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COMMISSARIAAT-GENERAAL VOOR DE VLUCHTELINGEN EN DE STAATLOZEN COI Focus EGYPTE Veiligheidssituatie 11 december 2019 (update) Cedoca Oorspronkelijke taal: Nederlands DISCLAIMER: Dit COI-product is geschreven door de documentatie- en researchdienst This COI-product has been written by Cedoca, the Documentation and Cedoca van het CGVS en geeft informatie voor de behandeling van Research Department of the CGRS, and it provides information for the individuele verzoeken om internationale bescherming. Het document bevat processing of individual applications for international protection. The geen beleidsrichtlijnen of opinies en oordeelt niet over de waarde van het document does not contain policy guidelines or opinions and does not pass verzoek om internationale bescherming. Het volgt de richtlijnen van de judgment on the merits of the application for international protection. It follows Europese Unie voor de behandeling van informatie over herkomstlanden van the Common EU Guidelines for processing country of origin information (April april 2008 en is opgesteld conform de van kracht zijnde wettelijke bepalingen. 2008) and is written in accordance with the statutory legal provisions. De auteur heeft de tekst gebaseerd op een zo ruim mogelijk aanbod aan The author has based the text on a wide range of public information selected zorgvuldig geselecteerde publieke informatie en heeft de bronnen aan elkaar with care and with a permanent concern for crosschecking sources. Even getoetst. Het document probeert alle relevante aspecten van het onderwerp though the document tries to cover all the relevant aspects of the subject, the te behandelen, maar is niet noodzakelijk exhaustief. Als bepaalde text is not necessarily exhaustive. If certain events, people or organisations gebeurtenissen, personen of organisaties niet vernoemd worden, betekent dit are not mentioned, this does not mean that they did not exist. niet dat ze niet bestaan hebben. All the sources used are briefly mentioned in a footnote and described in detail Alle gebruikte bronnen staan kort vermeld in een voetnoot en uitgebreid in a bibliography at the end of the document. Sources which have been beschreven in een bibliografie achteraan het document. Bronnen die consulted but which were not used are listed as consulted sources. In geconsulteerd maar niet gebruikt werden, staan in een lijst van geraadpleegde exceptional cases, sources are not mentioned by name. When specific bronnen. In uitzonderlijke gevallen worden bronnen niet bij naam genoemd. information from this document is used, the user is asked to quote the source Wie specifieke informatie uit dit document gebruikt, moet de bronverwijzing uit mentioned in the bibliography. de bibliografie vermelden. This document can only be published or distributed with the written consent of Publicatie of verspreiding van dit document is alleen mogelijk na schriftelijke the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons. toestemming van het Commissariaat-generaal voor de Vluchtelingen en de Staatlozen. Ernest Blerotstraat 39, 1070 BRUSSEL T 02 205 51 11 F 02 205 50 01 [email protected] www.cgvs.be EGYPTE. Veiligheidssituatie 11 december 2019 Inhoudstafel Lijst van afkortingen .......................................................................................................... 3 Inleiding ............................................................................................................................. 4 1. Korte geschiedenis ......................................................................................................... 5 1.1. Van president Moebarak tot president Morsi, januari 2011-juni 2012 .................................. 5 1.2. Van president Morsi tot legercoup, juni 2012-juli 2013 ..................................................... 5 1.3. Van interim-president tot president Sisi, juli 2013-mei 2014 ............................................. 6 1.4. President Sisi mei 2014 – april 2016 .............................................................................. 7 1.5. President Sisi mei 2016 – april 2018 .............................................................................. 8 1.6. President Sisi april 2018 – oktober 2019 ......................................................................... 9 2. Huidige toestand van het conflict ................................................................................. 13 2.1. Politieke evolutie ........................................................................................................ 13 2.1.1. Legale partijen ...................................................................................................... 13 2.1.2. Moslimbroederschap .............................................................................................. 13 2.2. Veiligheidsevolutie ...................................................................................................... 15 3. Strijdende partijen ....................................................................................................... 17 3.1. Gewapende islamitische organisaties ............................................................................. 17 3.1.1. Groepen die al langer bestaan ................................................................................. 17 3.1.2. Moslimbroederschap en affiliaties ............................................................................ 18 3.1.3. Al Qaeda en affiliaties ............................................................................................ 25 3.1.4. Wilayat Sinaï (WS) en Islamitische Staat in Egypte (IS Misr) ....................................... 26 3.2. Veiligheidsdiensten ..................................................................................................... 31 4. Typologie van het geweld ............................................................................................. 33 4.1. Noordelijke Sinaï ........................................................................................................ 33 4.1.1. Methodes en doelwitten van de gewapende, islamitische groeperingen ......................... 34 4.1.2. Methodes en doelwitten van de veiligheidsdiensten .................................................... 36 4.2. Gebieden buiten de Noordelijke Sinaï ............................................................................ 42 4.2.1. Methodes en doelwitten van de gewapende, islamitische groeperingen ......................... 42 4.2.2. Methodes en doelwitten van de veiligheidsdiensten .................................................... 43 5. Geografische spreiding van het conflict ........................................................................ 45 5.1. Sinaï ......................................................................................................................... 45 5.2. Gebieden buiten de Sinaï ............................................................................................. 45 6. Interreligieus geweld ................................................................................................... 47 Samenvatting ................................................................................................................... 49 Bijlagen ............................................................................................................................ 51 Bijlage 1: kaart van de provincies ....................................................................................... 51 Bijlage 2: Lijst van veiligheidsincidenten in Egypte van maart 2018 tot oktober 2019 ................ 52 Bibliografie ....................................................................................................................... 59 Pagina 2 van 87 EGYPTE. Veiligheidssituatie 11 december 2019 Lijst van afkortingen ABM Ansar Beit al Maqdis ACUD Administrative Capital for Urban Development AI Amnesty International AP Associated Press APRM Allied Popular Resistance Movement AQSP Al Qaeda in de Sinaï Peninsula CNA Centre for Naval Analysis CSF Central Security Forces DPA Deutsche Presse Agentur DW Deutsche Welle ENP Egyptische Nationale Politie HRW Human Rights Watch ICG International Crisis Group IED Improvised Explosive Device IMF Internationaal Monetair Fonds IS Islamitische Staat MB Moslimbroederschap PRM Popular Resistance Movement TIMEP Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy WS Wilayet Sinaï Pagina 3 van 87 EGYPTE. Veiligheidssituatie 11 december 2019 Inleiding Dit document geeft een overzicht van de veiligheidssituatie in Egypte tussen april 2018 en midden oktober 2019. Het is een update van de COI Focus Egypte. Veiligheidssituatie van 23 april 2018. Het document bestaat uit zes delen. Het eerste deel schetst een korte historiek van de recente politieke geschiedenis van Egypte, terwijl het tweede deel zich toespitst op de politieke en vooral de veiligheidssituatie in de bestudeerde periode. De meeste aandacht gaat naar een gedetailleerde opsomming van de confrontaties tussen de Egyptische veiligheidsdiensten en gewapende islamitische organisaties in de Sinaï, zowel de noordelijke Sinaï als sinds half 2016 ook de Centrale Sinaï. Ook de aanslagen tegen de koptische gemeenschap op het Egyptische vasteland worden vermeld. Deze COI Focus pretendeert niet om volledig te zijn en alle veiligheidsincidenten op te sommen. De strijdende partijen in Egypte, van wie sommigen pas sinds 2015 of 2016 actief zijn, worden geportretteerd in het derde hoofdstuk, een omschrijving van het geweld –de methodes en de doelwitten
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