), yet the charisma of Mulayam Singh has been able to keep the flock of OBCs, especially the Yadavs with the party.

The Yadavs are a prosperous agricultural community and fairly wide spread all over Uttar Pradesh. Both the BJP and the BSP have appointed their state leaders from amongst the OBCs. However, it is surprising that the political rise of the OBCs in Uttar Pradesh and the entire north has been delayed by about two decades compared to south India. The OBCs upsurge in the south could be seen as far back as the 1960s. It is also interesting to note that the pattern of the rise of the OBCs in the Hindi belt has been heterogeneous. In Bihar, the OBC consolidation fast and almost firmly entrenched in the game of power politics so much so that some observers consider the regime transformation in Bihar almost irreversible. In U.P., the OBC consolidation has come up slowly and the group has been almost equally divided between the BJP and the SP. In Madhya Pradesh, there has been no distinct OBC leadership for the simple reason that the Congress and the BJP have given them important positions in their respective organisation.

Yet another significance of the electoral politics of the 1990s in U.P. is that it could be called an era of coalition politics. Except for the brief 262 one party BJP government of Kalyan Singh (June 24, I99l to December 6, 1992), all the

41 Chapter -1 governments since December 1989 have been coalition governments. The formation of coalition governments owing to hung assemblies in U.P. points to a fractured mandate, which hinges on the fragmentation of the electorate on caste and communal lines. This social fragmentation on caste and communal lines has plunged the state into electoral pluralism, and there appears to be no end to this in the near future. And, thus, the era of coalition is likely to be extended much beyond 2003. Scholars are divided over the nature of the coalition politics in U.P. and elsewhere. Some opine that a coalition reflects a deadlock in the polity as no single party is able to command the majority of the people, and hence no single party government could be formed. Others disagree and instead consider that non-coalitional politics could be more stagnating. Coalition is not simply about the sharing of power, but is reflective of a cultural and social competitive politics. However, the coalition arrangement is not indicative of a deadlock. Instead, it is an effort to come out of the deadlock created by the fractured mandate of the people. The Assembly elections in U.P., in 2002 are a case in point, when the results were declared, it was a hopelessly divided mandate and the Governor was not in a position to invite any political party to form the government. There was a deadlock. Ultimately, the deadlock was broken when the BSP and the BJP came to terms and decided to form a coalition government. The February 2002 Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh were held against the backdrop of legal and constitutional controversies. One was about the use of photo identity cards by voters and the other was on the question of when the tenure of the 13th Legislative Assembly ended. Some argued that the term of the Assembly, which was elected in October 1996, ended in October 2001 after an interval of five years from the date of its constitution. The Election Commission declared that the term ended in March 2002 because the first meeting of the Assembly was held in March l997. In the last three Assembly elections of 1991, 1993 and 1996 the BJP had emerged as the single largest party. During the last one decade, the BJP had been in power for a total of six and a half years. The BJP's claim to be a party with a difference had been totally belied and the people saw that the BJP coalition government and its ministers were no better than their predecessors.

There was a discord over the temple issue between the BJP and one of its affiliates, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). The VHP wanted to go ahead with the construction of the temple at Ayodhya from March 15, 2002 but the BJP said that this

42 Chapter -1 was not on its agenda. BJP president Jana Krishnamurty deferred the temple issue till the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. The BJP leadership projected the U.P. Assembly elections as being crucial for the whole nation. The issues raised by the BJP during the election campaign can be classified into three parts: (a) communally sensitive issues, (b) general issues and (c) issues of local importance. These three sets of issues were not raised with the same force all over the state. The emphasis differed in different constituencies for tactical reasons. On a closer examination, it appears that the BJP had also classified all constituencies in to three categories (a) constituencies with a sizeable Muslim population, which may go for tactical voting against it, (b) constituencies where the BJP or an ally had the sitting MLAs, and (c) constituencies where the sitting MLAs belonged to the opposition parties. It is understood that innuendoes about Muslims and issues like cross-border terrorism, SIMI, POTA, illegal immigration from and threat from Pakistan (leading to greater mobilisation of security forces at the borders) were used with greater vehemence in (a)-type constituencies. (b)-type constituencies saw a campaign about issues of law and order, criminalisation of politics, stable government, social justice with reservations for the most backward castes and women, crop and cattle insurance, employment for one and a half lac youth in the next three years, etc. Issues of local importance like civic amenities, development, mediclaim policies for the poor, free textbooks for girl students up to class VIII and accountability of administration were raised in (c)-type constituencies.81

It is being said in certain RSS and VHP circles that the BJP failed in the February elections because it did not play the Mandir card. An examination of the electoral data reveals that the BJP has never been able to capitalise on the Mandir issue. It could never get even close to the majority mark after the demolition of the Babri masjid in December 1992. The ground reality is that U.P. voters do not seem interested in this issue. The paradox is that the Ayodhya issue agitates people outside Ayodhya and U.P. more than those who live in the state.82

The declaration of results was facilitated by the use of electronic voting machines (EVMs) in a big way. For 117,400 polling stations, about 130,000 EVMs were provided by the Election Commission. The EVMs were a big success in saving paper and printing costs, preventing booth-capturing, facilitating counting and revealing the collective voting behaviour of the rural caste groups by declaring the

43 Chapter -1 results booth wise. The secrecy of the ballot of a caste/community group was seriously compromised, and the bad repercussions of this in the rural areas have started showing. It would be in the fitness of things if the Commissions revert to its earlier method of mixing votes of different booths to avoid identification of group voting behaviour and the consequent harassment, especially of the Dalits and the weaker sections of voters.83

It was clear from the results of 2002 Assembly elections, the SP emerged as the single largest party by winning 143 seats. The BSP and the BJP appeared as the other major players by taking 98 and 88 seats, respectively. The Congress finished a poor fourth with only 25 seats. Among the allies of the BJP, only the RLD showed a good performance. It won l4 out of the 38 seats it contested but was confined to western U.P. Four allies of the BJP - Samata, Shaktidal and Lok Parivartan Party could not set even a single seat. Thus, since the mid 1990s the pattern shows that while the strength of parties is no longer dependent on any one single region, yet for each party some regions continue to contribute substantially to their vote shares. But, all political parties in Uttar Pradesh now have a significant presence in terms of votes in all the regions of the state.

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References:

1. K. Balasankaran Nair: (1995). Uttarakhand: Past, Present, and Future; Separation of Uttarakhand. Concept Publishing Company. p. 391 2. http://Uttar_Pradesh#cite_ref-Terai_40-0 "Uttar Pradesh Geography". Uttar Pradesh State Profile. Accessed on 22 July 2012. 3. Gecafs: http://www.gecafs.org/publications/Publications/IGP_Paper.pdf "The larger Gangetic Plain". Accessed on 22 July 2012. 4. Gopal K. Bhargava; Shankarlal C. Bhatt (2005): Land and People of Indian States and Union Territories. Uttar Pradesh; Gyan Publishing House. pp. 31–33. 5. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topiclist/Rivers-of-Uttar-Pradesh "Rivers of Uttar Pradesh". The Economic Times. Accessed on 22 July 2012. 6. Vir Singh; (2009): Mountain Ecosystems: A Scenario of Unsustainability. Indus Publishing. pp. 102–264. 7. Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow; Irrigation Department Uttar Pradesh. "Average rainfall pattern of Uttar Pradesh". Accessed on 22 July 2012. 8. Upkar Prakashan - Editorial Board (2008). Uttar Pradesh General Knowledge. Upkar Prakashan. pp. 26–28. 9. Sethi, Nitin (13 Feb. 2007). "Met dept blames it on 'Western Disturbance'". . Accessed on 9 March 2011. 10. Duckworth, J.W., Samba Kumar, N., (2008). Rucervus Duvaucelii. http://www.iucnredlist.org/apps/redlist/details/4257: Accessed on 5 April 2009. 11. http://upgov.nic.in/upwealth.aspx "Few patches of natural forest". State Government of Uttar Pradesh. Accessed on 22 July 2012. 12. Books Llc. (26 July 2010). Bird Sanctuaries of Uttar Pradesh: General Books LLC. p. 26.

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13. S. K. Agarwal, (2011): Environment Biotechnology. APH Publishing. p. 61. 14. http://panchayatiraj.up.nic.in/Acts%20And%20Rules%20Pdfs/Panchaya t%20Raj%20Act_1947_ch6.57-70.pdf "Directory of district, sub division, panchayat samiti/ block and gram panchayats in Uttar Pradesh". Panchayati Raj Department. Accessed on 5 October 2012. 15. The Indian Express. "Development of 13 Metropolitan Cities in Uttar Pradesh". 30 August 2010. 16. Census of India 2011: "Provisional Population Totals”, Government of India Publication. p. 19. 17. Khan, Atiq (16 Nov. 2011). "Maya Splits U.P. Poll Scene Wide Open". Lucknow: The Hindu. Accessed on 15 June 2013 18. Virendra N. Misra, Peter Bellwood (1985). Recent Advances in Indo- Pacific Prehistory: proceedings of the international symposium held at Poona. p. 69. 19. Census of India 2011. "Statistics of Uttar Pradesh". UP Government. 1 March 2011. 20. http://upgov.nic.in/upstateglance.aspx: Census of India. "Census Reference Tables, C-Series Population by religious communities". Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India. 2001. 21. http://www.indiatemples.co/templesinuttarpradesh.html "List of Hindu Temples". India Temples Organization. Accessed on 5 October 2012. 22. Census of India 2011: "Literacy rate in Uttar Pradesh". Accessed on 16 October 2010. 23. http://nclm.nic.in/index1.asp?linkid=203 Commissioner on Linguistic Minorities. "43rd report: July 2004 - June 2005". pp. 61–62. 24. Ibid. op.cit,. p. 69 25. Bridget Allchin, Frank Raymond Allchin; (29 July 1982): The Rise of Civilization in India and Pakistan. Cambridge University Press. p. 58. 26. Kenneth A. R. Kennedy; (2000): God-apes and Fossil Men. University of Michigan Press. Michigan, USA, p. 263.

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27. Gibling, Sinha; Sinha, Roy; Roy, Tandon; Tandon, Jain; Jain, M (2008). "India: Paleolithic to Neolithic Archeological Sites Over the Past 85,000 Years". Quaternary Science Reviews 27 (3–4): 391. 28. Hasmukhlal Dhirajlal Sankalia, Shantaram Bhalchandra Deo, Madhukar Keshav Dhavalikar (1985). Studies in Indian Archaeology. Popular Prakashan. , p. 96. 29. See, Gibling, Sinha; Sinha, Roy; Roy, Tandon; Tandon, Jain; Jain, M (2008). Op.cit,. 30. Pran Nath Chopra (1 Dec. 2003). A Comprehensive History of Ancient India. Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, p. 196. 31. John Stewart Bowman (2000). Columbia Chronologies of Asian History and Culture. Columbia University Press, Columbia; p. 273. 32. Richard White (8 Nov. 2010). The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815. Cambridge University Press. Accessed on 1 October 2012. 33. Sailendra Nath Sen (1 Jan. 1999). Ancient Indian History and Civilization. New Age International. pp. 105–106. 34. Annemarie Schimmel (5 Feb. 2004). The Empire of the Great Mughals: History, Art and Culture. Reaktion Books. Accessed on 1 October 2012. 35. Carlos Ramirez-Faria (1 Jan. 2007). Concise Encyclopedia of World History. Atlantic Publishers & Dist. p. 171. 36. Gyanesh Kudaisya (29 July 2006). Region, nation, "heartland": Uttar Pradesh in India's body-politic. Sage Publications. p. 471 37. Ibid Op.cit,. p. 463 38. Ibid Op.cit,. p. 411 39. Ibid Op.cit,. p. 402 40. Dilip Hiro (1 Mar. 2006). Nama: Journal of Emperor Babur. Penguin Books India. New Delhi, p. 96. 41. Stronge, Susan (1999): Mughal Hindustan Is Renowned For Its Opulence. “The Arts of the Sikh Kingdoms”, London: p. 255. 42. Ibid., op.cit., p. 258

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43. Ashvini Agrawal (1 Jan. 1983). Studies In Mughal History. Motilal Banarsidass Publication. New Delhi, pp. 30–46. 44. Ibid., op.cit., p. 49 45. Claude Markovits (2002). A History of Modern India, 1480-1950. Anthem Press. Calcutta, pp. 586–593. 46. Rudrangshu Mukherjee (1 Jun. 2005). Mangal Pandey: Brave Martyr or Accidental Hero?. Penguin Books. New Delhi, p. 12. 47. Śekhara, Bandyopādhyāya (2004). From Plassey to Partition: A History of Modern India. Orient Longman Publication. London: p. 407. 48. Ibid. op.cit., p. 355 49. Upkar Prakashan: ibid. op.cit,. pp. 46–287. 50. Sanjeev Joon. Complete Guide for SSC. Tata McGraw-Hill Education. p. 255. 51. Ibid., op.cit., p. 258 52. http://www.up-tourism.com/destination/varanasi/fair_festival.htm: "The glorious traditions and mythological legacy". Department of tourism U.P. Accessed on 18 sJuly 2012. 53. http://nclm.nic.in/index1.asp?linkid=203 Ibid. op.cit., p. 66 54. Zee news. http://zeenews.india.com/state-elections-2012/up/issues.html: "UP: the nerve centre of politics". Accessed on 22 July 2012. 55. Brass Paul R., (1965); Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh, University of California, Berkeley. p. l9 56. Jagpal, Singh, (2001); 'Politics of Harit Pradesh: The Case of Western UP as a Separate State', Economic and Political Weekly, August 4. 57. Brass, Paul R., (1984); Faction and Party in Indian Politics, Vol. I, Chanaky Publisher, Delhi, p. 2, 3 58. Ansari, Ghaus, 1960; 'Muslim Caste in Uttar Pradesh', A Study of Cultural Contact, Eastern Anthropologies' Cosmos Publication: New Delhi, p. 183 59. Brass, (1965); op. cit., p. 19

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60. Vajpayee, Dhirendra Kumar, (l97l); 'The Role of Political Participation', Mass Media and Empathy in Modernisation: A Case Study of Uttar Pradesh (lndia), Michigan University, Ph.D. thesis. Pp. 38-42 61. Pai, Sudha: (1931); 'Uttar Pradesh: ‘Agrarian Change and Electoral Politics', Shipra Publication, New Delhi, p. 3, 6 62. Lieten, G.K. and Ravi Srivastava, (1999); Unequal Relations, Power Relations, Devolution and Development in Uttar Pradesh, Sage Publications, New Delhi. P-521 63. Vajpayee, (I97l), op. cit., p. 39 64. Verma, A.K., (1991): A Study of Political Defections in Uttar Pradesh, Unpublished thesis, Kanpur University, Kanpur. p. 118 65. Verma. B.N. and Verma. A.K., (1986); 'The Bullets and the Ballots: The Parliamentary Election in India 1984', Samuchit, Bareilly. p. 131 66. Hasan, Zoya, (1998); Quest for Power, Oppositional Movements and Post-Congress. Politics in Uttar Pradesh, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. p. 2l 67. Hasan, Zoya, 1989; 'Power and Mobilisation: Patterns of Resilience and Change in Uttar Pradesh', Oxford University Press, Delhi. P. 82 68. See, Hasan, 1989. op. cit., p. 84 69. Duncan, Ian, 1997; 'Agricultural Innovation and Political Change in North India: Thc Lok Dal in Uttar Pradesh', The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4, July, 1997. p. 250 70. Hassan, (1989), op. cit., Pp. 134-35 71. Duncan, (1997), op. cit., p. 251 72. Pai, (1993), op. cit., Pp. ll-l2 73. Hasan, Zoya, (1994); 'Shifting Grounds: Hindutva Politics and the Farmer's Movement in Uttar Pradesh', Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 2l. Nos. 3 and 4 p. 8 & 18 74. Pai, (1993). op.cit., p. 113 75. Christophe, Jaffrelot, Jasmine Zerinini-Brotel and Jayati Chaturvedi. 2003: 'The BJP and the Rise of Dalits in Uttar Pradesh', in Roger Jeffery

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and Jens Lerche’. Social and Political Change in Uttar Pradesh. European Perspectives, Manohar Publishers, New Delhi., p. 156 76. Duncan, (1997), op.cit., p. 1 77. Hasan, Zoya, (1994); 'Party Politics and Communal Mobilisation in Uttar Pradesh' South Asia Bulletin, Vol.14, N o. l. Pp. 272-77 78. Duncan, (1997), op. cit., p. 2621 79. Verma, A.K. (2001); 'UP: BJP's Caste Card', Economic and Political Weekly, December l, 2002. ,Pp. 452-55 80. Verma, A.K., (2002); 'Political Prospects in UP: Pointers from a Pre Poll Survey', Economic and Political Weekly, February 9, 2002. 81. Verma, A.K., (2002); 'UP Assembly Elections: Caste Dominates ideology', Economic and Political Weekly, May 25, 2002. 82. Website of the Election Commission of India- www.e' ci.gov.in: Accessed on 18 July 2012. 83. Verma, (2002) op.cit.,

50

Electoral Politics: Theoretical Framework

Chapter -2

ELECTORAL POLITICS: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Electoral politics is the most visible and symbolic form of political participation. Periodic, free and fair elections are essential for the achievement of effective democracy. The free, fair and transparent elections reflect the will of the people, which provide the basis of the authority of the government. Henry J. Steiner in his work, states, “Countries with markedly different political systems have termed political participation the vital human right. In its absence, all others fall to a perilous existence”.1 Elections are, therefore, the means by which the great mass of citizens can participate directly in the political process and citizens do participate in this way and elect their representatives for public offices. In this chapter theoretical framework of electoral politics is drawn which would helpful to understand the BSP’s political adventures in state of Uttar Pradesh. Theories of electoral participation along with tracing out some electoral models are discussed in this chapter for focused analysis of electoral politics and voting behaviour.

Electoral politics is a participatory play in governing process through elections in which both voters and politicians want to achieve power, ‘to control the behaviour of others through force, threats, or withholding of resources’.2 Study of electoral politics renders an understanding of how government’s policies, political parties’ strategies about elections operates and how people behave in the process. The study also involves the investigation of citizens interacting with each other. Electoral politics have different dimensions of socio-political nature, tenants-landlords relations and parties’ electoral ambitions. Political parties used influential people amongst the third world societies to win elections and these influential people used political parties to get power within their constituencies over the administrations from top to bottom for the fulfillment of their own interests.

The study of electoral politics is an interesting topic due to its practical applications. Electoral politics is concerned with the distribution of advantages and disadvantages among people based on their interests. In urban and rural areas of especially developing countries like India, citizens have different wants and needs which are acquired by “arguments, persuasion, threats, flattery and other forces”.3 Citizens are constantly interacting with each other, and since the satisfaction of many of a person’s needs depends upon the relationships they establishes with others, the

51 Chapter -2 preferences and interests of some individuals will inevitably come into opposition with the preferences and interests of others. This opposition of preferences and interests may result in competition or conflict and in attempts by those concerned to reach some sort of accommodation, varying from elimination of the competitor to a reconciliation of differences.

In such countries, “Payoffs” are distributed among the parties in conflict. It depends upon two factors. (1) The type of decision making process, and (2) The people and the resources involved. The distribution of advantages and disadvantages are dependent upon both the types of decision making process and the people involved.4 On the basis of electoral politics, elected politicians gain office from the votes of a certain number of people, geographically defined i.e. from their constituencies. They owe their election to the votes, campaign funds, party work, and efforts of those who elected them as their elected representatives. They enjoy their work and desire to remain in office. Hence they pay attention to those who played a role in putting them on that position. The stronger the support, the greater will be the obligation by the politician to the supporters.5

Factors of Electoral Politics: Factors such as socio-economic status, religion, family influence, and the state of the national, local and provincial affairs affect political attitudes; but the people’s conscious feelings about the parties, issues and candidates are the most immediate determinants of voting behaviour.6 Throughout one’s life a variety of agents exert influence on a person’s political outlook. A considerable portion of this learning occurs before the individual is old enough to enter the voting booth i.e. in the early days of life. Family background can determine voting and party preferences.7 Many if not most, individuals adopt the same party identification as their parents. It was assumed that parents transmitted their partisanship to their off springs through a process called political socialisation.8

In the third world countries including India, paternal political influence on electoral politics is deeply rooted in socio-economic, cultural, religious and regional codes of life and this paternal influence reflects in the younger generations in societies. Participation of the people in the electoral process is the substance of procedural democracy and during every election large number of people participated in procedural democracy from within social chains. A free election which is the

52 Chapter -2 highest degree of a consolidated democracy is still the want of these societies. Elections are the hallmark of democracy. Robert Dahl, in an introduction to democratic theory suggests that political parties and elections are two requisite institutions of any democracy.9

Electoral Politics and Political Process: Electoral politics and political process both have direct relation with each other. Electoral process establishes political institutions whose success and failure depends upon the rate of political awareness. Democratic elections are a fair competitive examination for recruitment of leaders by the electorates. Electoral systems determine the rules according to which the voters may express their political preferences and according to which it is possible to convert votes into parliamentary seats.10

In electoral politics people are mostly concerned with style issues about war and peace, prosperity and depression, corruption and “good” governance. In election campaigns politicians are interested in getting re-elected.11 During election process and campaigns politicians used the language of voter, they liberally use “should” and “ought to”, they deal in generalities and half truths, they say things which they probably don’t mean and don’t understand themselves.

Strategies in Electoral Politics: In electoral politics, politicians have different strategies and techniques. The strategy of the politicians is clear. They make broad, vague, ambiguous, and emotional appeals in the hopes of winning as many votes as possible. This strategy serves a function for both politicians and people: for politicians it is generally the only strategy that will result in success (given the nature of the electorate), to people it gives the kinds of things they want to hear. Campaigns help to assure voters that they are making the right choice.12 Issues are always highlighted at party platforms and political parties used issue style politics in developing countries like India but the MLAs or MPs who represented constituencies used traditional ways such as caste, creed, colour, region, religion, language and biradari supports, friends influence and past developmental works. Voters often did not bother to ask any candidate his motivation for seeking election and reasoning at the grassroots level is sometime out of the question.13

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Voting in Electoral Politics: The major component of electoral politics is voting. The act of voting gives a concrete example of the individual citizen responding to stimuli, making decisions, and finally either acting or choosing not to. It provides a useful and illuminating case study of political behaviour. In electoral politics, a high voting turnout among the citizens is considered to be a significant indicator of the health of the political system, because political participation is assumed to be essential to the proper functioning of the democracy. Most political studies also assume that the act of voting is an indication that the individual citizen views himself as an active participant in the political system. If the individual feels, on the basis of past experience, that the results of elections do influence the decision of the government and that the efforts of individuals like himself or herself can affect the results of elections then he or she will be motivated to participate in the electoral process. If the citizen is motivated, he/she may put more of his/her time, energy, and resources into the process by studying the issues involved in the election, making contributions to campaigns, or actively working to help create support for a candidate, party, or position on some issue. If his/her effort is not rewarded by some sense of accomplishment, he/she is likely to make less of an investment in future elections.14 The voter is a prospective in an exchange relationship. Through party platform, speeches, statements of position, and personal contacts, the various candidates promise various benefits that will accrue to him/her if he/she invests his/her vote in their cause. Additional benefits (such as positions in the governmental structure) may be offered to induce the citizen to give active personal or financial support to the campaign.

Completing the bargaining cycle, the prospective voter makes his various needs and demands known to the candidates, usually through organised pressure groups and the machinery of political parties. During the course of a pre-election campaign, this bargaining process may lead to shifts of position by both the candidates and the prospective voters.15 The basic logic of voting as mentioned in down’s work is ‘rational choice’, i.e. voter’s vote as per their self interests and parties or candidates who receive votes are also rational because they have their own interests. These interests are not clear but always uncertain. This uncertainty situation always becomes the backbone of electoral politics. Politicians act solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in office.

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According to rational choice theory, politicians never seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies; their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office. They treat policies purely as means to the attainment of their private ends, which they can reach only by being elected. Parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies. 16

The election is a multivariate phenomenon. To understand how elections are won and lost, one must consider not only the influence that social characteristics have on the individual voter, but also the roles played by such institutional arrangements as election laws, these also affect how many seats each party wins for parliament. The relationship between the multitudes of influences upon individual voters: eligibility to vote rules, turnout considerations, party actions and political events, social characteristics, standing party identification, and issue predispositions. Many studies of voting terminate with statements about the preferences of individual voters. The most important political phenomena are not individual choices but the aggregate distribution of seats in the parliament, effecting control of executive government. In a country with simple two-party system the result is conceived as total victory or defeat; in multiparty system in which coalition government is the norm there are complications in converting parliamentary seats into coalition shares.17

The electoral process is a means of decision that lies within a broader political order, and in research on voting it is valuable to have the wider political system in which the electoral process is found. Timely elections would seem to be obviously related to political developments. They have to be considered in the context of the political culture and sentiments about legitimacy and commitment to the system. They have a direct and often decisive bearing on the capacity of a political system and on the performance of the authoritative structures of government in many political systems. They have a central role in the non-authoritative structures and the general political process. Elections induce the important element of accountability into a political system, and provide a means by which such accountability is achieved in greater or lesser degree. Accountability also seems to be related to political development. As John Badgley has reasoned, “A civil polity is one in which the public interest is served by the process of accountability”.18 While on the other hand Samuel Huntington believes that in many countries, elections serve only to enhance

55 Chapter -2 the power of disruptive and often reactionary social forces, except on short run basis. 19

Electoral Politics and Political Parties: Elections and political parties have a direct relationship with each other. During elections, parties are most prominently on display, or, to put it in another way, on trial. An election provides an unrivalled opportunity to examine the organisation, the personnel, and the policies of the parties. Parties are the main agencies for organizing and for providing political direction to the electorate, and for political choice. The electoral system affects the political life of a country mainly through the political parties.20 Elections are a mechanism which parties use to maintain their support base. Elections help to establish links between the society, mainly non-political, and the political system, in which parties function.

In heterogeneous society, people who are psychologically and emotionally attached to their political groups, have two perspectives i.e. traditionalist perspective and revisionist perspective.21 According to the traditionalist perspective, party identification is primarily an emotional attachment and not the result of the individual’s consideration of which party might be more likely to better serve his or her interests.22 It is thus a sort of psychological identification and is therefore not based on policy concerns. This perspective could be rational in the sense that with the passage of time partisan ties strengthen due to frequent use of their vote and exposure to agreeable information. Thus a citizen refrains from changing his party loyalty he has acquired so early in life without paying any heed to the multiple issues and policies surrounding him.23 According to the revisionist perspective, model partisanship is not merely a psychological attachment without political meaning; rather it reflects the citizen’s judgments of the parties’ performance on issues important to the citizen.24 This perspective comes closer to the rational activist model, according to which the public supposedly controls the behaviour of its public officials by exercising influence at the ballot box in a rational fashion. It implies that a voter takes into account all the factors i.e. issues, candidates, parties, manifestos, etc. before casting his vote. With all the information regarding political parties, campaign, candidates and contemporary issues at his disposal, it seems quite reasonable to state that issues and policy matters play an important role in determining an individual’s partisanship.25

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Issues and Bases in Electoral Politics: Electoral politics is concerned with all the issues and is based on wide range of factors such as political system, political parties, interest groups, military and bureaucracy. In electoral politics historical, social, psychological and other ecological factors directly effect on electoral process of the country. Electoral politics is also conditioned by deep-seated historical and societal factors.26 Gopal Krishna observed that the decision to vote for one candidate rather than another may be governed entirely by non political considerations and the voter may often be unaware of the political choice he/she is making through the act of voting.27 The importance of considering the electoral process within the societal as well as the political framework, and the role of elections as providing a crucial link between the society and the polity calls attention to the relationship between the political and the social system.28 The most generally discussed electoral propositions, namely that ‘social characteristics determine political preferences’.29

Political systems vary from society to society. Max Weber was of the opinion that the type of the political system depends upon the nature of its legitimacy. Legitimacy rests on three factors, i.e. traditions, charismatic personality, legality. Today Democracy i.e. the government where the power is vested in the people is considered to be the popular system. Democracy has different principles and necessary conditions. Among these the most important principle is the strong desire and full commitment of the masses toward democracy.30

ELECTORAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS:

Political organisation refers to the means by which a society maintains order internally and manages its affairs with other societies externally.31Such organisation may be relatively decentralised and informal as in bands and tribes, or centralised and formal, as in chiefdoms and states. In other words, political organisation is the system of social relationships that provides for the co-ordination and regulation of behaviour, insofar as that behaviour is related to the maintenance of public order. Political organisation is the means through which a society maintains social order.32 Elections are complex events involving individual and collective decisions, which directly effect, and are effected by, the total political and social process. They open up channels between the polity and the society, between the elite and the masses, between the individuals and his government. They are major agencies of political

57 Chapter -2 socialisation and political participation.33 Elections broadly considered, are complicated political processes, which are to be analysed within the context of the total political and social system. V.O. Key says that, ‘an election itself is a formal act of collective decision that occurs in a stream of connected antecedent and subsequent behaviour.’34

Robert Lane has developed a useful “paradigm for the study of electoral behaviour”35 which calls attention to the broader dimensions of the electoral process and to a variety of types, attributes, and factors which may be considered as either dependent or independent variables. The types of political behaviour listed under ‘responses’ represent, ‘collectively and individually, the dependent variable, the psychological attributes of individual, listed under ‘organisation’ and ‘the social or environmental factors listed under stimuli’ represent the independent variable. 36

On the other hand the Michigan Model of voter behaviour has a core theme on social psychological pattern.37 It depends on many factors. Events follow one another, converging in a series of causal chains and moving from the mouth to the stem of the funnel. Thus a multitude of causes narrow in to the voting act. At the mouth of the funnel are sociological background characteristic such as (ethnicity, race, region, religion, and the like), social status characteristic (education, occupation, class), and parental characteristics (class, partisanship). All these factors affect the person’s choice of party identification. Party identification in turn influences the person’s evaluation of the candidates and the issues, which takes us further into the funnel. Then comes the campaign. Closer to the tip are the conversations which the voter has with family and friends about the election. Then comes the vote itself.38 Michigan researchers concentrated, then and now, on those variables that are closest to the voting decision. This approach can be attributed to the influence of social psychology on modern political science.

Political scientists also have the opinion that “the immediate determinants of an individual’s behaviour lie more clearly in his attitudes and his perceptual organisation of his environment than in either his/her social position or other ‘objective’ situational factors”.39 The Michigan Model also suggests that long term factors are most important in determining party choice. But there is not a simple step from social locations to voting behaviour. Rather, the social position that an

58 Chapter -2 individual occupies affects the kinds of influence that he or she will encounter in interacting with family, friends, neighbours, workmates and so on. As a consequence of the interactions especially within the family-the individual acquires a party identification. This means sense of attachment to party, feeling of commitment to it, being the supporter of the party-and not just someone who happens to vote for the party from time to time.40 When there is an election, there is an interaction between a voter’s long term party identification and various short term influences, such as current political issues, campaign events, the personalities of party leaders or candidates and, the tactical situation in the local constituency, to produce a vote decision. The Michigan Model emphasises that it is the long term factors that are usually decisive. Indeed a person’s party identification will influence how the voter interprets and evaluates issues, party leaders and so on.

The concept of Party identification is central to the Michigan model and there are three clear differences between party identification and voting. Firstly, party identification is psychological while voting is behavioural. That is, identification exists in a person’s mind; one cannot observe it directly. Voting, however a definite action-putting a stamp on a piece of paper-and it is in principle, observable (normally done in secret). Secondly, voting is time specific while party identification is not. Voting can take place only at an election-and elections occur frequently whereas identification is ongoing and continuous. There does not need to be an election in the offing for people to consider themselves supporters of a party. Thirdly, party identification varies in intensity and voting does not. Some people will be very strong party supporters, others not very strong or just weak supporters. All votes count equally, however, whether the voter marks the ballot with a great thick black cross or tiny faint one.41 Party identification is, then, distinct from voting. This means that it can be used to help explain party choice in election, as in the Michigan Model. According to the theory, party identification serves important functions for the individual. It simplifies the task of understanding the complex world of politics. Identification also acts as a sort of psychological filter or prism through which political messages pass to the individual; it provides a framework within which political events are understood and evaluated. If people identify with a party they are not likely to shoot off in all directions at successive elections. Rather, they will have a ‘normal’ vote which in most cases will remain stable from election to election.

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The Michigan approach was based on a sample survey of voters, aimed at bringing out a correlation between party identification and volatility.42 It drew upon the social psychology of individual voters. Its focal point was to the voting behaviour as the end product of election activities, ranging from the announcement of candidature, media input and party propaganda to the act of casting the ballot at the polling station. The voter is the king-pin of the electoral process according to the Michigan approach, with scant attention given to the social context of voting. Sometimes a survey is conducted to cover the changes in the voter preferences during different phases of election, phases of the election campaign, modeled after a ‘rolling thunder design’.43 The concept is that the voter is sovereign in terms of taking decisions about which of the alternative political parties and patterns of leadership should be delegated his or her trust in the matter of policy making.

On the other hand, the Columbia school of thought focused on a sociological perspective to understand the partisan dynamics of elections. This perspective deals essentially with attitudinal determinants of voter along the continuum of policy preferences on the left-right ideological orientations. Here, the contexts of class, race, caste, ethnicity, religion, rural or urban sectors gender and generation influence the voter in varying degrees and styles. In this regard, the political communications approach revolves around the issue of the construction of electoral choice for the voter.44 Alternatively the Downsian theory of voting behaviour is based on the voter calculation of cost and benefit leading to the act of voting. This so called economic theory of voting behaviour is coached in the rationality thesis, whereby each voter is supposed to seek maximisation of his or her interest by carefully analysing the gains emanating out of preferring one party or candidate over the other.45 This approach depends heavily on the profile of the citizen who demonstrates stable issue preferences, credible information about policy alternative and knowledge of both short term and long term consequences of the ballot. These approaches have led to the corresponding research models applicable to filled surveys covering conceptual frameworks and methodological issues relations to the elections. Researcher can look at the three models in traverse order: spatial studies, alignment studies and party organisational studies. The spatial model corresponds to the Downsian theory based on voter maximising strategy. According to this approach, the issues positions of various parties converge with the issue dimensional of voter outlook.46 This

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‘Proximity theory’ reflects the meeting point of the electorate and political parties.47 In order to establish contact with voter parties try to control the dimensionality of a campaigns issue space, the approach could be applied to the study of the specific election, which must demonstrate a high level of issue salience. Here, we can take focus on the instances of two rapidly growing countries in South Asia. In India, local patterns of leadership were interviewed with the party high command straight after independence. Instead, Pakistan experienced not only an incomplete transition from the dynamics of micro to macro-politics as the foundation of electoral democracy, but also a process of rendering local government into an instrument to constrain the influence of politicians in the locality operating at higher levels. The mainstream parties in India- Congress, BJP and others are ‘inclusive’ and heterogeneous rather than ‘cohesive’ in nature. These are ‘catch-all’ parties, representing multiple support bases across ethnic, religious, sectarian and sectional boundaries. By the same account, these parties are somewhat autonomous with social cleavages of different kinds in different contexts. Their lack of cohesion is not necessarily counter- productive in terms of their ability to aggregate local influence structures in order to form a government. However, their organisational weakness means that there is no managerial class of politicians who would operate as ‘link men’ and bring ‘faction chains’ together in a larger and more meaningful entity.48 In Rajni Kothari’s view, the success of the ongoing democratic framework of politics in India draws, among other things, on the overall democratic intellectual climate which provided meaning to political activity of politicians.49 As opposed to the (Hindu) majority-based public ethos in pursuit of collective causes, the emergent Muslim middle class everywhere in British India sought accommodation in the system from a (Muslim) majority perspective. The state rather than society was the focus of its activity by way of seeking employment in the public sector, and thus representing a status quo orientation in terms of issues and policies.50 The overall potential of the much- cultivated sense of national insecurity in the country, often couched in the defecation of state, can be gauged from the continuously hostile attitude of the ruling elite towards politicians. Politics in India operates in an intellectual climate that is not very conducive to democratic ideals and norms.

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ELECTORAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Electoral politics is a key factor for political participation and political behaviour in a society. People inform themselves through interaction with each other, political groups and mass media. By interacting with different information agencies, a common man acquires the capability to form a clear judgment and other issues confronting a country.51 Civic culture includes a sense of obligation to participate in political input activities, as well as a sense of competence to participate.52 Citizen’s active participation in the political process may be in the shape of becoming member of a political party, taking part in election campaigns, voting during elections and pressing for demands to the government through a democratic manner.53 Here, it is inevitable to have a glance on conceptual framework of political participation for a better understanding of its relation with electoral politics.

Political participation refers to all those voluntary involvement of individuals or groups at various levels of political process. In the opinion of Harbert Mc Closky it is the voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers and directly or indirectly in the formation of public policy.54 Similarly, Conway defines it as "activities of citizens that attempt to influence the structure of government, the selection of government authorities, or the politics of government. These activities either may be supportive of the existing politics, authorities, or structure, or they may seek to change any or all of these." Huntington defines it as those activities by private citizen designed to influence government decision- making.55 Nie and Verba believes that political participation includes those legal activities by private citizen which are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selections of governmental personnel and the action they take.56

Thus, the political participation is the active engagement by individuals and groups with the governmental processes that affect their lives. This encompasses both involvements in decision-making and acts of opposition. Acts of active engagement include conventional political participation (such as voting, standing for office and campaigning for a political party) and unconventional acts, which may be legitimate (such as signing a petition and attending a peaceful demonstration), or illegal (such as violent protest and refusing to pay taxes).

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Tocqueville argues that the willingness on behalf of citizens to participate fully in the governance of their own lives is central to a thriving civil society. Such participation was an expression of citizenship, and was crucial to engendering a shared political culture. The best definition of a democracy (by Abraham Lincoln) is that it is a "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." Implicit in this definition is the idea that most of the citizens of that democracy must participate actively in the system so that the policy decisions of that government reflect what a majority of people in that system want, but participation is not limited in democratic systems at least some of the citizens from other systems can participate in the political process.

People with specific individual needs will contact government officials to get their needs taken care of. People with fewer unmet social and economic needs have little need to be involved in politics. Participation activities are not all equal; they have different opportunity costs for citizens. Citizens with limited time or financial resources may not be able to participate as much as they would like. Some people have been brought up with attitudes that support political participation or they are in social situations, such as being members of service organisations, where some types of political participation are expected. The use of direct mail to solicit funds, organized "get out the vote," and voter registration drives is increasing. The media's coverage or lack of coverage of certain topics and their endorsements of candidates can stimulate citizen interest in elections. An election, perceived as a closely contested, will generate more interest and participation because voters think that their vote really counts.57

Electoral politics strengthen democracy in which power over significant authoritative decisions in a society is distributed among the people of the country. The ordinary man is expected to take an active part in the governmental affairs, to be aware of how decisions are made, and to make his views known. According to the democratic theory the health of a democracy depends on the existence of a potentially informed and active citizenry. By working for, and voting for candidates who represent their views, and by making their views known to elected leaders, citizens could collectively translate their various policy preferences into government action.58 This is in fact what may be called the democratic ideal in which both the government

63 Chapter -2 and masses act in a reciprocal manner. The citizens put forth their demands, and those in power try to placate them by responding in a positive manner. With both sides playing their due roles, democracy gets the conducive atmosphere to flourish. In short the more the masses keep a vigil on what their elected representatives do while in office, the more the latter will be responsive to the demands and grievances of the former.

The act of casting one’s vote in a rational manner doesn’t only and necessarily mean electing members of legislature and hence the entire government. It goes even beyond. J.S. Mill considered electoral politics and political participation as moral imperative.59 Democracy has been used ever since the times of Herodotus to denote that form of government in which the ruling power of a state is largely vested, not in any particular class or classes but in the members of the community as a whole.60 With the entire emphasis on people’s participation in a democracy, it thus become incumbent upon the members of a community to take an active part in the decision making process. A government, which does not reflect the collective will of people, cannot be called a democratic government. Indeed, it is representation of masses in the affairs of their state, which distinguishes a democratic government from that of a military, authoritarian and despotic regime. An ordinary citizen, expressing himself freely in rational manner, at elections or without it, performs the key function to keep democracy alive. Democracy, says Prof. Lindsay, is participation, it means doing things in common with others, and taking share of responsibilities involved.61 It has been justly said that, like liberty, the price of democracy is eternal vigilance.

BASIC PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL POLITICS

Electoral politics based on some basic practices which attract a genuine commitment of contestants and voters to the competition for office only if the results of elections are not a foregone conclusion. That was the case in certain communist systems or one-party states. In other words, only competitive elections can be taken seriously for the purpose of establishing the rule of public representatives. In Fred Hayward’s words:

The basic principles and expectations of competitive elections can be summarised as follows: all the law abiding adult citizens are entitled to vote;

64 Chapter -2 political organisations are free to put up candidates, debate their merits freely, and criticise opponents; political organisations campaign with the objective of winning; each voter caste one vote and is not hindered in expressing a choice (preferably in secret); votes are honestly counted and the results faithfully reported; the candidate, party, or coalition with the most votes wins; the losing individual or party does not try to use force to alter the outcome or prevent the winner from taking office; and the party in power does not restrict political participation and competition which are within the parameters of existing rules.62

Myron Weiner similarly outlined four characteristics of electoral democracy; competitive elections; ability of political parties and contestants to canvas in a free atmosphere; acceptance of results in order to move on to the task of the formation of government as well as opposition; and location of supreme authority in the hands of the elected government accountable to the electorate.63 The last factor entails a requirement for parliamentary sovereignty, which has been problematic in third world countries over since their independence. Given the context of elections for a non- sovereign parliament, and similarly vulnerable provincial assemblies lower down, we need to outline the relevance of the election campaign, party mobilisation, media input and the actual polling of votes for the process of democratisation in these countries. While elections in these countries are competitive according to other criteria, the lack of parliamentary control over the levers of power in a final sense makes the whole process suspect in the eyes of political activists and analysts.

Theories of Political Participation:

Elitism: Elitism believes that all societies, democratic or not, are governed by elites. They possess more control over political resources and are drawn disproportionately from the upper socio-economic strata of society. Agreement among scholars breaks down, however, over the depth and range of conflict and competition within the ranks of the elite, and over the possible coexistence of elitism and democracy. Consequently, at least three models of elitism can be identified in the literature concerned with a democratic system. The following outline summarises the major ideas expressed in these models.

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The Elite-Class/Ruling Elite Model: This type of elitism is associated with Plato, Mosca, Pareto, and Michels. Mosca, even put the anti democratic case in 1896 when he said that in all societies, from the dawn of civilization down to the most advanced, two classes of people appear, 'a class that rules and a class that is ruled'.64 Mosca targeted Marxist social democratic movements, but he was equally dismissive of liberal democracy. Elitism was not only tainted, its message was bleak. Mosca made some acute observations (the ruling class, he says, easily subverts liberal democracy by conducting elections to the music of 'clinking dollars'), but in the end elite theory was a better defense of elitism than explanation of how societies work.65 Following are the special features of this model.

1. Power is concentrated in few hands and stems from positions within the socio- economic system. People acquire power by virtue of occupying key positions in the corporate, professional, and educational sectors of society. Economic wealth, especially institutional wealth, is the sole source of political power.

2. There is considerable convergence at the top of the political system, with a single, small, dominate elite drawn from the "cream" of America's upper class controlling all important sectors of individual’s life. Governmental institutions are regarded as largely irrelevant since actual power exists outside the formal, visible structures of government.

3. Members of the elite may occasionally disagree, but consensus normally prevails about the value of the existing system and its important policies. The cohesiveness of the elite is partly a product of their common upper-class background

4. The ruling elite is a closed group. Entry is not attained through the political process, but is a function of birth and "co-option" by the elite.

5. The elite is subject to little or no influence from the masses, whether through elections or any other means of political activity.

6. Public policy does not reflect the demands of the masses, but rather the prevailing values of the elite. These theorists therefore conclude that the state cannot possibly be classified as a democratic system.

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The Pluralist Model/Democratic Elitism

'Democratic elite' theory sounds like a contradiction of elite class model. Democracy after all depends on empowering ordinary people. As presented by Eva Etzioni Halevy, however, democratic elite theory claims to be a progressive theory compatible with equality and the needs of the weak. Her version of elite theory does not divide society into the few with power, and the many without; does not necessarily identify with the interests of leading elites; and, compared with Marxism and pluralism, promises a superior explanation of power in liberal democracies. The theory's central proposition, its 'meta principle,' is the importance for democracy of autonomous elites, autonomous from each other, and from (and within) the state. What makes multiple elites democratic is separation among them. This was the great insight, she claims, of Weber, Schumpeter, Aron, and the partially rehabilitated Mosca who, for all his doubts about democracy, saw the importance of separate competing elites. Democratic elitism shares much in common with pluralism; the key difference involves the role of autonomous elites in protecting democracy from overly powerful govermental elites. The former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe before the 1989 revolutions anchor the argument.66 The characteristic features of this model are as follows.

1. Power is unevenly, but widely, distributed in America. Power is an attribute of individuals in their social relationships. Regardless of social position, an individual has power when he/she can induce another person to do something that person would not otherwise do. Power can be achieved through the skills of leadership, information, knowledge of political processes, charisma, skills in public relations, and ideology. Economic wealth is only one of many different kinds of resources which carry a potential for political power and influence.

2. There are multiple elite groups in American society. Interests that exercise power in one policy area may not exercise it in all other areas. No single group dominates. Governmental institutions are relevant, and are decentralised, with multiple points where organised interests can gain "access" to a share of power.

3. There is considerable competition and conflict among elite groups over a broad range of issues. With the exception of a consensus on the core "democratic

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values" and the basic values of the economic system, there is no homogeneity of ideology or policy preference within elite ranks.

4. The governing elite is an open group in America. Entry is through the political process which provides a means of circulating persons into and out of their ranks.

5. The masses exert considerable influence over elites through elections and membership in various organised interests. Competition between elites for control of governmental positions and the "authority" vested therein, enables the masses to hold them accountable for the decisions they make.

6. While public policy may not necessarily represent majority preference, group demands are compromised and balanced so that policy does constitute a reasonable approximation of society's preferences.67

Democratic elitists are primarily concerned with the problem of sustaining political stability while democracy is of secondary importance. They argue that enlightened leadership, sanctioned by minimal acts of participation by the masses, is the best way to maintain order. The masses are generally ignorant and apathetic, extensive participation by them will necessarily undermine stability, and therefore undesirable. An over-active citizen is likely to make ill-considered, short-term and generally populist policy decisions. It is desirable for policy-making to be left to those who are intellectually suited to the task. Responsible elite can then neutralise the worst excesses of the masses through subtle manipulation. The art of governing is ‘giving the people not what they want, but what they will learn to want’. Even if more extensive electoral participation was deemed desirable, it is argued to be impractical. Direct or participatory democracy requires millions of citizens to make all important decisions.68 The argument against direct democracy is logically an argument against any kind of democracy. The commitment of elitists to democracy is weak: even representative democracy is conceded only on the grounds of expediency. This allows for the possibility that democracy could be dispensed with altogether, if another way could be found to pacify the mass demands. The attacks against the masses’ competence have often been made prior to extensions of participation rights to workers, women and minorities.

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THE HYPERPLURALIST MODEL

The model is found particularly in America. It has following features.

1. Hyper pluralism is a perversion of pluralism. The model accepts most of the pluralist view of power in America and rejects the elitist notion of concentrated power.

2. The various and numerous organised interests have grown strong and unyielding and uncompromising with one another. There has been the advent of "single- issue politics" in America.

3. Governmental structure is relevant. Government is decentralised and fragmented, providing organised interests numerous points where they can gain access to power and "veto" policy with which they are opposed.

4. Government has thus grown weak relative to groups and can no longer contain and control the struggle among our various interests. Government has become excessively differential toward groups, treating essentially all group demands as equally deserving of governmental attention.

5. Public preferences are not translated into effective public policy. Consequently, a government which cannot act effectively cannot act democratically.

Commentators have been divided about the degree to which democracy can be reconciled with the existence of elites. Some have seen them as a threat to democracy; others, the "democratic elitists," have perceived their autonomy as a necessary ingredient of a democratic polity. It is not possible to generalise about the attitude of elites to democracy. Some of them, like the military, by virtue of their functions, have values which are unlikely to foster democracy; others have values and procedures which are congenial to the democratic ethos. Elite autonomy cannot be a meta- principle of democracy.

Rational Choice Theory

Rational Choice Theory is an approach used by social scientists to understand human behaviour. The approach has long been the dominant paradigm in economics, but in

69 Chapter -2 recent decades it has become more widely used in other disciplines such as Sociology, Political Science, and Anthropology. This spread of the rational choice approach beyond conventional economic issues is discussed by Becker (1976), Radnitzky and Bernholz (1987), Hogarth and Reder (1987), Swedberg (1990), and Green and Shapiro (1996).

Rational Choice Theory generally begins with consideration of the choice behaviour of one or more individual decision-making. The rational choice theorist often presumes that the individual decision-making unit in question is “typical” or “representative” of some larger group such as buyers or sellers in a particular market. Once individual behaviour is established, the analysis generally moves on to examine how individual choices interact to produce outcomes.

According to rational choice theorists, a lack of willingness to participate by the majority is a sign not of their ignorance, but of their rationality. The rational individual will ask himself,’ What will I gain from the act of participation to that I would not gain if I fail to act?’ The likely answer is ‘Nothing!’ This is the free-rider scenario where non-participation is the most rational option. The implication is that political movements will be led by those who personally gain from their involvement. Thus, for political elites participation is rational, because it gives them power and prestige. The mobilisation of other participants will depend upon convincing them that they will directly benefit from participating, and that any gains will outweigh the costs. This means that certain types of participation (such as voting in national elections) will be more easily undertaken because they are relatively costless, whereas canvassing for a political party will occupy many hours and incur some costs.

Yet, if individual self-interest is the only basis for political action, how can we explain the considerable time and effort citizens put into their membership of voluntary political associations? To be sure, without individuals taking their citizenship obligations seriously, the basis for our freedom within the political community will be eroded. It may therefore be wholly rational to participate in politics. The challenge for rational choice theory is to ask how notions of rationality interact with other motivational forces.69 The commitment of elitists’ to democracy is weak.

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Participatory Theories of Democracy

Both democratic elitism and rational choice are instrumentalist theories: with the former electoral participation is a means to achieve a more important end of maintaining political authority; and with the latter participation is a tool used by individuals to further their interests. In contrast, participatory theories see political involvement as developmental: participation is more than a method of governing; it serves the wider purposes of cementing civil society together, and educating citizens in the art of governance. This means strengthening local government, and extending democratic practice into the institutions of civil society, as well as increasing opportunities for the use of national referendums and citizen-led policy initiatives. In a strong democracy, participation is not merely the defiance of an entrenched interest, but instead is a deliberative and public process that does not lay claim to any truth above what can be agreed consensually by its citizens.

The theory of participatory democracy deviates from this anti-institutionalist bias in modern democratic theory when it comes to the sources of electoral participation. It is by and large the only voice in democratic theory that allows for a role of political institutions in explaining electoral participation. This is why any theoretical account on the issue of participatory engineering ought to be rooted in this strand of normative democratic theory. The main focus of participatory theory lies first and foremost in the critique of the liberal conception of democracy as a competition for political power among responsible elites. This critique originated in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the midst of a larger cultural quest for more democracy and social equality. Participatory theory envisions citizens engaging into electoral decision making in great numbers through multiple acts of participation such as voting, direct decision making and horizontal as well as vertical political communication. It also envisions a perfect fit between mass participation and other values of good governance. This fit is seen as being based on a shared sense of collective responsibility among all participants. Theorists of participatory democracy claim that this vision can be reached by increasing opportunities to participate through institutional reform. They claim that the institutional restraints impinging on electoral participation within the frame of liberal democracy lessen electoral engagement and

71 Chapter -2 spawn political apathy in the long term while different institutional impulses are assumed to engender contrasting behavioural effects.

The strategy of integrative democratisation describes the relationship between individual actors and institutions in distinct ways. According to its proponents, individuals are not born as citizens but have to be educated to become citizens. From the perspective of participatory theory this can be ensured only through corresponding institutional frameworks that empower people. Authors such as March and Olson (1984) or Hall and Taylor (1996) reflect this particular perspective on political institutions in the context of institutionalist theory. They perceive institutions as independent factors that shape the very goals, perceptions and abilities of individuals.

Mark Warren (1992) has pointed out, the notion of individual growth and self- transformation triggered through institutional context that is probably a dominant paradigm among theorists of participatory democracy. It is at the same time the most difficult aspect of participatory theory to deal with in normative terms. This is because the notion of citizen-education has been perverted by dictatorships across the globe. However, there is a decisive conceptual difference between a totalitarian concept of education and participatory theory. It lies in the interrelationship between education and electoral choice. Participatory theory does not substitute political choice with self- transformation as totalitarianism does perceive. It rather argues that expanding citizens’ rights to affect policy choices has to be paralleled by a process of political socialisation and self-transformation to balance the pursuit of private interest with a sense of collective responsibility. The notions of choice and education stands in a complementary relationship rather than being substitutes to each other. This is emphasised in particular by the pluralist character of this strand of participatory theory, meaning its emphasis on the group basis of politics.

The debate on participatory democracy generated other alternatives to the notion of “political efficacy”. Jane Mansbridges stresses the idea of a “social urge”, which is defined as a focus on common interests and social cooperation on an equal basis as the most basic feature of the good citizen. Jürgen Habermas’ concept of individual autonomy combines both notions of individual empowerment and social responsibility. The Habermasian autonomous self is distinguished by a balance between self-referentialism and the capacity for internal and external reflection. The

72 Chapter -2 notion of internal reflection suggests that the self is critical toward his or her own impulses and motivations in the process of generating a preference. It touches upon the awareness that individual preferences have to be reconciled with other actors. For Habermas, from this balance – that can be considered a psychological state of mind - flows the ability to cooperate and to be part of a community that forms the basis of collective action. Despite these alternative conceptions of the democratic self, the concept of political efficacy has to be considered the most developed one in empirical terms.

While the theory of participatory democracy does not explicitly discusses problems of institutional design it makes an important statement regarding this very aspect. It stresses on the one hand that transformative environments, that educate the self to become a citizens, can’t be located at the level of constitutional structures. Quite the contrary, according to Barber (1984), political apathy is a consequence of ‘thin democracy’ that functions solely through procedures and formal institutions at the constitutional and sub-constitutional level and that has no residual effect on the subjective dimension of democracy. The reason for this lack of impact on the part of constitutional structures is seen in the lack of microstructures that would be able to shape the daily experiences of citizens and to provide an infrastructure for political learning and political socialisation. Participatory democratic theory stresses instead social groups as the core building bloc of democracy, since they affect the daily life of citizens in most immediate ways, and since they will be able to perform the function of political socialisation. From this perspective the integration of individuals into the group is a central prerequisite for building the democratic self with a high level of political efficacy.

The most recent debate on electronic democracy emphasises the internet and cyberspace as a new structural development in communications that will strengthen the prerequisites for alternative public spheres and the emergence of autonomous social movements. From this perspective, the internet could provide the vantage point for a new age of reasoning, a reincarnation of a critical public sphere in the Habermasian model and thus a revitalisation of emancipatory movements.

Electoral participation is seen as a good in itself; something that all individuals can play a part in and through which they develop not only their own electoral

73 Chapter -2 competence, but also forge the links that form civil society. Many of the normative arguments against participatory democracy are also arguments against democracy itself, and can be discounted if we believe that some form of democracy is desirable. It may also be possible to overcome the practical objections to direct democracy through innovations of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and new methods of citizen involvement (such as citizens’ juries or panels).

Participatory democracy theorists further argue that democracy is not only an expression of individual autonomy, but is also relational. It involves compromise, tolerance of others and accommodation between conflicting views. Democracy is the best chance that we have of reconciling the increased diversity of civil society. Democracy is also the most secure way of converting power into authority, because it entails citizens giving their consent to decisions made in their name. Democracy values in equal measure the contribution of all members of civil society. It therefore requires that wherever citizens themselves should take possible decisions. Theories that suggest democracy is merely a method of government that best preserves the status quo, or is more than the expression of narrow, pre-determined interests, seem hallow and uninspired in comparison.

Marxist Theory

The Marxists view of electoral participation emphasises on the ‘purposeful and conscious’ participation of the multitude but does not allow a changing ideologically established system. The Marxists view of electoral participation enunciated by Marx and Engel’s writings and further enlarged by Lenin and Mao. Marxists deny electoral participation at individual level or multi-group level or multi- party levels. They recognise in terms of class conflicts, which has got to be linked with single system. They hold that participation is just not to hold power and influence policies but to take purposeful and active interest in political process through a single party. In a socialist society, the communist party would act as the “vanguard of the proletariat” and the center for opinion aggregation. The party would be organised on the basis of ‘democratic centralism’, which implied every party organ was strictly bound by decision of anybody with a higher position in the party hierarchy.

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Mao later on suggested that proletariat would replaced by peasantry as the vanguard of the revolution. Involvement of the working class is ‘an essential process by which workers are educated to bring about the [socio-economic] revolution raising them to the level of ruling class is to win the battle of democracy. However, the view has been only one sided, as in practice, it is the party which finally decides the policies and regulates the changes. The high percentage of voting in a socialist system does not actually reflect the influence of the voters on policies. The options before people were restricted.70

BRIEF HISTORY OF ELECTORAL POLITICS

The historical origin of the term ‘electoral participation’ can be traced back from the ancient Greek period (the time of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle). As it has been mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, that electoral politics are some of the most visible and symbolic form of electoral participation. Citizen’s active participation in the electoral process by pressing for demands to the government through a democratic manner had started during the Greek period. In Greek city- states, political participation embodied the citizen’s life in the ‘Polis’. Greeks believed that citizenship means capacity to rule and to be ruled. In Athenian democracy an equation was developed between the citizens and the city-states. The citizen confirmed his life to the line of public law, which he himself had accepted, and which expressed his will. It is only because of Greeks abiding reverence for the city –state and law, democracy worked there.

Romans believed that political sovereignty not only resided in the people but the laws were made by magistrates in agreement with popular assemblies. The most important Roman writers like Cicero and Seneca argued popular participation in the government as the basis of democracy. The concept of popular sovereignty even became more established during the republican period and was theoretically accepted during the imperial period.

The term electoral participation also finds mention in the medieval period in the writings of Marshilio of Padua. (14th century) He wanted to liberate the temporal authority from the domination of church. In the middle ages Ecclesiastical property was regarded as a grant or subsidy by the community. Even the doctrine of

75 Chapter -2 representation has its root in the medieval period. A representative was a trustee rather than agent of the people. However, Marshillio of Padua advocated the idea of representation and popular sovereignty in the modern sense.71

In the the English scholar John Locke nurtured the concept. He clearly advocated the doctrine of popular sovereignty as he provided people the power to remove the sovereign in case he could not perform his duty for which he was appointed. Rousseau, in his concept of General Will gave an emphatic importance to electoral participation in the governmental affairs. However, it is true that in the earlier period, the term ‘electoral participation’ has a narrow meaning which dealt with the people’s participation in election process through voting, mobilising, canvassing, attending meetings and political discussions. Now it comprehends all those activities, by which subjects influence governmental process (it may be in the form of protests, riots, debates or any other).

Recent Trends in Electoral Participation

Several interesting trends have been identified concerning the electoral participation in liberal democracies:

An increase in unconventional electoral participation: Electoral participation and democracy have become central to the recent discourse of social scientists, practitioners and the public at large. The age-old democratic question of how to ensure the effective involvement of citizens in the life and decision-making of their social and political communities has got renewed debates. New generations seem to show considerable reluctance to engage in conventional democratic politics. At the same time, new forms of social and electoral involvement appear to emerge among them; in both respects, developments in people electoral participation may well indicate a more fundamental transformation of contemporary democracy over the years.

Developments in many countries in recent years have been hailed as a triumph for democracy, with a sharp increase in the number of democracies in the world following the collapse of totalitarian regimes. This development has opened up an important area for research on new democracies and how these can survive.72 Yet the

76 Chapter -2 state of old democracies has remained in focus as well, both as part of research agendas that attempt to find formulas for what constitute successful societies in a very broad sense as well as studies that are limited to specific aspects of society and political systems. In an age of globalisation, much emphasis is put on economic variables: competitiveness, productivity and economic growth. However, public interest as well as scholarly attention has also been directed towards ‘softer’ indicators like human development, quality of life and respect for human rights and – which is closest to our research question – the trends of electoral participation in recent times.

A drop in turnout rates in elections; At the mass level, scholars have primarily studied political trust: support of democratic values, confidence in institutions and trust in political leaders.73 Recently, political scientists have also shown a renewed interest in the study of trends in electoral turnout and other forms of citizen participation and involvement in advanced industrial societies as indicators of the state of democracy.74 Norris argues convincingly that we need to look beyond electoral turnout and include a larger variety of measures of political involvement and participation if we want to confront the thesis of civic decline. We generally use the broad concept of ‘participation and involvement’ to include both behavioral and attitudinal aspects of citizens’ political engagement.

Blais and Gray & Caul find that participation rates in national elections have declined in advanced democracies.75 The research of Norris is somewhat less conclusive, but her data shows that turnout declined in post-industrial countries in the 1990s.76 Similarly, Franklin finds a weak decline (5 percentage points) in turnout in established democracies from the 1970s to the end of the 1990s. Overall, turnout for the whole postwar era as more or less stable. Interestingly, he uses Norway as an example of a mature democracy with a marked increase in turnout at a recent election and also finds that Norway is one of six countries (out of 22) with a positive trend in electoral turnout in the period 1945–1999. At the Storting election of 2001, the turnout of 75.5 percent was the lowest recorded in the postwar period, and the four most recent elections (1993, 1997, 2001, and 2005) all have a markedly lower turnout than the norm in the previous decades. The downward trend is even more dramatic for local elections. In the most recent local elections, turnout at county elections reached an all-time low with 56 percent compared to a peak of 71 percent in 1979.77 In Uttar

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Pradesh turnout for Lok Sabha elections 2014 stands a record high of 58.35 percent against 47.78 percent in 2009. Highest turnout was recorded earlier in 1977 at 56.44 percent.

A Leaning towards local politics: Research on trends of participation in local elections is more extensive, although studies have not given a clear picture of what causes the decline. Interestingly from this point of view, Bjorklund and Saglie find that citizens increase their broader involvement in local politics at the same time as turnout declines.78 They also use some of the data from the longer series of national election studies to extend the findings from local elections. Having demonstrated that turnout in parliamentary elections has fallen to a level not seen since the period of 1950s, and that voters’ participation in local elections are steadily reaching new lows of participation rates for the postwar era.

Much stress on humanitarian and environmental issues: Recent research has put much weight on issues and events that are not easily accommodated within the established political order – especially those associated with new politics: pro- environment policies, feminism, anti-nuclear policy and, more recently, anti- globalisation. These issues have often been linked to activity in direct forms of participation like the signing of petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, and, in some cases, occupation of buildings and other violations of property. The policy bases of protest politics are not restricted to new politics issues or leftist causes. Research findings from 1975 and 1990 show that electoral action has a diverse political origin, with environment, local and regional policy issues, the European Union (EU), ASEAN, SAARC and economic issues are among important categories.79

A decline of trust in effectiveness of political institutions: Electoral participation through voting and other traditionally understood methods of electoral participation are eroding. Instead of communal and societal concerns, people are turning their focus towards their private lives. This change in peoples’ preferences has been witnessed and convincingly verified in many studies by social scientists. However, the public or political issues are not actually loosing their significance in people’s minds; as a matter of fact, politics still matters. Only the forms, and forums along with the concept of electoral activity and participation are changing, which is arousing concern among the political elite about the future of still dominant partisan politics.

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In the current situation, two opposite discourses on political citizenship and participation are dominating discussion in the context of western liberal democracies.80 They can be labeled as administrational and actionist discourses. The first one aims to create and rationalise the practices of participation from above (e.g. the planning of land use and urban construction, good governance practices). The second discourse strives for bringing alternative meanings and practices from below (e.g. the criticism of ‘official’ influence opportunities, the inhabitants’ own initiatives and plans, citizens’ public action). Public authorities are involving citizens in decision- making, but the citizens have been active somewhere other than in the traditional sphere of institutionally organised participation. Political environment has fractured into a diverse, complex and multi-spatial network.

A decline in loyalty to traditionalism: In the modern era, the social cleavages are not as absolute or oppositional as they are in pre-modern. However, they exist, but emerge in more relative or conditional form. Characteristically politics, in the modern sphere, is balanced between mobilised activities led from above and below.81 Modern participation needs resources to mobilise citizens and leaders to direct, or more precisely to channel, the course of that mobilisation. This view implies that there should be established political structures, a meeting place of a kind in order to make political demands and a supply to meet. The ideal type of this market place of politics is usually regarded as being a representative democracy in which every citizen may find his/her political home. To facilitate that participation and the pursuance of different political objectives there ought to be a variety of political groupings from which to select the most suitable political opinion, and then support it by various means of action. To handle these groups and to generate differing political ideologies and programmes there need to be political leaders, who are in charge to direct the interests and desirable goals of their supporters. Activities (actions) in politics, and particularly in representative democracy, are in many senses brought about by the sensitive balance of mobilisation from above and participation from below.

In recent years, especially in western democracies, there has been much talk and analysis in public, concerning how citizens and particularly young citizens are not interested in electoral participation. Researchers and other commentators have exhorted parties to sharpen their visionary messages in order to be more appealing in

79 Chapter -2 the eyes of voters. For example, the government Finland has started a special programme –The Civil Participation Policy Programme that “aims to reinforce the functioning of representative democracy and encourage civil participation” Despite its aims, the publications related to this policy programme tend to treat civil participation as a form of party democracy.82

To overcome political apathy and alienation (as the phenomenon is named), it has been suggested that parties ought to organise different policy alternatives and bring more and bolder visions into public debate during election campaigns and more systematic civil education within the schooling system. If the purpose of the civil participation policy programme is really to enforce party democracy, these suggestions and the realisation of them might cure the disease of political apathy. This ongoing discussion of political alienation among political scientists and politicians is an expression of concern about the unpopularity of electoral participation. However, in this discussion, there are certain points that deserve a closer look. In research and inquiries that have been done about people’s attitude and stance concerning politics, the findings are not too flattering about the image of politics. Young people tend to position politics on the dark side of life. The notion of politics receives such attributes and epithets as: dirty game, self- interest motivated or deceitful activities. On the other hand, if we analyse the situation in regard to voting, electoral participation and level of activity, and the width of the gap between citizens and between parties in Finland, and compare it with other Nordic Countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark [excluding Iceland] are traditional comparisons to Finland due to similitude of social fabric), it has been found that Finns are in general performing more poorly and scoring lower points in these matters.83 However, in India, which boasts an electorate of more than 814 million people. The poor, who comprise the majority of the demographic, are more likely to vote than the rich and the middle classes and turnout is higher in rural areas than urban areas. In low-turnout countries, these groups are often significantly under-represented in elections.

Citizen Participation in the Digital Age: A Comparative View of the State of the Art: Online citizen participation mechanisms present an unprecedented opportunity to break away from traditional legislative-political practices to the extent that said mechanisms constitute a more practical and equitable means of subjecting

80 Chapter -2 law and policy making and safeguarding processes as an input to an expanded range of citizens. Mexico analysts and researchers have, in this regard, been quick to point out that the information and communications benefits which flow, in theory, from this opportunity can help bring about the development of the vigorous civic culture. This is required for the establishment of a viable check against the power and influence of narrowly focused interest groups and the displacement of state’s deeply entrenched disposition towards democracy inhibiting trust. This will lead to the inculcation of democratic values and practices, which are the organic outgrowth of Mexico’s historic experience and contemporary reality.

Responding to the demands of local constituents, governments around the world have taken steps to develop and implement citizen participation and democracy enhancing digital spaces and mechanisms. For example, detailed information regarding the lawmaking and leadership activities, committee memberships (where applicable), and individual voting records (also where applicable) of elected or appointed officials is increasingly available online. Government web sites and portals also function to make available official reports and briefings. This potential is illustrated by the way in which over 20 million U.S. citizens used the Internet to gain access to the Starr Report (presenting the findings of the special prosecutor’s investigation into former President Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky) within 24 hours of its release. Focusing, more specifically, on the legislative function of government, many national congresses, parliaments and legislative bodies at the sub- national levels of government have used Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to make it possible for citizens to "attend" virtual public hearings and/or subscribe to and receive electronic bulletins pertaining to specific committees or issues. The strongest manifestation of Information and Communication Technology enabled citizen participation, national, state, and municipal governments are demonstrating a greater willingness to accept the proactive presentation of legislative proposals by citizens and/or conduct online plebiscites, referenda, and votes.84

As a result of the introduction of these services and features, citizens are, without regard for the urban-rural nature of their domicile, increasingly informed about and involved with the domestic and international issues, which bear on their lives and businesses. Conversely, governments are in a better position to promulgate

81 Chapter -2 laws and formulate policies, which more rationally relate to the needs and realities of their intended beneficiaries. This final outcome is particularly desirable in so far as those nations, who have a long tradition of capital, based law making by political elites who do not fully grasp the needs and realities of citizens from different segments of society or regions of the country.

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1 Henry J. Steiner, Political participation as Human rights (New York: McMillan and Company Ltd., 1960), p.60.

2 David Robertson, The Penguin Dictionary of Politics (England: Penguin Books, 1987), p.88.

3 Leon Mayhew, Society, Institutions and Activity (Davis: University of California, 1971), p.123.

4 Ibid. pp.2-4.

5 Ibid. pp. 6-8.

6 Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), p.301.

7 Ibid, p.113.

8 Ibid, p.51.

9 Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p.158.

10 Dietor Nohlen, Elections and Electoral Systems (Bonn; Friedrich Ebert-Stifting, 1966), p.84.

11 J. Blondel, Voters, Parties, and Leaders: The Social Fabric of British Politics (Australia: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 27-28.

12 J. Blondel, Voters, Parties, and Leaders: The Social Fabric of British Politics (Australia: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 27-28.

13 J.F.S. Ross, Elections and Electors (London: Eyere and spottis woode, 1955), p.33.

14 Thomas A. Reilly. Political Bargaining, (Manchester: Manchester School Press, 1968), p.37.

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15 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brother Publishers, 1957), p. 28

16 Richard Rose, Comparability in Electoral Studies, Ed. Richard Rose, Electoral Behaviour: A Comparative Handbook (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1974), pp. 8-9

17 John Badgley, Asian Development: Problems and Prognosis (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p.139.

19 Samual Huntington, “Made about Mega”, Newsweek (New York: June 21, 1988), p.12.

20 Ibid, p.33.

21 Ibid, p.45.

22 Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion, p.30.

23 Ibid, p.30.

24 Ibid, p.55.

25 Ibid, p.31.

26 Ibid, p.28.

27 Ibid, p.29.

28 Samuel J. Eldersveld and Bashiruddin Ahmad, Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behaviour in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p.89.

29 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.155-56.

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30 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p.345.

31 Academic American Encyclopaedia, Vol. 19 (Connecticut: Grolier Incorporated, 1987), p.104.

32 William A. Haviland, Cultural Anthropology (New York: MC Grand Hill Publishing Company. 1990), pp.321-22.

33 Rebert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get involved in politics (Glencoe, III , the free press, 1959), p. 6.

34 V.O. Key, ‘A theory of critical elections’, Journal of Politics, XVII (February 1955), p.3.

35 Rebert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get involved in politics (Glencoe, III , The Free press, 1959), p. 6.

36 Ibid, p.8.

37 Richards G.Niemi and Herbert F.Weisberg, Controversies in American Voting Behaviour (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and company, 1976), P.12.

38 Ibid, p.14.

39 Ibid, p.18.

40 David Denver, Elections and Voting Behaviour in Britain (London: Phillip Allan, 1989), p. 27

41 Ibid.

42 Jack Denis, ‘The Study of Electoral Behaviour,’ in Political Behaviour Ed, William Crotty, (Evganston, Illinois: North Western University Press, , 1991), p.55

43 Ibid., pp.59-61.

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44 John Curtice, ‘The State of Election Studies: A Mid-Life Crisis or New Youth?, Electoral Studies, vol.21, no.2 (June 2002), p.162.

45 K. Kight and M. March, ‘Varieties of Election Studies’, Electoral Studies, vol. 21, no. 2 (June 2002), pp.74-75.

46 Ibid, pp.175-76.

47 K. Shepsle and R. Cohen, ‘Multiparty Competition, Entry, and Deterrence in Spatial Models of elections’, in eds. J.m. Enelow and M. J. Hinich, Advances in the Spatial Theory and Voting (Vambridge University Press, New York 1990), pp.12-16.

48 R.S Katz and P. Mair, ‘Changing Model of Party organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of a Catch –all Party’, Party Politic, no. 1, (1995), pp.5-28.

49 Rajni Kothari et al,, Party system and election Studies, (New Dehli: 1967), pp. 4- 5.

50. Ibid, p.25.

51 Muhammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books ltd, 1994), p.30.

52 Ibid, p.255.

53 Peter G.J. Pulzer, Political Representation and election in Britain (London: George Allen and Unwin ltd, 1976), p. 93.

54. Mc Closky H; “Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences” Vol. 2 Edition 2; Published by Macmillan Reference USA. 1968. p-252

55. Conway M. Margaret: “Political Participation in the United States” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association Washington, D C: Congressional Quarterly,. (Feb., 1989). p-2

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56. Verba, S. & Nie, N. “Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality”, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; (1987). P-62

57. Ibid., p-120

58 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), p.88.

59 Ibid, p. 162.

60 Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion, p. 301.

61 J.S. Mill quoted in Muhammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in Pakistan, p.8.

62 Fred Hayward, Introduction in Fred Hayward, Elections in Independent Africa ed. (Boulder, 1987), p.3.

63 Myron Weiner, ‘Empirical Democratic Theory’ in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun eds, Competitive Elections in Developing Countries (London: Duke University Press, 1987), p.3.

64. Maciuszko, K. (1990). "A Quiet Revolution: Community Online Systems" in “ONLINE”, November 1990, p. 24-32.

65. Mosca Gaetano ‘Theory of Governments and Parliamentary Government’, Oxford University Press; London; 1939, p. 50

66. Ibid. p. 58, 154-155.

67. Etzioni Haley, Elite Power, “Manipulation and Corruption: A Demo-Elite Perspective”; Government and Opposition Volume; 24, Issue; 2, Pages 215 – 231, Published Online: 27 Apr 2007, Journal compilation © 2009 Government and Opposition Ltd.

68. Molz, R.K. (1994). "Civic Networking in the United States: A Report by Columbia University Students" in ‘Internet Research’, Winter, 1994, p- 52-62.

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69. Odasz, F. "Community Networking: Leveraging the Public Good Electronically!”, written for AT&T, June, 1996.

70. Marx and Engels; ‘Selected Works’, Vol, III, Moscow, Progress Publishers 1976, P-117.

71. Michael Rush and Philip [sic] Althoff; An Introduction to political sociology; Publisher; Nelson political science series, Nelson, London, 1971. p. 191-199.

72. Anderson, C. J. et al. “Losers’ Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy”. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2005. p-57.

73 Pharr, S. & Putman, R. D. (eds). ‘Disaffected Democracies’. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2000. p-113.

74. Gray, M. & Caul, M. Comparative Political Studies ‘Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950–1997’, Published by Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA) Georgetown University Washington DC, 2002. p-, 109–122.

75. ibid p-101

76. ibid p- 176

77. Norris, P. Democratic Phoenix. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge: 2002. P 11

78. Participation Portal, (in Finnish: Osallistuminen), The City of Tampere. Retrieved 11.10.2005. http://www.tampere.fi/osallistuminen/ Philosophy and Civil Society. Inventing Postmodern Civic Culture. Updated 23.2.2003. Retrieved 11.10.2005.

79. Goul Andersen, J. & Hoff, J. Democracy and Citizenship in Scandinavia. Houndmills: Palgrave. 2001. p-47

80. Anheier, H. K., Stares, S. & Grenier, P. Social capital and life satisfaction, in: W. Arts & L. Halman (Eds) European Values at the Turn of the Millennium, (2004) pp. 81–107.

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81. Curtis, J. E., Grabb, E. G. & Baer, D. E. Voluntary association membership in fifteen countries, American Sociological Review, (1992), pp. 139–152.

82. ibid. p- 122.

83. “Civil Participation Policy Programme (Hallituksen kansalaisvaikuttamisen politiikkaohjelmanwww-sivut)”.Retrieved9.10.2005. http://www.om.fi/20440.htm& http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/vn/liston/base.lsp?r=40242&k=fi&old=40232 in English: http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/vn/liston/base.lsp?r=40242&k=en

84. Smith, M. K. (1999 & 2006) 'Community participation', the Encyclopaedia of Informal Education, www.infed.org/community/b-compar.html.

89

Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Its Dalit Politics

Chapter – 3

Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Its Dalit Politics

The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) is a centrist national political party in India with socialist leanings. It was formed mainly to represent Bahujans (literally meaning "People in majority"), referring to people from the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes (OBC) as well as minorities. The party claims to be inspired by the philosophy and ideas of B. R. Ambedkar. The BSP was founded by a Dalit charismatic leader Kanshi Ram in 1984, who was succeeded by Mayawati in 2003. The party's political symbol is an Elephant. In the the party has 21 members, making it the 4th-largest party. The BSP has its main base in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. BSP started as Dalit party but later on included other castes and religions as well. This party is playing caste politics and a strongest party in Uttar Pradesh. This chapter aims to examine the different issues of segmented political parties and the deviation of the BSP from the fundamental ideological position of the Dalit Movement. This relationship is looked at from two levels - firstly the BSP’s ability to fulfil the goals of the Dalit Movement through its political and developmental agenda while it had been in power, especially, after the introduction of its ‘social engineering’ project, and secondly, the perception of BSP cadres at the local level about considering the BSP as a part of the Dalit Movement.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section is based on the primary knowledge about various political parties and their electoral politics in the state of Uttar Pradesh. This section will be helpful to understand the political environment of the state as every party is a child of existing political environment. The second section is a discussion on the appearance and advancement of the Dalit Movement in Uttar Pradesh. In this section, the phenomenon of the emergence of the BSP as a part of Dalit Movement is also discussed. The second section comprises a discussion on the politics of the BSP and the continuing changes in its political and developmental priorities. The last section presents the influence of BSP outside Uttar Pradesh along-with the party’s developmental priorities and its relationship with the Dalit Movement.

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PARTY SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL POLITICS IN U.P

A multi party system is dominant in Uttar Pradesh with a predominance of multiple smaller regional parties. The Election Commission of India registers parties to contest state as well as national elections. The party needs to have undertaken some sort of political activity for 5 consecutive years in order to gain recognition as state party. The party must also send minimum 4 percent quota to the lower house of India, i.e. the Lok Sabha or 3.33 percent to the state Assembly. If, the party fails to fulfil the above conditions, it can gain recognition by garnering at least 6 per cent of total votes in either state elections or national elections that are polled in its contesting candidates.

The Election Commission of India automatically recognises the party as a national party if the party gets recognition in 4 or more states. There are various symbols offered by the Election Commission of India. A party can choose any of the available symbols. Every state of India along with union territories has elected government unless President's rule is imposed.

NATIONAL PARTIES in UTTAR PRADESH

Table: 3.1

Name of the Party ACR. Year Chief

Bahujan Samaj Party BSP 1984 Mayawati

Bhartiya Janta Party BJP 1980

Communist Party of India CPI 1925 Suravaram Sudhakar

Communist Party of India CPI(M) 1964 (Marxist)

Congress-I INC 1885 Sonia Gandhi

Samajwadi Party SP 1992 Mulayam Singh Yadav

Not only because of its size but also for historical reasons, Uttar Pradesh has always been a key state in the Indian union. Major political movements in independent India, including backward class and Dalit politics and the rise of

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Hindutva largely developed or have significantly impinge on it. Economic backwardness and political populism are among the factors intertwined with the recent history of Uttar Pradesh.1 Here it will be convenient to study about the different political parties existing in the state and their political strategies during the election period.

All India Muslim Majlis: It was founded by Abdul Jaleel Faridi in 1968, after he had become disillusioned with the Samyukt Vidhayak Dal. After the death of Faridi, Alhaj Zulfiqarulla became the president and after that Mohd. Qamar Alam Kazmi became the president of All India Muslim Majlis.

In 1977 two Muslim Majlis MPs were elected on the Janata Party symbol. In 1992 Qamar Alam Kazmi raised his voice against the demolition of Babri Masjid. He started Karwane Insaf (Nyay yatra) against the Rath Yatra of Advani. He did several of Dharnas, Morchas etc. in between the period of his presidency. In 2002 Muslim Majlis joined the Awami Front, but later left it under the presidency of Qamar Alam Kazmi. After Kazmi, Khalid Sabir elected as president on 18th August 2002.

The youth wing of the party is called All India Youth Majlis. The president of the youth wing is Mohammad Kashif Yunus. Muslim Majlis later joined Uttar Pradesh United Democratic Front (UPUDF) led by ex-minister Janab C.M. Ibrahim and patronised by Shahi Imam Syed Ahmed Bukhari. Muslim Majlis is now part of Ittehad Front led by Maulana Salman Nadvi.2

Ambedkar Samaj Party (ASP): It is a political party in India that fights for the rights of Dalits. The party is opposed to Hindu nationalism, which it sees as representing an upper caste minority. ASP claims that Bahujan Samaj Party has betrayed Dalits through its alliance with Bharatiya Janata Party. The leader of ASP is Tej Singh. Singh is also commander-in-chief of the Bahujan Swayamsewak Sanghathan (BSS), a militant Dalit organisation. BSS was founded 1995. In the Lok Sabha elections 2004 ASP had launched nine candidates from Uttar Pradesh. Tej Singh stood as candidate from Aligarh and got 1054 votes (0.17%).3

Apna Dal: is an Indian political party from the state of Uttar Pradesh. It was launched by Sone Lal Patel, and has a following among the Other Backward Class, and has one member in the Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha. is founded in 4th

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November 1995. The Flag of Apna Dal has two colours orange and blue, half upper part is orange and half bottom part is blue. It is a party of all caste and religion. Apna Dal organised its first maharally at Beniyabag in Varanasi where lacs of people were present.

Sone Lal Patel, an associate of Kanshi Ram, was one of the founders of the Bahujan Samaj Party, but developed differences with Mayawati and formed his own party in the early 2000s. In 2002 mafia don turned politician Atiq Ahmed won in the state elections from Allahabad. However, the party failed to win any seats in the Indian general election 2009 or Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections 2007. In the Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections, 2012, , daughter of Sone Lal Patel won the Assembly election seat from Rohania, Varanasi. The party tied up with other smaller groups such as the Peace Party of India (PPI).

On 25th March 2014, Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) announced an alliance with Apna Dal.4 It was further announced that Apna Dal will contest two seats in Mirzapur and Pratapgarh under the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and it will extend support to the BJP for the remaining constituencies in Uttar Pradesh. Apna Dal won both of the above seats in 2014 General Lok Sabha election. Rakesh Kumar Verma alias R. K. Verma won Assembly constituency seat in bye election that held with parliamentary elections 2014.5

Bahujan Kisan Dal (BKD): The party was founded ahead of the Lok Sabha elections 2004 as the politiska branch of Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU). BKD is led by Rakesh Tikait and the party president is the former Uttar Pradesh governor Romesh Bhandari. Rakesh Tikait is the son of the BKU leader Chaudhary Mahinder Singh Tikait. In the Lok Sabha elections 2004 BKD put up nine candidates, all from Uttar Pradesh. BKD supported the candidature of Ram Jethmalani in Lucknow as the counter candidate against PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee.6

Bharatiya Kranti Dal was a political party formed by the Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Charan Singh. The party was founded at a meeting in Lucknow in October 1967. After the 1977 general election, the party merged into the Janata Party.7

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Bundelkhand Janshakti Kranti Andolan is a political movement in Uttar Pradesh. The organisation strives for the creation of a Bundelkhand state. Hazrat Khan is the general secretary of the organisation.8

Bundelkhand Mukti Morcha (Bundelkhand Liberation Front), is a political party in U.P. The film star is the president of the party. The party struggle for the creation of a Bundelkhand state (today part of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh). In the Lok Sabha elections 2004 Bundela stood on an Indian National Congress ticket in Jhansi, the "capital" of Bundelkhand. Bundela got 104,584 votes (12.76%).9

The Ekta Manch is a political alliance in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. The alliance was announced in April 2014, ahead of the 2014 Indian general election. At the time it consisted of the Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party (SBSP), the Quami Ekta Dal, the Janvadi Party and the Jan Adhikar Manch. The SBSP leader Om Prakash Rajbhar serves as convener of the alliance.10

Jan Kranti Party was a political party in Uttar Pradesh, India, based on Hindutva. It was founded by Kalyan Singh, Former chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, on 5th January 2010 (in connection with Singh's 76th birthday) with Almirah as the election symbol of Jan Kranti Party. The launching of the new party occurred two months after the alliance between Singh and the Samajwadi Party broke down. Upon the founding of the party, Singh handed over the leadership of the party to his son Rajveer Singh, who was named national president. Kalyan Singh declared that the intention of the party is to contest all 403 constituencies in the 2012 Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly election. On 21th January 2013 Kalyan Singh announced the merger of his both formed parties, Rashtriya Kranti Party (RKP) which he formed after get suspended from BJP in 1999 and also merger of his later founded party in 2010, Jan Kranti Party (JKP) with his former parental party, Bhartiya Janta Party during the Atal Shankhnaad rally of BJP in Lucknow's Jhulelal Park.11

The Jan Morcha was founded by V. P. Singh when he was dismissed from his post of Defence Minister and subsequently left the Congress Party in 1987. Together with Arun Nehru, Arif Mohammed Khan, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, V. C. Shukla, Ram Dhan, Raj Kumar Rai and Satyapal Malik, he formed a nucleus of

94 Chapter – 3 opposition to the government of which at that time possessed a commanding majority in the Lok Sabha. Following the increasing visibility of his stand against corruption in public life and his growing popularity, the other social- democratic parties like the Janata Party, Lok Dal and Congress (S) - many of them survivors of the original Janata Party - came together and merged with the Jan Morcha to form the Janata Dal to fight the 1989 General Elections, in which the together with the Left and Right parties opposed to the Congress gained a plurality of seats. Following the Janata Dal's time in power and its subsequent split and decline, V. P. Singh, after surviving a battle with cancer, re-formed the Jan Morcha in 2005 with socialist actor-politician Raj Babbar as its public face.12

In the Uttar Pradesh state Assembly elections 2007, the party fielded 118 candidates, but other than Dharmpal Singh, who won from Dayalbagh, defeating Kishan Lal Baghel of the Bahujan Samaj Party by three thousand votes (1.7%), no other candidate was successful. After the party drew a blank in the 2007 Uttar Pradesh elections, Raj Babbar joined the Congress, and Singh's elder son Ajeya Singh took over the reins of the party in anticipation of the 2009 general elections. In March 2009 Ajeya Singh announced that Jan Morcha was to be merged with the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP). Ajeya Singh and other members were inducted into the LJP and Ajeya was declared a Vice President of the party and its candidate from Fatehpur Lok Sabha constituency. However, later, joined hands with the Samajwadi Party (SP) of Mulayam Singh Yadav and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) of , to form a fourth front, and Mulayam Singh declared that the LJP would not contest any seats in U.P. Ajeya Singh then contested as Jan Morcha candidate from Fatehpur, but lost to Rakesh Sachan of SP.13

Jantantrik Bahujan Samaj Party (JBSP) splinter group of Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) formed in 1997 when 19 BSP Members of the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh broke away. JBSP allied themselves with Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and joined the National Democratic Alliance. In U.P. they gave their support to Kalyan Singh’s government. 17 out of the JSBP MLAs were inducted as ministers in the state government. JBSP became an unstable party, and suffered various splits. Four MLAs defected to Lok Jan Shakti Party. Another splinter group was Kisan Mazdoor Bahujan Party. When JBSP fell apart DP Yadav organised a new party,

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Rashtriya Parivartan Dal. JBSP should not be confused with another BSP splinter group, Loktantrik Bahujan Samaj Party.14

Kisan Mazdoor Bahujan Party (Peasants and Workers Majority Party) was a splinter group of the Jantantrik Bahujan Samaj Party in India. The leader of KMBP was Narendra Singh. In the state elections in Uttar Pradesh in 2002, KMBP was an ally of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and launched two BJP-supported candidates. KMBP was part of the state government in Uttar Pradesh around 2002. KMBP joined the Indian National Congress ahead of the Lok Sabha elections 2004.

Loktantrik Bahujan Samaj Party, splinter group of Bahujan Samaj Party formed in September 2003 when 37 Members of the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh broke away. The party leader was Haji Yakub. In October the same year LBSP merged with the Samajwadi Party. The formation of Loktantrik Bahujan Samaj Party (LBSP) was a way to avoid sanction under the Anti-Defection Law, and thus LBSP was in many ways a transitional pseudo-party (like Democratic Congress Party, etc.)15

Mahan Dal is an Indian political party founded by Keshav Dev Maurya based in Uttar Pradesh, India. Mahan Dal had joined Indian National Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA). In , Mahan Dal contested on three Lok Sabha constituencies, Badaun, Nagina and Etah. Mahan Dal claimed that the OBC voters of western U.P. especially , Mauryas and Kushwahas would support them in the election but Mahan Dal candidates lost on all three allocated seats.16

The Parcham Party of India (PPI) is a political party, representing the Muslim minority community. PPI was founded by the Indian Muslim Political Conference on 14th April 2003 at an "Azm-e-millat" convention in Aligarh. The president of the party is Saleem Peerzada. PPI are staunch opponents of the Hindutva movement. PPI opposes the United States occupations in Iraq and . The PPI was subject to much controversy during the Aligarh communal riots of 2006.

The Peace Party became the fifth largest political party of India's most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, following the state Legislative Assembly elections of

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2012. It won four seats in those elections. The party was founded in February 2008 by Mohammad Ayub, a surgeon and philanthropist.

The strategy of the Peace Party is to bring together other like-minded parties and groups, such as the Indian Justice Party, Lok Janshakti Party, Bhartiya Samaj Party, Janvadi Party and National Lok Hit Party into one forum. The party organised Muslims and most backward communities and has gained the power of over 70 percent Muslim vote. It plans to expand its activities to other regions of India, including Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttrakhand, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Orissa, and Chhattisgarh. In 2015, the Delhi state unit of the party merged with the Aam Aadmi Party, shortly before the 2015 Delhi polls.17

The Peace Party first contested seats in the general election of India, 2009, when it came ranked sixth by percentage of votes in a field that contained 124 national and regional parties. It had contested 21 of the 80 seats in Uttar Pradesh. In the by-elections that took place in 2010 at Dumariyaganj and Lakhimpur, it secured more votes than the Samajwadi Party and Indian National Congress.18

Pragatisheel Manav Samaj Party (PMSP) is a political party in Uttar Pradesh, India. PMSP is based amongst the Bind and Mallah communities. The mafia don Brijesh Singh contested the 2012 Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections on its ticket, from the Sayyadraja constituency.19

Rashtravadi Communist Party, (RCP) was floated by social worker Kaushal Kishore. Kishore had been expelled from Communist Party of India in 2001. He had contested Assembly elections twice for CPI. In the 2002 Assembly elections Kishore won in the Malihabad seat. Kishore got 62571 votes (47.37%). RCP and Kishore fights for the conditions and rights of hijras. RCP has nominated hijras in elections. In the 2002 Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections Payal Kinner (registered as a female candidate) contested the Lucknow West seat. Payal got 1680 votes (1.34%). Kishore has been inducted as a minister of state in Mulayalam Singh Yadav's cabinet in Uttar Pradesh. RCP has however developed closer relations to Indian National Congress. Kishore stood as a candidate in Mohanlalganj in the Lok Sabha elections in 2004 obtaining 28757 votes (5.03%). RCP participates in the Confederation of Indian Communists and Democratic Socialists.20

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Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party: The Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party (SBSP) was founded in 2002. The party is led by Om Prakash Rajbhar, a former leader of the Bahujan Samaj Party. The party has its headquarters in Fatehpur village of . SBSP is based amongst the Rajbhar community in eastern Uttar Pradesh. It favours the creation of a separate Purvanchal state in this region. In these areas the Rajbhar community constitutes some 18% of the population. The party calls for the inclusion of the Rajbhar community in the list of Scheduled Castes. However, it also favours the setting up of reservation quotas on socio-economic grounds.

SBSP fielded 14 candidates in the 2004 Indian general election, one in Bihar and the rest in Uttar Pradesh. Together they obtained 275,267 votes (0.07% of the nation-wide vote). The party contested the February 2005 Bihar Legislative Assembly elections with three candidates. Together they obtained 13,655 votes (0.06% of the state-wide vote). SBSP fielded two candidates in the subsequent October 2005 Legislative Assembly elections in Bihar. Together they obtained 11,037 votes (0.05% of the state-wide vote).21

The party ran 97 candidates in the 2007 Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly elections. All but three candidates forfeited their deposits. In total the party obtained 491,347 votes (0.94% of the state-wide vote). Ahead of the 2009 Indian general elections SBSP joined the Apna Dal-led coalition Adhikar Manch ('Rights Platform'), an alliance of BSP splinter groups. SBSP fielded twenty candidates, whom together obtained 319,307 votes. All forfeited their deposits. The party fielded six candidates in the 2010 Bihar Legislative Assembly elections. Together they obtained 15,437 votes (0.05% of the state-wide vote). The party ran 52 candidates in the 2012 Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly elections. All but four candidates forfeited their deposits. In total the party obtained 477,330 votes (0.63% of the state-wide vote).

In 2013 a SBSP candidate finished in second place in a by-election for the Bhatpar Rani Legislative Assembly seat. The SBSP candidate Sabhakunwar obtained more votes than the BJP and Indian National Congress candidates together. SBSP fielded 13 candidates in the 2014 Indian general election, whom together mustered 118,947 votes (0.02% of the nation-wide vote). Ahead of the election SBSP took part in forming the Ekta Manch ('Unity Platform'), a coalition of smaller parties in Uttar Pradesh. Om Prakash Rajbhar served as convenor of the coalition.22 98 Chapter – 3

Uttar Pradesh Praja Party: The Uttar Pradesh Praja Party was a political party in Uttar Pradesh, India. The party represented interests of zamindars (land owners), and contested the elections of 1951-52. The party was formed to oppose the Indian National Congress policy of abolition of the zamindari system. The idea to set up a conservative political party emerged in early 1950. An 'All India Democratic Convention' was organised in Lucknow on May 14–15, 1950, which sought to high- list property ownership rights as a civil liberties issue, and this conference set up two committees. By November 1950 Jagdish Prasad took lead in the party-building process and announced a conference to take place on December 19, 1950. The group of Jagdish Prasad began to be known informally as the 'Praja Party'.23

The Praja Party was formally founded at a conference of the Union on April 5–6, 1951. Jagdish Prasad was appointed president and Guru Narain Seth was named secretary of the new party. Jagdish Prasad was given the authority to appoint a 30-member Working Committee of the party, which would oversee District Electoral Boards. A 250-member State Council was to be set up, with each district of Uttar Pradesh having at least four delegates. The conference declared that the goal would be to recruit 2.5 million levy-paying party members.

The party won two seats in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly in the 1951-52 election, Birendra Bikram Singh in East and Virendra Shah in -cum-Jalaun North. The party had fielded a total of 55 candidates, who together mustered 301,322 votes (1.80% of the total votes in the state). In the Lok Sabha election the party fielded six candidates, whom together obtained 213,656 votes (0.20% of the nation-wide vote). The party disappeared after the elections.24

Uttar Pradesh Revolutionary Socialist Party: The Uttar Pradesh Revolutionary Socialist Party was (UP RSP) a left-wing political party in Uttar Pradesh, during 1951-1952. It held one seat in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The party ended up merging with the Communist Party of India. The party was formed after a split in the Revolutionary Socialist Party. As of 1950, under the leadership of Jharkhande Rai, the Uttar Pradesh state unit of RSP had become pro- communist. In 1951 the national leadership of RSP declared the entire Uttar Pradesh branch expelled and its State Committee dissolved. The group of Rai then set up UPRSP as a separate party. The influence of the party was limited to a few pockets. 99 Chapter – 3

The party contested the 1951-1952 elections. It was awarded 'bow and arrow' as its election symbol. During the election campaign, UP RSP worked in alliance with the Communist Party of India and the Bolshevik Party of India.25

In the Lok Sabha election the party contested two seats; Kunwar Maharaj Singh stood as the candidate in the (East) constituency and Lakshmi Shanker in the Ballia District South (West) constituency. Singh obtained 7,064 votes (7.36% of the votes in the constituency) while Shanker got 13,601 votes (11.61%). All in all, UP RSP got 0.12% of the votes in the state (and 0.02% of the votes nationwide).26 The party launched nine candidates in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly election. One candidate, Jharkhande Rai, won a seat. Rai won the Ghosi West seat, with 15,524 votes (47.95%). Two UP RSP candidates finished second in their respective seats; Udal got 7,587 votes (20.50%) in Banaras West and Kapildeo Singh got 8,267 votes (24.98%) in West. All other UP RSP candidates lost their deposits. In total the UP RSP candidates got 57,284 votes (0.34% of the votes in the state). The average percentage of votes of the UP RSP candidates in the constituencies contested stood at 14.32%.27

UP RSP merged with the Communist Party of India in 1952. The merger was formalized at a party conference in Mau, held November 28-30, 1952. Through the merger with UP RSP, the Communist Party obtained representation in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly.28

However, there are many regional as well as national political parties though working in the state, yet politics of Uttar Pradesh is dominated by the regional political parties as Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Samajwadi Party (SP) with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Indian National Congress are other parties.

Electoral Politics of Different Parties in U.P.: The state of Uttar Pradesh is has enormous significance. It consists mostly of very fertile land, a sacred (and heavily defiled) river, little industry and 180 million deeply divided people. Uttar Pradesh has been undergoing what observers like to call, a churning of the castes. Low castes are clawing their way to political power through almost any means possible. Broadly there are 6 ethnic groups in Uttar Pradesh, Dalits (21%), Muslims (18%), Brahmins (9%) with Thakurs, Banias and OBCs making up the rest. They are

100 Chapter – 3 deeply divided when it comes to politics. As of now, the BSP has captured the votes of Dalits, Brahmins and some Muslims, while the SP appeals to the OBCs, Muslims and Thakurs, BJP got upper class Hindu votes and rest of votes of Muslims, middle class Hindu OBC vote goes to Congress.

Thus, Uttar Pradesh, a key state in the race for power in New Delhi, is witnessing a resurgence of communal politics after a brief lull in the early 2000s. While the Samajwadi Party’s attempts to win back Muslim support seem to have hit a roadblock after the Muzaffarnagar riots, the Bharatiya Janata Party hopes to revive its earlier appeal by promoting and the Hindutva agenda. Though the earlier weakening of identity politics was expected to bring in a development-oriented politics, the state remains underdeveloped and caught between political parties that still play the same old electoral cards of division and promotion of strife. In some sense, castes in U.P. have been homogenised by a process of osmosis, where castes that were politically dispersed across a number of parties for ideological reasons gravitated to parties that catered to them solely on the basis of caste.

The dalits steadily moved towards the BSP whose dalit ideology attracted them. Similarly the “mandal” and the backward caste ideology attracted the OBCs towards the SP. These groups moved away from the BJP and Congress because those parties failed to give them their due share in the leadership structure of the party. This was due to the lack of internal democracy in those parties, widespread nepotism and the patronising attitudes of many upper caste leaders who took lower caste voters for granted. The SP did that by putting pressure on the Thakurs through Raja Bhaiyya, a politician with a criminal record, who had been convicted under the POTA when it was enforced. The SP helped secure his release consequently the Thakur support for the SP increased 15 percentage points during 1999-2004.29

The BSP, of course also put pressure on the other castes. Although the BSP did (and still does) court criminal politicians, Mayawati proved to be a more astute politician than Mulayam and, arranged several “Brahmin Jodo Sammelans” in all parts of the state, and also formed “Bhaichara Committees” in every district for developing cordial relations between Brahmins and the Dalits. Not only that, the BSP redefined its philosophical orientation from a “Bahujan Samaj” to “Sarvajan Samaj”.

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The state is supposed to be a neutral arbiter between caste and religious groups, not a patron of some in return for ‘vote loyalty’. Public offices, far from being an agent of change and development have become commodities to be bartered in return of votes. Unfortunately, things can change only if the demands and aspirations of the low caste groups in U.P. change. Right now they seem to be content with political power. Only when they start demanding things like better schools, roads and power will the politics change from being one driven by caste to one driven by development and performance. We have seen this happen now in Madhya Pradesh and in Delhi, and the South has been more like this for a while.

In U.P., in fact, a democratising revolution was started encompassing a social revolution. The lower castes have achieved political power with little bloodshed and in a fair, non-violent manner, but have retained their Dalit identity, just as the Brahmins have retained theirs. It is now up to them to translate political power into economic development and progress. Only then will the ‘largest democracy’ be a good example to the rest of the third world.30

Recently, the government of Uttar Pradesh has faced protests against its proposed enforced land acquisition in 2011. These protests have been centered on the village of Bhatta Parsaul, and have resulted in sporadic incidents of violence since January of that year. In August 2010 there had been protests against the state government in Delhi and these had resulted in three deaths. The issue is controversial because around 65% of the Indian population is economically dependent on agriculture but the government has the power to requisition any private land which it thinks is needed for a "public purpose". Past examples of this included several acquisitions by regional authorities across India for the purpose of developing Special Economic Zones (SEZ) to boost the economy and create jobs. In this instance, the state government of Uttar Pradesh has requisitioned the land for the building of the , a road linking Agra to Delhi.31

Three developments, namely, the decline of parties, poor governance and a growing financial crisis with negative economic growth are collectively responsible for the political instability in Uttar Pradesh. Due to caste mobilisation, parties confined to their narrow sectarian bases have been unable to aggregate public opinion, obtain majority support and form stable governments. This has led to short-lived 102 Chapter – 3 coalitions, which have not been able to formulate long-term policies that can address the long felt needs of the people contributing in turn to the breakdown of governance and instability. Fiscal indiscipline by governments has also pushed the state into a debt trap and serious economic decline, which is responsible for the disillusionment among the electorate witnessed in the recent elections in Uttar Pradesh.

Genesis and Growth of Bahujan Samaj Party

After witnessing the prolonged efforts of the Dalit movements in various parts of the country to bring about radical changes within the social structure and processes, the Dalit movement in Uttar Pradesh came out with a political agenda, which assumes that the state is an important means to bring about social change. The emergence of the Bahujan Samaj Party is an illustration of this approach. The strategy of putting the political project above all has diluted the identity of the Dalit Movement in Uttar Pradesh, and this is reflecting in the political and developmental priorities of the Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh.

The Dalit movement in India has roots in the reformative Bhakti Movement. The Bhakti Movement thrived in pockets across the country over several centuries. The Bhakti Movement was not an organised movement but a conglomeration of the individual efforts of various saints and social reformers who pursued their ideas through their writings, folk culture and belief in one divine power. The Bhakti Movement was anti-caste, anti-elite, pro-women, pro-poor, anti-Sanskrit, and affirmed that genuine love of God was sufficient to find solutions to social problems. The movement attracted large numbers of the lower castes and poor, including women. Though, the Bhakti Movement has not spoken exclusively for the Dalits or proposed any agenda for radical changes in the social structure of Hindu society, it has established a pattern of questioning the Hindu social order which later provided a platform for an organised Dalit Movement with a strong voice for social reforms.32

The failure of the efforts of the social reformers of the Bhakti Movement to bring structural changes in the existing social order of Hindu society through non- violence and appeals pushed the present Dalit Movement into politics. The political agenda has become crucial for the Dalit Movement to improve the lives of the oppressed and downtrodden. It was easy for the successors of the Dalit Movement to use ‘caste’ as a political strategy to enter into political discourses as the relationship

103 Chapter – 3 between caste and politics is seen as a relationship for the specific purpose of organising public activity.33

The Dalit Movement that began in U.P. during the late 1970s and 1980s, and accentuated during the 1990s. Uttar Pradesh had not responded much to the Dalit Movement in the pre and early post independence periods. However, during the late 1970s and 1980s, things changed dramatically and the state witnessed a resurgence of the Dalit Movement with a clear political agenda for social change. The movement had a leading objective to capture state power for the Dalits. This objective was equipped with the expectation that once Dalits get enough economic and political benefits using state power, it would automatically improve their social status. Enhanced economic and political status has continuously provided enormous power to the upper castes and ensured them a dominant social position. To make this happen, the Dalit political party, Bahujan Samaj Party, was formed in 1984 and it is one of the main political parties in U.P. politics.

Even if the Dalit Movement of northern India puts its political project as a top priority, the ideological concepts, such as ‘social mobility’, ‘relative deprivation’ and ‘reference group’, remain central to the Dalits’ social, economic and political status.34 Orthodox Hindu culture and traditions are recognised by the Dalit leaders as the factors responsible for the marginalsiation of Dalits. This ideological stand of the Dalit Movement has influenced its developmental and political priorities and in maintaining Hinduism and the upper castes as its foes. The formation of the BSP as a political party was a strategic part of the Dalit Movement and was expected to continue to be the spearhead of the movement. But on the contrary, the BSP is being seen as a harbinger of major changes in the fundamental ideological propositions of the Dalit Movement which was supposed to be espoused by the protagonists of the movement.

In the mid-1990s and the first decade of 21st century, the BSP brought major changes in the nature and ideology of the Dalit Movement in U.P. in terms of setting up political coalitions first with Hindu minded political parties like the BJP and later it formed a coalition with its all-time opponents, the Brahmins through ‘social engineering’. The latter is being posed by the BSP as a social coalition rather a political tie. This development brought about vivid changes in the BSP with major

104 Chapter – 3 changes in the social development policies of the BSP led governments in Uttar Pradesh.

The Emergence of BSP in Uttar Pradesh:

The political consciousness and the participation of the Scheduled Castes (SCs) in U.P. in the politics of the state have traditionally been low. U.P. did not witness anti-caste Dalit movements in the colonial period unlike the southern and western parts of India.35 There were diminutive and less influential streams of lower caste agitations, not necessarily violent, during the colonial period in U.P. (then United Province). It was hard for those agitations to keep their identity alive and separate from the vast anti-colonial movement. The anti-colonial movement in the United Province came under the umbrella of the Congress, prominently under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. The Gandhian movements were accommodative and provided significant space for lower caste people though they were given minimum representation within the party. During the Civil Disobedience Movement, there was huge participation from the Dalit community. The emergence of Dalit leadership in Gandhian movements was enough for Dalits to raise their voice against the atrocities meted on them by the upper castes and the Hindu religion. But, Dalit mobilisation, which was a part of the Independence Movement, could not raise social issues along with the political issues. The Gandhian movements were successful in associating Dalits only with ‘political’ but not with social or economic concerns. The early years of post independence in U.P. were quite celebrative for the Congress as it cemented its political and electoral base in the state. The Dalits were one of the main constructors of the electoral base of the Congress in U.P., and there was no striking political turbulence from their side which could exclusively be termed as a Dalit Movement.

Sudha Pai has divided the history of the post -independence Dalit Movement in U.P. into three phases.

The first is from 1956-1969, when Dalits decided to form their own party under the leadership of Bhim Rao Ambedkar with the Republican Party of India (RPI). The second phase is about the failure of Dalit political parties that enabled the Congress to secure Dalit support under the leadership of Indira Gandhi by the sharing in the consensus on ‘Garibi Hatao’. The third phase starts from the early 1980s when

105 Chapter – 3 the Dalit Movement entered into competitive democratic politics with the emergence of the Bahujan Samaj Party with the criticism that the Dalit Movement had distanced itself from the initiatives for social transformation and focused only on political motives and goals.36

In the first phase (1956- 1969), U.P. did not witness a strong presence of the Dalit Movement. This period was full of political and economic turbulence created by the land reforms. Though, the pace of the Dalit Movement in U.P. was not impressive, Dalit issues got predominance in the interpretation of the effectiveness and impact of land reforms in Uttar Pradesh. Several agrarian reforms were introduced in the post- colonial age within the framework of the socialist view of the Indian state, which of course, is reflected in the Constitution of India to improve the quality of life of the depressed classes with the motive of bringing social and economic equality and equity in society. The results of these agrarian reforms, however, did not prove beneficial for the targeted groups. Many scholars called the agrarian reforms as a ‘failed task’ or ‘a fiasco’.37 A study of the agrarian reforms in Basti, a district of eastern Uttar Pradesh, shows that the untouchable class got very little or nothing from the Zamindari Abolition Act of 1954.38

The real beneficiaries of these land reforms were the tillers of the land. Landowners did not till their land. The intermediate castes (Now OBCs) tilled the land and took their share. After the introduction of the Zamindari Abolition Act of 1954, landowners, who were mainly from the upper castes, had to forfeit land in excess 10 acres. These landowners started to sell their lands. Dalits and other depressed classes did not have the purchasing capacity to buy the land. Therefore, the intermediary castes who tilled the land purchased those lands.39 However, lack of purchasing power was not only reason that prevented the Dalits from taking the benefits of land reforms; it was more a matter of deprivation of the entitlement. Omvedt and Patankar have discussed it at length.

Two parallel hierarchies developed in the caste system of India. One hierarchy developed in the domain of agrarian relations ranging from landlords to independent peasants to tenant -cultivator to field servant. The last category comprised the untouchables - a form of semi-slavery. The parallel hierarchy developed in field of services ranging from priest at the top to the goldsmith, barber to washerman and

106 Chapter – 3 leather worker. The entire land policy evolved in the colonial period and during the freedom struggle was focused on the ideology of ‘land to tillers’ which excluded the lowest hierarchy in the agrarian system i.e. the untouchable field servants. 40

The failure of the land reforms in bringing equality among the Dalits in Uttar Pradesh was enough to encourage them to launch the Dalit Movement. This was not a tough task because the contemporary Dalit Movement had a strong presence in the political and social spheres in other parts of the country. The Dalits kept their faith in the Congress, which was the chief propagator of land reforms. For the Dalits, snatching away land from the upper caste landowners was a crucial development. Landowning capacity of the upper castes enabled them to exercise the power over the deprived classes. Therefore, taking away land from the landlords was a historical development, even if it proved less beneficial for the Dalits. Therefore, instead of putting Dalits against the Congress as land reforms failed, this phenomenon cemented the trust of the Dalits in the Congress which was also enjoying the reputation it had earned throughout the freedom movement as ‘protector of the nation’. The nationalist sentiments also protected the political interests of the Congress and the upper caste people who were then largely associated with it.41

One important reason for not letting the Dalit Movement take the floor in U.P. was the social structure based on Hindu traditions and beliefs. The norms and values of Hindu society to a great extent determine the distribution of opportunities to ownership of land and they have influenced the economic and political relation of people in Uttar Pradesh.42 Though social and economic relationships based on the religious interpretations have not been accepted by the Dalits as they were deeply internalised by them. The second important reason was that Dalits floating from bondage to one landowner to others could not develop a solid base in rural Uttar Pradesh.43 This restricted the ability of the Dalits in raising and maintaining a movement against the well established social hierarchy in the state.

During the second quarter of the 20th Century, concern over Dalit’s interests was raised at different forums at the national level in public and private under the leadership of Ambedkar. Ambedkar was a national figure and he had an impact across the nation. Ambedkar was very influential in national politics no second line leadership emerged in U.P. to carry on the legacy of the Dalit Movement established

107 Chapter – 3 by him. The Dalits in U.P., in the first couple of decades after the independence, could not mobilise themselves socially or economically; thus, their capacity to mobilise themselves politically was also restricted. During the early decades in post- independent India, political parties representing Dalit interests were less influential. The All India Scheduled Castes Federation (SCF) failed in finding any political room in the state. In the 1951 state assembly elections, the SCF was not prepared to contest for all the 347 seats. It could only muster 32 candidates out of which 20 lost their deposits. The SCF was the first all-India political party formed exclusively for the welfare of the Scheduled Castes. The party was the result of Ambedkar’s efforts to create a separate political party for Dalits. In first two Lok Sabha elections (1951 & 1957), the SCF could not win any seat from U.P.

In 1957, the SCF had to wind up and turned into a new political party – the Republican Party of India (RPI). The RPI could manage a little political leverage in consecutive state Assembly elections but failed to produce impressive political equations and remained marginalised in state politics. In the 1962 state elections, the RPI secured 3.74 percent with eight seats it increased in next election by 4.14 percent with 10 seats. This improvement was the result of the RPI’s coalition with the Muslim leaders in four districts of western U.P. This coalition was a reaction to the Hindu- Muslim riots in 1961.44 In the 1969 Assembly elections, the political base of the RPI deteriorated drastically. The party could win only one seat out of 425 seats (3.48 percent). In the Lok Sabha elections in 1962, the RPI won three seats and only one seat in 1967 general elections in U.P.

The RPI had two clear goals; one was to defeat the Congress, which was dominated by Brahmins and the second was to improve the condition of the Scheduled Castes. The RPI, however, faced major failures in bringing this agenda to the political front. This failure was laid in the nature of U.P. society and politics during that period.45 The leaders within the party could not arrive at a consensus on how to achieve these two goals. Some of them wanted to seek support from the Congress while others favoured a separate identity.46 Therefore, the RPI could not stand up to the strong organised structure of the Congress which was built at the local level by Brahmins, Rajputs, Scheduled Castes and Muslims. The Congress could manage the Scheduled Castes by making them as the stable electoral base of the party despite the fact that it was highly reluctant to put them in the party structure. For

108 Chapter – 3 example, in 1968, there was not even one representative from the lower castes and only one SC member among the presidents of its branches at district or town level.47

In the post-Ambedkar period, the hegemony established by the Congress was one of the important reasons for the poor influence of the Dalit Movement in India in general and in U.P. in particular. This hegemony was strengthened by the reputation that the Congress enjoyed throughout the freedom struggle and later by its accommodative politics. The Congress was successful in accommodating vibrant forces, which were expected to create political turbulence for the party and provide what they wanted. The Congress paid compensations to the Zamindars to compensate for their losses due to land reforms legislations, set up special agencies to assist small farmers, supported the minimum wage policy for the landless, and provided reservation in educational institutions and the administrative services for Scheduled Castes .48 The Congress was also aware of the Muslim votes. The party appealed to Muslims by offering them positions in party and government organisations and by giving their candidates party tickets to contest elections.49

This hegemony continued until it was challenged in the late 1980s (though the dissatisfaction with the Congress started 1970s onwards) by the backward and lower caste forces and the Hindu wing under the Jana Sangh and later the BJP. The decline of the hegemony of the Congress was a watershed development in state politics and it provided space for regional political forces. These forces were results of the mobilisation of local interests in terms of castes and communities. The Congress was unable to produce any kind of counter-mobilisation to these forces and it caused significant damage in the paternal electoral base of the party. The decline of the Congress was not limited only to the new political upsurge; it was underwritten by the inability of the Congress to provide an effective blueprint for the social welfare and development during its rule in the state in the first four decades after independence. Therefore, the roots of Congress’ hegemony were shaken as much because of its inability to maintain it as it was challenged by the others.50

After the failure of RPI as a Dalit political party, the 1970s and 1980s were crucial for the Dalit Movement in Uttar Pradesh. The state witnessed a very animated and path breaking movement under the leadership of Kanshi Ram who had put Dalit Politics in mainstream politics in the state. It was also the era when the Dalit Panthers

109 Chapter – 3 emerged. It was a gathering of Dalit youths with a more militant approach to voicing their concerns. Kanshi Ram, however, was not influenced by these waves of extremism and paved the way for a wholesome political movement. He had a broader view than any other Dalit leader in the past of a movement that could unite all the social sections affected by the discriminatory social arrangement of Hindu society. Kanshi Ram argued that only 15 percent the upper castes was ruling over the 85 percent backward and lower castes along with religious minorities. Therefore, the fraction of 85 percent should come together and take the advantage of democratic politics - being the majority they could rule over the country forever. Kanshi Ram used the basic principles of representative democracy, which had been criticised by the early Dalit leaders for not giving space to the Dalit community, i.e. rule of the majority as a political strategy. This strategy is reflected very clearly in the slogan “jiski jitni sankhya bhari, uski utni bhagidari” (share in power according to the ratio in population). Kanshi Ram’s view of an egalitarian society was not an idea of absolute equality but of the ‘rational distribution’ of the power based on the population strength. In his theory, he is more realistic than the earlier propagators of the Dalit Movement.

Kanshi Ram established a category called Bahujan, which comprises 85 percent of the society. He used this category explicitly as a political tool for the Dalit mobilisation. Keeping this view in his mind, Kanshi Ram established a non-political organisation called the All India Backward and Minorities Communities Employees Federation (BAMCEF) on December 6, 1973. The membership of the organisation was open only to Dalits employed in the public sector. The BAMCEF widened its base swiftly across the country, though it remained unnoticed by the mainstream media. To counter this media bias, the organisation launched its own journal, Oppressed Indian, and later scores of daily/weekly newspapers in most Indian languages.51 The BAMCEF remained a base organisation which accepted membership only from the government employees so that they could contribute economically for the implementation of its further agendas. This was a strategic and organised technique to precede the Dalit Movement. After levelling the ground for his progress to the political arena, in 1981, Kanshi Ram established the Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti, popularly known as DS-4, which was a political organisation. The political project of Kanshi Ram was backed by aggressive strategies with the

110 Chapter – 3 devastating language its slogans - ‘Brahmin, Bania, Thakur Chor, Baki Sab Hum DS- 4’.

In 1984, Kanshi Ram turned the DS-4 into a full-fledged political party, the BSP, launched on Ambedkar’s birthday with the slogan ‘vote hamara, raj tumhara; nahi chalega, nahi chalega’ (we vote but you rule, it won’t continue). The goal was based on an axiom of Ambedkar that political power is the key to all problems.52 The establishment of the BSP as a political party was part of a broader Dalit Movement initiated by Kanshi Ram in northern India mainly in Uttar Pradesh. In the late 1980s, at one point of time Kanshi Ram was heading four Dalit organisations, i.e., BAMCEF, Buddhist Research Centre, DS-4 and BSP. All these organisations were considered as different parts of a complete Dalit Movement. The BSP has been considered as main organisation that would fulfil the political goals of Dalit. The BSP has been very successful in grasping the Dalits votes in U.P. in favour of the party as envisaged by its leaders.

At the beginning of its political career as political organisation, the BSP could make its presence felt only marginally, but very soon it occupied an influential place in state politics. When the BSP contested the election for the first time, it had already nearly 10 percent of the votes as its social base. The Assembly elections in 1993 proved a turning point for the BSP when it made a political coalition with the SP to prevent the BJP from coming to power. This election was launched the BSP and it created more political space with an increase in its vote share from 10.26 to 28.53 percent of the seats for which the party contested.53

In 1989, BSP entered into the competitive electoral politics, it was the time when the Dalit Movement in U.P. turned into a complete political movement with less focus on social reforms and economic equality. This change in the Dalit Movement was underscored by the major developments in the political landscape of U.P. The rise of the Hindutva politics of the BJP, violent communal tension for building a temple in Ayodhya and the announcement of the Mandal Commission report’s recommendations, all set the stage for the polarisation of communities along caste and religious lines.

These opportunities provided a clear avenue to the BSP to use its political leverage. The BSP was successful in increasing its social base continuously over

111 Chapter – 3 successive elections. The BSP’s political strategy was mainly based on caste rather than class, even if it claims that the party works for the lower class people. However it was heavily dependent on the lower castes and could garner political support only from the Scheduled Castes and not other sections of society. This development restricted the expansion of the BSP’s electoral base.54 Therefore; BSP brought a decisive and surprising shift in its basic ideology and electoral strategy. During the initial years of the first decade of the 21st century, the BSP focused on ‘social engineering’ to bring Brahmins and other upper castes together through the policy of Sarvajan.

Though, the BSP claims in all public forums and political manifestos that its policy brings the Dalits and upper castes together, it included only Brahmins in its political strategy with explicit focus. This social engineering brought Dalit and Brahmins together, which resulted in a huge victory for the BSP in the 2007 state Assembly election in U.P. The BSP organised several “Brahmin Jodo Sammelans” in different parts of the state, and also formed “Bhaichara Committees” in every district for developing cordial relations between the Brahmins and the Dalits.55 The logic offered to rationalise this peculiar coalition was that if both castes could remain on one political platform, the atrocities and deprivation of the Dalits that were being caused by the Brahmins could be stopped .56 Electoral politics of BSP in different election periods will be discussed and examined in the subsequent chapters.

Influence of Bahujan Samaj Party outside U.P

Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) has been successful in expanding its political arena in the national politics too. During the three and half decades of its journey into national politics it could attain considerable reputation in the Indian political scenario. In the 1989 national election it contested for 245 seats and win three seats, two from Uttar Pradesh and one from Punjab. At the same time it could score 2.07% votes. In the 10th Lok-Sabha election of 1991 the party contested for 231 seats and won one seat from Madhya Pradesh and one from Uttar Pradesh. Similarly, in the 11th Lok- Sabha election of 1996 the BSP contested for 210 seats and won 12 seats; 3 from Punjab, 2 from Madhya Pradesh and 6 seats from Uttar Pradesh. From then the party had been rising continuously but in 2014 national election in which it could not win single seat. As this research has some separate chapters on the electoral politics of

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Bahujan Samaj Party during different national as well state elections here, I am not going to enlarge the chapter with discussing in detail in the present chapter.57

Table-3:2 Lok Sabha (Lower House)

% of Lok Indian Seats Seats % of Votes in Sabha General State ( seats ) Contested won Votes seats word Election contested 09th Punjab ( 1 ) Lok 1989 245 03 2.07 4.53 Uttar Pradesh ( 2 ) Sabha 10th Madhya_Pradesh(1) Lok 1991 231 02 1.61 3.64 Uttar Pradesh ( 1 ) Sabha 11th Madhya Pradesh(2) Lok 1996 210 11 4.02 11.21 Punjab ( 3 ) Sabha Uttar Pradesh ( 6 )

Apart from achieving great success in Uttar Pradesh and in Indian national politics the Bahujan Samaj Party has a deep influence on politics of different other states of the Union of India. In the 10th Vidhan Sabha election of Bihar in 1990 it contested for 164 seats without having a positive result. But in the subsequent elections of 11th Vidhan Sabha of Bihar in 1995 it won 2 seats. Until the 15th Vidhan Sabha election of Bihar, it continued contesting elections in most of the seats and could win two to five seats in different elections. In Chhattisgarh also the party contested elections in all the three Vidhan Sabha elections of the state. The party won two seats in first two consecutive terms of state Legislative Assembly elections and in the 4th election for the legislature, the number of winning candidates was declined to one seat. In Delhi Legislative Assembly elections too it has been contesting from almost every constituency from its beginning of 1993. But only in a single instance of 4th Vidhan Sabha election 2008, it could win two seats from the national capital of Delhi. In Haryana Vidhan Sabha election, the party has been nominating its candidates from 8th Vidhan Sabha election onwards. But each time it has been to be satisfied with one seat regularly.58

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In Himachal Pradesh state politics, the Bahujan Samaj party has been maintaining its presence from 1990. However, except in one instance it has not been successful in winning a single seat in the state Legislative Assembly elections. The party has also been playing a significant role in Madhya Pradesh state politics since 1990. It has created example of greater influence with winning eleven Assembly seats during 1998 Legislative Assembly elections in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. Again, in the state of Maharashtra, BSP nominated its candidates to the 289 Legislative Assembly seats in the general elections of 2009. But, it is true that the party has not been able to win any seat still date. In the initial era of BSP’s entry into Punjab politics it could remarkably influence the system of democratic election. Although the party successfully won nine seats during the 1992 Legislative Assembly elections of the state, yet the number of seats started declining in the subsequent elections and in the recent times it stood in zero. Similarly, the Indian state of Rajasthan has also witnessed the presence of BSP though without having a greater influence on the ground level. However, the Uttarakhand Legislative Assembly has allotted the party seven, eight and three seats in the three recent consecutive elections.59

Apart from these states mentioned above the Bahujan Samaj Party has a positive influence in the politics of the Indian state of Jharkhand. Thus, it cannot be denied that the Bahujan Samaj Party has a greater influence in developing democratic political culture in a multi-party system like India. Its issues in the electoral politics is much concerned with establishing a system where social justice can be prevailed as the party strives for the cause of down-trodden Dalit Samaj of Indian society.

Thus, the state of Uttar Pradesh plays an important role in the political scenario of India. The state consists of large area of highly fertile land, the sacred river Ganges, scanty industrial setup and almost 180 million people deeply affected by religious taboos, caste system and internal differences. The U.P. politics prominently features a multi-party system with an emphasis of the local parties endorsed by specific cults in the state. In U.P., a total of six national parties including Bahujan Samaj Party, Communist Party of India, Bharatiya Janata Party, Congress and Communist Party of India (Marxist)) and many state parties (like Samajwadi Party and Rashtriya Lok Dal) take active part in the electoral politics of the state.

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Religion and caste play an important role in Indian politics as well as in Uttar Pradesh. It emerged a huge remark in U.P. politics during the decades of 1990’s. Throughout the 1990s, identities constructed around ‘Hindutva’, ‘Mandal’ and ‘Dalit’ drove mass politics in Uttar Pradesh as political parties mobilised and divided the electorate along the lines of social cleavages. The collapse of the Congress party led to a fragmented multi-party system with narrower identity-based parties, new strategies of mobilisation and sharp contests in electoral politics resulting in political instability and coalition governments. Thus, caste and religion are two important social issues, base upon which parties try to woo votes and voters also consider these things while casting votes.

In fact due to the caste and religion factor Uttar Pradesh had suffered a lot. The political parties always made the agenda of caste not to development. Due to ethnic mobilisation, parties confined to their narrow sectarian bases have been unable to aggregate public opinion, obtain majority support and form stable governments. This has led to short-lived coalitions, which have not been able to formulate long-term policies that can address the felt needs of the people contributing in turn to the breakdown of governance and instability.

BSP started as Dalit party but later on included other castes and religions as well. This party is master in playing caste politics and strongest party in U.P. right now. Looking at the majority demand, U.P. Chief Minister Mayawati has also emerged in the state with a new strategy while announcing the candidates list. To get the support of Dalits, she has awarded candidature to several candidates belonging to the backward classes. The BSP has also expanded its arena of political activity in many of the Indian states like Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra and the national capital region of Delhi, and this research has found that despite the pivotal position that the Dalit identity has come to occupy in national politics, there are limits to the growth of the BSP's influence in these states in the national as well as Assembly elections in the respective states.

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32. Srinivas, M N. Caste: Its Twentieth Century Awtar. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1996.

33. Kothari, Rajni. Caste in Indian Politics. Orient Longman, Delhi: 1970; p-232.

34. Guru, Gopal. ‘The Dalit Movement in Mainstream Sociology’. In S M Micheal (ed), Dalits in Modern India: Vision and Values. Vistar Publication, New Delhi: 1999.

35. Pai, Sudha. ‘From Harijan to Dalits: Identity Formation, Political Consciousness and Electoral Mobilization of the scheduled Castes in Uttar Pradesh’. In Ghanshyam Shah (ed), Dalit Identity and Politics. Sage, New Delhi: 2001.

36. Ibid. op.cit;

118 Chapter – 3

37. Joshi, P C (1972). ‘Review Article’, Seminar, May. Sen, Bhawani (1962). Evolution of Agrarian reforms in India. People’s Publishing House, Delhi: 1991.

38. Singh, Rajendra. ‘Peasant Movement in Uttar Pradesh: A Study in the Politics of land Control in ’. In M S A Rao (ed), Social Movements in India. Delhi: Manohar Publication, 1978. p-18

39. —————. ‘Caste, land and Power in Uttar Pradesh’. In Gail Omvedt (ed), Land, Caste and Politics in Indian State. Delhi: Authors Guild, 1982.

40. Omvedt, Gail and Bharat Patankar. The Dalit Liberation Movement in Colonial Period. Economic and Political Weekly, 14 (7 & 8), 1979.

41. Ibid. op.cit; p-44

42. See, Singh, 1982 op.cit p-54

43. Ibid op.cit p-55

44. Brass, Paul R. ‘Uttar Pradesh’. In Myron Weiner (ed), State Politics in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1968.

45. See, Pai, 2001 op.cit p-14

46. Lynch, Owen M. The politics of Untouchability: “Social Mobility and Change in a City of India”. Colombia University Press. (quoted in Sudha Pai), New York: 2001

47. Jaffrelot, Christophe. “India’s Silent Revolution- The Rise of the Low castes in North Indian Politics”. Orient Longman/Permanent black, New Delhi, 2003.

48. Hasan, Zoya. ‘Power and Mobilization-Pattern of Resilience and Change in Uttar Pradesh’. In Frankel R Francine and M S A Rao (eds), Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order. Delhi: Oxford Press, 1989.

49. Ibid; op.cit p-11

119 Chapter – 3

50. (Kohli:1987, Dreze and Gajdar: 1997) Kohli, Atul (1987). The State and : The Politics of Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

51. Teltumbde, Anand; An Enigma called Kanshi Ram, “Economic and Political Weekly”, November 6, 2006, pp. 4531-4532.

52. —————. Uttar Pradesh- A Maya Revolution, Economic and Political Weekly, June 9, 2007, pp. 2147- 48.

53. Election Commission of India. http://eci.gov.in/eci_main/ StatisticalReports/SE_1951 /StatRep_51_UP.pdf; Retrieved 5 March 1999

54. Lerche, Jens: ‘Hamlet, Village and Region: Caste and Class Difference Between Low Caste Mobilization in East and West UP’. In Roger Jeffery and Jens Lerche (eds), Social and political Change in Uttar Pradesh. Manohar Publication, New Delhi: 2003.

55. Verma, A K; BSP’s Strategy for Uttar Pradesh: Wooing The Brahmins for a New Alliance. “Economic and Political Weekly”, June 25, 2007, pp. 2647- 2648.

56. —————: Reverse Social Osmosis in Uttar Pradesh. Economic and Political Weekly, March 10, 2007, pp 817-182.

57. Financial Express: "General Elections – 1992: Schedule of Elections" (PDF). 5 March 1992. Retrieved 5 March 1992.

58. India News: “7th phase: 73% voter turnout in Punjab, 60% in Bihar” Sandra Fernandez, One, 30 April 2014

59. Sudha Pai: “BSP's Prospects in the Assembly Elections”, Vol.- XXXVIII No. 30, July 26, 2003

120

Electoral Politics of BSP in 1990s Elections

Chapter – 4

Electoral Politics of BSP in 1990s Elections The popular reading of the last some decades of electoral politics is of a rapid decline and impending collapse of Indian democracy. The changing outcome of the electoral game in these decades have been seen here as the reflection of a fundamental transformation in the terrain of politics which in turn is anchored in the process of social change. The voters choose differently in this decade, for, the structure of choice inherent in elections has undergone a change. Yet the choice often turns out to be far from the act of sovereignty that the fiction of liberal democracy makes it out to be.

An attempt to understand the politics of electoral choice in contemporary India and especially the country’s most densely populated state of Uttar Pradesh brings us face to face with a tension that lies at the heart of India's current democratic transition, if not at the heart of democratic theory itself. The last decade of 20th century represents the full unfolding of the contradiction between the logic of political equality and that of social inequality, something that Ambedkar had warned against in the Constituent Assembly itself. The dynamics of political equality triggered off by the institution of universal adult franchise and the self-reproductive processes of the structure of socio-economic inequality inherited from the past have both crossed a certain threshold without being able to tame the other completely. As the participatory upsurge leads to the downward spread of democracy, the political processes begin to disturb the inherited ritual social hierarchy and trouble the established elite with hitherto unknown anxieties.

Since elections are associated with much of this upheaval, the spectacle of election has come to occupy an aura of 'samudra manthan', the grand ritual churning of the social sea by the small gods of democracy with the help of the modem instrument of a vote. But just as this churning seems poised to yield the proverbial 'amrita', it comes up against the rocky bed of economic inequality. The maya of collective action and the invisible 'rakshasa' called Ideology conspire against all the small Gods. The churning does not stop, the spectacle goes on. Yet at some level it turns into a harmless game, subtly delinked from some of the gravest threats it posed to the lords who inherited the sea. It is hardly surprising that the enactment of this story through a series of elections, all in the course of 10 years or so, has stumped analysts of Indian politics, especially electoral politics of the state of Uttar Pradesh

121 Chapter – 4 often deceiving them into a surface reading of the entire process as no more than a horse-race of political entrepreneurs.

Interpreting modem politics is a demanding activity in the best of times. But the cognitive demands placed on the interpreter of contemporary Indian politics in general and electoral competition of Uttar Pradesh appear excessive even by that standard. For one thing, the received conceptual frames of various hues were never designed to grasp the specificity of the path of democracy in a poor, non-western society. Besides, there was no way the feeble intellectual attention given to the task of collecting relevant information and making sense of it in India could have met the scale and the pace of events in the last decade of 20th century. The most common reading of that decade of electoral politics, in its academic and popular versions, is a story of the rapid decline and the impending collapse of Indian democracy. It finds signs of widespread election fatigue leading to popular disinterest in and cynicism towards politics. The decade stands out for sudden outburst of some of the maladies inherent in our system: the endemic multiplication in the number of political parties and the fractionalisation of the political space; the rise of regional parties and caste- community based parties that threaten to unleash fissiparous tendencies and a clash of primordial loyalties; end of ideology-based politics and the decline of political morality; and, of course, excessive political corruption, non-governance, disorder and instability. 1

The principle ambition of this research work on the electoral politics of Bahujan Samaj Party during that decade is to contest all too familiar view from above without yielding to the temptation of building its mirror-image. The changing outcome of the electoral game in this decade is seen here as the reflection of a fundamental transformation in the terrain of politics which in turn is anchored in the process of social change. The voters choose differently in this decade with the mushrooming growth of caste, sect and religion based political participation. So the structure of choice inherent in elections has under-gone a change. The size, the composition and the self-definition of those who choose have changed. More and more citizen from the lower rungs of society participates in this ritual of choosing, they come not as individual but as groups, and they bring with them their own tastes and worldviews. They have much more to choose from and they exercise their right to reject very frequently, as the site of choice has moved closer home. The voters can 122 Chapter – 4 choose from a given set, but they cannot determine which set to choose from. They can elect someone and then throw him out, but there is precious little that they can do to ensure that the representatives actually represent them once in power. For the convenience in the comprehension of readers, researchers as well as critics the chapter has been arranged in a way that articulates---- a) Electoral politics of BSP from 1996 to 2000. b) BSP’s political tactics for achieving power through coalition politics and c) BSP’s caste politics.

Electoral Participation of BSP and Elections:

Bahujan Samaj Party has been playing significant role in the electoral politics in both the national as well as state politics in India. In the 1996 national election of Lower House the party contested for 210 seats and won 11. It could attain 4.02 percent of votes throughout the country and surprisingly the party achieved 11.21 percent of votes in those seats from where it contested the election. From Madhya Pradesh it could win 2 seats, from the state of Punjab it won 3 seats and from Uttar Pradesh it secured 6 seats. (Table: 4: 1) In the election of 1998 BSP contested for 251 seats but it could not secure more than 05 seats. However, the party could win 4.67 percent votes in totality and 9.97 percent of votes in those seats from where it contested election. BSP could secure only a single seat from the state of Haryana and 4 from Uttar Pradesh. 2

BSP has strengthened its position in the electoral politics in the13th Lok Sabha election of 1999 and contested for 225 seats in the country. The party won 14 seats from Uttar Pradesh alone with attaining 9.97 percent votes from where it contested election. (Table: 4: 1)

123 Chapter – 4

Table: 4:1 BSP’s Performance in Lok Sabha (Lower House) Elections

Lok Indian Seats Seats % of % of State ( seats Sabha General Contested won Votes Votes in ) Term Election seats contested 11th 1996 210 11 4.02 11.21 Madhya Lok Pradesh (2) Sabha Punjab (3) Uttar Pradesh (6) 12th 1998 251 05 4.67 9.84 Haryana (1) Lok Uttar Sabha Pradesh (4) 13th 1999 225 14 4.16 9.97 Uttar Lok Pradesh Sabha (14) Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

Apart from these Bahujan Samaj Party also strived to influence electoral participation in Rajasthan Vidhan Sabha Election during 1990s. In the 9th Rajasthan Vidhan Sabha election of 1990 it contested for 205 seats and in the 10th Rajasthan Vidhan Sabha election of 1993 it contested for 50 seats but could not win a single seat. However, in the 11th Rajasthan Vidhan Sabha election of 1998 the party contested in 108 seats and won 2 seats. Moreover, it could secure 3.81 percent votes in those constituencies from where it contested election. (Table: 4: 2)

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Table: 4: 2 BSP in Rajasthan Vidhan Sabha Elections

Vidhan Sabha Rajasthan Seats Seats % of % of Votes Term General Contested Won Votes in Election seats contested 9th Vidhan Sabha 1990 205 0 0.79 2.54 10th Vidhan Sabha 1993 50 0 0.56 2.01 11th Vidhan Sabha 1998 108 2 2.17 3.81

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

As far as Punjab Vidhan Sabha is concerned BSP contested in 105 seats and won 9 seats with a good percentage of 17.59 in 1992 election. But graph was declined in the 11th Vidhan Sabha election commenced in 1997. Though it contested in 67 seats the party had to be satisfied with winning a single seat. However, BSP could secure about 13.28 percent of votes in those seats where it contested election. (Table: 4: 3)

Table: 4: 3 BSP in Punjab Vidhan Sabha Elections

Vidhan Sabha Punjab Seats Seats % of % of Votes in Term General Contested won Votes seats Election contested 10th Vidhan 1992 105 9 16.32 17.59 Sabha 11th Vidhan 1997 67 1 7.48 13.28 Sabha

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

Bahujan Samaj party strived a lot in electoral competition in Maharashtra Vidhan Sabha from during whole decade of 1990 but each time it had to return with an empty hand. It took part in 122, 145 and 83 seats during 1990, 1995 and 1999 elections respectively but could not impress the voters of the state in all the three consecutive elections with its Dalit political propaganda.

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Table: 4: 4 BSP in Maharashtra Vidhan Sabha Elections

Vidhan Sabha Maharashtra Seats Seats % of % of Votes Term General Election Contested won Votes in seats contested 8th Vidhan 1990 122 0 0.42 0.98 Sabha 9th Vidhan 1995 145 0 1.49 2.82 Sabha 10th Vidhan 1999 83 0 0.39 1.24 Sabha

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

The party gradually increases its hold day by day in the Madhya Pradesh Vidhan Sabha by taking part in the electoral politics of that decade. In the 9th Vidhan Sabha election of the state in 1990 it won two seats with engaging its candidates in 183 seats. Similarly, in 10th Vidhan Sabha election of 1993 the party won two seats and contested in a greater number of 286 constituencies. But as compared to 5.89 percent in 1990 BSP could secure greater number of 7.86 percent of votes in those seats from where it contested election in 1993. Again the party improved its status in the state in 11th Vidhan Sabha election of 1998. It served ticket for 170 seats and won 11 with attaining 11.39 percent of votes in those seats from where it contested election. (Table 4.5)

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Table: 4:5 BSP in Madhya Pradesh Vidhan Sabha Elections

Vidhan Sabha Madhya Seats Seats % of % of Votes in Term Pradesh Contested won Votes seats General contested Election 9th Vidhan Sabha 1990 183 2 3.54 5.89 10th Vidhan 1993 286 2 7.05 7.86 Sabha 11th Vidhan 1998 170 11 6.15 11.39 Sabha Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

In all the three consecutive Himachal Pradesh General Elections of 1990, 1993 and 1998 the Datit and lower caste based party contested for 35, 49 and 28 seats respectively. But all the efforts have gone in vein as the party could not compete in a single constituency. However, the party has increases its presence in the state from 1.76 percent in 1990 to 3.28 percent in the 9th Vidhan Sabha election of 1998. (Table: 4.6)

Table :4:6 BSP in Himachal Pradesh Vidhan Sabha Elections

Vidhan Sabha Himachal Seats Seats % of % of Votes Term Pradesh Contested won Votes in General seats Election contested 7th Vidhan Sabha 1990 35 0 0.94 1.76 8th Vidhan Sabha 1993 49 0 2.25 3.0 9th Vidhan Sabha 1998 28 0 1.41 3.28 Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

In the state of Uttar Pradesh where the party has a strong base the BSP could not achieve majority in both 12th and 13th Vidhan Sabha (Lower House) elections

127 Chapter – 4

1993 and 1996 respectively. In the 1993 election of State Legislative Assembly BSP contested for 164 seats and won 67 with achieving 28.52 percent votes in those constituencies from where it contested election. A similar number of 67 seats were won by the party in 13th Assembly election of 1996 with nominating 296 candidates. The graph of votes was also down lower to 27.73 percent in the seats it competed the election. (Table: 4:7)

Table 4:7 BSP in Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha (Lower House) Elections

Vidhan Sabha Term UP Seats Seats % of % of Votes in Elections Contested won Votes seats contested 12th Vidhan Sabha 1993 164 67 11.12 28.52 13th Vidhan Sabha 1996 296 67 19.64 27.73 Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

BSP towards Regional Homogenisation

It would be of interest to examine the political behaviour of the seven electoral regions into which U.P. is divided, to discern whether there was a similar or different voting pattern in them during the decade (1990-99) under study.

The erstwhile Uttarakhand region in U.P. is now a full-fledged state called Uttarakhand. But, for the purpose of the electoral study of U.P. during the last decade of 20th century, we cannot exclude this region because till the 1999 Lok Sabha elections and thereafter, it was a part of Uttar Pradesh. Uttarakhand used to send 4 MP's to Lok Sabha, and 14 MLAs to Uttar Pradesh Assembly. In 1989 Lok Sabha elections, the seats were equally shared by the Congress and the Janata Dal - two each. But since 1991, the BJP - magic gripped the region – the party bagging all the four seats in 1991 and 1998, two seats in 1996 and three seats in 1999.

Ruhelkhand is generally more politically mobilised, as seen from the voters turn out. The BSP has been consolidating the Dalit votes in the region, and from a meagre 5.06 percent votes in 1991 it shot up to 22.58 percent votes in 1999 Lok Sabha elections. In Assembly elections in Ruhelkhand during the decade, the BSP had

128 Chapter – 4 done well in 1996. Though BSP bagged five seats and received popular votes of 18.69 percent votes though the party put up 37 candidates.

In the Upper Doab region in 1996, the BSP and the SP got one seat each. In Assembly elections too, the BSP has recorded significant presence in the region. It is interesting to note that in the 1999 Lok Sabha polls, the BJP, SP and the BSP almost equally shared the popular votes. Significantly, the BSP has made a place for itself in the region by winning 11 seats and 16 seats in 1993 and 1996, respectively and garnering a substantial share of popular votes. The nationally famous Faizabad Lok Sabha and Ayodhya Assembly constituencies fall in Lower Doab. Amethi, Akbarpur and Allahabad parliamentary constituencies also make this region politically very significant. BSP started showing its presence the in the region and could capture one seat (22.89 percent votes) in 1996, while in 1998 but the BSP could not open its account and also lost some valuable votes. The BSP marginally improved its performance in lower doab in the 1999 elections and won two seats. The BSP too came in a big way in this region by winning 13 seats (10.23 percent votes) and 15 seats (22.43 percent votes) in 1993 and 1996, respectively. The Congress was totally besmirched electorally in Lower-doab.

Bundelkhand is the southern part of Uttar Pradesh. The four Lok Sabha constituencies of Banda, Hamirpur, Jhansi and Jalaun have been a traditional bastion of the BJP since 1991, and the Congress has been virtually wiped out in the region.4 SP too has no significant presence in the area despite some vote share. But the 1999 Lok Sabha elections brought some stunning results: the BJP was completely wiped out in Bundelkhand though retaining a popular vote share of 27.46 percent. But the shock to the BJP was administered by the BSP which captured all the Lok Sabha seats except Jhansi. Though there was only a marginal difference in the vote shares of the two (BSP: 28.89 percent; BJP 27.46 percent), the BJP could not get a single Lok Sabha seat. The only seat falling to the non-BSP was the Jhansi seat which went to Congress (Sujan Singh Bundela). And though the BJP and the SP put up some good fight, the BSP was relegated to the fourth position in Jhansi in the 1999 elections. The Congress had to wait for long before it could open its account in Bundelkhand. The region shows a rigid social fragmentation on caste lines. A marginal swine in favour of any of the three could also produce stunning results in future elections (Table 4:8).

129 Chapter – 4

The results of the Assembly elections too exhibit more or less the same trend, with the BJP and the BSP emerging rival forces.

Poorvanchal relends a strong contingent to Lok Sabha and Assembly elections. While the 1989 Lok Sabha elections were dominated by the Janata Dal (JD), the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been the favourite of Poorvanchal since 199l. It is interesting to note that while the BJP was battered in almost all regions in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, Poorvanchal provided the much needed relief to the BJP by electing nine of its candidates. The SP and the BSP have been trying hard to make inroads in Poorvanchal, and appear to have succeeded to a great extent- which is proved by their vote share in the last Lok Sabha elections (BJP - 26.69 percent BSP- 23.57 percent and SP- 28.59 percent).

In Poorvanchal we find caste based polarisation; and hence, what we have said about Bundelkhand largely holds true of Poorvanchal too. The Congress has not been able to get a single seat during the last three Lok Sabha elections. In Assembly election, though the BJP has been the leading party both in term of seats won and votes polled, the BSP and the SP have emerged as competing forces. On one occasion in 1993 Assembly polls, the BSP went much ahead of the SP, winning 36 seats against the 20 won by the SP. But while the BSP share of votes has been constant at 27 percent during the 1993 and 1996 Assembly polls, the SP has been on the rise from 12.89 percent votes in 1993 to 22.03 percent in 1996, the graph of Congress popularity has been going down. The changing pattern of regional variations in voting patterns in Uttar Pradesh in the 1990s can be traced through the following tables.

130 Chapter – 4

Table: 4:8

Proportion of Votes Drawn from Each Region by Major Potitical Parties: Vidhan Sabha Elections, Uttar Pradesh, 1991-1996

U.P. Vidhan Shabha Election 1991

Region Share in the Congress BJP JD BSP Total Electorate Ruhelkhand 11.5 12.8 14.8 13.4 08.2 Avadh 17.5 20.3 15.5 11.0 15.7 East 20.0 13.9 14.3 20.8 32.4 West 08.7 08.7 10.2 17.1 02.9 Doab 11.9 16.0 17.8 18.5 14.1 Bundelkhand 04.9 05.4 04.4 02.4 09.9 North East 14.6 l 5.1 17.1 12.9 14.2 Uttarakhand 05.0 07.8 05.9 03.9 02.1 Total 100 100 100 100 100 Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

U.P. Vidhan Shabha Election 1993

Region Share in the Total Congress BJP JD BSP Electorate Ruhelkhand 11.4 09.8 12.6 02.8 15.7 Avadh 17.2 18.9 16.5 08.2 27.5 East 20.0 11.4 16.1 48.9 10.4 West 09.9 12.2 12.4 05.2 04.6 Doab 17.4 18.3 18.5 09.9 24.1 Bundelkhand 04.8 06.4 04.3 10.6 01.0 North East 14.6 l 4.0 14.7 12.3 15.4 Uttarakhand 04.7 08.9 04.9 02.2 01.3 Total 100 100 100 100 100 Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

131 Chapter – 4

U.P. Vidhan Shabha Election 1996

Region Share in the Congress BJP JD BSP Total Electorate Ruhelkhand 11.3 12.8 13.1 12.5 14.4 Avadh 17.1 24.6 17.0 16.6 19.8 East 20.1 11.7 17.5 22.4 21.7 West 10.1 10.7 11.7 07.8 07.3 Doab 17.6 16.8 17.2 18.6 17.4 Bundelkhand 04.7 07.0 04.4 05.2 03.5 North East 14.3 09.1 13.3 14.5 14.1 Uttarakhand 04.8 07.3 05.8 02.4 01.9 Total 100 100 100 100 100 Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

In the 1989 Assembly elections, which were held simultaneously with the Lok Sabha elections, the BSP was the strongest in Eastern U.P. with 31.1 percent of its votes coming from that region and was quite weak in the rest of the state. The BJP won the Assembly elections in 1991.

The BSP once again drew its greatest strength from Eastern U.P. with 32.4 percent of its vote share coming from this region, while it was the weakest in Uttarakhand and Western U.P. In the 1993 Vidhan Sabha elections, the SP and the BSP romped home thanks to a successful alliance. The Congress did not fare well in these elections, but the table indicates that as before its vote share was evenly spread all over the state. The BJP's votes were also spread out over Uttar Pradesh. The BSP once again derived its greatest strength from Eastern Uttar Pradesh and the region's share in the party's votes was 48.9 percent. As for the Samajwadi Party, Avadh replaced Eastern U.P. as the strongest region for the party.

In the 1996 Vidhan Sabha elections, the BSP,s region of strength remained Eastern U.P., which contributed 22.4 percent of the party's votes, but the party increased its votes in Ruhelkhand, the Doab and Avadh. Eastern U.P. contributed 2l.7

132 Chapter – 4 percent of the SP's vote, with Avadh contributing 19.6 percent of its votes. Both the BSP and SP remained weak in Uttarakhand.

Since the mid 1990s the pattern shows that while the strength of parties is no longer dependent on any one single region, yet for each party some regions continue to contribute substantially to their vote shares. But, all political parties in Uttar Pradesh now have a significant presence in terms of votes in all the regions of the state.

Party strategies in the U.P. Assembly elections 1996:

Having more than doubled its Lok Sabha vote in U.P., from 8.7 percent in 1991 to 20.6 percent in 1996, 10 the BSP welcomed the Vidhan Sabha elections as a party in the ascendant. While the Congress vote was spread across the social spectrum, the BSP's vote in the Lok Sabha elections revealed an extremely uneven social base. Table 4:8 indicates the percentages of the various caste groups that voted for the BSP in the Lok Sabha elections. As the table indicates, scheduled castes were heavily consolidated behind the BSP. No other caste or religious group gave the party such strong support. It also obtained a respectable percentage of the votes of non- Yadav backward castes.5

The party demonstrated little appeal among Muslims and Yadavs, and among upper castes, it had virtually no support. As a party searching for ways to increase its vote share in U.P., the BSP's first option would obviously be to consolidate its base among scheduled castes. As only 21 percent of U.P.'s population," however, scheduled caste voters alone could not ensure a majority for the BSP. The other potentially viable constituencies for the BSP seem to have been non-Yadav OBCs, who had not rallied behind any single political party, had indicated some receptivity to the BSP in their voting behaviour in the Lok Sabha election, and who were naturally included within the party's ideological appeal as a party of the 'oppressed'. The prospects for expansion among the Muslims were uncertain. Although the Muslims were part of 'Bahujan' targeted by BSP ideology, the BSP's acceptance of the BJP's support to form a government in U.P. had damaged its credibility among Muslims, most of whom had voted for the upper front in the Lok Sabha elections. As for Yadavs, who were also nominally part of the 85 percent majority that the BSP purported to represent, it would be hard for the BSP to compete with the SP as a

133 Chapter – 4 defender of their interests. Perhaps the constituency most impervious to BSP penetration was the upper castes, whose votes had already been captured by the BJP and who were in any case the ideological antagonists of the BSP. However, the BSP's opening gambit in the Vidhan Sabha elections was to announce an alliance with the Congress Party, appearing to court through this alliance the very upper castes whom it had previously opposed.6

At the same time, the BSP refused to consider an alliance with the SP, which would have brought all parties representing the backwards, Scheduled Castes and minorities on the same side. Throughout the BSP election campaign, little rhetoric was used against upper castes and upper caste domination. Additionally, the party allotted at least one-fifth (52) of its 297 seats to upper caste candidates.7 Rather than construct an electoral majority out of the 85 percent 'Bahujan' against the 15 percent 'Manuvadi' castes as it had in its previous election campaigns, then, the BSP had clearly chosen instead to seek votes from sections of all castes. The BSP's attempt to attract upper caste voters went hand in hand with efforts to expand its base among its more natural constituencies. The central plank of the BSP's campaign in this election was the promise to make Mayawati the Chief Minister (the other two planks were anti-goondaism, an attack against Mulayam Singh Yadav and the upper front, and anti-communalism, aimed against the BJP). This was a strong signal of the party's commitment to scheduled caste voters, who were also allotted the greatest share of party tickets (30 percent). Backward class were courted by allotting them tickets in almost equal proportion to the scheduled castes.8 Muslim support was vigorously sought by making anti-communalism a central part of the election campaign, obtaining the endorsement of several religious leaders including the Imam of Jama Masjid on the assurance that the BSP would not come to any post-poll agreement with the and by allotting one-fifth of its tickets (52) to Muslim candidates.'9 The BSP refused to consider an alliance with the SP, which was ideologically closer to it, and ally instead with a party that it had publicly declared an instrument of the upper castes. One reason of the alliance with Congress is that electoral arithmetic, by demonstrating to Kanshi Ram that the BSP could not hope to obtain power solely on a lower caste base, was driving him to make his party palatable to the upper castes. The gradual transformation of the BSP from an angry lower caste party into a benign 'catch-all' party as it is faced with the imperative of electoral politics. Organisation

134 Chapter – 4 and support base of the BSP, however, suggests that there is a limit beyond which the BSP is not likely to seek upper caste support. The ideology of the BSP, on the basis of which it has recruited party workers and mobilised votes over a period of at least 12 years, is built around the essential distinction between lower and upper, majority and minority, oppressed and oppressor. The very definition of the term 'Bahujan' emphasises this distinction: the term is a negative one, including Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians, or, as one BSP worker put it, all those who are not included in the three upper castes.10

The grass roots organisation of the party is constituted primarily by workers from scheduled and most backward class, in whom anger against the upper castes and the idealism of social transformation is deeply rooted. As Table 4:8 indicates, over 90 percent of the party's votes come from Scheduled Caste (66 percent) and non-Yadav OBC voters (27 percent). If the BSP is to maintain its electoral base and its organisational cohesiveness, then, it cannot abolish the distinction between oppressed and oppressor. The BSP's alliance with Congress as an indication of the gradual transformation of the party into an inclusive party with space for all social groups, then, it is more convincing to read the alliance as (1) a short-run strategy to catapult the party into a position to form a government in U.P. and (2) as a means to capture Congress' remaining Dalit and backward vote in U.P., and in other states. In fact, if his directive to Congress to give all tickets to Brahmins is any indication, it seems Kanshi Ram's intention to consolidate the BSP as a party of the Dalits and minorities through this alliance and remake Congress from an umbrella party to an upper caste party.11 The most viable path of expansion for the BSP is as a party of minorities who collectively constitute a majority, rather than as a catch-all party for all castes, it also is clear where the antipathy to Mulayam Singh comes from. It is not simply a matter of personal hatred but a calculated attempt to weaken the BSP's principal political rivals as champions of the oppressed by dividing them. Kanshi Ram candidly admits: both the SP and the Janata Dal are speaking our language. So I think, it is very essential for us to eliminate them as otherwise they will cut into BSP support.

The principal 'polarising' strategy available to the BSP would have been to lay greater emphasis on social justice and caste polarisation, mobilising the 'Bahujan Samaj' against the upper castes, as it had done in previous campaigns. The principal reason for passing over this strategy seems to have been the fact that the BSP saw its 135 Chapter – 4 main electoral opponent as Mulayam Singh Yadav, and its main electoral objective to "finish the Smajwadi Party". A backward class leader himself, Mulayam Singh was not vulnerable to attacks on behalf of social justice. Had the fight been a bipolar one against the BJP or any other party not also associated with the crusade for social justice, there is no reason why the party could not have used precisely such an appeal.12

BSP and Coalition Politics

The BSP undertook a huge modification in its electoral strategy 1993 onwards. There was already a prelude of it in the 1991 elections, when Kanshi Ram tried an electoral alliance with the Samajwadi Janata Party but which had gone in vain. An alliance with other party was realised in the 1993 U.P. Assembly elections, which also meant a big change in the party's electoral strategy. Its first alliance partner was the SP of Mulayam Singh Yadav, split from the Samajwadi Janata Party. According to the existing number of the MLAs, the BSP became a junior partner, with the commitment of Chief Ministership for Mulayam Singh Yadav in case of winning. Therefore, difference of the objectives of alliance was obvious: the SP was seeking power. The BSP moved closer to the SP attending and organising joint rallies in a large number.14

Since the SP was getting strong support of the OBC, especially of the Yadav community, it realised the possibility of the SC-OBC cooperation against upper castes. During the election campaign for the Uttar Pradesh Assembly in 1993, the BSP activists coined and used the slogan: 'tilak, taraju aur talwar, inko maro joote char.15 This slogan derogatorily means that Brahmins, Banias and Rajputs, each identified by a slighting term, should be beaten with a shoe-a traditionally demeaning form of punishment because of the ritual impurity of leather, and at the same time leather can be a symbol of Chamars because of their traditional occupation in the caste system. This provocative slogan is full of anti-upper caste sentiment, and it is served as a simple and dramatically offensive marker of the party's ideological position at the time of making first coalition with the OBC.

In the context of U.P. in 1993, the demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992 led Dalits, the backwards, and Muslims to politically come together and to form an electoral alliance against the Hindutva force. In the aftermath

136 Chapter – 4 of the destruction of the Babri Masjid, Muslims have been puzzled about their political support and leadership. They have turned away from the Indian National Congress (INC) for its alleged culpable failure to prevent the demolition of the mosque, and have given considerable support to the SP and some to the BSP. These two lower-caste parties, with support of the Muslim community, effectively opposed to the communal mobilisation of the BJP by joining the backwards and Dalits together. The BJP tried to unite the entire Hindu community with an opportunity of the Babri Masjid issue but the Hindutva ideology did not appeal to the lower castes, who never felt themselves being part of the Brahminical system. Moreover, following the announcement of implementing the Mandal Commission report by the V. P. Singh government in 1989, caste-based mobilisation had become more capable to unite the Dalit and the backwards in Uttar Pradesh. The 1993 elections had marked the culminating point of the anti-upper caste mobilisation. Therefore, the SP-BSP alliance was the united front of the backwards-Dalit forces, joining together through 'Mandal' issue, against the communal upper-castes camp awakened by 'Masjid' issue. Though this coalition failed to be marked by the diversification of the 'Bahujan' under it, not receiving support of the whole OBC, it had a backing of the Muslim community instead, which would add the weight of anti-communal coalition.16

The BSP's coming into power in U.P. as a junior partner of the SP was a noteworthy event because a political party based on Dalits' support and led by Dalit leadership became a part of power probably for the first time in Indian history. Seen from the perspective of the early ideological pursuit of the BSP, it was a huge leap towards the fulfillment of the mission to bring together Dalits, the backward class and to some extent Muslims in the same political platform of Bahujan Samaj. The coalition government lasted only for 18 months, from November 1993 to June 1995. The coalition between Dalits and the backwards proved to be vulnerable. There had been so many inner tensions in the coalition of the two parties at the political level, and at the social level as well.

The political levels of problems included the personality clashes between the leaders of two parties. Mulayam Singh Yadav did not like Kanshi Ram's constant interference in running the government and the authoritarian style of Mayawati also caused problems. Mayawati also complained about maltreatment of the Ministers from the BSP in the Mulayam Singh-led government as early as March 1994. She 137 Chapter – 4 further blamed it, calling 'Manuwadi.' More seriously, Mulayam Singh attempted to isolate the BSP in the coalition by absorbing its base among the backwards and Muslims.17 Two leaders from the respective parties competed to win over support of the Muslim community but finally Muslim leaders like Mahsood Ahmed and the SP leaders showed off their closer relationship isolating Kanshi Ram. Mulayam Singh's alleged casteist way of administration and politics also caused tension. He favoured Yadavs, his own caste members, in recruitment and promotion in the district administration, which came under the open criticism of the BSP. He also tried to absorb the MLAs belonged to the OBC from other parties into his own party in order to hustle the BSP out of coalition govemment.18 The BSP, along with other opposition parties of U.P., again blamed the Mulayam Singh government for its alleged census irregularities after the catastrophic defeat in the Panchayat elections in 1995.19

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Table: 4:1 Coalition Politics during 1990s

Sl. Period Period to Chief Minister Coalition Partners No. from 1 5.12.1989 23.6.91 Mulayam Singh All anti Rajiv (Cong.) Yadav (JD) forces except BJP. 2 5.12.1993 3.6.95 Mulayam Singh SP & BSP Yadav (JD) 3 3.6.1995 27.t0.95 Mayawati (BSP) BSP & BJP (BJP supporr from outside) 4 21.3.1997 20.9.97 Mayawati (BSP) BSP & BJP 5 21.9.1997 12.11.99 Kalyan Singh BJP, Jana BSP, LC & (BJP) Ind. 6 12.11.1999 28.10.2000 Ram Prakash BJP, Jana BSP, LC & Gupta (BJP) Ind. Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

The social level of reason for the collapse of coalition government was the inability of the SP and the BSP to unite the backwards and the Dalits. It became increasingly clear that there were fundamental differences between the Dalits and the backwards-particularly, the upper backwards-in the countryside, which could not be easily overcome. The traditional job of Chamar/Jatavs in the caste system has been the leather-works but they also engaged in the various village services and agricultural labour. As main purveyors of agricultural work, Chamars had to confront Jats, the traditional landholding and cultivating peasant caste in western U.P., Punjab and Haryana, while they faced the power of Rajputs as a non-cultivating landlord caste and intermediary cultivating tenant castes like Kurmis, Yadavas, etc. in eastern U.P. and Bihar.20 These kinds of traditional confrontations have been continuing in the village level and the increasing number of serious atrocities against Dalits during the Mulayam Singh government in U.P. caused worries even from the central govemment. In the first five months of the government's tenure, there were about 60 clashes involving Dalit and the OBC, in which 21 Dalits and three members of OBC were killed.21 These murders were reflective of local conflicts between Dalits and the land-holding intermediary caste groups. Shaking hands in the highest level of political

139 Chapter – 4 elites could not soothe the grass-root sentiments out of their everyday lives. And the rise of a new assertiveness among the Dalit groups also led to conflicts with the backward castes over questions of identity and policies. After the collapse of the coalition government, the BSP have never pursued an alliance with the OBC-based party, which means the end of 'Bahujan phase' in their electoral strategy. It also stopped identifying upper castes as enemies. Every social group in any position of the caste hierarchy started to be considered as its potential ally.22

This coalition of the two parties officially broke up on June 2, 1995. The BSP quickly bagged support of the BJP and the formation of a new government was declared on the very next day. A new coalition government was formed with support of the BJP and Mayawati became the first Dalit Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. The news of the BJP- BSP alliance was received by surprise because their ideologies and policy lines were contradictory to each other. The ideological line of the BSP before this incident was against the Manuwadi and communal forces, and it had blamed the BJP for last several years for the same reasons. Therefore, this coalition was obviously pragmatic pursuing their political purpose. Both the parties had clear aims they were targeting through the coalition. The BJP, highly upper-caste-centered party, hoped to draw support from the lower-caste groups by establishing the image that the party joined hand with a 'Dalit party.' The BSP aimed at obtaining the political power, because it had sought to be a 'ruling race,' as emphasized from the earlier period.23

Mayawati clearly revealed that the object of this coalition was 'to stop Mulayam's goonda raj,' which did not mean ideological concurrence between the two parties.24 Kanshi Ram, the party supremo never stopped blaming the BJP for being Brahminical, Manuwadi, even after forming the government with support of the BJP. He reiterated that this coalition is only for a short time, 'in order to fight criminals and Mulayam Singh Yadav together' and he had no future plan of further alliance with the BJP for the 1996 election. He did not rule out the possibility of future relationship with Mulayam Singh saying that 'he would support the BSP for his own interests.'25 It demonstrates his perspective on the political relationship-everything depends upon the political interests. His reaction was cool to the point that the BJP is a communal party. There seems to be not much room for the BSP to justify their alliance with the communal force. It proved its own character as a casteist party putting more critical

140 Chapter – 4 importance on caste and power-which is, according to the party leadership, vehicle for the advancement of the Dalit community over the secularism issue.26

In the period of coalition between the BSP and the BJP, there have been massive activities leading the 'Dalitisation' of U.P. During her period in office, Mayawati implemented a number of socio-economic and cultural policies exclusively for Dalits. The formation of the government was-a form of mobilisation, encouraging Dalits to stand up for their rights, even with the support of the BJP. Mayawati, as the Chief Minister, pursued policies which were beneficial mainly to the Dalits and to a lesser extent, the backwards and the Muslim community, e.g. the Ambedkar Village Programme (AVP), the Ambedkar Rozgar Yojana (ARY) for Dalit women, 27 percent of the state budget allocation for the OBC, reservation benefits for the lower caste Muslims etc. She also erected many statues of Ambedkar and renamed institutions, towns, districts, etc., after famous lower-caste leaders, such as Phule and Periyar, which would give her and her party the image and the legitimacy as heir of Ambedkar and his movement. She also took an opportunity to appoint Dalits in key positions in the administration at the district and state-level.27

The BJP, which did not like those pro-Dalit policies of the Mayawati government, withdrew its support and the government collapsed on December 17, 1995. The President's rule was imposed for U.P. and the 1996 Lok Sabha elections and the state Assembly elections in the same year were undertaken under the President's rule. The uncomfortable relationship between the SP and the BSP, and the BSP's coalition with the BJP in 1995 obstructed the BSP's inclusion in the new National Front on the eve of the 1996 Lok Sabha elections.28 The BSP and the SP could not bring together, which divided the lower-caste votes, and resulted in the benefit to the BJP. The BSP did not take part in any electoral alliance but it fielded 12 upper-caste candidates in Uttar Pradesh to draw support from the upper-caste voters without aligned party.29 In terms of votes, the BSP improved its vote share in the constituencies of Uttar Pradesh from 8.7 percent in the 1991 Lok Sabha elections and 11.12 percent in the 1993 Assembly elections to 20.61 percent in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections.30 However, the BSP was not able to translate its increased vote percentage into seats, though returns of this general election were better than any other elections so far it undertook. This problem made the BSP to form an electoral alliance with the INC for the U.P. Assembly elections same year. Since the previous issue of Babri 141 Chapter – 4

Masjid, which had caused the vehement communal riots, was not valid anymore, the 1996 Assembly elections were characterised by the competition amongst castes blocs. It was a revival of 'Mandal' issue in the sense that the OBC, represented mainly by the SP, tried to gather various castes belonged to the OBC category and concerted all its efforts against upper castes. The INC continued its umbrella strategy to draw votes from all sections but wanted to keep its traditional vote bank, lower strata of society, by allying with the BSP. The BSP also needed this alliance with the INC to widen its base especially among the upper castes and to gain votes from wider spectrum including the OBC and Muslims. But its strategy to gain support from the OBC proved failure.31 Realising the election would be a caste game, Kanshi Ram was reported to have asked the INC to field 100 Brahmins in the 125 seats allotted to it, so as to wean the upper castes away from the BJP and attract them back to the INC.32 In that sense, this alliance was only in pursuit of the increase of votes, considering the social milieu which would decide the voters' sentiments. Not only alliance, the BSP also posted candidates from various communities such as the OBC, Muslims and upper castes. It gave about 30 percent tickets to Dalits and an equal amount to the backwards and some to upper castes. But the general appearance of its ticket distribution gave an impression of advancement of the upper-caste members in the party. It also attempted to gain Muslim votes by including anti-communalism in the agenda of its election campaign, promising that it would not form any agreement with the BJP after the elections and giving tickets to 52 Muslims.33 Newly coined slogan 'Dalit Muslim jagega, Mulayam Singh bhagega' showed its endeavour to pursue the Muslim support and its animosity against the SP.34

BSP’s Caste Politics:

In the 1996 Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections, the BSP scored the vote share of 19.64 percent, much increased than 11.12 percent of the 1993 Assembly elections but obtained the same number of MLAs as in 1993.35 The electoral alliance could not form the government with the number of MLAs it held, 67 of the BSP and 33 of the INC, so that the alliance broke. No party won an overall majority and the central government again imposed the President's rule in the state. There was a possibility of forming the coalition government of the United Front and the INC-BSP but could not be realised due to enmity between the SP and the BSP. In spite of keeping status quo, the 1996 elections were meaningful for the BSP in the sense that it consolidated the 142 Chapter – 4

SC as a 'voting bloc seeking to control their own destiny.36 In fact, it secured support from the 65 percent of the Dalit voters in the 1996 Assembly elections, according to a survey.37 But at the same time, support from the other communities, especially from upper castes and Muslims were still rather low, marking less than 1 percent and 4.7 percent, respectively.38 The upper castes were not be able to sympathetic to its aggressive anti-upper castes ideology and the Muslims were not ready to give their trust and support to the BSP due to its former alliance with the BJP.

The political suspension was broken when a six-monthly 'power-sharing agreement' was reached between the BSP and the BJP after the considerable bargaining. Earlier, the BSP broke its alliance with the INC on January 27, 1997, presumably because it started to negotiate with the BJP around this time. Under the new agreement, each party was supposed to form a government for six months under its own leader, supported by the other from outside. This agreement was received with surprise especially by the INC. Kanshi Ram again argued that it did not matter which of the 'Manuwadi' parties they made an alliance, whether with the Congress or with the BJP: Their task was simply to come into power and change the system from the position of the government.39 The BSP formed the government first, on March 21, 1997, under the Chief Minstership of Mayawati. The BSP-BJP agreement lasted only a little more than six months. The BSP leadership eager to implement various programmes to benefit the Dalits, carried forward the various social programmes including Ambedkar village programme and many others for generating employment, and enhancing education and health etc.40 The Mayawati-led government also transferred a large number of civil and police officials to post the Dalit officials instead, in order to ensure the proper and rapid implementation of various policies.41 The Kalyan Singh-led BJP government had objected to these policies and stopped most of the Dalit-oriented programmes when it assumed power on September 1997. Until it officially withdrew its support for the BJP government on October 21, 1997 the BSP has been suffering from the internal dispute on the question of whether to support the Kalyan Singh government or not. Only two day after it withdrawal its support, a faction of 26 MLAs within the BSP was split, later to form a new political party, the Janatantrik Bahujan Samaj Party, and provided support to the BJP government.42 Withdrawn of support and consequent split of the BSP ultimately resulted in the stronger BJP government without coalition.

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After breakdown of the power-sharing arrangement with the BJP and being unable to form an alliance with the SP, the BSP went for the 1998 Lok Sabha elections with no electoral alliance. Mayawati preferred the policy of distributing tickets to non- Dalits, in a bid to increase seats and thereby, gain power alone. Setting up for the general elections, Mayawati sidelined its upper-caste leaders by not giving any post in the party organisation. It looked obvious that the party abandoned its strategy of attracting the upper castes under the slogan of 'sarva samaj.' The ticket distribution and organisational setup before the 1998 election hinted its comeback to the old policy of consolidating its own vote bank.43 But the party's performance at the 1998 Lok Sabha elections was disappointing. The BJP won 57 seats and the 36.49 percent of the vote in Uttar Pradesh mainly at the expense of the BSP.44 The BSP retained its vote-share of 20.90 percent but gained only four seats in its original base of eastern districts.45 Kanshi Ram was also defeated in the Saharanpur constituency, a Dalit-majority area, while Mayawati retained her seat in Akbarpur constituency reserved for SC. The party performed well in its traditional stronghold, where it had put Muslim candidates and gained support of Muslim community.

As the central government led by A. B. Vajpayee could not survive the confident vote in the Lok Sabha, new general elections were announced in 1999. The BSP kept the same election strategy of embracing the various caste groups from the social strata as in the former election; ticket distribution to the various communities instead of election coalition-Three social groups other than Dalits were identified by the party for widening its base: the upper castes, the backwards and the Muslims. But the 1999 elections could have seen some significant modifications to the already existing strategy. In June 1999, a proposal supported by Kanshi Ram was debated for a revival of the SP-BSP alliance in Uttar Pradesh, in the form of a combine of Dalits, Yadavs, Muslims and a section of the Thakurs and OBCs.46 The leaders of both parties attempted to realise the alliance through intermediaries until the early July 1999, but it proved to be unsuccessful. The main reason was opposition from Mayawati, who did not want any alignment with the SP and believed that the BSP could perform well without any electoral arrangement. Rather, she expected support from the Muslims who were reportedly moving away from the SP. She ruled out other electoral alliance with any other party and argued that the party could broaden its base

144 Chapter – 4 and increase the number of seats by distributing tickets to the backwards, Muslims and upper-caste candidates.

The BSP, in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, allotted 20 tickets to Dalits, 38 to the backward classes and 10 to the upper castes-five Brahmins and five Thakurs in Uttar Pradesh. Moreover, the allocation of the tickets was according to its strength in the total population in a constituency.47 It fielded Muslim candidates in 17 constituencies, 20 percent of total constituencies in Uttar Pradesh, where it was felt that they were moving away from the SP.48 Mayawati also made serious efforts to earn the Muslim support, by promising them the benefit of reservation if they helped the BSP to gain enough votes, so as to be a part of the new government, which she pointed out, would enable them to have their own representatives in power.49 The party also made considerations on caste matters in each constituency by fielding a Gujjar in Baghpat, a Kashyap in Kirana, a in Muzaffarnagar, and a Burman in Hardwar.50 The party tried to embrace Brahmins by nominating Brahmin candidates in such constituencies as Sitapur, where the Brahmins had expressed their displeasure with the BJP. In eastern U.P., the BSP managed to gain support of Kurmis among the OBC and sections of the Most Backward Classes. The party also developed leadership across the state, among the castes neglected by other political parties, such as Pal, , Baghel, Maurya, Pushkar and Saini among the backwards, and Sawar, Pasi, Dhobi, Valmiki and Khatiks among Dalits.51

On the other hand, the BSP had to take risks adopting the election strategy of pursuing Dalit-Brahmin alliance trying to embrace the upper castes, its traditional enemy. The first political risk was the diluting exclusive identity as a Dalit political party, which party leadership was also aware of. Kanshi Ram attempted to justify the making union with the upper castes, by arguing that it was adopted precisely for 'quicker growth' and more importantly for 'empowerment of the oppressed. The second risk that the party faced was a decline of party discipline, because such strategies promoted a power-oriented political culture in the party. The party's strategy and policy have always been decided on the basis of gaining power, not of ideology or of discipline. Pursuing short-sighted returns is atmosphere of party. The party seems to become more open to various-castes and communities others than Dalits, but at the same time, it was misused by local politicians for their political purpose. Many occasions when the party cadre joined the other parties, often the SP, apparently 145 Chapter – 4 following their personal gain, demonstrate this problem. This tendency continues in the 2000s.

Table: 4:8 The tendency of BSP’s Caste Politics

Community Lok Sabha Vidhan Sabha Lok Sabha Lok Sabha 1996 1996 1998 1999 Upper Caste 00.9 03.6 02.8 02.9 Yadavs 80.8 03.3 07.3 03.6 Other OBCs 12.9 13.4 16.0 l 3.5 SCs 61.3 6l .3 65.8 62.3 Muslims 06.0 12.0 07.3 07.2

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

As regards the BSP, it has somewhat managed to improve its performance among the upper castes and the Muslims. But its main source of strength continues to be the SCs who have been voting for it overwhelmingly.

Thus if there is so much turbulence at the level of electoral outcomes, one of the fundamental reasons for it is that the participatory base of electoral democracy is expanding in the 1990s. But now there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the electoral political arena of BSP in this period has witnessed greater participation and more intense politicisation than before. The last decade of 20th century represents the full unfolding of the contradiction between the logic of political equality and that of social inequality, something that Ambedkar had warned against in the Constituent Assembly itself. The changing outcome of the electoral game is seen here as the reflection of a fundamental transformation in the terrain of politics which in turn is anchored in the process of social change.

Bahujan Samaj Party has been playing significant role in the electoral politics in both the national as well as state politics in India. Moreover, the party has upgraded its position in the electoral politics in the13th Lok Sabha election of 1999 and contested for 225 seats in the country. The party won 14 seats from Uttar Pradesh alone with attaining 9.97 percent votes from where it contested election. (Table: 4: 1)

146 Chapter – 4

Apart from this Bahujan Samaj Party also strived to influence electoral participation in a number of states like Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, Bihar, Maharashtra, Uttarakhand, etc. in different state-Vidhan Sabha Elections during 1990s.

The party influenced greatly the electoral process of Uttar Pradesh and come into power though with the alliance with other political parties. Its primary motive was to explore Dalit votes and it was successful to a great extent, in this regard. Moreover, Bahujan Samaj Party achieved support of Other Backward Classes and Muslims. In the later period of that decade the party got the support of other castes with its Sarvajan agenda. However, this fact ca not be denied that electoral politics of Bahujan Samaj Party has been primarily with Dalit politics.

147 Chapter – 4

References:

1. Pai, Sudha. "Changing Contours of Dalit Politics", Economic and Political Weekly 39.16, (2004): 1589-590. JSTOR. Web.www.jstor.org

2. Tatu, V. “Politics of Ethnic Nepotism.” New Delhi: Sterling Publishers United, 1991.

3 Election Commission of lndia, Statistical Report on General Election, 1993 to The Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, New Delhi, p. 15

4. Verma, A. K. "Mayawati's Sandwich Coalition." Economic and Political Weekly 42.22, (2007): 2039-043. JSTOR. Web.

5. Economic and Political Weekly, February 1, 1997, 215

6. Asian Age, June 12, 1996

7. Zee Research Group. "UP Story so Far." Zeenews.india.com. Zee News, retrieved, 31-08-99

8. Gupta, Dipankar, and Yogesh Kumar. "When the Caste Calculus Fails: Analyzing the BSP's Victory in UP." Economic and Political Weekly 42.33 (2007): 3388-396.

9. Asian Age, September 6, 1996

10. Ibid. op.cit.

11. The Times of India, July 9, 1966

12. Ibid, June 17, 1996)

13. Singh, Jagpal. "The Bahujan Samaj Party: Ideology, Social Basis of Support and Politics."Class, Ideology, and Political Parties in India. Colorado Springs: International Academic, 2002. pp, 241-53.

14. Adeed Markaz, March, 14--20, 1993 (Reprinted in Akela (ed.}, op. cit., pp. 83-4); Amar Ujala, April, 25, 1993

15. India Today, October 15, 1994, pp. 35-6.

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16. Pai, op. cit., p.163.

17. Amar Ujala, March 9, 1994.

18. The Times of India, February 21, 1995.

19. India Today, May 15, 1995, p. 84-5. Kanshi Ram also blamed the SP for its election irregularity and mentioned it as a pretext of the BJP-BSP coalition. India Today (Hindi), June 30, 1995, p. 52. (Reprinted in Akela (ed.), op. cit., p. 182.)

20. Omvedt, Gail and Bharat Patankar. The Dalit Liberation Movement in Colonial Period. Economic and Political Weekly, 14 (7 & 8), 1979, p. 157.

21. The Times of India, March 2, 1994. Frontline also reports the case of local BSP leader like Ramautar Paswan and alleged vengeful murder against it, which are all related with growing clout of Dalits and caste conflicts at local level, Frontline, March 11, 1994, pp. 4-10.

22. Ibid.op.cit.

23. Pai, op. cit., p. 171.

24. India Today, June 3, 1995, pp. 48-9.

25. Ibid., p. 52

26. Ibid.

27. Pai, ‘Transformation of the Indian Party System-Lok Sabha Elections 1996', Asian Survey vol. XXXIV, 1996, p. 1178.

29. Amar Uja/a, April, 20, 1996.

30. Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections, 1991 to the Tenth Lok Sabha, vol. 1, p. 76; 1993 to The Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, New Delhi, p. 15; 1996 to the Eleventh Lok Sabha-vol. 1, New Delhi, p. 116.

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31. Koeris. Brass, 'General Elections 1996 in UP', EPW vol. XXXII no. 38, 1997, pp. 2403-21; also see Pradeep Kumar, 'Dalits and the BSP in UP Issues and Challenges', EPWvol. XXXIV no. 14, 1999; pp. 822-6.

32. The Pioneer, July 9, 1996.

33. The Times of India, September 8, 1996; The Pioneer, September 18, 1996.

34. Amar Ujala, August 12, 1996.

35. Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 1996 to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, New Delhi, 1997, p. 16.

36. Omvedt, 'Dalit Politics', The Hindu, April1, 1998.

37. Jaffrelot, Christophe. India's Silent Revolution. New York: Columbia UP, 2003, p. 417.

38. Kanchan Chandra and Chandrika Parmar, 'Party StrategieS in the UP Assembly Elections, 1996', EPW vol. XXXVII no. 5,1997, pp. 214-22.

39. Amar Ujala, June 15, 1997.

40. Ibid. ‘Mayawati Conveyed Her Message' March 24, 1997.

41. The Times of India, March 23, 1997.

42. The Times of India, October 24, 1997.

43. Arnar Ujala, July 4, 1998.

44. Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections, 1998 to the 12th Lok Sabha vol. 1, New Delhi, n.d, p. 91, 110.

45. Ibid., pp. 92, 111.

46. Frontline, October 8, 1999, pp. 20, 24.

47. Pai, 'SSP's New Election Strategy Pays Off', EPW, vol. XXXIV no. 44, 1999, pp. 3099-3101.

150 Chapter – 4

48. Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections, 1999 to the Thirteenth Lok Sabha vol. 1, New Delhi, pp. 230-53.

49. Amar Ujala, August 22 and September 7, 1999; and The nmes of India, September 8, 1999.

50. The Hindu, August 11, 1999.

51. Pai, Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution, p. 183.

151

Electoral Participation of BSP in the Post 2000 Period

Chapter-5

Electoral Participation of BSP in the Post 2000 Period

This chapter will analyse the electoral participation of one such Indian political party formally established as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Focus will be given on the post 2000 period and special importance will be on its electoral strategies applied in different elections and their consequences from 2000 to 2014. More specifically, in order to make the study convenient to the readers. The chapter will address the following important issues: a) though the party came into Indian political scenario in order to struggle for the cause of lower castes basically Dalits but it has to sacrifice its ideology in the arena of Uttar Pradesh Politics. Initially the chapter will examine BSP’s transformation of policy from Bahujan Samaj to Sarvajan Samaj. b) The second section will clarify the political performance of BSP in 2002 Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections. c) Electoral performance of the party under study in 2007 Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections will be discussed under third section. d) The fourth section will explore the success and failure of BSP in the parliamentary elections of Lower House from 2004 to 2014. e) BSP’s electoral participation in the states other than U.P. will be tacitly discussed under the last section.

It is worth mentioning that the BSP has grown quite effectively over the years, but it has experienced the huge popularity and development of political will in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The BSP’s electoral success is seen as a unique phenomenon due to the fact that no other Indian political party running primarily under the platform of catering to the interests of ex-untouchables has achieved such success.1 However, the BSP could not have achieved success by simple voter majority because Dalits and Other Backwards Classes do not comprise a direct voter majority. Perhaps one reason for the BSP’s ascendancy in Uttar Pradesh was due to the fact that the Scheduled Caste population of Uttar Pradesh constitutes approximately 28.9 percent of the state’s population. This is the largest Scheduled Caste (SC) population of any state, making it the perfect breeding ground for a political party that caters specifically to this caste groups economic, political, and social interests. Uttar Pradesh has historically had a large SC population, but the SC and Other Backwards Classes were never able to unify in neither a potent nor organised manner. The other main challenge was to supplant the dominant party of the state, Congress.2

152 Chapter-5

BSP’s Sarvajan Agenda

As it has been discussed in the earlier chapters of this study, past experience suggests that, Scheduled Castes in Uttar Pradesh vote almost exclusively for the BSP. There has been a shift in confidence and high levels of lower caste political mobilisation that has allowed the BSP to gain power and sway in the state. The BSP’s wide range of political coalitions has obviously helped the party to gain influence and control in various states. In order to gain more powerful political status, it started to sacrifice the very principles that made it such a popular and earnest party for the lower castes. It was only due to these factors the party was vehemently raised its position and thus, we find that the apex of BSP political power had been from 1995- 2012. This sudden rise of the BSP makes it a unique party.

The BSP’s electoral success during the first decade of 21st century is seen as a unique phenomenon due to the fact that no other Indian political party running primarily under the platform of catering to the interests of ex-untouchables has achieved such success.3 However, the BSP could not have achieved success by simple voter majority because Dalits and Other Backwards Classes do not comprise a direct voter majority. In the earlier decade, the BSP found success by forming political coalitions with the Samajvadi Party (SP), Congress, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), all of which have very different political ideologies and agendas than those of the BSP. The major question to address is whether the formation of these political coalitions has led to the BSP having to sacrifice its ideology for seats and political power at both the state and national level. Due to the formation of these coalitions with anti- ideological groups and parties may be regarded as the steps towards Sarvajan Samaj, from Bahujan Samaj.

The BSP-SP government from 1993-1995 began to fade quickly after its inception as the contradictions between the lower castes and middle classes began to come to surface. As a result of that mutual distrust clashes between the both BSP and SP supporters began to increase at the grassroots level. The leader of the SP, Mulayam Singh Yadav began a process referred to by the BSP as “Yadavization” in which Yadav pushed for defecting against various members of the Legislative Assembly, leading to the creation of anti-SP propaganda spread by the BSP and thus the coalition could not survive for long.4

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As the BSP-SP coalition failed to sustain, the BSP entered into a political alliance with the BJP, making rising political leader Mayawati the first female Dalit to become the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. Mayawati’s tenure as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh was of much significant, as many changes were effected during her administrations that pose questions concerning political coalitions and BSP ideology. While the political alliance between the BSP and BJP was surprising, it displayed the new political strategy of the BSP. The alliance had helped in exerting more influence and power in the region, while the BJP allied to gain more Dalit support. In reality, this was a trap specifically set by the BSP so that if the BJP were to back out of the alliance, they would risk being labeled as biased against the lower castes.5

These coalitions are important to analyse not only because they give critical insight to the political and electoral strategies of the BSP, but more importantly provides a framework of analysis to evaluate and investigate changes in BSP ideology throughout each period of political alliance. Here, we find that potential changes have been made in BSP ideology and the various actions taken by the BSP with the advent of twenty first century. Actually, the political ideology of the BSP had a very strong egalitarian nature and strives to create equal opportunity for the oppressed Dalit, Scheduled Caste, and Other Backwards Class population. The ideology has been deeply rooted in themes concerning equality, economic and social independence, and bringing about change within the “system”. The BSP’s voter base is cognisant of the party’s strong stance on issues concerning social justice, which has made it one of the most popular parties for underrepresented, oppressed, and lower caste communities.

However, it is be worth mentioning here that during the initial period of 1984- 1998 BSP performed as an ‘ethnic party', a party which represents itself as a champion of the cause of one particular ethnic category or set of category to the exclusion of others and this kind of representation becomes its strategy of mobilising voters based on the principal of ascription, exclusion and centrality. However, on this basis, BSP for this period may be categorised as an ethnic party because BSP had the long term goal, the political consolidation of caste and religious minorities in India collectively constitute a majority of the population, with an attitude of opposition to the Hindu upper-castes and it drew a separation line between Scheduled Castes; and its target constituency were Scheduled Castes.

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Thus, the party since coming into existence in 1984 till now it has passed through three distinct phases of electoral politics. First one remained till mid 1990s with mainly a focus on 'Bahujan Samaj" comprising Dalits Other Backward Classes and Minorities; and it was a period characterised with clash or a type of hate against upper castes, and support to the Mandal classes: Backward Classes including Yadavs; and with all these characterisation this first phase reached at its zenith with the formation of a 'Post-electoral alliance' with Mulayam Singh Yadav's 'Samajwadi Party' in 1993-Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections when both parties got success in forming a coalition government in Uttar Pradesh. The start of second phase of the party took place with the breading of social and political relation between these two BSP and SP that ended the coalition government in 1995.6

However, from here i.e. mid 1990s, a new trend started in U.P. politics where parties realised that if they would not have support from other castes and ethnic blocks, their vote bank could not be expanded. This realisation made them ready to gave their tickets to candidates belonging to other castes or religious groups in 1996 Assembly Elections such as; BSP has given tickets to Bralimins and Muslims, BJP to Dalits and backwards, and the SP to upper caste and Dalits.7

Gradually, BSP moved towards third phase where its electoral strategy has been changed from appeal to the upper castes sections directly, mainly 'Brahmins' and 'Banias'. BSP encouraged these people to join hands with the Dalits and the poorer backward castes to fight with the rising domination of landed, prosperous castes such as Thakurs, Yadavs, Jats, Kurmis, and Lodhis representing muscle power such a new electoral politics, introduced by Mayawati to woo the upper castes people, is known as: "Social Engineering” the strategy to make the BSP not only the party of Bahujan Samaj but a party representing the entire sections of society from lower to upper castes specially 'Brahmins' and 'Banias' in spite of their privileged position decided by birth, they are in a weak and insecure condition.

One of the factors responsible for its emergence is the weak position of Brahmins in two national parties: Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party. As the Congress party became irrelevant in Uttar Pradesh while on the other side BJP's influence was only among the Thakur, Kurmi and Lodhi leaders who occupied powerful position in BJP. In this electoral politics 'Brahmins' remained as an un-

155 Chapter-5 influencing vote bank neither for BJP nor Congress had a stronger position in the state. Such type of neglected position was not only faced by Brahmins but another upper caste 'Banias' who were also not given any importance by these political parties. Dominant classes as Thakurs, Yadav, Kurmi and Lodhi were enjoying muscle and money power over other classes.8 Brahmins and Banias became the victims of this muscle and money power of these prosperous and privileged classes under the shelter of Bharatiya Janata Party and in this situation the BSP leader Mayawati turned towards a new electoral strategy of shifting the emphasis of the movement from majority to one that encompasses to the whole society i.e. 'Sarvajan Samaj.' It indicates the BSP's shift of ideology from the welfare of Bahujan Samaj to the Sarvajan Samaj that means welfare of the all sections of society not of a particular community, and this ideology can be seen in the thought of Kanshi Ram that "Assemblies should reflect the composition of society."9

This new strategy was formulated two and half years before the 2007 Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh on the advice of the BSP's legal counsel, 'Satish Chandra Mishra' who played a commendable job by taking a bold move to overturn the anti Brahminical position of the party.10 So, he may be seen as the main architect of this policy.11 This new strategy of Mishra was based on the insecurity among the predominant community and the challenge posed by the rising economic and political strength of the intermediate castes mainly: Yadavs and Jats. This perceived feeling of insecurity increased more when some of the intermediate castes joined with aggressive landowning upper castes: Thakurs; BJP, the party to which Brahmins shifted their allegiance after the collapse of the Congress Party, was overrun by backward class leader, Kalyan Singh and Vinay Katiyar as well as Thakurs as Rajnath Singh, who were not much concerned with Brahmins' problems.

Thus, politically vulnerable condition of Brahmin community gave birth to the idea' in Satish Mishra's thought: the idea to revive the old Congress alliance between the top and bottom ranges of the castes but with a remarkable difference between the Congress led 'Social Alliance' and BSP's 'Social Engineering'. The distinct point is that in past, Congress Party, run by Brahmins extended its patronage to Scheduled Castes with promise to provide them protection and prosperity, but then, the situation is in its reversed order, where Brahmins are in a condition of hope from BSP, a party

156 Chapter-5 of pre-exploited sections.12 Such an idea of Mishra convinced Mayawati to have an alliance with 'Brahmins' who constituted 10% of the electorate that would also be helped in influencing the Bania community who were being oppressed by the land mafia. The implementation of this idea started with the 'Brahmin Sammelans' and for this purpose a 'Maha Sammelan' (Grand Meeting) was organised on 9th June, 2005 in the state capital, Lucknow. By organising this meeting, BSP imparted a new dimension to the caste- oriented politics of Uttar Pradesh by showing its growing influence among the Brahmin community'' and this meeting was a historical one where Brahmins paid homage to Mayawati, a lower caste origin; and she in return gave assurance of protection to them.13 During her speech, Mayawati blamed the manuwadi parties and media to play negative role against the Bahujan Samaj Party's ideology so that upper castes people could not join Bahujan Party, as is written by her in autobiography: "My Struggle Filled Life And The Journey of Bahujan Movement", Vol. 2. (Hindi)" Not only had this but she also made it clear that upper caste parties gave a slogan: "Tilak, Taraju aur Talwar; Inko Maro Jute Char" in the name of BSP to bring upper castes people against BSP and she also said that the blame of opposition parties on BSP being anti-upper caste and Hindu religion, is also not true; and to clarify this, she said that our party is not against the Hindu religion except those parts which are said about the Bahujan Samaj in Hindu religion and are against the self respect of these depressed sections of society.14 To make her statement more influential she also repeated the statement of Ambedkar given by him during the presentation of Hindu Code Bill on 24th February, 1949:

"If you people, means upper castes people, want to safe Hindu system, Hindu culture, and Hindu society, whatever weaknesses had been originated, do not he hesitating to reform them. This bill wants to reform only those organs that had been defaulted, nothing else than it "15

It is necessary to make clear certain points that differentiate Kanshi Ram or his Bahujan Samaj Party from B.R. Ambedkar, though Dalit Movement in U.P. was inspired by Ambedkar. We find difference between the ideologies of both regarding the caste because Ambedkar believed in the 'abolition of the caste system' as he propagated in his book 'Annihilation of Caste', for him it was vital for Dalit emancipation but contrary to him, Kanshi Ram and Mayawati have favored the 157 Chapter-5 awakening of Dalit and backward identities. They have promoted the caste system in order to mobilise Dalits towards the restoration of their caste identity to transform society into a 'Samtamulak Samaj' (equal society) in which all castes would be seen equally and each having its own caste ideology. However, he believed in a strategy for Dalits to use their castes as a means or tool to emancipate themselves until a casteless society was formed.16 Mayawati, during her speech, presented view before the upper castes people that if they change their manuwadi thinking and cooperate in bringing social change by abolishing unequal social order, these upper caste people would be given honor and respect by Bahujan Samaj Party. Such a changed society would be in the interest of all castes and communities and nation.17

In this way, in these unique meetings Brahmins paid homage to Mayawati and she in return they were assured by her protection find along with these meetings "Bhaichara Samitis" or brotherhood organisations were opened in every villages that were jointly run by Dalits and Brahmins.18

The journey of BSP from Bahujan to Sarvajan was not easy for it because at its first step, party tap the more socially committed among Brahmins and through them made appeal to the larger community. The BSP needed Brahmins and other forward castes to come forward in providing their assistance and cooperation to BSP and they were responded by the party through allotting tickets, Rajya Sabha nominations and ministerial berths. The induction of Satish Chandra Mishra, Advocate General in the BSP government played a major role in wooing Brahmins, as he appealed to canvass support among likeminded Brahmins and coordinators were appointed to organise district level Brahmin's Maha Sammelans (Brahmin Congregations). By 2007, there was a 'Brahmin Revolution' in U.P. Mayawati was focusing on forming 'Bhaichara Banao Samitis' (Brotherhood Building Committees) in all the 403 Assembly constituencies and each Samiti structured down to title booth level constituting 300 Brahmins and 100 Dalits that was chaired by a Brahmin and a Dalit General Secretary. Assembly area had division into 25-30 sectors and each sector had eight to ten booths.19

Besides Brahmin Maha sammelans Bahujan Samaj Party made attempts to woo other upper castes: Kshatriya, Vaishya and Kayastha communities as far as Kshatriya community is concerned, Mayawati directed BSP leaders to associate the

158 Chapter-5 upper caste people, Thakurs also with the party and ally their fears that BSP's welfare agenda was for Dalits only but to bring equality in society, coming together of upper castes and Dalits is essential. Therefore, Thakurs are also being invited to the party and to achieve this objective Mayawati set the party's Thakur leaders the task of organising district level meetings and convincing people that only BSP could fight for their interests. Three Thakur legislators: .Tejveer Singh (Barauli, Aligarh), O.P. Singh (Sultanpur) and Kuldeep Singh (Unnao) have been to hold meetings to spread BSP's message.

Other is the Bania community who constitute three percent of the population also been taken into account for generating confidence towards them by BSP. After the successful completion of Brahmin Maha Sammelan in Lucknow, BSP hold a 'Bania Sammelan' in Agra on 17th July, 2005 in order to forge a tie with a powerful trading Vaishya Community in Uttar Pradesh. This decision to organise a Bania Sammelan was taken by BSP’s president, Mayawati. It was stated by the BSPs national Spokesman, Sudhir Goel, the chief guest at Sammelan, Mayawati is trying to unite other OBC trading castes: Telies, Sahus, Halwais, and Sonar etc who make up another 10 percent. Bania Sammelans were held by the BSP in Agra, Allahabad, Meerut, Muzaffar Nagar, Kanpur, Farukkhabad, Sant Kabir Nagar and Jhansi in order to woo these sections of the society, among which one was held on 28th December, 2006 in Lucknow where Mayawati told about the permanent association of trading with her party and promised it security and political participation. As pointed out by Goel, trading castes were the first victims of exploitation and kidnapping because of this reason security was a matter of great importance for them. The prevailed chaotic law and order situation gave emergence to the "coalition of victims." Being opportunistic in its approach BSP leader, Mayawati realised the importance of the consolidation of these victims or non-Yadav coalition into BSP which would be helpful to stood as victorious one. And also told that once the Vaishyas enter the BSP fold, the weaker sections of society, who are well entrenched in the party, would guard their interests. In this way, to bring more and more upper castes people into its fold, BSP has constituted "Bhaichara Baraho Committee" (Develop Brotherhood Committees) at every Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Assembly) constituency to forge an alliance directly with the castes or communities, not with the support from any

159 Chapter-5 political party. BSP sent directives to all its district Brahmin MLAs, ex MLAs and other leaders to mobilise their own community.20

Bahujan Samaj Party extended its influence among other castes through a strategy of giving 'share in ticket distribution on which basis BSP brought a revolution in U.P. electoral politics in 2007 Assembly elections. This strategy proved helpful in attracting Brahmins and Vaishyas communities because Brahmins and Vaishyas as well as Dalits, the opposite groups became ready to come closer because of their common threat posed by the nexus formed by the dominant Other Backward Classes (OBCs) including the Yadavs and the Rajputs.

Such a strategy was also reflected in party's priorities when Mayawati said that 'after regaining power BSP would work for the upliftment of the SCs, STs, OBCs and Minorities and it would work for the welfare of these communities and give them an opportunity to move ahead on the social ladder. Apart from these sections of society, BSP would also take care of the interest of the poor and unemployed belonging to the upper castes. Schemes would be launched for the welfare of farmers, labourers, lawyers, government employees and traders and this was made clear by her in an interview to "The Hindu" in April 2006,

"The majority of the people in our country are poor. Even among the higher castes, it is a small percentage that is privileged, the rest are poor and have the same wants of roti, kapda, aur makan (food, clothes and shelter). We are for an equal social order. Social inequality and discrimination result in economic inequality, if opportunities were truly equal, there would be no economic inequality. Our aim is to establish a Samatamulak Samaj (a society based on equality). I am still against Manuwad. What is Manuwad? It is division of society into four Varnas. The BSP wants to end this discriminatory order, and we have succeeded to quite an extent. As upper castes integrate with Dalits, mutual suspicion and hatred will end. This is samajik parivartan (social change).21

From said statement it becomes obvious that BSP's aim is to make a society based on equality and to achieve this goal it would have to take the upper castes and Dalits together to build a bigger sarva samaj (a society for all communities)

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Following this strategy Mayawati distributed elections tickets in 2007 Assembly elections.22About this ticket distribution Mayawati said that she and her party members tried to get a majority in Assembly elections. This ticket distribution is an effort to achieve the support of all castes and communities with a focus of shifting from Bahujan to Sarvajan. This transformed ideology of BSP, from exclusively Dalit to wooing all social classes, made possible for it to emerge as a majority party in 2007 Assembly elections of U.P., a state where since 1991 no party could won majority in the House and so many times President's Rule had been imposed during this period in the state.

BSP and 2002 Assembly Election:

In 2002 Assembly Elections no party had gained an absolute majority in the state. BSP didn't want to ally with the SP and as a result the BSP allied with the BJP. Mayawati was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the state. The BSP-BJP alliance too broke down in the wake of Taj Heritage Project. Moreover, many BJP leaders in the state were highly against Mayawati’s autocratic style of functioning. After the Assembly elections of 2002, the BJP supported BSP government in Uttar Pradesh which aimed to attract the Dalit votes towards BJP for the general elections of 2004. However, this strategy of BJP failed when it withdrew its support to the BSP on the charges of corruption.

Table: 5: 1

BSP’s Performance in Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Sabha in 2002

UP Seats Seats % of % of Votes in Vidhan Sabha Term Elections Contested won Votes seats contested

14th Vidhan Sabha 2002 401 98 23.06 23.19

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx As the Table 5.1 shows that BSP, 14th Vidhan Sabha election of Uttar Pradesh in 2002 contested for 401 seats but could win only 98 seats. The party could acquire 23.6 percent of total votes in the seats from where it contested election. Moreover, the breaking down of BSP-BJP alliance gave an opportunity to the SP to form

161 Chapter-5 government in the State with the help of BJP. On February 2003, Mulayam Singh Yadav was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State and continued in power till 2007 Assembly Elections.

An analysis of the February 2002 assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh reveals that the campaigns were held against the backdrop of legal and constitutional controversies. One was about the use of photo identity cards by voters and the other was on the question of when the tenure of the 13th Legislative Assembly ended. Some argued that the term of the Assembly, which was elected in October 1996, ended in October 2001 after an interval of five years from the date of its constitution. In the last three Assembly elections of 1991, 1993 and 1996 the BJP had emerged as the single largest party. During the last one decade the BJP had been in power for a total of six and a half years. The BJP's claim to be a party with a difference had been totally belied and the people saw that the BJP coalition government and its ministers were no better than their predecessors.23

There was a discord over the temple issue between the BJP and one of its affiliates, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). The VHP warned to go ahead with the construction of the temple at Ayodhya from March 15, 2002 but the BJP disagreed with saying that this was not on its agenda. BJP president Jana Krishnamurty deferred the temple issue till the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. The BJP leadership projected the U.P. Assembly elections as being crucial for the whole nation.24 The issues raised by the BJP during the election campaign can be classified into three parts: (a) communally sensitive issues (b) general issues and (c) issues of local importance. These three sets of issues were not raised with the same force all over the state. The emphasis differed in different constituencies for tactical reasons. On a closer examination, it appears that the BJP had also classified all constituencies into three categories; (a) constituencies with a sizeable Muslim population, which may go for tactical voting against it, (b) constituencies where the BJP or an ally had the sitting MLAs, and (c) constituencies where the sitting MLAs belonged to the opposition parties.

It was understood that innuendoes about Muslims and issues like cross-border terrorism, SIMI, POTA, illegal immigration from Bangladesh and threat from Pakistan (leading to greater mobilisation of security forces at the borders) were used

162 Chapter-5 with greater vehemence in (a)-type constituencies (b)-type constituencies saw a campaign about issues of law and order, criminalisation of politics, stable governments, social justice with reservations for the most backward castes and women, crop and cattle insurance, employment for one and a half lac youth in the next three years, etc. Issues of local importance like civic amenities, development, medic aim policies for the poor, free textbooks for girl students up to class VIII and accountability of administration were raised in (c)-type constituencies.25

It is being said in certain Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) circles that the BJP failed in the February elections because it did not play the 'Mandir' card. An examination of the electoral data reveals that the BJP has never been able to capitalise on the 'Mandir' issue. It could never get even close to the majority mark after the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992. The ground reality is that U.P. voters do not seem interested in this issue. The paradox is that the Ayodhya issue agitates people outside Ayodhya and U.P. more than those who live in the state.26

The declaration of results was facilitated by the use of electronic voting machines (EVMs) in a big way. For 1,17,400 polling stations about 1,30,000 EVMs were provided by the Election Commission. As there were more than l6 contestants in 33 constituencies the commission had to supply about 16,000 extra EVMs (one EVM can accommodate only 16 contestants).The EVMs were a big success in saving paper and printing costs, preventing booth-capturing, facilitating counting and revealing the collective voting behaviour of the rural caste groups by declaring the results boothwise. The secrecy of the ballot of a caste /community group was seriously compromised and the bad repercussions of this in the rural areas have started showing. According to A. K. Verma, it would be in the fitness of things if the Commission reverts to its earlier method of mixing votes of different booths to avoid identification of group voting behavior and the consequent harassment, especially of the Dalits and the weaker sections of voters.27

As it is clear from the results, the SP emerged as the single largest party by winning 143 seats. The BSP and the BJP appeared as the other major players by taking 98 and 88 seats, respectively. The Congress finished a poor fourth with only 25 seats. Among the allies of the BJP, only the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) showed a good

163 Chapter-5 performance. It won l4 out of the 38 seats it contested but was confined to western U.P. Four allies of the BJP - Samata, Shaktidal, Lok Parivartan Party and Kisan Mazdoor Bahujan Party could not set even a single seat.

When we compare the performance of the parties in the 2002 and 1996 Assembly elections, we find that the BJP was the major loser both in terms of seats and votes. Its vote share came down by 12.36 percentage points in 2002. Another major loser was the Congress. There was a lot of euphoria in the Congress camp about staging a comeback in 2002. The party did capture power in Punjab and Uttarakhand (where Assembly elections were held simultaneously) but it was a setback in U.P. The party did not lose much in terms of seats and vote share as it was already down. It is noteworthy that this time the Congress put up 298 more candidates than it had in the previous Assembly elections, and yet its vote share remained almost stagnant (registering a marginal gain of 0.65 percent). The BSP and the SP registered almost identical gains both in term of seats and votes. In comparison to the 1996 Assembly elections, the BSP gained 32 more seats and 3.32 percent more votes and the SP got 36 more seats and 3.53 percent more votes.28

Again, in enlarging the analysis of 2002 election for BSP the research exposes that since 1998, the party has begun to eliminate its line of exclusion between the bahujan and the Hindu upper-castes and this elimination process was its transformation from an ethnic party to a 'multi-ethnic party’ means a party that makes appeal related to ethnicity central to its mobilising strategy but have a neutral or equidistance toward all relevant categories on the dimensions of ethnicity.29 So, the founder of BSP Kanshi Ram and the present party leader, Mayawati adopted a new strategy to woo a particular section of upper-castes Hindus: 'Brahmins' but not with a direct approach to them, in fact, by convincing their political leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee from Bharatiya Janata Party and P.V. Narsimha Rao from Congress. Later on, since late 1990s the party distributed a number of tickets in the state as well as parliamentary polls to upper castes and intermediate castes candidate but without any social alliance between party's vote banks. BSP, under the leadership of Mayawati gave 37 tickets to Brahmins, 36 to Thakurs, 6 to Vaishyas and 3 to Kyasthas in the 2002 State Assembly Election.30 On the other side other castes and religious communities had been given tickets like OBCs 122 and Muslims 85.31

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Thus, because of its policy of switching over from Bahujan Samaj to Sarvajan Samaj, BSP gained support from all caste groups and Muslims as well. It gained l4.7 percent more Dalit votes, while 7 percentage points among both the OBC and Muslims voters and amongst the upper caste by 2.2 percentages point.32

Table 5:2

Transformation of Castes Support to BSP from 1999 to 2002:

Castes 2002 1999 Gains/Loss Upper castes 4.8 2.6 +2.2 OBC 15.3 8.3 +7.0 SC 73.2 58.5 +14.7 Muslims 9.0 1.7 +7.3

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Result- Full Statistical Report. ci.nic.in. Above data shows that preferences of various castes for BSP have changed more positively in 2002 assembly elections in comparison to 1999 Lok Sabha elections.

BSP’s Performance in the 2007 Assembly Elections:

May 11, 2007 marked a monumental moment in the history of Indian politics, as the BSP was voted to power as a single-handed majority in Uttar Pradesh’s state assembly elections.33 This election results have raised several important implications, not only in the Uttar Pradesh circles alone, but also at the national level. Mayawati’s victory was the first time that a Dalit-led party emerged victorious in state elections without participating in a coalition government.

Mayawati-led Bahujan Samaj Party won 206 seats in the 402-member state Assembly, becoming the first political outfit in the last 14 years to obtain an absolutely majority in the state. In the election held from 7th April to 8th May 2007, the northern Indian state, with a population of that time 180 million, witnessed uniformed polling, with a voter turnout of 46.13 percent. 34

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Playing the caste and ethnic cards the BSP had an impressive showing, winning 30.51 percent of the votes. This represented a 7.32 percent positive vote swing when compared to its vote share of 23.19 percent in the last election in 2002. On the other hand, the SP, the BJP and the Congress Party won only 97 seats, 50 seats and 22 seats respectively. There was also no significant difference in their vote share – they retained almost the same vote share as in the 2002 Assembly elections. However, it is significant that, while the SP’s total vote share of 25.71 percent was close to its 25.37 percent in 2002, it lost 46 seats from the last election. Nonetheless, as its winning margins in 60 out of 97 seats are much higher than its opponents, the SP was able to retain the same vote share. While one could point to low voter turnout for the SP’s defeat, allegations of corruption and the deteriorating law and order situation were, no doubt, significant factors in the SP’s fall from power in Uttar Pradesh.

The Congress Party’s vote share reduced by only 0.27 percent – it had 8.69 percent of the votes as opposed to 8.96 percent in 2002. Rahul Gandhi was in charge of the Congress Party’s campaign in the state. He addressed nearly 156 public meetings and road shows during his party’s campaign while the Congress Party’s President, Sonia Gandhi, addressed 23 public meetings and the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, five public meetings. Even then the Congress Party failed miserably. It had very little grassroots support and its workers were not able to create a channel for support and an electoral vote bank. This was evident from the fact that the Congress Party was not able to garner more than 5,000 votes in 170 out of the 393 constituencies it contested.

The biggest loser of the election was the BJP. It obtained only 17.16 percent votes as compared to 20.08 percent in the 2002 election. The negative swing of 2.92 per cent was largely due to the upper caste (Thakurs and Brahmins), which have been the traditional vote bank of the BJP in Uttar Pradesh, switched over to the BSP.35

It is interesting to note that the BSP has maintained around 21 percent of vote share between 1980 and 2002. This Dalits, a traditional base-electorate for the BSP, make up 21.2 percent in the state’s population. Prior to this election, the BSP did not win more than 98 seats in the state. So there may be some factors which turned the tide in its favour. In a shrewd move, the BSP courted the upper castes such as the

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Thakurs and Brahmins as well as the ethnic groups such as the Muslims. One in two Muslim candidates fielded by the BSP emerged victorious in this election. The religion card brought the BSP 30 seats compared to 20 seats for the SP.

Often accepted as features of Indian politics, the caste and religion cards, coupled with aspirations of the weaker and minority groups to seek political identity, provided the impetus for the BSP’s triumph in Uttar Pradesh. In the previous elections, BSP consistently used caste as the focal point of its campaign efforts, focusing solely on the interests of the lower castes and minorities such as SCs, OBCs, and Muslims. This was a successful strategy in the party’s early stages in attempting to develop a consistent vote bank.36 Tables presented in the previous chapter as well as the present chapter display the BSP’s consistent upward rise until 2007 Assembly elections in U.P., in terms of overall percentage of votes claimed in Uttar Pradesh assembly elections, which coincided with the party’s early strategy of mobilising lower caste votes. Table 5.3 below shows the BSP’s electoral performance for the year 2007 and 2012 in the Assembly elections. The BSP won a majority of 30 percent without the help of an outside party or joining any official political alliance in the 2007 Assembly elections. The party has contested for 403 seats and amazingly won 206 seats. A remarkable percentage of 30.43 votes were achieved by the party and a similar percentage of 30.43 votes it could attain in those seats from where it contested election.

Table 5.3

BSP Performance in 2007 and 2012 U.P. Assembly Elections

U.P. Seats Seats % of % of Votes in Vidhan Sabha Term Elections Contested won Votes seats contested

15th Vidhan Sabha 2007 403 206 30.43 30.43

16th Vidhan Sabha 2012 403 80 25.95 25.95

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx During campaigning for the 2007 election, the BSP shifted its electoral strategy. While the BSP did advocate its usual caste dominated political aspirations, it

167 Chapter-5 instead used the idea more of as a metaphor in order to create and cement grassroots alliances. These grassroots efforts were built heavily on the premise of showing that the concerns of lower castes were valued by the party just as much as the concerns of other communities.37

Mayawati began to reach out to the Brahmans in order to put forth an understanding that the BSP was willing to listen to their concerns and grievances, while being fully confident that the party would not lose the support of the lower caste by engaging in political dialogue with upper castes.38 One major indicator of a shift in BSP policy was the fact that throughout the entire 2007 election campaign, Mayawati did not commit herself to Mandal policy. Mandal policy refers to the various proposals concerning reservations and quotas that would improve the conditions of the lower caste from an economic and social standpoint. This indicated that the BSP was clearly sensitive to the perceptions of the upper castes in Uttar Pradesh and began to think about the party’s potential to hold power in the long run. In fact, the party decided against issuing a manifesto for the 2007 state elections in order to allow Mayawati more flexibility in amassing a more diverse support network for the BSP.39

BSP’s Performance in 2012 U.P. Election:

The election to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly was held in seven phases dated on 8th, 11th, 15th, 19th, 23rd and 28th February 2012, and March 3, 2012. At 60%, the voters' turnout was the highest ever in the state, and 14 percentage points higher than the previous Assembly elections in 2007. The ruling Bahujan Samaj Party, under the Chief Ministership of Mayawati which previously won an absolute majority of seats, was overthrown by Samajwadi Party, which gained an absolute majority in the election.40

In the result of Assembly election 2012, a clear mandate for the SP and a substantial decline of the BSP, was widely seen a surprise. The final outcome showed that the incumbent BSP performed poorly. On the other hand, its main rival, SP recorded its best-ever performance winning a total of 224 seats, 127 more than the 2007 Assembly elections, and secured 29.15% of the vote, a gain of nearly 4 percentage points since 2007 (in terms of seats, this was the best performance by any party since the Congress’ victory in 1985 when it won 269 of the 425 seats of

168 Chapter-5 undivided Uttar Pradesh). In comparison to election of the 2007 high of 206 seats, the BSP crashed to just 80 seats, a massive drop of 126. (Table 5:3) The party secured almost 26% of the vote, down 4.5 percentage points since 2007. Although it is true that the gap between the SP and the BSP in terms of vote share was that of just 3 percentage points, yet it indicating a high seats vote disproportionality in disfavour of BSP’.

There may be several reasons and issues behind that great failure of BSP in the performance 2012 state Assembly elections. a) A Centre for Media Studies report showed that the corruption has increased in U.P. during the tenure of BSP leader Mayawati. The Central Bureau of Investigation declared that there was "strong evidence" against the then rolling Chief Minister Mayawati in a case about disproportionate assets for a public figure.41 b) The Election Commission (EC) lauded its voice about the use of money in the election for some form of undue campaigning. Therefore, as the EC imposed restrictions on the movement of unaccounted money, police checks across U.P. netted over 120 million in cash and several kilograms of silver and weapons.42 c.) The national government sent a notice to the government of Uttar Pradesh under the leadership of Mayawati for alleged corruption in MANREGA. The Chief Minister, Mayawati, however rejected the allegations as "politically motivated."43 But it became an issue for opposition parties to criticise the policies of the incumbent government on the eve of 2012 Assembly elections. d.) Mayawati had also been accused by former minister Avdesh Verma of selling party tickets in the election for Rs. 40 million.44 When the rival parties were informed about the fact they highlighted it and made the party weak in preaching the demagogues during the 2012 Assembly elections. e.) Furthermore, the BSP also expelled Badshah Singh and Babu Singh Kushwaha, who had been removed after CBI evidence of corruption, from the party on charges of corruption. So both the leaders joined the BJP on due time of elections.45

169 Chapter-5 f.) The opposition parties accused CM Mayawati, during the tenure of the incumbent of constructing parks and statues of herself and other Dalit icons such as Ambedkar and Kanshi Ram in places like Noida and Lucknow and in some other important places of U.P. that cost the exchequer crores of rupees in the name of development and social upliftment for Dalits.46 This issue also lowered the image of BSP in 2012 Assembly elections. g.) The Supreme Court of India also criticised the Mayawati Government for not halting the construction of the memorials. The Court also criticised the U.P. government for the Land Acquisition Act calling it "an engine of oppression" for the government's low cost acquisition without adequate redress for the villagers, who were then beaten by police. At the same time, Congress General Secretary Rahul Gandhi toured two villages to start an agitation march against such acquisitions.47 All these hampered the BSP in the way of attaining public attraction during 2012 Assembly elections.

As classified by Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), out of the seven regions of Uttar Pradesh the BSP was behind of its rivals in five regions namely, Rohilkhand, , east, Doab and north-east, both in terms of votes and seats. It was only in west and Bundelkhand that the BSP managed to gain an upper hand, but here too the party had to suffer losses compared to 2007 and this was largely due to some impressive gains made by SP. In Doab, with 73 seats, the main contest was between the BSP and the SP with the later emerging ahead with 41 seats. Within this region, the SP swept the districts of Etawah, Kannuaj, Etah, Mainpuri, Farrukhabad, Auraiya and Kanpur Dehat. The BSP performed best in Agra, and in it was the RLD-Congress alliance which emerged on top. In the west where the BSP finished ahead of the rest, the party won most of its seats in the districts of Saharanpur, Baghpat, Gautam Buddha Nagar and Ghaziabad. The electoral trend in favour of SP was quite strong and pushed the BSP to the margins in the reserved scheduled caste (SC) constituencies (which tend to only marginally have a higher proportion of SCs). SP won 58 of the 85 SC seats on offer, leaving the BSP, which is considered to have an advantage in such seats, with only 15. This was a significant turnaround considering that in 2007, the BSP had won 61 of 89 reserved SC seats and the SP had managed to win just 13.48 Although the BSP continue to get

170 Chapter-5 an overwhelming proportion of their total votes from Dalits and Jatavs, respectively (their core voters), yet they were unable to retain their 2007 dominance among these sections. While the SP saw a 6 percentage point vote drop among Yadavs and Muslims, the BSP’s decline among Jatavs was even bigger. The extraordinary polarisation of Jatav votes that was witnessed in favour of BSP in 2007 came down this time, with 62% of Jatavs voting for Mayawati’s party, a drop of 24 percentage points. While the BSP lost a significant chunk of its core, it seems to have held on to some of its gains among upper castes and Muslims in 2007. However among lower OBCs who had also given BSP an advantage in 2007, the party lost 11% votes in 2012. (See, Table 5:3)

BSP and The Indian National Elections in Post 2000 Period:

As far as the national elections are concerned the Bahujan Samaj Party is not lagged behind in the electoral participation. Its Dalit politics and the shifted ideology of Sarvajan Samaj have been working in accumulating public support in the politics of India. In the fourteenth Lok Sabha election of 2004 BSP contested for 435 seats and was successful in winning 19 seats though all these seats were in U.P. itself. The party surprised all in 2009 by electing 21 Congressmen as Members of Parliament (MPs) when many thought that the Congress party was in terminal decline in U.P.49 but in the 16th parliamentary election BSP though fought for 503 seats, yet all efforts of the party had gone in vain. (See Table 5:4)

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Table:: 5:4 Performance of BSP Lok Sabha Elections from 2004-14

% of Votes Lok Indian Seats Seats % of in Sabha General State ( seats ) Contested won Votes seats Term Election contested

14th Lok Uttar Pradesh 2004 435 19 5.33 6.66 Sabha (19)

Madhya 15th Lok Pradesh(1) 2009 500 21 6.17 6.56 Sabha Uttar Pradesh (20)

16th Lok 2014 503 0 4.3 NA Sabha

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx Actually, the 2014 Lok Sabha elections result in Uttar Pradesh surprised all, not because it went in favour of the Bharatiya Janata Party, but because of the reach and sweep of the party, both in terms of geography and demography. On the eve of the poll, it was widely acknowledged that there was a Narendra Modi wave in Uttar Pradesh. But even a generous assessment was that the BJP could at best replicate its 1998 performance – when it won 57 of the 82 seats, and secured 36.5% of the votes.50 However, the voters thought otherwise. In the last seven years (2007-14), we see that U.P. voters have giving regularly springing surprises. They surprised all in 2007 by giving an absolute majority to the Bahujan Samaj Party when many had thought that a fractured mandate was inevitable in the caste-ridden state. They surprised all in 2012 by giving an absolute majority to the Samajwadi Party when political observers expected that the work done by Rahul Gandhi would enable the Congress to sustain its performance of the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. The saffron sweep of 2014 appeared to be yet another surprise.51

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For about a quarter of a century, political competition in U.P. centred around regionally dominant, caste-based parties, mainly the BSP and SP, while national parties, especially the Congress and BJP, were marginalised. Caste-based identity politics became the fulcrum of electoral politics in the state, with both the SP and BSP developing caste-centred support bases, which provided 20% or more of their votes. The SP was based on the support of the Other Backward Classes, mainly Yadavs, and the BSP on dalit support. After the second democratic upsurge, from 1989 onwards, only the SP and BSP have formed governments in U.P., except for intermittent BJP governments on four different occasions. 52

The caste based politics which was in continuous rise during the last decade of 20th century, was started declining in the 2010 onwards in the state of Uttar Pradesh. We find that the BJP’s share of seats had been declining in Assembly elections, from 221 seats in 1991 to 47 seats in 2012. This was accompanied by a fall in its vote share, from 31.5% in 1991 to 15% in 2012. In the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, the party won only 10 seats and secured 17.5% of the vote. It was a risky proposition for scholars and commentators to predict that the BJP would sweep the poll this time, even though there were strong indications of voters’ preference for the party and its prime ministerial candidate Modi. Thus, the 2014 Lok Sabha elections signaled a paradigm shift in voters’ behaviour in U.P., with good governance and development being preferred over the identity politics of caste and community.

BSP’s Electoral Participation Outside U.P. in the Post 2000 Period:

Apart from achieving great success in Uttar Pradesh and in Indian national politics the Bahujan Samaj Party has a deep influence on politics of different other states of the Union of India. In following series of tables performances of the party under study are discussed very tacitly.

In the 12th Vidhan Sabha election of Bihar in 2000 it contested for 249 and could ensure its presence in the state with winning 5 seats. But in the subsequent elections of 13th Vidhan Sabha of Bihar held in 2005, the party won 2 seats though contested for 238 seats. However, the percentage of votes was increased from 1.89 in 2000 to 4.41 in the 2005 elections. Again, in the 14th Assembly elections in the state of Bihar BSP could command 4 seats with contesting for 212 seats and the percentage of acquired votes were about same as in the previous election. Thus, until the 15th

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Vidhan Sabha elections of Bihar in 2010, it continued contesting elections in most of the seats and could win two to five seats in different elections. In the 15th Vidhan Sabha elections of Bihar in 2010, the party though contested elections from the 243 constituencies, but without winning single seat and percentage of vote-share was not insignificant. (See Table 5:5)

Table - 5:5

Electoral Participation of BSP in Bihar Vidhan Sabha: Post 2000

Bihar % of Votes in Vidhan Sabha Seats Seats % of General seats Term Contested won Votes Election contested

12th Vidhan Sabha 2000 249 5 1.89 2.47

13th Vidhan Sabha Feb. 2005 238 2 4.41 4.50

14th Vidhan Sabha Oct. 2005 212 4 4.17 4.75

15th Vidhan Sabha 2010 243 0 3.21 3.27

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx In Chhattisgarh also the Bahujan Samaj party contested elections in all the three post 2000 Vidhan Sabha elections of the state. In the second Chhattisgarh Vidhan Sabha elections of 2003 it contested for 54 seats but could win only in 2 constituencies. However, the party could attain 9.4% votes in those seats from where it contested elections. Thus, the party won two seats in first two consecutive terms of state Legislative Assembly elections and in the 4th election for the legislature, the number of winning candidates was declined to one and the percentage of votes from where the party contested election was declined to 4.29%.(See table- 5:6)

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Table 5: 6

Electoral Participation of BSP in Chhattisgarh Vidhan Sabha in Post 2000

Chhattisgarh % of Votes in Vidhan Sabha Seats Seats % of General seats Term Contested won Votes Election contested

2nd Vidhan Sabha 2003 54 2 4.45 9.4

3rd Vidhan Sabha 2008 90 2 6.11 6.11

4th Vidhan Sabha 2013 90 1 4.27 4.29

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx In Delhi Legislative Assembly elections too it has been contesting from almost every constituency from its beginning of 1993. The BSP, in the third election of Legislative Assembly of Delhi in 2003 put forth 40 candidates but it proved fruitless. But in the 4th elections of Legislative Assembly in 2008 the party contested for 69 seats and could win 2 seats. This time, the party attained 14.05% votes in those seats from where it contested electionss. However, from that election its position has been declining. In the 5th election of Legislative Assembly in the year 2013, BSP again contested for 69 seats but in no constituency it could win single seat and the percentage of attained votes also declined to 5.44%. Moreover, BSP strategy was failed in winning single seat in the sixth election of Delhi Legislative Assembly though it contested for 70 seats and the percentage of votes also declined to an inconsiderable percentage of 1.3. Thus, only in a single instance of 4th Vidhan Sabha elections 2008, it could win two seats from the national capital of Delhi. (See table- 5:7)

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Table 5: 7 Electoral Participation of BSP in Delhi Vidhan Sabha in Post 2000

Delhi Seats Seats % of % of Votes in Vidhan Sabha Term General Election Contested won Votes seats contested

3rd Vidhan Sabha 2003 40 0 5.76 8.96

4th Vidhan Sabha 2008 69 2 14.05 14.05

5th Vidhan Sabha 2013 69 0 5.33 5.44

6th Vidhan Sabha 2015 70 0 1.3 1.3

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

So far as the electoral performances of BSP in Haryana Vidhan Sabha in the period of Post 2000 are concerned the party contested for 83, 84, 86 and 87 seats in 2000, 2005, 2009 and 2014 respectively and won one seats in each consecutive election. Thus, in Haryana Vidhan Sabha elections, the party has been nominating its candidates from 8th Vidhan Sabha election onwards. But each time it has been to be satisfied with one seat regularly. Similarly, in every election its percentage of attained votes also remained stagnant from tenth to 13th state Legislative elections. (Table: 5:8) Table- 5: 8 Electoral Performance of BSP in Haryana Vidhan Sabha in Post 2000

Haryana Seats Seats % of % of Votes in Vidhan Sabha Term General Election Contested won Votes seats contested

10th Vidhan Sabha 2000 83 1 5.74 6.22

11th Vidhan Sabha 2005 84 1 3.22 3.44

12th Vidhan Sabha 2009 86 1 6.73 7.05

13th Vidhan Sabha 2014 87 1 4.37 4.52

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

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The savior of lower castes interests the BSP also engaged in the politics of Himachal Pradesh in the post 2000 period. In the 10th Legislative Assembly elections of Himachal Pradesh in 2003 it contested for 23 seats but had to be satisfied with no seat. The party had not lost its patience and again contested for 67 seats in the 11th Vidhan Sabha election and remained content with a single seat. Similarly, it fought for achieving seats in 12th Vidhan Sabha election in 2012 with same aspiration and had to satisfy with same result. Therefore, in Himachal Pradesh state politics, though the Bahujan Samaj party has been maintaining its presence from 1990, yet except in one instance it has not been successful in winning a single seat in the state Legislative Assembly elections.

Table - 5: 9

Electoral Performance of BSP in Himachal Pradesh Vidhan Sabha in Post 2000

Himachal % of Votes Vidhan Sabha Pradesh Seats Seats % of in Term General Contested won Votes seats Election contested

10th Vidhan Sabha 2003 23 0 0.7 2.02

11th Vidhan Sabha 2007 67 1 7.40 7.37

12th Vidhan Sabha 2012 67 0 1.7 2.02

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx The party has also been playing a significant role in Madhya Pradesh state politics since 1990. Regarding the post 2000 politics in the state the Bahujan Samaj Party struggled a lot as it contested for 157, 230 and 227 seats in the three consecutive Legislative elections of 2003, 2008 and 2013 respectively. Although the party had created history with winning eleven assembly seats in 1998 Legislative Assembly elections in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, yet never could repeat the history in the subsequent elections. The party could succeed in 2, 7 and 4 seats in the consecutive Legislative elections.

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Table - 5: 10 Electoral Participation of BSP in Madhya Pradesh Vidhan Sabha in the Post 2000 Period

Madhya % of Votes in Vidhan Sabha Pradesh Seats Seats % of seats Term General Contested won Votes contested Election

12th Vidhan Sabha 2003 157 2 7.26 10.62

13th Vidhan Sabha 2008 230 7 8.97 9.29

14th Vidhan sabha 2013 227 4 6.29 6.42

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx Again, in the state of Maharashtra, BSP appeared with a high ambition as it took part in the 11th Vidhan Sabha elections in the state with contesting for 272 seats. But the result discouraged the party with achieving success nowhere. The party nominated its candidates to the 289 Legislative Assembly seats in the general election of 2009. But, it is true that the party has not been able to win any seat. A similar event took place in the 13th Vidhan Sabha election of 2014 as the party contested for 260 constituencies but all the efforts gone in vain.

Table 5: 11 Electoral Participation of BSP in Maharashtra Vidhan Sabha in Post 2000

Maharashtra % of Votes in Vidhan Sabha Seats Seats % of General seats Term Contested won Votes Election contested

11th Vidhan Sabha 2004 272 0 4.0 4.18

12th Vidhan Sabha 2009 287 0 2.35 2.42

13th Vidhan Sabha 2014 260 0 2.3 2.80

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

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A very similar case was seen in the electoral performance of BSP in the Punjab Vidhan Sabha in the Post 2000 elections. the party participated in the state politics in 2002, 2007 and 2012 with contesting 100, 115 and 117 seats respectively in Legislative Assembly elections of the state but the people returned it with an empty hand at every time. Thus, in the initial era of BSP’s entry into Punjab politics it could remarkably influence the system of democratic election. Although the party successfully won nine seats during the 1992 Legislative Assembly elections of the state, yet the number of seats started declining in the subsequent elections and in the recent times it stood in zero.

Table 5: 12

Electoral Participation of BSP in Punjab Vidhan Sabha in Post 2000

Punjab % of Votes in Vidhan Sabha Seats Seats % of General seats Term Contested won Votes Election contested

12th Vidhan Sabha 2002 100 0 5.69 6.61

13th Vidhan Sabha 2007 115 0 4.13 4.17

14th Vidhan Sabha 2012 117 0 4.28 4.28

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx There was a state Legislative Assembly elections in Rajasthan the 2003, 2008 and 2013. The BSP examined its fate in the 12th Legislative Assembly elections with contesting 124 seats and won two among them. Again, in 13th and 14th Legislative Assembly elections it set its contestants for 199 seats each time and won 6 and 3 seats respectively. So, the Indian state of Rajasthan has also witnessed the presence of BSP though without having a greater influence on the ground level.

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Table 5: 13 Electoral Performance of BSP in Rajasthan Vidhan Sabha in Post 2000

Rajasthan Seats Seats % of % of Votes in Vidhan Sabha Term General Election Contested Won Votes seats contested

12th Vidhan Sabha 2003 124 2 3.97 6.40

13th vidhan sabha 2008 199 6 7.60 7.66

14th vidhan sabha 2013 199 3 3.37 3.48

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

The formation of Uttarakhand had provided an avenue for Bahujan Samaj party to enter into political game with renewed energy. In the first Uttarakhand Legislative Assembly elections 2002, the party tried to achieve 68 seats and got success in 7 seats. Again in the second Uttarakhand Legislative Assembly elections of 2007 it strived for 69 constituencies and succeeded in the 8 instances. But in third Uttarakhand Legislative Assembly elections of 2012 it contested for 70 seats and remained content with 3 seats only. So, the Uttarakhand Legislative Assembly has allotted the party 11.93%, 11.76% and 12.19% votes in the three recent consecutive elections.

Table 5: 14 Electoral Participation of BSP in Uttarakhand Vidhan Sabha in Post 2000

Uttarakhand Seats Seats % of % of Votes in Vidhan Sabha Term General Election Contested Won Votes seats contested

1st Vidhan Sabha 2002 68 7 10.93 11.20

2nd Vidhan Sabha 2007 69 8 11.76 11.76

3rd Vidhan Sabha 2012 70 3 12.19 12.19

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

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The Indian state of Jharkhand is dominated by lower castes like Scheduled Tribes, Mahadalits and the like communities in which Bahujan Samaj Party could easily expand its reign. In fact, here too the party has not been able to put impression by mobilising public support with its electoral strategy of articulating interests of lower castes. In the third Legislative Assembly elections of 2009 it contested for 78 seats but could not open its account. Again, in the fourth Legislative Assembly elections of 2014 it fought in the 41 constituencies and remained content with a single seat only. The percentage of acquired votes was declined from 2.55 in 2009 to 1.8 in 2014. However, it cannot be denied that the Bahujan Samaj Party has a positive influence in the politics of the Indian state of Jharkhand.

Table 5: 15

Electoral Participation of BSP in Jharkhand Vidhan Sabha: Post 2000 Period

Jharkhand Vidhan Sabha Seats Seats % of % of Votes in General Term Contested won Votes seats contested Election

3rd Vidhan 2009 78 0 2.44 2.55 Sabha

4th Vidhan 2014 41 1 1.4 1.8 Sabha

Source: Election Commission of India. Election Results- Full Statistical Reports. ci.nic.in. Retrieved from http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx Thus, the Bahujan Samaj Party has a greater influence in developing democratic political culture in a multi-party system like India. Its issues in the electoral politics is much concerned with establishing a system where social justice can be prevailed as the party strives for the cause of down-trodden Dalit Samaj of Indian society. Indeed, with the emergence of BSP a new trend in the Indian political process has been prevailing. Now, the parties have to respect the political aspirations of lower castes and down-trodden population in the country while formulating public policies and election manifestoes.

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In this chapter of the study analysis have been made on the electoral participation of one such Indian political party formally established as the Bahujan Samaj Party in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Focus has been given on the post 2000 period and especial importance is on its electoral strategies applied in different elections and their consequences from 2000 to 2014. The Chapter concludes that BSP has grown quite effectively over the years, but has experienced the most popularity and development of political will in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The BSP’s electoral success is seen as a unique phenomenon due to the fact that no other Indian political party running primarily under the platform of catering to the interests of ex- untouchables has achieved such great success.

There has been a shift in confidence and high levels of lower caste political mobilisation that has allowed the BSP to gain power and sway in the state. The BSP’s wide range of political coalitions have obviously helped the party to gain influence and control in various states, but in order to gain more powerful political status, it started to sacrifice the very principles that made it such a popular and earnest party for the lower castes. It was only due to these factors the party was vehemently raised its position and thus, we find that the apex of BSP political power had been from 1995- 2012. The most surprising result it produced during Assembly elections 2007 in Uttar Pradesh in which it could command majority in the House.

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References:

1. Duncan, Ian. "Dalits and Politics in Rural North India: The Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh." The Journal of Peasant Studies 27.1, 1999

2. Pai, Sudha. "Changing Contours of Dalit Politics." Economic and Political Weekly 39.16, 2004: pp-1589-590. JSTOR

3. Dhankani, Rita. "Uttar Pradesh." Www.unicef.org/India.

4. See, Jana & Sarmah, 2002, p- 245

5. S.M. Michael, “Dalit Vision of a Just Society in India” in India,” in S.M. Michael, Dalits in Modern India Vision and Values (ed), Vistar Publications, New Delhi, 1999, pp. 113, 111.

6. Ajoy Bose, Behenji: A Political Biography of Mayawati", Penguin, India, 2008, p. 228.

7. Sudha Pai, "Electoral Identity Politics in Uttar Pradesh: Hung Assembly", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXVII, No, 14, April 6, 2002, p-1335.

8. Gupta, Dipankar, and Yogesh Kumar. "When the Caste Calculus Fails: Analyzing the BSP's Victory in UP." Economic and Political Weekly 42.33, 2007: p. 229.

9. Rowena Robinson, "Hindu Nationalism and Bahujan Castes", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLVI, No. 16, April 16, 2011, p. 33.

10. Pai, Sudha. "Changing Contours of Dalit Politics." Economic and Political Weekly 39.16 (2004): p. 175.

11. Christophe Jaffrelot, "Religion, Caste and Politics in India", Primus, New Delhi, 2010, p. 574.

12. Sakrikar, Dinkar. "The Mandal Commission Report." Pucl.org. People's Union for Civil Liberties, Aug. 1994, p. 177.

13. The Hindu, June 10, 2005, p. 1.

14. See, Jana & Sarmah, p. 177.

183 Chapter-5

15. Vivek Kumar, "Behind the BSP Victory", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLII, No. 24, June 16,2007, pp. 991-992.

16. Shyam Singh, ‘Three Years of BSP Governement in UP’, Economic and Political Weekly XLV (38), 18 September 2010, pp. 77-81.

17. Srinivasulu, K. "BSP and Caste Politics." Economic & Political Weekly 29.40, 1994: pp- 2583-586

18. See, Jana & Sarmah, p. 177.

19. Subodh Ghildiyal ‘After Brahmins, BSP Set to Woo Muslims’, The Times of India, 30 July 2007

20. Sudha Pai, ‘New Social Engineering Agenda of the Bahujan Samaj Party: Implications for State and National Politics’, Journal of South Asian Studies 32(3), 2009, pp. 338-353.

21. "The Hindu" April, 28, 2006,

22. Paul Wallace, Ramashray Roy, "India's 2009 Elections: Coalition Politics, Party Constitution and Congress Continuity", Sage, New Delhi, 2011, p. 145.

23. See Pai, 2002, p-254

24. Verma, A.K. "Subalterns in Uttar Pradesh: a New Trajectory", Economic and Political Weekly Vol. XLV, No. 48, November 27, 2010, p. 13.

25. See, Verma, 2002, p-1

26. Verma, A.K. "Mayawati's Sandwich Coalitioio", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLII, No. 22, June 2, 2007, p. 2039.

27. See, Verma, 2002, op.cit

28. Gupta, Smita. "BSP at the Crossroads." Economic and Political Weekly 44.26, 2009

29. Times of India, May 12, 2007,

30. Ibid. op.cit.

184 Chapter-5

31. Kumari Mayawati, "My Struggle Filled Life and the Journey of Bahujan Movement" (Hindi), Vol. III, BSP Central Office, New Delhi, 2008, p. 792.

32. A.K. Verma, "UP Assembly Elections; Caste Dominates Ideology", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXVII, No. 21, May 25, 2002, pp. 1978-1979.

33. Ibid. op.cit

34. Sengupta, Somini. "Brahmin Vote Helps Party of Low Caste Win in India." New York Times, New York, (NY) 12 May 2007, 1st ed., sec. A:

35. OutlookIndia.com, 19 June 2007.

36. See, Duncan, Ian, 1999

37. Gupta, Dipankar, and Yogesh Kumar. "When the Caste Calculus Fails: Analyzing the BSP's Victory in UP." Economic and Political Weekly, 42.33, 2007, pp- 3388-390.

38. Ibid. op.cit,

39. Ibid. op.cit, p-, 339

40. The Times of India. 10 March 2012. Retrieved 2012-04-21.

41. India Today (9 February 2011). Retrieved on 2012-01-23.

42. News.webindia123.com (8 January 2012). Retrieved on 2012-01-23.

43. Sify.com (28 October 2011). Retrieved on 2012-01-23.

44. News.oneindia.in (6 January 2012). Retrieved on 2012-01-23

45. www.aajkikhabar.com:80/en/news/689148/689148.html. Retrieved 8 January, 2012.

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47. Economictimes.indiatimes.com (8 January 2012). Retrieved on 2012-01-23.

48. www.epwrfi ts.in Retrieved on 2012-01-23.

185 Chapter-5

49. Beg, Mirza Asmer and Sudhir Kumar: “Uttar Pradesh: Signs of a Congress Revival?” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No 39, 2009, p 190

50. Verma, A. K. "Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh." Economic & Political Weekly 39.14, 2004s: pp- 3-16

51. Sruthijith, K K: “Modi’s Landslide: This Powerhouse Non-profit Just Changed Campaigning in India Forever”, Quartz India, 15 June. 2014

52. Yadav, Yogendra: “Electoral Politics in the Time of Change: India’s Third Electoral System, 1989-99”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 34, Nos 34- 35, 1999, pp 2393-99.

186

Conclusion

Conclusion

CONCLUSION

In every democratic setup, political parties play a vital role in formation of government and formulation of public policies. Thus, in the contemporary world with the mushrooming growth of liberal democracies throughout the globe political parties have become an integral part of modern politics as well as instruments of government making. The ideology and organisational structure of a political party are vital for its performance. All political parties have their constitutions which give in detail the organisational structure, the underlying ideology and the basic thrust of the parties. However in practice most of them may not adhere to what their party constitutions proclaim. The parties bring out election manifestoes which make prolonged promises to the people but in reality the main purpose is to capture power. The parties in their propagandas generally declare to be truly secular parties and work for all sections of the society without any partial policies.

The present study has been made as an initial effort in the context of electoral participation of Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in the state of Uttar Pradesh since 1996. The study is solely based on empirical analysis of the beliefs, orientations and perceptions of the Bahujan Samaj Party in the state of Uttar Pradesh especially focusing on the role of this segment in the political system at micro level. Special focus is given on the transformation and changes that have been occurred in the participation process of the political party during the last few decades. With the advent of Bahujan Samaj Party in the state of Uttar Pradesh, a new epoch has been started in the history of electoral participation in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh that made them highly active citizens in the political process.

Therefore, the research explored that the Bahujan Samaj Party having its Constitution in place and it declares its ideology as social transformation of the society so that the Dalits and other exploited sections of society can get equal rights. It was formed mainly to represent Bahujans ("People in majority"), referring to people from the Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) as well as minorities. The party claims to be inspired by the philosophy and ideas of B. R. Ambedkar.

187 Conclusion

The BSP has its main base in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. It is important to note that not only because of its size but also for historical reasons; Uttar Pradesh has always been a key state in the Indian union. Major political movements in independent India, including backward caste and Dalit politics and the rise of Hindutva have largely developed here or have significantly impinged on it. Economic backwardness and political populism are among the factors intertwined with the recent history of Uttar Pradesh. These trends were followed by the Dalit Movement that began in Uttar Pradesh. during the late 1970s and 1980s, and accentuated during the 1990s. Uttar Pradesh had not responded much to the Dalit Movement in the pre and early post independence periods. However, during the late 1970s and 1980s, things changed dramatically and the state witnessed a resurgence of the Dalit Movement with a clear political agenda for social change. The movement had a leading objective to capture state power for the Dalits. This objective was equipped with the expectation that once Dalits get enough economic and political benefits using state power, it would automatically improve their social status. Enhanced economic and political status has continuously provided enormous power to the upper castes and ensured them a dominant social position. To make this happen, the Dalit political forum, Bahujan Samaj Party, was formed in 1984 and it is now considered as one of the chief political parties in Uttar Pradesh politics.

Although Dalit Movement of northern India puts BSP’s political project as a top priority, the ideological concepts, such as ‘social mobility’, ‘relative deprivation’ and ‘reference group’, remain central to the Dalits’ social, economic and political status. Orthodox Hindu culture and traditions are recognised by the Dalit leaders as the factors responsible for the marginalisation of Dalits. This ideological stand of the Dalit Movement has influenced its developmental and political priorities and in maintaining Hinduism and the upper castes as its foes. The formation of the BSP as a political party was a strategic part of the Dalit Movement and was expected to continue to be the spearhead of the movement. But on the contrary, the BSP is being seen as a harbinger of major changes in the fundamental ideological propositions of the Dalit Movement which was supposed to be espoused by the protagonists of the movement.

188 Conclusion

In the mid-1990s and the first decade of 21st century, the BSP brought major changes in the nature and ideology of the Dalit Movement in Uttar Pradesh in terms of setting up political coalitions first with Hindu minded political parties like the BJP and later it formed a coalition with its all-time opponents, the Brahmins through ‘social engineering’. The latter is being posed by the BSP as a social coalition rather a political tie. This development brought about vivid changes in the BSP with major changes in the social development policies of the BSP government.

One important reason for not letting the Dalit Movement take the floor in Uttar Pradesh was the social structure based on Hindu traditions and beliefs. The norms and values of Hindu society to a great extent determine the distribution of opportunities to ownership of land and they have influenced the economic and political relation of people in Uttar Pradesh. Though social and economic relationships based on the religious interpretations have not been accepted by the Dalits they were deeply internalised by them. The second important reason was that Dalits, floating from bondage to one landowner to others could not develop a solid base in rural Uttar Pradesh. This restricted the ability of the Dalits in raising and maintaining a movement against the well established social hierarchy.

The Bahujan Samaj Party is a party which is not very old. It did not emerge out of revolutionary struggles or movements. Its roots lay in a lower middle class ‘Trade Union’ organisation of government employees, formed by Kanshi Ram the All India Backward and Minorities Communities Employees Federation (BAMCEF) which was made up of the new, educated and better–off groups among the Dalits. Kanshi Ram established a category called bahujan, which comprises 85 percent of the society. He used this category explicitly as a political tool for the Dalit mobilisation. Keeping this view in his mind, Kanshi Ram established a non-political organisation called the All India Backward and Minorities Communities Employees Federation (BAMCEF) on December 6, 1973. The membership of the organisation was open only to Dalits employed in the public sector. The BAMCEF widened its base swiftly across the country, though it remained unnoticed by the mainstream media. To counter this media bias, the organisation launched its own journal, Oppressed Indian, and later scores of daily/weekly newspapers in most Indian languages. The BAMCEF remained a base organisation which accepted membership only from the government employees so that they could contribute economically for the implementation of its 189 Conclusion further agendas. This was a strategic and organised technique to precede the Dalit Movement. After leveling the ground for his progress to the political arena, in 1981, Kanshi Ram established the Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti, popularly known as DS-4, which was a political organisation. The political project of Kanshi Ram was backed by aggressive strategies with the devastating language its slogans - ‘Brahmin, Bania, Thakur chor, baki sab hum DS-4’.

In 1984, Kanshi Ram turned the DS-4 into a full-fledged political party, the BSP, launched on Ambedkar’s birthday with the slogan ‘vote hamara, raj tumhara; nahi chalega, nahi chalega’ (we vote but you rule, it won’t continue). The goal was based on an axiom of Ambedkar that political power was the key to all problems. The establishment of the BSP as a political party was part of a broader Dalit Movement initiated by Kanshi Ram in northern India mainly in Uttar Pradesh. In the late 1980s, at one point of time Kanshi Ram was heading four Dalit organisations, i.e., BAMCEF, Buddhist Research Centre, DS-4 and BSP. All these organisations were considered as different parts of a complete Dalit Movement wherein the BSP would fulfil the political goals that Kanshi Ram had formulated. The BSP has been very successful in grasping the Dalits votes in Uttar Pradesh. The reasons for this success are very obvious.

At the beginning of its political career, the BSP could make its presence felt only marginally, but very soon it occupied an influential place in state politics. When the BSP contested the election for the first time, it had already nearly 10 percent of the votes as its social base. The Assembly elections in 1993 proved a turning point for the BSP when it made a political coalition with the Samajwadi Party (SP) to prevent the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) from coming to power. This election was launched the BSP and it created more political space with an increase in its vote share from 10.26 to 28.53 percent of the seats for which the party contested.

The year 1989, when BSP entered into the competitive electoral politics, it was the time when the Dalit Movement in Uttar Pradesh turned into a complete political movement with less focus on social reforms and economic equality. This change in the Dalit Movement was underscored by the major developments in the political landscape of Uttar Pradesh. The rise of the Hindutva politics of the BJP, violent communal tension for building a temple in Ayodhya and the announcement of

190 Conclusion the Mandal Commission report’s recommendations, all set the stage for the polarisation of communities along caste and religious lines.

The BSP was successful in increasing its social base continuously over successive elections. The BSP’s political strategy was mainly based on caste rather than class, even if it claims that the party works for the lower class people. However it was heavily dependent on the lower castes and could garner political support only from the Scheduled Castes and not other sections of society. This development restricted the expansion of the BSP’s electoral base. Therefore, BSP brought a decisive and surprising shift in its basic ideology and electoral strategy. During the initial years of the first decade of the 21st century, the BSP focused on ‘social engineering’ to bring Brahmins and other upper castes together through the policy of Sarvajan.

Though the BSP claims in all public forums and political manifestos that this policy brings the Dalits and upper castes together, it included only Brahmins in its political strategy with explicit focus. This social engineering brought Dalit and Brahmins together, which resulted in a huge victory for the BSP in the 2007 state Assembly Elections in Uttar Pradesh. The BSP organised several “Brahmin Jodo Sammelans” in different parts of the state, and also formed “Bhaichara Committees” in every district for developing cordial relations between the Brahmins and the Dalits. The logic offered to rationalise this peculiar coalition was that if both castes could remain on one political platform, the atrocities and deprivation of the Dalits that were being caused by the Brahmins could be stopped.

Bahujan Samaj Party has been successful in expanding its political arena in the national politics too. During the three and half decades of its journey into national politics it could attain considerable reputation in the Indian political scenario. In the 1989 national election it contested for 245 seats and win three seats, two from Uttar Pradesh and one from Punjab. At the same time it could score 2.07% votes. In the 10th Lok-Sabha elections of 1991 the party contested for 231 seats and won one seat from Madhya Pradesh and one from Uttar Pradesh. Similarly, in the 11th Lok-Sabha elections of 1996 the BSP contested for 210 seats and won 12 seats; 3 from Punjab, 2 from Madhya Pradesh and 6 seats from Uttar Pradesh. From then the party had been rising continuously until 2014 national elections in which somehow it could not win

191 Conclusion single seat. As far as the national elections are concerned the Bahujan Samaj Party is not legged behind in the electoral participation. Its Dalit politics and the shifted ideology of Sarvajan Samaj have been working in accumulating public support in the politics of India. In the 14th Lok Sabha election of 2004 BSP contested for 435 seats and was successful in winning 19 seats though all these seats were in Uttar Pradeh itself. The party surprised all in 2009 by electing 21 Congressmen as Members of Parliament (MPs) when many thought that the Congress party was in terminal decline in Uttar Pradeh. But in the 16th parliamentary election BSP though fought for 503 seats, yet all efforts of the party had gone in vain.

In fact due to the caste and religion factor Uttar Pradesh had suffered a lot. The political parties always made the agenda of caste not to development. Due to ethnic mobilisation, parties confined to their narrow sectarian bases have been unable to aggregate public opinion, obtain majority support and form stable governments. This has led to short-lived coalitions, which have not been able to formulate long-term policies that can address the felt needs of the people contributing in turn to the breakdown of governance and instability.

Thus, the BSP has grown quite effectively over the years, but has experienced the most popularity and development of political will in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The BSP’s electoral success is seen as a unique phenomenon due to the fact that no other Indian political party running primarily under the platform of catering to the interests of ex-untouchables has achieved such success. However, the BSP could not have achieved success by simple voter majority because Dalits and Other Backward Classes do not comprise a direct voter majority. Perhaps one reason for the BSP’s ascendancy in Uttar Pradesh was due to the fact that the Scheduled Caste population of Uttar Pradesh constitutes approximately 28.9 percent of the state’s population. This is the largest Scheduled Caste (SC) population of any state, making it the perfect breeding ground for a political party that caters specifically to this caste groups economic, political, and social interests. Uttar Pradesh has historically had a large SC population, but the SC and Other Backward Classes were never able to unify in neither a potent nor organised manner.

192 Conclusion

FINDINGS:

The research has found that with political changes the geographical and socio- economic nature of the State of Uttar Pradesh has been transformed. From the most populous Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, a new state has been emerged. People have become more socially and economically conscious as the gap between the upper and lower castes has been reduced. Moreover, general masses have been awakening politically and class-consciousness has been inculcated in them with the mushrooming growth of caste based political parties. The long term one party dominance of Indian National Congress has been overthrown. The BSP and the BJP appeared as the other major players in political scenario of Uttar Pradesh. Thus, since the mid 1990s the pattern shows that while the strength of parties is no longer dependent on any one single region, yet for each party some regions continue to contribute substantially to their vote shares.

The electoral participation of Uttar Pradesh can be divided into two phases- the phase of Congress domination from 1952 to 1989 and the non-Congress phase of coalition governments from 1989 to 1999 characterised by the three political formations, viz., the SP, the BJP and the BSP. The second phase of the state's politics is marked by political competition among the political parties based on caste and communal factors. However, an interesting and unexpected development that has started taking place in the politics of the state during the second phase is that most parties have come to realise the limitation of 'exclusive politics' that is the inadequacy of caste or religion to be the only basis for a political formation and have tried to cross-expand their social base and steadily move to 'inclusive politics' that is the necessity to attract all sections of the society, irrespective of caste or religion, to the party fold. Since independence, Uttar Pradesh as constituted as well as mirrored the trends and patterns of national politics.

The research searched-out the primary knowledge about various political parties and their electoral participation in the state of Uttar Pradesh. This may be helpful to understand the political environment of the state as every party is a child of existing political environment. In this analysis the phenomenon of the emergence of the BSP as a part of Dalit Movement has also been discussed. Our finding comprises a discussion on the politics of the BSP and the continuing changes in its political and

193 Conclusion developmental priorities. The study brings-out the influence of BSP outside Uttar Pradesh along-with the party’s developmental priorities and its relationship with the Dalit Movement. The BSP has also expanded its arena of political activity in many of the Indian states like Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra and the national capital region of Delhi.

The study has brought to the notice of readers that religion and caste play an important role in Indian politics as well as in Uttar Pradesh. It emerged a huge remark in Uttar Pradesh politics during the decades of 1990’s. Throughout the 1990s, identities constructed around ‘Hindutva’, ‘Mandal’ and ‘Dalit’ drove mass politics in Uttar Pradesh as political parties mobilised and divided the electorate along the lines of social cleavages. The collapse of the Congress party led to a fragmented multi- party system with narrower identity-based parties, new strategies of mobilisation and sharp contests in electoral participation resulting in political instability and coalition governments. Thus, Caste and Religion are two important social issues, base upon which parties try to woo votes and voters also consider these things while casting votes.

Finally, the study exposes that though BSP started as Dalit party, yet later on included other castes and religions in its political agenda. Under the charismatic leadership of Mayawati, this party is playing caste politics and strongest party in Uttar Pradesh. Looking at the majority demand, the then Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Mayawati has also emerged in the state with a new strategy Sarvajan Samaj. To get the support of Dalits, she has awarded candidature to several candidates belonging to the backward classes. This research has also found that despite the pivotal position that the Dalit identity has come to occupy in national politics, there are limits to the growth of the BSP's influence in these states in the national as well as Assembly elections in the respective states. Mayawati started preaching people other than Dalits like Thakurs and other upper classes. Its electoral success in the 2007 Assembly election proved that its strategy of Sarvajan Samaj rightly worked among the various communities, which so far had been hostile to the party.

Suggestions: The research suggests that more studies are required in this field so that political culture and political behavior of such segmented society can be

194 Conclusion exposed. If further analyses are made properly people will be informed about influence and democratic power of the marginalised sections like Dalit will be estimated. A really welfare society can only be established through promoting such lower class, caste, religion or marginalised population based party is impartially analysed. A specific suggestion to the party leaders is that in order to make more efficient party, all internal institutional infra-structure of BSP should be more democratic in nature. As the party is recognised widely for its administrative efficiency, anti-communalism, anti-political nepotism and the like matters the leaders should try to make the more transparent in its administrative activities. Moreover, the party chief should be more conscious about tactics of its political rivals and take appropriate and prompt actions against the ill elements inside the party.

195

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208

Appendix

Appendix

CONSTITUTION OF THE BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY

(As adopted by the National Convention held at the Red Fort grounds Delhi on 22nd, 23rd and 24th June,1984, amended from time to time, and redrafted by the Central Executive Committee in pursuance of the Resolution of the Party Conference passed in its meeting held on 28th July, 2000)

Part –Nomenclature, Aims and Objectives

Article I. - Nomenclature.

1. The name of the party shall be “BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY” and this constitution may be called the “Constitution of the Bahujan Samaj Party”.

2. It shall come into force with effect from 25th June 1984.

3. The flag of the party shall consist of a rectangular blue cloth with length and breadth in the proportion of 3 and 2, and Party Emblem in white colour in the center.

4. The symbol of the party shall be Elephant.

Article II. - Aims and Objectives.

1. The chief aim and objective of the party shall be to work as a revolutionary social and economic movement of change with a view to realise, in practical terms, the supreme principles of universal justice, liberty, equality and fraternity enunciated in the Constitution of India, to be followed by State in governance, and in particular summed up in the following extract from the Preamble of the Constitution:

“We, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to

I Appendix all its citizens:

Justice, social, economic and political;

Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality of status and opportunity; and promote among them all

Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation;”

2. The party shall regard its ideology as a movement for ending exploitation of the weaker sections and suppression of the deprived through social and economic change in keeping with the above stated chief aim, and its political activity and participation in governance as an instrument of furthering such a movement and bringing in such a change.

3 This being the chief aim of the party, the strategy of the party in public affairs will be governed by the following general principles:

------i. That all citizens of India being equal before law are entitled to be treated as equal in true sense and in all matters and all walks of life, and where equality does not exist it has to be fostered and where equality is denied it has to be upheld and fought for. ii. That the full, free, uninhibited and unimpeded development of each individual is a basic human right and State is an instrument for promoting and realising such development; iii. That the rights of all citizens of India as enshrined in the Constitution of India and subject to such restrictions as are set out in the Constitution, have to

II Appendix be upheld at all costs and under all circumstances; iv That the provisions of the Constitution requiring the State at Center and in States to promote with special care and protect the socio-economic interests of the weaker sections of the society denied to them for centuries, have to upheld and given practical shape in public affairs as a matter of prime most priority. v. That economic disparities and the wide gaps between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ must not be allowed to override the political principle of “one man, one vote, one vote, one value” adopted by our republic. vi. That unless political empowerment is secured for the economically deprived masses they will not be able to free themselves from the shackles of economic and social dependence and exploitation.

4. In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the aims stated above the party will work specially towards the following objectives: i. The Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, the other Backward Castes, and the minorities, are the most oppressed and exploited people in India. Keeping in mind their large numbers, such a set of people in India is known as the Bahujan Samaj. The Party shall organise these masses. ii. The party shall work for these sown trodden masses to – a. to remove their backwardness; b. to fight against their oppression and exploitation; c. to improve their status in society and public life; d. to improve their living conditions in day to day life; iii. The social structure of India is based on inequalities created by

III Appendix caste system and the movement of the Party shall be geared towards changing the social system and rebuild it on the basis of equality and human values. All those who join the party with the commitment to co-operate in this movement of social change shall be ingratiated into the told of the Party.

5. Towards the furtherance of the above noted aims and objectives the organisational units of party as designated in this constitution, shall be empowered to- i. purchase, take on lease or otherwise acquire, and maintain, moveable or immovable property for the party and invest and deal with monies of party in such a manner as may from time to time be determined; ii. raise money with or without security for carrying out any of the aims and objectives of the party; ii. to do all other lawful things and acts as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of any of the aforesaid aims and objectives,

Provided that none of these activities will be undertaken without the express approval of the National President.

Part II – Membership and Organisational Structure

Article III. - Membership.

1. Any person who is a citizen of India, has attained the age of 18, accepts the Constitution and ideology of the Party, and is not a member of any other political or social organisation whose aims and objects are not approved by the Central Executive Committee of the Party, can become a member of the Bahujan Samaj Party by paying an annual subscription of rupees 10/-.

2. The subscription amount shall be increased by rupees ten after every three years, provided that the’ Central Executive Committee of the Party shall IV Appendix have the power to review the subscription amount at any time.

3 The year of membership shall be from 1st January to 31st December.

4. A person shall have the option to become a member at a place of which he is 'ordinarily resident' or at a place where he ordinarily works.

5. Every member shall have the right to vote in election to any of the constituent units of the Party, and to contest such an election to any of Tice of the Party, unless disqualified by any rule made under this Constitution.

Article IV. - Organisational structure.

1. The central organisation of the Bahujan Samaj Party shall include (i) The National President of the Party.

(ii) The National Vice President of the Party.

(iii) General Secretaries of the Party.

(iv) Secretaries of the Party.

(v) Treasurer of the Party.

(vi) Central General Council.

(vii) Central Executive Committee.

2. The local organisation of the Bahujan Samaj Party shall include-

(i) . A State/UT General Council for each State/UT.

(ii) . A State/UT Executive Committee.

V Appendix

(iii) .A District General Council for each District. (iv).A District Executive Committee for each district.

The primary unit of the Party shall be the 3.(i). district Executive committee. ii). The District General Council shall consist of

delegates each elected by 1000 members of the party registered in that district. .

(iii). The District Executive Committee shall consist of a

President (who shall also be the President of the

District General Council), a Vice President, such number of General Secretaries and Secretaries as may be determined under para 1 (xii) below, and a

Treasurer. The President of the District Executive

Committee shall be elected, either by vote or by consensus, by delegates comprising the District

General Council. The District President shall nominate other office bearers of the Committee.

(iv). The State/UT General Council shall consist of

VI Appendix

Presidents of the District Executive Committees of the Districts contained in the State/UT concerned.

(v). The State/UT Executive Committee shall consist of a President who shall also be the President of the

State/UT General Council), a Vice President, such number of General Secretaries and Secretaries as may be determined under para 1 (xii) below, and a

Treasurer. The President shall be elected, either by vote or by consensus, by delegates each elected by

5000 members of the party registered in the

State/UT. The President shall nominate other office bearers of the Committee.

(vi). The Central General Council of the Party shall consist of Presidents and other office bearers of all

State/UT Executive Committees.

(vii). The Central Executive Committee shall consist of the National President, the National Vice President, such numbers of General Secretaries and

VII Appendix

Secretaries as may be determined under para 1 (xii) below, and a Treasurer.

(viii). The National President shall be elected by vote or by consensus by delegates each elected by 10000 members. The National President shall then nominate other office bearers of the Central Executive Committee.

(ix). The office bearers of the District Executive Committee shall be removable by the President of the Committee after obtaining the approval of the President of the State Executive Committee of the State concerned.

(x). The office bearers of the State/UT Executive Committee shall be removable by the President of the Committee after obtaining the approval of the National President of the Party.

(xi) The National President shall have the prerogative to intervene at any time and to remove any office. bearer of a State/UT or District Executive Committee and direct re-election or nomination (as the case may be) to the office thus vacated.

(xii) The number of office bearers of State/UT and District Executive Committees shall be decided according to the Rules framed by the Central Executive Committee under the Constitution.

(xiii). The term of all General Councils and Executive Committees of the party and their office bearers shall be three years.

4. The National President shall preside over the general meetings of the party and the meetings of Central General Council and Central Executive Committee. Meetings of Central General Council and Central Executive Committee shall be convened by the National President as and when required and agenda for these meetings shall be approved by the National President.

5. The National President shall exercise all powers of the Central Executive Committee when the Committee is not in session.

VIII Appendix

6. In the absence of the National President all functions of the National President can be performed by the National Vice President, provided that all decisions taken by the National Vice President in such a situation shall be put up before the National President for ex post facto approval.

7. In the event of unfortunate demise of the National President the National Vice President shall immediately and automatically assume charge as National President and shall continue to function as such until the end of the current term of the National President.

Article V. - Central Secretariat.

1. To carry out the policies and programmes laid down by the party and the Central General Council the President shall be assisted by a Central Secretariat which shall consist of such number of General Secretaries, Secretaries and other such officials as may be appointed by him. The President shall be in charge of the funds and shall keep proper accounts of all investments, incomes and expenditures with the assistance of the Secretariat.

2. All monies received for the party and the central organization of the party shall be deposited in an account in a nationalized bank in the name of the party and such account shall be operated by either the National President or the National Vice President or by an office bearer of the Central Executive Committee duly authorized by the National President in this behalf.

Provided that a sum of money required for day to day and emergent expenditures shall be kept at the disposal of the National President and the National Vice President or in the Office of the Party.

Article VI. - Central Executive Committee.

1. The Central Executive Committee shall be the highest executive authority of the Party. It shall be the final authority in all matters relating to the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Constitution. The

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Committee shall also have the powers, in special cases and to remove difficulties, to relax the application of provisions of the Constitution without violating the provisions of the Constitution.

2. The Central Executive Committee shall frame rules for administration and execution of any provisions of this Constitution and for any other administrative matter not specifically provided in the Constitution but not inconsistent with it.

3. The Central Executive Committee shall frame Rules for maintaining discipline in the Party.

4. The Central Executive Committee shall superintend, direct and control the functioning of all State /UT and District Executive Committees and Councils.

5. The Central Executive Committee may take such disciplinary action provided herein against any committee or office bearer of any committee other than the National President or the National Vice president, as it may deem appropriate.

6. To meet any special situation, the Central Executive Committee shall have the powers to take such action in the interest of the Party as it may deem appropriate, provided that if any action is taken which is beyond the powers of the Committee defined in the Constitution it shall cause the same to be laid before the Central General Council for ratification as early as possible.

7. The Central Executive Committee shall prepare accounts of the Party and the Central General Council every year.

8. The Central Executive Committee, with the approval of the National President, may appoint one or more auditors or inspectors or other officers to examine the record, papers and account books of all or any constituent bodies of the Party, and it shall be incumbent on the office bearers of all constituent

X Appendix bodies to furnish all required information to the auditors, inspectors or other officers and to allow them access to all offices, accounts and records.

9. The State/UT Executive Committees shall frame rules which shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution and the rules framed by the Central Executive Committee for proper functioning of the State/UT and District units of the party. No such rule shall be valid unless approved by the Central Executive Committee and the National President.

Article VII. - State/UT and District Executive Committees.

1. Each State/UT Executive Committee and each District Executive Committee shall be responsible for the affairs of the Party within its respective jurisdiction.

2. Each District Executive Committee shall prepare an annual report on the activities of the Party in the district and work of the District General Council, including an annual statement of accounts, and submit it to the State President to be laid before the state/UT Executive Committee.

3. Like wise each State/UT Executive Committee shall prepare an annual report on the activities of the Party and of the State/UT General Council, including an annual statement of accounts, and submit it to the National President to be laid before the Central Executive Committee.

4. On a failure of any State/UT or District Executive Committee to function in accordance with this Constitution or any rules framed or directions issued by the Central Executive Committee, the latter with the approval of the National President or the National President, may, suspend the said Committee and form an ad hoc Committee to carry on the work of the Party in the respective jurisdiction.

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5. All such vacancies in the State/UT and District Executive

Committees as occur due to resignation, death or removal, shall, unless otherwise directed by the Central Executive Committee or the National President, be filled in the same manner in which the vacating incumbent was elected/ nominated, and the new incumbent thus elected/nominated shall hold office for the residual term of the said \office.

6. No action of any committee once properly constituted, shall be invalid merely by reason of any vacancy.

Article VIII. - Rules of Discipline.

1. The following shall constitute acts of indiscipline:

(i) To act contrary to the declared policies of the Party;

(ii). To indulge in open and public criticism of the policies of the Party.

(iii). To form a group within the Party or to give support to any member with the object to challenge the authority of a constitutionally appointed office bearer of the party;

(iv). To spread ill feelings among members or to carry out a campaign of vilification;

(v). To obstruct the working of the Party in any way;

(vi). To misappropriate the funds of the Party;

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(vii). To join a party or a group or an association not recognized by the Party or whose principles are not approved by the Central Executive Committee;

(viii). To misuse authority vested by virtue of being an office bearer of the Party, or to fail to use such authority and thereby to bring about a failure of the functioning of a constituent of the Party; and (ix). To oppose an official candidate set up by the Party in any election.

2. Any member guilty of any act of indiscipline shall be liable to punishment which may include one or more of the following:

(i). Expulsion from the Party which may be permanent; (ii). Suspension from the membership of the Party for a specified period; (iii). Removal from office;

(iv). Imposition of disability to hold office which may be for a specified period or permanent.

3. Any member against whom charges of indiscipline are levied shall be tried by the State/UT Executive Committee or the Central Executive Committee as the case may be; although the National President can directly take cognizance of any case of indiscipline.

4. A member aggrieved by an order of punishment may appeal before the National President, who may, if he considers appropriate, refer the appeal to Central Executive Committee for hearing or proceed to hear the appeal himself.

5. The Central Executive Committee shall issue orders in cases of appeal

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6. The order/approval of the National President shall be final.

Article IX. - Amendment of the Constitution

An amendment of this Constitution can be made by the Central General Council by a simple majority:

Provided that an amendment of this Constitution can also be carried out by a resolution of the Central Executive Committee, being the highest executive authority of the party, provided the amended provisions do not militate against the aims, objectives and basic party structure, and are aimed at more effective functioning in a given situation.

Article X - Mandatory Provision

1. The Bahujan Samaj Party shall bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established and to the principles of Socialism, Secularism, and Democracy and shall uphold the Sovereignty, Unity and Integrity of India.

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source- http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/mis- Political_Parties/Constitution_of_Political_Parties/ConstitutionOfBSP

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