STATE of the SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2013 2 the Purpose and Goal of the Implicit Bias Review
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Avoiding the Conjunction Fallacy: Who Can Take a Hint?
Avoiding the conjunction fallacy: Who can take a hint? Simon Klein Spring 2017 Master’s thesis, 30 ECTS Master’s programme in Cognitive Science, 120 ECTS Supervisor: Linnea Karlsson Wirebring Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank the participants for enduring the test session with challenging questions and thereby making the study possible, his supervisor Linnea Karlsson Wirebring for invaluable guidance and good questions during the thesis work, and his fiancée Amanda Arnö for much needed mental support during the entire process. 2 AVOIDING THE CONJUNCTION FALLACY: WHO CAN TAKE A HINT? Simon Klein Humans repeatedly commit the so called “conjunction fallacy”, erroneously judging the probability of two events occurring together as higher than the probability of one of the events. Certain hints have been shown to mitigate this tendency. The present thesis investigated the relations between three psychological factors and performance on conjunction tasks after reading such a hint. The factors represent the understanding of probability and statistics (statistical numeracy), the ability to resist intuitive but incorrect conclusions (cognitive reflection), and the willingness to engage in, and enjoyment of, analytical thinking (need-for-cognition). Participants (n = 50) answered 30 short conjunction tasks and three psychological scales. A bimodal response distribution motivated dichotomization of performance scores. Need-for-cognition was significantly, positively correlated with performance, while numeracy and cognitive reflection were not. The results suggest that the willingness to engage in, and enjoyment of, analytical thinking plays an important role for the capacity to avoid the conjunction fallacy after taking a hint. The hint further seems to neutralize differences in performance otherwise predicted by statistical numeracy and cognitive reflection. -
Cognitive Bias Mitigation: How to Make Decision-Making More Rational?
Cognitive Bias Mitigation: How to make decision-making more rational? Abstract Cognitive biases distort judgement and adversely impact decision-making, which results in economic inefficiencies. Initial attempts to mitigate these biases met with little success. However, recent studies which used computer games and educational videos to train people to avoid biases (Clegg et al., 2014; Morewedge et al., 2015) showed that this form of training reduced selected cognitive biases by 30 %. In this work I report results of an experiment which investigated the debiasing effects of training on confirmation bias. The debiasing training took the form of a short video which contained information about confirmation bias, its impact on judgement, and mitigation strategies. The results show that participants exhibited confirmation bias both in the selection and processing of information, and that debiasing training effectively decreased the level of confirmation bias by 33 % at the 5% significance level. Key words: Behavioural economics, cognitive bias, confirmation bias, cognitive bias mitigation, confirmation bias mitigation, debiasing JEL classification: D03, D81, Y80 1 Introduction Empirical research has documented a panoply of cognitive biases which impair human judgement and make people depart systematically from models of rational behaviour (Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Pohl, 2004). Besides distorted decision-making and judgement in the areas of medicine, law, and military (Nickerson, 1998), cognitive biases can also lead to economic inefficiencies. Slovic et al. (1977) point out how they distort insurance purchases, Hyman Minsky (1982) partly blames psychological factors for economic cycles. Shefrin (2010) argues that confirmation bias and some other cognitive biases were among the significant factors leading to the global financial crisis which broke out in 2008. -
Graphical Techniques in Debiasing: an Exploratory Study
GRAPHICAL TECHNIQUES IN DEBIASING: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY by S. Bhasker Information Systems Department Leonard N. Stern School of Business New York University New York, New York 10006 and A. Kumaraswamy Management Department Leonard N. Stern School of Business New York University New York, NY 10006 October, 1990 Center for Research on Information Systems Information Systems Department Leonard N. Stern School of Business New York University Working Paper Series STERN IS-90-19 Forthcoming in the Proceedings of the 1991 Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences Center for Digital Economy Research Stem School of Business IVorking Paper IS-90-19 Center for Digital Economy Research Stem School of Business IVorking Paper IS-90-19 2 Abstract Base rate and conjunction fallacies are consistent biases that influence decision making involving probability judgments. We develop simple graphical techniques and test their eflcacy in correcting for these biases. Preliminary results suggest that graphical techniques help to overcome these biases and improve decision making. We examine the implications of incorporating these simple techniques in Executive Information Systems. Introduction Today, senior executives operate in highly uncertain environments. They have to collect, process and analyze a deluge of information - most of it ambiguous. But, their limited information acquiring and processing capabilities constrain them in this task [25]. Increasingly, executives rely on executive information/support systems for various purposes like strategic scanning of their business environments, internal monitoring of their businesses, analysis of data available from various internal and external sources, and communications [5,19,32]. However, executive information systems are, at best, support tools. Executives still rely on their mental or cognitive models of their businesses and environments and develop heuristics to simplify decision problems [10,16,25]. -
Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation
Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Phelps, Elizabeth A., Kevin J. O'Connor, William A. Cunningham, E. Sumie Funayama, J. Christopher Gatenby, John C. Gore, and Mahzarin R. Banaji. 2000. Performance on indirect measures of race evaluation predicts amygdala activation. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 12(5): 729-738. Published Version doi:10.1162/089892900562552 Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3512208 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation Elizabeth A. Phelps New York University Kevin J. O'Connor Massachusetts Institute of Technology William A. Cunningham and E. Sumie Funayama Yale University J. Christopher Gatenby and John C. Gore Yale University Medical School Mahzarin R. Banaji Yale University Abstract & We used fMRI to explore the neural substrates involved in (Implicit Association Test [IAT] and potentiated startle), but the unconscious evaluation of Black and White social groups. not with the direct (conscious) expression of race attitudes. In Specifically, we focused on the amygdala, a subcortical Experiment 2, these patterns were not obtained when the structure known to play a role in emotional learning and stimulus faces belonged to familiar and positively regarded evaluation. In Experiment 1, White American subjects observed Black and White individuals. -
Cognitive Biases in Economic Decisions – Three Essays on the Impact of Debiasing
TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT MÜNCHEN Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaftslehre – Strategie und Organisation Univ.-Prof. Dr. Isabell M. Welpe Cognitive biases in economic decisions – three essays on the impact of debiasing Christoph Martin Gerald Döbrich Abdruck der von der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Technischen Universität München zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. rer. pol.) genehmigten Dissertation. Vorsitzender: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Gunther Friedl Prüfer der Dissertation: 1. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Isabell M. Welpe 2. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr. Holger Patzelt Die Dissertation wurde am 28.11.2012 bei der Technischen Universität München eingereicht und durch die Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften am 15.12.2012 angenommen. Acknowledgments II Acknowledgments Numerous people have contributed to the development and successful completion of this dissertation. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Dr. Isabell M. Welpe for her continuous support, all the constructive discussions, and her enthusiasm concerning my dissertation project. Her challenging questions and new ideas always helped me to improve my work. My sincere thanks also go to Prof. Dr. Matthias Spörrle for his continuous support of my work and his valuable feedback for the articles building this dissertation. Moreover, I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Dr. Holger Patzelt for acting as the second advisor for this thesis and Professor Dr. Gunther Friedl for leading the examination board. This dissertation would not have been possible without the financial support of the Elite Network of Bavaria. I am very thankful for the financial support over two years which allowed me to pursue my studies in a focused and efficient manner. Many colleagues at the Chair for Strategy and Organization of Technische Universität München have supported me during the completion of this thesis. -
What Is Implicit Bias? March 1, 2017
Prepared for the Senate Select Committee on Women and Inequality by Megan Lane of the Senate Office of Research What is Implicit Bias? March 1, 2017 Brief Summary of Implicit Bias Implicit bias involves “attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner.”1 According to a body of scholarly research, the unconscious attitudes we hold about other people often are based on categories such as race, gender, age, or ethnicity. Studies suggest that implicit bias is pervasive, not necessarily in line with our declared beliefs, developed early in life, and not fixed.2 Further, implicit bias is expressed at both an individual and institutional level. Institutional bias has been studied in the education, employment, and criminal justice contexts,3 and it may present itself in an organization’s policies and procedures. Some researchers believe implicit bias influences behavior and contributes to discriminatory conduct.4 Conversely, other experts contend that the evidence linking unconscious bias to discriminatory behavior is weak and warrants further study.5 The State of Research on Implicit Bias In the 1950s, psychologists studying social cognition focused on the nature of prejudice. Early research on prejudice led to studies that attempted to separate out our “automatic” versus “controlled” processing of information.6 In the 1990s, researchers focused much of their attention on understanding our automatic or unconscious judgments. In 1995, social psychologists Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji 1 Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, “Understanding Implicit Bias,” Ohio State University, 2015. http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/research/understanding-implicit-bias/. -
Working Memory, Cognitive Miserliness and Logic As Predictors of Performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test
Working Memory, Cognitive Miserliness and Logic as Predictors of Performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test Edward J. N. Stupple ([email protected]) Centre for Psychological Research, University of Derby Kedleston Road, Derby. DE22 1GB Maggie Gale ([email protected]) Centre for Psychological Research, University of Derby Kedleston Road, Derby. DE22 1GB Christopher R. Richmond ([email protected]) Centre for Psychological Research, University of Derby Kedleston Road, Derby. DE22 1GB Abstract Most participants respond that the answer is 10 cents; however, a slower and more analytic approach to the The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was devised to measure problem reveals the correct answer to be 5 cents. the inhibition of heuristic responses to favour analytic ones. The CRT has been a spectacular success, attracting more Toplak, West and Stanovich (2011) demonstrated that the than 100 citations in 2012 alone (Scopus). This may be in CRT was a powerful predictor of heuristics and biases task part due to the ease of administration; with only three items performance - proposing it as a metric of the cognitive miserliness central to dual process theories of thinking. This and no requirement for expensive equipment, the practical thesis was examined using reasoning response-times, advantages are considerable. There have, moreover, been normative responses from two reasoning tasks and working numerous correlates of the CRT demonstrated, from a wide memory capacity (WMC) to predict individual differences in range of tasks in the heuristics and biases literature (Toplak performance on the CRT. These data offered limited support et al., 2011) to risk aversion and SAT scores (Frederick, for the view of miserliness as the primary factor in the CRT. -
Dunning–Kruger Effect - Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia
Dunning–Kruger effect - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning–Kruger_effect Dunning–Kruger effect From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which unskilled individuals suffer from illusory superiority, mistakenly rating their ability much higher than average. This bias is attributed to a metacognitive inability of the unskilled to recognize their mistakes.[1] Actual competence may weaken self-confidence, as competent individuals may falsely assume that others have an equivalent understanding. David Dunning and Justin Kruger of Cornell University conclude, "the miscalibration of the incompetent stems from an error about the self, whereas the miscalibration of the highly competent stems from an error about others".[2] Contents 1 Proposal 2 Supporting studies 3 Awards 4 Historical references 5 See also 6 References Proposal The phenomenon was first tested in a series of experiments published in 1999 by David Dunning and Justin Kruger of the Department of Psychology, Cornell University.[2][3] They noted earlier studies suggesting that ignorance of standards of performance is behind a great deal of incompetence. This pattern was seen in studies of skills as diverse as reading comprehension, operating a motor vehicle, and playing chess or tennis. Dunning and Kruger proposed that, for a given skill, incompetent people will: 1. tend to overestimate their own level of skill; 2. fail to recognize genuine skill in others; 3. fail to recognize the extremity of their inadequacy; 4. recognize and acknowledge their own previous lack of skill, if they are exposed to training for that skill. Dunning has since drawn an analogy ("the anosognosia of everyday life")[1][4] with a condition in which a person who suffers a physical disability because of brain injury seems unaware of or denies the existence of the disability, even for dramatic impairments such as blindness or paralysis. -
Infographic I.10
The Digital Health Revolution: Leaving No One Behind The global AI in healthcare market is growing fast, with an expected increase from $4.9 billion in 2020 to $45.2 billion by 2026. There are new solutions introduced every day that address all areas: from clinical care and diagnosis, to remote patient monitoring to EHR support, and beyond. But, AI is still relatively new to the industry, and it can be difficult to determine which solutions can actually make a difference in care delivery and business operations. 59 Jan 2021 % of Americans believe returning Jan-June 2019 to pre-coronavirus life poses a risk to health and well being. 11 41 % % ...expect it will take at least 6 The pandemic has greatly increased the 65 months before things get number of US adults reporting depression % back to normal (updated April and/or anxiety.5 2021).4 Up to of consumers now interested in telehealth going forward. $250B 76 57% of providers view telehealth more of current US healthcare spend % favorably than they did before COVID-19.7 could potentially be virtualized.6 The dramatic increase in of Medicare primary care visits the conducted through 90% $3.5T telehealth has shown longevity, with rates in annual U.S. health expenditures are for people with chronic and mental health conditions. since April 2020 0.1 43.5 leveling off % % Most of these can be prevented by simple around 30%.8 lifestyle changes and regular health screenings9 Feb. 2020 Apr. 2020 OCCAM’S RAZOR • CONJUNCTION FALLACY • DELMORE EFFECT • LAW OF TRIVIALITY • COGNITIVE FLUENCY • BELIEF BIAS • INFORMATION BIAS Digital health ecosystems are transforming• AMBIGUITY BIAS • STATUS medicineQUO BIAS • SOCIAL COMPARISONfrom BIASa rea• DECOYctive EFFECT • REACTANCEdiscipline, • REVERSE PSYCHOLOGY • SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION • BACKFIRE EFFECT • ENDOWMENT EFFECT • PROCESSING DIFFICULTY EFFECT • PSEUDOCERTAINTY EFFECT • DISPOSITION becoming precise, preventive,EFFECT • ZERO-RISK personalized, BIAS • UNIT BIAS • IKEA EFFECT and • LOSS AVERSION participatory. -
Social Comparisons of Subjective Well-Being
Is the grass always greener on the other side? Social comparisons of subjective well-being THOMAS GOETZ1, CHRISTOPH EHRET2, SIMONEJULLIEN1, & NATHAN C. HALL3 I University 0/ Munich, Germany, 2University 0/ Regensburg, Germany, and 3University o/California, Irvine, USA Abstract This study investigates subjective well being (SWB) among residents of Munich (n 380) and Venice (n 545) with respect to their individual SWB and their judgments of SWB for residents of their own city and those living in the other city. Our results indicate that egocentrism rather than striving for self enhancement guided people's judgments of SWB. For people with low individual SWB, a below average effect was found, whereas for people with high individual SWB, a better than average effect emerged. Also in line with the egocentrism approach, judgments of individual SWB were positively related to the judgments of SWB for residents of their own city, but unrelated to SWB of those living in the other city. Implications for future research are discussed. Keywords: Subjective well being, satisfaction with life, social compan'sons Introduction abilities of other groups (outgroups; Abrams & Hogg, 1988). This phenomenon is called the ingroup Many studies have shown that most people believe bias (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992) and is a central they are better than average (see Alicke & Govorun, component of Social Identity Theory developed 2005; Armor & Taylor, 1998; Krueger, 1998; Taylor by Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986; see Rubin & Brown, 1988, 1994, for reviews). This effect has & Hewstone, 1998, for a review on research on the been found in various domains: with respect to ingroup bias). -
Dunning–Kruger Effect – Why Once a Fool, Always a Fool
Dunning–Kruger Effect – Why Once a Fool, Always a Fool David Lacko Psychologický ústav FFMU, Brno [email protected] The majority of people believe that they are better-than-average. In psychology, this phenomenon is called the illusory superiority. A specific form of illusory superiority is Dunning–Kruger’s effect which states that people overestimate their abilities based on their real abilities. The rule is that the less competent a person is, the more they overestimate themselves. And, on the other hand, able people have a tendency to underestimate themselves slightly. A considerable part of this phenomenon is also the fact that the less able people do not change their attitudes even after being confronted with the reality. The majority of people believe that they are better-than-average. Some sources (Boyd, 2014) mention that as much as 93 % of population consider themselves better than average, even though it is logical, that it is statistically impossible.In psychology, this phenomenon is called theillusory superiority, or theAbove Average Effect / Better than Average Effect. Out of interest, I will give you a few examples.The majority of people think that they are more intelligent and more attractive than the majority of others (Whittlestone, 2012), and on the scale from 1 to 10, where 10 is the highest better-than-average, they ascribe themselves number 7 (Ghose, 2013). 88 % of people think that they drive better-than-average (Svenson, 1981); even the majority of elderly people rank themselves among better-than-average drivers (Marottoli and Richardson, 1998). If you suppose that this is only the case in more stupid people, you are wrong.94% of professors assume that they are better-than-average in comparison to their colleagues (Cross, 1977). -
Implicit Bias and the Law
SEEING THROUGH COLORBLINDNESS: IMPLICIT BIAS AND THE LAW * Jerry Kang ** Kristin Lane Once upon a time, the central civil rights questions were indisputably normative. What did “equal justice under law” require? Did it, for example, permit segregation, or was separate never equal? This is no longer the case. Today, the central civil rights questions of our time turn also on the underlying empirics. In a post–civil rights era, in what some people exuberantly embrace as post-racial, many assume that we already live in a colorblind society. Is this in fact the case? Recent findings about implicit bias from mind scientists sharply suggest otherwise. This Article summarizes the empirical evidence that rejects facile claims of perceptual, cognitive, and behavioral colorblindness. It then calls on the law to take a “behavioral realist” account of these findings, and maps systematically how it might do so in sensible, nonhysterical, and evidence-based ways. Recognizing that this call may be politically naive, the Article examines and answers three objections, sounding in “junk science” backlash, “hardwired” resignation, and “rational” justification. * Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. [email protected]. http://jerrykang.net. ** Assistant Professor of Psychology, Bard College. Financial disclosure statement: The authors have earned honoraria from academic lectures on implicit bias. Professor Kang also serves as a paid consultant to the National Center for State Courts’ project on implicit bias. For helpful comments, we thank Gary Blasi, Devon Carbado, Rachel Godsil, Carol Goldberg, Anthony Greenwald, Cheryl Harris, Ken Karst, Sung Hui Kim, Doug Kysar, Greg Mitchell, Jennifer Mnookin, Jeff Rachlinski, Russell Robinson, Len Rubinowitz, Ed Stein, Michael Sullivan, Steven Willborn, and Noah Zatz.