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(INCLUDING PANDEMICS) INTO DRR PLANNING Annex INTEGRATING BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS (INCLUDING PANDEMICS) INTO DRR PLANNING Annex Team Members Rajib Shaw, Keio University and Resilience Innovation Knowledge Academy (RIKA) Ranit Chatterjee, Resilience Innovation Knowledge Academy (RIKA) Ambika Dabral, Resilience Innovation Knowledge Academy (RIKA) Advisors Emily Chan, Chinese University of Hong Kong, China Antonia Loyzaga, National Resilience Council, the Philippines Yong-kyun Kim, Ministry of Interior and Safety, Republic of Korea ii | Page Table of Contents 1. Background ............................................................................................................................................... 1 2. Biological hazards ..................................................................................................................................... 2 3. Content review ......................................................................................................................................... 5 3.1 Regional DRR and biological hazards/ public health response plans/ agreements ........................ 5 3.1.1 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ............................................................. 6 3.1.2 European Union (EU) ............................................................................................................... 7 3.2 National DRR and biological hazards/ public health response plans ............................................ 11 3.2.1 Germany ................................................................................................................................. 13 3.2.2 India ........................................................................................................................................ 13 3.2.3 Japan ...................................................................................................................................... 15 3.2.4 Singapore ............................................................................................................................... 16 3.2.5 South Korea ............................................................................................................................ 18 3.3 Risk assessment frameworks ......................................................................................................... 19 3.4 Review of Guidance/ recommendations on integration of biological hazards to DRR and development planning ............................................................................................................................... 25 3.5 Learning from past and current experiences ................................................................................ 29 3.5.1 Past outbreak/ pandemic ...................................................................................................... 30 3.5.2 Country specific response to COVID-19 ................................................................................ 40 4. Key steps and learning ........................................................................................................................... 47 5. Key sectors ............................................................................................................................................. 49 5.1 Sectors that help in mitigation ...................................................................................................... 50 5.1.1 Healthcare .............................................................................................................................. 50 5.1.2 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) ............................................................................ 50 5.1.3 Education ............................................................................................................................... 51 5.1.4 Information and telecommunication (IT) .............................................................................. 51 5.1.5 Banking and financial ............................................................................................................. 51 5.1.6 Media and entertainment ..................................................................................................... 51 5.1.7 Public utility and other essential services ............................................................................. 51 5.1.8 Transportation ....................................................................................................................... 52 5.2 Sectors that exacerbate transmission of infectious diseases ....................................................... 52 5.2.1 Transportation ....................................................................................................................... 52 5.2.2 Tourism and hospitality ......................................................................................................... 53 5.2.3 Education ............................................................................................................................... 53 5.2.4 Livestock and animal husbandry ........................................................................................... 53 iii | Page 5.2.5 Healthcare .............................................................................................................................. 53 5.2.6 Housing and public utility services ........................................................................................ 54 5.3 Sectors impacted ........................................................................................................................... 54 5.3.1 Impact on the primary sector ................................................................................................ 55 5.3.2 Impact on the secondary sector ............................................................................................ 56 5.3.3 Impact on the tertiary/ service sector ................................................................................... 56 5.3.4 Impact on the quaternary sector ........................................................................................... 57 6. Cross cutting issues ................................................................................................................................ 58 6.1 Human rights violation, domestic violence ................................................................................... 58 6.2 Age, gender and disability .............................................................................................................. 58 6.3 Disruption in public events and impact in socio-cultural identity ................................................ 59 6.4 Impact on disaster response, preparedness and recovery ........................................................... 59 6.5 Supply chain ................................................................................................................................... 59 6.6 Human resources and mental health ............................................................................................ 60 6.7 Migration ........................................................................................................................................ 60 6.8 Livelihood and Social Security ........................................................................................................ 61 References ...................................................................................................................................................... 62 List of Figures Figure 1: Bangkok Principles for Implementation of the Health Aspects of the Sendai Framework ............. 1 Figure 2: Key observations from ASEAN .......................................................................................................... 6 Figure 3: Key observations from EU ................................................................................................................. 7 Figure 4: Key observations from Germany .................................................................................................... 13 Figure 5: Key observations from India ........................................................................................................... 13 Figure 6: Key observations from Japan .......................................................................................................... 15 Figure 7: Countermeasures against pandemic influenza .............................................................................. 15 Figure 8: Key observations from Singapore ................................................................................................... 16 Figure 9: Three response phases in Singapore .............................................................................................. 17 Figure 10: Key observations from South Korea ............................................................................................. 18 Figure 11: Analytical interpretation of risk assessment frameworks and guidance ..................................... 20 Figure 12: Suggestive comparative representation of variety of risk in the matrix ...................................... 23 Figure 13: Timeline of Spanish Flu ................................................................................................................. 32 Figure 14: Timeline of SARS ..........................................................................................................................
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