l\1ilitary Review
J US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
COMMANDANT Major General J. R. Thurman
DEPUTY COMMANDANT Brigadier General William C. LOllisell
Editor in Chief Production Editor COL Rose Stauber Dixie R. Dominguez
Associate Editor Spanish·American Editor COL Paul R. Hilty Jr. LTC Rafael Martinez-Boucher Army lVar Col/ege
Assistant Editor Brazilian Editor LTC Joseph E. Burlas COL Pedro L. A. Braga Brazilian Assistant Editors LTC Sergio R. N. Franco LTC Geraldo P. Almeida FilllO
Features Editor Publication Officer LTC Jamie·lV. lValton Amos IV. Gal/away
Managing Editor Art and Design CPT John IV. I. Ball Jerome F. Sclleele Military Review Professional Journal of the US ArnlY
FIFTY-FIVE YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICE VOL LVII· FEBRUARY 1977 NO 2
ARTICLES Moscow's Concept for Collective Security in Asia LTC Alfred Biegel, USA 3 Conflict of World Views: Origins of the Cold War ILT Keith A. Dunn, USA 14 France's Defense Policy 26 Balance of Power in Europe LTC Ernest F. Koenig, Austrian Army 37 Daily Life at Fort Atkinson-on the Missouri-I820·27 Part II COL Virgil Ney, AUS, Ret 50 History of US Army Force Structuring ILT John C. Binkley, USA 67 South Africa: NATO's Unwelcome Ally .' Charles Latour 84
DEPARTMENTS Reader Forum 2 Articles of Interest 48 Others in Review 83 Military Notes 94 Military Books 100
COVER A familiar sight to all who have been to Fort Leavenworth, the clock tower on Sher· man Hall is a landmark in the area. Prior to World War II, the Command and General Staff College was located under the tower in Sherman·Grant·Sheridan, but has been twice relocated to settle finally in J. Franklin Bell Hall in 1959. The cover photo is the tower as seen from a location near Bell Hall looking north.
MILITARY REVIEW is published monthly In English. Spanish and Portuguese by the US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft leavenworth, KS 66027. Use of funds for prmting this publication approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 23 December 1975. Controlled circulation postage paid at Leavenworth, KS 66048. SubSCription: $8.00 per year US and APOI FPO; $10 00 foreign. Single copies $1.00 US and APO! FPD; $1.25 foreign. Address all mail to Military Review, USACGSC. Ft leavenworth. KS 66027. Telephone (913) 684·5642 or AUTOVON 552·5642. Unless otherwise stated. the views herem are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof. Basis of offiCial distribution is one per general officer and one per five field grade officers. US ISSN 0026·4148 ) ~If READER FORUM
Reading the Battlefield luxury in Europe today of large reserves The article "A Dilemma in Studying for decisive counterattacks or immedi Soviet Tactics" by Lieutenant Colonel ately available reinforcements, we are George F. Steger (Military Revlew, June forced to announce our resolve to defend 1976) • and the letter of rebu ttal by forward and to devise tactics which will Colonel Dallas Brown in the Reader be successful in winning the first battle_ Forum (Military Review, November There might not be a second. Part of that 1976) lliuminate the real challenge to goal is knowing the potential enemy well battlefield commanders today -" Reading enough to take advantage of any vulnera the Battlefield." . bility he might have That, by the way, Lieutenant Colonel Steger, although was the purpose of the ,micle which stating the "most likely" course of action Lieutenant Colonel Steger wrote. for an attacking Soviet Army commander Colonel Brown, on the other hand, is to be that of commitment of major using this discussion to express his dissat elements along certain predetermined cor isfaction with the forward active defense ridors, still caveats his statement by quall· doctrine. The new doctrine is a matter of fying remarks and, therefore, should not fact, and it is the duty of the intelligence have been challenged so unequivocably analyst to view the threat in light of it by Colonel Brown on the issue. After all, and to devise ways of helping our com the statement was made that we cannot manders read the battlefield. A discussion trust Soviet "plan mindedness." of whether the change was wise, and I Nevertheless, there is stlll a very good think it was, might make interesting case for Soviet commitment of major reading, but it was clearly not the point elements of attack forces along certain of Lieutenant Colonel Steger's article and predetermined corridors Soviet writings is, therefore, not relevant. on this subject are explicit. The very COL Frederick C. Dahlquist, USA Soviet writers to which Colonel Brown refers (Sidorenko, Savkin) are at pains to emphasize in all their works the principle Seeckt and the US Army of mass. As Colonel Savkin says, "The main effort must be concentrated on the I have some comments concerning most important axis or sector and at the Major L. D. Holder's article, "Seeckt and right time." the Fuhrerheer," which appeared in the However, what really disturbs me October 1976 MllJtary Revlew. . about the interchange between Lieuten Notwithstanding Hitler's political mag ant Colonel Steger and Colonel Brown is netism and militaristic meglomania, there that one of these two experts on Soviet is little doubt that rebirth of German military art, Lieutenant Colonel Steger, is armed power following post-World War I considering the realities of the situation disarmament was a result of the single which -has resulted from the recent major minded insight and personal effort of change in US tactical defensive doctrine. General Hans von Seeckt. It is interesting This doctrine on forward active defense is that Major Holder placed a minimum definitely not emerging, not avant-garde; value on the potential application of it is current tactics as taught now in the Seeckt's concepts to the structuring and US Army Command and General Staff training of a small, volunteer American College and as expressed in the latest Army. I personally feel that the analogies version of Field Manual 100-5 and in all the "How to Fight" manuals. Lacking the (contmued on page 112)
2 Military Review READER FORUM
(continued trom page 2) Boston Massacre Started Nothing One may quarrel with Cecil B. Cur to be drawn are useful regardless of the rey's assumption that the British soldiers perverted use to which the German Army involved in the Boston Massacre fired ultimately was put. because they perceived a real threat to First and foremost, it must be reo their personal safety (Bicentennial Fea membered that Seeckt envisioned mobili· ture, Military Review, October 1976). zation. As a consequence, his Reichswehr And Currey may stretch a point when was otganized and trained to facilitate a suggesting that John Adams and Josiah rapid expansion. Training for officers and Quincy acted as defense attorneys for the enlisted men was comprehensive and soldiers out of a sense of guilt for what placed great emphasis on development of happened on the night of 5 March 1770. leadership potential. In addition, military But I agree with him that war did not formations Were designed to form a viable grow out of the incident. cadre in the event of mobilization. It is I would go even further and challenge further interesting that the Army under· conven tional wisdom espoused by many took a program of parallel planning for scholars and famous persons in American industrial roo bilization which ensured history that the Boston Massacre held that the industrial base was prepared to deep meaning for all the American colo accept massive demands for arms pro· nies. That the militant Whig leadership in duction. Massachusetts led by Samuel Adams, Seeckt provided the German Army James Otis and Dr. Joseph Warren, to with a forward· looking modern doctrine name a few, trumpeted the incident as which emphasized mobility and com· the ultimate manifestation of an over bined arms employment to maximize the riding threat to liberty imposed by the combat power of relatively small forma· British Army is true. But public commu tions against a numerically stronger nications-newspapers, pamphlets, ser enemy. He visualized highly maneuvera mons and committees of correspond ble mechanized forces, supported by air ence-throughout the colonies generally cover, and coordinated through an inte failed to pick up, to any substantial grated command and control structure. degree, the railings flowing from Massa Elements of Seeckt's doctrine, all of chusetts. Moreover, those same media which represented the most advanced reflected no significant public reaction technical perfection of the military art as outside of Massachusetts to the killings it ellisted in the 1920s and 1930s, can be except for a couple of short newspaper found in current US Army tactics. articles in Connecticut. At a time when the US Army is faced My point is simply that, over a period with austere- funding and relatively low of time, scholars and writers have blown manpower levels, it seems to me that the Boston Massacre out of proportion as there is value in the lessons to be learned a major causal factor leading to the War from Seeckt's ability to "make bricks for Independence. The popular view of without straw." His character flaws and the killings, perpetuated to the point of lack of political wisdom should not ne· legend, was limited to Massachusetts and, gate the brilliance of the organizational possibly, its immediate neighbors. Out feat he accomplished. Seeckt's Fuhrer side the Bay Colony, no body but the heer provides a proven model of mobiliza' ardent Whig leaders cared. tion strategy worthy of careful study. R.W.Smith, MAJ Lvnn W. Kling, USA Editor. Manne Corps Gazette
112 Military Review MILITARY REVIEW 1922-1977
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'''M'';';''
.....< • , ' ,: ", ,
Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Biegel, United States Army
HE balance of power and influ tive ,ecurity de,ign for the Asian T ence is changing rapidly in Asia, arcna, GeneraJly, various Western ob The smoldering Sino-Soviet diHpute, serverH have dbmbsed the USSR's aggravated by contemporary ideologi pr()nollnl'ernent~ on this subject as pri cal hOHtIlity, by power rivalry and marily exereises in rhetoric and fun national antagonism" has caused damentaJly anti-Chinese, Furthermore, MOHcow to reaHHess Its political-mili "hen judging the lack of "unent tary options III that region, Conse Asian nation receptiveness, these ob quently, it now seems reasonable to :-.el'Vers consider the anti-Western im question whether America can con plications of the Soviet concept to be tinue to give Europe pride of place in only minimal. its global strategy, for the security The thesis of this article is that concerns of. the United States, the So Moscow's concept for coJlective secur viet Union, the People's Republic of ity in Asia constitutes a concrete, China (PRC) and Japan intersect in reahstic policy option which challenges Asia, These foul' nations principally, America's interests in that important often referred to as the quadrilateral region, This concept deserves the at powers, 1 will shape the future con tention of US strategists equal to that figuration of power now beginning to given Soviet Illterests in Europe. " Re emerge in Asia (see accompanying flecting Moscow's strategy in light of figure), shifting regional events, the Kremlin's As a means of addressing the sig security design evidences the USSR's nificant changes in the Far East, the willingness to increase its commit Soviet Union has postUlated a coJlec- ments in Asia, Simultaneously, the
February 1977 COLLECTIVE SECURITY growth of Soviet regional military The end of Pax Americana in Asia, capabilities sharply contrasts with an signaled by the US setback in Viet American tendency to reduce its mili nam, was followed by another visible tary pre sen c e in that important policy defeat in Angola. Once again, arena. :1 crucial questions are being raised A fter three decades of unprece auout the declining credibility of US dented power in world affairs, Amer gloual power. One example of this per ica finds itself questioning its role as spective can ue gleaned from a Chi world policeman. More importantly, nese assessment contained in Pelcing torlay the world appears to be evalu Rer;el(' in January IG76. America's ating perceived erosion of US resolve perceived decline in contrast to Soviet and confidence. expansion is outlined in the fopowing Although the United States remains Chinese commentary: I the predominant global power, the humiliating withdrawal from South After World Wa,' II, US imperial east Asia has had an effect on Amer ism established its sphe, es of influ ica's superpower image. Recently, in ence all "v,.,. the /I'''' lei. On till' decline ,'reasingly sharp questions have been tmlay, it is trying hard to maintain raiserl in international fOl"lImH COll it" vested interests. It'/lile Soviet re cerning America's place in the global vl.,i"ni.,,,, ... is trying to outstrip valance of power, as well as its will US imperialism. Carrying out rabid ingne" to resume a leader'hip role ('.!"}lat/siml al,,'oacl it is seeking /florid in world affairs. ''''!lellwn!!. It ;" "'ildll! ambitious and J/l(,l'C arillf'ntuffJU8. n'hener(,l' 1't makes a strp forward. the United States is }H (':':8rd a step backward. \
Appearing before a Senate subcom mittee in January ID7G, Secretary of State Henry KiHHinger underscored \\~a~hington'H current dilemma in I .. ulunt termH:
",~ f fA-« If the United States is seen to emas -,p clliatc itself in the face "f massive. L<.:- ~~. 1111[" eccdellted S,,!'irt and Cuba,i in Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Biegel is ten'entilln, what will be tlte pacep a student at the Defense Language tilln "f tlte leaders around the ,,'odd Institute, West Cnast B,anch. Presidio as they make decisions concerning of Montel'ey, California. He "eeeiver! a their future sccurity? ; B.A. f""/II the City Cnl/ege of Netc Y01'!c; an M.A. from The American Dr. Kissinger succinctly keyed on University, Washington, DC; and an the significant precedents set by Mos M.M.A.S. f1'Onl the USACGSC, class cow's successful intervention in the of 1976. He has served in Ge,.,,,any and Vieinam and with the Joint and Third World when he stated: Stmiegic Forces Dirertomte of the US An"y Concepts Antilysis Agency, Angola ,·cpresent., the /irst time Bethesda, Maryland. since tlte aftermath of World War, II 4 Military Review COLLECTIVE SECURITY
Pentagonal and Quadnlateral Balance of Power
• • Co' ,t tutes Quadrilateral Balance of Power In ASia
A!oSumptlons
• An even balance of power among the fIve major power centers neither ellists nor IS likely to eXist ,n the foreseeable future
• The global statu~ quo Will remaan tenuouo:. and subject to dynamIC change
• The US and USSR Will H~ma\l\ qlobal mlll\ar'l o:.uperpowers In thp forpseeable future
• China IS likely to remaan a regIonal power With !)0tn'1tJal for Increasing Its global power-that IS, polItical, economic and mrlltary
-Japan IS likely to forego the military option and concentrate on economic advance
_Western Europe WIll continue to strIve for Increased economIC, political and mllttary Integration and umty
that .the Soviets have moved militarily mrrtina thiB kind of thrrat. 6 at long distancrs to impose a "evime of their choice. It is the first time that In essence, few cou Id di~pute the ad the US has failed to respond to Soviet verse effect on US policy that resulted military moves outside their immedi from Moscow's successful intervention ate orbit. And it is the first time that in Apgola. When faced by an absence Congress has halted the Executive's of effective Western resolution and action while it lI'as in the process of response, Soviet actions were predict-
February 1971 5 COLLECTIVE SECURITY able: The Kremlin demonstrated the mo,t traumatic historical experiences 'yill and capacity to fill the power of the Ru"ian people. For the first vacuum. anrl only time in its history. Russia In an era of military bipolarity and was subjugated totally by an eastern political multlpolanty, Mo~cow's pol invader. After bearing the devastat icyrnakel's are paying increasing at~ ing burdens of an alien rule for over tent ion to the emerging balance n-f a century. the Rl1~:-.ian vidol'Y at the global power. In contra"t to We"tel'll Dattle of Klllikovo in 1:,80 effectively conceptions of the balanc~ of power ended Mongol contl'ol over most of concept, 7 the Kremlin'" leader" alway~ Ru:-;sia. 11 have exprc:4:4cLl their cunviction that Almo~t ~ix eenturies later, \\ hen the what they call the "global correlation wOl'ld ~]lotlight focll"ed Oil the Sino of world's forces" has been changing Soviet bordel' conniet in the spl'ing of in their favor. Even mure :-.ignifieant ] ()G(), Yevgeny Yevtllshenko published is Moscow's expre,sed view that the a poem whieh identified Mao and the balance of forces already has ~hiftell Chinese a" the "new ;\fol1gols." SaId in It:-. favor."- Ye\·tushenko in his famous poem Soviet souree~ indieate that the ""lIed 0" tlte Red S""I(' of the U.,suri: ~hift in the global balance actually occurred in ] %n. At that time, L I. l',," call sec i" the lIIurky twilight Brezhnev allnounced that the \\odd The U('1f' JI,[fJrlglIl If'an'lors with Socialist community, led by the USSR, hn11lbs in tli('ir qui/'els had "firmly grasped the hi~toriral ini H"t if thc!! attack the alarll/ bclls tiative" and "ehanged the balance of /(';11 ring power to the detriment of imperial And till 1'(' Will be JlIfI1'(' than eU(Juyh i~m."" This period markell the "IHI of fillhte," America'" nuclear ']lrimacy with the F",· a ne/(' battle "f Kulik"1'" u achievement of nuclear panty by the USSR. This fador, combinell with the Since Peter the Great to the present growing capability of the Soviet Union Soviet regime, the complex interrela to projert its military power through tIOnship between Russia'::; expansion alit the globe, appeared to provide the toward the east and the USSR's con :4Ubsta11ce for :\foscow',s view. temporary concern with Asian secur ity has become mOl'e obvious. The Historical Aspects Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 signified With almost two-thirds of the So the fil'st pact signed by the Chinese viet Union!s territory in ARia. Mos . EmpIre with a European powel'. With cow has a significant incentive to be the decline of Chinese I'egional power, come a leading Asian power. '" Gen Russia inexorably expanded its east erally, Moscow's pervasive interest in ern frontiers to the Pacific. Today, the east conforms to a long historical almost 300 years later, partly because tradition. When examining the indis of what China calls the "unequal pensable links between the contem treaties" of both Aigun (1858) and porary period and the Russian histori Peking (1860). the Soviet Union is cal experience, the Kremlin's fixation faced again with the dilemma of se on the subject of Asian·security seems cure frontiers in Asia. ''I . inescapable. The Mongol invasion and While Russia's relative security pri conquest of 1237-41 was one of the orities in the distant future are by no Military Review COLLECTIVE SECURITY
mean" clear, Soviet fear of the poten commentators have re-emph,u;izeo con tial threat from the east is IIlcreasing. sistently the need to create a Soviet For the Kremlin's deebionmakers, the backeo ,ystem of collective secunty outeome of this prubable ongoing de· in Asia. The ab~enl:e of explicit ra~ bate Will have Important long-I'ange tJOnale to !'>upport Mo:->cow'::; repetitive secul'lty implicatIOns. During the ['om "ssertions has triggered a flood of ing decadc~, the Soviet Union is likely global ,peculatlllll that has yet to run tu shIft itH SCl'Ul'lty Pl'lOl'ities tow~ll'd Its cOlll':->e. It, the east. Undelllably, thiS a]lpeal ap Available documentary evidence peared to be the main thrust uf Alex frum Suviet source" does not amplify ander I. Solzhenitsyn's adVice in hi~ the speCific pI'inciple,. Background Letter to tlte Sodet Lcud,')". In 1974, events, however, continue to support before his exile from the Soviet UIll;n, the as"umption that ;\foscow's pl'lority Sulzhenitsyn wrote:, motivation fur Its "ecurity initiative is to contain China, 17 C'unllil'ting ideo, F,'olll all sides e.rcept China lI'e hUl'l' logical and national interests that ample !Juarautee of se£'llJ'ify for a have become more vislule (loS a result lono time to come . ... For the lU:.rt of the burder cla,he~ in March 1DGD hal[-c('utul Y Hm' only !lcuuiuf' military stimulate I\iosL'ow':-, re:-;ulve lo create n('ed will be to de f r "d ou' selvcs a politil'al-milital',}' alliance in ASia. agaiust China . ... A tall established One might preoiet that the Kremlin's Nm'theast is {Jur best dc/cnse against proJlotlrH.:ement is merely the concep Cltina. !\'o flue else on earth fhl'catrtls tual stage of an evolVing sectlnt,}' us, and no one is yoing t() attack us. n design. Given the growth uf Suviet political,military capabilities, a future Against this backdrop, which high· secul"i ly framework cull hI evolve tu lights the Soviet security dilemma, :->u}lpurt a probable geopolitical Him to one might understand more readily bulate, <,onstrain and cuerce the prrc. the historical relevance of Moscow's Adllitionally, Brezhnev's remarks pronouncement of a "Grand Design :--eem tu Imply a second, more diffuse for Asia." objective. DUI'ing the period when the Soviet initiative was proposed ini Contemporary Aspects tially, the Nixon administration al Three months after the outbreak of ready had announced Its intent to OIS border gkirmishes along the Sino-So engage from the waI:, III Southeagt viet border, during an international Asia. Further, Britain had uutlined Communist conference in Moscow, So its intent to withdraw its remaining viet Party Chief Brezhnev on 7 June f()rce~ east of Suez by 1971. Hence, 1969 proposed the need for a system Moscow assumed that the retrench of collective security in Asia. Seven ment of Western puwer was inevilable. years have passed since Brezhnev ob Growing Soviet strategir and com'en served that "the course of events is tional mil ita I' y. capabilities also putting on the agenda the task of prompted the Kremlin to assert its creating a system of collective security intention to exploit an anticipated re in Asia." ", Since the proposal was gional security vacuum. Thus, Brezh first announced, subsequent elabora nev's announcement of the collective tion of the Soviet concept has been Hecurity concept provided the means nonspecific. Yet, Moscow's officials and for explol'ing Asian receptivity for a
February 1977 COLLECTIVE SECURITY security design that could replace for Asia represents a broad security "til'ed" Western regional security framework to bolster the USSR's manage!'s and preeiude a potential global, position while accomplishing resurgence of Japanese imperialiRID. I); the following important regional stra FUl,thel'more, Pl'e~ident Nixon>~ tegk objectives: \'isit to (,hina in 1972 SIIggested a Sino-American rapprochement that • Deterring potential threats to the worried Moscow more than any other territorial integrity of the USSR. aspeet of (,hinese external policy, with • Increasing the Kremlin's regional the possible exception of China's nu power and influence at the expense of clear weapon potential.!lI The Ford (,hina and the We,tern World. visit to the PRC in December 1!J75 • Maintaining ideological primacy repre;-;ent~ an event with a potential over the PRC and other Commlini"t impaet analogous to that of the pre govel'llments and parties of Asia. vious Nixon visit. Consequently. Mos • Achieving a rapprochement with cow remain~ quite concerned auout the China during the post-Mao era on uncertain implications of the future Moscow's terms. balance of forces that could result • Minimizing the effects of the from 11 firm Sino-American connection. growing Sino-American rapproche ThiS factor has become increasingly ment. appar~nt :-.ince Brezhnev't-j initial pro • Improving relations with Japan. nouncement of the Soviet security de • Preventing a Sino-Japanese part sign for Asia. nership with de facto US backing. Soviet concel'll about the implica tions of 11 probable Sino-Japanese Although the Kremlin continues to rapprochement are calculations that ,tress that the bilateral underpinnings rank immediately after the growing of its Asian security initiative ulti SlI1o-American relationship. Moscow mately might evolve into a multilateral realizes the relative difficulty it has ,tructure, one should not lose sight in competing effectively for Japan's of the fact that Soviet capabilities will favor or, at the very least, Tokyo's remain the deci,ive arbiter of any benign neutrality. Hence, the Krem fulure Asian power equation. lin appears to be capitalizing, some Moscow's emphasis on the collective times crudely, on what appears to be nature of its ,ecul'ity design is prob the most potent weapon available in ably rhetoric which obscures its l'eal its arsenal-Soviet military power. ~u purpose-the advancement of the uni As long as Moscow refuses to retul'll lateral national interests of the So the northel'll territories to Japan, and viet Union. Therefore, the Soviet con for as long as the Sino-Soviet border cept for Asia still must be grounded dispute remains in force, the deterrent firmly on the basis of Soviet regional force of the Kremlin's security design intere"ts and global strategic objec in Asia will continue to be an increas tives. Moscow's emphasis on the col ingly significant Soviet regional ob lective basis of its security design can jective. be construed as a secondary require To be sure, the Sino-Soviet dispute ment. By focusing on the collective provides the major incentive for Mos aspect of its initiative, the 'Kremlin ~ow's contemporary foc~~ on Asia. apparently is attempting to legitimize Generally, the Soviet Grand Design the growth of its power in the Asian
Military Revieyt COLLECTIVE SECURITY arena, Moscow also is attempting to It is ditlicult to imagine Moscow's avoid the impression that the Soviet leadership remaining silent in the face Union would impose its own seeurity of Chinese claims that the L'SSR is a Hy~tem on weaker regional natJOIlH. I';uropean rather than an Asian power. If the self-interest priorit,' of its se At the same time, there are no indica CU1'it,Y, proJ1o~[tl ]:-; lInden·,toud, one tions to conclude that Moscow will ac hardly can assess the importance of cept Peking as an equal partner in the Kremlin's IH'oposal completely on the Soviet version of the "Will'ld CI)m the baSIS of Third World Asian re munlst lI!ovement" 01' that Mosco\\' cept i veness. \Vould accede to Peking's role as the One must concluoe that the USSR, I('ader and recognized model fOl' the faced by the potentially dangerous 11' Third Wol'ld. China is unlIkely to sub redentist claims by both Japan lind mit \\'IllIngly to a pOSItion subordinate China, will attempt tu ensure the ter tu the L'SSR within a theoretically ritorial status quo of the Soviet Union. united Socialist camp. In the coming The requirement for secure frontiers decade, ho,tiIity and rivalry probably in Asia, when coupled with conflicting wIll continue to mark the Sino-Soviet Sino-Soviet national and ideologIeal relationship. As a result, the VSSR IS interestH, now provides n major im~ lIkely to increase rather than diminish pulse for the Kremlm's regional se its. coercive capabilities agll!nst China. clll-ity design. Obviously, lIIoscow de sires to achie\'e a guarantee for So Kremlin Hopes viet borders on the same basis that Brezhnev'" initiative for collective now exists in EU1'ope. ThIS :..;eclll'ity ,ecuri!y in Asia should be viewed as imperative undel'lies repeated SovIet a broad ..;ecul'ity frameworl{ to iRolate, statements which directly I'elate the cOIlstrain and coerl'e Peking. By this objectives and achievements obtained means, the Kremlin hope' to re(iuce by the Helsinki Conference with Rus and eventually to eliminate possible sia's curl'ent seclll'ity initiative for anti-Soviet activities b,' China. It IS Asia. important to stress that the Kremlin Encouraged by the recent achieve has marie no secret of its ultimate aim ment of collective security in Europe, to bring China back into the "World Mo'cow call be expected to intenSIfy Communist Movement" tu partil'lpate its requirement for a similar security in the struggle against imperialism. framework for Asia. Since it appears Thi:.; factor has remained Mo:-;cow's doubtful that Peking 01' Tokyo will consistent theme and condition for the react favorably to any security pro normalIzation of relations WIth China posal urged by Moscow, the Helsinki in the post-Mao era. success which guaranteed Soviet ter Until Moscow's conditions for a ritorial gains in Europe cannot be ex Sino-Soviet rapprochement are met, pected to be duplicated in Asia within the Kremlin can be expected to exe the foreseeable future_ Consequently, cute a containment policy directed one can assume that the hostility and against Peking. This threat, in the tension in the region, particularly be form of a collective security design, tween Moscow and Peking, will con is given continual play in the Soviet tinue to fester. Tokyo's apparent media. "tilt" toward P e kin g represents While a Soviet intention to provoke another growing danger for Moscow. a major war with China is unlikely,
February 1977 9 COLLECTIVE SECURITY
Moscow's initiation of sporadic border attacked by Peking because an easing conflicts to coerce a recalcitrant ad of tension in Europe is considered to versary cannot be ruled out. At the be detrimental to China's security in strategic level, Peking is painfully terests. aware that it" comparative military In view of Moscow's stated intent capabilities are significantly inferior to exploit internal tensions resulting to the Soviet Union in all areas with from a Chinese succe!->~·don cri,gis, an the exception of manpower. Further, increased buildup of Soviet forces the PRC's military manpower is used along the Sino-Soviet border would for substantial internal tasks, Thus, be a particularly ominous sign of a the ChIllese leader"hip is confronted major Soviet coercive effort against by a dilemma. No matter what sacri China. Moscow's repeated refusal to fices are marle, the PRC cannot hope to change its ideological relationship match the military might of the with China from proletarian interna USSR. Despite the PRC's extensive tionalism to peaceful coexistence in military buildup during recent years, ,hcates that the Soviets will not re the gap between relath'e Sino-Soviet linquish a potent ideological justifica military capabilities is widening to tion wh.ch legitimizes coercive action the detriment of China. Peking'~ mili against the PRC. tary equ ipment i" largely ob~olete. While the Soviet collective security China does not po"sess the sophisti initiative for Asia supports Moscow's cater! military teChnology, intelligence ter!'ltorial status quo, .t plays a role collection and command and control in underscoring 1loscow's ideological capabilitie" available to the Soviet primacy in the Socialist world. This Union. China's inherent weakness con concept also implies a growing Soviet stitutes a standing invitation for an des;"e to threaten China by diverting increase in the potency of Moscow's Peking's attention from the contested coe,'cive diplomacy. By matching its Smo-Soviet border region to flanks pronouncements with act ion, the where the PRC may be even more vul Kremlin likely will follow through nerable. By attempting to forge a bi with its stated intent to exploit oppor lateral or multilateral security alliance tunities provided by a post-:\Iao suc around the rimland of China, the So ces"ion "truggle. viet Union appears to be increasing its regional politlcal'military advantages Soviet Concerns should military clashes along the 'Sino Deep hatred and fear of the Soviet Soviet border escalate into wider con Union's coercive actions and contain flict. ment policies continue to preoccupy Yet, to believe that solemn pledges Peking's leadership. This apprehen embodied in the collective aspect of the sion intensifies the PRC's efforts to USSR's security design would be the' avoid the Soviet encirclement and to crucial factor is naIve, High-sounding divert Moscow's capabilities away phrases and lofty principles in multi- I from China. These fundamental secur lateral pacts could not provide a credi- ' ity concerns cause the Chinese to ex ble substitute for the unilateral capa- , ploit existing areas of instability on bilit.es of Soviet regional power, Con- ! other Soviet fronts. The relaxation of sequently. the USSR is expected to in tension along EUropean borders, si'g crease it. military power in the Asian nified by the Helsinki Conference, is arena. While the anticipated buildup
10 Military ReView COLLECTIVE SECURITY of the Kremlin's regional militar:, is likely to remain in force. canabilities has significant anti-West Aufi-Wes/em Ob/fCfil·fH. A majol' ern o\'ertones and would be aimed at seconriary objective of the Kremlin's aecomplishing Moscow's uroarler stra :-.enll'ity :o:cheme relates to Mo~tow':-; tegic objectives and interest~, Soviet desire to expand the USSR's regional military capabilities \\ ollid form the power and influence at the expen,e of backdrop of Moscow's campaign of the WeRt ern World. Mnsco\\" hope" to coercion agamst China. [n addition to fill the ,el"urity Vacuum left by the de a likely improvement of its milltill')" parture of Bl"Iti,h RIlc1 perceived re capabilities along the Sino-Soviet bor trellchment of American pcmer. The deI', Moscow olln ue expected to in Kremlin long has oppo'ied antl-Com crea:-;e it~ naval ')}'e~en('e in the Pal'ifie mllni:-,t A:-.ian g}·ouping .... ami hope:-- til and Indian Oceans to remind ChUla eH}lltalize on America',:.:: i:.-:o'atlOnl~t that its southern borders alsu are vllI tendelleie:-l. Recent statemellts from nerable to attack. The KremlIn'" 1'1- :\'lo";(.O\V indicate that its ~el'ilrity de valry Inth China for influence o\"er the ",igu is :-.eell a .... a m€'nll~ to: Asian nations along the rimland of the PRe to include IndIa, Vietnam, • Replace the JlO\\ defunct South Laos, Thailand, Burma and Taiwan ea .... t A ..,ja T I' eat y Organization prodde a clear Signal that Mo,cow lSEATO,. intends to heighten Peking's security • "'eutralize the A,ian and Pacific conl'ern~ Rhould renewed conflict e:-l~ ('tHllll·)1 IASI'ACI. calate along the Soviet Union's terl"l • Neutralize the A:-:sol'lHtioll of torial frontiers with ("hina. Stluthea,t A,illn "'ations (ASEANI. • ~eutralIzt' the US Pal"itic cloc Priority Objectives trine. At least three priority objectives ran he t1eriverl from :'.foscow's seelldty l'l'f'I'('llt (lJ FflJ'I";fnll an Atlt/-Sf/cit} l'Olll'ept for ASlH: ('uJ/taWI1If tit 1>lJlil'lI. Significantly. Antl-ChiJln~r CIJutaltlmcnt Puliey. ~1()..;t'o\\'\., :-.eclirity concept for A~Ia i~ The primary motivation for the Krem e,plicaLle 111 term" of \ltal Soviet lin's security design relates c!tredly I egional iJltere:-.t~ and IIb.Jedl\'C'~. ;\'0 to deteriorating Smo-Soviet relations. lollger l'llll the Kremlin .... ubol'dinate China now dominate.-:i ~Jo.~('ow·s J'e~ It....; A:.;ian ....;el'lIl'it,v l'ulJl'eI'Jl~ to th(l~e gional focus. The Sino-So\'iet displlte of Europe or tn g-Iolml Soviet pnlitll'al has reached the level where :'.Ioscow's military competition \\"Ith the United national and ideological interests clash State". The jlu",lhIllt,' of a Sino-Japa with the PR(" throughout the globe. ne,e partnershIp with the de {acto Con~equently, the neutralization of the backing of the t.:nited States has Chinese thre'lt to Soviet "e('urity has' fOl'l'ed ::\losco'V tu fol'u:o-; It~ il1tere~h; become the Kremlin's prionty concern un its inerea:-;illgly vital geopolItical in Asia. Thi~ concept appears to be a East ASIan front. Hence, Asia is no\\" Soviet-led containment pol icy of an area no less important to- the in China. Peking has opposed it vehe terests of the USSR than EUl"Ope and mently. Since a genuine Sino-Soviet the Middle Enst. An effective Sino rapprochement after the demise of JapaneHe and Amel'lcan partnership in Mao is doubtful, the anti-Chinese ra the po,,(-Mao era likely would result tionale for Moscow's security design In the following:
February 1977 11 COLLECTIVE SECURITY
• Deterring the Soviet Union from that there are few current Asian ad \nitiating major c 0 e r c i v e action herents to the Soviet security initia against China. tive, one should not fall into the trap • Reduction of the probability of a of applying current evaluations of Sino-Soviet rapprochement on Mos Asian government reactions as the cow's terms during the critical post sole criteria for the concept's signifi Mao era. cance. With the possibility of dynamic • Limiting Moscow's political-mili ,changes in the future regional power tary 'options in Western Europe, the alignment, a more receptive climate Middle East and throughout the Third for the Soviet Asian security initia World. tive should not be precluded. At the • An increase of the Soviet Union's same time, it is important to stress "two-front" dilemma, while enhancing that the potency of visible and usable Western security interests and ob Soviet pow~r throughout the Asian jectives at Moscow's expense. theater, rather than the more tenuous • Minimizing Moscow's ability to capabilities or allegiance of Third undermine the Japanese-American al World regional nations, ultimately liance and forestall the emergence of will decide the success or failure of a close Sino-Japanese alignment. the Kremlin's security design for Asia. • Forcing the USSR to temper its The available evidence suggests that support for anti-Western and anti Soviet interests in Asia deserve the Chinese causes in order to offset the serious attention lof Western policy possible development of a more for makers equal to that given Soviet in midable Sino-American-Japanese se terests in Europe, for Brezhnev's pro cUl'ity alignment. nouncements represent an expression of Soviet intentions to construct a Significance of Moscow's Grand Design for Asia formidable security capability in Asia. In assessing the significance of the By analogy, Moscow's broad formula Soviet security initiative. a word of tion even might be contrasted with caution is in order. Only the Mongo similar regional doctrines proclaimed lian People's Republic (MPR) and by previous American administrations Iran officially have declared their in before they actually were imple tention to cooperate in the Soviet se mented. The Truman, Eisenhower and curity design. In Iran's case, its sup Nixon Doctrines provided outlines of port remains ambiguous and unlikely. strategic American policy trends to India, Vietnam, the MPR and, pos ward specific geographic regions of sibly, Afghanistan currently appear the globe. to be the only candidates for possible With the possible exception of the membership in the Soviet-backed re Indian Ocean, the predominance of gional security effort. However, to as Soviet power throughout Asia is not sess the significance of the Soviet ini yet apparent. Still, one must transcend tiative for collective security in Asia the current regional context in search entirely on present Asian membership of relevant trends. Notably, the Mon alone would doom Moscow's concept to roe Doctrine was promulgated long certain failu reo Yet one should tread before the United States had the cautiously before concluding that the power to establish its own' sphere of concept is inherently weak or lacks influence in Latin America. Similarly, substance. Notwithstanding the fact the Sino-Soviet dispute, combined
12 Military He,view COLLECTIVE SECURITY
with repeated Soviet assertions that gional security design, for, like the the 'correlation of wO~'ld forces are Monroe Doctrine, the Soviet proposal shifting in favor of Soviet-style social appears to await the day when grow ism, provides the Kremlin with suffi ing regional capabilities actually cient incentives to create its own re- match. Moscow's declared intentions.
NOTES
1 GeOl"itC W. 00.11. "The Super-Powers in Asia," the Socmhst nations_ A Ithough Soviet leaders at East ASia (wd the World SlJatl'm [>art I .. The the 2h.t Purty ConR'I·('sli claimed that thC' shift SUJ'cr-I'oweTIJ fllld thl' Contl'zt. Adelphi Papcr8. in thl' wOlld relntion of force!> wa!'. decisive and Number 91. The lnt(>rnationnl [nstitutl' (or 8tm_ Irlevocable nnd thnt hlUgh parity or po ..... er be~ tl's:!'ic Studies" London, Eng., 1972, pp 1-8. twccn the Wc~t and the Communist camp C'Xlsti'd, the Yl'lIr 196U WOI< ollegedly the fin.t tlmc that 2 In Det'cmbel' 1973, Secretary DC Stute Henry SU\ let Bource'! indlt'ah>d that thl' balunl'e or forces Kbainger under~cored th(' dominant theme of <1ctunl!y by-pussed the We-;t in favur of socjnli!:lm America's l'eintlOnshlp with Western EUI"oIJe and led by the Soviet Union. Raymond L. Garthoff. the Al'Rntic community. Henry A. Kh;singer. "The Tllc 8m'let Imllf}(' of Fut,n'c War. Public Affnirs Yell I' of Europe," Amt'TlCIlII Forelon Polic/J Titre/' Prt·... ", Woshington. DC, Hl59, p 5, RHSUllB. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., NY, 1074, pp 271-B2 1U L. I DrezhnC'v, 011 tile Polu'y 0/ the Soviet 1.'''1011 fwd tlte ["termlhOl/1I1 SItuatIon. Novo 1 11111l1. pp r,~-GO. ~ Jen Ku-ping, ''The Wurld tn 1975. Factor" for Duth Revolution nnd War Are In(,lensing," ['d"uU Uevi( tl', 2 January 197G, J) 21- l~ Ale'(andpr I Slllzh(>hltsyn. Lett(r to the'S01'If't 1.,'(!(ll'7H, Hnrpl'T & Huw Publishers. In('" NY. ; Henry A K;"'singer, "Angola: Secunty Dl , 1!.li5. Jl 4& nends un Equilibrium Not Surr('ndC'r." Vital SJl('cch('s 0/ the Day. 1 March 1976, p 291. Ii L. I. Drczhncv m an atidl'(>!>s to dw 10ter ntltwnlli Meding of the Communl"t nnd Y.\Hker'>' IlUnd. PUlty in Mo'>cow n,; fJlIotpd in V_ Pnv]ov"ky, "Col ll'ctl~e Security the Wny to Pl'nC'c m Asia." I"trr i "Dnlnnce IIf Power j<; a concept thnt de.,cr,bes "'ltwl,ai A/rmrs. July 1972, p 2.{ how ;,tate'< deal With the Ploblems of nntlOnaJ aecurity In th(· ('onte:o:t of shlftmg llilianC('':'i nnd III Aiel!.nndel" O. Ghcbhnldt. "The SUVlI't System alh.:-nmenb." The balanc{' uf power {'oncept b con IIf CnlJectl'oe SC'{'Ul·ity In A"Ill." A.'fl"" Sun ry. ~ld(',.{'d to b(' n cenU·al featule of the strug'gie for Dccl'mbl'r H17.I. flP 1075-91. Petcr Hownr,l, "A power in th{' mtel'natlOnal nrena Jack C Plnno Rv .. t~'m of CoU('{'tiV(' Security." M.Zfltl, J\lly-Augu~t and Huy Olton. The [lllCTlHlllOrlftl Uttatw"s [JI< l'HHl. PI) HIO-204. Arnold L. Horlick. "The Soviet tlollaTlI. Holt, RinC'hurt & Wm"ton, NY. 19fi9, pp UOlOn<;.' Asifln Collpctiv(' SeC'urlty Proposal' A 124_25 nnd Hun~ J Morgenthau, Polltlt'8 Amol'!J Club In Search of Members," 1'(!("lfir AlfflirB. Natw/l/j Tit" StrufWlt, /or Pow,r fll,d ["'1ft, V"lume 47. Numbcr 3. Fall 1974. PI> 269~>l5, Shf'l Alfled A. Knopf, 1nc, NY. HlG7, pp lr,1-211. .!on W, Simon, "The Japan-China-USSR Trl .In).!le,'' 1',f('lfi(" A (r(llT8. Volum(> 27. Nomber 2. k The Soviet concept of "COrl plution of furce)''' Summer 1974 pp t25·'l!ol. and Vietur Zor;>;n. ··Cnl also reiPTI f'd to as "'balance of force»" Ii> (lnbu let ti ... c SecUl'tty," SuTt'lvnl, August 19G~I, Jl 24)l.. rat(>d in F. D Kohler. et aI, SOl'let Str(ltefl1J for the SCVClftlf'8 FrOnt Cold Il'ar to PC(Lrc/ul Co 17 Many ub"el'V('!"> bciJevl' that the ('ur.ilnnl I'XI:st,lI("e, Cpnlt'r for Advanced Int.ernatlOnal reR.l>nn for Drpzhnev'" propo!:>ui \\tn'> thC" de~lre to Studies, Universih' of Millmi. Washington, DC. Ulj.mnlze nn antI-China front In A'>H1 In l"p"ptm ... e 1972. pp 41-42 The reference t.o the "favtJrable tf) the long-"moJ,lering Sino-SuviC't ('onnict nlung eorl'eilltion of force .... h eon»lstently rppeated In th('lr common burtlel', China'!:! con-.i ... tent (OI·US. on the stlltC'mpnt., mnde by SO'ojet pohcymaker" ,mti thl' "um'Q'HlI t1"puth's" nl I February 1977 13 A Conflict of World Views: The Origins of the Cold War First Lieutenant Keith A. Dunn, United States Army ITHIN the last decade, many would cause hostility between the W historians who concentrated USSR and thc United States from on the post-World War II years have the end of World War II until the condemned American foreign policy present: two totally different perspec makers for causing the Cold War. tives for organizing the world and Revisionist historians have advanced protecting the respective nation-states numerous interpretations to explain from the origins of another world the Grand Alliance's demise: the use war. Therefore, to understand the of the atomic bomb as a warning to origins of the Cold War, one 'must the Soviet Union that it should loosen comprehend how each country's inter its control over Eastern Europe: the pretations of past events generated change from a sympathetic, if not different sets of assumption for the pro-Soviet, Franklin D. Roosevelt to postwar world and why Soviet-Ameri an aggressive, impulsive Harry S. can objectives conflicted. Truman; a capitalist need for markets Moscow defined its essential post and a desire to dominate the world war objective as security from another economy; and the abrupt manner in attack by Germany which had already which the United States ended lend directed two devastating military cam lease aid to the Soviet Union. paigns at the heart of the .USSR. To These difficulties di;r not cause the obtain the desired security, Soviet Cold War. Rather, they were mani leaders believed that they needed a festations of a larger problem that ring of loyal states. This plan meant 14 Military Review ORIGINS OF COLD WAR that Eastern EUrope had to be in ers feared that nations deprived of clined philosophically toward Moscow markets and raW materials would use and that the political and economic wars of conquest to obtain the neces structure of those nations had to con sary foreign markets. form to Soviet desires. The Soviet Quite obviously, Soviet and Ameri Union recognized that a nation that can assnmptions for the postwar world was tied economically to a political directly conflicted. Moscow intended bloc also would be tied militarily and to use spheres of influence, bloc trad politicnlly. Therefore. by means of ing and political pressure to ensure bilateral trade agreements, economic friendly governments in an area of collaboration and reparation pay vital strategic interest. The United men£s, Moscow attempted to break the States attempted to deny :'oioscow a East European pre-World War II ties sphere of influence and tried to en with the West and to construct a force liberal trade practices upon the cordon sanitaire of friendly govern world. When Washington failed to ments on the Soviet Union's borders. I obtain its objectives in Eastern Eu rope, it charged Moscow with non cooperation and holding hostile at American View titudes toward the United States. American postwar planners failed to consider that other nations could hold America viewed the postwar period different though feasible assumptions from a different perspective. After living through war, depression, fas cism and then renewed war, Washing ton's policymakers saw a direct con nection' among these events. Each in cident proceeded from the other in an almost cyclical development. Ameri can military planners thought that American demobilization after World War I had eneou raged aggressors. Military personnel also maintained that the United States needed its military power ready throughout the world to repel attacks from future First Lieutenant Keith A. DUnn is aggressors. Washington's pol i tic a I a member of the US Army War Col planners, however, thought that eco lege Strategic Studies Institute, Car nomic factors caused wars. They con lisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He I'e cluded that events of the 1920s and ceived a B.S. in Education from South 1930s represented a general pattern: east Missouri State University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Ame7'ican Diplo Retarded international trade led to I macy from the University of MissOl/d. depression, rise of totalitarian govern He has served as an instruct01' at the ments and eventual world war. As US Army Security Agency and as , long as nations attempted to construct aide-de-camp for the former Deputy closed economic systems through bi Commandant of tile US Army War lateral barter trade and cartel agree Coilege, 'Brigadier General Edwal'd B. : ments, American political policymak- Atleeson. IFebruary 1977 15 ORIGINS Of COLD WAR fpr handling postwar problems. policy when he stated that: Peace and prosperity were the two Any. situation in which armed hos most important postwar objectives for tilities a"e in progress or are threat American political policymakers. 2 Ob ened is a situation wherein l'igilts and sessed by a decade of world depres inte"ests of all nations either are or sion and fascism, planners feared that, may be . 16 Military Review ORIGINS OF COLD WAR States' postwal' foreign policy. In fea.r of the past, the SecI'etal'Y of cl'eased tl'ade meant that the United State admonished the Council to sup States could attack the two postwal' pOl't a bold realistic appl'oach 01' to problems' which it feared: recurl'ent watch the United States sink into depression and unemployment. In ueconomic collap:::;e and economic an· H)45, Secl'etary of Commerce Henry archy fal' more disastrous than the Wallace consistently advol'ated ex depression of 1!l2!l ...." Driving his panded trade as a panacea for Ameri point home. the Secretary contended can postwar domestic problems. For that avoiding such an economic dis example, in April, Wallace told the ,,"tel' depended upon finding jobs and President of the Anglo-American good wages for retlll'lling. soldiers. He Trading Corporation that the Depart estimated t hat the United States ment of Commel'ce would do evel'y- needed to find Jobs for 60 million \ thing within its statutory limitations \l'Ol'king men and \\omen ..Without {to increase postwar tl·mie. The Com such Job", the American dome"tic merce Depal'tment. Wallace sa i d. economy would mllap"e. Finally, Stet would work hand in hand with pl'lvate tinius claimed that the United States enterprise to eliminate foreign re had the physical ability to maintain strictions un world commerce because jobs for GO million people. But Stet a "mal'ked increase in the volume of tiniuR said: foreign trade will be a necessity if .. . in peacetime 11'(' cannrd 1'cach this country is to mainldin fllll em this hi!}h lel'r! of production unlcss ployment in peacetime." In September, we ran find markets abrnacl as well Wallace wl'ote Senator Wayne Morse: as at home tor inl'cstmcnt and 0/11' ... that an e.1'panding foreign trade goods and scrrircs. x can and I('ill make a major contribu tiun to the attainment of Ollr most important economic nb}ectires: sus Responsibility of Power tained production, filII prndllctit'e em ployment, and a rising level of lir ing .. .. 7 Folluwing the pattern set by Stet Other agencies, in additiun to the tinius, Acting Secretary uf State Commerce Departmen t, felt pressures Joseph Gl'ew addl'essed the fil'st grad to explain American postwar foreign uating class from the School of Ad policy in tel'ms of domestic economics. vanced International Studies on "The One month before V-E Day, Secretal'Y Responsibility of Power." Al'guing of State Stettinius addl'essed the that the United States had to recog Council on Foreign Relations and ex nize that it was a world power, Grew plained Amel'ican war objectives. "We tried to make it clear that America are fighting this war," Stettinius told could not afford to retrench after the group, "in order that all Ameri World War II. Power, as Grew defined cans may gain the opportunity to live it, meant economic power as well as secUl'ely and in peace." Explaining military power. FUl'thermore, the Act that victory in war was only the first ing Secretary warned that the United step, Stettinius said that Washington's States, and particularly future foreign fOl'eign and domestic policies had to service personnel, must not think work in harmony to prevent future "narrowly and in pUl'ely national wars. Playing on the ever-present terms." The United States had to February 1977 17 ORIGINs OF COLD WAR revive Europe and the world economy. example of Germany during the 19308 Otherwise, Grew predicted that there always lingered in the back of State would be "no sound prosperity at Department officials' minds. They be home, no growth of world trade, lieved that economic disorder meant nothing but recurrent depression, po the rise of dictators and autarky fol litical instability, and pethaps another lowed by war. world conflict."" In addition to the fear of recurrent depression, State Department repre World Trade sentatives believed that economic blocs would mean rival political and military blocs. Hull had stressed during the Unable to shake a philosophy which 1930s that economic agreements were defined peace and war in economic followed by political and military al terms, political planners· prescribed liances. Although Hull's thought was expansion of world trade as a cure not completely accepted in the preced for all problems. With the United ing decade, the H u llian reflections per States emerging as the most powerful meated postwar philosophy. Clair Wil economic nation, it approached the cox, the Director of the Office of In postwar era with confidence and self ternational Trade Policy, told the Na assurance. In July 1945, a committee tional Council of Social Studies that from the Foreign Economic Adminis "international trade has been an in tration (FEA) reported t hat the strument of war." Using World War United States, and possibly Canada, II as his example, Wilcox pointed out were the only two nations with enough that military and economic warfare gold reserves and undamaged indus merged in modern wars. Industrial trial capacity to face postwar economic states when engaged in economic con problems with flexibility and freedom. flict created cartel agreements, for The committee predicted success if eign exchange controls, import quotas, Washington took decisive action, but, preferential trading systems and bar at the same time, it foresaw world ter trade in order to become less de disaster if the United States failed in pendent upon rival nations. Wilcox its mission of reordering the world: claimed that such autarkic policies We have the power to produce a were as aggressive as military 'alli world-wide expansion of trade and a ances because restrictive trade prac general relaxation of trade barriers tices generated animosity followed by among the western nations, if we take war. 10 appropriate action. We can also [by] Williard Thorp, deputy to the As 1t'ise action insure the maximum ex sistant Secretary of State for Eco pansion of trade with state-trading nomic Affairs, said in November 1945 countries. If we fail to talce adequate that the world faced the development action, we may doom the world to a of a ru ble bloc, a sterling bloc and a return to contracting economies, ris dollar bloc. If these economic blocs ing trade barriers, and vanishing in solidified, Thorp feared that each sys ternational trade. 12 tem would use "the whole gamut of The FEA committee did not explain, economic and political pressures to however, that the Soviet Unicn might achieve their economic objectives." II approach postwar economic problems As Thorp's comments indicated, the from a different perspective. In ad- 18 Military Review ORIGINS OF COLD WAR dition, the FEA did not point out more imports other count";es will not that Washington could do little to be able to pay us 1m' the increased change Soviet policies without alienat exports that lVe seek. 1\ ing the former wartime ally. Through a series of institutions, such as the International Bank for Soviet Objectives Reconstruction and Develupment, the International Monetary Fund, as well as American postwar loans and the The goals espoused by Washington's assumed postwar demand fur Ameri most influential economic pustwar can goods, the United States huped planning agencies struck at the heart to break down trade barriers. Placing uf Soviet postwar ubjectives. Moscow money in the hands of rebuilding na illtended to establish a clused economic tions had a dual purpose which the system and to use the industrial and new Secretary of State, James F. natural resources uf the cuuntries it Byrnes, recugnized. In the fall of cuntrolled to rebuild a Suviet Uniun 1945, Byrnes told his fellow South devastated by war. In additiun, the Carolinians to support American lend USSR wanted to break the prewar ing policies. Loans increased American trading patterns uf East Eurupean foreign markets and struck a bluw nations and to direct the l'ommercial against exclusive trading blocs be relatiuns uf thuse states tuward the cause, as Byrnes said, "in the long Soviet Uniun. A friendly ring of states run dollars we lend can be spent only would provide Moscow HUme ~eclll'ity in this country." 1:1 and would facilitate l'ehabilitation be Loans, however, were only a partial cau,e the Kremlin cuuld use the repa solution sin c e the United States ratiun payments it received from East wanted to increase its imports. Im Eurupean natiuns tu rebuild Suviet ports would place cash or credit in econumic produdivity. Pi :;\foreover; the hands of foreign guvernmenb. the Soviet Union lacked the indus Also, purchasing foreign goods would tl'ial and monetary capacity to cum stimulate American exports and would pete with the United States in any provide American business with raw free market environment. The USSR materials. Finally, if handled through had approximately 25 percent of its private busine:-ls channelB, increa:4ed capital equipment destruyed February 1977 19 ORIGINS OF COLD WAR of the war: 5.5 million died in the not allow pre-World War II trade armed forces, 4 million civilians had patterns to re-emerge. Given Washing been executed or died in captivity and ton's l>redilections for reorganizing 2 million were military invalids. More the postwar world, the State Depart over, the OSS predicted that the So ment had to oppose Soviet policies. viet Union would suffer an additional Viewing the world as a totality temporary manpower loss totaling 5 with events in one area affecting million prisoners of war and deportees. other regions, men in positions of While' the OSS was somewhat inac power feared any weakness on the curate in its statistical estimates, its part of the United States. The phi total assessment should hm'e demon losophy was the forerunner of the strated to the State Department the 1950's domino theory: Some State serious problems which Moscow faced Department representatives believed in reconstructing the Soviet state. 17 that, if they acquiesced to the Soviet Union anywhere, Moscow would be encouraged to take a recalcitrant at Two Alternatives titude on all disputed questions. The State Department never fully devel oped the nascent domino theory in Given its destruction caused by 1945. Rather, policy planners always World War II, the USSR faced the talked in vague, abstract terms about postwar era much less optimistically "the principle." The State Depart than the United States. After Wash ment readily acknowledged that it ington refused to supply postwar lend might apply "the principle" in areas lease and "lost" the Soviet appeal for that were not vital to American in a loan, the United States should have terests because Rumania, Bulgaria recognized that Moscow had only two and Hungary were never defined as alternatives in the postwar era. The e . 20 Military Review ORIGINS OF COLD WAR property for Rumanian reparation ness. These traditional military con payments. Within a month, however, cepts, however, were expanded to Soviet troops evacuated the area and match the global economic world view returned the occupied property. This of Washington's political decisionmak failed to pacify US military and for ers. eign service personnel in Rumania. As one of them said, "We have re won the houses but not a point of Demobilization principle." In other words, he be lieved that Soviet troops had ex tricated themselves without acknowl Military leaders feared that the edging t h a't American companies United States would demobilize as it should not pay Rumanian reparations did after World War 1. Moreover, the to the Soviet Union. '" military had little faith in the United "The principle" also applied in J a Nations. Believing that only military pan. Washington successfully k e p t power deterred aggressors, the War Moscow from obtaining any measure Department disdainfully critized: of control or responsibility for Japa ... peacr/fJl'in.Q pcoples 01 the IVorld nese occupation .. Washington decided 1,1'1/11 J al'e demonstrating an eager that American suzerainty in Japan ness to send their representatives to was essential for the defense of slIeh ermlerenee .• as those at Dum the United States. When the Soviet barton Oaks and San Francisco . . , ," Union, Great Britain and Australia Military preparedness as a necessary asked that an advisory council be es ingredient to discourage future ag tablished to make recommendations gressors dominated postwar military to the American Supreme Commander, thought. As American mothers, daugh Washington refused to give the con ters and wi ves clamored to "bring templated coundl any decisionmaking the boys home," military leaders op power. Underlying Washington's ex posed rapid demobilization. General clusion policy in Japan was the fear George C. Marshall, General H. H. that acquiescence on "the principle" Arnold and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. might cause unforeseen results of a King warned that aggressors like drastic nature. As Admiral William Hitler were spurred to wars of con Leahy explained to Truman and quest by weak opponents. Already Byrnes, the suggested advisory com planning for future wars, the heads mission: of the three armed forces mai lltained ... Ichile it may appear innocuous, that the next war would be worse than may eventually result in a Soviet con World War II. The United States had trol of Japan Il'hich ,{'ollid be highly to be prepared militarily or face the detrimental to America's post IVar possibility that American cities, in intel'ests in Asia. ,,, dustry and citizens might feel the Whereas political decisionmakers ap direct impact of war. Marshall, Arnold proached the problems of the post and King argued, therefore, that the war period looking through a prism United States shOUld be prepared and of economics and an infant domino should meet aggression away from theory, military advisers maintained American borders."" Rapid demobili their> traditional concepts of tactics, zation would we a ken American strategy, bases and military prepared- chances for obtaining overseas bases February 1977 21 ORIGINS OF COLD WAR that the United States could use as titled "Over-All Examination of U.S. outposts for the first line of defense Requirements for Military Bases and against attack. Rights.!' The subsequent reVISIOns In order to support its plans, the provide an excellent example of the Joint Chiefs of S,taff (JCS), as early expanding global nature of the Amer as 1943, divided the world into three ican commi tment for the postwar zone8: period. The revised JCS document • Required for the dired defense focused primal'ily all the Pacific. The of the -United States. ,Joint Chiefs explicitly stated that: • Required for defense of the . .. all Japanese Mandated Islands Western Hemisphere in addition to and Cen/ral Pacifie Islands inC'll/dina category one. Ihe Bunins and RYI/kl/s sillJIIld be • Required by the United States b"ouaht under e.,.elusive Unz/ed Slates as one of the great powers enforcing .,'ra/caie contro/. ,; peace pend1!1g the establishment of a Other areas that the Ame";can mili world organization. tary defined as "essential," which the The areas in which the .rcs wanted .le'S defined as the "long tel'm right bases for the direct defen.;e of the to lI~e us a military base under ex United States ineluded Alaska, the elUSIve control of the United States," Philippine Islands. Samoa, Panama were Canton, Galapagos, Panama, Ice and Bel·muda. In the second category, land, Greenland and the Azores, In the JCS felt that the United States addItion, the Joint Chiefs said that needed bases in Mexico. the northern the American military "required" base portion of South America, western rights in the Philippines, F~rmosa, Africa and Greenland. The final area Dakar, Monrovia and ('a~aLlanca. ::11 where the American milit"I', required postwar bas,," fell entirely III the Far East and included the Kurile Islands. Defense Perimeter eastern China, Indonesia, all the is-' land,!:; of Miel'Olle~ia and ba~es on the Marquesas Isl>lI](ls."' The Joint Chiefs The JCS's definition of "essential" argued that hbtory indicated that and "required" bases presented a well Europe or Asia would launch any de"eloped plan that would position future attack upon the United States. Amencan military power thl'Oughout "It is therefore obviously.necessary," the world. WIth bases in the Phil·ip the JCS contended, "to assure that pine~, Formosa anrl the Aleutian Is all approaches from these continents land chain, the American military be adequately guarde,!." Also, the could l'Ol1Htrllct a defe1l8e perimeter American military wanted to acqUIre that circumscribed all of the Far East. bases in North Afrila and South Asia Likewise, with bases in ~orth Africa, to facilitate military aircraft on the the Azores, Iceland and Greenland, eastern pel'imeter m""i ng rapidly to the United States could st!'ike at any the western d~fense perimeter and troubled European area or present avoiding' the "I () w trans-Atlantic' a forward defense wall for the Ameri trans-Pacific route."' can east coast even after demobiliza By 1945, the JCS expanded its origi tion of American forces in Europe. nal limited fOCllS on air bases and In one sense, the JCS plan was similar developed a new position paper en- to George F. Kennan's containment 22 Military Review· ORIGINS OF COLD WAR argument. While Washington had not ministered the Allied control organiza openly identified its future enemy as tions. In addition. Washington learned Kennan did in his Mr. "X" al·tide, that wartime decisions and II reluc the military developed an intl'ieately tant American public restricted the constructed proposal to contain its alternati\'e~ open to it~ po1il'ymal(er~. former Allies as well as its future N!oreO\'er. the United States could not enemies behind a worldwide defense use United Nations Relief and Reha wall. bilitation Administ""tion (U:>IRRA I Military exigencie, facilitated the a,ssbtance to iJreak Soviet economiC' acquisition of the desired ovel'seas control over the Balkans because war~ bases. By V-J Day, American fun'es lime agreements stopped the CNRRA occupied the e~~ential ba~e area~. and from negoti,;ting trade agreements they remained on BOllin, Midway, with Bulgaria. Hungary and Ruma Wake. Guam and Okinawa. Although nino American cotton cornpanie}-; re the United States relinquished the fu,ed to barter cotton to Hungary, Marianas, Eniwetok, the Marshall Is even though the State Department' lands and the Caroline Islands as supported the idea. because barter trusteeships to the United Nations. trade was the antithesis of American it did so under the condition that trade philosophy. Finally. the United these islandR were considered a~ ~tra States inhibited itself. The State De tegic areas under the Security Coun partment refused to rCC!lgnizc the cil's jurisdiction. Thus: the United Balkan provisional governments bc States held a veto over any fu tu re cat"e it feared that re('ognition im disposition of the islands that it de plied acceptanee of Soviet pulkies in fined as essential for Its own defense. the Balkans. Until the State Depart A few months after the San Francisco ment extended diplomatic recognition. Conference. Secretary of Navy James the United States could not make post V. ForrestaI placed the American posi war loans to the Balkan statcs. There tion in perspective. The :>Iavy Depart fore. as long as the Cnited States ment preferred Ameriean sovereignty Withheld recognition. it limited its over all the Pacific islands. but For· fleXibility in the Balkans." restal said t hat Washington had agreed to place some of the Far East islands under United !'lations jurisdic Preconceived Ideas tion with explicit restrictions: Namely that {('hatel'cr lI'e Pllt into the trusteeship pot is done at 0/11' The manner in which the Unite(\ volit;on and nut IInder any (lI'erall States defined its postwar objectives Manket cmllmifment and second, that determined its reaction to the Soviet ,ehatever u'e pllt ;n ;s put ;n upon Union. Preconceived ideas within the terms that are agreeable to /IS. n State Department and the War De Washington discovered. howe v e r, partment kept policymakers from ac that it was easier to acquire bases cepting the view that another country than to enact its views for economic could proceed from a different set of. prosperity. For example. the State assumptions. By defining American Department had no control over events postwar objectives as global. the State in the Balkans because' Soviet troops Departinent viewed Soviet economic occupied the area and Moscow ad- policies of exclusion in the Balkans February 1977 23 ORIGINS OF COLO WAR as a threat, and the War Department that separated Moscow and Washing interpreted Soviet attempts to obtain ton. a North African trusteeship and to The qrigins of the Cold War sprang ,take part in the occupation and con from different perspectives for organ trol of Japan HS threats. Washington izing the postwar world. The conflict thought that cumpromising on any ing American and Soviet interpreta preconceived idea 01' well-developed tions for how to avoid another war "principle" cuuld threaten the entire and how to protect their respective world urder that it envisioned for the nation-states ultimately contributed to postwar world. Therefore, when the a new type uf warfare. From historical USSR and the United States began hindsight, one could blame either na to disl'uSS armist il'e and peace terms, tion for precipitati'ng the Cold War. the different views fur reorganizing But. 30-plus years after the fact. it the postwar world caused cOllfiirt, still seems more important and ap dissension and suspicion. This delayed propriate to understand Sov'iet-Ameri the peace treaties with Gel'many's for can positions in order to move beyond mer Allies when the best interests the easy step of placing "blame" to of everyune concerned \\ ere tu sign ward the more difficult task of amelio a quick general peace settlement and rating the conflicts that still divide then move to settle the differences the two superpowers. ~OTES 1 Due to the Illek of Su\iet nN'ui\1l1 mat ... tiul. It 10 /\ nnunl Mes .. nge oC the Pre<;ilit'nt to Congress, II> diffi 24 Military Review. ORIGINS OF COLD WAR Thorp, "The N('c("lsity of FOI'(li~n Invek'ltment," Sl't'r('tnry II! Stntc to Tl'umlln. 1 May 1945, ForriUJI TIl{' DI'llllrtm£'Jlt 0/ State lllf/fctlll, 25 Nnv('mb('r Rr1l1ti(JU8 of till' Ullltl'il SttltrH. BUTOl'e, 1945. 1945, PP 829-32. Wn.!!hington, DC. 1!)6~. Volume IV, pp 202-3, I:! Cnmmitt('(' on Tl'Rd(' E1I:pan!>lon, 31 July HI R P Wilitcrs to BUl'ton Bt'I'ry, .10 October 1945, Rccol'd Group 169, General Re{'ord,;; of th(' 1940. DS Budnp('st LeJ.!ution PO.\lt File!! 711 o. Fot"('i,m Economic Adminhtl'ntiun (Wll .. hin,.:tlln Fed('l"al Records Centcr, Suitland, Maryland), CTF. ~o I.cnhy Dinri(' .. , 24 Oetobel' 1045. p 177, Ad D.211/46. mil"al Willillm Leahy :Pnpel's {Llbmry (If Con J!r(' February 1977 25 from The French Embassy Press and Information Service France's Defense Policy HE world context for France's security ideological competition or rivalry for power, or T policy is characterized by a few basic the accumulation of weapons on all sides. It facts: first, that, in East·West relations, the only takes on meaning when seen in a long·term quest for detente has replaced the Cold War; perspective, and, like every effort that takes second, the growing importance that the coun· time to accomplish, it may run into both tries of the Third World, most of them the fruit pitfalls and obstacles. of decolonization, have acquired in interna· Refusing both confrontation and abdication, tional relations; and, lastly, the first signs, in detente cannot develop and produce results the western part of our Continent, of the without a minimum of confidence in the economic and political organization of Europe. future; this, in turn, presupposes that each state The quest for detente stems from a twofold should be reasonably certain of its security. The conviction that France was among the first only foundation on which to build this sense of countries to express: the conviction, first, that, security is a balance of forces that is perceived in the age of nuclear weapons, military conflict and recogn ized as such. . can only rnsult in collective suicide and the As the President of the Republic said in destruction of civilization; second, that, despite Helsinki: philosophic, political, economic or social differ· History teaches us that maintaining equilib· ences, the normalization of interstate relations, rium is an essential condition to furthering the reduction of areas of tension and the detente and peace because only this can pro· increase in exchanges of all kinds are to the duce the necessary climate for security. advantage of mankind because they give peace Equilibrium and detente are like two sides its best chance to succeed. of a coin. A threat to one inevitably puts the Detente, defined in this way, does not dispel other in jeopardy. for the present, or even the near future, either This is why, while working to further This arlicle IS extracted from the Report on the Program for Military Expenditures and EqUipment for the Armed Forces for the 1977-82 period. adopted by the French Pari iament as Law Number 76·531 on 19 June 1976: I 26 Military. Review FRANCE'S DEFENSE POLICY detente, France, for its part, intends to pursue trading powers in the world, is obliged to give its defense effort so long as genuine disarma· special attention to the conditions governing ment has not been attained and will remain the cost and regular delivery of its supplies alert so that the effective.ness of its armed from abroad, for they govern, to a large extent, forces is maintained. France regrets that, while our own economic health. Conflicts arising in the member countries of the Warsaw Pact are the Third World, even if they have a local cause, increasing and modernizing their military po· may result in the intervention of the great tential, some of France's allies are reducing powers and, through a process of escalation, theirs. Lastly, this is why France is not partici· jeopardize international peace. pating in the negotiations in Vienna on the In a broader perspective, tranqUillity in the reduction of forces in Central Europe: One world will depend, to a large extent, on the must be alert so that these negotiations do not equilibrium between the developing countries produce results that might aggravate, instead of and the developed countries. attenuate, the existing geographic and military Given these factors, France has chosen to disparities and, in the long run, endanger make the most of its international position, Europe's capacity to organize its own defense. which is unique in many regards, and to practice a policV of overture, dialogue and Third World Influences cooperation. It wants to help the states of the The states of the Third World, whose ranks Third World with which it has the strongest continually have swelled by decolonization over ties, both historically and geographically, and the past 20 years, today constitute an essential to strengthen their independence and secure factor in the contemporary world due to the their development France is aware of the importance they have acquired on the inter· current importance of north·south relations and national scene. intends to help search for and define a more The mere fact that there are so many of just, more rational and more stable new eco' them-which generates more and more eco' nomic order. Finally, each time conflict breaks nomic, political and military decision making out, France strives to its utmQst to help settle centers creating a more complicated world and, it in certain respects, a more uncertain one However, for this policy to be effective, makes nuclear proliferation, in particular, a France must have the means to confront the possibility that can no longer be ruled out This widespread insecurity of a much more complex is true at least in the long run, whatever the world which is far from haVing found its indispensable efforts made to try to prevent it equilibrium, a world where direct or indirect These states also must be taken into account threats can appear at any moment on unex· because of the wealth some of them have pected horizons. acquired through their share of the world's resources of raw materials and energy and the The Goals of France's Security Policy influence they now can exercise at both the In today's world, for France to shirk its regional and international levels. obligation to assure its own security would Lastly, these states have to face tremendous imply carelessness and resignation. In fact, for a problems which, for many of them, are addi· free people, security goes hand in hand with the tional factors of internal instabiliiy and ex· protection of this fundamental liberty, the ternal VUlnerability. They include economic most essential of all because it is the bulwark of underdevelopment, inadequate food supplies all the others. It is on the basis of this concept and energy and technological dependence. that France defines the conditions necessary for The evoiution of the Third World concerns its security, justifies the major options of its France's security in more than one respect Our defense policy and determines goals for the country, now that it has become one of the top armed forces. February 1977 27 FRANCE'S DEFENSE POLICY A nation cannot be certain of security unless acquire them, and then to modernize them, it hes the collective will to retain mastery over reflect the determination to guarantee its de· its destiny-that is, to evaluete the situation on fense wfiile making a specific contribution to its own and make independentlY the decisions the overall strengthening of deterrence. This on action to be taken. This will for independ· effort will be pursued with the intensity neces· ence precludes any type of systematic align· sary to keep its effectiveness in step with ment with the diplomatic positions of other technological developments. states; it becomes still more imperative when France acceded to the Atlantic Pact at the the nation must decide on the timeliness, outset and remains a full member of the correct moment and means of a potential Alliance. Under present circumstences, in fact, commitment of its armed forces in the event of the Alliance alone can offset the sizable mili· crisis or conflict. tary potential of the states united under the In. order for this will to be translated into Warsaw Pact and guarantee the balance of fact, every citizen must be conscious of belong· power in Europe. While continuing to accept ing to a single community and must understand full obligations to the Atlantic Pact, 10 years the necessity of preserving its identity, safe· ago France decided to withdraw from the guarding its heritage and ensuring its future. integrated military organization of the Alliance. The will must be manifested in each person's In fact, France came to believe that staying in individual support and in everyone's unhesitat· such an organization could compromise, in ing participation in the common effort. terms of military means, the freedom to evalu· Today, as in the past, the security and ate and make decisions about the timeliness, independence of France require the protection moment and means of a potential commitment of the national territory and its inhabitants of its forces in the event of crisis or conflict. against any risk of direct aggression or any Although justified by this consideration, with· threat endangering their lives or liberty. drawal did not mean that France refused to The integrity of the national territory is a cooperate closely with its allies, but merely that necessary condition of security. However, it it refused to accept any automatism that might alone is not enough. Because of the increasingly denigrate control over its defense policy. close correlation between peace and the pros· The conditions for France's security are not perity of nations at the present time, security is the result of the major options of defense inseparable from the international context. It policy alone; they also stem from the definition can be threatened to varying degrees by ten· of the essential functions of the armed forces: sions'that might affect vast areas of the world, -To protect national territory against any both on land and at sea. But, above all, it attempt to invade or any act of aggression and depends directly on the equilibrium of Europe. guarantee the freedom of the French people It would be illusory to hope that France could under all circumstances. retain anything more than diminished saver· - Without compromising independence, to eignty if its neighbors were occupied by a be able to participate in the defense of Europe, hostile power or even came under its control. including its northern and southern approaches. The .security of the whole of Western Europe is, This potential participation reflects the solidar· therefore, essential for France. ity in fact and solidarity of intent that binds France with its European partners and helps Major Policy Choices deter aggression in this region. Because of the conditions deemed vital for - Outside Europe, to be able to contribute security, France has been led to make a number to the security of the countries with which of major policy choices. France is linked by agreement or by de facto First, it must possess purely national nuclear economic or cultural solidarity. lM!allons. The sacrifices: accepted in order to - At sea, to be able to protect its interests 28 Military Review FRANCE'S DEFENSE POLICY and contribute to the security of maritime destroy certain punctual installations located traffic which is indispensable to the uninter· behind the combat zone. rupted flow of our supplies. Strategic nuclear weapons, more than any The Role of the Armed Forces other, hold over every potential aggressor a threat that outweighs the benefits of the action France's military strategy is based on its he might undertake. The deterrent effect of this capabilities for deterrence and combat acquired weapon lies in its psychological and technical through the existence of nuclear and conven· credibility. The psychological credibility is tional armed forces which reinforce each other. based on the determination of the nation. It These forces ensure national independence, means that the threat to use it must be reserved preserve the integrity of the territory and help for the defense of the country's vital interests; maintain equilibriurri in Europe. They also must uncertainty about the nature, localization and be able to play a role in regions where the extent of these interests is one factor of < interests of France might be directly or indio deterrence. Technical credibility does not reo rectly challenged. quire nuclear parity, but it does demand that, Military means fulfill their function first by in the face of ever·improved means of detec· the mere fact that they exist, then by deploying tion, attack and defense, we maintain a very them and, lastly, by entering combat should it high technological level in order to preserve the b~come necessary. survival and penetration capabilities of the The fact that they exist is concrete and weapons. lasting proof of the national will; they are one The tactical nuclear arsenal comprises a of the elements of the country's influence on variety of weapons. Its size and power, along the international scene. Maneuvering them, with the diversification of its carriers, offer a which ranges from their being put on alert and broad spectrum of possible uses depending on reinforced, to their movement and deployment, the circumstance. Its presence along with the gives special meaning to diplomatic action. conventional forces increases its weight as a Their entry into combat means that the deci· deterrent and its combat ability. Its use against sian has been made not to be dominated by the an aggressor that may have made an error in enemy. This role and the specialized nature of judgment backs up the threat of using strategic the armed forces, the custodians of power with nuclear weapons. the exclusive role of serving the nation, justify Conventional forces, because of their diver· the special rules that govern them and the sity and flexibility, are suited to a wide variety unique place they occupy in the national of crisis situations so characteristic of our era. community. Therefore, these forces have a mUltiple role, but their basic mission is to preserve the integrity of Nuclear and Conventional Forces the nation's territory. As early as 1956, France made the decision In the event of a crisis in Europe or its to acquire nuclear means. Today, it has a wide peripheral zones, the maneuvering of these range of weapons: missiles on nuclear subma· forces enables the government to indicate its rines and the Plateau d'Albion, Pluton determination to intervene. Their use in com missiles ·and bombs carried by aircraft (the bat, either independently or along with the Mirage IV, Mirage III, Jaguar and soon the forces of other countries, especially within the Super Etendardl. Because of the very nature of framework of the Atlantic Alliance, will show these weapons, the decision to use them is the adversary that.France is resolved to employ made, in every case, only by the Chief of State. all the means at its disposal to oppose any Depending on circumstances, they would be aggression. The naval forces, if necessary in used either to annihilate vital targets; paralyze conjunction with other nations, contribute to combat units, their supplies and support; or the safety of maritime supply lines. February 1977 29 FRANCE'S DEFENSE POLICY Overseas, the continuing presence of French objectives, France, in the effort the nation forces and their intervention capability must 'makes for its armed forces, must strike a first be able to ensure the safety of the overseas balance "between nuclear and conventional departments and territories; French forces also forces and distribute as rationally as possible must be able to carry out various forms of the resources allocated for equipment, person external action-for instance, being present in nel and the training needed by the units. other countries at the request of international organizatjons or the countries involved or to Current Forces give the threatened states military or technical The general organization and structure of assistance. the navy, air force and gendarmerie seem today Because of the capabilities expect&d of them well'adapted to the missions they must fulfill, and the types of action they may have to but the organization and structure of the army undertake, armed forces must be endowed with show too much specialization among the cate certain characteristics. In order for them to be gories of troops which, in practice, seems too able to act without delay, they must be ready rigid. for action at all times, must be stationed in The nu mber of armed forces personnel was suitable locations and must have a high degree greatly reduced between 1962 and 1970 and of mobility. Although the rapid reaction time has not changed significantly in number since required makes it impossible to have the entire that time. Today, the armed forces number system of conventional forces depend on mobi· about 676,000 men: 314,000 career soldiers, lization, the reserves still play an indispensable 283,000 conscripts and 79,000 civilians. In role in any major crisis, especially for the recent years, only the gendarmerie has been defense of the national territory and as support expanded. forces. Special measures have been designed to French Armed Forces must be able to adapt improve the conditions under which French to diverso situations whiCh means they must be citizens carry out their military service and to organized and trained for many kinds of action improve aid for those who are in difficult and that units coming from different services financial circumstances. Most noteworthy of must be able to act as a whole. This need for the latter measures are the increase in the versatility does not, however, mean that struc· soldier's pay from 2.50 francs to 7 francs a day, tures should be uniform or the equipment of the right to one free trip per month, the the various types of forces identical. increase in social aid for underprivileged con· Units must be able to sustain action for a scripts, various measures to facilitate the con· certain length of time, depending on the dis· scripts' return to civilian life after military tance from their bases. So, they must be service and improvement in living i:ondiiions provided with strong and flexible logistical and facilities. support. In addition to soldiers of the regular army, Finally, France's military forces must always there are those available for mobilization. These be large enough. In this regard, conscription consist mainly of 300,000 persons on reserve plays a vital role. Conscripts, by their number duty for the army. Their value for mobilization, but perhifjls even more by their quality, con· however, "is limited because of the insufficient tribute to the preparedness and effectiveness of equipment at their disposal. all the forces. They exemplify the participation The infrastructure programs are designed to of the entire French people in the defense of give each of the armed forces the installations their nation, and they are the means for a necessary for their missions and the upkeep of constant interrelation between the nation and new equipment. But the main emphasis has the armed forces that serve it. been placed on ways to improve living condi If the military system is to correspond to tions for the personnel (barracks, schools, 30 Military Review fRANCE'S DEFENSE PDlICY hospitals), particularly for the army because its manne brigade make up the Force of Interven facilities are larger and older and require a tion_ The Territorial Defense Forces, under the long-term effort_ responsibility of regional military commanders,' The buildup and improvement of the nll are made up in peacetime of two alpine clear forces over the last 15 years has been a brigades and about 40 regiments, inadequately major endeavor_ This program was carried out equipped, which are given nonmobile assign firmlv, steadily and clear-sightedly_ Thanks to ments_ FinaJly, some 10,000 men are stationed its totally national nuclear fQrce, France is the overseas_ third-ranked nuclear power in the world today_ In the current contp.xt, this organization The goals set bV the three program laws for makes it difficult for the army to satisfy its the three complementary components of the requirements for troops and officers_ Moreover, strategic forces have been reached_ Approxi- _ the structural and geographical distribution of mately 40 Mirage IV bombers are In operation_ forces makes it impossible to adapt their use to Two units, each including nine surface-to-sur various situations and to make the best use face strategic ballistic missiles, are operational. possible_of their means, given the missions that Three submarines, each armed with 16 sea-to might have to be carried out today_ This is why surface strategic ballistic missiles, are in service; the army, which must in addition reduce its a fourth is undergoing trials; and a fifth is under overhead expenses, embarked at the end of construction_ 1975 on a structural reorganilation_ The first The equipment in tactical nuclear weapons measures, which deal with the territorial com has reac~ed a significant level. The tactical air mand, with the formation of infantry divisions force now has four operational squadrons_ The and with training, are being implemented now_ First Army has two regiments equipped with The process of modernizing the forces' medium-range Plllton missiles and, in 1976, will equipment slowed between 1971 and 1975 receive the equipment and weaponry for a third because deliveries were about two years later and fourth such regiment. than originally forecast. This delay, resulting in a greatly increased average age of equipment, The Armv was due mainly to the reductions in equipment Between 1962 and 1975, the army was credits, but also to technical difficulties in transformed from a force of 600,000 men perfecting high-performance modern materiel. mainly engaged in overseas operations to a During this time, 475 AMX30 tanks-that is, 85 force of 330,000 men better prepared for a percent of the number hoped for-were deliv modern European conflict_ This transformation ered, meaning that 810 battle tanks were involved a thorough reorganization and the operational, but the program for AMX30 modernizing of management procedures; in the bridge-laying tanks had to be abandoned_ Be area of equipment, notable accomplishments cause of the difficulties in perfecting this were made, especially in the areas of tan ks, equipment and the increasing price of this type helicopters, antitank missiles and communica of materiel, only 160 AMX10 armored person tions_ nel carriers went into operation instead of the Todav, the army is made up of four kinds of 280 planned_ The number of tactical support forces; about one-third of the total personnel is trucks and Gil/ois amphibious vehicles corre involved in support and maintenance activities_ sponded to the forecasts, whereas 171 SA340s The Force of Maneuver, designed and trained were delivered, bringing to 340 the number of for combat in a nuclear situation, are organized helicopters in service, The army does not have within the First Army which is itself divided modern rifles_ Technical delavs also lowered the into two army corps and five divisions compris anticipated number of MILAN launch stations ing 15 brigades; 11 of these are mechanized and from 275 to 195_ 4 motorized_ One airborne division and one In addition to the effort that should be February 1977 31 FRANCE'S DEFENSE POLICY /, Alpine Brigade troops in training in the Alps ticularly strong and sustained corrective action_ Finally, the army situation is a special one in respect to infrastructure_ The effort made over the last few years unquestionably has made it possible to complete successfully the renova tion of 17 barracks and to begin work on 33 others_ Eight new barracks compounds have been completed, and five others were being built in 1975. However, financial difficulties forced a reduction in this effort at the begin ning of 1976, and this will continue to be a cause of concern for the state of the army whose housing conditions for young r.cruits continued on these medium-range antitank still are not in line with modern standards_ weapon systems and on the HO T long-range one, it is essential for the army to improve The Navy significantly its short-range and very short-range The navy, which has 68,300 men, has not conventional artillery_ During the 1971-75 pe expanded since 1960_ It has one of the basic riod, the orders for GeT artillery and Roland components of the nuclear forces-the Oceanic weapon systems were reduced sharply from 55 Strategic Force which has maintained a steady to 10 and from 65 to 30_ In view of the steady and uninterrupted presence in the seas since the qualitative and quantitative growth in conven first patrol of The Redou table in 197t This tional armaments throughout the world, the force complements the conventional surface, cumulative effect of these delays requires par- submarine and air forces which also have 32 Military Review FRANCE'S DEFENSE POLICY Oceanic Strategic force submarine on patrol remained at the same level since 1960. ordered and delivered under the first law, The conventional forces are well·balanced. 54,640 tons under the second law and 25,000 They basically a,e distributed between the two tons to be delivered this year under the third naval air complexes-one in western France and law. Under the first two programs, most of the the other in southeastern France. They are fleet escort ships were refitted. The third law based in Brest, Lorient, Lann·Bihoue and provided fBr modernization of a cruiser and Landivisiau on the Atlantic and Toulon, Nlmes seven submarines. A number of new combat and Hyeres on the Mediterranean. Outside of vessels, totaling 31,000 tons, have been laid the Metropolitan territoI'{, although the forces down for delivel'{ after 1976. ~ow have only a few support bases, they are Most of the units are fitted with modern posted overseas in the Pacific Ocean and the weapons and equipment, especially for air Indian Ocean where they have the mobile surveillance and submarine detection, com· logistical support of specialized ships. puterized analysis of tactical data and, recently, The current tonnage of the conventional sea·to·sea anti surface missiles. surface and submarine fleet, comprising 140 However, affected by successive delays duro fighting ships, is about 320,000 tons. More than ing the last three program laws, ship COllstruc two·thirds of the fleet (217,000 tons) is made tion has not attained a rate permitting satisfac up of older ships delivered before the last three tory renewal of the conventional fleet which program laws were enacted. The remaining has an average life span of 25 years. The units third is composed as follows: 22,710 tons put into service between 1955 and 1965 will be February 1977 33 FRANCE'S DEFENSE POLICY Crolale surface·lo·air missile ready soon tor decommissioning, and the fleet fit into the country's overall defense strategy will lose 17,000 metric tons this way in 1976. and meet the conditions necessary in the Naval aviation is composed of two ele· deployment of modern weapons systems-that ments: maritime patrol aircraft and carrier· is, there are broad commands specialized in the based aircraft. The maritime patrol aircraft deployment and implementation at forces, number some 40 Neptunes and Atlanrics. The large regional commands for joint logistics and carrier· based fleet is composed of about 80 support functions and command units at air planes, including interceptors, strike, reconnais· force bases. sance and naval surveillance aircraft in addition The 450 combat aircraft are divided into 30 to antisubmarine helicopters and tactical utility squadrons-22 tor the tactical air force and 8 helicopters including 16 Super Frelons. Given for air defense. the age of the aircraft, there is an urgent need The tactical air force equipment is being for replacement of the carrier·based aircraft. modernized, with Jaguars gradually replacing Under the third program law, t.he Super Erend· older aircraft. Fifty Mirage Vs initially buiJt for ard program was authorized together with the export have been acquired by the air torce, but construction of WG 13 helicopters for service so far slightly fewer Jaguars than predicted have on the new fngates and corvettes to replace been ordered. These planes generally have the Alouette III antisubmarine helicopters. performed at a high level. However, at the present time, when electronic countermeasures The Air Force and antiaircraft defenses (missiles and cannon) With personnel reduced to about 106,000 playa dominant role, a special effort is needed men, the air force provides two elements of the to improve equipment for countermeasures and strategic forces, a fleet of 450 combat aircraft high· precision weapons for air·to·surface attack. divided between the tactical air force, air Of the three electronic surveillance aircraft defense and 150 transports. Added to this is a planned, only one has been ordered: fleet of trainers, training aircraft and helicop· The modernization of air defense continues, ters: Since 1964, the air force has revamped its with Mirage Fls replacing the older airplanes command structures and organization so they (SM82s and Vautour Ns), while the STRIDA 34 Mililary Review FRANCE'S DEFENSE POLICY air defense data-processing and presentation about 73,500 men including 4.000 conscripts. system is to be completed. The force stili IS faced with two difficulties: It Radar coverage of the territory and its is asked to take on more and more tasks, and approaches is now complete, but only at high the I1!strictions on the availability of its person· and medium altitudes. Improvements are nel remain heavy. But it is worth noting that, needed in the interception of hlgh·speed hostile starting in 1972, the creation of new posts targets, especially at low altitudes. The pro meant that it could grant its personnel a third posed new fighter plane which has been chosen half·day off every week. should meet this need. I n the field of equipment, the objectives of Short·range antiaircraft defense gradually modernization adopted in the third program will be ensured by erotale missiles; 70 percent law generally have been met: replacing light of the planned orders have 'been procured as vehicles and increasing their number, at the part of a continuous effort to provide protec' pnce of a Significant reduction in the orders tion for sensitive areas. Within this same can· for utility vehicles and continuing the effort to text, air base installations are to be camou· modernize telecommunications. with priority flaged and protection measures increased. for the gendarmerie at the departmental level rather than the mobile gendarmerie and the The Gendarmerie command network. Nevertheless, for budgetary The gendarmerie, despite a continued in· reasons, it has been possible to order only 163 crease in personnel (during the past five years Wheeled armored vehicles instead of the 212 nearly 11,000 additional military positions initially planned. The program to replace light were created of which one·third are filled by arms also was restricted: Orders were reduced conscripts) numbered, on 31 December 1975, by 10 percent from what was forecast. The mobile gendarmerie FebruarY 1977 35 FRANCE'S DEFENSE POLICY Conclusions activities of the arsenals and industries have not . The foregoing analysis enables us to draw been serious. general conclusions about the situation of the These principal areas provide the starting armed forces and to identify the principal areas point for France's increased efforts in modern requiring effort in the future. izing its defense forces and strengthening its The nuclear equipment programs have been defense policy_ completed and are to continue to receive Examples of major efforts toward upgrading particularly close attention in the future. Can· of nuclear and conventional forces of the three cerning'conventional materiel, gaps still must be services and the gendarmerie are summarized filled, and the modernization of this materiel below. has not proceeded fast enough. This has meant • The Nuclear Forces. It has been decided to an increase In the average age of equipment develop new MI RV (multiple independently which emphasizes the need for an increased targetable re-entry vehicle) missiles with greatly replacement eflort. As In the case of nuclear increased range. In addition, funds will be weapons, the quality and availability of our allocated on a yearly basis for the priority conventional weapons must be maintained at purpose of designing and building a new gener- a high level. ation missile-launching submarine. . The amount of defense research has de • The Army_ The army will be reorganized creased over the past few year>. Such a situa to number 16 divisions. These divisions will tion must not continue; it is vital to retain include: eight armored divisions, six infantry technological capability in the future. divisions, one alpine division and one par3troop Financial restrictions have forced the armed division. With regard to field artillery, more forces to cut back spending In certain other than 100 self-propelled, rapid-fire 155mm guns fields involving living conditions of personnel will be added to the inventory as early as 1980. and more especially in their training. It is • The Navy. The combat capability of em harder to maintain equipment that is often old, barked aviation will be maintained by putting and, beyond the technical problems inherent in into service the first of the nuclear-powered such a situation, it has direct consequences on aircraft carriers, and financing will be available the operational activity and capability of our by 1980 for the development of a maritime forces. Ammunition and fuel supplies neces patrol aircraft to replace the A tlan tics presently sarily have fallen. Joint army and navy exercises in service. have had to be eliminated deloite their valu~ • The Air Force. Another 100 or 'llore Fls for the cohesiveness of large units. As for air are to be built in addition to the standing force activity, although it was satisfactory until orders in effect for Jaguars. The futu re combat 1974 it has been reduced since then to a level aircraft is to be the Mlfage 2000 wh ich sh'ould barely compatible with the demands of security be operational by 1982. It will carry a radar and the needs of operational training. system for low-altitude interception with su These deficiencies are the result of increased perior performance in tracking high-speed ob payroll costs probably underestimated in the jectives at high altitude. past. • The Gendarmerie. The force will be These costs, which represented 51.9 percent strengthened by increasing the number of of the defense budget in 1970, rose to 56_5 people authorized between now and 1982_ percent in 1975. France considers every aspect of the pro Lastly, the French arms industry has been gram realistic and financially acceptable thus faced with a reduction in the rate of its far and is confident that these ~orces will deliveries to the armed forces. Until now, provide the country with the tools for an exports have compensated for this reduction, effective defense adapted to a world that is still and, for this reason; repercussions on the potentially dangerous_ ~n 36 Military Review Lieutenant Colonel Ernest F. Koenig, Austrian Army N EUROPEAN l"ullntp"ies, the em sy~tems Bud different il1tel'pretatiOl1~ I phll>;is on independence, natiunality nf t'ontl'overslal terms sl1l:h as "relaxa and Helf~detel'mjnation CHllseS an uver tion" and "peaeeful l'oexistellL'L'," thiS ridIng emphasis on sec uri t y con article will try to explain the com ciommesf->. This conciousne:-is is sup~ mon and divel'gent obJedives of the ported strongly by a majority in net.tral countries. A brief evalllatlOn thohe countries where f l' e e opin of . the actual sitlw.tion IS neee:'l!'>ary. ion can be expressed publicly and The motives and objectives which led is HlI integral part of Suviet foreign to talks on force reduction. the rela policy. The balance of puwer between tlOllshlP to the llelslllki Conference. NATO and the WTO (Warg"w Treaty its l'ontroven.;ial· Pl'Upus;;tls Hnd the Organization) gUHI'antees a certain possible further development WIthin amount of security, but force reduc the framework of intel'l1ational agl'ee tions could impart un this. Therefore, ments will be examined. This will the overall interest in force reductions allow an explanation of the individual by European nations, to include the attitudes of the neutral cOllntries to neutrals. is understandable. Within ward force redllction and an evalua its puwer, every country tries to in tion of how the balance of power or fluence developments to its own ad ('hanges to it impact on these coun vantage. This is true not only for tries. the major powers and the countries The neutral. non-bloc countries 111 within the two treaties, but also for Europe are Austria. Finland, Sweden. the countries not in one of these blocs. Switzerland and Yugoslavia. Additiull Considering the major differences ally. there al'e Spain. Albania. Ireland between the Communist and capitalist and the Vatican. Spmn shows interest february 1977 37 BALANCE OF POWER in mutual force reduction because of Europe) 2 and will be used throughout. the impact on the southern flank of The original term MBFR, introduced a force reduction in Central Europe. by NATO, lost its "B" (Balance) by Albania is hostile toward any agree demand of the Soviet Union. This, ment between the Soviet Union, the by the way, pretty well characterizes United States and their allies. Ireland the attitude of the WTO toward the and the Vatican primarily are not force reduction: to preserve the pres involved in these questions. ent local superiority. Desp'ite common interests, it would be wrong to assume that a neutral bloc with a common opinion exists. The Overall Situation in Europe Switzerland and Austria have per-_ manent neutrality which is interna tionally acknowledged. Sweden favors Two ideologies face each other in a "de facto" neutrality while the neu Europe today. The ideology promoted trality of Finland is characterized by by the Soviet Union promises economic its special relationship to the Soviet freedom; the ideology promoted by Union. Yugoslavia emphasizes its non 'the United States is based on political bloc status. I freedom and self-determination. Since The term "neutral" in this article the first claims to have the only solu will include "non-bloc." MFR (Mutual tion, a conflict situation is unavoid Force Reduction) is a more general able. This explains the different inter term for MRFAAMCE (Mutual Re pretations of "relaxation" and "co duction of Forces and Armaments existence," and Associated Measures in Central While the military situation is still in overall balance with a slight trend favoring the Soviet Union and its allies, the economic and sociopolitical Hituation i~ askew. Despite economic shortages and resistance In many sat ellites, the East was able to stabilize its sociopolitical system, often by force. Its economic base, particularly energy and other natural resources, is se cured. The West European countrIes, on the other hand, increasingly are dependent un foreign resources. Un less alternatives can be fOllnd, an Lieutenant Col u n e I Ernest F. economic dependence of West Europe Koenig. Austrian Army, is Senior on the East could be created. In all Planning Officer in the Planning Staff probability, this would cause at least of the Minish'Y of Defense in Vienna, a partial political dependence. Austria. He is a graduate of the Com The Soviet Union favored the Con me"cial Academy. Fienl1a. Austria; ference on Security and Cooperation the Austrian "Th£1'esianische" Milt tal'Y Academy; the Austl'ian Geneml in Europe (CSCE). It wus another Staff Col/ege; the Academy for 01' opporhmity to pre sen t the Soviet ganizatiun, Giessen, West Germany; Union as a peace-loving nation and to and the USACGSC, 'class uf 1976. influence the attitude of the people 38 Military Review BALANCE OF POWER of the participating We~tern nations in the development uf MFR-negotia toward threat, defen February 1977 39 BALANCE OF POWER reinforced Finland's position in for eign as well as internal matters. 8 IC= Austria Finland has a Western parliamen tary democracy. The country's general situation leads to misperceptions in Austria was successful in regaining some Western states where it is re its independence in 1955 after being garded as an appendix of the Soviet Germany's first victim in 1938. From Union. The inner-political situation is 1955, it built a military defense based very complex. on a territorial defense with active mobile elements. II The Austrians pro duce their own highly mobile and ac curate light tanks and small arms 1=) Sweden and are well-known for their outstand ing light and medium military trucks. Austria's leaders, aware of the coun Sweden, with its self-imposed and try's geostrategic location, size awl self-interpreted policy of nonalign strength and the military restrictions ment in peacetime, should lean to -especially on all types of missiles ward neutrality in case of a confiict.o included in the "state treaty of 1D55," The effectiveness of the neutral stance took the initiative in 1070 and ex depends upon both its acceptance by plained the interest of the neutral other powers and the credibility of the countries in questions concerning the Swedish defense forces. The aim of European security. They also promoted Swedish diplomacy is the international a mandatory termination of conflicts acceptability of its nonalignment sta by peaceful means, an integrated sys tus. The national defense is based on tem of collective security and a bal conscription and high-level technology anced force reduction during the combined with heavy military expendi CSeE.7 ture. Sweden's homemade ail' force is the size of the Royal Air Force. Recently, the commanding general of the Swed II I I Finland ish Armed Forces expreSRed his con cern about the increasing Soviet mili tary strength in the north and ·its Finland has its special relationship capability to deploy up to 14 divisions with the Soviet Union as outlined in within 10 days into Sweden and Nor a treaty of mutual assistance and fol way.IO Sweden supported the CSCE lows a neutralist policy of no alliances. from its beginning and wants to con Active friendship toward the Soviet tribute to a relaxation between East Union is demonstrated by a sympa and West in order to guarantee its thetic response to many of its foreign own security. It is interested in apply policy initiatives. Finland was success ing the principles of the United Na ful as mediator between East and tions Charter without restrictions in West in preparations for and during Europe. Sweden wanted an interac the CSCE. All interested governments tion between the CSCE and MFR, but agreed with the organi7.ational pro not at the risk of jeopardizing the posa'ls coming from Helsinki, which end results of the CSCE. It stressed 40 Military Review BALANCE OF POWER the importance of neutral status for but was unsuccessful in those goals. neutral countries. Belgrade's view is that the security of Eu rope cannot be divided and de sired guidelines for the MFR talks. The military security aspect is very 10 Switzerland important for this country. Belgrade supported the economic February 1977 41 BALANCE OF POWER tives, there are individual motives Both sides do agree that the aims which are more homogenous on the of the Vicnna talks should be to en Eastern side: One moth'e was to sup hance security and stabilIty in Europe port the progress of the CSCE by by achieving a moI'e stable military agreeing to the Western proposals on balance at lower leveb of forces with lVlFR talks, After the success of the UndIminIshed security for all pal·tid CSCE, the priorIty now i, not that pants. 1", Thi~ was confirmed repeat high, To stop further integration of edly by the Soviet press, I" N A TO 'is one of the major obJectIves Details on the objectives can be of the WTO, as well as control and ,Ierived from the proposals, but, in containment of \Ve:-;t Germany. A uni general terms, the West wants to bal lateral reduction of forces by the ance the main elements of instability United States, for instance, is not a in the present military equation in short-range objective of the Soviet Central Europe. The elements of in Union because it could "shock" NATO ,tability are the WTO manpower and into an undesired unity, When the tank superiority and the distance to United States dropped redul'tion plans, Central ~;urope for the TJnited States the interest of the Soviet Union on l'ompared to the Soviet Union."" lVlFR could have declIned ,ome\\ hat. The Soviet Union is not willing to Perhaps the question of tactkal nu give up a relative ~uperiority without deal' weapO)1g alsu cuuld be a motive. receiving ~omething in return. Thi~ In any case, MFR is a tool for the could be a halt in the further integra type of "detente" favored by the So tion of NATO and a reduction of viet Union: "polItical Mtente sup West Germany's strength, but the ported by mil ita I' y Mtente" ,-, as (endelll'ies in this direction are not proved in the con'elation between the dear at the moment. Thus, proposals conferences at Heblllki and Vienna, deal with the 42 Military Review BALANCE OF POWER 19508. The Harmel Report on the the basic figlll'es from ,,:hieh ~ A TO future tasks of NATO had prepared negotiators started. the ground for the proposal under N A TO's Initial prop""al suggested the title uMBYR" in ID6R after the reductiuns in two phases. The first Reykjavik meeti ng of the NATO phn:.;e would il1\'oh e a 15-pel'(..'ent cut Council that year. '" The next major in Amel'lClln and Soviet ground troops event was L. Brezhnev's call for force in the MFR area, which would leave reouctioll in 1071. After l'Ca:-;::Hll'an{'e:.;, 11,8.000 CS troops I a reduction of basic preparatiuns started the fall of :lO,OOO) alll! :181,000 Soviet troops (a 1972, followed by preliminar,' talks rerluetion of G8,OOO), In the second and formal negotiations beginning' in phase. there would be a reduction of all October 1873. Coordlnatiun with the ~ A TO and \\'TO gl'O!IIHI fnl'res tu a outcome of the rSCE did not uccur, comm"n ceiling of 700.000, involving and no m a j 0 r progress has been further cuts by 1\ A TO of 70.000 and achieved since the signing of the Hel by the WTO uf 13(;,000, 1\0 doubt a rea :-;inki act. Many ql1e:-;tioll~ are vag-lie :';011 fill' pl'opo:-:ing that cut .should ~tart or open. Central Europe was not cle- "ith g'roull NATO/WTO Comparative Strengths MANPOWER EQUIPMENT Ground Air Tanks Aircraft NATO 800 210 6,655 1,310 WTO 925 178 15,450 2,800 The manpower figures are '" thousands The tank fIgures exclude reserve stocks fined in the communique on the pre a simple matter, free fl'llm the tom paratory consultations, but, for the plexities that would be inlrocluced by moment at least, the talks have been including other services. The problem concerned with force:; and armaments is somewhat l'umplicated, however, by in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Ger the fact that some l'uuntrie" have many, West Germany, the Nether ~1I1'fal'e-to-ail' forces in their al'mies, lands, Bel g i u m and Luxembourg. uthers in their ail' force,;. The initial France is not taking part in the dis WTO propos.lI l'overed both ground clIssions, so its forces are presumably and air forces. The base figures from excluded (except perhaps the two divi which it might start would be: NATO sions in Germany), as are any So 1,010,000 and the WTO 1,100,000. The viet or NATO troops not stationed pro po s a I envisaged ellts in three in the area described."a Of major stages: an initial reduction of 20,000 concern for NATO and neutral coun by both sides by 1975, leaving figures tries' is 'Hungary, with its national of 990,000 and 1,079,000; a second and Soviet divisions. The table shows reduction of 5 percent by 1976, leav- February 1917 43 BALANCE OF POWER f. ing 940,000 and 1,025,000; and a final madly have geopolitical reasons. reduction of 10 percent by 1977. The Austria's attitude toward MFR is figllres w~uld then be 845;000 men positive. and active, which explains its for NATO and 925,000 for the WTO. memorandum of 1970 submitted to WTO negotiators also have proposed all involved countries. It expresses that aircraft in the area should be the necessity of balanced force reduc included as well as tactical nuclear tion, stresses the disadvantages of a forces. e, All the above figures are mere dislocation of forces in Europe computed by NATO. ~ATO included and mentions the sole Austrian self aircraft and nuclear weapons in its interest of participating in activities last declaration, but the WTO did which have an impact on Austria's not change its attitude, still favoring destiny. e, The Soviet Union appre a reduction which maintains the exist ciated this initiative along with those ing balance of forces on a 17-percent of Finland and Switzerl~nd 2H but lower level. e.-, blocked the implementation aspect. Austria is very interested in an ac cumulatioll of forces on its eastern Impact on the Neutral Countries border which could occur in the event of an exclusion of Hungary from the force reduction. This would cause not Some prerequisites are typical for only a primary threat as in the case neutral countries, especially for these of any concentration of forces close with per~anent neutrality. They have to one's country, but also would cause to be independent in theIr internal a secondary, even more dangerous and foreign political decisions, and threat in case of an armed East-West they must avoid obligatlOns which conflict. Either an e a s tel' n thrust endanger their duties as a neutral. through Austria or a movement of The second prerequisite has special NATO against Hungary would involve impact on bilateral relationships. The Austria. Additionally, the use of tac first prerequisite can be endangered tical nuclear weapons probably wou ld by a change in the balance of power. er. be unavoidable because of the decisive The neutral countries have similar ness of each of these actions. interests 111 a reduction of forces in Finland seems rather uninvolved their environment and a lowering of with MFR. It should, however, be con the existing tensions. This should oc cerned about any reinforcement in .its cur without changing the existing vicinity considering the possibility of equilibrium and without leaving a a movement to the flanks of troops single nation so strong that it could from Central Europe as a consequence become a new threat for the neutral of progress in the MFR negotiations. countries. ~ot desirable is a propa This behavior may have its explana ganda effect which simulates a peace tion in Finland's restricted flexibility ful agreement without implementa in matters of foreign policy. tion. This could reduce the neutral's In Helsinki, Sweden's Premier as own security efforts and endanger in well as Yugoslavia's Pre sid e n t dependence, security and the fulfill stressed the necessity for serious ne ment of the neutral's international gotiations on arms reductions. 'ell Swe duties: den wants to participate in these nego Different attitudes toward MFR pri- tiations later on an equal status with 44 Military Review. BALANCE OF POWER the other neutral countries. This is with comprehensive facts and figures understandable as it faces the same which are the basis for any material problems as Finland ..'0 progress. Switzerland's geographical situation Three technical approaches are gen is more favorable compared with the eralized in this discussion. 3" The mili other neutral countries. There is mod tary power approach maintains the mil erate Swiss interest in later partici itary and political status quo at lower pation mainly on verification tasks. levels of military effort. It does not Being very concerned about its par- . take into account that politics and ticipation in international agreements, military measures are inseparable and the Swiss Parliament refused to sup underestimates the significance of US port the nonproliferation treaty. This troops compared to USSR troops in support can be given only after CSCE Europe by disregarding the geograph and MFR succeed and are imple ical factor. This approach would not mented. be in NATO's interest. Yugoslavia, with an active military The pol i tic a I linkage approach strength equivalent to 23 divisions makes arms control and troop redur and a strong militia, is less concerned tiun agreements dependen t on the po about the single threat of one country. litical progress of East-West rela It is interested in an overall reduc tions. This is time-consuming. Hel tion of forces with the final aim of slllki provided the opportunity to take eliminating the pact organizations.·lI this approaeh, but, obviously, it is not It appreciates the Vienna talks as the in the interest of the Soviet Union. most successful initiative on this The instrumental approach tries to specific subject. But it is also aware change the political situation through of shortcomings which exclude re MFR. Its outcome is doubtful and its maining European countries and dis methods are risky, but it may be the regard other sensitive areas slIch as only way. the Mediterranean. Obviously, it is The negotiation8. when compared interested in participating, but it is WIth the Strategic Arms Limitation very cautious about its offers. Talks, start from imbalances and a multinational concern. Thus. the prob lems are more complex. Probably, future Development these talks will have less impact Oll the East European countries during the negotiation phase than on the The future development of MFR West European nations. is hampered by the fact that condi After successful negotiations on tions have changed since NATO ini force reductions, it will be necessary tiated the talks. For instance, the im to set up a system of arms control. mediate necessity to reduce US troops Then other areas of sensitivity in vanished, but internal economic pres Northern and Southerll Europe should sures impact on the defense efforts be negotiated. The neutral countries of many countries. ~ A TO realized de could assist in arms control. Their . ficiencies in the original proposal such vital concerns-security and independ as the exclusion of Hungary and the ence--demand .their participation in impact on its restructuring efforts. the negotiations as early as possible. The WTO is not wiIling to come up After successful negotiation and im- February 1971 45 BALANCE OF POWER plementation, the neutral countries while some actively support every ef will be a stabilizing element in the fort toward relaxation and force re security of Europe as long as they do duction. Their involvement depends on not participate in a force reduction. the degree of danger they perceive. They will be too weak to initiate hos The outcome of the CSCE seems prom tilities but too strong to be neglected. ising but is dependent on its adual implementation. The neutral countries supported implementation measures Conclusion oriented on a reduction of military forces. The force reduction talks, which could not be connected with the The conflict between East and West CSCE, are characterized by some com does not exist by mistake but, rather, mon motives of the blocs, but also by because of a confrontation of two some different major aims. Because ideologies, sometimes intensified by of the complexity of the problem and the Soviet attitude in East Europe. the large number of participants, re This attitude could be called imperial sults will not come quickly. Many ad istic, but also could be explained as vantages and disadvantages must be an extensive need for security. While evaluated on both sides. Any outcome talking about relaxat;on, the lise of has to be connected with an implemen "two languages" makes mutual under tation. As common motives exist, solu standing dIfficult. Additionally, the tions can be achieved, solutions which interpretation of security is different. lead to mutual advantages. With de While the Western view encompasses creasing force density, the neutral avoidance of conflicts and self-deter countries could contribute decisively mination, the Eastern is more geo as a stabilization factor. This explains strategically oriented. the interest of the neutral countries. The Western attitude is defensive; They are concerned about their se the East concerned with the "status curity and independence; they do not quo-plus." The mIlitary forces in want to be exposed to a threatening Europe are slightly stronger in the situation. They wish "to avoid the East. The economic and sociopolitical situation which makes necessary a developments rather favor the East. swift decision on D-day to have to Some neutral countries are skeptical choose 'the right friend.''' .1.1 NOTES 1 Rudolf Hecbt, "KSZE.'MBFR· AU8 n("utTnicT n Karl F. Luetgcndor-r. "AJ.tudlr FT(I(1CII d('T S'cht" t"CSCE/MBFR: From n Nt'utrnl View"), VCTteldlglntflSl'oittlit Obtl'TTCI('lts" t "Aetuul Ques LOllnl. Number 11. 1972. p 14. tion About the Dl'fem,(' Policy of Au~tril1"). OstcrrciciHsche Mtlltunsdu.' Zeltschrlft. Number 2, p 2 Hnn!:! C. Pllster. "Frledl,du' KOt'X!St('7!Z "lid HI75, 79 E)/tBptl1/JIUJlgs1)ohttlt" ("Penl'etui CO('xlstf'nCe nnd Rclnltntion Polil'Y"), ostcTu:if.'iusC'hc Mritturi8C"ilc j DIl! Hn1tlUln drr TlItIJ(IIlIl~{"f I( 11 II/,d II('IIt,.,"('lI ZetfschTI!t. Number I, 1976. p 8. Sta(lten I Attitudes of thC' Non-Bloc nnd Nf'utrnl CountriC'!», Sz('hcrilclt ulld ZI18urnmcII"rbClt tJI F:uroJla, Verlng fUr Wlssl'nschnfl und Pohtlk. :1 Hecht. 01'. ("It. Cologne, Wf"';t Germany. 1973. p 69. i Loewenthal in Manfred Woerner. Neue DI H IntervIC'w wlth Touko Rissnnen. 17 February me~18101!ell der SIr:hcrhcit (New Dimensions of 1976. Security), Internntionnle Wehrkunde-BegeR"nung, Muni.ch, West Germany. 2 February 1976. p 6. tJ V'c HaltzOlO dcr Biindllls{rciclI ulld 1H'utralc)I Staatr?n tAtlltudes of the Non-Bloc nnd Neutt'al :i Ibid .• p 9. Countrie~), 01/, Cit., P 66. 46 Military Review BALANCE OF POWER to Sth;: Synnergrl'n, "Srhll'rdh(lu' IICHf}r01l188C ;.:1 Ale'lamkr Frnluv. ";UrI811,utlltl/{'II ZllT mlli tiber dw 1IJnl'IIRl'lIdr Starler dl'T SOW)I t-.'itrr'tt tIlT'8e-liflt /·:"tsl,alllflH'1I HI f:"To}m" t "Ml'II .. urc. ., ',rufte" ,"Swedl ... h Concerns About the InCICIl!Hn~ fur a Military Rl'ln'llntlUn in 1·:t110])(>" l, ~Ulf')t'- Strength ur the Soviet Armed Fon'cs"}, Wchr 1,,1110" j'{'lIte, Numiwi 17. lUi4. pp n-7. J10itit8Chl' In/ormal/oll, 10 April 1!J75. .::.! B('ltlnm. ap. ('IC. J) 1. 11 "Switzerland's Ncutl'lllity," pro Uti/ rtlll, Number III, 1971, pp 1-5. ::~ TI,c !\1,/dllry liaf'PH'(', l'!'J:;-lfJ;(J. TIHI Int('l' Ilillltlnni In~tltlit{' for StrHtl'J,"Ii, StUlih"l Lund"n, 12 Dlc HaltllflO dcr Iht"dH'sfrl>'c» 1I11d "f'l",.",.» Eng, 111,Ii, )1 101. Stflntcn (Attitudes of the Non-Dlol' anti Ncutl'nl Cuuntric"}. 011. nt, P G., .!I "'I'T!lI'I"'''llf)tj,,,, "I lJ, ""'[Jll"I]~" ("F,JI>('(' Hr. ,iucll"n III M.n t'mtnt7"), I'Tr"IH'. Vlt'nnn. AIl'ltrm, 27 ,llInt' l:r,5, 1) I. 11 Dieter Mnhncke, "lVddtf Chal,('{'u 1,(Ji "Ill( .. -, r T""J,/>tTt. T tlllll'"'' II/e 7,(',fllJ'(}. 2'< Ft'hnwl')' RIUltltll(J8/Jf'(J,.('f/ZU""i'· ("Have AI'mnnH'nt Llml l'I~r. I' 1. tutloml u Chanl'e?"). H',hrfQrlj,/lUl'[l, Numlll')' 2, 197(,. P 41. ~I" Hr'. ht, "I' rlt, JI Ii). l:i Leunid ill'(>zhn{'v, "Fllr ('/Ill' ~·I rb, H;/' rUlIfJ .!7l1l1ff d('s illt(Tl'ntlollft/{'II Klonfl/l" ,"F,lr nn Iml'l'''\{' ment of thl' lnternntionnl C'hmnt{'''), 1111'1 :!"II I'llIllY". "1J~tITT,."'t IIII( .lent n'Cll ,lIT MO/jkaur" Swill. 15 Jun(' 1\175 II '''11.11 'I I' fi'(/'II f:"t" ,,1,/11"']" ("Au .. tIHI "n tht· HU,l.1 ur Indt'pl'IHll'nt D(,"l'lullm~'nt") "'It)II'I.'tll II 1011 III Chl'lstoph lJcrtrnm. Mlttual F()TCC Rcd",t'OI''l J"·,,t •. lG May tVj';,. I' 12, 111 [.;llrOlJ(' The PollUcfll AS}Jfcta. Adrl/dn /,III/{TI!, Number lH, The InternatIOnal Ih'ltltute fol' Strn· tcgic StudH's, London, Eng, 19i2, pp 2·9, ,II) lhr' /lotltll"fJ 1ft r HII."J"'~(Tt 'C" >lml )I('ut'ra/('" 1" Mllhnckc, 01', elt, p 11. ,'''ml(,,, {AUltwi",> l)f til" Nun-HI"t' and Nl'ntrnl Cuuntlll'''). 01' I'lt. P '>I; Iii Stanky n, Rct>or, "MBFR Alm>- Ilt Security and Stllblhtv," Commanelt'T8 P,oeM, 14 NOH'mbrl' \1 i\lIIJ.nk,1 VUk Attention Subscribers The Military Review Subscription Fund has reinstated its Automatic Re· newal program. That means that when you subscribe or renew your subscrip· tion to Military Review this year if you mark the automatic renewal block we will renew your subscription automatically every year until you tell us to stop. Automatic renewal helps you avoid the inconvenience of renewing your subscription each year. We will bill you annually at the subscription rate in effect at that time. A check from you when you pay your monthly bills assures you of another 12 months of the Military Review. the Army's professional journal. February 1977 47 Daily Life at Fort Atkinson --on the Missouri --1820-27 Part II Colonel Virgil Ney, Army of the United States, Retired HE daily life at Fort Atkinson could be dull, but it was never without T some excitement. There were the weekly parades and reviews wherein the soldier-farmers trooped the colors and passed in review before their dis tinguished commander to the inspiring martial tunes of The Dashing White Sel'ycant, Yankee Duudle, The White Cuckade, as played by the red-coated 6th Infantry Regimental Band, The colors of the tledghng Republic moving into position before the tightly drawn lines of the small battahons caused many a chill to travel up and down the spines of the reviewed and the j'e viewers, Hands, worn and blistered from the toil of the fields, once again grasped the burnished walnut stocks of the flintlock muskets and rifles and presented arms to thal red, white and blue banner as the field music played retreat and the flag was retired for the night at the quarters of the com manding officer. Drill and more drill made up the daily program for the average soldier at this remote station on the Missouri River. Marching in step to the notes of the little 6th Infantry Band 01' of the fifers and drummers of the field music, the troops learned to move in cadence at the shouted commands of the officers and sergeants, During the farming season, drill was all but sus- Port I of thl~ nrtirJe appC'nrcc\ in thl' JllnunlY 1977 ~lilltl/ry llt I U 1t'. Copym:ht lD 1977 by Colonel Virgil Ney. Army or the Unitl'd Stnte,'l. Retirt:!d. 50 Military Review FORT ATKINSON - pended-the troops found themselves engaged in producing crops of grain, vegetables and cattle in order to survive. West Point graduates at Fort At kinson often would find themselves in command of rows of corn and fields of wheat instead of ranks of men. While performing their duties in the interest of garrison and post de fense, the troops were faced with the problems of group living-under an absolute rule exercised by the officers and noncommissioned officers ap pointed over them, according to the Articles of War and Army regulations. In order to carry out the provisions of military law and the Articles of War, the commanding officer at Fort Atkinson relied upon the well known institution of the court-martial. In fact, at this post, courts-martial were convened so frequently that they were a I~rt of daily life. There were two types of courts-martial. The first was the garrison court of three offi cers with limited power to try noncapital offenses. This court could not try officers, and it could not adjudge a fine of more than one month's pay nor confinement at hard labor for more than a month. The general court was composed of 5 to 11 members and could try officers and adjudge the death penalty for capital offenses. 1 At this early post, the crimes requiring court martial action ranged from desertion, murder, intoxication on duty and disobedience of orders to embezzlement and other disorders. Deserters were given short shrift when they were apprehended. The most famous case of military justice at Fort Atkinson was the execution of Private John Shepherd by public hanging before the as~embled command on 1 April 1821. Shepherd was charged with mutiny and murder for "depriving Sergeant Slements of hi, life by deliberately dischm'ging the contents of a loaded gun into hi, body." After the hanging, which all the garrison men capable of bearing arms were required to witness, Shepherd's body was not given a military bUl'ial, but was delivered to the post surgeon for dissection." Officers as well as enlisted men were found before courts-martial. The offenses committed by the officers were lisually those pertaining to drunken ness on duty, disobedience of orders and unmilitary conduct. Several prom ising military careers which began in the Wnr of 1812 ended in disgrace at Fort Atkinson," In the guardhouse, really a prison" ithin the stockade area, the most Coh>1lcf Virrlif Nell, Army of the United Stntes, Retired, is a Theses Director at the National War Co/lege, for GeDl'ge Washing to>! [lnil'rr sity, lchere he hds taught history and political science, He holds a Ph.D. from Georgcto/Cn Uni vCl'sity. He has been Scnim' Military Analyst with the Combat Operations Research Gronp, Technical Operations, Incorporated, Afe,mndria, Virginia, and Chief. Social Sciences Division, Research Associates, Inc 0 ,. po rat e d, .Sill'e>· Spring, Maryland. He has 11'ritten and lectured extensively on military and historical ,qubjects, February 1977 51 Payday was always an occasion desperate offenders were key-locked and handcuffed and wore leg irons and the ball and chain to prevent escape. They were those awaiting transporta tion to a distant prison to serve their long terms. Those with short sen tences of a month or two served out the time in the garrison. The prisoners usually were employed daily at hard labor under armed guard. Guard mount, as now, was the daily formation to establish the guard for 24 hours. The guard was divided into three reliefs. of eight hours-with an appropriate number of men in each relief to cover the sentry postc Each relief was commanded by a corporal, who, in turn, was commanded by the sergeant of the guard, who reported to the officer of the day or officer of the guard if one was designated. The guard slept in the guardhouse upon its weapons, ready for instant inspection or duty in case of the approach of the officer of the day, the commanding officer, an emergency or attack. Guard was one of the most important duties performed by the troops. For the average private. this meant shouldering a loaded flintlock Spring field or Hal peTS Ferry musket or rifle and walking post on the bluff above the dark. swirling waters of the Missouri. Adventure walked with the young soldier. To the west were dark, foreboding hills wherein any number of savages might lurk bent upon lifting the hair of the sleeping garrison. Eastward across the river were the Indian villages which he could see from his senh'y path. The noises of the night. the strange sounds of th" forest and. prairies. all contributed to the apprehension of the recruit' on guard for the first time. The schedule was one hour on post and two hours off, so the members of the guard all had their turns at sentry go. Soon the sun, peep- 52 Military Review FORT ATKINSON ing over the blue bluffs to the east, heralded the dawning of the day as an nounced by the rattle of drums and the screams of the fifes after the roar of the morning gun Bt reveille, In a post such as Fort Atkinson, a real break in the daily life came when the paymaster arrived from Franklin, Missouri. The arrival of an express rider with official and personal mail also was a big event. Some times the troops were not paid for months on end due to bad weather, river conditions and Indian intertribal warfare, This lack of money and mail tore at and weakened morale, When the paymaster rode into the fort, there was jubilation, Perhaps the happiest were the sutlers and laund,'e"es who had been carrying the troops on credit since his last visit! The Army prepared the troops for their pay by issuing a written order, The following extract of an order will explain: Headl)uarters 6th Infantry Fort Atkinson Ii!, Sept 1823, Orders '. The fire Senior Companies ()f the Reyt ,,'!ll be paid I() 111 OI'm 1(', The payment will cOlllmence at 8 n'c/ock in Ihe morning at R()om N(), 22 in the Cantonment, The "emaining C()mpanies 1('111 be paid the next day, Payment to commence at the same time of day at the same place. lVO penHiS,'linn for any whiskey sold to enlisted men until further 0, ders, By order ()f C()l, Leavena'orth J, Rogers Lt & actg, Adjt 6 Inft, l The troops usually were paid by companies arranged in order of their captain's date of rank. All Wore the uniform of the day, the officers wearing their swords and the paymaster sitting down, generally with his sword and a loaded flintlock Harpers Ferry pistol laid on the pay table, Each soldier, as his name was called by the clerk, stepped forward, halted, saluted the paymaster who retul'lled the salute and cOlin ted out in coin the amount due the soldier, The man counted the money, saluted and left the table to move to the sutler's and the laundresses' tables, Here, he paid his indebtedness according to their lists, With money in his pockets, but usually very little, he soon was facing his comrades from whom he had borrowed, Next, to the sutler's store for a drink of rum or whiskey, but a trying experience with the one payday spree caused the colonel to close down all liquor sales temporarily, r, Whiskey /l'as pe"haps the. >lIOSt frequently mentioned topic in gar rison ordel's, At one time the commissary had nine thousand gallons, and a liberal supply ,<'as ,'egularly furnished every soldie,', Extra /Vork was ,'ewarded by a larger allon'ance, In addition to the official allow ance (1 gill a day), the siltier sold enol'1nol/s I)uantities and the laun dresses became bootleggers !"hen garrison orders prel'ented the sutler from supplying the demands directly, From these sources the soldiers secured enough whiskey to become drunk altogether too f,'el)uently in February 1971 53 FORT ATKINSON accm'd with the commanding o!ficer's standards, Numerous orders con cel'ning its sale and consumption were issued, In one of them Leaven 'worth said, 'The men are carousing and getting drunk almost every night', Following one pay day 136 persuns 1<'e~e coul't-mal,tialed, thirty eight of them for drunkenness, 6 Thus, the commander at Fort Atkinson was faced with a most serious command problem, compounded by the fact that the direct cause was legal and sanctioned by Army regulations, Further, the demand for whiskey was met, unofficially. by civilians who set up as "traders" in the immediate vicinity, Soldiers, sneaking out after tattoo, headed for "Cooper's Place" where solace with the bottle and perhaps feminine companionship could be found, Another such establishment was in the vicinity of the Hook. 1 Frequently when the paymaster in St, Louis or Franklin w~s not avail able to visit the post, one of the garrison officers wou ld be ordered to go to secure the funds, Franklin was the nearest national bank where monies could be obtained for military payrolls, The following special order directed that the above plan be put into effect: II eadquarters 6th Inf Fort Atkinson 24 Dccembel' 1822 Special 01'(/cr" Capt, Riley hal'iny been ,»'dered to procecd to Fmnklin (Missouri) ICitlt men and pack h",','es to tran"p'l1't and glwl'd to this post a q/lan tity of specie fm' the payment of the tmops, thc Post Q/lartermaster (('ill pay such necessary c,"pe,we .. as Capt, Riley may produce proper l'eceipts f01', taken in the name of the Quarta JIaster, H. LeapenH'otth Col, Cumg,' However, there was an additional factor involved in sending Captain Riley by land to secure the gold and silver coins with which to pay the troops, The Missouri River, the highway of the Army, was frozen at this time from bank to bank; hence, navigation was impossible, The departure, of such parties from the post was always an exciting event-special care was used in the selection of the soldiers to go on such missions, They in volved adventure and a certain amount of dangel', and the troops were able to see "civilization" again if only for a few hours 01' days, So, the day before Christmas 1822, a mounted party of officers and men with packhorses departed from the 'snow-covered garrison of Fort Atkinson and followed a crude road or trace to Franklin, This route had been estab lished by Lieutenant Gabriel Field, one of the post's young officers, and a fa vorite staff officer of Colonel Leavenworth's. Snow in this area could be a problem even for horses and riders, often drifting to a height of 3 to 8 feet. The gold and silver specie--enough to pay 447 officers and men--'-was heavy. No paper currency was available at this time in our history. Change was made by cutting the coins into "bits"-which gave the American cul- 54 Military Review. FORT ATKINSON ture denominations of "2 bits," "4 bits," "6 bits," and so forth which have survived to the present day. The threat of attack against Fort Atkinson was ever-present, yet it did not occur. Colonel Leavenworth, always the prudent commander, took no chances: Hmtiqllarters 6th Inf Fort A.tkinsm! II May 182,1 Orders The sitllatif))! in I('hieh we are placed allti the ""o"'le"ge that there a}'e II ar parties ()f Indians iu o1fr /'icinity. rend(,rs it prudent that i1l diridllals (j" partie, who gn allY cOllsi"crablc distallce f,.,,," the Gal'1'i son shollid curry thei,· ar",s 01/(1 be prcpa,eti to "efell" thelllsel,·c,". Ollt parties will be furnishcd with twcllty 101fl"ls of ,arfri"yes per man. "-lajo1' Fflster will make ,"IIC/i al ranflCtHCut.<.; as hr malJ think p,'ope,' to praellt the plIMie!.' hursr.• at fhe farlll ft'OIll beillY t"kell away af night. fl. Le({I'cllf/'(JI fh Col. Cnmd!l. '/ The daily schedule at Fort Atkinson was often enlivened by the ap pearance of visitors, distinguished or othel'\\ ise. Later, some of them were to become well-known figures in American histOl':>': Frequent posts and e.rp' ('ss('s all ired {rum Sf. LOlliS H'lt bin t wel1'e to fifteen days. Boats plied the .'[issouri. Fill' tnulas 01/(1 flappcrs came frequently. John E. Wool, Albert Sidllel/ John.,ton, IVll1i"m S. Harney, Georye Cu,yhan, W. H. Ashlcy, F:. P. Gaines, If err SUIIIC fd fhe befter known vlsit(ll'S. Occa.-:irmnlly (l Spauial'd }Jut ill his appca1'nu('c and Rn bidou set ollt from Fort Atkinson for whaf the sllflcr called ·Sf. Afee'. One party set out in 1820 for the )lost at the mOllth of the St. Peters. (F"rt Snelling. Milln.) Defnchmellfs wCI'e <,,,"fillHalll! nr,.i,·illY nlld de parting. Instend of beiny a _.. lee])!!. monfJtonous. isolated ('umm21nify. it was a hil'e of ac!idfy. 1""tfOri IIf l,ri"l1 the lll'al'cyn,.r/ "r a dead e.rpedi finn. it was (In nut]Jm~t of n rll'ilizntirJn fhat W(lS ,'\(lOU to foll(JlI'. HI Obviously, many of the men at Fort Atkinson had enlisted in the Army for adventure and soldiering in the Indian country. When they found hard farm work and labor to be their lot, they were discontented and unhappy. Isolation from the nearest civilized settlements and towns by hundreds of miles of wilderness populated by wild Indians was a hard ~act of military life that some of the troops could not accept. Hence, they deserted, endeavor ing to make their way back to the settlements along the Missouri River. In becoming deserters, they were committing one of the most serious crimes in the military code. By their absence, they were weakening the de fense of Fort Atkinson and contributing to the dangers shared by their comrades. The General Regulations for the Army required five roll calls each February 1977 55 FORT ATKINSON day. 11 There was a sound reason for this seemingly repetitious and mo notonous function. The company commander and the orderly sergeant were bo'und to know where all their men were at a given time. The defense of the post would be greatly hazarded without an adequate number of men to man the loopholes, windows of the barracks and the bastions in case of an Indian attack. Colonel Leavenworth established a standing operating procedure for the actions to be taken when a soldier was repol·ted missing at one of the daily roll calls. The signal l!'ill be three guns in quicle succession, a pause of five minutes, and then one gun for each deserter. The Quarter Master will communicate the lenoldedge of this to all persons residing Icithin saund of it, and also to the indians, IdlO are in the habit of visiting the Post. It wlll be well to induce the Indians to locate themselves in such a man ner as to to lee advantage of it. H. Leapentvorth Col. Comdg. Thirty dollars shall be promptly paid to either soldier, citizen, or Indian, /Cho shall apprehend a deserter. U Order No. 87 H. Quarters, 6th Inf. Fort Atkinson 2 April 1822 Sholiid a deserter be overtaken it It'iIl be well to talee him alipe, but better to shoot him than to let him escape. Hence. if he should not stand when hailed, or should attempt 10 malee resistance, the COlln!>'y will e~'pect the pursuers to do their duty. H. Leavenworth Col. Comdg. 13 Thus, when the daily routine of Fort Atkinson was broken suddenly by . the booming of three cannon, all the garrison knew immediately that some one had left the post without permission and was in a deserter status. A deserter could take only three directions from the post on the bluff. The hills to the northwest were noble but inhospitable to a lone man on foot and without food. The bluffs to the east across the wide Missouri led directly into the camp of the reward-hungry Potawatomi Indians. The river-but where could a deserter find a canoe or boat to float down its swift and turbulent current? The southwest, through the Otoe and Pawnee tribal grounds-on foot, never; with a horse, perhaps. On to Santa Fe into Mexican Territory? Barracks rumors had it that the colonel pad sent Sergeant Cedars to Santa Fe to round up some deserters. Ii The Indians, having little use for money, were paid off with goods to the 'approximate value of the reward. Thus, the deserter had almost no ~ 56 Military Review FORT ATKINSON chance of making his way through Indian country. The following garrison order will explain how the Indians were paid and how the deserter was charged with the amount against his pay: Head Qllarters, Fort Atkinson 25 Aug. 1821 Special Garrison Order Lieut. Gabriel Field ACS, As. Com. of Sllb. will issue to the Indians, who have brought in a deserter at this Post, a deserter by the name of Han'is Hill, a p1'ivate in Captain lIfal·tin's Company, 4 % yards of stl'ong goods, 9 scalping knives, 18 Hawkbills, [An ·error in copying-zt shollid read hawlcbells which /Vere small bells used by Indians in dancing. (Ii. L. Peterson).] 3 hair combs; and one paper of vamillion. This Act. amollnting to $19.62% cts. ,!'ill be dedllcted fl'om the pay of the said Harris Hill. W, lIforgan, Lt. Col. 6th. Int. Comg." A survey of The Descriptive Roll of the 6th Regiment of U.S. Infantry, 1817-1827 reveals that, from 1819-27, the period of Cantonment Missouri and Fort Atkinson, 47 soldiers deserted from the regiment. 10 Five were ap prehended and foul' returned voluntarily. Considering the hard labor serv ice performed by the 6th Infantry Regiment during this period, the average of about six deserters a year, 01' one deserter every two months, was not a bad record for the time and the state of the military art. The daily inspection of quarters constituted one of the most impor tant functions performed by the company officers and noncommissioned of ficers. The living, or squad, rooms of the barracks were required to be swept and scrubbed until the whitewashed walls shone. Bunks were all made into a standard bedding display with the straw-filled bed sacks folded and blankets rolled 01' folded for ai ring as prescribed by orders. The daily inspection included the kitchen and mess room of the bar racks. At Fort Atkinson,' each barracks usually had its own kitchen, some times located in the subbasement, from whence the troops carried their cooked meals to their quarters above to eat. Other systems of feeding the troops included separate mess halls. Those messes had special tables for the unmarried noncommissibned officers. All tasks in connection with troop messing were undertaken by the "cooks police." These individuals served a daily tour by detail from the company roster. The kitchen "handymen" cleaned the huge cooking pots and pans and kept the cooking fires of cotton wood logs burning in the huge company fireplace. They also carried water for cooking and washing. The inspection report signed by Major Ketchum is most interesting in employment of certain categories of cleanliness. The term "tolerable" ap pears most frequently. In modern terms, this word would mean generally "endurable," "fairly good," "not bad," "so-so." In the US Army of that day, February 1977 57 FORT ATKINSON the words Hsuperior," "excellent," "outstanding," "satisfactory" and Hl1nsat~ isfactory" had not as yet made their appearance in the lexicon of the mili . tary profession. Another event, which interrupted the daily schedule, was the funeral of a brother officer or soldier. The Army regulation~ were explicit with Arrival of a keelboat heralded great excitement at the remote post reference to the military honors accorded the dead. In military tradition, each funeral contained the basic elements of soldiering-that is, marching, saluting, music and musketry. The soldiers' farewell consisted of the firing of three volleys of musketry over the open grave. The Army did not have chaplains at this time; hence, there was a lack of religious atmosphere except for the prayer of a Lrother oflicer or comrade in arms. 17 Sickness and death, funerals and one public hangmg gave a somber note to the ac tivities of the military post and its population. Sick call, played by the fifers and drummers, at 8; 15 a.m. brought forth those who were ill. Their indispositions were noted by the orderly sergeant and entered in the sick book. They then were carried or marched to the post hospital where the surgeon made a rapid determination of the soldier's con dition and marked him in the sick book "quarters," "hospital" or "duty." At Fort Atkinson, there was little of the habit of "riding" the sick book to escape daily duty. Within the limits of the medical knowledge and facilities, the soldier received the best care possible. There were no nurses, only fellow soldiers or patients to help feed and to attend to the sick. Deaths were not unusual, and the funeral cortege wending its way to the post cemetery to the north of the bluff to the doleful tune of Roslin Cast reminded all of the hazards of duty on the frontier. But, after the three volleys of the soldiers' farewell were fired over the grave, the escort and the mourners, except the. grave detail and the close friends of the deceased, were marched back to the post a.t a lively quickstep played by the 6th Infantry Band. Back in quarters, the 58 Mmtary Review FORT ATKINSON' brothel' officers of the late comrade in arms gathered to drink a toast to his memory. The barracks friends of the late private, perhaps, were soon at "old Kennerly's," the sutler, for a c;lrink to his memory and to drown the sadness ,of his death. With the large number of Irish in the regiment, there was a real possibility of a wake-before the burial, and after, with permission granted by the commanding and company officer. Regimental orders u~ually prescribed a period of mourning, as below: Camp MissolLri 18 March 1820. Regt. Order: In consequence "f Ihe dealh of 0/11' Brotltcr Officer Lieul, Clark, the officers belonging to the Rifle Relliment ,<'ill wear crape on Iheir left ann fOl' the period of one month. By order (Signed) S. Shannon Act. Adj. R. Rt. IR - On 5 November 1821. Lieutenant Henry Taylor of the 6th Infantry died at Fort Atkinson. The order for his funeral is simple and adequate: Head Quarters. Fort Atkinson .5 NOI'ember HI21 O"ders No. II: The funeral of the late Lieut. (Henry) Taylor II'ill move fl'U1I1 his quarters at half past 3 o'clock this afte11loon. Lieut. Clark lI'ill com mand the escort; it is e.rpecled Ihat el'ery officer /l'ho can attend lI·ill. The Pall Bearers l!'ill be selecled previous to the pl'O('ession moving. By ordel' of Lieut. Col. Morgan C. Pentland Adj. 6th Tnf '" As Lieutenant Taylor's death was reported as of 5 November. his bur ial was rather hasty because usually no embalming facilities were available in the Army, 01' civil life. at this time. At this remote post, the preparation of the body for interment was accomplished by friends of the departed. Un der the supervision of the post surgeon. they washed and clothed the de ceased in the uniform of his corps and rank. Tombstones were made from stone from the local quar'·y. Name, birthplace, rank and organization were engraved thereon by a soldier skilled in this trade. The recovered pieces of the tombstone of Lil1utenant Gabriel Field of the 6th Infantry Regiment at test to the usual means of marking graves at Fort Atkinson. Thus were the <,Ie parted warriors of Fort Atkinson sent on their final march to Valhalla. The absence of taps played on the bugle will be noticed by the readers. This practice was not established until during the Civil War. February 1977 59 FORT ATKINSON A frontline commander, not wishing to alarm the enemy by the three volley" of musketry, substituted the bugle call taps in the belief that the adjacent , enemy would attach no eombat significance to~ the' rendition of the music, Head Qual'tel''< 6th Inf Fort Atkin.'wn Apr 17, 182;1 Orders It has becume the painfUl dilly of the Col CrJ1lll1y to announce to his rfln1mand fhat the [}(Jllant, al'fil'c, and !Jcnernus Llcut. Gabtiel Field is no more. He dier! fn<-:t cl'rnin[l of ten o'dodt in rnnsequence of an ac~ rir/ental (('/llInri 111 tlrc tllluh If ifh a "harp puiuted kuife by (('}dfh the main artety anrl ncl'/'C Il'ere sC/'C? ed. His funelai will bf attenderl tomo,.,'oll' at cleren o'clock A,M, Maju)' Ketchum's Company ",ill fOllif the escmt, The Arljutant /l'ill detail a sufficlfnt numl,e) 10 cO))lplete the C(})Ul"lJ}Y 10 its establishment for this duty, ..lInjn}" F{)stCJ brinrt fhl' scrfluc/ utJi('C) in cOJ1lwanri at this Post he will immediately sccure all the effects /I)' equipage II'/tich were of the latc Lieut Field (r/('('('a-:c(/) am} make lOI ii/pel/tory thereof. and Q,q S()On as possible transmit the same to the Officer /If the Depm'lment of IVm', All fhe publirk ]Ho]Jrl'fy which mall be fnJOul in OJ" alJfJut his late quaf tfl'S /('ill be rleli,'e, cd to Uel/t, Z, C. l'a/meJ', Acting post QuarteJ' Master fnr (('hielt l""pel' rcceipt.< Inll be v"'en. AJ the requcst or Jla ior Fosler, S){rgerm .!r,Jm Gale and Capt Gmy will UKsist in the pCl'f01'lna1lc(' nf this dllty. II. I,cal'fnl/'O),th Cnl, Comdg,,'O Control over the river traffic \\'as assured by carrying out the order quoted below: Head Quarters 6th Infantry, Fort Atkinson 27 April 1822, O)'deT No, 111: All persons haping cltarge of boals, or parties, or indi1'iduals pass ing through Ihe Indian country "'ill int'al'iably ,'eport to the Command ing Officer, The Office)' of the Day "'Ill attend to the e,tecution of this order, By orda of Col, LeavenJl'orth Ch, Pentland Adj, 6th Inf," 60 Military Review FORT ATKINSON The arrival of Indian, at the l)(),t wa~ alway" an event of ,orne import. The Indian in the Fort Atl(ln~on area \I'n" frielHlly to the ,,"ldier~, but the troops were cautioned about the Indian', habit of tal,ing- items which did not belong to him. \'ost animals, hor,e" e"peculll)" \I ere the nwin objects of Ind.ian thievery. and the uIITel'cnt commanders \\ere partIcular tn 1~8l1e stnct orders in this regard, Individual bra\'p, anti ,mall gn>up, of Indian, were to be admitted into the gal'! ison thl'Oligh the maIn gate and then on through the guardhol1::-,e for securIty ren:-;un~. \Yhen a council WH"; held., there \\ ere many Indian" in the counct! hou"e-\\,herc thcy were addl'e"ed by the commanding officer and tl10 Indian agent. Often, the cOllncll """ thc only time that the average ,oldieI' at the post saw an Indian at c1Me range, The truops \\ere faseinate,l by the garb and appearance of the red men a, they ol'ated and di,cl"se,1 their relatIOn ship with the Great White Father in l'ar-a\\'ay Washington, During the council, which might lust for several day, with the In,lians pitching their teepee, outside the post \\'all", the troops \\'ere alway~ on the alel't for a quick assembly under arm" in event of trouhle, Once the Indian, departed with their gifts and peace medal", the troop, could relax an,l retul'll to sol diering, or farming, FOl' the recruit to have seell the Indulll at cl(),c di" tance was a real thrill and one not easily forgotten Often at ",eh councils. a brigade 01' regimental review would be held, Thu", the Indian, were ~ho\\'n some of the white man's war medicine, In addition to the ,"\I'ade of unib and other cel'emonies under arms, the ,lemon"tration of artillery an,l rocket firing would be scheduled to show the Indians the operations of the latpst model'l1 firepower, Almost daily, various type, of boats appeared on the ~Iissouri River below the garrison, These helped to lig-hten the isolatIOn and monotony-as they were halted and inspected by, the fort'" officers, These craft ranged from the sturdy keelhoats to the Ill'fmitive little ,teambnats and the canoe" and barges of trappers and traders bound for the mysterious land of the Indian to the north--llp the Missonri--to the Mandan V'illages and beyond, To the av"rage soldiel' watching from the bluff, these areas were where adventure awaited tho~e brave enough to ascend the turbulent river, When the sentry at the southeast bastion called out, "COI'poral of the Guard, Boat Ahoy," all eyes were tumed toward the river, Garrison orders were specific with regard to allowing boats to proceed up the river, There were ~everal valid reasons for this strict supervision, but the primary one was the control of the flow of whiskey to tribes to the north, All boat~ with distant de~tina tions were required to "heave to" and to tie up at the fort beach for inspec tion before moving on, Captains and crews were thus ashore at the post and the soldiers busily engaged in talking and trading with them. News of the outside world was especially desired by the troops, The voyager" wanted in formation about the Indians and the river ahead. When the boat was the sutler's, there was great speCUlation as to its cargo and when it would be unloaded and offered for sale, Kennerly, the sutler, customarily would permit the officers and their ladies a preview of the" goods as soon as the cargo was unloaded and in his store, ,Tames Ken nerly was an avid diarist and he recorded the following: February 1977 61 FORT ATKINSON 21 (May 1821,). Clear morning-commenced unloading Boat & find ali in good appa"ent o"de1'-summoned to meet the Council of Adminstn. at 10 o'c/ock-went up & lind Majr. Foster', Ketchum and Rily [sic] composed tile bUld. Foreman ve,'y e.rt,·a/'agant as to his Ideas on mer cantile tmnsaction, saying that 6 pr. Ct. was as much as the merchants e.rpected to make on thei,. capital & saying that the mercltants of Frank lin I('ould supply goods on better terms than my InVOice was priced, all of l!'Idclt I fiatly and p"eemplorily denied, opened a keg 0/ Tobacco & s"ld to Troops all goods oul and 110 prices Ii.t·ed by cOllneil. n Sunday 30th. Warm & very liard south l<'ind, much engaged as usual in store 1I101'ed 111 y family to nel/' hOllse today- Coin. & Lady called after supper, opened looking glasses to,' Mrs. L. & she took one. n One of the greatest events of the average day at Fort Atkinson was the arrival of a single keelboat or steamboat which was destined for the post. The soldiers, crowding the bluff and looking down at the docking of the visitor, knew from experience that this activity meant new recruits, mail or the long-awaited supplies for the sutler. His boat generally was filled with "creature comfort" items which the troops had done without since the last boat arrived-perhaps month, before. Included in such a category was the supply of tobacco and snuff and a limited stock of "patent" medicines and soap. Further, the sutler soon had his shelves filled with bottles of wine, whiskey and rum-all of which supplemented the regulation issue of spirits. If there were recruits on the boat, the crowding soldiers called out good-natured and possibly humorou, greetlllgs as they debarked and were formed to march to headquarters. Here, the adjutant and the sergeant ma jor welcomed them. In most instances, the commanding officer would address them with an official greeting and welcome to the regiment and the fort. Then they moved out to their assigned barracks where they drew their straw bedding and were shown their bunks-labeled with each soldier's name and rank. When the sergeant withdrew, a general introduction period ensued-the new men meeting the "old timers" and exchanging com'ersa tions about conditions and people "back home." Information about the com pany and platoon officers followed in the vein of their strictness and fair ness in the exercise of command. The sergeants were categorized by the aliI members and the recruits informed about their foibles and good points. Colonel Leavenworth was described by the veteran soldiers as "fair," "strict" and "a thorough soldier who had proven his courage and bravery in 1812." It also was disclosed that he had a sense of humor-witness his order about the soldiers, who were not men) but weasels, for stealing the eggs from the post chicken coop. The Majors Foster and Ketchum were noted as skilled farmers and brickmakers. They were said to be fair and just when they were on court-martial duty. Because of their higher rank, the troops had little contact with the majors-except at the fal'm and the court-mar tial. With the sounding of drill call, all soldiers, old and new, grasped their equipment-crossbelts, cartridge boxes, bayonets and muskets-and fell in on the parade in front of the barracks. . In 1823, Fort ·Atkinson troops went into combat against the Indians at 62 Military Review FORT ATKINSON Troopers of the 6th Infantry rush an Ankara Village the Arikara villages several hundreds of miles nurth un the i\lI,;souri. W. H. Ashley, the fur trader from St. L01I1S. and his men had been ambnHheu by the Arikara and had suffered heavy lo"es in killed aurl wounded. A,hley withdrew down the nver and sent a messengel' by boat with some of the more seriou,ly woundeu l'eqlle,tmg that the commanding o!fieer at Fort Atkin,on senu troops to punish the warriors. The daily life of everyone at the fort was mterrupted as never before when the mes,enger presented Ashley', WI itten plea for help, and Colonel Leavenworth directed the arl jlltant "to have OHieer's Call ,ollndeu at once." The troops in barracks and on the parade ground ,oon learneu what was happening from the \\ ollnded men as they carried them to .the post hospital. The officel's assembling at the headqllarters came to a\tent ion as the colonel entereu t he room and in formed them as follows: "Gentlemen, Ashley has been attacked by the Arickaree at this point on the map anrl hal' suffered heavy losse, and is asking for help." Company commanders were asked, in turn, to report the condition and availability of their companies for extenderl fielrl service. This report was followed by a discllssion of the boats available and the estimated strength of troops required. Detailed comment by the officers developerl that a punitive expedition could be mounted and on the dver within four days headed toward the Arikara villages. The colonel, not one to shirk respon sibility, realized the gravity of the situation! He could not inform Washing ton or Louisville (department headquarters) of his plan nor expect to receive a reply because of the slowness of communications. He must make his own decision and announce it to the command. This he dirl without hesitation it was to attack! February 1977 63 FORT ATKINSON There was excitement in the barracks when the company commanders returned and announced the subject of the officers' meeting and the colonel's decision. Action at last! The Indians are to be rought-adventure and glory for the soldier-farmers of Fort Atkinson. There was dangel', too, even death or the chance of wounds, but that is all part of the soldiers' trade. Who was to go and who was to stay? The post with its women and chilliren must be protected. The crops, the horses and cattle-can the local Indians be trusted not to attack a weakened garrison? Those who stayed behind were impor tant, too! By order of the captains, the sergeants '11ade the final selection. Under Major Foster, post commander in the absence of Colonel Leaven- worth, they woulli form the fort's defense. I The babble of voices and the hustle of the selection of those who were to go, or remain, began as soon as the sergeants took over from the com pany commanders. In modern military language, Colonel Leavenworth had directed that the post send a task force of 220 men of the 6th Infantry Regiment and the Artillery Detachment. Within four days of the mes senger's arrival. the men, supplies. ammunition and two six-pounders were loaded aboard four keelboats. Under the experienced direction of Major Ketchum, an expert boatman, the flotilla swung into the rapid current of the Missouri and began the slow, grueling ascent up stream. From atop the bluff, the wet-eyed wives, children and remaining troops under Major Foster waved and shouted farewells. Seven of the expedition never were to see Fort Atkinson again. They were the first US Army casualties of the Indian wars in the West which were to last until the 1890s. The men, including Sergeant Stackpole. were drowned when a keelboat was wrecked on a snag neal' the present city of Yankton, South Dakota. 2. Illustrative of the state of communication and travel at this time in the Army's history, the following recapitulation should prove interesting. The attack on the Ashley party occurred 2-3 June 1823; the'messenger by water reached Fort Atkinson (700 miles distant) on 18 June; Leavenworth's pu nitive expedition was en route 22 June; the objective was reached the eve ning of 9 August. 2" The story of the Arikara Expedition of 1823 is told elsewhere, but it must be said that the troops under the command of Colonel Henry Leaven worth did ascend the Missouri River in keelboats, with accompanying can- . non, and attack the Arika'ra fortified villages. The troops from Fort Atkin son had their great adventure in landing and. backed by the fire of the six pounders and a small howitzer. in a force reinforced by Sioux Indians and trappers as allies. chastised the Arikara for their wanton murder of Ash ley's men. Colonel Leavenworth, with the addition of Pilcher's trappers and the Indians to his order of battle, was pleased to call his command "The Missouri Legion." The return from the humbled Arikara villages required about 24 days down the swiftly flowing Missouri. Colonel Leavenworth's report of the ac tion, upon receipt by his superior commanders at St. Louis and in Louis ville, brought forth the commendation of the department commander, Major General E. P. Gaines. and Brigadier General Henry Atkinson. the district commander in 8t. Louis. General Gaines noted "the handsome and honorable 64 Military Review FORT ATKINSON result of the late expedition." 20 After this decisive action by the troops from Fort Atkinson, the Arikara Nation was never independent again. Today, the action by the little task force from Fort Atkinson is com memorated by a battle streamer attached to the regimental color of the 6th Infantry Regiment. It reads: "South Dakota, 1823." "' Thus, the daily life of the garrison at Fort Atkinson spanned the entire spectrum of the operation of the military community. Basically, the specific mission was to be prepared for action against an attacker when and if re quired. But more than this was involved-the human factors of group living and the dynamics of the military ethic all contributed in th~ir own ways to the sum of a successful US Army post on the frontier of the early West. Hence, the daily life of the post was made up of official, personal and special types of activities expected of soldiers and military organizations. Then, as now, the officer and soldier were willing to accept living under an absolute rule which brooked no interference with its operation. His daily living often reflected his own desires, but usually the commanding officer established the pattern. This was especially 80 at Fort Atkinson where Colonel Leaven worth's paternal interest in all his troops governed. Those who served with him have attested to his marked ability to reconcile diverse elements. This greatly contributed toward making life at Fort Atkinson pleasant and in teresting for the garrison. As an educated gentleman. and a practical phi losopher. he was able to solve complex command problems without calling _ upon higher headquarters for help and advice. He was qualified highly for independent command and demonstrated this quality upon several occasions at Fort Atkinson. Housing. feeding and clothing the command were the principal facets of group living at Fort Atkinson. At first. food and supplies were very lim ited-actually. at one period. the troops would have starved if the Rifle Regi ment had not possessed some good hunters who shot game en route on the voyage up river to the Council Bluffs. On arrival there. the troops were plagued by an inept civilian contractor who could not deliver the necessary rations for the troops. When the commanding officer carried out the War Department order to establish company gardens (which developed into huge farms). the troops were faced with strange and new duty for a soldier that of farmer or drover. Interspersed with drill was the farm duty which in time supplanted and canceled it. Thus. the daily life was not one of ad venture. but of the hard. dull labor of the farm from which many of the " recruits had sought to escape. But this was not a new experience for an army; the Roman legion and many of the world's famous military organiza tions had done this very thing to survive. The farming. operated under military discipline. planning and control. produced bumper crops. Tn a day when the military' service was marked by primitive doctrines and often crude procedures. Colonel Leavenworth gained the reputation of being an enlightened commander. Tn the small and often irritating aspect of frontier garrison life. he gained a high level of performance from his men. He. was adept at dealing with ignorant and unlettered enlisted men whose performance had to be brought up to a higher level. Respected by both offi cers and men, he has been credited with exerting a profound influence upon February 1977 65 FORT ATKINSON the Army in establishing basic standards of duty and discipline."" In the 1820s, as in the 1970s, the daily life of the military post took its style from the commanding officer. The daily life at Fort Atkinson depended upon the education, philosophy of command and the ambitions of the com mander. Today, after a lapse of over 157 years, Fort Atkinson and its com manding officer, Colonel Henry Leavenworth, have many lessons to teach us as professionals of the military ethic. NOTES 1 AnWTlran Srntc rnlH'T8 Ml1,t'lrU AI1(l,rs SYlltfllUf of MflrtJal 1.011'. Pu,ltl SCT!'"C find Pohrr. Numbl,'r HID, pp 2G~-74. :.! The COUit-Mnllinl :1 F. ll. Helt,,"n, Hr'ltOTH(11 RCII/(ltCT of the UI'Itrrl Stutrll Army, Thl' Notional Tribune, WIl.,h Inglon, DC. 1890, pp J01 nnd 516. I Ol'di'r Bunk, 6th Infnnlry. fi Murch lR22 to fI Octob"T 1821, Nebl'uskn Stnte Historicol Stlciety. Linculn, Nil. !".Iblt!. n E'hmT B Wc .... ]!')', '>LI'(f' ot n FrontieT Post: Fort Atkm""on. 1823-1R2G," .Journal 0/ til(' Amenf'lIlI Md,raTu IlI~tttut(·, Volume III, Wmt('1' 1939, pp 203-9 ~ OilIer U{IlJk, Fill t Atkin"'lln, 24 Dcc('ml){'l' 11':22. n Ordc!' Dook, I'ort Atkln;;un, 11 May 1~21. III Wl'slpy, all. (·,t .. l' 20!L 11 ...t11lerl('I11) StUtf l'UJ,rrn ""1"duTY Ajtfl/TH, Volum(' 2. p 203 I:! arliN Dook, 6th Infantry. 6 Mnn'h 1822 to fI Octuber 182:~, op. CIt .. pI:). 1.1 IbHI, p 16. 1-1 Und., pp I081i-87 I!i Ordcl Book, lith Infantry, 1 Janunry 11<.21 to 7 March 1822, NatIOnal Arehhl(,'l. Wa!'lhington. DC. p 127. 11\ Tile Dcst'nptlt'c Roll 0/ the fill! RI'Oimeut 0/ V S Infa./ltry. 1!I17·JS27, Nlltionlll Ar('hi\lc~, Wu!>hmgton, DC. 1. Amlrlf'un Stutf' /'aIJfT8 /IIl/.t"ry Af/aITs. op. cli .. Volume 2, p 206. 11'> Order Bouk. 6th Infantry. 9 Jnnuary IB19 to 21 November IB20, National ArchIVc,>. Wush- in)ltun, DC. lflOrder llook, 6th Infantry, 1 January 1821 lo • Mnrch ~R22. 01'. cit .• P 129. :!() Older Duuk. 6th Infantry, 6 Murt'h 1822 to 6 October 1823. 0lJ. l'tt. 21 IbId .• P 34. :!:.! Thl' DIUTY Df Jq7TIl'R K('IwcT1V jR2J·1Il}6. Edited by Edgar D. Weslcy. MbMlUri Historical Society, St. Louh. MO. 192R, Volume VJ. Number 1. p 71. 23 IbId. P 73, 2-l L('ttcr from Colonel Le :.!-) Amc1'1(un State Paper8' M",tarv AlfaiT8. Glllc & SPllton, Washinj:!ton, DC. 1834, Report of Colone1 Leav{'nworth to Major General E. P. Gaines. Commanding Western DePartment. 30 August 1823. pp 692~93. 26 [bid., p 693. 27 John K. Mahon and Rornann Dany"h. ATmy Lineaoe SeneR. InfaJltr/J, Part I: Rl'ouiar Armv. Office of the Chl"f of Military Hi!>tory, UnIted Stule» Army, Washington, DC. 1972. p 206 . . 28 Virgil Nf'Y. "Prairie Generals And Colonels at Cnntonment MissoUl'i and Fort Atkinson," NebTaH'~rJ. Historu. Volume 56. Number 1, Spring 1975. p 72. 66 Military Review' A History of US Army Force Structuring First Lieutenant John C. Binkley, United States Army HE problem of force structuring and the replacement of massed for T may be the most Important Issue mations by dispersed Units confronting the military. How forces are structured determines, to a great extent. In many ways. the Civil War was the how effectively the unit will operate and first modern war. It combined the what can be accomplished on the totality of war. that sprang from the battlefield. There are four factors that French Revolution. With the power of determine how and why forces are industrialism The size of the armies. structured: the military tactics and doc new transportation and communication trine used; the command and control methods. and weaponry made It capability available; technological In· resemble 20th-Century war far more novations which Include weapons. than Its 18th-Century predecessor Un transportation and communications; and fortunately. for the soldier who had to the enemy threat. either real or fight the war. tactical doctrine did not perceived. keep pace With technological in novation The brigade and the regiment Until the Civil War. America clearly In linear formation led to mass carnage reflected its European origin. both in on both Sides Ironically. these mass tactics and force structuring. Troops formations were a result of the were put Into massed formations command and control system and tac because of limited communications tical doctrine of the C,v,l War. This Irony capability and the state of 18th·Century was observed by the noted military weaponry Skirmishing. a result of the histOrian Russell Welgley. experience of fighting the Indian wars. was the one American addition to Eu In the face of withering fire from ropean tactics. The advent of the rifled both rifles and artillery. attack for gun. with its increased range and ac mations tended to open up more than curacy. heralded the future of weapons ever before. and attacks tended to February 1977 67 ARMY FORCE STRUCTURING become a senes of short dashes from In the size of armies, span of control cover to cover, infantrymen working also became a problem The solution 'their way forward from rock to tree. ... was the establishment of an In But officers had to resist such termedlary, echelon between the tendencies and finally had to retain division and the army-the corps. With much of the old two rank attack Ime. liS establishment In March 1862, the They had to insist on relatively compact system became manageable though formations if they were to retain control organIZations above regimental level by VOice and visual communicatIOns and were sllil ad hoc In structure' strong 'entrenched positions are not carried by men moving In In the 50 years between the CIVil dnblets ... the end of the assault had War and World War I. the earlier trends to be some semblance of the traditional continued at an accelerated pace. massed charge Unhappily that charge POSSibly the most Important was the led almost mvanably to large casualties Increase In range and effectiveness of and repulse ' weapons and with It a corresponding trend toward dispersion Skirmishing While technology had entrapped became an Important part of tactical both armies within certain tactical doctrine and was employed extensively parameters, It also allowed greater flex dUring the Spanish-American War and Ibility at divISion and above Though the Philippine Insurrection. command and control problems at this level were complicated by the size of the As skirmishing became more Im armies and the extremely large portant, greater emphasis was placed geographic areas In which· they on smail-unit operations. In 1841, the operated, technological changes In the squad became a tactical as well as an logistics base, such as the use of administrative unit' After that, It railroads and Increased communications became the mainstay of training capability through telegraph, allowed procedures and tactical doctrine. As greater coordinated unit movement over early as 1867, General John easy Iden extended distances With the inCrease tified the Important soclo-organlZatlonal aspects of the squad Later In the century, Emory Upton, In his tacllcal Writing, emphaSIZed open forrTjlltlons centered around the squad Upton based his squad on eight men formln,9 two ranks ThiS may be looked upon as the first fire teams ThiS trend toward (he Importance of the squad was In stltullonallzed In 1892 when the Drill Regulations of that year established once and for all the squad as the basIc element.' DUring thiS period, the sIZe of the Army as well as the nature of Indian warfare meant that combat operations F/fst Lieutenant John C. Bmkley is or training usually was conducted by a an Author/Instructor on the Military force of regimental sIZe or less.' In an History Committee, Department of Un· ifled and Combined Operations, effort to eliminate thiS problem, USACGSC. He received his B.A. and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson M A. from Loyola University and IS a ordered a full division to be tested in doctoral candidate in History. Texas In 1911. It took almost 90 days to 68 Military Review ARMY FORCE STRUCTURING field the B',OOO-man "maneuver August 1917 With a manning level of divIsion," While in some ways a fiasco, 27,313 men,· While there is little doubt this exercise allowed officers to gain that the square diVISion was created experience and to experiment with the specIfically for the fighting on the use of telegraph, wireless, gasoline Western Front, there is considerable engines and airplanes, The "maneuver difference of opinion as to what specific division" was based on a triangular factors had the greatest Impact on ItS configuration of three brigades structure, According to the US Army Although four such divIsions had been offiCial history of World War I, the created on paper by 1913, only one was rationale was organized,& the character of fighting on the The experiments conducted In Texas Western Front made it necessary to were an Invaluable prelude to World have a untt ready to relieve the unit to War I After August 1914, the events In Its front. a due regard for the economy Europe forced a reconsideration in the of forces under such conditions and the Army's approach to force structuring reduction to mmlmum of the eVil, of The most important pre-1917 effort was mixing units, made it desirable to the National Defense Act of 1916 which reduce the numbers of bf/gades from continued the triangular configuration three to two. " 7 of the division with three regiments per brigade, While apparently an effective ThiS obViously reflected the French looking organization on paper, thiS Interest in minimIZing the confUSion cumbersome 2B,256-man mass was too while relieVing Units In the line, The infleXible, What was needed was a new only difference was that the American organization, one that would reflect the brigade was the sIZe of a French unique nature of the fighting on the diVISion Western Front A second factor that went Into the The debate over thiS new divisional structuring of the diVISion was the need formation IS a classic case of force to sustain combat power dUring a war of structuring, Criticism of the 1916 attrition General Robert Lee Bullard division centered around three major stated that the square diVISion was problems, The first dealt With span of formed With the belief "that It might go control It was felt that haVing nine along Without the need of refilling," ThiS regiments was too unwieldy The other appears to be the best explanation for two critiCisms revolved around tactical the fact that the US diviSion was about considerations, Given the type of tWice the size of ItS European fighting being conducted on the counterpart. Another explanation IS that Western Front, the Europeans felt that organIZational constraints helped decide the 150-man American company was the format of the diVISion. General too small, The French also were op James G Harbord maintains that a posed to the large-Size US diVISion shortage of staff officers led to the Their experience had shown that units conclUSion that fewer officers were attrlte qUickly and had to be replaced, needed to staff fewer large diVISions,. From the standpoint of coordination, smaller divisions were easier to move In The diVISion was not the only and out of the line than larger ones, echelon that reflected the new character of warfare It was manifest at After extensive evaluation and study all levels, primarily because of the of the' European conflict, a square Impact of new weapons and the desire diviSion, composed of two brigades with to use them effectively, In the words of two regiments each, was adopted on B one Army historian, "hand grenades, February 1977· 69 ARMY FDRCE STRUCTURING ORGANIZATIONAL CHART-WORLD WAR I SQUARE DIVISION NOTE IN PRACTICE, MACHINEGUN COMPANIESWEAE ATTACHED AS NEEDED TO INFANTRV BATTALIONS Source: Virgil Ney, Evolution of the US Army Division: 1939-1968. Combat Operations Research Group·M·365, US Army Combat Developments Command. Fort Belvoir, VA. FIGURE 1 70 Military Review ( ARMY FORCE STRUCTURING nfle grenades, and automatic nfles appeared In 1935. General Malin Craig, caused many changes."9 At first. there Army chief of staff, created a special was a tendency to concentrate these committee to deal With the need for special weapons In separate units in the reorganlzallon. The result. in 1936. was company and the battalion Slowly, It a test triangular diVISion composed of became apparent that the firepower three regiments. It was believed that the supplied by these weapons was used new diVision would Incorporate the most efficiently If Integrated at the latest changes in technology and lowest level Some weapons. however, motorization while operating With such as machlneguns, mortars and reduced staff and overhead. The supply ta nks, were used more efficiently If kept and maintenance elements were in in separate specialIZed units tegrated in a foreshadowing of the diVISion base system which was Im Despite some superficial similarities plemented under the name between the last part of the Civil War ReorganIZation Objective Army and World War I. the differences in DIVISions (ROAD). force structunng were profound The division slice had increased some While the diVISion was gOing through fivefold, and the division staff was in massive changes dunng the interwar creased to coordinate the vast logistical years. comparable changes were oc structure. Because of the lethality of currong .at all other echelons In the new weapons and increased com battalion, one of the four infantry com mUnications capability, troops dispersed panies was converted to a machlnegun to a greater extent than dunng the C,v,l company and the BrOWning Automatic War. This dispersion was reflected Rifle (BAR) remained the mainstay of further In the Integra lion of modern firepower for small Infantry Units. In weapons into units at all levels July 1940, the weapons squad was created to concentrate the BARs In one Since the square divIsIOn was a place The continued existence of the product of a specific conflict en BAR and later the M1 nfle reflected an vironment, General John J. Pershing Important doctnnal deCISion. While Eu felt that any postwar division needed ropean armies supplied automatic Increased mobility and flexibility. With firepower by virtue of crew-served thiS Intent, he created a board to explore weapons, the US Army used individual the matter of reorganIZatIOn. Sur Infantry weapons. In theory, the squad pnslngly, the board felt the old structure now was capable of advancing with a was adequate .. General Pershing re minimum of 0utslde support. To make Jected this position beheving that no the most of thiS capabollty, the sIZe of Single structure was best for all types of the squad was Increased from 8 to 12 war and that mobility must be an es men. ThiS doctrinal deCISion was sential facet of any new organization furthered In 1940 With the Introduction Essential to the accomplishment of thiS of the light machinegun which was goal was hiS belief In the reduction of added to the weapons platoon, leaving the diVISion's size to less than 20,000 the squad and the Infantry platoon un men, With the pooling of needed hindered by crew-served weapons that resources at corps or army. Pershing might limit mobility on the battlefield. also felt that a triangular diviSion would Mobility and disperSion went hand in best implement his ideas. Unfortunately, hand as longer-range weapons allowed the desire for the status quo was too greater frontages. lhese changes strong.~o created a greater demand for more efficient command and control During the 1930s, Interest in the capabilities, both organIZationally and organization of the division again technologically" February 1971 71 ARMY FDRCE STRUCTURING With the outbreak of combat In the Infantry's defensive firepower. To Europe, numerous organizational counter the mass attacks of the tank-air changes were needed to respond to the blitzkrieg team. pooled antitank and necessities of modern war The antiaircraft guns were to be employed 14 organization responsible for developing these changes after March 1942 was ThiS doctrinal conflict over pooling the Army Ground Forces under the antitank resources was part of a parallel command of General Leslie J. McNair. debate on the proper means of com HIS -organization/tactical philosophy bating armored forces Until 1939, the was to concentrate the maximum Army allocated ItS limited antitank number of men and materials In the resources organically to regiments and offense. To achieve this. McNair felt that battalions This reflected the prevalent two things were necessary restricting doctrme of the time which stressed the tho number of noncombat troops and dispersal of tank assets. The fall of pooling of all nonessential combat France demonstrated the full effect of assets at higher headquarters. HIs the tank-air team and caused a major arguments for >loollng centered on in re-evaluation of US doctrine 15 Two creased flexibility, greater range of schools of thought developed on the weapons and the concomitant wider antitank question The first maintained frontage of units. fluctuation in resource that tanks were the most effective demands and the fear that "type" Units means of countering other tanks, while would freeze needed assets even when the second school. of which McNair was unused The opposition. on the other an advocate. saw guns as the answer hand, argued that too much pooling would destroy teamwork" In the summer of 1941, the success of German 88mm antitank guns against The question of pooling led to doc the British In North Africa, as well as trinal issues over whether or not units the results of US maneuvers, appeared should be "task·forced" or "type to prove the reliability of the gun as a forced" This general Issue, In turn. solution to the tank problem These became separated Into sub· Issues con events tended to corroborate, at least to cerning specialized assets and combat McNair. the advantages of pooling an units. The controversy over specialized titank resources. By the fall of 1941, assets was whether tanks, tank McNair's position was dominant In destroyers, antiaircraft guns and aircraft November that year, the Tank Destroyer should be pooled or made organic to the and Tactical FIring Center was opened, unit they supported The controversy specifically to train tank destroyer crews regarding combat units resulteq In a and develop doctrine. Also that fall, a compromise In which diVISions, were proposal was made to create 220 tank "type-forced" along functional, lines, destroyer battalions 55 organic to while higher echelons became "task diviSIOns, 55 organic to corps and forced" Lower echelons. while initially armies and the remaining 110 in "type-forced." slowly became "task General Headquarters reserve As one forced" as the war developed 13 student of the period noted, thiS "is a clear indication of the seriousness With The question of pooling specialized which the War Department viewed the assets was Inextricably connected to the armored threat."" whole Issue of force structuring McNair felt that antitank and antiaircraft The Irony involved With these doc systems at regimen1al level and below trinal changes was that they never were should be based upon Infantry weapons Implemented in the manner in which With this in mind, the .50-cal. they were intended. Out of tbe proposed machinegun and the bazooka became 220 tank destroyer battalions, only 78 72 Military Review ARMY FORCE STRUCTURING ARMORED DIVISION (HEAVY) x X \c=:)\'''"''''''''''''''''''''''"I 6~6~~6A L::JL::JL::J~~~H I~~ ~ I Source: Dale Brudv'g, "A Proposed Division Organization Concept," Reference Book 61 -2, Selected Readings in the Development of Combat Divisions, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1971. FIGURE 2 February 1977 73 ARMY FORCE STRUCTURING existed by 1944'7 In a very real sense, FollOWing the idea of separate tank US tank destroyer doctnne was con forces, the first US armored diviSions ce;ved to defeat an enemy which had were tank-heavy organIZations created ceased to eXist by the time these units by combining "pure" tank and infantry became operational. The reason for this regiments These diviSions consisted of was the change In German tactical more than 15,000 men and 400 tanks. doctrine that moved away from mass The commitment to tank autonomy was armored attacks and toward the use of pushed to the pOint of consldenng an balanced Infantry-armor-artillery com armor "type" corps and even a tank bined arms teams. On the Western army Even as late as March 1942, the Front, the team consisted of a company US armored diVISion looked surprisingly of Infantry, a company of tanks and a like the panzer diVISion structure of battery 01 artillery On the Eastern Front, 1940, With two tank regiments, each the battalion was the main bUilding With three battalions and one triangular block These changes, In turn, were Infantry regiment To facilitate the reflected In American tank doctrine To command and control problems of understand fully these changes and highly mobile forces, two subordinate their later Impact on US force struc headquarters, "combat commands," tUring, we now must turn our attention were created Thus, the diVISion could to the development of US armored be diVided Into three separate com forces 18 mands Just like the ROAD diVISion of today 10 After World War I, two schools of thought developed as to be the proper The North African campaign was a use of armored vehicles One came from catalyst that changed the tank-heavy the cavalry school which looked upon Orientation of the armored diVISion. The the tank as the dominant element In an successful use of antitank defenses by independently operating mobile com the Germans revealed the vulnerability bined arms team. The tank would be a of armor when unaided by Infantry The weapon of explOitatIOn, unhindered by Immediate organizational result of thiS plodding infantry The second school of new tactical situation was the creation thought maintained that tanks should be of "light" armored diVISions. Of the 15 Interspersed With the Infantry for armored divisions that fought In the mutual protection ThiS latter POSition European Theater of Operations (ETO), was dominant In 1940 only two remained "heavy," based on the March 1942 organIZation The The German panzer diVISions that "light" diVISion was a balanced tank smashed France In May 1940 were Infantry team of three battalions of tank-heavy combined arms teams con each With thiS change, the battali'on sisting of two tank regiments (200 to became the bUilding block around which 220 tanks) and an Infantry brigade of the diVISion was structured The com one regiment and a reconnaissance bination of Interchangeable battalions battalion. By massing their numerically plus the three combat commands gave inferior armor. the Germans were able the type of fleXibility that was instituted to destroy the dispersed French forces." later In the ROAD diVISion The diviSion The American reaction was the accep could be task-forced even below the tance of massed armored formations combat command level" ThiS was manifest In McNair's com mitment to pooled antitank resources The other main diviSional 'structure, and the establishment of Armored the Infantry diVISion, remained Forces on 10 July 1940. ThiS newly organizatIOnally stable all through the created organization was given war. The only major change was in autonomous control of all tank units. response to McNair's deSire to 74 Military Review ARMORED DIVISION (LIGHT) B8G~§§J~ §J G Source: Dale Brudvig, "A Proposed Division Organization Concept," Reference Book 61-2, Selected Readings in the Development of Combat Divisions, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort L~avenworth, KS, 1971, FIGURE 3 streamline the composItIOn It was cut divIsIOn kept its triangular configuratIOn approxImately 13.5 percent wIth most of with the combined arms regimental the reductions coming from staffs or combat team as the basis Even the support unIts. Among the casualtIes squad was stabIlized at 72 men and were large antitank guns, compensated remained unchanged" for by pooling from hIgher headquarters and the introduction of bazookas In the ASIde from the basic Infantry and weapons platoon, and automatIc rifles armored diVISIons, there was con which were replaced by, lIght sIderable experimentation with func machineguns in the weapons squad. As tional units created for specIfIc Jobs. the offICIal US Army hIstory noted: Four such functional-type diVIsions were created-mechanized, lIght, ... increased firepower affects the cavalry and airborne divisions. For a reduction in weapons. The Infantry variety of reasons, by 1943 the first February 1977 75 ARMY FORCE STRUCTURING three types, with the exception of the replaced by the more effective 90mm 19th light Division (Alpine) which nfle." ,fought m Italy, had been converted into either ,nfantry divisions or had their Similarly, other changes took place assetli dispersed. The only expenmental In response to the lessons learned divIsion to have some success was the durmg World War II. Efforts to supply airborne. Although only used in special the foot soldier With some form of circumstances, it was successful to the mobile protection resulted In the ar pomt of having a "type" airborne corps mored personnel carner. The sIZe of the established. The movement toward squad also changed In response to the specialIZation was extremely limited due expenence gamed. A squad of 12 men to the reqUirements for standardization clearly represented too large a span of and the need for uniform planning and control for one man. To solve thiS logistical support 2J problem as well as work Within postwar Army reductions, the squad was Combat m the ETO demonstrated the reduced to nine men Increased necessity for effective force structunng firepower substituted for manpower and the proper use of technological Innovation The transformation from the The diviSional organIZation remained "pure" Infantry and armored divIsions remarkably stable until the advent of the was an example of effective adaptation pentamic diVISion of the mld-1950s The to the combat enVironment The tank "light" armored diVISion that had been Infantry team supplied the fleXibility that so successful dunng the war contmued was Imperative In a flUid combat With only one major adjustment-the situation ThiS fleXibility was based on addition of a fourth battalion of tanks technological mnovatlons In com and a fourth battalion of mfantry 25 ThiS munications (that IS, radios). weapon balanced tank· Infantry team kept ItS systems (that IS, tracked vehicles) and ,n flexlbtllty With the three combat com the organizational Innovation such as mands The Infantry diVISion kept ItS the armored diVISions' combat com· tnangular configuration based on the mands. FleXibility, m turn. brought about regimental combat team Dunng the greater dispersion which resulted m war, It had been planned to attach a declmlng casualties tank company organically to each maneuver battalion ThiS proposal never The domination of the tank·tnfantry was Implemented dunng the war and team during the war had a contlnumg was Impeded further by postwar effect on postwar force structunng. finanCial constraints The Korean War, espeCially since RUSSian tactics can· essentially an Infantry war. sldered armor the dominant arm DUling demonstrated no Immediate need' for World War II, the 2 36-lnch rocket such an arrangement It was not until launcher (bazooka) had been developed later, In the face of new threats and ,n to give the small mfantry unit antitank the support of new strategic doctnne, protection Dunng the Korean War, that thiS type of tank'lnfantry team because of the heaVier armor of the would come Into eXistence RUSSian tanks, the 35·mch bazooka replaced the smaller World War II Despite these structural cha nges, model. The preeminence of the armored little was done to reonentate the threat also was seen m the weapons triangle diVISion from ItS World War II squad where the 50·cal machlnegun European baSIS. From 1950 on, thiS was replaced by the 57mm reCOilless structure became less and les,s Viable nfle The mamstay of the gun platoon of Two factors were Important In the heavy weapons company became refOCUSing the diVISIOn-the Korean the 75mm nfle though later It was War and the development of RUSSian 76 Military Review US INFANTRY DIVISION (TRIANGULAR) x x EJ8§ffiEELSJ 8 ,------,888 8 8 [~~1"" Source' Dale Brudvlg, "A Proposed D,v,sion OrganIZation Concept," Reference Book 61-2, Selected Readings in the Development of Combat Divisions, US Army Command and General Staff Coilege, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1971. FIGURE 4 nuclear weapons The Korean War order to avoid presenting a nuclear demonstrated that a European target. onentated divIsion was not necessarily effective elsewhere In the world It As early as 1951, preliminary con needed greater flexibility to operate In sideration had begun of a new division different global envlronments'6 structure having both a nuclear and Beglnnmg m the mld-195Gs, the nonnuclear capability. The Operations presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Research Office (ORO) of Johns Hopkins the battlefield had a profound impact on Umv"rSlty proposed a new organization force' structuring. It beGame evident based on five maneuver elements. The that, within a high-Intensity nuclear maneuver element was a battalion environment. units must be dispersed In combat team consIsting of two rifle February 1977 77 ARMY FORCE STRUCTURING companies, one tank company, one gun Underlining the whole pentomic ap company and a service company, proach was the belief that. In a nuclear totaling about 1,200 men In theory, this environment. units would have to be structuring would supply both hOrizontal dispersed and possibly isolated. In and vertical flexibility. The ORO further creased firepower, especially from proposed grouping five of these bat artillery-deliverable nuclear systems, talions Into a combat command with five radiO communications and mobility combat commands forming a corps made such disperSion possible. ThiS (60,000 men) and five corps forming a trend toward self-sufficiency was field army (330.000 men) The division manifest at all levels to Include the echelon was to be removed and the squad. Fire teams were created with the combined arms team concept moved capability "of Independent action in a down to battalion level." Widely dispersed front "" The Davy Crockett became the symbol of the In September 1955, the uS Con Infantryman's nuclear battlefield tinental Army Command (USCONARC) capability The armored diVision. on the began extensive experimentation with other hand, remained essentially un the ORO proposals which would later changed since It had been structured evolve into the pentomlc diVISional with thiS type of independent fleXibility structure This cOincided with the dUring World War II. ascent of massive retaliation as the prevalent American strategic doctrine. Despite the theoretical soundness of Pivotal to this doctrine was the belief the pentomlc system, it was fraught that high-intensity conventional war with weaknesses The battle group was could not be separated from nuclear too small to have any sustaining power war As tactical nuclear weapons were In either a nuclear or nonnuclear en Inserted Into the European scenario. vironment. and it was too nuclear this conviction became even more ap Oriented to operate effectively In con parent ventIOnal combat. Its apparent flexibility disappeared when tested in reality. Part In September 1956, the 101 st Air of thiS infleXibility was due to the borne D,v,s,on was converted to a pen elimination of the battalion echelon As tomlc airborne diVISion. It was diVided has been noted by Ernest Fisher, Army Into five battle groups (about 10400 histOrian men) )lVhlch were, In turn, diVided Into five companies and a 105mm battery The seeming advantage of Thus, the battalion echelon was ellmlnatmg the battalIOn proved illusory removed from the diVISional structure. The resultmg single echelon betwe'en The Infantry versIOn of the pentomlc the diVISIOn commanders and the diVISion was essentially the same with company commanders gave the diVISIOn the exception of haVing three platoons commflnder a span of control that in per company (Instead of four as in the cluded sixteen units. 30 airborne diVISion) and a battalion of five companies of tanks. ThiS arrangement In the end, the organIZation allowed the battle group to be tailored strlng"ncy of the pentomlc structure with armor when needed The advan and the change from massive retaliation tages of the pentomlc structure were a to fleXible response caused a fun less lucrative target on the battlefield damental reorganization In the diVISion. and Increased flexibility In the final The new product was the analysIs, a "smaller more self-sufficient ReorganIZation Objective Army combat unit, larger than the battalion, D,v,sions. The foundation of ROAD can but smaller than the regiment." was be traced to the Korean War when the created.'· triangular diVision came into question. 78 Military Review ORGANIZATION OF PENTOMIC INFANTRY DIVISION OIVISIOI\I 6ATTAL10~ ARTlLlfR'r HLAODUAATlllS HEAOOUAlllERS.-" aUARTERMASTER AOMIMSTRATlV~ HIAr...SPORTATIOPII OflAcH .... e"oT TRAllIISAt.lO BAIIID Source: Virgil Ney, Evolution of the US Armv DIvision: 1939-1968, Combat Operations Research Group·M·365, US Army Combat Developments Command, Fort,Belvoir, VA, FIGURE 5 In 1952 and 1953, a series of Army creasrngly, limited war appeared to be boards re-evaluated the regimental and at least as much a threat as nuclear divIsional structure and came to the conflict In response to this problem, the conclusion that task forcing was more Modern Mobile Army (MOMAR I) was efficient than a highly structured considered, The MOMAR divIsion kept system The Lonnrng Board, which con the pentomlc structure but would have centrated on divIsional organIZation, the capability of berng tarlored to fit the recommended a brigade structure along miSSion The heavy MOMAR divIsion the lines of the armored division The was essentially the traditional armored battalion was to be a self-sufficient unit divIsion while the medium MOMAR with as many as 15 allocated to the division was a mechanIZed Infanlry division," division In a very real sense, MOMAR "pornted the way toward ROAD rnsofar In, the late 1950s, as the assump-, as MOMAR I envIsioned an army tions upon which massive retaliation oriented toward limited rather than was predicated were questioned rn- general war."" By 1960, it was felt that February 1977 79 ARMY FORCE STRUCTURING ROAD DIVISION BASIC STRUCTURE BASIC STRUCTURE ALL fOUR DIVISIONS I I I HE.AOOUARTERS ARMORED AND AVIATION f:NGII\jEE.R CA.IjA.lR't SUPPORT HEADOUARTERS BATTAlIOl\j BATTALIOl\j COMMAND .~ SOYADRON COMPANY BRIGADE HE.ADQUARTERS MILITARY POLICE SIGNAL AND DIV'SIO'" COMPANY BATTALION ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS COMPA,",'" TANK INI-"AI\jlRY BATTAlIO,., • BATTALION' • Number and type of maneuver battalions may vary •• The support command commander's responsibilities for the administration company are limited to tactical, security and movement aspects Source: Virgil Ney, Evolution of the US Army Division: 1939-1968, Combat Operations Research Group-M-365, US Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, VA_ FIGURE 6 even MOMAR lacked the necessary 1975, thus providing Its name, Field flexibility and a further solution was Army 75 (FA-75), ThiS clearly meant the sought, dawn of flexible response]) FA-75 diVisions would have organic only those In September 1959, USCONARC elements needed under 'all Cir directed the US Army Command and cumstances, Implemented In the form of General Staff College to prepare a field the ROAD division, it became a' highly army concept "optimIZed for limited flexible organIZatIOn consisting of a war," The mandate was that the division base and from 6 to 15 organization should be operational until maneuver battalions divided among 80 Military Review ARMY FORCE STRUCTURING three brigades. This division had the The factors of technology, command ability to tailor itself Internally or to be and control, tactics and doctrine, and tailored externally by the addition of the enemy threat clearly have molded new units. Despite the addition of other the structure of US Army forces. Most units, the span of control did not change pronounced has been the trend toward because of the brigade echelon. Flex highly mobile and flexible combined ibility was increased further by the arms teams integrating all forms of capability of uSing the brigade In an weapons systems Without modern independent role communications and transportation, such organIZational innovations as the The development of ROAD was a ROAD brigade system would be Im logical evolutionary product of decades pOSSible Of equal importance has been of force structurong. One trend since the omnipresent enemy threat and the World War I had been to move the level conception of how the next war Will be of tactical and adminostratlve integration fought This has been apparent In the constantly to a lower echelon DUring last 20 years as the change to the World War II, the regimental combat pentomlc and then to the ROAD struc team had performed these duties, In the tures were clearly In response to a pentomic division. the battle group had speCifiC perceived threat Future sufficed. Under the ROAD system, It American forces Will be structured by was the battalion. This step ..... erely the same factors that molded them In reflected the trend toward self the past suffl.clency necessary due to the reo qUlred dispersion of units Such force structuring was supported by advances NOTES In transportation, such as aircraft and helicopters, as well as communocatlons 1 Russell F Welgley History of the United improvements ROAD was to provide St8tes Army. The Macmllllan Co . NY 1967, p 237 both a nuclear and nonnuclear capability ThiS structure has sufficed 2 For a full diSCUSSion of the command and control problems dunng the C,Vil War. see Virgil essentially. with minor variation. for the Ney The E~olutlon of Military Command and Con decade and a half since ItS conception trol 500 B C ·1965 AD. Combat OperatIOns Research Group M·217, US Army Combat' One speCial variation of ROAD was Developments Command. Fort BelVOir VA. 1965. P the airmobile diVISion While first 54 and followmg pages • proposed In 1962 by the Howze·Board, the concept was first imple'1ftented 3 Ernest Fisher. Weapons and EqUipment operationally In 1965 With the es· Evolutton and Its Inffuence Upon OrgantTatlOn and Tactics In the American Army From 1775·1965. tabllshment of the 1 st Cavalry D,v,s,on Office, Chief of Military History, Washington. DC. lAlrmoblle) The keynote of the Unpublished. pp 1·27 organIZation was surprise, fleXibility and mobility. To support the highly mobile 4 Virgil Ney. Orgamzatlon and EqUIpment of Infantryman, a battalion of helicopter the Infantry Rifle Squad From Valley Forge to gunships replaced some of the I ROAD. Combat Operations Research Group-M-194. traditional tube artillery While an US Army Combat Developments Command, Fort effective counterinsurgency weapon, BelVOir, VA, pp 8-18 the concept has application to more conventional operations. Air cavalry 5 Virgil Ney. Evolution of the US Army DIVISion 1939·1968. Combat Operations Research unots are an Integral part of armored Group-M-365, US Army Combat Developments cavalry and reconnaissance unots. The Command, Fort BelVOIr, VA. January 1969, pp 14- '01 st Airborne D,v,s,on has been con 15 verted to an airmobile diVISion and IS very much a part of European planning. 6 For a companson of the sizes of the various February 1977 81 ARMY FORCE STRUCTURING divIsional structurE'S. see L Vanloan Nalsawald 19 Hemz Guderian Panzer Leader. Translated by 'ProJect Shop. ORO 5·239.' Reference Book 61·2. Constantine Fltzglbson. E P Dutton & Co NY. Selected Readings In the Development of Combat 1952. Appendl); XXV DIVlslOm US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS. 1971, DD 2·4 20 Palmer Reorganization of Ground Forces for through 2·13 Combat op Cd pp 322·24 7 Untted States Army In the World War 1917· 21 Ibid. pp 326 28 1919 Hlstortcal 01\/l51On, Department of the Army Washrngl'On, DC 1947 Volume I p 118 22 Ibid. p 314. and Ney. Orgamza(lon and E Q(Jlpmem of the In/amry Riffe Squad From Vafley 8 Nalsawald O{l CII. pp 2-13 ItHough 2 15 Forge to ROAD op cit pp 44 50 9 Ney Evolution 01 the US Army 23 Fisher op CIt. p 87 and Ney Evolution of D,VISion 1939 1968 op cil D 23 and see Fisher tI)e US Army DIVISion 1939 1968 00 Cit 0040 D{l Cft DP 48 62 49 10 Na,sawdld op CIC. P 2 17 24 Fisher op CIt. pp 9091. and Ney OrganualJon and EqUIPment 01 the Infantry RIfle 11 Flsher,op cil pp 63 66 Squad From Valley Forge to ROAD. 00 CIt. pp 51· 55 12 Rob~rt Palmer ReorganizatIOn of Ground Forces for Combat The Army GroundForces The 25 8rudvlg. 00 Cit P 2·118 OrganizaTIon of Ground Troops Untted States A,my In World Weir II Edited by K",nt Roberts Greenfu:.ld 26 Ernest Fisher. RelationS/lip of the ROAD and Robert R Palmer HlstoTlcal DIIIISIon Concept to Moroll ConSIderatIOns In Strategic Department of the Army Washtngton DC 1947 p Planning Monograph Number 1063. Office. Chief 296 of Mllrtary History Washtngton DC 1965 p 50 13 For a detailed diSCUSSion at the varIOus 27 IbId pp 45 50 The original Operations aspects of force strllctuong of speclaltled assets Research Office study was given the short title of and the debates that went with It see Ibrd ttle PENT ANA structure The offiCial tlUe was Doctrine and Orgamzatlon Concepts for an 14 Fisher op Cit p 82 AtomiC NonatomlC Army DUring the Period 1960· 1970 , 5 Robprt Doughty French Antllank Doctrtne. 1940 The Antidote That Faded Mdltary ReView. 28 Ibid pp 45 54 The reason the number f,ve May 1976 pp 36 47 ThiS article gives a full was selected for the number of component Units diSCUSSion 01 the type of debates that were Clf' was as follows three units were conSIdered the culattng Within the French military lust as the\! Ideal number of subordinate units In the attack were In the Amencan while four was Ideal for the defense 16 Charles Balle\!. The Development of Amencan 29 Ney Organuat,on and EqUipment of the Tank Destroyers Dunng World War II The Impact of Infantry Rifle Squad FlOm VaJley Forge to ROAD. Doctnne Combat EJ(penence. and Technology on op CIt. p 47 Matenel AcqUISition Unpublished Master of Mdltary Art and St.lence TheSIS. US Army 30 Fisher. RelatIOnship of the ROAD Concept (0 Command and General Staff College Fort Moral ConSIderatIons In Strategic Plannmg. 00 Cit Leavenworth KS. 1976. p 7 P 106 17 Robert Palmer Organization and Tralnmg of New Ground Combat Elements •. The Army Ground Forces The Orgamzatlon of Ground Troops. Umted 32 Ib,d. p 63 States Army m World War II. op CIt. pp 427 ·28 JJ Ibid p 65 The US Army Command and 18 Dale Brudvlg. 'A Proposed Dlvlsl.On General Staff College was not the only contributor OrganizatIOn Concept.' Reference Book 61·2. to ROAD DUring thiS time frame. the US Army Selected Readmgs In the Development 0/ Combat Armor School worked el(tenslvely toward the Dlvlslons.op cit, p 2·108 development of ROAD 82 Military Review from ,j"- IATlI'S FIFTEEN NATIONS , South Africa: NATOs Unwelcome Ally lLLlO~S of worus have been a moment's notice. Of course, the Suez M written about South Africa's Canal route could be closed by the So strategic position in the world touay. viets at any time, anu the oil platforms Standing, as it does, a massive sen in the North Sea would not sun-i\'e tinel over the main traue route be hostilities for more than a few days. tween East and We"t, its importance Europe would be deprived of the one as the guardian for the supply of oil commodity without which no nation to the NATO countries needs no could sUJ'vi~e for long. stressing. Fortunately for us, South It would not require full-scale war Africa is strongly anti-Communist and to achieve this. The Soviet Union, with would resist to the utmost any form of South Africa in its hands, could an domination by a Communist country. nounce a complete blockade of oil But let us be quite clear; if South around the Cape of Good Hope, coupled Africa should ever fall into the hands with the threat of destroying the of a pro-Soviet Communist party, the North Sea oil platforms. Does anyone oil route from the rich oil fields in the suppose America, which has other oil Middle East to Europe could be cut at supplies, would retaliate by· nuclear Digested from NATO's Fifteen Nations (The Netherlands), June·July 1976. Copynght (iJ 1976 by NATO's fifteen Nations 84 Military Review SOUTH AFRICA bombardment? Does anyone suppose There is little doubt that well-coor that the NATO navies, bereaved of dinated attacks with st,'ong, well-led bases in the South Atlantic and Indian forces would 0 vel' w h elm South Oceans, could raise a blockade? Does Africa's relatively small de fen s e anyone suppose that, faced with such forces. a threat coupled with political de Fortunately, no African state, or mands, ~ATO would not accede to combination of states, even with So them? viet, Chinese or Cuban advisers and It follows that the loss of South arms, could carry out such an opera Africa to the Soviet Lnion could tion. The threat, therefore, would be strangle NATO completely. Sou t h f"om a major power, and at present it Africa may be outside the European does not appear a very likely possi area, but it is as important to NATO bility. as Norway or Turkey. Yet, although A more likely threat might be im'a this has been obvious to military com >ion by land and air forces from the manders for nearly a decade, they north by African troops, assisted, ad have been quite unable to impress it viHed and supplied by a major power, upon the politicians who are domi but without the actual participation nated by a biased United Nations and of foreign troops, or possibly with only mesmerized by the vision of black a small number of foreign troops such majority rule. as the 12,OOO-strong Cuban contin This is no place to go into the vexed gent. This is a possibility which has question of apartheid, but there is no been discussed much lately in the doubt that South Africa is better press. To understand the chalices of managed, more settled and more thriv such a project, it is lIecessary to look ing than any other state in Africa. at what forces might be involved. However, Western politicians do not These are inextricably bound up with agree with South Africa's treatment various political and terrorist organi of the black population and are un zations which abound in Africa. likely to be convinced of the necessity It would take too long to discuss of military aid there until their own them all, but the main ones affecting necks are in danger; then, it could be South Africa are: too late. All that can be done at the inoment is to keep pointing out where The ANC the threat lies in Southern Africa, a The African National Congress threat which is just as great to NATO (ANC) had a subversive wing inside and all our lives in Europe as it is to South Africa until 1%4 when its lead the population of South Africa. ers were arrested and dispersed. It has strong Soviet support, and its head Tbe Threats quarters at present are believed to be A glance at the accompanying map in Mozambique. It has a militant off shows that South Africa is bordered shoot called the Pan-Africhnist Con by the sea on three sides and by other gress (PAC) which has broken away African states on the fourth. If any iIl from the parent organization. There is disposed nation should wish to occupy another militant organization, also it, a simultaneous landfair push from owing allegiance to the ANC, called the north and sea/air landings on the "Spear of the Nation." The militants' coasts would be the obvious strategy. objective is to get the whites out of February 1977 85 SOUTH AFRICA Southern A frica altogether, but they ganization and, as is well-known, has al:e uncool'dinated allli are based gen succeelled with the help of Cuban erally on tribal allegiances, South troops and Soviet arms in dominating A frica has banned all "f them, and Angola. However, it now faces spo any ~llbve)·:·n{)n iH SllPPl'l's:-:.eu rigor radic subversion and gllel'l'illa activity om,I,\' by the South A frican police, so from the rival organizations which thcrc i, little underground terrorist have been deposed. activit,' In the Republic at the present time, That b not to say, however, that lAPU and ZANU the training of PAC and "Spear of the ZA PU and ZANU are two organiza ~ation" guerrilla:.: is not proceecling tions, ostensibly belonging to the outRide South A frica. The training is A ~r, operating in Rhodesia and seek fORtere .. 86 Military Review SOUTH AFRICA _ Durban / Saldanha Bay ,_ /_ East London _ Capetown - Port ElIZabeth Slmonstown • ~--..,....r" organizations and states got together, tempt to infiltrate into South-West the,· cuuld mount an offen,ive without Africa. but the country is by no means the considerable help of well-trained conducive to g'uel'I'llia-type operations, foreign troop' with modern equip It i, even cuncelvable that. having ment. Before such an inva,ion could uUlle su. with perhaps m"n~' of the be mounted. RhodesIa would have to guerrilla_ having been captured. the be controlled completely by the blacks. Jll'LA. together with the Cubans. Po",ibly. South-West A f l' i c a also might ,leclare that they intenrled to would huve had to have fallen to the "liberate" their personnel imprisoned Communists. Botswana has practically in SW A and mount a larger scaled in no armed forces. and any invasion vasion of that territol'Y, would have little difficulty in passing However. invarling across a border. through it. apart from its inhospita even with the armor that the Cubans ble. desert-like country. Full-scale in could provide. would not be easy. The vasion from the north on a broad front country is vel')' inhospitable. and looks unlikely for the time being un South Africa now is keeping a consid less major support by sophisticated erable force stationed on the border. troops is available. certainly sufficient to cope with ill-co Much more possible is the third al ordinated guerrilla attacks. This force ternative of increased guerrilla war could be reinforced easily if the at fare on the borders. At present. there tacks developed further. are two frontiers over which guerril The conclusion. therefore. is that. las co U I d infiltrate-the Angolan' with the present size of the Cuban South-West Africa frontier and the force in Angola. toget~er with the Mozambique 'South Africa frontier. It MPLA forces. South Africa would is not inconceivable that MPLA guer have little difficulty in repelling any rillas with Soviet arms and backed by attempt at a combined Cuban 'MPLA Cuban logistics and support might at- invasion in this area. February 1977 87 SOUTH AFRICA The South Africa/Mozambique bor to its north, many with common fron der consists primarily of a game park tiers and only a weak Botswana be which perhaps lends itself more to tween'. guelTilla activity, but there is little or Would not this be the moment for a no habitation there and it is difficult Soviet-inspired black invasion from to see what the guerrillas could the north across the whole of South achieve. If perhaps an organized inva Africa's northern frontier, stretching sion by the Mozambique Liberation from coast to coast? Front' (FREUMO), backed by for South Africa would require enor eign troops, could be mounted at the mous forces to defend such a frontier, same time as a Rimilar inva~ion into but. fortunately, in some parts the ter South-West Africa, it might embar rain is so difficult for military opera rass South Afnca which then would tions that invasion across the whole be faced with a war on two fronts. front is unlikely. Even so. a very long All this, however. is speculation. frontier remains. The MPLA is occupied fully at present in Angola trying to run the country South African Defense Forces and deal with its own subversion, while Before discussing what Sou t h the FRELIMO also has intrinsic sub Africa really requires to deter such versive problems. In any case. there is an adventure. a look at its present de little contact between the MPL,1 and fense forces and military organization the FREUMO. is in order. Any immediate steps to mount even The chart shows outline details of a lim i ted invasion of South-West the South African forces but needs Africa or South African ,territory ap some explanation. pears unlikely. South African defense forces con sist of a Permanent Force, a Citizen Deterrence Force and a number of Commandos. So much for the present, but what The Permanent Force includes the of the future? Once Mozambique and navy, army and air force and consists Angola have settled down, it is more of men who have joined the forces as than possible that organized and con a career. In all. they number about centrated training of black regular 20,000 regulars. The Citizen Force troops will begin in earnest. Tanks, comprises all the noncareer members guns and aircraft may arrive in large of the defense forces-for example, numbers, and. in a few years, both volunteers and the national servicemen Mozambique and Angola may have who have completed their period of highly efficient armies. No one knows continuous service. They form a large for sure what will happen in Rhodesia reserve which can be called up in time once black majority rule is established. of war or emergency. The Commandos It is possible that a powerful black also are volunteers or conscripts, but Rhodesian Army may be formed and they are formed into home-based units supplied with the latest Soviet military to pat l' 0 1 property, factories and equipment. Z a m b i a is already the farms. The Commandos al:e similar to home of Communist-inspired terrorist what we, in Britain. called the Home organizations, and South Africa will Guard during World War II. They live find itself faced with a complete Com at home and carry out their normal munist-dominated bloc of countries work during the day. 88 Military Review South African Defense Forces Army Navy Air Force 38,000131,000 conscriptsl 5,000 11,400 conscriptsl 8,500 13,000 conscriptsl 133 combat aircraft armored brigade' Daphne class submannes 2 light bomber squadrons With mechanIZed brigade' destroyers With 2 Wasp antl 6 Canberra Bil1I2s, 3 T4s and 4 motomed brigades' submanne warfare helicoplers 9 Buccaneer S50s 2 parachute battalions' 5 antisubmarine warfare fngates 3 fighter, ground-attack squad 6 field and 2 medium artillery 13 Wllh I Wasp helicopterl rons with 16 MIf.ge IIIEls regiments' I escort mInesweeper Itraining and 14 IIIDZs light antiaircraft artillery reg ship) fighter, ground attack squad Iments· 10 coastal mmesweepers ron With 15 F86s Iberng re 8 field engineer squadrons' 5 patrol craft le,-Bntish Ford placed by Mirage F1Alsl 5 Signal regiments' class) fighter/reconnaissance squad 141 Centunon and 20 Comet 12 Agosla class submarines, 2 ron With 27 Mirage IIICl/Bl! medium tanks Type A69 fllgates, 3 fasl pa RZs 1,000 AML245!60 and AML- Irol boals, gUided miSSile and rnterceptor squadron With 16 245/90 Elands 6 corvettes wllh Gabnel II Milage FICZs 50 M3 armored cars surface-to-surface missile on 2 mar j tIm e reconnaissance 230 scout cars order) squadrons with 7 Shackleton 250 Saracen and Ratel ar· MR3s and 20 Plagglo PI66S mored personnel carners Reserves, 10,500 CitIZen Force Albatrosses wilh I fngate and 7 mine 25-pounder and 55 inch gun! 4 transport squadrons With 7 howitzer sweepers C130Bs, 9 Transall C160ls, 17-pounder and 90mm anti 23 C47s, 5 DC4s, I Viscount tank guns 781, 4 HS125s and 7 Swear ENTAC antitank gUided weapon Ingen Merlin Ills 204GK 20mm, K63 tWin 35mm, 4 helicopter squadrons 2 With l70 40mm and 3 7·inch anti 40 Alouette Ills, I With 25 aircraft guns SA330 Pumas and 1 with 15 18 Cactus ICrotalel and 54 SA321L Super Frelons Tlgercat surface-to-air mis flight of 12 Wasps (naval as Siles Signed) 2 communIcatIOns and liaison Reserves: 138,000 Active Re squadrons la r m y assigned) serve ICltlzen Forcel_ Reserv With 22 Cessna 185A!D!Es, ist serve 19 days per year for 36 AM3C Bosboks and 3 C4M 5 years Kudus Trainers rnclude Harvards, 145 MB326 Imp a I a 15 Isome armed), 22 Impala lis; and 25 Vamp"es, C47s and Alou ette 1I/111s 132 Milage F1AZs, 30 Impala lis and 37 Kudus on order) , Cadre units that would be brought up to full strength Reserves: 25,000 Citizen Force on mobilization of the Citizen with 6 squadrons with 36 Force and would form 2 divi Impala 1/ lis, 145 Harvards SIOns. and T6Gs Source: The Military Balau('(', 1976-1977, The Internntionnl Im,tituk> for Strategic Studies, London, Eng., 1976. PP 44-46. February 1977 89 SOUTH AFRICA All white male South African citi tel's is located in Pretoria. zens who are medically fit are liable The army is divided into corps such for national service. They are called as artillery, infantry, armor, engi up in the year they become 18 and neers and signal, plus a number of serve 12 month~ with an armed serv other administrative corps. The troops ice. This is followed by a five-year are dispersed into a number of geo period when they are called up each graphical cummalld", each ullder its year for annual training camps of own commander, and the regulars in about- 19 days each. They can enter each command are responsible for the what is termed the "controlled re training of all ground forces, regular, serves" and remain there for another Citizen and Commando. 10 years before finally being put on There are small brigade headquar the nationalresen'e. About 27,000 men ters within each command, and units pel' year are called to the colors. Thus, are assigned to brigades for training the army, for example, at anyone time exercises. Training is rigorous and might consist of 7,000 regulal's and very tough-based more on action 31,000 conscripts (national service again~t guerrilla~ than on conven men). Backing them up are some tional warfare. At present, a full bri 138,000 active reservists who would be gade is kept on the border of South the first to be called in an emergency, West Africa and Angola, but, to do and behind them are those men who this, it has been necessary to call up have completed their 1 G years with the part of the CItizen Force, a brigade at service~. Many of these men would be a time (about 6,000 men) for three no older than 34 to 45 year~ and would months. Thus, every three months, form useful additions to the defense fresh Citizen Force personnel join the forces. About 200,000 whites could be brigade headquarters and l' e p I ace called up quickly if necessary. In addi those who have just completed their tion, colored, Indian and black troops three months. It is a perfect example are being recruited and are proving of "on-the-job" training and ensures very successful. that a large number of reservists re The Commandos take the same ceive first-class training. It is, how training a~ the Citizen Force and have ever, a drain on the economic and so the same service commitment. There cial life in the Republic. are also 12 Ail' Commando Squadrons The air force is divided into four with private aircraft. Like the Citizen commands-Strike, Maritime, Trans Force, all Commandos ~erve 16 years port and Light Aircraft and Main before being posted to the Commando tenance. It, too, is dispersed through Reserve. out the various airfields in the Repub lic, the largest of which is at Water Command and Control kloof, near Pretoria. The head of all the defense forces, The navy is divided into four direc whether regular 01' reserve, is the torates-Training and Manning, Ad Chief of the Defense Forces. He has a ministration, Stores and Technical chief of staff, called the Chief of the Services. Like the other services, the Defense Staff, and there are chiefs of navy is dispersed into regional areas, the navy, army and air force. each with its own commander. They Civil defense comes under the chief are: Simonstown, Cape Town, Durban, of the army. The defense headquar- Port Elizabeth, East London, Walvis 90 Military Review SOUTH AFRICA Bay and Saldanha. Not all the regions As a result, South Africa now is are activated in peacetime but would capaule of manufacturing small arms be manned in the event of IVaI'. The and ammunition. armored cars and the headquarters of the navy is at Simons Caetlls surface-to-air m iss i I e (the town. French emtale manufactured under There is considerable liaison be license). The llrmament industry is tween the m"y alld the Maritime gro\\ illg daily ,md lIuW i, capaule of Command of the ail' force. A joint buihling small ships. In fact, South maritime headquarters has been es Africa is reported to be building, or tablished at Silvermine in the Cape assembling, the ISI'aeli Saar IV class peninsula. It has one of the most mod of missile uoat armed with Gabriel ern underground facilities anywhere mi.t.;Riles. in the world. From here, using its Equipment bought overseas includes slender maritime resources, including the British Centloi",! and Comet seven old Shacklelon reconnaissance tanh, Bri ti,h frigates and the French aircl'aft and 10 Ruccancel' strike air Daphne class ,uumarines, British and cl'aft, South Afl'ica is acting as the French aircraft, British 155mm how maritime intelligence centel' in the itzer, and DOmm antitank guns, the South Atlantic for the whole of the French i::ntac antitank missile and a Western World. :liore than 25,000 sur variety of antiaircraft guns. Unfor face shi]ls a yeal' ]lass ftrOlllld the tunately, many of the ships, tanks and Calle. not to mention many clandestine guns are out of date, and the Enlae submarine" and to kee]l watch on this missile is very much a first-generation tl'alflc is no small accom]llishment. type, South Africa has considerable nu Arms and Equipment clear know-how. and it ,hould be ]los South Africa has been increasing sible for it to build a nuclear bomb, its defense expenditure over the past but the tactical advantage of possess six years, but only slightly more than ing such a wea]lon is hard to envision. necessary to kee]l ]lace with inflation. It would not be of any great value In 1970, the defense budget was 277 against dis]lersed t I' 0 0 ]l s invading million Rand. and, today, it is R!J48 across a 2.000-mile border. million, equivalent to US $1,332 mil lion. A great deal of the budget has How NATO Can Help been spent on efforts to become more At ]lresent, the SOli t h African independent of foreign sources of sup forces are good enough to counter ]lly, as many of these sources have limited im'asion, spomdic guerrilla dried U]l for IJolitical reasons. In 1!J64, activity and internal disorders, but an A rmament Board was formed to es would be unable to deal with a full tablish self-sufficiency for everything scale, foreign-backed invasio.n. To ]lracticable. To this end, a thriving ]lrevent such an adventure, South aircraft industry has been started A frica must be seen to be ca]lable of which assembles Impala training air inflicting unacce]ltable casualties on craft and Mimge Fl fighters. In 1967, the invader. Currently, it would be the Armaments Development and Pro beyond its resources to build a suffi duction. Corporation (ARMSCOR) ciently formidable force in isolation, was formed to develop and manage but, if it had allies who would come to state-owned factories. hel]l when the situation demanded it, February 1977 91 South African Buccaneer low-level reconnaissance aircraft ::-::..----~ Self-propelled 25-pounder A frigate of the South African Navy SOUTH AFRICA the outlook would be very difIerent. sumed enemy, but they do require The greatest deterrent to any ter modernization and replacements. More ritorial invasion would be if NATO imjlOl·tant is the necessity for modern treated an attack on South Africa as field guns and antitank weapons, both an attack On NATO as a whole. of whicl;I are available in NATO conn One could go even further and sug tries. gest that perhaps AmerIcan troops The only ail' defen,;e missilcs pres should be stationed on South African ently available are the locally produced soil (as they are in Europe). Ameri Cnctlls and the Short Tigerc"ts. both can and other NATO ships could exer close-range missiles and only of value cise regularly off the South African in the defense of airfields. headquar coasts. and American aircraft could be ters anti moving troops. They are by based on airfields in Soulh Africa. no means a deterrent against high There is a precedent for basing Amer level bomhing and reconnaissance. ican forces in a non·N ATO country, South Africa has u radar warning for this is exactly what happens in chain across it,; northern borden;, hut Spain. it, elliciency is not knoll'n. In any ease. Assuming that such an obvious since the future enemy is likely to be preventive measure would be politi using model'll Sodet aircraft. a com cally unacceptable fOI' the time being, plete computel'lzetl chain, such 'IS the what else mig h t NAT 0 do to :--:ADGE I NATO Ail' Defense Ground strengthen the South African defense Environment I system. is required, to forces? South Africa's greatest weak gether lI'ith long-range mi,;,iles. ,;uch nesses are lack of model'll maritime '" the Xi!.'c Heu'/llcs ",,,I the improved aircraft, modern antIsubmarine ships. Uri WI{. anti modern fighter inter modern guns and modern air defenses. ceptor aircraft. Not one of these items could be used South Africans contribute $53 PCI' in any way as oppressive tools within capita on defense compared \\,Ith Brit the Republic. and it ,eems illogical ain's $184, France's $233 alid Amer that NATO nations should refuse to ica', $4:\0. so it should not be iml'os ,uJlply them. What IS required, then, :-.ilJle to ufford. modernization of exiRt is an immediate Hupply of ~Vinn'fJd,'{, Illg forces. Whether it COliid raise the ()r;olls or A tluntics to strengthen the manpower iH anothpl" matter. all-important maritime surveillance Ho\\'ever. it lI'oultl be a goot! begin over the Cape route and its surround ning if the NATO ('Ountries \\'ould ing areas, new antisubmarine fl'igates agree to supply the armaments needed with the latest antisubmarine warfare so urgently. The question of station (ASW) weapons and more naval heli ing American troops there could peI' copters. Given these. South Africa haps \\ ait until the present situation would at least have the basis of a jells and the threat to South Africa's reasonable ASW and airbome early role as N A TO's southern sentry be warning force which would, of course, comes defined more clearly. At least need augmenting in the event of any occasional rein forcernent exercises attempt to blockade the Cape route. could be conducted. On the land side. the present Cen At present. South Africa is carry turion and COlllet tanks. while some ing out its vital sentinel role entirely what out of date. probably are efficient unaided by NATO. Yet it is there that for the type of terrain and the as- so much of NATO's security rests. i11r February 1977 93 ARTICLES OF INTEREST Yugoslavia Thirty Years After maintain an equilibrium between Wash By Paul Maldent ington, Moscow and Peking, but the Defense Nationa/e, June 1976 (France) economic Crisis in the West has created Translated and condensed by an opening for the Soviet bloc which re COL John W. Price, USAR cently absorbed over half of Yu'goslavia's exports. Yugoslavia's new constitution of 1974 continued to emphasize decentralization of the economic decisionmaking process. The Military Defense of Finland The five legislative cham bers were re By LTC Hannu Sarkio, Finnish Army duced to two: the Federal Chamber and DMZ, September-October 1976 (Austria) the Chamber of Republics and Provinces. The highest echelon of the executive The military defense planners of Fin branch is a nine-man group. The single land face special problems and enjoy party, called the League, has a Central unusual advantages. National security pol Committee of 165. The Executive Com icy, neutralIty, geography, conscription mittee of the Presidium is directed by and the will to defend influence Finland's Stane Dolanc, a Slovene, who is d possible military defense. successor to Tito l now 84. Finland's geographical characteristics Of the 250,000 members of the armed demand special consideration in defense forces, 80 percent belong to the League. planning. Except for Iceland, Finland is The military budget jumped 25 percent In the northernmost country in Europe. real terms last year, most of whIch was About 60 percent of the 340,000 square programed for defensive weapons. kilometers of the country is wooded; Yugoslavia had a good economic 60,000 lakes make up another 9 percent. growth rate of 7 percent in 1974, but Swamps, the reef-bound and island-dot draconian measures were necessary to ted coastline and ·the long winter .also combat inflation in 1975. 'In a country provide advantages for the defenders. which is rural, de collectivization of the Farther north on the Arctic Circle, Lap farms did not bring the desired results, land provides another barrier. The combi and small holdings (the average farm is 12 nation of these obstacles and the two acres) are being repurchased by the state. month-long winter's night make it diffi There is a persistent movement for cult for an army not used to these Croatian autonomy. Of greater concern, conditions to operate in Finland. however, are the pro-Soviet refugees The commander in chief of the Fin trained in Kiev who have been inHltrating nish Armed Forces is the President of the the country with the aim of influencing Republic who can delegate his authority the selection ofTito's successor. to a military person in case of war. The Though clearly Socialist, Yugoslavia commander of the armed forces is di considers itsel f non~igned and tries to rectly responsible to the President and is 48 Military Review in charge of the air force, na~y and army. include missiles and fast, light warships The army has seven major recrUIting equipped with naval guns, torpedoes and districts divided into a total of 25 mili missiles. tary areas. The most Important items in the air The Paris Treaty of 1948 set the total force inven tory are the CM 170 Fouga strength of the armed forces at 41,900. Magister light ground combat and training The cadre is about 16,500, of which fighters, MIG21 F interceptors and the about 9,000 are military. Between 32,000 S.lab J 355 Druken interceptors. and 44,000 draftees arc trained annually. About 93 percent of the men eligible The border patrol has about 3,000 mili· for the draft in a given year arc called up tary personnel who could be added to the for active duty for a 240-day annual bdSic armed forces in case of mobilization. training COUrse. Reserve officers. reserve The largest service is the army which is noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and those composed of combat troops, territorial pUrSuing technical fields arc trained an addi· defense troops and support troops. The tional 90 days. SInce World War 11, over a first group consists of mobile brigades million draftees have been tr.lined, and. made up from all branches of the army today, about 700,000 reservists arc avail and designed for decisive operations. The able for mobilization. Approximately territorial troops serve to protec t specific 30,000 men are called up .lnnually for objectives and carry out 5issi activities (a short periods of active duty training. kind of guerrilla warfare) based on special Enlisted personnel may be called up for local knowledge and peacetime prepara 40 days. NCOs and enlisted men in tions. AJi branches of the army arc technical services for 75 days and officers equipped with hghtweight heatable tents for 100 days. Service in several of the which permit operations in temperatures arms branc.hcs and techniCal services down to 40 degrees below zero. counts toward training time for certain The most important branch of the civilian careers. Basic training for career army is the infantry which also includes officers lasts two and a half years. Re· armor troops and elite troops such as centiy. a new system was set up to allow paratroopers, rangers and 5issi forces. The eligible volunteer NCOs who have met infantry is mechanized but usually navi· cert.i.in training and testing criteria to gates combat areas on bicycles, skis or pursue officer training. snowmobiles. Among its defense missions. the Fin Field artillery equipment includes So nish Armed Forces have been committed viet 130mm cannon and Finnish 122mm to United Nations international peace· field cannon. Emphasis in recent years keeping forces. has been placed on acquiring a low·level Unfortunately, the prevailing will of antiaircraft artillery capability. With an the people to defend themselves has not almost unin terrupted reef between 30 to been reflected in the defense budget. It 50 kilometers wide, coastal artillery en· now amounts only to about 5 percent of joys natural protection. In addition, the the federal budget or around 1.4 percent Baltic Sea is frozen over several months of the gross national product. Only of the year providing barriers to sea through careful budgeting, limiting pro operations. The coastal defenses consist curement to essentials and refurbishing of mostly of 76mm to 305mm fortress older equipment has the materiel readi artillery guns. Newer equipment additions ness of the armed forces been maintained. February 1977 49 "The American Idea and the Western Hemisphere: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," Arthur P. Wll1tJkcr. ToddY in W,l\hingtoll, the Western HemIsphere idea has become In drchaic .tdornmcnt to "Kill, Hate-Mutilate," Grace Lichtenstein. Women arc being tr.lined to be officers in the first coed classes at the service academics. The author. a natiol1Jl correspondent, observes the femdle cddets during "Bea;t" week at the US Air Force Academy and is appalled at the violencL being taught the girls. But isn't that what war is about'- The New York Times Mag",i"e, 5 September 1976. "The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive," Joseph D. Doug!'.,s Jr. The n.• tllre of the threat fJcing Western Europe deserves the closest pos~iblc scrutillY in the widest possible forum. In line with the growing interest 111 NATO nuclear doctrine and deployments, the author analyzes Soviet uncl ..,sified miht,uy doctrine and science literature JS it Jpplies to limited nuclear wJ.r in Europe. The study WdS prepared for the Director of Defense Research Jnd Enb~neen"g ,md the Defense Nuclear Agency and IS available through the US Guvernment Printmg Office. -Studies In Com,,,,,,,ist A.ff""s, Volume 1, 1976. "The Military Ethic," COL William L. H.wser, USA The Amenc.,n role in Vietnam ended not a moment too soon, for it almost destroyed the US Army. Hauser thinks the Army, although still ""ot ready." IS on the road to recovery. However, he says the process is tJking tuo much time, hindered by the "long generation" of leaders who continue to opefJ.te 111 the mmd-set of po~t-WOlld War ll.-Strategic Survey, Fall 1976. "A Professional Army?," LTC Jorge Munoz. Can a modern profeSSional army depend upon a conscript system? The Juthur's answer is ·'nu." He J.rgues that the conscript system 15 not cost-efficient. is unpopul.n with the youth dnd. most importantly, docs not lend itself to the high degree of specializdtion required In a modern army.-Memo""l del Ejercito de Chile, January-April 1976 (Chile). "The Temptation to Pre·Empt in a Fifth Arab·lsraeli War," Steven J. Rosen and Martin Indyk. The term "preempt" used in the Middle East context refe" to an Israeli first strike undertaken to disrupt and intercept Arab forces perceived to be preparing a strike of their own. The authors explain why the Middle East environment of the future is apt to place J premium on preemption in a c.risiS-J pre!'rium that will seriously detract from the stability necessary for d negotiated settlement to the Arab-Hraeli conflict. Orbis, Summer 1976. February 1977 " 83 MILITARY NOTES UNITED STATES CHRYSLER CORPORATION TO BUI LD XM1 The Army ha, selected the Chrysler Corporation to develop and build it, new main battle tank, the XMI. The company wa, chosen over General Motors (GM) after a two·year competition, reversing last year's Army recommendation to adopt the GM version. That recommendation was rejected by the Defense Department in order to reopen the competition between the two companies so they couJd modify their proposals to Incorporate standard components with West German tanks. The new tank will be known as the Abrams In honor of the late General Creighton W. Abrams, former army ch,,1 01 staff, and IS expected to cos! around $4.9 billion over the next decade. The MILITARY REVIEW and the U.S. Army Command and Gener~ Staff College·assume no responsibility toraccuraty of informatIOn contained In the Ml LIT ARY NOTES section 01 this publication. Items are printed as a service to the readers. No offiCial endorsement of the views, OpinIOnS, or factual statements is Intended.-The Editor. 94 Military Review NOTES ~It TWO INFANTRY DIVISIONS SCHEDULED FOR MECHANIZATION Two eXlsling mfantry diVISions will be mech factors and availability of housing and training anlzed within the next five years. resources. Also scheduled for conversion in 1978 is the The most likely candidates for conversion 256th Infantry Brigade of the Louisiana Army are believed to be the 24th Infantry Division at National Guard. The 256th will be assigned to Fort Stewart/Hunter, Georgia, and the 9th the Active Army's 5th Division (Mechanized) at Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. Fort Polk, LouISlana.-Army Research and These units are favored because of economic Development. CHEMICAL DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT The Army is expanding its program in Fiscal will continue to rise. Year (FY) 1977 to upgrade the survivability of The major effort under research and devel its forces in the event of a chemical attack and opment in FY 1977 will be point alarm systems, permit them to Operate effectively in a toxic new protective masks, an area scanning alarm environment, To initiate the efiort, the Army and a skin decontamination system, received more than $100 million in combined Procurement of troop protective equipment funding for research, development, test and has begun with the purchase of 150,000 Mark 3 evaluation, procurement and operation and nuclear, biological and chemical oversuits from maintenance actiVities. This represents an in· a British manufacturing firm at a cost of crease of almost $35 million over ~Y 1976, and approximately $12 million.-DMS Intelligence, projections through FY 1981 indicate fundmg ©1976. FUZE FOR TANK PROJECTILES With the aid of General Electric Corporation tank's laser range finder and onboard ballistic engineers, the Army has developed a fuzing computer. In this way, the tank can operate technique to increase the accuracy and speed of with a round already m the chamber and fire as firing airburst projectiles from a tank. The new soon as a target is spotted. technique sets the fuze automatically after firing. The faster firing is the result of transmit· The fuzing mechanism in the projectile ting range data after the round is in flight includes an antenna, radio receiver and where, previously, the tank commander first low-power complementary metal-oxide semi had to determine the range of a target and set conductor timing circuits, Power is supplied by the fuze manually before firing. a coil within a cylindrical magnet rather than The new fuze system will be linked to the batteries.-DMS Intelligence, © 1976. February 1977 95 ~It NOTES NEW ARMY GUN The US Army has a new "one for two" weapon system that will produce significant dollar savings and boost the effective range of an artillery projectile. The US Army Armament Command is producing a new cannon whIch combines the firing capabilities of two separate weapons systems now in use. Designated the M201, it will replace the cannOn on both the MI07 175mm self-propelled gun and the MIlO a-inch self-propelled howitzer. The resulting single system will be called the MIIOA I a-inch self-propelled howitzer. The cannon's prominent feature is its barrel which, being 105 inches longer than that of the MilO, will enable it to fire an artIllery projectile a greater distance without impairing the characteristic howItzer capability of firing a projectile in a high trajectory. The cannon represents the latest major development in modern field artillery and features a full chrome-plated, autofrettage barrel. 96 Military Review NOTES ~n AUSTRALIA BUDGET INCREASES Plans to purchase US·manufactured gUided a $160·million contract. An even bigger pur· missile frigates and maritime reconnaissance chase Will involve the acquIsition by the Royal aircraft have prompted Australian Defense Mill' Australian Navy of two FFGl class gUided Isters to Increase their 1976·77 military budget mISsile fngates at a cost of $321 millIOn. They almost 18 percent to a record $2.8 bllilon. will be delivered to Australia in 1980 and 1981 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and the Aus· respecllvely. Waltlllg In the wings is an Aus· tralian Government signed an offset agreement tralian Air Force requirement to replace its more than a year ago covenng the purchase of aging French·built MIfBge 11/ f,ghter air· eight P3C antlsubmanne warfare aircraft under craft.-OMS Intelligence, © 1976. YUGOSLAVIA ROCKET LAUNCHER The Yugoslavian multiple·rocket launcher YMRL32 shown in the photograph was first seen sometime in 1975, It is modeled extensively on the Czech 8M21 Tatra 813, but fires Yugoslav·designed 128mm rockets, The 32·tube launcher can fire the rockets to a range of 18,000 meters and automatically reload within two minutes, A sophisticated electrolhydraulic launcher control mechanism, with both remote and cab firing systems, can set the system up in 30 seconds, with firzt rounds fired 15 seconds later.-International Defense Review, © 1976, February 1977 97 ~Ir NOTES USSR BENEFITS OF THE SOVIET ARMY OFFICER Have. you ever been curious as to how When an officer is detailed to a remote, benefits and promotions of the Soviet .Army unaccompanied area, his family is authorized to officer compare with those of his US counter· remain in government quarters at his last part? The following statistics and general infor· accompanied post. Depending upon rank, of· mation have been compiled in such a manner as ficers have varying degrees of access to special to provide a quick reference and are accurate stores which stock merchandise normally not (according to available informationl as of 1976. found in Soviet markets. Each officer is granted 30 days' leave per year plus 15 days travel time. Promotion: The Soviet officer is commis· Travel from place of duty to place of leave is sioned as a lieutenant upon graduation from a free. In addition to annual leave, 30 days leave higher military school. Future promotions de· is granted in conjunction with a permanent pend on a combination of three things: A change of station. Each of the 16 military favorable officer evaluation report (DERl, hold· districts has its own resort areas and offers ing a position calling for a higher rank and package vacation deals. These include room, completion of time in grade. The OER, or board and activities and cost a nominal 50 to attestation, is written every two to three years. 100 rubles per person. The AII·Army Hunting The evaluation includes job performance, ca· Society operates some 150 lodges which also pability to command and characterization of are available. political Qualities. Time in grade varies from two years as a junior lieutenant to four years as Retirement: Retirement pay is a complex a captain and major to an indeterminate time matter in the Soviet Army and is a combination before attaining the grade of colonel. Promo· of position pay, grade, allowances, length of tion is decentralized for company grades. A service and age. If you have served 20 to 25 national system operates for selection to field years and are under 50 years of age, you receive grade ranks. about 30 percent of your active duty pay and allowances. If you are over 50 years old, you Pay' Exact pay scales are not known. The receive 40 percent. For active service beyo.nd following monthly pay scales, however, are 25 years, the rate is 50 percent plus an fairly accurate and have been converted to US additional 3 percent for each year of service dollars at the rate of $1.36 per ruble: lieuten· over 25. In computing longevity, there are ant, $204; captain, $244; major, $299; lieuten· various bonus factors. One month of combat ant colonel, $340; colonel, $476; and marshals duty equals three months regular duty, and up to $2,720. The average pay scale for the remote and hazardous duty equals two Soviet worker is about $190 per month. months. Retirement IS mandatory for company grades at age 40-lieutenant colonels must retire Allowances and Leave: Government hous· at 45, colonels at 50, with generals being ing is provide~ at substantially reduced rates. allowed to stay until 55 or 60 years of ~ge. 98 Military Review NOTES ~m INDONESIA DEFENSE BUDGET Indonesia's defense budget once again has and external defenses, also will use $23 million topped the billion·dollar mark. The allocation from US foreign military sales credits. for 1976·77 is approximately $1,024 million At present, plans are to purchase two ships. compared with the previous year's $1, lOB medium·hft helicopters and counterinsurgency million. Indonesia's President Suharto, who is surveillance eqUipment.-OMS Intelligence, © planning to modernize his country's domestic 1976. UNITED KINGDOM CHOBHAM ARMOR A completely new type of armor which, according to British officials, represents the most significant achievement in tank design and protection since World War II has been revealed by the Secretary of State for Defence in london. The new armor, known as Chobham armor alter the Military Vehicles and Engineering Establishment at Chobham, England, where it was developed, provides a high level of protection against all forms of antitank weapons. Makeup of the new armor IS classified, but West Germany and the United States have been given information on its composition so that they may use it in their new tanks to be introduced in the early 1980s. Eighteen months ago, Britain signed a' contract with Iran for a supply of improved Chieftain tanks. The order, worth more than £500 million will give the Shah more than 1200 tanks fitted with the new armor. They will be known asShir Iran-Persian for the lion of Iran. But the British Army will not get the new armor for some time. Economic impracticability was cited as the reason.-Soldier, the British Army Magazine, ©1976. February 1977 . 99 I. lIt BOOKS 101 Pages. Arms g Armour Press. London. England. 1975. $19.95. The coalition of allies which had of Napoleon, marked the only meeting forced Napoleon to abdicate was still between that great captain and the concerned with the distribution of the other most famous commander of territories of the former French Em their time, Wellington. That meeting pire when Napoleon escaped from has continued to fascinate military Elba in March 1815. Although Napo readers because of its importance' as leon attempted to satisfy the allies as the end of Napoleon's resurgence and to his peaceful intentions, he was un the final eclipse of his empire. suc"essful. He was branded a "public The campaign started on 15 June enemy and a threat to the world"; when Napoleon crossed the border coalition armies numbering almost and drove the Prussians back at Gilly 800,000 men massed on the French without decisive results. Wellington, frontiers. Two of those armies meanwhile, not learning of these Wellingt';,n with 100,000 and Bliicher events until late in the day, attended with 135,OOO-were in Belgium; Na a ball after issuing a movement order poleon decided to attack there. to deploy his forces. The scene was Waterloo, the final, decisive defeat set. Napoleon had to win. A dramatic Title de91J.!"n nrtwork for thh review was done by the I'l'VICWcr'll Wife, Normn Mullen. victory would quiet his critics within 100 Military Review BOOKS ~It France and would do much to restore Concisely written, with sufficient maps the prospects of the empire. On 16 to follow each phase of the battle, the June, he had his opportunity. The book brings to life the events of 1815. previous day, he had partially wedged Sound as well as faulty decisions himself between the British and the which influenced events are presented Prussians. Now, he could defeat them clearly as is the mystery still sur and make a triumphant. entry into rounding some of the fateful events Brussels. of those four days. The text alone is Sharp, vicious fighting was the or sufficient to recommend this book as der of the day. Battles raged at Ligny an impressive addition on the subject, and Quatre Bras as Napoleon thrust but the aspect which sets this book ha'rd at the Prussians and the British. apart from others is its magnificent The French delay that day in attack collection of artwork. Fifty-one color ing both points cost them the decisive paintings and over 300 monochromes victory sought by Napoleon. vividly recreate the excitement, con At Quatre Bra~, Marshal Ney at fusion, heroism and sometimes the tacked but never succeeded because carnage and waste of this climactic the British had time to piecemeal in struggle. The paintings are fascinat reinforcements. The prize remained ing, and they make this volume stand out of Ney's grasp, but he had out as unusual and worthwhile. Buy achieved partial success. The British the book or get someone to give it to had suffered heavy losses. you-but don't miss it. The 17th was a day of frustration LTC WILLIAM J. MULLEN III, for Napoleon. BlUcher escaped early Battalion Commandel', 1 st Infantry in the morning; Grouchy was not or Divisiun dered to pursue him until about noon. Wellington, too, slipped away and with that act cost Napoleon another WORLD WAR II· An Account of Its Documents. opportunity to crush the British. Well Edited by James E. O'Neili and Robert W. Kraus· ington established his position near kopf 269 Pages Howard University Press. 1976 Waterloo and waited. $1500. The climax came on 18 June. The outcome wavered as the bloody fight Here is an invaluable research tool ing surged back and forth. It was a for the military historian and the near thing, but, in the end, the attack serious student of World War II. The of the Middle Guard failed. The magnitUde of this war is perhaps no French, outnumbered 3 to 1 after the where better illustrated than in the arrival of the Prussians, were de sheer bulk of tons upon tons of official feated. One of the great military records accumulated by the major par geniuses of history was beaten in a ticipants. This book is dedicated to re battle whose victory was within his search of World War II documents and grasp. to assisting research by elaborating Napoleon's veterans died hard, but, upon sourre materials for content and in the end, they died. With them the how to locate needed documents. emperor's star, which had flickered The book is composed of papers and since March, finally went out. proceedings of the Conference on Re lVaterloo is an expert's superb ac search on the Second World War. This count of Napoleon's last campaign. conference was sponsored by the Na- February 1977 101 ~I~ BIWKS tiollal An'hh'e, In .Julle 1~71 \\ ith the This I:-.ta \aluablr bllok fill' the hi:=; ub.l€rthe of uringing the \altlaule l'e~ t!lrIan and I>.: well \\ Cll'th the price of ~(llll'('e~ of the ~atlOnal AI'l'hh e .... to $1;; The ,tnciellt ma)' lI"t neeu the the attentioll of :-:l'illlial''''; and ~tuclL'llt...;. hook on hb ~hplf. bllt it .... htlllhi he nne A:-.:-.embled 102 Military Review BOOKS ~I~ logical; Hnd 110 Plilleiple nf ~el('L"tiotl tr.lyal (If till' .... oldlel··:-- trade ill [Tutu appeal':-., unle::-.~ It ue an Illrli~1 rimill:dl' TIt/\ ta .... t. :\lol't'tlvl'l', 'thl'l'l' 1:- 110 l'eIJ elful·t to touch 1>",:e with all the "gre,lt J'L''''l'lItatillll frum thL' ... izable llteratul'e names" \\ ho have "illll\:l'1l nll thlll)! .... IIf thc \'ll'lllam W,lr. mihtal'Y. The Pl'udlh.. t thn .... d~yll!Vl' .... In 1I1idert.liulIg" til anthll}ogil.0 a tu a dltTll:-.l' lwtig'L'pndg-L', mill h of "Ubjl·\·t ,\ ... V.I-::t alld ftll mldal~lL' a~ that whil'h deal:-. only III the m(Hl g'i,'lIeral Ilf \\a1" it ... elf .•lll l·(lttOl' j" Lll'cd \\Ith way \\ Ith the :-.ub.Ject of .I1'n1--. all immL'dl.ltL· hard l'hllll'l! het\\l'cn Slll·h !;u·k of flllib \\ ()lIId llot hi!\ L' l'qll;d!~' "'I'lilld illtL'l'lltl t 1\ l· .... : \\ 11l't her tl) been di:..:ubliIlg h,1I1 l'.lt h (If the :-;L'k~ limIt tIlt! Humber of Huthllr:-- CIlYcl'lld. tion::; bePIl ""UIIiCIt'lltly l'11I (lmpa~ ... lIlg' III the 1111 L'll·:-.t of it :--hnl't \\ (11 1<, ur to stand on It:-:. n\\ll llwl'il ..... Hilt thl' \\ lwtlh'!' to Pl'll\ ltlL' ttlnll)! ehl'lJ ... 1\ e "'o\' YUlIIlg-el' Hart ha:-- dI;·,tl iLuted the :;;-)l) el·'Ij!e. thu:-> 1lt' .. ·l' .... ,... ltHtlllg" it ll'llglhy page .... uf availahle te'Xt amllllg' thL' \\\llk. Sel'l<.IIIg- to Il'l'OIlUk itTet(llil'il a,:tonbhing total of 77 allthol,. Thll<, able:--, the ~ \lUng-l'r Harl ha:-; .lImed to un the il\(,l'age, ollb' ahollt thl'l'e pagl' .... ue IJl'()ud!y Illllu:--Iye \\ ithin H In'ief are al1otate(l to eal'h of the atlnutledly .... pavE' The l'l'--Ultlllg compl·nmi .... e ll1 d eminent hi~ttll'ian..... thClIl'j ... t..... geti inc\ Itably to "upcl'fIu.dlty alul thu:-. era}:..;, IHllitil'al It'dde1''' Hnd. nt)vl..lll~t:-> to d dl:-;aPl)(IllliIllg- b()1l1<. }'epl'escnted ill the antholog-y. :\lo ... t (,OL LLO~lJ .J. ~!.\T fllI-.\I~. of the-;e \\Tit !.!}' ... are 11ut c.tl'l"l·...,:--ible lJ'}Jfll'tJllnlt I)f !·;n','i ....,h. US.lIA ill such :-;mall d\):-.e .... Imag-Illc, fol' ex ample, an effort til d" Ju,;tlce to Alfred Thayer l\Iahall ill a ..... ingle Ildge tlf his TIGER, DIe Geschichte elner legendaren Walfe, prose. Though there are d few memtl 1942-45 by Egon Kleine and Volkmar Kuhn 326 raule exceptwll...:.-thr- :-.clectioll:-; uy Pages Motorbuch Verlag. Stuttgart. West Germany Auraham Lincoln and Dougl",; ~I"c 1976 Arthur "lime to mind- -the bulk I' l111~ati~factol'Y either Ll'C:ll1Se of their Of all the I' capons the Gernulll, in 11!m..:ines:--., lal'k of ccntralIty 01' uoth, troduced in Wclr!d War II, there are Oi l'Olll':-.e, the uOllk does ha\'e Ii:-; a few that 8tlll stanrl out t"day. One po February 1977 lD3 ~It BOOKS 1942 to the end of World War II, this an ally, He pulls no punches, His se weapons system was employed in every lection of 'quoted materials from the c;'ucial situation of the land war. Re Congl'essionai Reco1'd and the media spected by the enemy and highly are calculated to reinforce his charges. praised by German commanders, it is His narrative quickly and effectively amazing to learn about the influence places the reader in the Congressional of a relatively small number of Tigers gallery, and it is from this vantage in specific actions such as at Lenin point that he wants his reader to view grad, 'Tunisia or Sicily. the events as they unfolded, The student of combined arms war He carefully weaves a story of cer fare 01' tank and antitank warfare tain congressmen and senators who, will find this book highly interesting while supporting the war effort until and most in formative. I can easily 1968, could no longer go along with visualize armored warfare students the war policies of the new President. comparing sequences of action de The effort to break Richard Nixon picted in the book with scenes in the and extricate from the war may not 1973 October War. have been conspiratorial, but the Com With the existing threat of some munists I'enppear all too frequently as 19,000 tnnks in the Warsaw Pact in the play unfolds. Wielding its power ventory today, it is not surprising as lawmaker, the Congress deliber that the US Army is concerned with ately denuded the President of his an armored confrontation in a possible powers as commander in chief by ty European war. For those interested Ing hiS hands in the running of the or involved in preparing such a sce war. The purse strings gradually were nario, Tige1' can provide some thought drawn tighter until at last Cambodia ful and useful sidelights. and the Republic of Vietnam had no COL WOLFGANG GERHARDT, means with which to resist. lIead'lua1'ters, LANDJUT Betrayal has its faults. Apparently, the author's strong feelings regarding the Congressional role in the Vietnam BETRAYAL IN VIETNAM by LouIs A Fannmg. 256 defeat were with him before he began Pages. Arlington House, New Rochelle, NY. 1976. to write. He begins with his thesis $8.95. and carefully selects short, dramatic quotations to prove his point. The dan The author seeks to demonstrate ger is that too much may have oeen that, "it was not the Hanoi Commu taken out of context. Mr. Fanning's' nists who won the war, but rather the focus on the Congress allows far too American Congress that lost it," and, little attention to Henry Kissinger's further, "that a Democratic caucus of role in the 1973 "Peace" agreements, the Congress of the United States, a I' 0 U n d whom the controversial aided and abetted by a few liberal Re "breach of promise" accusations re publicans, cast the South Vietnamese volve. Lastly, the simplistic, direct people into Communist slavery." style is almllst too convincing, par Mr. Fanning carefully traces the ticularly in vlew of the myriad of con events of 1969 to 1975 through the flicting and confusing themes which published words of the participants, comprise the Vietnam conflict. particularly those persons whom he The whole story of the Vietnam holds accountable for the betrayal of War is not in yet. Befl'ayal does not 104 Military Review BOOKS I'Jll claim to be the last word. But Mr. fundamental in the enforcement pro Fanning's book goes a long way' to visions of the United Nations Charter. ward furnishing a piece of the puzzle Within this context, the military is that was the Washington scene. While then acclaimed as legitimate for its it is not perfect and is in many ways own sake or as a direct expression of incomplete, it raises vital issues that social values, particularly where these must be confronted if this nation is can be identified with the desire to to l' e sis t Communist aggression. maintain order to ensure stability Therefore, it deserves to be read by within society. The functioning of the professional soldiers whose duty it is military within the international com not only to fight and win but to tell munity is seen by the jll1thors to be our elected representatives and ap legitimate because its legal status is pointed officials when, where and how dependent on the willingness of per we think they are wrong. sons with deviant wishes to give way MAJ DAVID PRICE, to the majority and accept the mili Depal·tment of History, USAFA tary's claimed rights. The authors have a good sense of architecture: The structure into which THE MILITARY AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY. their ideas build is not difficult to Edited by Gwyn Harries·Jenkins and Jacques van grasp. In a larger sense, the book ex Doorn. 217 Pages. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, plores the evolving concept of national CA. 1976. $12.00 clothbound. $6.00 paperbound. security 'into a form comprehensive to the average citizen. Conceptually, the This book is both imaginative and book emphasizes that the ultimate ra thought-provoking. Through a series tionale for the military must be as of astute essays, the authors, from a sessed within the context of political variety of countries, have addressed purposes and human values, not out the broad but central question of side of it. The authors accept the prop armed forces and their legitimacy. osition that the principles of military Some studies of this kind tend toward legitimacy are a concomitant of the abstraction, but this is a competent state. chronicle, international in its focus DraWIng heavily on historical prece and written with an exceptional under dent and empirical observations, the standing of the complex social and book emphasizes that the military is political issues involved. meaningful only in relation to strat In probing the major domains of the egy, and strategy is meaningful only military and the problem of legiti in relation to national objectives. macy, this volume suggests that the Herein, the study has a practical ap justification of armed forces as a so plication. A nation uncertain about cial institution is maintained initially its international objectives will squan through an emotionally determined der its military strength and engage public loyalty. Traditionally, the pre in untenable and irresponsible strate vailing attitude in this country has gies that alienate public opinion at been that the use of military power home as well as abroad. Thematically, is iegitimate if, but only if, the ends this engaging and revealing narrative served were essentially antiwar ends stresses that the principles and stand -as, for example, preventing or re ards of military validity will continue sisting aggression. This concept is to exist so long as military considera- February 1977 105 ~It BOOKS tions do not take precedence over po land did "pend years gathering his litical considerations in the conduct materjal and writing his narrative. of foreign policy itself. However, the He did conduct hundreds of interviews inexorable fact remains, so long as with men and women who "knew Hit war lurks in the background of inter ler intimately"; he did wade through national politics, the more difficult batches of newly released or newly que8tion is not whether nations re discovered primary material. quire.military strength, but how. much Then, after all his efforts, Toland and what kinds of military strength decided his book would have no thesis. are most appropriate for achieving a He would present the reader with the nation's objectives. Thi8 is especially great mass of fact. he had collected true since military force is quite and let the reader draw his own con clearly very much a part of the cu 1' clusions about Adolf Hitler. He would rent world situation. not guide (except occasionally) the On balance, the issues examined in reader's thinking. It is the lack of a this book are critical In the contem central thesis, I feel, that constitutes porary world and constitute an im· the missing ingredient, for there are pOl·tant area of current research far too many facts and simply not worthy of thoughtful consideration. enough guidance. RICHARD l. LESTER, Toland's system works nicely where Learle/ship and Management Devel he has all, or almost all, of the avail uplllent Centp,., US Ai,. Force Ai,. able facts. Too often, though, not all U"i,'crsity. of the facts were at hand, and I found, in pOI·tions of the book, I was literally ,trangling in masses of clinging, cloy ADOLF HITLER by John Toiand 1035 Pages Double ing, irrelevant details. A prime ex day & Co, Berkeley, CA .1976 $14.95. ample of this occurred during my reading of the events surrounding the This ,hould have been a grand and 19~8 Munich Conference when we are glorious book, for John Toland can told far more about Neville Chamber write. He is also an outstandIng re lain's actions and reactions than we seal-cher, a seeker of facts. His pre· are of Hitler's. Again, during the vious books (and a Pulitzer Prize) "Crystal Night," what do we find of demonstrated his capabilities. This Hitler's actions or feelings? Yery book, dealing as it does with a subject little, I can assure you. most difficult to handle, certainly rein What, then, can we be certain of forces my already high opinion of after reading these thousand and more John Toland's abilities. pages? Above all else, we can feel cer Yet I am not completely satisfied tain that Hitler was "a born politi with the final product. There is some cian" who "found it not only natural thing lacking in the book, something but inspiring to mix with crowds, hard to define but lacking neverthe shaking hands, kissing babies and less. It's as though Toland, in work bowing to women." Hitler. was a poli ing his recipe, skipped a step and tician who could approach each group omitted a dash o( seasoning. The re of Germans-working class, middle suIt? A dish that appeals to, but does class, highbrow-with a sep'arate mes not satisfy, the palate. sage and have each group believe him. This is most unfortl!nate, for To- He was a leadet (made, or born?' 106 Military Review BOOKS ~n who "never allowed himself to take an With the signing of the 1939 Ger aggressive stand on minor matters" man-Soviet Pact of Nonaggression, and who knew "he must have a burn Biddle as well as others realized that ing public issue on which he could Poland's fate had been sealed. The mobilize support from worker and Germans began their attack on 1 Sep burgher alike." That issue eventually tember 1939 and were joined by their assumed the all-encompassing term Soviet Allies some 16 days later. In of "self-preservation." a' period of some two weeks, the hap Finally, we feel, as does Toland, less Polish nation once again had that Adolf Hitler was "probably the ceased to exist-divided between its greatest mover and shaker of the ancient enemies. twentieth century," the "controversial Biddle's papers provide an accurate and mysterious" leader of a "most account of the diplomatic events lead powerful and fearsome political force." ing up to the 'dismemberment of Po This is not a book to be taken land. Perhaps even more interesting lightly. It is indeed a tremendous ef was the ambassador's keen insight on fort, worthy of Toland's talents. If it the nature of blitzkrieg warfare. In does not do all I had hoped it wou ld particular, he was to note the blitz do, it does enough. I have no doubt it krieg's devastating disruption of com will be accorded a most honorable place munications and the Germans' effec on the shelves that contain the best tive use of tactical air and al'mo)' in writings of our times. And it is a book concert. On the other hand, some of the World War II historian will over his comments were less perceptive. His look at his own peril. contention that a strong fortified de fensive line might have deterred the LTC ALBERT N. GARLAND, blitzkrieg is questionable considering USA, Retil'ed, the fall of France and the failure of Deputy EdltOl', Infant>·y Magazine the Maginot line. Still, the ambassa dor's papers have withstood the scru tiny of modern scholarship as to ac POLAND AND THE COMING OF THE SECOND WORLD curacy and correctness. WAR: The Diplomatic Papers of A. J. Drexel Biddle Jr., Uniled Slates Ambassador 10 Poland, 1937· Credit for this fine book must go to 1939. Edited by Philip V Cannistrato, Edward D. the editors for an excellent introduc Wynot Jr. and Theodore P. Kovaleff 358 Pages tion and their skillful job of editing Ohio State Umversity, Columbus, OH 1976. $17.50. and arranging the material to provide continuity and keep the reader's in Ambassador Biddle's understanding terest. For those who have gone and insight into the problems of the through the nightmare of trying to Polish state as well as Hitler's Euro sort through memoirs. 0r pClpl?rs-they pean objectives are reflected clearly in will undoubtedly appreciate the qual his diplomatic papers of 1937-39. ity of editing which went into this While European policy was appease book. . ment, the ambassador recognized and While $17.50 might seem like a steep understood Hitler's moves. Biddle saw price, diplomatic historians as well as the need for swift action in support others may find this book well worth of the Poles lest they go the way of the money. Czechoslovakia and Hitler's other con CPT ROBERT S. BARTANOWICZ, USAF, quests. Department of History, USAFA February 1977 107 ~It BOOKS WHEN HELL WAS IN SESSION: A Personal Story gun with 'efforts to elicit confessions III Survival as a P.O.W. in North Vietnam by Rear of gqilt for their role in the war Admiral Jeremiah A Denton Jr., USN, wIth Ed against the North. This torture was Brandt. 246 Pages. Reader's Digest Press, Pleas· exceedingly cruel and extended over antville, NY. 1976. $8.95. long periods of time. Denton describes it in detail, and it is heartbreaking. Man's inhumanity to man was il- Even Denton's guards wept after one -Iustrated dramatically by the treat 5-day period of tortu reo ment • of American prisoners o'f war The process of communicating pro (PWs) at the hands of their North vided the American prisoners with a Vietnamese captors. Being a PW is a way of maintaining morale, a method terrible thing under the best circum of mental exercise and a vehicle for stances: There is the obvious psycho vexing their captors. Denton invented logical impact, and physical dangers one ingenious tap code; other methods are numerous. And certainly the involved coughs, sniffs, whistles and North Vietnamese captors went to sneezes. Because the prisoners had exquisite lengths in amplifying these such a varied group of respiratory conditions. problems, these codes often were dif Rear Admiral Jeremiah A. Denton ficult for their captors to detect, Jr" commandant of the Armed Forces Denton describes some of the more Staff College, has written the latest mundane aspects of prison life. Food, prisoner of war memoir. On 18 July of course, was a favorite subject of 1965, Lieutenant Commander Denton conversation, as it is for all prisoners catapulted from the deck of the USS of war. The development of exquisite Independence in his A6 fighter air menus ~as one aspect of the food ob craft. S~cretary of Defense McNamara session that was as popular with watched as the 28-plane flight headed American prisoners in World War II toward a bridge complex 75 miles as with those in North Vietnam. Sex south of Hanoi. Denton was shot down was no big thing. Denton tells us that over the muddy Ma River and cap prisoner-women relationships were tured, thus beginning nearly seven confined to exchanges of meaningful years of captivity. glances, "more sympathetic than sex After an ll-hour ride, the badly ual in nature," He doesn't say so, per wounded Denton was deposited in Hoa haps he thought it unnecessary,. but Lo Prison, better known to Americans when one's belly is empty, sex is no as the Hanoi Hilton. During the fol problem. lowing years, he was moved many Admiral Denton's story needed to times among the prisons of Hanoi, the be told, and he tells it well. But, to most notorious of which was called me, at least, the occasional outcrop "Alcatraz." Despite its terrible con ping of political preaching detra'cts ditions, the occupants of "Alcatraz" from his book rather than enhances it. took solace and pride in the fact that He concludes with the following to be there was a badge of honor. passage: These were the most dangerous Amer This nation is carrying the hopes ican prisoners,' the ones who had best of hundreds of millions of people withstood all that the North Viet thoughout the world, both in Commu namese had to offer. nist and in Communist-dominated Torture for the prisoners had be- countries . ... We must do what we c~n 108 Military Review BOOKS ~If to spread among the deprived of the Middle East, Africa and/or Asia. In !Vodd the fruits of our labo)' ... and short, these books abou t the past pro share with them our own spiritual vide a bridge leading to the future. light. Those who do not remember the past Except that they imply that the are condemned to relive it. United States should be the moral ar The second reason for reading these biter of the world, these are the noble books is that there is a fantastic sentiments of a heroic, Christian man. amount to see. Both books are extra One can only wonder iust how Ad ordinarily rich in gripping photo miral Denton envisions that these sen graphs Which convey the sights of timents will be implemented. war far more renlistically than the BROOKS E. KLEBER, US Army impassioned prose of our most skilled Training and Doctrine Command military write)·s. In both, the photos convey a "you are there" feeling mak ing the reader a participant in each PICTORIAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II by Charles of the actions. In the case of the Falls Herridge. 253 Pages. A & W Promotional Book edited study, for the prephotography Corp, NY. 1975. $8.95. era. paintings and sketches of per sonalities and battles, maps and other GREAT MILITARY BATTLES by CYril Falls. 304 substitutes for photographs were se Pages. A & W PromotIOnal Book Corp., NY. 1975. lected with great care and convey the $1500. strategic and tactical situations ana lyzed with great effectiveness. As this Why should US military personnel suggests, a serious student of military in the second half of the 1970s read history is advised to begin with the two books essentially historical and Falls text. photographic in character? There are The Herridge book chronologically two reasons. First, as a French prov overlaps the latter part of the Falls erb has it, the more things change, text. It begins with Germany imme the more they are the same. For all (liately after World War I and carries of the changes in military technology through World War II to the defeat and tactics since World War II, the of Japan. "The Prelude to War" chap characteristics of political and military ter was parlicu lat'ly impl·essive. The leaders and military strategy, and the photo of a crippled German officer "re interrelationships of the political, eco duced to begging in the street after nomic, military and geographic aspects the First World War" coupled with of warfare have not changed over the another showing the "destitution and span of recorded history. As one reads broken pride" of unemployed Germans these books, it is not difficult to imag raises the question of what impact a ine what the scenarios might be from similarly high rate of unemployment 1945, where each book stops, to about might have on various countries, in 1095, after taking the Korean and cluding the United States. Vietnam Wars, the four Arab-Israeli As this suggests, there is much conflicts, 1948-1973, and various other more food for thought in these two breaches of peace into account. That books than one can possibly summa period also would include one's specu rize in limited space. Read them. lation 'about breaches of peace yet COL SIDNEY KLEIN, USAR, to come in the period 1077-05 in the Consulting Facuity, USACGSC February 1977 lD9 ~It BOOKS NEW BOOKS RECEIVED This H:,tmg i, Jlllbli ... hcd to bring new prnf(, .. .,ionnl books to th(' nttcntlull of rcn,\{'I'!, U(''vicw ('opi(',; have alrcruiy becn sent to r~·Vlc'\(~rs. AND IT CAME TO PASS-NOT TO STAY by R. Buck· A SAILOR'S ADMIRAL: A Biography of William F. mmster Fuller 157 Pages Macmillan 1976 $695. Halsey by James M. Merrill 271 Pages Thomas Y. ARMS CONTROL REPORT. 73 Pages US Arms Con· Crowell Co 1976 $995 trol and Disarmament Agency 1976. 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