Hiscox WTPV Aug 2009.Indd
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AUGUST 2009 Table of contents Transnational terrorism 2 Profi le: The Jakarta attacks 3 Worldwide terrorist activity 4 Africa Americas Asia Europe Middle East and North Africa In-depth 8 Coming up 9 A forensic investigator examines debris inside the Ritz-Carlton hotel INDONESIA A suspected suicide bomber early on 17 July detonated his explosives near the Lobby Lounge restaurant in the Ritz-Carlton hotel in the capital Jakarta. A second explosion occurred at the JW Marriott (which suffered an attack in 2003) and is also thought to have been perpetrated by a suicide bomber. A third bomber also reportedly checked into the JW For more information about Hiscox or Control Marriott with the two known attackers; police subsequently defused another Risks, please contact: bomb at the hotel. Retribution for the execution last year of three men Stephen Ashwell accused of involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings was a potential motive. Tel: 020 7448 6725 1 Great St Helen’s, London EC3A 6HX The attacks bore the hallmarks of fringe extremist elements within regional [email protected] extremist network Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which have continued to promote www.hiscox.com violent jihad even though JI as a whole has sought to move towards the political mainstream since the last large-scale attacks in Indonesia in 2005. Peter Simpson Veteran bomb-maker Noordin Top – one of South-east Asia’s most wanted Tel: 020 7970 2373 terrorists – has been identifi ed as a likely leader. The attacks all but confi rm Cottons Centre, Cottons Lane, fears that radical JI factions are still highly active and may have revived London SE1 2QG funding and resource networks that counter-terrorism operations in recent [email protected] years are thought to have heavily disrupted. However, it remains far from clear www.control-risks.com whether the attacks signal the beginning of a new campaign in Indonesia. Prepared by for Note: Hiscox Syndicates and Control Risks request that recipients do not forward the contents outside the distribution list. Any breach of this will lead to removal from the distribution list. Transnational groups and Islamist extremism PAKISTAN At least one person was killed and three others injured on 8 July in a suicide bombing in the Nasir Bagh area of Peshawar, the capital of North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Speaker of the provincial assembly Karamatullah Chagharmatti, who had just passed through the area, may have been the intended target of the attack. The incident followed a steady increase in the infl uence of militants associated with the Tehrik-i-Taleban Pakistan (TTP – Pakistani Taleban) and affi liated groups in NWFP. While NWFP remains the centre of Islamist extremist activity in Pakistan, there is a credible risk of retaliatory attacks in other parts of the country, including the capital Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Karachi (Sindh province) and Lahore (Punjab province). Previously, the authorities on 17 June closed Peshawar International Airport following a threat against passenger fl ights, while two gunmen on 12 June were killed by the security forces following an attempted attack on the Peshawar residence of Lt-Gen Masood Aslam, the commander of the military operation in NWFP. On 11 Security offi cials examine the site of the 8 July explosion in the June, at least three police offi cers were killed and 13 others Nasir Bagh area of Peshawar injured in a suicide bombing on the Peshawar Ring Road. MALI CLASHES MAURITANIA ARRESTS The military on 3-4 July clashed with members of QIM Public prosecutor Mustafa Ould Said on 21 July said that in the northern region of Tombouctou, though details of two extremist cells plotting attacks against foreigners had casualties on either side remained unclear. The incident been broken up and that a number of extremist suspects had came after the military in June had attacked a suspected been arrested. One of the cells was allegedly responsible QIM base in the northern Tessalit area (Kidal region), near for the murder of US aid worker Christopher Leggett in the the border with Algeria. At least 12 QIM members were capital Nouakchott in June. According to Ould Said, the killed in the operation and a number of others detained; other was planning to kidnap Westerners in Nouakchott unconfi rmed reports indicated that fi ve soldiers were and the north of the country, while one of its members was killed by landmines. The offensive came after suspected wanted for his alleged involvement in an attack on a military QIM militants shot and killed intelligence offi cer Lt- patrol near Tourine, near the mining town of Zouerate, in Col Lamana Ould Bou at his residence in Tombouctou. September 2008 in which 12 soldiers and a guide were killed. The latest fi ghting underscores long-standing security The reported discovery and dismantling of the cells, if concerns in areas where QIM operatives have a platform confi rmed, would represent a positive development for the from which to conduct terrorist and criminal activities. The security environment and particularly that of Nouakchott. group appears to be attempting to re-establish links with its The apparent swift break-up of the cell allegedly regional Islamist extremist affi liates, especially in Mali, with responsible for Leggett’s murder is particularly positive, the intent of improving its operational assets in the region. though it is unclear whether other members of the cells The government remains deeply hostile to any foreign remain at large. Nevertheless, the fact that other extremist terrorist presence on its territory. Mali, Algeria and the US cells and networks appear to have emerged just a year are conducting a joint programme to counter the activities of after the authorities claimed to have broken up a major QIM in the border region. However, the two African countries, extremist network in the capital is a source of concern, particularly Mali, are not adequately resourced or organised suggesting a persistent threat of terrorism and in particular to signifi cantly undermine QIM’s capabilities in the area. of small-scale, targeted attacks against Westerners. Prepared by for 2 Note: Hiscox Syndicates and Control Risks request that recipients do not forward the contents outside the distribution list. Any breach of this will lead to removal from the distribution list. Profi le: Jakarta attacks ATTACKS Police on 18-19 July released details asserting that JI had been responsible for the 17 July bomb attacks at the Ritz- Carlton and JW Marriott hotels in Jakarta. The attacks came after the government on 16 July had increased security at strategic locations across the country, including all transport hubs. In the days following the attacks, the Four Seasons Hotel in Jakarta and the Best Western Asean International Hotel in Medan (the capital of North Sumatra province) received anonymous telephone bomb threats, though these turned out to be hoaxes. The chief concern resulting from the attacks is the evolution of tactics by the perpetrators, who exploited a chink in security practices prevalent at most Indonesian hotels. By posing as guests and assembling their explosive devices in a hotel room, the bombers easily evaded security measures devised to prevent vehicle-borne attacks, the main method used in previous strikes in Indonesia. The bombers’ tactics will spur the hotel sector and government authorities to revise their security strategies, in particular front-of-house screening, which may now see guests subjected to more intrusive security checks. More generally, while Indonesia has in the past led South-east Asia on hotel security, the attacks will force hotels around the Security offi cers stand guard outside the JW Marriott Hotel, region to adopt more stringent deterrence measures. September 2003 JI 2003, which notably also targeted the JW Marriott. The 2003 attack refl ected a clear intent to cause mass casualties at Although it is too early to assess whether the attacks a Western target in an area of the capital with high levels point to a resurgence of JI in Indonesia, they nevertheless of security. Several key members of the group, including its demonstrate the group’s operational capabilities and ability to leader, Abu Dujana, were arrested in June 2007, marking a launch attacks aimed at vital personnel, locations and assets signifi cant blow to its operational capabilities. Later, the four in major cities, despite counter-terrorism operations. The main suspects in the October 2002 bombing of a nightclub attacks came amid a period of relative calm in Indonesia and in Bali were executed in 2008; the attack had killed more followed arrests of key JI leaders, which may have generated than 200 people, including a number of foreign tourists. a false sense of security. This, coupled with a relative easing of security following heightened levels during the recent OUTLOOK presidential election, may have provided the attackers with the opportunity and confi dence to carry out their mission. There remains a risk of further terror attacks in Indonesia, particularly in Jakarta and on Bali. Potential targets include JI, which seeks to establish an independent Islamic state in both offi cial and ‘soft’, or lightly defended, targets, such as South-east Asia, is suspected of having links to al-Qaida. The entertainment venues, tourist sites, churches and other last major terrorist attack in Indonesia took place in October areas that foreigners frequent. In addition, bomb hoaxes 2005, when three suicide bombers thought to be linked to JI are likely to continue, as they often do in the aftermath of struck in the tourist areas of Jimbaran and Kuta on Bali, killing major attacks. Heightened security measures, such as the at least 20 people and injuring 129 others. JI in September enhanced scrutiny of baggage at hotels and additional security 2004 attacked the Australian embassy in Jakarta, while 12 checkpoints at sensitive locations, will remain in place.