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IFS Insights 4/2019

India Elects: what are the implications for the country’s foreign and security policy? by Lars Tore Flåten

The Indian election is already underway Takeaways and takes place in seven phases, from 11 April to 19 May. India had entered election mode when the terror attack in • Security policy is important in this year’s elec- Kashmir claimed the lives of forty police tion. This is mainly due to the recent tensions in force personnel. This event, as well as the Kashmir. subsequent Indian response, placed security policy higher up on the agenda than it • India’s two largest parties, the Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have different usually is in Indian elections. For this re- approaches when it comes to responding to terror ason, it is pertinent to explore the foreign attacks from groups based in Pakistan. The BJP policy legacy of the current government has a lower threshold for applying military force in India, which is dominated by the Hindu against Pakistan. nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The article also examines what is at stake • The two parties also seem to differ when it comes to India’s approach to alignments, particularly for India and Asia when the country’s 900 with Japan and the United States. Million eligible voters cast their ballot.

The author belongs to the Centre for International Security.

THE BJP AND THE CONGRESS PARTY NEIGHBOURHOOD FIRST The two largest parties in India are the BJP A key pillar of the foreign policy during the and the Congress Party. The latter governed Modi administration has been the so-called India from 2005in to 2014. It derives much of its political appeal from India’s freedom policy denotes an attempt to improve India’s struggle and the legacy of the Nehru-Gandhi relations“Neighbourhood with the first” South doctrine. Asian neighbours. This line of dynasty. The Congress Party is also closely To a certain extent, it is motivated by the sig- associated with the idea of secularism as the foundational principle of the modern Indian traditional sphere of interest.1 Modi’s an- nation state. By contrast, the ideological aim nouncementnificant inroads of this made policy by China in 2014 into was India’s met of the BJP is to strengthen and promote the with cautious optimism throughout the re- Hindu nature of India – often at the expense gion and Modi invited all South Asian leaders of religious minorities, namely Muslims and to his inauguration, including the Pakistani Christians. Although not particularly visi- Prime Minster, Nawaz Sharif. Relations with ble during the election campaign in 2014, most of the neighbours, however, soon de- Hindu nationalist ideology has represented teriorated. With growing unrest in Kashmir, a constant factor during Prime Minister culminating in the recent escalation between Modi’s reign, and more than ever before an India and Pakistan, the relationship between authoritarian form of Hindu nationalism the two nuclear neighbours is colder than characterizes Indian society. A key element it has been in decades. For Modi, whose throughout Modi’s reign has been his efforts political image as a proactive and strong lea-

Hindu-based India. When it comes to foreign might rally support for him in the ongoing policy,to convey however, an image the ofdifferences a strong, confidentbetween theand elections.der of a resurgent This is, however, India, the only recent one conflict possible outcome. Modi has received substantial cri- is still a developing country, and the foreign ticism from opposition parties for exploiting policytwo parties of both are the more Congress difficult Party to grasp. and the India BJP the issue for political gain. Moreover, the op- tend to be driven by economic considera- position has also questioned if the air attack tions. Another factor that both the previous against the alleged training facilities of the Congress government and the current BJP Jaish-e-Mohammad in Pakistan was neces- government has had to take into account is sary and whether it was successful.2 Both the BJP and the opposition seem to be balancing China. China’s expansion in the South Asian a tight rope when referring to this topic. All regionhow to hasrespond become to the evident growing throughout influence the of parties obviously want to stand up for the na- last decade. China is India’s most important tion in times of distress, at the same time as trading partner, at the same time as it is there are obvious risks connected to placing perceived as a threat to India’s security. To too much emphasis on security threats or for criticizing the armed forces. When it comes to Pakistan no Indian government wants to economicallyIndia, it has become with China increasingly at the same difficult time as appear compliant, but there are some inte- itto expands find the rightits strategic balance ties between with both engaging the US resting differences between the previous and Japan – to some extent against China. In Congress-led government and the current the remainder of this article, I examine the BJP-government. In the aftermath of the ter- foreign policy legacy of the BJP government ror attacks in Mumbai in 2008, the Congress- in light of these challenges. I pay particular led government chose not to retaliate against attention to any differences between the BJP Pakistan. By contrast, the BJP-government and the Congress Party. appears to have a lower threshold for applying military force. In 2016, Indian security forces in Kashmir were attacked by terro- rists. India chose to respond by conducting

© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2019. ISSN 1894-4795 IFS Insights 4/2019 3 India Elects surgical strikes on the Pakistani side of the the relationship between India and Nepal Line of Control in Kashmir. The recent events has improved since 2016, but it has not been in Kashmir show that the BJP government is fully restored. willing to go even further by employing its When it comes to improving relations air force, also outside of Pakistan-controlled with neighbouring countries, Bangladesh is Kashmir.3 the only positive example. These improve- BJP to abstain from using force in the event ments date back to 2008, but they have inten- of renewed Thus, tensions it might with be Pakistan difficult in for the the fu - ture. and Bangladesh have settled their border With regard to the smaller neighbours disputes,sified significantly increased during bilateral Modi’s trade reign. and expan India - in South Asia, the BJP government has had ded their security cooperation – especially at limited success. At the start of Modi’s tenure, sea.8 This development, however, has not ta- there was widespread fear in India regarding in Bangladesh. To the contrary, Bangladesh Lanka. This culminated as the two countries andken placeChina at established the expense a strategic of China’s partnership influence signedthe significant an agreement inroads concerning China made the in lease Sri of in 2016 and as much as 20 percent of China’s the port of Hambantota to China for arms exports go to Bangladesh. Moreover, 99 years.4 India was worried that this would Bangladesh is fully committed to China’s Belt enable China to establish a stronger presence and Road Initiative, which also includes the in the Indian Ocean. To some extent, relations construction of ports close to India’s border.9 with Sri Lanka have improved. This is partly due to increased skepticism regarding the policy has not contributed to improving long-term consequences of Sri Lanka’s debt India’s To conclude, standing inModi’s the South neighbourhood Asian region. first to China. Moreover, Chinese initiatives have - not created more jobs for the population in roads into India’s immediate neighbourhood, Sri Lanka. This has opened the door to other andChina India has iscontinued still perceived to make as significantdominant and in external actors, including India and Japan. In somewhat arrogant by its smaller neigh- fact, India has on several occasions tried to bours. Thus, in this respect there are high convey a contrast to China by stating that all degrees of continuity between Modi’s BJP of its investments abroad are to be accompa- and previous governments. nied by responsible debt arrangements.5 Modi has received a lot of domestic cri- tique for his dealings with Nepal. This is ACT EAST mainly due to Indian attempts to interfere in A second major priority of the Modi govern- Nepal’s constitution-writing process in 2015- ment is Act East. This line of policy refers to 16. Nepal refused to comply with Indian de- Indian aims to upgrade its relations with the ASEAN10 powers and with East Asia, particu- blockade of Nepal which lasted for several larly with Japan. This policy was not an in- months.mands, which6 The blockade again led again to an openedofficial Indianthe vention of the BJP government. It was initia- door for China, and in the following months ted in the early 1990s, and has been adhered China and Nepal signed several agreements to by every government since then – under on infrastructural development, security cooperation and also agreed to conduct a joint to convey was that the time had come for a military exercise.7 This development created morethe name proactive “Look approach East”. What that Modi would wanted not only large headlines in New Delhi, as India feared include improved economic relations but that China was in the process of getting the also security cooperation.11 To some extent, upper hand in Nepal – a country that has tra- Modi has been able to facilitate such cooperation. He has placed great emphasis on deep- security orbit. So far, there is little that sug- ening the partnership with Japan. In 2016, gestsditionally that beenChina firmly has overtaken placed within India’s India’s pro- India and Japan signed two important deals: minent position in Nepal. To a certain extent, Security Measures for Protection of Classified

Military Information and Transfer of Defence participant of the Indo-US naval rehearsals – Equipment and Technology.12 This signals known as the Malabar exercise – and in 2018, India and the US signed several important between India and Japan, which go beyond agreements concerning technology and intel- thea significant level of ministerial deepening dialogue of the partnership mechanisms ligence sharing.17 Moreover, in the autumn established under the previous Congress-led of 2017, rumours that the Quadrilateral government. Moreover, the BJP government Security Dialogue (the Quad) had been re- has prioritized naval cooperation in the Bay vived gained traction. 18 The Quad group of Bengal, particularly through the BIMSTEC- consists of the United States, Japan, India and forum – which consists of the literal states Australia and is generally considered to be to the Bay of Bengal.13 Thus, Act East has directed against Chinese expansion in Asia. been a moderate success. India has steadily However, the story did not end there. In the improved its economic ties with the ASEAN spring of 2018 Modi visited China, and only countries, and its trade with South East Asia days after the meeting India announced that is now much larger than within the South it would not allow Australia to participate in Asian region.14 One might argue that this the Malabar exercise, which is closely asso- development would have taken place under ciated with the Quad. Furthermore, Modi also any Indian government. Perhaps that is true, stated that India was fully committed to its and India’s engagement with South East Asia policy of strategic autonomy and he warned and Japan will probably continue to expand against great power rivalry between China regardless of the outcome of the election. 19 However, it is also fair to say that the energy - Modi has put into the Act East policy is a pro- renceand the with USA regard in the to Indo-Pacific India’s foreign region. policy? bable reason for its success in recent years. Not Did necessarily. Modi’s behaviour As the strategic reflect incoheanalyst, A possible consequence of India’s security cooperation with Japan and the United States what appears to be the consensus in Indian is that it might affect India’s relations with strategicIan Hall, hasthinking. pointed Since out, the it rather early 2000s,reflects ASEAN negatively. The ASEAN powers are Hall argues, India has been fully committed key supporters of a multipolar order and to multilateralism.20 Security cooperation fear the emergence of great power rivalry with the United States and Japan was in fact between China and the United States in the initiated under the previous Congress-led region. government. Although this cooperation has

represent a deviation. India does not only INDIA’S APPROACH TO ALIGNMENTS seekbeen cooperationintensified under with JapanModi, andit does the notUnited When Modi and the BJP assumed power in States. Throughout the last decade, India has 2014, there was much uncertainty concer- joined the China-led Shanghai Cooperation ning India’s role in a changing Asian security Organization and was a founding member setup. Some of this uncertainty was due to of China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment the way in which the BJP referred to the Bank. Thus, security cooperation with Japan and the United States as well as continued election manifesto.15 Moreover, when Modi engagement with China and the ASEAN po- choseurgent not need to toparticipate “seek for innew the allies” annual in me its- wers represent the most probable future eting of the non-aligned movement in 2015, course of India regardless of which party there was much speculation in Indian media that emerges victorious in May. There might whether India was on the brink of deviating be some differences concerning the balance point between security needs on the one strategic autonomy.16 These speculations hand and economic considerations on the from its official policy of non-alignment and other, but the Congress Party and the BJP cooperation with both Japan and the United seem to concur when it comes to the main States.intensified In 2015, as India Japan deepened became itsa regular security course. There is, however, one complica-

© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2019. ISSN 1894-4795 IFS Insights 4/2019 5 India Elects ting factor. Did India’s cold shoulder to the cond term, it is indeed possible that the party will pursue a more ideological agenda. What government or was this move temporary would then be the consequences with regard andQuad due reflect to pragmatic the strategic considerations outlook of the alone? BJP to Indian foreign and security policy? Modi is well aware that the voters have not When it comes to foreign policy, the RSS is - mostly concerned with Pakistan and China. mic growth and job creation. Moreover, he is It views the partition of the subcontinent alsoforgotten well aware his promises that these of significant promises wouldecono in 1947 as fundamentally illegitimate and rather promotes the idea of Akhand Bharat – with China – its main trading partner – one greater and undivided India.23 There is little yearbe impossible before the to elections. fulfil if India Thus, was if Modi to fall gets out that suggests that the RSS actually aims to a second term, the Quad, and with it also the unmake the partition and include Pakistan question of Indian alignments, may very well in the Indian state. However, the movement resurface again. clearly advocates that India ought to apply more aggressive measures and teach Pakistan a lesson.24 Moreover, the RSS views IDEOLOGICAL REVIVAL? China as an imperialist power that seeks to During the last year, the BJP has been un- undermine India in every way, partly by sup- der considerable pressure. The government porting secessionist movements in India. The has not delivered as promised with regard RSS also holds that China’s claim to Tibet is to job creation, nor with many of its highly illegitimate and it demands that all territory promoted economic initiatives. So, how will acquired by China after the war in 1962 has to be returned to India.25 Furthermore, the the election campaign? One possibility is that RSS has passed several resolutions regar- itthese might broken resort promises to religious influence polarization the BJP in in ding how India should respond to the threat order to secure more Hindu votes, as it has from China. These resolutions include to up- often done before. Such polarization might grade and to modernize the armed forces, to affect India’s bilateral relations with Pakistan establish civil militias in border areas and to and Bangladesh negatively. Most analysts oppose China more aggressively in interna- seem to concur that the BJP will lose the tional institutions.26 It needs to be added that majority, although it is still likely to become since the RSS is a civil organization it does India’s largest party. Thus, the BJP will have not need to seek approval from Indian voters to rely on the support from alliance partners or to consider how its views are perceived by in order to stay in power. This may have a potential alliance partners in India or by the moderating effect on the party. However, the international community. Moreover, Modi’s reverse outcome is in fact also a possibility. Since the BJP was founded in 1980, there a pragmatist. He is, however, also a lifelong has been one constant factor throughout its memberfive-year oftenure the RSS. suggests that he is primarily history: when the party experiences setbacks Thus, to conclude, with regard to Indian – the larger Hindu nationalist movement in- foreign and security policy there are small, terferes with demands of a revival of Hindu yet important differences between India’s nationalist ideology.21 The BJP does not me- two largest parties – the Congress Party and rely constitute a political party with an or- the BJP. These differences are perhaps most ganization connected to it. The BJP is rather notable with regard to how to respond to to be understood as the political wing of the cross-border terrorism emanating from larger Hindu nationalism movement, which Pakistan, the pace of India’s engagements revolves around the Rashtriya Swayamsevak with South East Asia and Japan, and Sangh (RSS). No leader in the BJP has been India’s commitment to strategic autonomy. appointed without the support of the RSS Moreover, there are some uncertainties as and no major decision is taken without the to which version of the BJP that may emerge consent of RSS leaders.22 If the BJP gets a se- victorious after the elections. If the views

- tial, one might expect sharper tensions with bothpromoted Pakistan by the and RSS China, become and probablymore influen also a with Japan and the United States. significant expansion of security cooperation

NOTER: 8 Kaura, Vinay, “Grading India’s 1 Kaura, Vinay, “Grading India’s The Diplomat, The Diplomat, January 1, 2018. Retrieved from https:// January 1, 2018. Retrieved from https:// thediplomat.com/2017/12/grading-indias-Neighbourhood Diplomacy”, thediplomat.com/2017/12/grading-indias-Neighbourhood Diplomacy”, neighborhood-diplomacy/ neighborhood-diplomacy/ 9 Bhattacharjee, J. “Decoding China- 2 The Hindu, February 28, 2019, “Country Observer Research standing with PM, but PM is busy cam- Foundation, June 27, 2018, retrieved fromBangladesh https://www.orfonline.org/expert- Relationship”, https://www.thehindu.com/news/natio- speak/41935-decoding-china-bangladesh- nal/country-standing-with-pm-but-pm-is-paigning: Arvind Kejriwal”, retrieved from relationship/ busy-campaigning-arvind-kejriwal/arti- 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. cle26400367.ece 11 Government of India, September 1, 2014, 3 Contrary to most reports in Norwegian “Tokyo Declaration for India-Japan Special media, Balakot is not in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir but in the province Khyber from http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease. Pakhtunkhwa. aspx?relid=109219Strategic and Global Partnership”, retrieved 4 The Hindu, December 9, 2017, «Sri Lanka 12 Government of India, July 14, 2016. “Joint formally hands over Hambantota port on 99- Statement After the Meeting between Raksha year lease to China», retrieved from https:// Mantri and Japanese Defence Minister in www.thehindu.com/news/international/sri- http://pib.nic.in/ lanka-formally-hands-over-hambantota-port- newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=147097 on-99-year-lease-to-china/article21380382. New13 Pant, Delhi”, H. and retrieved B. Mohanty, from “Building a ece 5 Beri, R. 2017. “India’s New Initiative in ORF Issue Brief, issue no. 212, 2017. BIMSTEC14 Scott, D. Agenda “India’s for ’Extended Counterterrorism”, Neighbourhood’ in IDSA Comments, June 13. New Delhi: IDSA Concept: Power Projection for a Rising https://idsa.in/idsacomments/indias-new-Africa: The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor”. In India Review 8, no. 2, 2009. initiative-in-africa-asia-africa-growth-corri- 15 dor_rberi_130617 BharatiyaPower”, Janata Party, retrieved from http:// 6 Rajagopalan, R.P. “How India can beat www.bjp.org/manifesto2014. BJP. 2014. “Election Manifesto 2014”. The Diplomat, April 12 16 Ganguly, S. “Has Modi Truly Changed (2018), retrieved from https://thediplomat. The Washington com/2018/04/how-india-can-beat-china-in-China in Nepal”, Quarterly 40 (2), 2017. nepal/ India’s17 The Hindu, Foreign September Policy?” In 7, 2018, “COMCASA 7 Wolf, S.O. “Growing Nepal-China Security will help India track China’s Indian Ocean https://idsa. in SADF Focus, no. 35 (2018), retrieved from in/idsacomments/indias-new-initiative- https://www.sadf.eu/sadf-focus-35-groCooperation and its Ramifications for India”,- in-africa-asia-africa-growth-corridor_rbemoves better”, retrieved from - wing-nepal-china-security-cooperation-rami- ri_130617 fications-india-siegfried-o-wolf/

18 Pant, H. “Take Note: Asia’s ’Quad’ is The Diplomat, November 10, 2017, retrieved from https://thediplomat. com/2017/11/take-note-asias-quad-is-Back”, back/ 19 Chaudhury, R.R. “India’s inclusive Indo-

IISS Analysis, July 6, 2018, retrivedPacific Policy from seeks https://www.iiss.org/blogs/ to balance relations with analysis/2018/07/india-inclusive-indo-pacithe US and China”, -

20 Hall, Ian, “Multialignment and Indian fic-policy-china-relations The Round Table, 105 (3), 2016. Foreign21 Policy under Narendra Modi”, in thesis. Two religious parties and Indian democracy: Jaffrelot, C. The “Refining Jana Sangh the moderation and the BJP between Hindutva radicalism and coalition poli-

22 Jaffrelot, C. The Sangh Parivar: A reader. Newtics”, Delhi,Democratization, India: Oxford 20(5), University 2013. Press, 2007. 23 Jaffrelot, C. The Sangh Parivar: A reader. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 2007. 24 RSS.org 2013, “Article 370 must go – ex- - eved from http://rss.org/Encyc/2013/12/4/ excerpts-Shri-Guruji-interview.htmlcerpts from Shri Guruji’s interviews”, retri 25 RSS.org 2013, “India should register its views forcefully and forthrightly with China http://rss.org/Encyc/2013/5/21/ram-madhav-china.htmlsays Shri Ram Madhav”, retrieved from 26 RSS.org 2013, “India should register its views forcefully and forthrightly with China http://rss.org/Encyc/2013/5/21/ram-madhav-china.htmlsays Shri Ram Madhav”, retrieved from

IFS INSIGHTS ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lars Tore Flåten is a senior researcher IFS Insights at the Norwegian Institute of Defence line forum for articles, comments and wor- Studies, The Norwegian Defence aims to provide a flexible on- University College. He belongs to the the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Asia Programme at the Centre for Allking views, papers assessments within the fieldsand conclusions of activity ofare the author’s own. The author’s permission International Security. is required for any reproduction, wholly or in part, of the contents.

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