l\1ilitary Review J US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS COMMANDANT Major General J. R. Thurman DEPUTY COMMANDANT Brigadier General William C. LOllisell Editor in Chief Production Editor COL Rose Stauber Dixie R. Dominguez Associate Editor Spanish·American Editor COL Paul R. Hilty Jr. LTC Rafael Martinez-Boucher Army lVar Col/ege Assistant Editor Brazilian Editor LTC Joseph E. Burlas COL Pedro L. A. Braga Brazilian Assistant Editors LTC Sergio R. N. Franco LTC Geraldo P. Almeida FilllO Features Editor Publication Officer LTC Jamie·lV. lValton Amos IV. Gal/away Managing Editor Art and Design CPT John IV. I. Ball Jerome F. Sclleele Military Review Professional Journal of the US ArnlY FIFTY-FIVE YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICE VOL LVII· FEBRUARY 1977 NO 2 ARTICLES Moscow's Concept for Collective Security in Asia LTC Alfred Biegel, USA 3 Conflict of World Views: Origins of the Cold War ILT Keith A. Dunn, USA 14 France's Defense Policy 26 Balance of Power in Europe LTC Ernest F. Koenig, Austrian Army 37 Daily Life at Fort Atkinson-on the Missouri-I820·27 Part II COL Virgil Ney, AUS, Ret 50 History of US Army Force Structuring ILT John C. Binkley, USA 67 South Africa: NATO's Unwelcome Ally .' Charles Latour 84 DEPARTMENTS Reader Forum 2 Articles of Interest 48 Others in Review 83 Military Notes 94 Military Books 100 COVER A familiar sight to all who have been to Fort Leavenworth, the clock tower on Sher· man Hall is a landmark in the area. Prior to World War II, the Command and General Staff College was located under the tower in Sherman·Grant·Sheridan, but has been twice relocated to settle finally in J. Franklin Bell Hall in 1959. The cover photo is the tower as seen from a location near Bell Hall looking north. MILITARY REVIEW is published monthly In English. Spanish and Portuguese by the US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft leavenworth, KS 66027. Use of funds for prmting this publication approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 23 December 1975. Controlled circulation postage paid at Leavenworth, KS 66048. SubSCription: $8.00 per year US and APOI FPO; $10 00 foreign. Single copies $1.00 US and APO! FPD; $1.25 foreign. Address all mail to Military Review, USACGSC. Ft leavenworth. KS 66027. Telephone (913) 684·5642 or AUTOVON 552·5642. Unless otherwise stated. the views herem are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof. Basis of offiCial distribution is one per general officer and one per five field grade officers. US ISSN 0026·4148 ) ~If READER FORUM Reading the Battlefield luxury in Europe today of large reserves The article "A Dilemma in Studying for decisive counterattacks or immedi­ Soviet Tactics" by Lieutenant Colonel ately available reinforcements, we are George F. Steger (Military Revlew, June forced to announce our resolve to defend 1976) • and the letter of rebu ttal by forward and to devise tactics which will Colonel Dallas Brown in the Reader be successful in winning the first battle_ Forum (Military Review, November There might not be a second. Part of that 1976) lliuminate the real challenge to goal is knowing the potential enemy well battlefield commanders today -" Reading enough to take advantage of any vulnera­ the Battlefield." . bility he might have That, by the way, Lieutenant Colonel Steger, although was the purpose of the ,micle which stating the "most likely" course of action Lieutenant Colonel Steger wrote. for an attacking Soviet Army commander Colonel Brown, on the other hand, is to be that of commitment of major using this discussion to express his dissat­ elements along certain predetermined cor­ isfaction with the forward active defense ridors, still caveats his statement by quall· doctrine. The new doctrine is a matter of fying remarks and, therefore, should not fact, and it is the duty of the intelligence have been challenged so unequivocably analyst to view the threat in light of it by Colonel Brown on the issue. After all, and to devise ways of helping our com­ the statement was made that we cannot manders read the battlefield. A discussion trust Soviet "plan mindedness." of whether the change was wise, and I Nevertheless, there is stlll a very good think it was, might make interesting case for Soviet commitment of major reading, but it was clearly not the point elements of attack forces along certain of Lieutenant Colonel Steger's article and predetermined corridors Soviet writings is, therefore, not relevant. on this subject are explicit. The very COL Frederick C. Dahlquist, USA Soviet writers to which Colonel Brown refers (Sidorenko, Savkin) are at pains to emphasize in all their works the principle Seeckt and the US Army of mass. As Colonel Savkin says, "The main effort must be concentrated on the I have some comments concerning most important axis or sector and at the Major L. D. Holder's article, "Seeckt and right time." the Fuhrerheer," which appeared in the However, what really disturbs me October 1976 MllJtary Revlew. about the interchange between Lieuten­ Notwithstanding Hitler's political mag­ ant Colonel Steger and Colonel Brown is netism and militaristic meglomania, there that one of these two experts on Soviet is little doubt that rebirth of German military art, Lieutenant Colonel Steger, is armed power following post-World War I considering the realities of the situation disarmament was a result of the single­ which -has resulted from the recent major minded insight and personal effort of change in US tactical defensive doctrine. General Hans von Seeckt. It is interesting This doctrine on forward active defense is that Major Holder placed a minimum definitely not emerging, not avant-garde; value on the potential application of it is current tactics as taught now in the Seeckt's concepts to the structuring and US Army Command and General Staff training of a small, volunteer American College and as expressed in the latest Army. I personally feel that the analogies version of Field Manual 100-5 and in all the "How to Fight" manuals. Lacking the (contmued on page 112) 2 Military Review READER FORUM (continued trom page 2) Boston Massacre Started Nothing One may quarrel with Cecil B. Cur­ to be drawn are useful regardless of the rey's assumption that the British soldiers perverted use to which the German Army involved in the Boston Massacre fired ultimately was put. because they perceived a real threat to First and foremost, it must be reo their personal safety (Bicentennial Fea­ membered that Seeckt envisioned mobili· ture, Military Review, October 1976). zation. As a consequence, his Reichswehr And Currey may stretch a point when was otganized and trained to facilitate a suggesting that John Adams and Josiah rapid expansion. Training for officers and Quincy acted as defense attorneys for the enlisted men was comprehensive and soldiers out of a sense of guilt for what placed great emphasis on development of happened on the night of 5 March 1770. leadership potential. In addition, military But I agree with him that war did not formations Were designed to form a viable grow out of the incident. cadre in the event of mobilization. It is I would go even further and challenge further interesting that the Army under· conven tional wisdom espoused by many took a program of parallel planning for scholars and famous persons in American industrial roo bilization which ensured history that the Boston Massacre held that the industrial base was prepared to deep meaning for all the American colo­ accept massive demands for arms pro· nies. That the militant Whig leadership in duction. Massachusetts led by Samuel Adams, Seeckt provided the German Army James Otis and Dr. Joseph Warren, to with a forward· looking modern doctrine name a few, trumpeted the incident as which emphasized mobility and com· the ultimate manifestation of an over­ bined arms employment to maximize the riding threat to liberty imposed by the combat power of relatively small forma· British Army is true. But public commu­ tions against a numerically stronger nications-newspapers, pamphlets, ser­ enemy. He visualized highly maneuvera­ mons and committees of correspond­ ble mechanized forces, supported by air ence-throughout the colonies generally cover, and coordinated through an inte­ failed to pick up, to any substantial grated command and control structure. degree, the railings flowing from Massa­ Elements of Seeckt's doctrine, all of chusetts. Moreover, those same media which represented the most advanced reflected no significant public reaction technical perfection of the military art as outside of Massachusetts to the killings it ellisted in the 1920s and 1930s, can be except for a couple of short newspaper found in current US Army tactics. articles in Connecticut. At a time when the US Army is faced My point is simply that, over a period with austere- funding and relatively low of time, scholars and writers have blown manpower levels, it seems to me that the Boston Massacre out of proportion as there is value in the lessons to be learned a major causal factor leading to the War from Seeckt's ability to "make bricks for Independence. The popular view of without straw." His character flaws and the killings, perpetuated to the point of lack of political wisdom should not ne· legend, was limited to Massachusetts and, gate the brilliance of the organizational possibly, its immediate neighbors. Out­ feat he accomplished. Seeckt's Fuhrer­ side the Bay Colony, no body but the heer provides a proven model of mobiliza' ardent Whig leaders cared. tion strategy worthy of careful study. R.W.Smith, MAJ Lvnn W.