A I R reviewU IN I V E R S IT Y AIR UNIVERSITY

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNALreiview OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Realistic Deterrence and New Strategy...... 2 Col. Kenneth L. Moll, USAF I mpending Crisis in Air Force Leadership...... 13 Col. Doyle E. Larson, USAF T he Inter-American Defense Board...... 21 Col. Francis H. Weiland, USAF Antimilitarism in the Age of Aquarius...... 32 Maj. Joseph W. Kastl, USAF In My Opinion T he Commander and the Minority Mental Process...... 39 Lt. Col. Earl W. Renfroe, Jr., L’SAF Air Force Review A Combat Crew Production Function...... 47 Lt. Col.Herman L. Gilster, USAF P ublic Affairs Aspects of the 1968 R eserve Mo b il iz a t io n ...... 59 Maj. John D. Williams, USAF Books and Ideas D etente or Status Quo in Europe...... 68 Col. John L. Sutton, USAF T he Uses of Hist o r y in the N uclear Age...... 73 Herman S. Wolk D ipl o ma c y and the Possible...... 80 Dr. Joseph Churba R eflections from Harriman...... 84 Dr. Joseph W. Annunziata T he Contributors......

the cover Address manuscripts to Editor, Air University The new national security strategy to support the Review Division. Bldg 1211, Maxwell AFB, AL Nixon Doctrine has been designated '‘realistic 36112. Printed by Government Printing Office. deterrence.*' The President has said the transition Address subscriptions to Superintendent of to the new concept “ is underway but far from Documents. GPO, Washington DC 20402: yearly completed. . . . We have set a new direction. $4.50 domestic, $5.75 foreign; single copy 75<. We are on course.” In this issue of the Review For back issues, mail check or money order to Colonel Kenneth L. Moll examines the concept, Book Department, DMSB, Bldg 1450. Maxwell points out the lack of finalization of the strategy AFB, AL 36112: domestic 75<, foreign 90<. and the force structure to implement it, and pos­ tulates that the Air Force can provide the crucial Vol. XXIII No. 1 November-December 1971 ingredient: the flexibility of aerospace power. REALISTIC DETERRENCE AND NEW STRATEGY

Colonel Kenneth L. M oll ATE IN 1970, after nearly two years of foreign policy and strategic studies by the Nixon Administration, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird an­ nounced a “new strategy of realistic deterrence.” The Secretary’s 191-page L“Defense Report” of 15 March 1971 provided many additional guidelines and explanatory details and emphasized that the strategy truly “is new.” However, study of the Defense Report and the accompanying fiscal year 1972 budget shows no clear pattern for future force structure in the late 1970s.1 It is the theme of this article that the final and definitive “realistic deterrence” strategy has not yet evolved, and the final force-structure concepts have not been determined. The Air Force seems to be in a unique position to offer the strategy’s one missing ingredi­ ent. Mr. Laird’s 1971 Defense Report is a particularly interesting document, espe­ cially when read in conjunction with President Richard M. Nixon’s Foreign Policy Report of 25 February 1971 and the 1970 versions of both reports. To­ gether, these documents provide an insight into the Nixon Doctrine, the criteria REALISTIC DETERRENCE AND NEW STRATEGY 3 for strategic sufficiency, and other guidelines realistic deterrence had to be developed to of realistic deterrence. “deter not onl) nuclear war but all levels of It is not necessary here to trace the develop­ armed conflict. But at the same time we had ment of the Nixon Doctrine from the initial to develop this new strategy in a way that Presidential “backgrounder” during a fueling faces up to the realities of the 1970s.” Being stop of Air Force One at Guam on 25 July “perfectly frank,” he observed that “successful 1969 to its most recent articulation in the implementation of the strategy of realistic de­ President's 1971 Foreign Policy Report. Nor is terrence is the most difficult and challenging it necessary to review the many abandoned national-security effort we have ever under­ terms—such as “low profile,' “lj/o-war strat- taken in this country.” 2 egv,” or “zero-war strategy”—which have What makes it so hard are the new realities been used at various times, officially or unoffi- in today's world. As listed in the Defense Re­ ciailv, to describe the Administration's tenta­ port, these realities are a growing Soviet mili­ tively evolving strategic concepts. It suffices tary capability and international influence, merely to describe the present, for 1971 con­ emerging Chinese nuclear threat, reordered tains the latest diplomatic and strategic mile­ national priorities and higher personnel costs stones in the Administration's progress toward for the U.S., changing world economic envi­ a “new era.” ronment, and greater awareness of burden­ Mr. Laird reports that “in effect, we have sharing by nato and Asian friends. completed our transition to baseline planning, Perhaps because the 1971 Defense Report and we are now building for the future,” but was, as one newspaper described it, “top- he adds that “we have not solved all the hard heavy with broad philosophy and rather thin problems before us.” Mr. Nixon says “the on explicit details,” 3 general reaction to it transition from the past is underway but far was somewhat unenthusiastic and confused. from completed. . . . our experience in 1970 Most press accounts repeated without much confirmed the basic soundness of our ap­ comment Mr. Laird's claim of a new strategy proach. We have set a new direction. We are and did not attempt to interpret or endorse its on course.” reputed innovations. A Washington Post edi­ The course charted by Mr. Nixon empha­ torial considered that “novelty—ncw’ness and sizes partnership (the Nixon Doctrine) with change-—was a central, even somewhat obses­ “our friends” who “are revitalized and in­ sive, theme,” adding that the Report’s “nov­ creasingly self-reliant.” This partnership, to­ elty is overstated, as are claims for the internal gether with strength and negotiation, will cohesiveness of the new policy in all its many form a new foreign policy and “an enduring parts.” 4 Other reporters saw contradictions structure of peace.” in the logic and the words. The Washington Acknowledging the President's foreign pol­ Star quoted a defense official as saying, “The icy direction, the 1971 Defense Report defined whole point [of the new strategy] is to put the supporting “new National Security Strat­ downward pressure on w-ar and upward pres­ egy of Realistic Deterrence.” The new strat­ sure on negotiations,” but the paper also egy “is designed not to manage crises but to noted that Mr. Laird’s Report “leans very prevent wars” and is to operate “across the heavily on a concept called ‘the total full spectrum of possible conflict and . . . force.’ ” 5 A later Star column hit the Re­ capabilities.” It is, the Report asserts, “posi­ port’s criticism of the old “responsive and re­ tive and active” as compared to past policy active” policy while discussing “only a few which was “responsive and reactive.” pages later . . . how the United States might In a recent interview, Mr. Laird said that ‘respond’ to world problems.” 6 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Admittedly, it is difficult to put one’s finger massive retaliation and flexible response, re­ on exactly what is new. The Defense Report ceive clearer definition than the new one. For points out strongly that the new strategy is not example, the Defense Report states that mas­ “a mere continuation of past policies in new sive retaliation’s “strategy and forces were de­ packaging.” Yet it contains many hoary terrence-oriented with emphasis on nuclear truisms, such as the necessity for “lowering the umbrella” and that its research and develop­ probability of all forms of war through deter­ ment emphasis was “on development of new rence of aggressors” and for correlating “mili­ systems.” For flexible response, the “signifi­ tary strategy, national security strategy, and cant change in strategy was the shift in em­ foreign policy.” Despite a 22-page chapter on phasis to greater orientation for U.S. toward force planning concepts and 52 pages on the bearing the principal Free World burden in plans themselves, it is much easier to find non-nuclear conflict.” Flexible response r &d piecemeal shading differences than it is to find “emphasized refinements rather than concep­ significantly new concepts. tual new systems.” The Defense Report does In some respects the two former strategies, not supplement these succinct descriptions

“Nixon Strategy for Peace: Strength-Partnership-Negotiations” (extracted from the 1971 Defense Report). According to the author, this diagram of “realistic deterrence” includes an implicit concept that (1) other Free World nations will concentrate on deterrence in the lower two-thirds of the spectrum, while (2) the United States will concern itself mainly with the upper ,wo-thirds (these two factors have been added to the original diagram, with arrows). The strategy’s “missing ingredient,” he says, is a force-structure concept which “must be founded upon U.S. aerospace flexibility.”

Strategic Peterrence_ I (treoiBimy(Credibility contingent on Major War Deterrence sulliciency and/orand'or saliSALT'

f (CrediDility contingent on modern a n ^ u lliae "1 ^ nuclear capability plus strong allied and U. S. G P F assisted by Security Assistance, inel. FM Deterrence of Strategic * Forces * Localized Conflicts -vG* ~ ! ,s r Strategic Bomber SQdns. (Feasibility dependent on will ot allies 'Tv^ ern.Ted Reserves I D eployed I Heavy l- 26 iMediuml: and strong MAP/FMS programs plus Army Manpower iMillionsF. .942 carryover the New York Times that, is on this “Total Force approach” to deter­ after Vietnam, “I seriously doubt if we will rence, which is described as applying “all ap­ ever have another war. This is probably the propriate resources for deterrence” across the very last one.” 7 A few days later he told spectrum. Howard K. Smith of American Broadcasting The Defense Report states that “for those Company there would continue to be brush- levels in the deterrence spectrum below gen­ fire wars but “the main thing for us is not to eral nuclear war, the [Free World] forces . . . get involved in them.” 8 Strangely enough, must have an adequate warfighting capability, the press and public paid little attention either both in limited nuclear and conventional op­ to the President’s statements or to this basic tions.” The total force approach seems to concept within the Defense Report. place some increased emphasis on U.S. theater Possibly the concept was not fully under­ nuclear forces. For general nuclear war, realis­ stood because the Defense Report did not ex­ tic deterrence depends upon the U.S. nuclear plicitly correct earlier statements which umbrella just as the previous two strategies seemed to emphasize improved U.S. conven­ did, but at the same time there is discussion tional forces. However, instead of emphasizing and some added dependence on negotiations U.S. conventional capabilities, the Defense ( salt ) and on defensive measures ( abm ). The Report indicates that strategic forces will re­ importance of “maintaining and using our 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW technological superiority” is recognized, and cent) in the fy 72 budget, perhaps because of the fy 72 r &d budget is indeed increased some the acknowledgment, buried in a brief discus­ 16 percent. The new strategy avoids emphasis sion of European deployments, that “in this on either new systems or refinements but in­ context naval forces are particularly impor­ stead proposes “options to adjust” future force tant.” On the other hand it is maintained that capabilities. “our goal is to minimize the need” for naval Despite these indications that the new strat­ deployments. egy is different from the two previous ones, it These illustrations are not presented here in is not always clear what the differences mean any critical sense; no such document could be in terms of future U.S. forces and capabilities. written without providing some ambiguities For example, in the listing of “six major rea­ and apparent contradictions when statements sons” for the r &d increase, five reasons are are selected from within its lengthy context. related to advanced technology and new cap­ The point is that the concepts and guidelines abilities while the last is “to develop simpler for realistic deterrence are not specific enough and less expensive weapons.” The Report to permit resolution of the ambiguities. talks elsewhere of assigning “multi-mission There are a number of factors—some de­ roles” to some forces and of specially tailoring scribed in the Defense Report and some not other forces. It notes that the Army’s readiness —which might enable realistic deterrence to today “is lower than we would like” and that work, even without further evolution and clar­ “our tactical air forces also need to be im­ ification. Factors favorable to the new strategy proved”; extensive descriptions of these im­ include provements are provided. But the Navy is the —Increased readiness, burden sharing, and only service to receive an increase (seven per­ the total force approach, to provide greater

USS Home (DLG-30) guided missile frigate REALISTIC DETERRENCE AND NEW STRATEGY 7 deterrent utility of Free World forces. ica more effective in worldwide deterrence. —Negotiations that may lessen the proba­ U.S. force reductions, together with evidence bility of war and reduce defense costs. cited in the Defense Report that the threat is —Nixon Doctrine redefinition of U.S. na­ not decreasing, may actually offer a prospect tional interests and roles overseas. This means of decreased and endangered deterrence in at greater psychological and material self-reli­ least some parts of the spectrum. Obscurities ance of the Free World, with less direct Amer­ and weak points remain in the deterrence ican involvement and, implicitly, lowered equation, and it is not always clear how Free U.S. military commitments. World forces will deal with them. —Greater public and governmental willing­ The situation today perhaps is analogous to ness to accept security risks (or at least to that of 1949—two years after the policy of accept a lowered priority for security needs). containment had been adopted—when con­ This willingness is based partially on percep­ tainment’s accompanying military force struc­ tions of a decreased external threat and on the ture was still unclear. The Unification and optimistic hope that potential Soviet/Chinese Strategy hearings proved how little definition threat developments will not materialize. or agreement there was. By 1953-54, contain­ Unless the calculated risks fail and the po­ ment’s massive retaliation strategy and force- tential threats do materialize in some inescap­ structure concept had been fully articulated, able manner, the above factors probably and it was understood and acquiesced in by would create a more “enduring structure of all. Similarly, so much had been written and peace” than existed in the past when world discussed about flexible response that it was stability depended almost solely on U.S. mili­ well understood when adopted in 1961. In tary power. Realistic deterrence might well 1953 and again in 1961, although there w-ere work within such a structure. many arguments about details, the basic Nevertheless, the “favorable” elements thrust and implications of each new strategy’s alone do not appear to be sufficient to insure force structure were not in question.9 That is the credibility and success of the new strategy. not the case with realistic deterrence; some­ Burden sharing, improved readiness, and the thing is missing. total force approach are goals that have been On the surface at least, the guidelines seem­ sought by the U.S. ever since the formation of ingly fail to provide a clear indication of the nato in 1949, though these goals were not U.S. force-structure and employment concepts always specifically named and given the same that are to make realistic deterrence work. emphasis as today. There is an obvious limit Though some of the guidelines are original to the additional capabilities which might and distinctive, the combination of vital new' now be expected, and it is not at all clear that elements or capabilities does not seem suffi­ these concepts alone will be enough to com­ cient to establish a truly new' dimension to the pensate for the reductions in active U.S. concept of deterrence. There is not yet a new forces. Similarly, negotiations will not neces­ strategy as innovative and conceptually lucid sarily lead to any breakthroughs for American as the Nixon Doctrine itself. Something must and Free World security. be added to make the evolving strategy more finally, reduced American emphasis on than simply “a movement toward a middle overseas involvement might make the new position between” massive retaliation and flexi­ and less “reactive” military strategy more tol­ ble response (as one w'riter saw it in late erable to the American public (and therefore 1970). To support the distinctive new foreign more workable in the seventies than its prede­ policy, the new strategy should be completely cessor ); yet it would not seem to make Amer­ distinctive in its own right. 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW It is not the purpose of this article to be reduced from $25 to $23 billion, and the critical of anyone for failing to develop a Navy was increased from almost $21 to al­ wholly new' military strategy in two years. most $23.5 billion.) The Washington Post (Developing the 1947 containment policy’s quoted an “administration insider” as sum­ strategy took six years.) Rather, the purpose is ming it up: “The Army is taking it in the simply to examine the state of evolution of neck.” 10 Writing knowledgeably on the fu­ realistic deterrence and to make the point that ture, in the July 1971 Foreign Affairs, an its new strategic guidelines are not yet Army colonel observes that the Army and matched by specific force-structure concepts. other services must provide “a flexible military force relevant to political realities” and that “careful force planning and programming at Service Concepts Needed the highest echelons are necessary to lay the Another purpose is to appraise what might groundwork for rewarding peacetime be done by the military services to assist in the service.” 11 But he suggests no new strategic further conceptual evolution of realistic de­ policies whereby the Army could facilitate ful­ terrence. filling these needs. The new strategy would The Army does not appear to be able to seem to preclude any new and conclusive offer much that is new. Pared by the new Army contributions except, of course, in the strategy from almost 20 divisions to 13 5/3 areas of military assistance and more respon­ (plus 8 “Modernized Reserve” ) divisions, the sive reserve forces. Army also has had its budget reduced from Many maintain that the key to new capa­ $25 billion in fy 68 to $21.5 billion in fy 72. bilities for realistic deterrence is something (In the same time period the Air Force was called the “Blue Water Strategy.” Navy Mag-

CH-47 Chinook helicopter A-7 A attack airplane

azine editorialized about this in its January larger fleet of nuclear fleet ballistic missile 1971 issue, noting that the Nixon Doctrine ( fbm) submarines—“perhaps the best protec­ “seems aptly fitted to a ‘blue water" or mari­ tion we have now, the best deterrent we have time military strategy, emphasizing seaborne now as far as the Navy is concerned.” 14 Em­ air and amphibious power just over the hori­ phasizing the latter point, a Prize Essay in the zon, keeping American forces largely out of April U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings urged foreign countries but able to move in with a “blue water oceanic option” that would limited means quickly. . . In its February move the “strategic deterrent to sea while issue, Navy returned to the subject. The Presi­ there is still time.” 15 dent, it proclaimed, “seems to be moving—al­ A “blue w'ater” strategy, including fbm beit ever so slowly—toward a ‘Blue Water strategic forces as well as carriers and other Strategy/ ” 13 In March Admiral Arleigh A. surface ships for conventional operations, may Burke, former Chief of Naval Operations, indeed be the missing link that is needed in wrote that the “only way the Nixon Doctrine realistic deterrence, even though at first glance “can be fulfilled is through a strong maritime this strategy seems to run counter to the policy strategy.” He advocated a “hard-hitting mod­ of increasing deterrence across the spectrum em naval force” for controlling the seas, while reducing U.S. manpower and costs. The showing the flag, and supporting other na­ only justified observation here is that there has tions. “The ability to engage decisively and been no clear articulation (at least publicly) of disengage quickly,” he said, “is the inherent how the blue water strategy would work, what strength of a maritime strategy.” 11 A few general force structure would be required to davs later the chairman of the House Armed support it, and whether the resultant capabili­ Services Committee, Representative F. Ed­ ties would in fact provide any essentially new ward Hebert, said 1971 would see a “renais­ and decisive element for realistic deterrence. sance" of the Navy, “top dog" in the defense Thus it is difficult to visualize how a blue budget for the fir>t time since World War II. water strategy could, at reasonable cost within He 'upported not only more aircraft carriers the new' realities, offer any sizable innovations. and rebuilding of the surface fleet but also a But there is no intent here to argue against 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW either the Army or Navy coming up with a Should a President, in the event of a nuclear new force-structure concept in support of real­ attack, be left with the single option of order­ istic deterrence; they should be encouraged to ing the mass destruction of enemy civilians, do precisely that. And the Air Force should in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? address what the Air Force might do to help Should the concept of assured destruction be implement Mr. Nixon’s “new direction” and narrowly defined and should it be the only Mr. Laird's “new strategy.” The nation measure of our ability to deter the variety of should have the opportunity of selecting from threats we may face? a large marketplace of ideas. The services must seek, “in a way that faces In his 1971 Foreign Policy Report, in dis­ cussing strategic “flexibility—the responses

M113AI armored personnel carrier

up to the realities of the 1970s,” to contribute available to us,” the President answered his more to the total force approach. As an indis­ question: pensable feature of this effort, the military es­ We must insure that we have the forces and tablishment must offer a new breadth of Pres­ procedures that provide us with alternatives idential options—something Mr. Nixon appropriate to the nature and level of the clearly indicates that he wants. provocation. This means having the plans and Curiously, the matter of Presidential mili­ command and control capabilities necessary to tary options has received more emphasis in the enable us to select and carry out the appro­ Foreign Policy Reports than in the latest De­ priate response without necessarily having to fense Report. In 1970 Mr. Nixon posed a resort to mass destruction. question which received considerable attention Perceptive reporter William Beecher of the and conjecture at the time: New York Times put the question and answer REALISTIC DETERRENCE AND NEW STRATEGY 11 together in a recent column, concluding that tential. Of all the services, the usaf is the one thev reflect “the President’s determination to w'hich can best provide versatility for world­ increase his choices in nuclear war should de­ wide total force deterrence, using multimission terrence fail.” 16 But it is more than that. aerospace forces supported by advanced, sur- Elsewhere in his Foreign Policy Report, Mr. vivable command and control, including aero­ Nixon indicated a parallel desire for “a full space surveillance systems. Air Force strategic range of options” for general purpose forces. forces could be used to help deter less-than- What he wants, it emerges, is precisely what all-out strategic nuclear or tactical nuclear at­ Mr. Laird wants: deterrence across the spec­ tacks, or even conventional conflicts in such trum. The President merely places a different places as Vietnam or nato. Nuclear-capable emphasis on the problem. For realistic deter­ tactical air forces similarly could be used to rence across the spectrum, there must be credi­ help deter strategic war as well as tactical ble options anywhere within that spectrum. nuclear and conventional conflicts. (The De­ The need for Presidential options and the fense Report makes these latter two points, concept of realistic deterrence are indivisibly but without emphasis and without attention related—each calls for greatly improved flexi­ to command and control—the key to both bility in deterrence. And improved flexibility flexibility and credible options.) appears to be the one missing ingredient in Army and Navy forces, on the other hand, realistic deterrence. Without flexibility, large are not so flexible. For example, armor and and separate U.S. forces would be needed for amphibious battalions, helicopters, aircraft each separate increment of the upper deter­ carriers and other naval surface forces, abm rence spectrum. Such a force structure is systems, and fbm submarines—all offer some­ hardly realistic within the President’s stated thing special for realistic deterrence; each will defense limit of 2.5 million military personnel be required for its special applications. But and 7 percent of the gross national product. none offers efficient and realistic deterrence With reduced resources, the U.S. must em­ except in one rather narrow part of the spec­ phasize (as Mr. Laird has said) advanced trum. None—except aircraft carriers—has the technology, nuclear-capable forces, highly flexibility to deter substantially in other parts skilled but limited manpower, and (as Mr. of the spectrum. Nixon has urged) flexible Presidential options. In my opinion it will be up to the Air Force Also, to provide deterrence in the upper two- to provide most of the force and option flexi­ thirds of the spectrum, U.S. forces must em­ bility needed in the seventies. No listing will phasize multimission capabilities to operate ef­ be suggested here of the specific systems and ficiently and broadly within this range. To developments required; this calls for detailed, support such operations, the U.S. command classified studies. It can be said that the neces­ and control structure must be able to guaran­ sary aerospace force and command and con­ tee the essential worldwide information and trol systems either exist today or are possible responsiveness so that the President could se­ within the state of the art. With the right lect and confidently order any one of the vari­ principles and appropriate emphasis, the re­ ety of options at his command. quired capabilities can be put together well within the fiscal and manpower limits. It can also be said that the .Army and Navy would An Aerospace "Total Force" retain important roles in the new strategy, New Strategy each making its own contributions. This U.S. force-structure requirement Primarily, however, for deterrence in the matches exactly the Air Force’s near-term po­ critical upper two-thirds of the spectrum, I 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW believe the new force-structure concept must proach. This one innovative ingredient will be founded upon U.S. aerospace flexibility. complete the evolution of a distinctive new Emphasis on aerospace flexibility must be the strategy of realistic deterrence needed for the central U.S. element in the total force ap­ seventies. Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research

Notes 1. The Defense Report contains the FY 72 budget and force reasonably clear is based on the Defense Report's incisive analysis summary; the remainder of the Five-Year Defense Program (FY of them as well as on the writerr’s own research. 73-76) is classified. This writer’s observations ure based solely on 10. Michael Getler, “ Defense Costs Peril Strategy,” Washington the Defense Report and its unclassified guidelines, without reference Post, April 19, 1971. to or knowledge of the FY 73-76 program. 11. Colonel Robert C. Card, Jr., “The Military and American 2. U.S. \etcs and World Report. May 17, 1971, p. 29. Society,” Foreign Affairs, July 1971. pp. 705, 706. 3. Charles W . Corddry, “ Laird Brings Defense Plan to Congress.” 12. “Nixon Doctrine and the Blue Water Strategy,” Savy, January Baltimore Sun, March 10, 1971, p. 1. 1971 (and editorial on same subject—Part 11, February 1971). 4. “A New Nuclear Strategy,” Washington Post, March 15, 1971. 13. Arlcigh A. Burke, “China Sea to the Caribbean.” Sew York 5. Washington Star, March 9. 1971, p. 1. Times, March 2. 1971, p. 35. 6. Orr Kelly, “ Nixon Strategy- By The Numbers,” Washington 14. Don Lewis. “ Hebert says *71 ‘Year of Navy,* ” New Orleans Star, March 16, 1971, p. 8. Times-Picayune, March 6, 1971. 7. Sew York Times, March 10. 1971, p. 1. 15. George L. Lowe, “The Only Option?” United States Naval 8. “Nixon Doctrine and the Hope of No More Wars,” Kansas Institute Proceedings, April 1971. p. 23. City Star. March 28. 1971. 16. “On Defense. Nuclear Options Are Sought,” New York Times, 9. The assertion that the two earlier strategies were distinctive and February 26. 1971, p. 14. IMPENDING CRISIS IN AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP

Colonel Doyle E. Larson First Sergeant Delaney eased into the parking spot and stopped. The colonel will be disappointed, he thought, if the guys don’t go along with his plan. He got out of the car, closed the door quietly, and started across the parking lot. The crunch of the gravel echoed loudly between the dormitories, and he considered for a moment that some of the guys would be irritated by the noise. Delaney opened the door and peered down the hall. Trash was piled knee-high at the center of the hall, and here and there a lone beer can lay on its side. ”The janitor will have his work cut out for him,” he said, half aloud. The smell of incense, perfume, alcohol, and pot invaded his nostrils as he knocked softly at the first door. Pie pondered about the source of each of the smells and then realized that the door had come open and he was staring into the face of T/Sgt Bill Johnson, the dormitory chief. “Good morning. Bill. Don’t know whether you remembered or not, but this is the Fourth of July. The day the colonel wanted to have a parade, —ah—to sort of celebrate the country’s two hundredth birthday.” “Oh, gee, that’s right, Sarge.” Bill rubbed his eyes and then said. “I’ll try to get the guys round) d up right away. Can't promise you anything, but I’ll do my best.” “I’ll certainly appreciate that, Bill,” the first sergeant replied. “Tell you what,” Bill said, “we'll meet you in the day room in fifteen minutes— make it eight o’clock on the nose.” By eight o’clock the first few airmen began coming into the day room, in various stages of undress and costume. Most stared sullenly at the walls, each other, or the sergeant, but a few gave voice to loud complaint as soon as they stepped into the room, bitching profanely about being awakened on their day off and about the suspected ancestry of “lifers.” Sergeant Delaney began to explain the situation, somewhat hesitantly, but then heard the approach of Sgt Johnson and decided to withhold his comments until all the airmen were present. “'That’s all I can round up, Sarge. Benson and Brill must be downtown with their girls. Talley says he’s sick, and Rudder won’t open his door. Pie had a little party in there last night with some of the WAFs, and they’re probably still ‘tripped out.’ ” Johnson finished his explanation and sat down. “OK, Bill, thanks,” said the first sergeant. “Guys, I'm awful'y sorry to wake you up so early this morning on your day off, but the colonel is pretty keen on us doing something special to celebrate the nation's two-hundredth birthday. He just feels strongly that we ought to have a parade in order to sort of make something special out of the event. What do you guys think about the idea?” “I think it’s just plain stupid, ” an airman in the front muttered. “Two hundred years. Big deal.” A chorus of voices gave him a measure of support. The first sergeant held up his hands and said, “The colonel will sure be disap­ pointed if we don’t have this parade. Look, this thing won’t take long—you can wear your I505’s—and after it’s over I'll use squadron funds to buy beer and grass and we can have a little party. What do you say? I mean, after all, this will only be the second Saturday this year that we’ve made you do anything at all.” At the side, a couple of airmen mumbled something that Delaney thought might be interpreted as favorable. Sgt Johnson said he thought it sounded OK. After another wave of conversation, the first sergeant spoke again. “OK, then. Let’s do it. We'll meet on the parade ground at nine and the whole thing will be over in less than thirty minutes. I am sure pleased that you are all helping me out on this.” IMPENDING CRISIS IN AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP 15 S SUCH A SCENE possible in the Air military discipline is no longer accepted at Force in 1976—just five short years away? face value. The college graduate in the Army IThe drastic increase in violent dissent, lack wants to be shown that the exercise of military of respect for law and order, absence of patri­ authority over him is both right and necessary, otism, and rampant disorder in our society are the same standard he uses for all other readilv apparent. But will things come to such authority.1 a state in so few years that the scene just In order to comprehend and cope with the depicted could actually occur? Quite possibly problems created by these cultural changes, so. usaf managers need to understand how our Some young adults are rejecting many as­ society got where it is today, determine its pects of our culture, formulating radical new' current impact on the Air Force, and try to society patterns, and rapidly overturning exist­ determine how it will affect the management ing moral standards. Quite often it appears of resources in the next decade. Unfortu­ that thev seek to destroy traditions and institu­ nately, usaf senior managers, the very people tions without having so much as a vague idea who should be attempting to solve this prob­ of what will be established as a replacement. lem, appear to be thoroughly confused them­ With these young people displaying attitudes selves. A similar observation about the civil­ and morals so widely different from the estab­ ians of that generation was made by Richard lished standards of older generations, there is Poirer in the Atlantic Monthly. small hope that the Air Force can remain More terrifying than the disorder in the immune to these cultural changes taking place streets is the disorder in our heads; the rebel­ throughout the nation. From this population lion of youth, far from being a cause of dis­ resource, of course, must come the future lieu­ order, is rather a reaction, a rebellion against tenants, crew' chiefs, clerks, technicians, lead­ the disorder we call order, against our failure ers, and managers of the seventies. to make sense out of the way we live now and There is evidence that the changes are al­ have lived since 1945.2 ready under way in the Air Force. Use of A salient fact is that today’s young people marijuana has increased to a point where osi in their late teens or early twenties were un­ investigative units are totally saturated. The touched by two very strong factors that influ­ Army and the Marines have experienced a enced the older generation, which includes the doubling of desertion rates in the past four senior managers in the Air Force today. These years, and the Air Force increase may portend tw’o very influential factors were the depres­ worse things to come. Some blacks demand sion of 1929-32 and World War II. Members Afro haircuts and soul music, and some young of the older generation have these two influ­ airmen argue with their sergeants about ences firmly entrenched in their characters, whether or not to shine their shoes or scrub whether they are aware of it or not. These the floor. Indeed, the Air Force may very well influences have instilled in people over forty a be right on the fringe of some radical changes. keener respect for hunger and poverty than After completing a worldwide survey of the today's youth can ever fully understand, for so current student unrest, Joseph A. Califano, few of them have known want of any kind. Jr., former aide to President Johnson, com­ Through the impact of World War II, our mented on the parallel unrest in the military: senior people have shared the emotion of an In the Army, dissent is a major issue on a urgent threat to national security, the result­ scale unprecedented in the history of this na­ ing unification of the nation in an almost tion. Radical newspapers are being published, unanimous resolve, and the happiness that anti-war coffee houses are being opened, and was experienced at the absolute defeat of a 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW mortal enemy. Moreover, that enemy was one determine their situation and observe the that could be identified easily with the forces direction they were heading. Quite possibly of evil. That clear-cut situation contrasts the rapidly changing world around them and sharply with the complex nature of the world the onrush of technology distorted their today: a cold war environment that has no perspective and permitted hindsight evalua­ definite lineup of forces and an ending that tion only. At any rate, it now seems clear that cannot be visualized by even the most skillful the veterans of World War II were undergo­ of political scientists. ing a transition—a cultural transition in In 1945 World War II servicemen came which mankind itself was in the process of home to civilian life with their war brides in growing up, and doing it much too rapidly. tow and settled down to what they hoped Throughout the fifties strong factors were would be a peaceful life. The GI Bill and at work as this cultural transition took place. associated veteran benefits gave them a run­ A shift in living habits and attitudes resulted ning start toward a prosperity and affluence in a steady increase in urbanization. A once unheralded in the history of mankind. Chil­ stable living pattern, geographically, became a dren of the Great Depression, they worked fluid situation with the proliferation of auto­ diligently and successfully to acquire more mobiles. At the same time the influence of the and more possessions, build bigger and more church began to decline significantly. What expensive houses, and buy finer cars, investing had previously been clear-cut moral standards wisely—in short, creating a blanket of security now were scrutinized more carefully; some against anv future economic calamity like that were found irrelevant and were replaced by a which they had experienced in the early thir­ code called situational ethics—“It all depends ties. on the situation.” With new and daring psychologists as their As the influence of the church waned, par­ guides, the war veterans spawned the “baby ents very carefully kept up the fagade of re­ boom" and vowed to provide their children spectability. Children were faithfully taken to with all the things that they themselves had church each Sunday while fathers, just as never been able to enjoy. In a multitude of faithfully, played eighteen holes of golf. Atti­ ways the ex-servicemen broke the “shackles of tudes and morals soon began to crumble, and tradition" and raised their children in an en­ before long the phoniness of the situation vironment of prosperity and permissiveness. began to be apparent to the younger genera­ The generation that had survived both the tion. depression and the war entered the decade of The space age dawned on a generation of the fifties with growing confidence and rising parents and national leaders totally unpre­ expectations. College completed, they entered pared to cope with the rapid pace of technol­ the business world, rose in rank and position, ogy, already advancing at a speed that, when increased their incomes, acquired more posses­ coupled with growing urbanization, was sions, and began to display all the distinguish­ bringing about subtle but very real deteriora­ ing marks of middle-class success. From mate­ tion of the society. “The society of the 1950's rial and economic viewpoints, their lives were based on bland conformity, privatism, and well ordered and their goals were easily visi­ middle class values of sociality, was not ready ble. for the sudden impact of the technological Had that generation taken the time to ex­ age.” * amine the moral and social aspects of their But ready or not, the age came. It arrived society, they might not have felt so comforta­ as most of today's young generation was still ble. Perhaps it was impossible for them to in the early formative stages of life. The gen­ IMPENDING CRISIS IN AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP 17 eration of the sixties grew up under the strong Youth has rebelled. It has refused to fall influences of science and technology, in a so­ down and worship “mother science” and the ciety 75 to 80 percent urbanized, constantly “almighty dollar.” It yearns instead for things being reshaped and unified by the new elec­ meaningful, beautiful, and mysterious. It tronic media. Television drew youth into new wants warmth and feeling iastead of toys, levels of human involvement and provided trinkets, and a tv sitter. It has rejected the them with a depth of knowledge and a quan­ coldly rational, scientific, practical approach tity of information far greater than that expe­ to life in favor of intuitive, humanistic atti­ rienced by their parents at a comparable age. tudes. In effect, this generation became the first to Television has unquestionably been another grow up under the dominant influence of major factor in the lives of the younger gener­ strongly humanistic values. ation. Worldwide instant telecast has permit­ There were several strong psychological ted them to watch Neil Armstrong take man’s forces at work molding this young generation first step on the moon, switch to a baseball into the specter we see today. The first of game in New York, and then view the Viet­ these forces has been termed “instantism” and nam combat in their own living room, watch­ can be attributed to technology-. Because of ing an infantryman bleed, in living color, as significant developments in packaging and the action actually occurs. Moreover, tele­ preserving, it became possible to have instant vision has brought more than a simple change foods of unlimited varieties: instant breakfast, in method of communication; it has also quick-fix lunch, ten-minute tv dinners—add caused a change in thinking processes. The water and it became almost the real thing. At ability to select from a wide variety of pro­ the same time development of the transistor grams, to reject a subject when it has become permitted radios and television sets that start boring or difficult, moving instead to a new working immediately. As a result, today’s and exciting picture has caused the younger youth expect things on an instant basis—mas­ generation to think superficially and often in­ ter the piano overnight—learn a language in differently about a multitude of problems just hours—build muscles in a flash—get out without ever really coming to grips with any of Vietnam tomorrow. They are, in short, the of them. The Now Generation is prone to Now Generation. The consequence of “instant- view matters only as they appear here and ism” has been a lack of patience and perse­ now and is reluctant to take the time and verance on the part of the young people and a effort to study a problem in depth, from be­ corresponding intolerance of failure or slow ginning to end, and labor hard for a solution. progress. Instead, they dash into the middle of a prob­ Another psychological factor has been so­ lem, attempt to analyze it quickly, and then ciety's overemphasis on scientific and material turn away from it without really understand­ aspects of life. The young have been deluged ing the matters that caused the problem in the with possessions and gadgets and over­ first place or to speculate on future possibili­ whelmed with scientific data. Parents, teach­ ties. How much easier it has been for them to ers. and scientists have poured forth limitless select a different channel until one is found streams of information, displayed all things that is easier to watch and Jess painful to the and all creatures in the most complete, naked, conscience. and factual manner possible, and answered Many senior usaf managers survey this each and every question with totally accurate young generation and despair of ever being scientific pronouncements—no intuitive, mys­ able to turn over to it the reins of manage­ terious aspects permitted. ment. Frequently, the older generation reacts 18 AIR USIVERSITY REVIEW to this new breed of young people angrily and But it cannot be dismissed lightly. The Air irrationally, and a situation already bad be­ Force must draw its manpower from this new come-' worse. How bad are they, really? Is generation, and never before has a generation there, in fact, a wide gap separating senior been so dominant in creating massive changes front junior, oldster from youngster? Can in a culture. Dr. Clark Kerr, former Chancel­ bridges be restored? Allen J. Moore, in his lor of the University of California, stated in book The Young Adult Generation, has this an interview: to sa\ about the differences between the gen­ The students in any country are usually erations and the gap that separates them: going in the same direction as the country In times of rapid change, normal differ­ itself, only the students are a little quicker ences between generations are aggravated and and go a little bit farther. So if you want greatly magnified. This is due largely to a to understand students, you better try to breakdown in communications structures be­ understand the country. And also, if you want tween generations and the inability ol society to understand the country, you better look to maintain continuity between age groups.' at the students, because they are a very sensitive weathervane that will tell you the In other words, in spite of numerous avenues way things are pointing.7 for dialogue—instant and portable tv, a pro­ liferation of transistor radios, mountains of The usaf will not solve its leadership prob­ papers, magazines, and books, and two and a lems merely by conducting a study of student half cars per family—the generations have life, of course. But the new generation must be stopped communicating with each other. Mr. studied and its shortcomings understood. The Moore contends, however, that the gap be­ youth of today urgently need a balancing in­ tween generations is not as wide as many peo­ fluence, which the older generation is capable ple believe. A recent study, he says, found that of providing. The young adult entering the two-thirds of the students polled believed that Air Force in the seventies is different from his their attitudes were ver\ similar to the atti­ elders—different but far from perfect. Al­ tudes of their own parents. Further, he points though 95 percent of the younger generation out, moral standards have not been changed are decent, sincere, and intelligent, they need abruptly but have been steadily becoming wise and capable leaders who can help them more liberal for the past half century. mature into the better and brighter leaders The voungcr generation thus may really not who will be needed in the eighties. be as far out of step as suspected at first analy­ usaf managers must be made aware of and sis. This thesis is supported by sociologists Rich­ trained to cope with the traits of the young ard Flacks and Kenneth Keniston." Both airman and officer entering the Air Force found high correlation between the beliefs of today. To overcome the effect of “instantism,” voting adult protesters and their parents, as the voting airman must be taught patience well as between those held by nonprotesters and perseverance. Only through experience and their parents. There is, in fact, little evi­ on the job can the young man understand the dence that young adults participating in the need for these essential traits. Recognizing various movements of dissent have been con­ vouth s stronglv humanistic attitude and sensi­ verted from or have rebelled against those val­ tive nature, the properly trained manager will ues and beliefs held by their parents. establish and maintain a personal, open, and direct line of communication through which he can express genuine concern for and inter­ T herefore, the gap may not be est in each man he supervises. In this way he as wide or as frightening as previously feared. will teach by experience the practical and ra­ IMPENDING CRISIS L\' AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP 19 tional approaches to problem solving. By un­ ing does not exist for the young man who derstanding thoroughly the impact of televi­ pursues an Air Force career as a noncommis­ sion on a youth's thinking process, a fully pre­ sioned officer, however. Although Air Force pared supervisor can assist him in thinking a Regulation 50-39 provides for nco academies, problem through as he faces it, patiently ex­ few noncommissioned officers are afforded the plaining each step from start to finish and opportunity to attend, and then only after helping the airman arrive at a valid and real­ they have already served as managers for fif­ istic solution. Because he is aware that the teen years or more, afr 50-39 also provides voung man will often construct lofty and im­ for nco leadership schools for airmen serving practical ideals, the manager must be trained in grades E-4 and E 5, but unfortunately to help him build a foundation of good sense only five major commands are operating just and practicality for those beliefs. And, finally, a handful of such schools. Many leadership because the young man of today frequently schooLs were closed when a manpower short­ lacks a framework of moral and ethical stand­ age developed because of the needs in Viet­ ards that could serve as a guide for his life, nam, and very few of them have reopened. the Air Force manager must be prepared to Another directive, afr 50-37, establishes man­ suggest sound goals and guidelines he can fol­ agement training for junior officers, civilians, low and set an unpretentious example he can and noncommissioned officers. Again, how­ emulate. ever, the chances for the young nco manager to attend during the early part of his career are negligible. This deficiency in nco leadership training is I he question naturally arises, affecting the usaf at a crucial point in the then, as to whether or not the Air Force is organization: at the middle management presently prepared to cope with this cultural level, where young and inexperienced non­ change taking place around us. The answer commissioned officers arc attempting to train, must be in the negative. The vast majority of discipline, and motivate large numbers of Air Force managers are woefully prepared young airmen of the Now Generation. This is and untrained, and the growing examples of the initial point of contact with the younger mission failure or degradation because of this generation. This is the “front line” that must are either unrecognized for what they are or contend with changing morals taking place in just covered up by embarrassed supervisors. our society. This is the vital element that The Air Force is well equipped to accom­ should be serving as the bridge to span the modate the young men who enter the service generation gap which separates the colonel in a commissioned status. The Air University from the basic airman. But unfortunately, system of professional military education al­ these young noncommissioned officers are most guarantees the young officer an opportu­ forced to do their job without the benefit of nity to take at least one if not all three of the any formal leadership or management train­ courses conducted, either in residence or by ing. And, frequently, this lack of nco training correspondence. The^e schools are designed is the direct cause of mission failure or degra- and operated with a high degree of flexibility dation: the required workload could not be and relevance, which enables them to keep accomplished because the work force lacked pace with the changing society and make ap­ the proper motivation or leadership. The propriate changes in leadership training tech­ work that these nco managers are responsible niques. for almost always amounts to the very heart of A comparable system for leadership train­ the unit's mission. This is the middle manage­ 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ment level that must deal directly with the cent of the curriculum is spent on this subject people. As Carl Heyel has put it: area. Leadership schools must be opened up No matter what new techniques for decision throughout the Air Force, on each base, to making and operational control are developed, provide all key nco managers in the grades of every organization must still depend upon E-4 and E-5 the skills they desperately need people for its final output. And these people to train and manage the young airman. must be selected, trained, assigned, directed A fresh and searching look needs to be and controlled. That is why management on taken at the content of these leadership the firing line continues to be the key link in courses. The requirement for each subject every management chain of action.8 must be examined in light of the question, “Management on the firing line”—the What kind of a junior manager do we need in flight line, the electronic maintenance shop, today’s Air Force? In the interests of economy the data-processing room—these are the “gut” and mission effectiveness, such subjects as areas of the Air Force mission, and these are close-order drill may have to be de-empha- the areas where middle management is break­ sized in favor of greater emphasis on effective ing down and adversely affecting the mission communication. The time currently allotted accomplishment. This breakdown has been for “atc familiarization” might be better spent taking place with increasing frequency, some­ on a subject such as “conducting an ojt pro­ times covered up and corrected by a supervi­ gram.” In short, the entire course needs to be sor but more often not. restructured to meet today's needs, usaf can The situation will worsen as usaf is given ill afford to continue using 1940 management fewer men and less money. General Ryan has techniques for the Air Force of the seventies. stated that more work must be done, and In the face of a rapidly changing culture done better by fewer people. That goal will and confronted with increasing reductions in not be realized unless immediate corrective ac­ men and equipment, the Air Force is being tion is taken to provide adequate leadership challenged todav to do more and more with training for junior noncommissioned officers, less and less. If usaf management is to meet the E-4 and E-5 managers who must make this objective, each member of the force must first contact with the voung airman. be capable of assuming more and more of the afr 50-39 does not presently outline a load. Each nco and officer must be better course of training that will do the job. That motivated and better trained. The key to the course must be revised to provide greater em­ entire operation may very well be how well phasis on human relations, understanding Air Force management adjusts to the chang­ human nature, and personalized leadership ing society in America. If adjustments are not techniques based on a knowledge of the made, if corrections are not ordered, usaf will strengths and weaknesses of the youth of not measure up to the stated objectives. today. At the present time only about 25 per- Air War College Notes 1. Joseph A. Califano, Jr.. The Student Revolution: A Global 6. Kenneth Kcnistnn, "The Sources of Student Dissent," Journal Confrontation (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc.. 1968), p. 86. of Social Issues, July 1967, pp. 108-35. 2. Richard Poirer, "Disorder in the Streets," Atlantic Monthly, 7. Mary Harrington Hall, "Interview with Clark Kerr," Psychology May 1968, p. 77. Today, October 1967, p. 27. 3. Paul Goodman, Crowing Up Absurd (New York: Random House, 8. Cnrl Heyel, Management for Modern Supervisors (American I960), p. 19. Management Association, 1962), p. 9. Allen J. Moore, The Young Adult Generation (New York: Abingdon Press, 1969), p. 35, This article has been adapted from a paper written S. Richard Flacks, "The Liberated Generation: An Exploration by the author as a student at the Air War College, of the Roots of Student Protest," Journal of Social Issues, July 1967. pp. 52-75. 1970-71. Home of the Inter- American Defense Board in Washington, D.C.

THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD

Colonel Francis H. Weiland

HE Inter-American Defense Board (ia d b) marked its twenty- ninth anniversary on 30 March 1971. It is the oldest interna­ Ttional military body in the free world today, having operated continuously since its inception in 1942. ia d b’s functions are principally concerned with military planning and strategic studies. The Board also provides an invaluable opportunity for exchange of professional infor­ mation and maintenance of an intimate dialogue among defense insti­ tutions of the Americas, as well as among some of the most important military personalities in the western hemisphere. As an indication of the high regard in which the Board is held by the Latin American member governments, four former Delegates are currently presidents of their countries: General Emilio Garrastazu Medici, President of Brazil; General Fidel Sanchez Hernandez, Presi­ dent of El Salvador; Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, President of Guate­ mala; General Juan Velasco Alvarado, President of Peru. 21 22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW In light of recent events in Latin America Union on 9 December 1941, the problem was and the greatly increased urgency for an effec­ formally addressed at the Third Meeting of tive and viable United States foreign policy Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in for this area, it is especially timely to examine Rio de Janeiro, January 1942. The Ministers this multinational bodv in some detail, for created the Inter-American Defense Board by evaluation of its function as the principal mili­ unanimous resolution and immediately called tary organ for coordinating defense matters in a meeting of military officers in Washington, the hemisphere. The purpose of this article is D.C., to study and recommend measures for to review briefly ia d b's historical development, the common defense.1 organization, functions, and importance as an Born of the pressures and urgencies of the institution within the framework of the common threat from the Axis powers, which Inter-American System. loomed large as the United States became heavily committed in World War II, the or­ historical development ganization emerged as a dynamic force in re­ solving the immediate problems of coordinat­ Concern for western hemisphere security in ing the defense of the hemisphere. From its the late thirties and early forties of this cen­ headquarters in Washington, the ia db framed tury predated the formal entry of any Ameri­ the basis for coordination and cooperation can nations into the conflict raging in Europe. among the individual national forces which The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 proved so effective during the years of con­ made security a priority consideration and flict. triggered preparations for collective defense Among the Board's significant wartime ac­ among the American nations. At the urging of complishments were projects dealing with se­ the Chilean Foreign Minister, Juan B. Ros­ curity against sabotage, protection of sources setti, in a cablegram to the Pan American of strategic materials, establishment of naval

— — — — liaiton only when porent organ in teuton continuous lioiton Diagram of the Inter-American System THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD 23 and air bases, exchange of air intelligence, an­ are depicted in the accompanying chart. Op­ tisubmarine defense, and standardization of erations of the military organ, the ia d b, are organization, training, and materiel. The fully independent of the political organ, the Board also succeeded in its efforts to introduce oas. Although Article 64 of the Charter of the language training in military schools of each oas provides for establishment of an Advisory country, to insure effective communication Defense Committee to advise the Organ of among the armed forces of the American na­ Consultation on problems of military coopera­ tions. Most important, the concept of hemi­ tion that might arise in connection with the spheric military cooperation and reciprocal as­ application of existing treaties on collective se­ sistance was firmly established. curity, the committee has never been acti­ In 1945 the Conference on Problems of vated. War and Peace, meeting in Mexico City, reaf­ The only actual link between the Board firmed the status of the ia db as the military and the oas is through the General Secretariat organ of the Inter-American System.2 In re­ of the oas for budget purposes. Of course, if viewing the Board’s operation up to that time, the Advisory Defense Committee were to be the conference concluded that the ia d b had convoked, the Board would furnish both advi­ proved its value as an agency for joint study sory and secretariat support to the committee. of military problems, exchange of informa­ The authority of the Board emanates directly tion, and formulation of recommendations re­ from the member states in precisely the same garding the army, naval, and air forces of the manner as that which exists for the oas. oas American republics. decisions flow to the American states through Two later conferences of the American the oas ambassadors. On the other hand, ia d b states developed agreements that are now per­ resolutions are passed to the member govern­ haps the most important bases of inter-Ameri­ ments by the military Chiefs of Delegation.1 can relations. These were the Rio conference By ma jority vote of the original ia db Coun­ of 1947,3 which produced the Inter-American cil of Delegates, the location of the Board was Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (better known established in Washington, D.C., and the reg­ as the Rio Pact) and the Bogota conference of ulations and basic organizational structure 1948, which produced the Charter of the Or­ were developed. The ia db initially comprised ganization of American States (oas). These three elements: a Council of Delegates, for two documents and the agreements which directing the organization, and an Interna­ they record have become cornerstones of the tional Staff and a Secretariat, which were Inter-American System. Discussions of defense subordinate to the Council. The current struc­ and securitv matters at other conferences in ture is identical except for the addition of the years that followed were also appropri­ another subordinate element, the Inter-Ameri­ ately noted in the progressive development of can Defense College. the Board. Collectively they have added, ei­ The location of the organization is impor­ ther by direction or implication, new dimen­ tant because this determines the nationality of sions to the mission and functions of the ia d b. key positions in the structure. Board regula­ These aspects are treated more fully in the tions specify that the host country fill the posi­ remainder of this discussion. tions of Chairman of the Board, Director of the International Staff, Director of the organization Inter-American Defense College, and Secre­ tary of the Board. Since the United States is The general concept of the Inter-American the host country, these key positions are filled System and the organization of its elements by rotation among the U.S. military services. Lieutenant General Eugene B. LeBailly, USAF. Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board (top left) . . . Brigadier General Jorge Jose Sartorio, Air Force of Argentina, Vice Chairman of 1ADB . . . General LeBailly presiding over a session of the Council of Delegates, flanked by the l’ice Director and Director of the International Staff and the Secretary of the Board

The Chairman is nominated by the service Board are filled from nominations of Latin Chief of Staff to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and American states on a rotational basis, the se­ appointed by the President of the United quence having been determined by a drawing States. The positions of Director of the Inter­ of lots in the Council. Brigadier Jorge Jose national Staff, Director of the College, and Sartorio of the Air Force of Argentina, the Secretary of the Board are also filled through current Vice Chairman, is also Chief of the nomination by the chief of the service respon­ Argentine Delegation. Prior to joining the sible, according to a predetermined schedule Board, he was Commander of the VII Air of rotation. Brigade, AAF. The present Chairman of the Board, Lieu­ Although this prescription for assignment of tenant General Eugene B. LeBailly of the top posts to the host country would seem to United States Air Force, succeeded Lieuten­ suggest United States dominance. Board regu­ ant General James D. Alger of the United lations strictly limit the authority of these posi­ States Army. According to the established se­ tions and reserve all final policy determina­ quence, the next Chairman should be nomi­ tions to the Council of Delegates for corporate nated by the United States Navy. The posi­ decision. The Board may be relocated in any tions of Vice Chairman, Vice Director of the member country simply by a vote of the International Staff, and Vice Secretary of the Council of Delegates. In that event, the posi­ THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD 25 tions of the Chairman, the Directors of the tional countries are expected to participate in Staff and the College, and the Secretary the near future. The Staff operates under the would automatically revert to the new host direction of Brigadier General Charles R. country. Bushong, United States Army. The Council of Delegates is the ultimate An impressive volume of work is handled governing authority of the ia d b. The Council, by the Staff, not only in relation to its modest which is currently comprised of delegations size but also in that its work is the product of from eighteen countries, deliberates topics on parliamentary action and multinational coop­ its agenda and produces decisions on internal eration. All Staff divisions and committees are matters in the form of directives, which are chaired by Latin American officers. Final staff transmitted to the Staff, the Secretariat, and work and recommendations are arrived at by the Inter-American Defense College, as ap­ the working elements of the Staff, in much the propriate, for implementation. Matters con­ same manner as are decisions of the Council cerned with planning the common defense or of Delegates. For this reason the Staff is advisory aspects related directly to the pri­ headed by a Director and Vice Director mary mission of the Board are referred, after rather than the more conventional chief and processing by the Council of Delegates, to the vice chief of staff. member governments in the form of resolu­ The Staff performs all tasks specifically pre­ tions. scribed by the Council and accomplishes all All the delegations are manned entirely by technical work required in connection with military' personnel, and most are headed by the primary mission of the ia d b. This latter senior general or flag-rank officers, who nor­ process is continuous and includes preparation mally sene for a period of at least two years. of special studies and supporting Staff work Size of the delegations is not limited by regu­ for coordination with military elements of the lations, but as a practical matter participation member states. in Council sessions is restricted to not more These tasks are extremely complex and de­ than four delegates from any nation. The mand highest attention to detail and profes­ larger countries generally maintain a strength sional skill on the part of the Staff. In the of four participating delegates, while some of majority of instances, officers detailed to the the smaller countries are represented by a sin­ International Staff are among the most com­ gle officer. Each delegation has but one vote, petent and promising in the armed forces of however. The Chairman does not have the the hemisphere. Four former Staff members privilege of a vote. have been elevated to general/flag rank in the Regular sessions of the Council are held on past year, during or immediately after conclu­ alternate Thursdays. Additional special ses­ sion of their tours. Other officers are now rep­ sions and assemblies may be called by the resenting their countries as ambassadors after Chairman or by the Council as deemed ap­ completing their tours of duty with the Board. propriate. The Secretariat provides administrative and At the present time the International Staff logistical support for the entire organization. is made up of 17 officers from seven countries: These functions are carried out through four Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Vene­ Deputy Secretaries—for Administration, Con­ zuela, and the United States. The work pro­ ference and Documents, Finance, and Liaison gram assigned by the Council generally pre­ and Protocol. The post of Vice Secretary is supposes a Staff strength of 20 officers. All rotational by country and is currently filled by member countries are authorized to assign of­ an army officer from El Salvador. ficers to the Staff, and representatives of addi­ Because of the obvious need for ready ac­ 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW cess to U.S. government protocol and support Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. It was agencies and for an intimate familiarity with established for the conduct of advanced stud­ the Washington scene, most of the administra­ ies at the strategic level, with broad involve­ tive personnel of the Secretariat are either ment in areas and disciplines particularly re­ U.S. nationals or Latin Americans who have lated to this hemisphere. The overall goal and long had assignments in this country. Among course of instruction are very similar to those the many diversified tasks accomplished by of our war colleges. The course of instruction the Secretariat is that of interpreting and is designed to advance the professional qualifi­ translating the heavy volume of business of cations of military and civilian government the Board, which is carried on in four lan­ officials, to prepare them for participation in guages. While Spanish is prescribed for every­ activities associated with international cooper­ day Staff work, all formal documentation is ation within the hemisphere and interaction also prepared in French, Portuguese, and with nations or international organizations English. The Secretariat provides interpreter outside the hemisphere. Significantly, less than service for the Council sessions, which are twenty percent of the curriculum is devoted to conducted much like a miniature United Na­ military subjects. tions, with simultaneous interpretation in the The position of Director of the College is four languages used by the member countries. rotated among the United States military The academic organ of the Inter-American services, in the same manner as the position of Defense Board, the Inter-American Defense Chairman of the ia d b. Rear Admiral Gene College ( ia d c ), was opened in 1962 at Fort LaRocque, United States Navy, is the present

The Council of Delegates in sesssion THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD 27

Director of the ia d c , having succeeded Major return to their countries to assume more ad­ General John B. Henry, usaf. vanced positions in military service or as The College, like its parent organization, is high-level civil government officials. Their in all respects a truly inter-American institu­ “success stories” include promotions of some tion. The positions of Assistant Director and forty-four alumni to general/flag rank, a Min­ Chief of Studies are permanently designated ister of Foreign Affairs, a Minister of Labor, bv Board regulations to be filled by officers three Ministers of Defense, and numerous oth­ from countries other than the host country. ers who have been appointed to high-level Since 1964 civilian government officials have dual positions having civil as well as military been admitted to the College both as students responsibilities, such as Director of Civil Avia­ and as members of the faculty. This broaden­ tion. Recent developments attest that this is a ing of the student body and faculty has continuing trend. tended to expand the scope of interest in the Top officials of the Board and the College College and has added a new dimension to continually receive highly complimentary cor­ the student viewpoint being developed during respondence and enthusiastic personal com­ the course of study. The faculty of the College ments about the College from government is preponderantly Latin American, and Span­ leaders of the American states. These com­ ish is the official language for course instruc­ ments laud the quality of instruction and tion. Senior officers and civilian officials from nearly ideal atmosphere for study. Attendance all member nations meeting enrollment re­ at the College is considered a prestigious rec­ quirements are eligible for acceptance as stu­ ognition and a positive factor in advancing dents. Provision is made for sixty students, the professional career of the officers selected each member state being assigned a normal as students. quota of three student spaces. This quota may be augmented to accommodate the desires of functions of the organization member governments if nominations for any As previously noted, the Inter-American De­ class are less than capacity. Class X, which fense Board was initially established to study graduated in June 1971, was comprised of and advise member governments on matters military and civilian students from thirteen concerning the defense of the western hemi­ countries. The course lasts nine months. sphere. The planning function was later iden­ The College curriculum devotes much more tified as part of the Board’s mission. At first time to the politico-economic and social fields glance the ia d b, when paired with the oas, than it does to those of a purely military na­ seems to bear a functional similarity to nato, ture. Typically, the student body is addressed and for this reason it is interesting to compare by Latin American ambassadors to the oas, these institutions. Both are designed to provide Cabinet officers of the United States govern­ military defense and security for their respec­ ment, and lecturers who are outstanding au­ tive geographical areas. thorities in the humanities as well as the social The juridical basis in each instance is de­ sciences. Thus, the course equips students to fined by formal treaties, which record the de­ cope with the problems of the individual termination of the signatory parties to join in countries, familiarizes them with the charac­ collective defense and establish means for col­ teristics of international organizations, and laboration in security matters. The Inter- provides a broad understanding of the dynam­ American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of ics of the modern world. 1947 may be considered the western hemi­ Since its establishment, the College has sphere counterpart of the North Atlantic graduated 337 students. Most often, alumni Treaty of 1949. There are, however, some ob­ 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW vious differences: nato is primarily a military The Central American Defense Council defense organization, while the oas/ ia db was established 14 December 1963 in Guate­ “team” embraces political, economic, and cul­ mala City and is comprised of the Defense tural fields as well. The nato military complex Chiefs of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guate­ is an immense and powerful force in-being. mala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Panama, al­ The oas/ ia d b has no ready forces at its dis­ though not a member, regularly sends observ­ posal; rather, it constitutes an integrated base ers to activities conducted by condeca. Its or­ of expert capability to resolve problems and ganization is patterned generally after the ia d b cope with aggression. The ia d b has no estab­ and does function as a regional military lished “chain of command” in the classic mili­ organ; but it is not subordinate to the Board. tary sense. Coordination and liaison are main­ ia db observer participation and reports re­ tained, however, with other elements of the ceived from condeca exercises provide an im­ inter-American military system: the Central portant element of realism to overall defense American Defense Council ( condeca), the planning. conferences of the chiefs of the individual The conferences of the chiefs of the armed armed forces, and the bilateral or multilateral forces have accumulated an admirable list of exercises conducted by military forces in the accomplishments, related, of course, to the in­ hemisphere. terests of their respective services. Here again, Strategic plans and recommendations are through observer participation and receipt of developed by ia d b for subsequent expansion conference reports and special studies, the and implementation by individual member Board derives significant tangible benefits. governments, rather than by multinational ac­ Observers at the annual Air Force chiefs’ con­ tion as is the case with nato. oas/ ia db ferences and the reports generated by these operates on a budget about one-sixth that conferences have provided timely technical in­ provided for the combined nato operation, gredients for Air Force aspects of Board plans. although the mission of both is to deter In those countries that have assigned air­ aggression and provide for collective defense borne antisubmarine functions to their Air in event of attack. Forces, appropriate units are included in this Each of these organizations is playing an essentially naval training operation. extremely important role in world affairs, and Several combined exercises have been con­ they continue to function effectively in their ducted in the hemisphere. These have often respective areas of concern. The oas/ ia d b, been arranged with U.S. support but under however, accomplishes its missions relative to multinational auspices. security aspects at much less cost and some­ Military planning by the ia d b is focused on what less formality. the strategic level. Since it is the highest mili­ Perhaps the distinction between these two tary organ in the Inter-American System, the great defense complexes is historically a func­ Board formulates those basic elements for tion of the nearness of the threat of outside military planning that are not already estab­ intervention. The closeness of the Soviet lished in existing documents of the System. Union and its historical preoccupation with For example, the Board produces “Basic Ele­ imposing a barrier between the Eastern bloc ments of Continental Policy,” “General Stra­ and the West, coupled with its direct interven­ tegic Evaluation,” and “Continental Strategic tions in the internal affairs of some of the Concept” and keeps these documents current. Eastern bloc countries, have constituted a Board plans are designed for maximum flexi­ more imminent threat than any facing the bility, to provide a basic format for coordina­ Americas. tion and to permit effective operational plan- The Inter-American Defense College at Fort Lesley ]. McNair in Washington, D.C. riing by national authorities. most probable threat is that manifested in The first General Military Plan was devel­ many areas in the form of rural guerrilla oped in 1949 and 1950, was accepted by the movements and, more recently, in urban ter­ Board in 1951, and is maintained continu­ rorism. These movements are alleged to be ously by the Staff. Subsequent revisions have supported to some degree by nations of the been made to accommodate, as appropriate, Communist bloc. Even though it is considered the changing political conditions in the world. that Castro-sponsored insurgency presents an The plan is classified, of course, but it can be immediate, tangible threat to social progress said that specialized aspects, such as strategic and political stability in the Americas, Soviet areas and logistics, are covered in a number of and Chinese Communist inroads present a detailed annexes. longer-term threat. Soviet policy, unlike that Of the possible war hypotheses now ad­ of Cuba, encompasses more subtle and indi­ dressed in the plans, it is recognized that the rect means of reaching its subversive goals. It 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW is recognized also that, while the Communist eliminate friction among neighboring armed countries publicly attempt friendly relations forces. with American governments through intensi­ The absence of official military representa­ fied diplomatic intercourse and trade and cul­ tion on the oas Council and the lack of regu­ tural exchanges, they simultaneously support larized official coordination between the oas local Communist parties, ia db studies and and the ia db are considered by some to be planning continue to encompass all aspects of weaknesses which tend to make the system less military concern. The threats of armed attack effective than it could be. When Dr. Galo and subversion are afforded appropriate con­ Plaza, Secretary General of the oas, addressed sideration in all aspects of staff work. the Council of Delegates of the ia d b in June In general, the work of the Board is ad­ 1968, he acknowledged the importance of co­ dressed to the member governments in the ordination and liaison between the two organ­ form of recommendations or resolutions. The izations and pledged to seek ways to that end. final formal acceptance of this work, however, The most recent example of this relation­ is entirely at the discretion of the individual ship is the fact that the Board was invited to governments. send a representative to attend the sessions of Consistently, officers assigned to the Board the oas General Council and the Conference have firmly supported the principle of hemi­ of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The Board spheric solidarity, and the Board has remained was represented at these sessions by the Chair­ staunchly anti-Communist. At the same time, man, Lieutenant General Eugene B. LeBailly. many members are quick to emphasize their The Board has proved to be a valuable belief that Communism cannot be neutralized agency for planning and for collaboration by military force alone but must be pre­ among military officials of its twenty member empted through vigorous effort in the eco­ countries. This close affiliation embraces all nomic and social fields as well. Many of the branches of the armed forces, and the contin­ studies produced by the ia d b Staff have high­ uous exchange of imaginative professional lighted the necessity of continuously relating military views constitutes an extremely impor­ defense planning to nonmilitary fields of na­ tant nucleus for mounting a rapid collective tional development. Board members recognize effort in defense of the hemisphere if need be. the need for increased effort on the part of Now, nearly thirty years after its establish­ their own military leadership toward achieve­ ment, the ia d b continues to produce military ment of this purpose. plans, advice, and recommendations for the member states. This function is extremely im­ portant in maintaining a continuous strategic Importance of IADB in Inter-American System evaluation and a capability to respond to any While evaluation of any international organi­ threat by marshaling resources quickly for zation is often difficult to express in concrete collective defense. At a time when some politi­ terms, the ia d b has earned many credits dur- cal pundits seem inclined to optimism regard­ ing its long history. Not the least of these is ing the cold war—in spite of the Soviet sup­ the fact that only one relatively minor armed pression of initiative among its satellites and conflict has occurred in Latin America since the continuing Communist aggravation in the Board was established. The very existence Berlin, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East of the Board has been a major contribution to —many Latin Americans hold an opposing the preservation of peace and security in the view. To them, the external threat is more western hemisphere. The cooperation and in­ ominous and insidious now than ever before. terchange fostered by the Board do much to The need for close military collaboration, alert THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD 31 area surveillance, and an aggressive internal ing strategic-level studies and plans for just security program is well recognized. such a situation. It has even greater potential The Inter-American Defense Board pro­ and stands ready to do more. vides the active organization for accomplish- Inter-American Defense Board

Notes 1. Resolution XXXIX, Third Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of the Treaty. This xonc is defined in the treaty in specific co­ of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro, January 1942. ordinates of latitude and longitude, generally as enclosing the terri­ 2. As used in this article, the term “ Inter-American System" tory of North and South America and adjacent waters, from pole to embraces all official permanent organizations and intergovernmental pole. Significantly, although Canada is not a member of cither the conferences to meet political, economic, social, and military require* OAS or the IADB and is not u participant in the Inter-American menis of the American states comprising the system, which are also Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, its territory is included in the members of the OAS. security rone defined in the Treaty. 3. The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Con­ 4. Originally founded with 21 countries, the IADB excluded Cuba tinental Peace and Security, Rio de Janeiro. August IS-September 2, in 1901. Of the 20 remaining members, only Costa Rica and Haiti 1947. The Rio Pact established the boundaries of the security zone do not presently have a delegate assigned, but this situation is of concern to the signatory stales and is referenced in Article 4 temporary.

Correction The Soviet SS-9 missile shown on page 19 of our September-October 1971 issue was incorrectly identified as an SS-11. Both the SS-9 and the smaller SS-11 missiles have been tested with multiple re-entry vehicles. ANTIMILITARISM IN THE AGE OF AQUARIUS

M ajor Joseph W. Kastl

Then it’s Tommy this, an’ Tommy that, an’ “Tommy, ’ow’s yer soul?” But it’s “Thin red line of ’eroes” when the drums begin to roll— * * * For it’s Tommy this, an’ Tommy that, an’ “Chuck him out, the brute!” But it’s “Saviour of ’is country” when the guns begin to shoot . . . —Kipl ing

HE “Age of Aquarius”—this time of protest and dissent—augurs badly for American military men. To a small but Tvocal young minority, disenchanted with the state of our nation, antimilitarism is a basic tenet of faith. And given this condition of disaffection, the ability of the military to sur­ vive as a viable, proud, and disciplined organ­ ization is in jeopardy. It will be the purpose of this article to ex­ plore the implications which youthful antimil- ANTIMILITARISM IN THE AGE OF AQUARIUS 33 itarism holds for the future of America and We have never, since the Battle of Bull Run, been caught up in a social revolution at a time then to offer suggestions for continued mili­ of simultaneous economic affluence and eco­ tary vitality. nomic stress, while debating foreign policy and, at the same time, fighting an unpopular Whither America today? war. The total impact of this novel environ­ To the youths of the Now Generation, this ment has been a tremendous and generally nation is falling apart. America is split over its unfavorable effect on attitudes toward the Vietnam adventure; uneasy about its domestic military services, particularly the attitudes of economy; and wary of its blacks. The end young people.4 result is a polarization between these young For many, the ills of America go deep into people and older generations. As analyst Sam­ the gut of this country. In his thought-provok­ uel Lubell sees it, feelings run so high that we ing book The Crisis of Confidence, Arthur M. have become a shrill society, with moderation Schlesinger, Jr., reasons that though millions and compromise seriously out of fashion.1 were out of work in the worst days of the Staff writer Richard Harwood comments in Great Depression, one could safely walk the the Washington Post that the military has be­ city streets. In the 1930’s America’s dissidents come a devil to be exorcised for all national endured by remaining inside the fabric of so­ ills. As Harwood explains it, flower children ciety. Despite the economic situation, people in the streets see the uniform as symbolizing still respected traditional stability. Nobody some sort of “corruption” in the American killed our leaders; no state went communist; blood and a distortion of national priorities. no gangs murdered business men; looting was Somehow, the military exemplifies “darker virtually unknown.5 impulses” festering deep in the American The fact remains that in the 1930s most soul.’ people did not challenge the American system And so the military faces a crucial time. In itself! Yet apparently this is happening today. colleges and high schools, so-called “heroes” As Herbert Marcuse, philosopher of the New arise to preach draft resistance. Politicians Left, asserts: the system itself—with its “ag­ decry “militarism.” Priests, lawyers, and baby gression, domination, exploitation, ugliness, doctors counsel draft evasion. Recruiters face hypocrisy or dehumanization, routine per­ hostile college campuses. Some 5000 young formance”—is under cross-examination.6 men virtually renounce citizenship to seek So it is that some of the young—who have sanctuary in other nations and dodge the seen three of their champions murdered in draft. Students bomb rotc buildings, and America (the two Kennedys and Dr. King) — rotc units are disbanded at such colleges as literally seek to revolutionize our nation. Colgate, Kenyon, Harvard, Brown, Dart­ Meanwhile, says Mr. Schlesinger, middle-class mouth, Tufts, Stanford, Union, Trinity, Americans are so frightened and polarized Princeton, and New York University.1 Near that a recent gun registration ordinance in military bases, underground antimilitary news­ Chicago turned up 357,598 guns—probably papers and so-called “ci Coffeehouses” pro­ more equipment than that possessed by many liferate. active armies.7 It is evident that antimilitarism troubles Amplifying my earlier reference to Ameri­ thinking at the highest echelon of Air Force can dissident youth blaming much of this leadership. Thus, speaking at the 1969 World­ trouble on the military, the New Republic, in wide Personnel Conference, General John C. a lead editorial, “A Restoration of Confi­ Meyer said: dence,” said: 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Those who protest and march and those who Americans over thirty who disagree stren­ don't cannot comprehend how the hungry can uously with “mod” youth. For older Ameri­ be fed, cities made livable, rivers and air puri­ cans, these young people are engaging in an fied, the uneducated properly schooled—so long as the President and Congress commit untenable refusal to “play by the rules”: most of our national budget to the military.8 They had to work to achieve the social posi­ tion they presently occupy, but other groups Yet most military/ men fail to understand why they should be scapegoats for every possi­ ble shortcoming in America today. In this po­ sition, they join the overwhelming majority of

v v ANTIMILITARISM IN THE AGE OF AQUARIUS 35 in American society are demanding these rary American antimilitarism must move to positions as a matter of right. Their children the ultimate question: Could it be, simply had to pass entrance exams to get into college; stated, that the youth reject traditional ideas other mens children (they think) do not. of patriotism because this nation is in a sicken­ Their fathers had to work long hours to sup­ port their families: other men’s fathers seem­ ing decline? ingly did not. They fought bravely to defend It is said that the oldest known piece of America in World War II and in the Korean writing is a stone tablet dated many centuries War. and now it is alleged that those who before Christ. Upon this tablet are written fight and die in wars are immoral or foolish. words which translate as follows: “Alas, times They lived according to the American ethic are not what they used to be; children no of sobriety and respectability, and now they longer honor their parents.” In the days of see on tv the spectacle of the drug smoking Plato, also, men complained that children hippie at a rock festival.9 were not respectful of their elders. Obviously, So today’s middle-class American is told the bemoaning the decadence of the younger gen­ old ways no longer apply; others can take by eration is nothing new1. handout what he sweated to achieve. Yet Nonetheless, there is a genuine feeling what of the rules of hard work, belief in God, among many of America’s concerned thinkers and patriotism which “made America great’’? that something is disastrously wrong. As sup­ Many military men will be quick to agree port for this thesis, consider one leading intel­ that America, faced with a chronic distaste for lectual magazine, Horizon, reputed to have its the old ways, is in a crisis. Today, we have finger on the pulse of current thought. Recent alien creeds and a loss of traditional religious articles have compared the Fall of Rome to belief; hippie dirt in place of discipline; class present-day America; commented on “The war; ungovernable cities; mannish women; Flight from Reason”; and compared the nudity flaunted; a chaotic society. The chang­ United States to the fragile, haunted Weimar ing standards and lack of social stability are Republic. reflected in our X-rated and R-rated movies, The intellectual historians see a general which present areas of experience and behav­ aversion being voiced by the young against ior that would have been deemed unworthy of the old mores and a rejection of traditional our neighborhood movie screens as recentlv as values. More important, as Professor Edmund a decade ago. Stillman wrote in Horizon, in his intriguing With the present milieu, then, it is easy to article, “Before the Fall,” there appears to be see why Mr. Harwood’s investigation for the a failure of national nerve by both old and Washington Post found military men confused young.10 by present-day American mores. As one West Stillman posits—and many would agree— Point major put it, “Does society care for us? that amazing parallels exist between the Fall Does it respect us and believe in what we are of Rome and our own time and people. Com­ doing? How are we to function in a hostile parisons are easily made: In both Rome and society?” present-day America, “the kids have it too easy," and the severe frontier ways no longer gain honor; in both worlds, “old religions” America in decline? receive lip service—but a young Christian We must go one step deeper with this prob­ willing to die for his faith is today, arguably, lem. A physician cannot hope to halt a deep as hard to come by as a Roman youth in a . d . infection by treating only the skin surface. In 250 willing to die for, say, belief in the god the same way, any commentary on contempo­ Jupiter. In both times and places, parents in­ 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW dulge their children by overpermissiveness. In * We must enrich the sphere open to both, morals are lax; a breakdown in law and ambitious younger officers and airmen. The order appears imminent; words like “chas­ Air Force must reweigh the role of the mili­ tity,” “altruism,” “patriotism,” “esprit de tary and consider whether that task might be­ corps," or “nationalism” are considered out­ come more far-reaching. It might include do­ dated and funny. As with Rome, America’s mestic civic action programs accelerating so­ best men seem drained off to fight. In both, cial, racial, and economic growth; exchange tradesmen do shoddy work; manual labor is programs with colleges and local govern­ thought demeaning; dehumanizing practices ments; and dialogue to bridge the gap be­ gain wider acceptance; discipline is in short tween military and civilian citizens. supply; and the economy—geared to war and * We must recognize that today’s deficit spending—decays. bright young man wants to do his best, and Are these parallels between Rome and we must offer the greatest of participative America accurate? At least since the time of Gibbon, historians have been fascinated with management possible, consistent with disci­ unraveling the riddle of why Rome fell. pline and mission. Autocratic management Through this discovery, they hope to avoid leaves little place, of course, for job satisfac­ failure in their own society. tion or creativity. Some would go farther and Is there validity in the comparison of the question whether certain traditional practices two nations? Unfortunately, history does not are necessary for carrying out the mission. In yield its lessons easily. But what happened in today’s “soft core” force, for example, Air Rome following its permissiveness must give Force enlisted personnel are distinctive from us pause for our own times. In Rome, the last those of the other services in that they rarely of the old stoic virtues remained in but one engage in battle. Though the mission may be class: the military. There, also, military em­ to fly and fight, must the nco in civil engi­ perors eventually took control, and the nation neering, the jag paralegal technician, or the remained more or less a military dictatorship personnel manager also be fighters? Perhaps for centuries. not. * We must challenge our bright junior some tentative suggestions men and reward their excellence. Today’s Admittedly, these matters are disturbing. In youth possess great capacity to yield fresh per­ light of what has been written, we come full ceptions to the Air Force. As General James circle to the point of origin: Given today’s Ferguson said, speaking to a Space and Mis­ social and intellectual attitude of “Do your sile Systems Organization group of junior own thing,” is there any place for a disci­ officers, the men want and need recognition plined military force? To put it more simply, for genuine achievements—what General Fer­ How does the military survive, faced with the guson calls “psychic income.” 11 Such recog­ hippie generation? nition is not to be had through making a For the military to remain a proud organi­ bright young man a library officer or engaging zation, it must demonstrate that no conflict in what General John C. Meyer calls “Mickey exists between today’s creative participation Mouse and Bunny Rabbit programs." 12 Per­ and the more traditional concepts of duty, haps this also means disabusing ourselves of honor, country. In searching for ways by what many think is a fascination for trivia— which the military might best achieve success superficial aspects of tradition which today in this purpose, I have arrived at five sug­ lack relevance for many. Perhaps, after all, gested areas for exploration: the length of one’s hair, the presence of a “tail” showing on an airman’s fatigue uni­ 25 years we have enjoyed an unusually long form, or the “leveling” of books by order of period of high acceptance by society. A review height at a service academy could be re-exam­ of history will point out matters of pertinent ined for their “relevance” (to use the modern interest: some 98 draft dodgers were killed in vernacular). Eliminating outdated concepts riots in the first few months of the Civil War; and giving real jobs to these men means dem­ the first shots in the Mexican War were fired onstrating that imagination and intelligence are needed and will be nurtured; means being while Congress was preparing to abolish West sensitized to legitimate gripes about the struc­ Point; and some 67 percent of the population ture of the forces; means never abridging opted against the Korean War in late 1950. individual freedom of choice and action Thus, the message to be learned from history unnecessarily. is, simply, Don’t panic. The American people • We must recognize that there is no seldom really “like” the military, and for the need yet to panic. Military historians have Air Force to expect love from the civilian sec­ pointed out that very vocal antimilitarism is a tor is asking too much. traditional part of America. During the past • Finally, we must possess a means for 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW military men to register legitimate—even con­ For Lincoln, too, there existed a brutal, troversial—feelings without fear of censure. bloody, unpopular conflict. In the Civil War, Otherwise, experiment and criticism will pass as now, there was little clear understanding of to “outsiders” rather than Air Force profes­ the national aim. Then, as now, riots caused sionals who fully understand our mission and injury or death. Then, as now, newspapers “the art of the possible.” For example, many editorialized against the President, calling him Air Force officers today reason that the stage a tyrant, despot, or wicked traitor. Then, as directors of the Vietnam conflict are civilians now, foreign critics second-guessed the Ameri­ who have superintended that overall expedi­ can leader. Then, as now, “doves” in New tion, yet the military is blamed for the fact England asked for a moratorium. Then, as that the war is not “won.” Many officers pri­ now, the youth called the war sinful and un­ vately insist that the American government justifiable. never asked the military to “win” that con­ Yet Lincoln remained true to the words he flict. Now, when does free expression of this had spoken in 1860, while still an unknown view become impermissible license? Perhaps attorney, at Cooper Union in New York. His the issue needs much thoughtful probing.13 words may offer safe harbor for the doubts

which assail us todav:J T he c r is is facing the American military today Neither let us be slandered from our duty by is the same as that which faced the nation false accusations against us, nor frightened over a century ago. History may or may not from it by menaces of destruction. . . . Let us repeat itself—but remarkable similarities exist have faith that right makes might, and in that between the problems of our present Com­ faith let us to the end dare to do our duty mander in Chief, trapped in the frustration of as we understand it. a foreign adventure and a radical domestic JAG School, society, and another Republican President. Institute for Professional Development

Notes 1. Samuel Lube-11. The Hidden Crisis in American Politics (New 7. Schlesinger. op. cit. York: W. W. Norton, 1970). p. 24. 8. “A Restoration of Confidence.” Hew Republic, 20 and 27 2. Richard Harwood, “Military Under Fire,*' Washington Post, December 1969. 12 July 1970. 9. Andrew N. Greeley, “Turning Off ‘The People’: The War and 3. “4 Schools Kill ROTC,” Air Force Times, 29 July 1970. White Ethnic Groups," New Republic, 27 June 1970, pp. 14-16. 4. John C. Meyer, “ Adjusting the Institution to Its People and 10. Horizon, Autumn 1968. p. 5. the Times,” Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, 1 O c to b e r 1969. 11. “ Young Officers Offer Change,” Air Force Times, 17 June 5. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of Confidence: Ideas, 1970. Power, and Values (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), pp. 7-9. 12. Meyer, op. cit. 6. Sam Keen and John Raser. “ A Conversation with Herbert 13. See generally Mark M. Bontner III, “Seeing Ourselves as Marcuse.” Psychology Today, February 1971. Others See Us—First.” Army, February 1971, p. 24. Lieu t en a n t Colonel Earl W. Renfroe, J r . THE COMMANDER AND THE MINORITY MENTAL PROCESS WORRY a great deal about a very tangible a lot of outsiders about, just causing trouble! Iand personal qualification necessary for effec­ This information was imparted to the employ­ tive interaction with minority personnel, that ers with dramatic and practical sincerity—a of racial sophistication. This sophistication is sincerity necessary to survive. By and large, ol’ not what you might imagine: it doesn’t come dependable Bessie Mae and Beulah were be­ from a mere belief that all men are created lieved. In this and many other circumstances, equal; it doesn’t come from attending a school the black either said nothing or conveyed the that was integrated back in the forties; and it opposite of his true attitude to his employer. also doesn’t necessarily come from the exercise To a lesser extent, a similar evasion has of command. occurred in the military among black officers Today I will assume that commanders are and nco’s . Under the circumstances of inte­ all racially sophisticated and that you will gration of the armed forces, there has been a grant me total academic freedom so that I reluctance on the part of the black officer and may, in effect, take the gloves off a delicate nco to advertise his blackness. After all, were subject. You may perhaps evaluate your own not the services proclaimed fully integrated? internal racial sophistication by the degree to What retort is there to the statement that you which you are or are not surprised by what I can progress just as far and as fast as your say. As you know, in the Equal Opportunity abilities dictate? Many things have conspired business we are mainly concerned with the to introduce subliminal pressures to be quiet black minority problem, because it outranks about race and to concentrate on the business all others in severity. of seeking out the hated enemy. By an unfortunate but necessary circum­ All these things and others left the nation stance, a large majority of Americans have unprepared for a historic phenomenon that been victim of an immense put-on by black has occurred w-ithin the framework of Ameri­ Americans. This put-on has involved pur­ can society: the Africanization of the Ameri­ posely conveyed mistruths and evasions re­ can black. What exactly do I mean by the peated and repeated for centuries by a minor­ Africanization of the American black? Vis­ ity filled with hostility and frustration. The ually, its manifestations are quite apparent: scope and depth of black hostility toward the Afro, the dashiki, the black power symbol, whites has—to this day—remained beyond etc. Naturally, the mental process is less ap­ the comprehension of the layman. parent, but most noticeable in the military is I was in Montgomery, Alabama, during the the proliferation of black ethnic groups or as­ historic bus boycott of the mid-fifties, attend­ sociations. ing Squadron Officer School. In the evenings If this Africanization had not occurred and on weekends I would spend my time en­ coincident with the hippie cult and long hair, gaged in what limited social activities there it would probably be more dramatic or ob­ were. Well, social activities were less frivolous vious because essentially it reflects an irreversi­ than usual because the big topic every night ble conceptual rejection of the American at churches, in restaurants, bars, and at other dream. gathering places was the status of the boycott. Let’s think about the when and why it hap­ The object of much hilarity and anger were pened. The time of change can be readily the stories related by live-in and live-out do­ identified. If you were to obtain one of the mestic help. They would relate, to everyone’s film strips of national newspapers and care­ cynical amusement, how they told their em­ fully run the film backwards, you would note ployers in no uncertain terms that they didn't that the beginning of the rejection of Ameri­ want any part of that mess l—that there were can dress, American grooming, and so forth 40 IN M Y OPINION 41 began at approximately the time the Fair ies. Negroid hair was thought to be ugly and Housing Bill was defeated in Washington. If very African. you continued to run the film backwards, you Because a human being is a human being, would see the continuing demonstration proc­ the sudden rejection of attempts to look and ess that had its genesis in Montgomery. But think exactly like the white American has re­ the defeat of the Fair Housing Bill in 1966 sulted in some overreaction in the black lat­ was most significant because its message to eral position. The danger in American culture black Americans was that you may have inte­ for years to come will be that the seriousness gration but not equality. As you remember, of what has occurred will not be understood. prior to this bill the demand for equal rights In the end we shall have a better America, was being answered by bill after bill, all of but I fear our racial confrontations will be­ which represented quantum civil rights ad­ come more serious before they ease. We see vances. However, the Fair Housing Bill was many overreactions to this change, most nota­ really to have furthered true equality because bly the Black Panther stance versus the police. it would have facilitated the destruction of the The result is that the Panthers are now' ac­ ghetto. The obvious reversal of voting patterns cepted as black folk heroes. by previously staunch supporters of Negro Our current military racial problems are rights tended to validate in the minds of the not simply a reflection of the attitudes or cir­ then Negro a deeply rooted folk attitude that cumstances occurring in American society. the American white cannot be trusted. Figu­ No, our problems are the result of nonrecogni­ ratively speaking, it rendered the then moder­ tion or lack of appreciation of the fact that, ate Negro impotent. In the mind of the black, though we all call ourselves American, sepa­ the Fair Housing Bill represented acceptance rate identifiable cultures are involved. as a social equal; it represented recognition It has been common many times to speak that the right to own property anywhere in of the adjustments that some people have to one's land was equal in importance to the make when they come into the military. One right to dispose of property. example is the guy from upstate Minnesota Today the militant young black's view is who has never had any contact with blacks that integration alone is unacceptable; equal­ before. Seldom mentioned or appreciated is ity is the goal. Many people have been con­ his black counterpart. As Equal Opportunity fused by first the black appeal for integration Officer I am continually in contact with and then the apparent attempts by blacks to northern big-city ghetto blacks who until they resegregate themselves. This is not really a came into the service had no contact with conflict but is a manifestation of the ideology whites. The isolation and immensity of the of separatism. Under this concept, to be inte­ New York, Chicago, Washington, Philadel­ grated means that a superior “accepts" an in­ phia ghettos—to mention a few—produce ferior and grants rights to him. Separatism on first-term airmen whose total world has pre­ the other hand means that there are two lat­ viously been black. The ghetto is not a nice eral and equal positions—the white position place to grow up in. The product of the and the black position. Neither grants the ghetto is naturally a bit different from his other anything because they are both equal: service bunkmate who is, say, a middle-class that is, equal but different. Thus we now have white. The ghetto’s black is often sullen, ag­ the black fixation on an ethnic identity. Until gressive, hostile, loud—a problem. very recently the black was actually ashamed Essentially, the ghetto serviceman is a prob­ to be black. The African was really thought to lem because lie’s in a strange environment, be like those native characters in Tarzan mov­ competing with others from—often—highly 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW advantaged backgrounds; but of course he’s nerve enough to say something meaningful— “being treated just like everyone else.” Sure as something he feels is constructive—he has to shootin’ he’s being supervised by some hard have forty-nine other guys with him for sup­ taskmaster who lets the chips fall where they port, and it comes off as a confrontation. may and is absolutely convinced that he’s the Although this guy is black, in many in­ world’s fairest individual. What the supervisor stances his presence forces on the supervisor doesn’t realize is that this black youngster is an attitude readjustment that benefits young not under the slightest illusion that he’s equal white personnel also. One notable feature of to everyone else. Now suddenly, in a white the so-called militant black movement is the world, he hears articulate conversation in the lack of reaction from white airmen. To be barracks, and it upsets him: he realizes how sure, there are those who say that the blacks shallow his world has been, he realizes how are getting special privileges, but perhaps you poor his diction is, he even feels stilted in will have those with you always. Actually, the making small talk. And when he’s put up on young white often is in agreement with the the starting line by the fairest supervisor in the objective of black grievances, but he is not of world and told to compete, his mental process a cultural orientation that would predispose says “Uh huh, that guy knows I’m going to him to the brinksmanship approach of com­ fail." When his deportment begins to deterio­ municating problems. rate after he’s been given an equal chance to Many times there is an attempt to say that succeed, it is perhaps concluded that he’s just something was a “nonracial” thing, just peo­ a troublemaker after all. ple problems. Here again the point is missed: Often this airman, unable to communicate any time only black personnel are involved in with you as his commander, is so sensitive something it may appear nonracial, but the about his communicative inadequacies that he question must be asked, Why are only the refuses to be drawn out. Perhaps you have blacks interested? For instance, Why would noted a lack of personality in many black air­ the use of disposable plastic glasses in a mess men. This apparent lack of personality is ac­ hall annoy only black airmen? What I’m in­ tually an unfortunate inability to communi­ ferring is that because of the communicative cate effectively so as to project personality. helplessness of many blacks—because so many Actually, he's quite awed by you and the feel that you are incapable of understanding power you wield. This awe is unfortunate be­ their feelings—they'll quite often confuse you cause in many instances it prevents him from by injecting seemingly unimportant nonracial approaching you informally. The fifty black complaints. guys down at the ball diamond demanding I can remember a number of years ago how redress represent people who in most cases the Commandant of Marines explained the have all their lives listened at the breakfast racial assaults and disorders that were occur­ and dinner table to parents talk about what ring at Camp Lejeune. He said that a number the supervisor did or said to them or what of mistakes had been made: not enough soul they had to do as a result of some supervisor’s music on the juke boxes, for one; another was order. Their picture of society is that of some­ a statement in a medical guide that in sus­ one being supervised, someone at the bottom pected heat exhaustion the marine should be rung, someone powerless. This tvpe of individ­ checked for paleness. He then said it was now ual feels so powerless and inadequate (and this realized that the statement was considered of­ inadequacy is reinforced by his new associa­ fensive to blacks because they don't pale. I tion with airmen from white middle-class remember shaking my head at the time, backgrounds) that when he finally gets up knowingo it would be unfortunate if he contin- IN MY OPINION 43 ued to believe that that sort of thing was caus­ vantage in dealing with the American black ing black marines to assault whites. Though because the black has often observed that the he may well have been told that, again you northerner is more susceptible to reversals of have these misleading illustrations by those attitudes under pressure than the southerner who feel that it is impossible or embarrassing is. The southerner, having once made his ra­ to attempt to communicate reality. What was cial attitude known, pro or con, is generally really being said was that black marines were thought to maintain a reliable and consistent completely ignored as identifiable contributors position; conversely, the northerner is often to the corps. The soul music bit and the medi­ felt to be racially unreliable. cal book were only the “for examples.” In fact, I think more candor would go a In terms of racial sophistication, the Thir­ long way towards winning the confidence of teenth Air Force approach has been to de-em- black military personnel. Actually, a black phasize the motherhood aspect of equal op­ subordinate would be pleasantly surprised to portunity. In other words, we have perhaps hear a white supervisor say that he is to some gotten a bit off the track in approaching equal degree prejudiced; that he is prejudiced be­ opportunity in terms of the Ten Command­ cause he grew up that way; that he has not ments or the Bill of Rights. All too often we been able to cope fully with the attitudes he have associated it with many cultural ideals learned many years ago; that he is not com­ that are not really encompassed in our day- pletely sure of himself in terms of not saying to-day lives but are merely accepted in a con­ things that are considered offensive by blacks; ceptual sense. For instance, in terms of our that far from blacks’ being hurt personally or cultural orientation it is bad to be prejudiced. professionally while under his supervision, he However, I think if we were to examine the feels that he and the organization will benefit black attitude toward prejudice we w'ould find from their presence. Then when a slip of the that the black does not expect an individual to lip occurs, the black will not discredit the ear­ be unprejudiced. He well appreciates the fact lier professed lack of prejudice and feel he’s that to grow up unprejudiced in today’s so­ really in an enemy camp. ciety would be an exceptional accomplish­ In addressing the subject of supervision and ment. Rather, the black appreciates those in­ equal opportunity problems, one thing was dividuals who recognize and “accept’’ their clearly evident to me as base Equal Opportu­ prejudices and are therefore in full control of nity Officer at Takhli. Though there were a their expressed attitudes. number of organizations that had large num­ One unfortunate thing that usually occurs bers of black personnel, only a few seemed to when a racially unsophisticated supervisor ini­ have racial problems. I used to have a sort of tially confers with a black subordinate is that standing joke with my base Assistant Equal there is an attempt to say something like “I’m Opportunity nco. When he would call to say from the North” or “I grew up unprejudiced’’ that there was an airman in his office with a or “I believe in treating everyone fairly." Al­ problem, I’d jokingly remark, “Don’t tell me though it might be considered just the thing he’s from------squadron!” Many of the to say, this type of statement is considered squadrons were never heard from with re­ offensive to a black. In particular, I would quests for adjudication of racially oriented caution anyone from the North against using problems, while others seemed to be a hotbed that geographical locale as a sort of plus fac­ of dissident activity. In most instances there tor. Black folklore does not favorably differen­ was one personality to whom everything tiate between the northerner and the south­ pointed as the culprit, and usually that per­ erner. Quite often the northerner is at a disad­ sonality was a senior nco. In all my experi­ 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ence as base Equal Opportunity Officer at craft at the airport, when a squadron com­ Takhli, I never had a complaint against an mander came down specifically to speak to officer from an equal opportunity standpoint. me. This squadron commander, a captain, However, I do not intend to let the officer off said he had enjoyed my presentation and the hook so lightly. Though in many instances would like my comments on a situation that the senior nco was fingered as the problem, he was currently faced with. It seems that the when the oic or commander would depart, black airmen in the organization had re­ the problems of the particular organization quested an audience with him, but he was ceased, even though the same senior nco was deferring their request on the advice of his still present. Naturally, the nco is in a position first sergeant, who felt that the white airmen where he has much more “body contact” with in the organization would consider it preferen­ airmen than do the officers. I have concluded tial treatment. He stated that his first sergeant that many times the nco was not really to had twenty years’ service and he did not feel blame but was more readily so identified be­ he should buck this experience. The scenario cause he carried out the policies of the oic or sounded all too familiar. I advised him that commander. probably the reason his first sergeant opposed Perhaps my biggest shock as Equal Oppor­ the meeting was that the captain would be tunity Officer—and this after eighteen years’ hearing a lot about his first sergeant at the service at the time—was to find that there are meeting. I thought that the comments of his individuals in the ranks who purposely and black personnel would be very constructive to continually harass others for no reason except him as a commander. that they are of a different race or different religion, and that this harassment was so de­ signed and calculated. I was not prepared for this, but through thorough equal opportunity I f i could say that I have come investigations, I was able to document it time to one major conclusion as a result of my and time again. exposure to the equal opportunity business, it When I'd encounter such situations and would be that we have airmen in the military brief the commander on racial problems ex­ who, if employed by industry, would be called pressed to me by one or more of his airmen, the hard-core unemployed. I call them the his first reaction would normally/ be to hit the hard-core unemployed basic airmen. “Hard­ ceiling. He would most definitely and emphat­ core unemployed” is a term that industry has ically state that his door was always open and applied to personnel who normally would not question why the airman found it necessary to be hired but who were hired because of gov­ bring this thing out in the open without first ernment contractual requirements. Since in­ advising him. Essentially, the fact that the air­ dustry, unlike the military, is profit-oriented, man did take the problem outside the organi­ once industry had these guys on board it had zation served as constructive criticism, for al­ to decide how to make a profit out of them. though the door was open, someone or some­ Industry decided to institute programs for re­ thing had tended to block the progress of per­ training and reorienting them. sonal complaints through it. The programs developed were quite exten­ I recently made a tour of all Thirteenth Air sive, and industry began to learn some rather Force bases in Thailand, and at one base I interesting things about these people. Not sur­ addressed a meeting of all organization and prisingly, it was found in many instances that tenant squadron commanders. I was rather they could not get to work on time. Though surprised the next day, while awaiting my air­ this tardiness was initially considered mere ir­ IN MY OPINION 45 responsibility, closer examination disclosed large bases in the SEA theater fifty-five per­ that they had never really learned the social cent of the airmen basic are black. I feel that value of timeliness. They had never held posi­ eventually this problem will have to be reme­ tions that required punctuality; in fact, they died by longer periods of basic training for had held very few positions. It took a consid­ this type of personnel, black or white. Why? erable amount of time to orient these people Because, unfortunately, we are turning these toward the reason why being on time was unprepared individuals loose in our military important, but in most cases they were even­ society before we have sufficiently reoriented tually successful. They also found that an ap­ their social values and remedied their cultural parent lack of job aggressiveness on the part inadequacies. of disadvantaged employees was not a physi­ One of the things constantly being used in cal laziness but was actually an aversion to the equal opportunity area today is the rap undertaking new responsibilities for fear of session or round-table discussion. I think es­ failure or fear of criticism. Tardiness and lack sentially this is fine as long as we do not use of aggressiveness were, therefore, determined such forums as a device cloaked under the to be constant factors or habit patterns. word “communication.” We are beginning to If you look at the military performance use the word “communication” today the way profile of many airmen whom we process we quite often use the word “professional”— through 39-12 actions today, you often see a that is, improperly. It is beginning to be im­ familiar pattern of circumstances and actions plied that as long as we just communicate we eventually culminating in identification of the are solving problems. In many of the equal individual as a “troublemaker,” whereas ac­ opportunity round-table discussions or rap ses­ tually he was, through lack of background, sions that I have attended, communication unable to meet particular standards. A typical was going on, but only the transmitting or example is being late to work. This individual sending part of communication; the receiving cannot believe that he is so important to the part, the listening and understanding portion vast military machine that he need be given of communication, was lacking. Quite often an Article 15 because he is late for work a few these sessions amount to a period of mutual times. But of course that is exactly what hap­ admonition, name calling, and exposure of pens. He does not consider the fact that his problems, but no problem solving. I feel it is overall performance has been marginal any­ important, when this type of session is held, way. Because he does not understand and has that someone insure that problems once iden­ not previously developed the social values of tified are followed up and, hopefully, solved. the broader community, he interprets the pun­ Otherwise this form of communication begins ishment for minor infringements of rules as to take on the air of “doing your thing.” directed at him because of his color, and an In conclusion, I’d like to say that the equal almost predictable deterioration of his deport­ opportunity field is very young and still ment results. thrashing about for effective methodology. Although I have touched on only a small The equal opportunity officer has an emotion­ portion of the hard-core unemployed problem ally draining job in that he is in daily contact that we have in the military but do not recog­ with emotionally disturbed people. The first nize, I think we will have to address specifi­ emotionally disturbed person he meets is the cally these individuals and their problems as guy who brings in the problem. The next we move toward the all-volunteer force. As an emotionally disturbed person encountered is example, I might statistically emphasize my the one just informed that he has been ac­ comments by pointing out that at one of the cused of being racially prejudiced. After nine +6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW to twelve months of equal opportunity ad judi­ and draws a conclusion about you. He listens cation, many officers and nco’s develop a case to your speech pattern and is unconcerned as of what I call “equal occupitis.’’ At long-term to whether it is southern or northern, but he bases they ask to be relieved; at the conclusion listens for the word “boy” or “colored people” of short tours they happily disappear from or “I was a poor boy myself and look how view. The main reason for this has been that I’ve succeeded”—he listens for these gaffes although equal opportunity is a full-time job, and draws conclusions. Although you may not it has previously been delegated as just an­ feel that these statements are distasteful or other “additional duty.” However, we now that the conclusions I’ve mentioned constitute see a number of Air Force actions that are fast a fair evaluation, the evaluation is made nev­ leading to the designation of the equal oppor­ ertheless. tunity field as an Air Force specialty. So, finally, Airman First Class George The world through black eyes is much dif­ Washington reports to your base and asks the ferent from the one you commanders imagine. first black face he sees, “What kind of base is Because the average black has always been so this?”—not “How's squadron so-and-so?” or removed from the exercise of power, he ac­ “How many black officers are around?” or tually views your position as a sort of super “How's the female situation?”—but “What omnipotent one. When he opens the base kind of base is this?” And if the reply is, newspaper, he makes a point of looking for “Man, this is the worst base I’ve ever seen,” black faces; if none are there, he draws some it’s mutually understood that the question was conclusion about the paper's staff and you. He watches you as \ou make your rounds of related not to the availability or scarcity of the base—he watches to see if and how you facilities but to the image of the one person approach black personnel, and he draws a who is thought to be all things to all people: conclusion. He looks at the ratio of black to the commander. white prisoners in your confinement facility Hq Pacific Air Forces A COMBAT CREW PRODUCTION FUNCTION

Lieu t en a n t Colonel Herman L. Gil st er

PRODUCTION function describes how certain inputs can be combined to Aproduce a given output. Because of the widespread belief that a quantifiable measure of military output does not exist, there has been little effort to estimate the parameters of such a function for military personnel. I suggest, however, that an acceptable proxy for this output could be the Operational Readiness Inspec­ tion scores generated by various units of our operational commands. These scores give a measure of the effectiveness we might expect from our units and personnel if they were ever put to the test in an actual wartime situation. Actually, this is the rationale behind the Operational Readiness Inspection ( ori). 47 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Let us take the Strategic Air Command as The individual sac wings then provided lists an example. A sac crew’s primary mission, in of all crew members who participated in the case of war, is to put its bombs and missiles on Olive Pit Express exercise, so that personnel the target. The ori bombing scores give a rel­ background data on these individuals could be atively objective measure of how sac crews extracted from the master file by the of­ would perform this function. I am not argu­ fice of the Director of Personnel Planning, ing that these scores provide the full measure dcs/Personnel, Headquarters usaf. These of an individual’s output; certainly there are data were mated with the crew ori scores to other factors that one would wish to consider. provide the sample observations. However, a crew's superior performance in The decision whether or not to include a this particular area does enhance sac’s pri­ particular crew in the sample was predicated mary mission: to deter aggression. These on two requirements. The first requirement scores, therefore, do provide a first-order was that the crew had flown the low-altitude measure of output. phase of the mission and recorded bomb This article describes the preliminary results scores during that phase. The second require­ of a feasibility study in the sac ORi-Personnel ment was that all large crew scores had re­ subarea. The question which it attempts to sulted from crew error and not from materiel answer is, “Are sac ori bombing scores ran­ failure or unknown causes. Both these require­ domly generated, or can we determine some ments were imposed to provide a more con­ basic input factors that significantly influence sistent measure of crew output. The data mat­ their values?” In other words, is there a signif­ ing process, subject to these requirements, pro­ icant relationship between a crew member’s vided 387 observations, or “crews over the tar­ background and how well he performs on a get,” for the sample analyzed in this study. given ori? Specifically, what type of returns A list of the variables included in the sam­ do we obtain from such factors as experience ple is shown in Table 1. The qualitative varia­ in the aircraft, length of service, age, and edu­ bles take the value 1 or 0 and are used to cational level? Additionally, are qualitative ratings such as Officer Effectiveness Reports and crew designations (Ready, Senior, or Se­ lect) good indicators of how well the individ­ Table 1 ual will perform on the ori? List of Sample Variables the data base Output Variable Low-Level Bomb Circular Error (CE) or Miss The sample period covered by this study ran Distance in Feet from July to December 1967. During this pe­ Qualitative Input Variables riod 30 sac B-52 Strategic Wings participated B-52 aircraft model (D, E, F, G, H) Crew designation (Ready, Senior, Select) in the Olive Pit Express simulated wartime Substitute crew member mission as part of either an ori or a Bar None Bar None exercise exercise. The two exercises are identical ex­ Source of commission (ROTC, OTS, etc.) cept that the ori is monitored by an Inspector Quantitative Input Variables Total flying time in hours General team whereas the Bar None exercise 8-52 flying time in hours is not. All scores recorded during these flight Total commissioned service time in years missions were transmitted to Headquarters sac Age in years and later provided for the study by the sac Educational level (code for years of school) Inspector General and Director of Training. Officer Effectiveness Report index AIR FORCE REVIEW 49 classify the data by groups. Such classifica­ must be chosen to stand for the common fac­ tions can often increase the sensitivity of the tor, which in this case could be labeled “expe­ analysis, as will be shown later. rience.” For this study that variable is total One qualification must be put on the re­ flying time. sults : Absolute bomb scores are considered se­ Another rather interesting finding of the curity information and cannot be given in an study was that ori scores were more sensitive, unclassified article. For this reason whenever in a statistical sense, to the personal back­ the results are presented graphically, one score ground of the aircraft commander (ac) than to is designated by the letter X, and other scores that of the copilot ( cp), radar navigator ( rn), are shown as incremental differences from this navigator ( nav), or electronics warfare officer base score. When the results are presented al­ ( ew o ). This may be surprising to some who gebraically, the constant term in the equation suppose that scores would be most sensitive to is denoted by the Greek alpha, a. These pro­ the personal background of the radar naviga­ cedures disguise the absolute scores obtained tor, the crew member who actually does the by the crews while still permitting one to ob­ bombing. Apparently the aircraft commander serve the relationships between the scores and sets the pace for the whole crew, whose effec­ input variables—the subject of this study. tiveness may be highly dependent on his lead­ ership ability. One reason for this finding could be that the aircraft commander’s back­ crew personnel characteristics ground is usually representative of the back­ The high correlations between certain person­ ground of the entire crew. The correlations nel background variables, such as total flying presented in Table 3 give credence to such an time, commissioned service, and age for each crew member, made it impossible to deter­ mine the independent influence of these varia­ bles with any degree of confidence. As an ex­ Table 3 ample, the correlation matrix for the aircraft Correlations between Total Flying Time by commander variables is presented in Table 2. Crew Position

AC CP RN NAV EWO Table 2 AC .22 .22 .05 .32 Correlations of Aircraft Commander Personnel CP .... .16 .16 .21 Variables RN .18 .16 NAV .08 Flying B-52 Commissioned Age Educational EWO .... Hours Hours Service Level

Flying hours .... .59 .83 .82 -.20 B-52 hours .37 .42 -.13 Commissioned .91 -.18 service argument. The experience levels of the indi­ Age -.20 vidual crew members are positively correlated. Educational Except for the correlations between the air­ level .... craft commander and navigator and between the navigator and electronics warfare officer, all correlation coefficients are statistically sig­ nificant beyond the 99 percent confidence In situations such as this, the most effective level. In general, the more experienced air­ variable for explaining the desired relationship craft commanders have the more experienced 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW crews. For these reasons, the aircraft com­ section. For security reasons it is disguised in mander’s background data were used to repre­ the constant of that equation. sent the entire crew. Aircraft commander’s source of commis­ sion. An analysis of variance test indicated sensitivity results there were no statistically significant differ­ On the Olive Pit Express exercise, four low- ences between scores classified by the aircraft altitude simulated bomb drops were recorded. commander’s source of commission. Ideally the average score should be used as an Substitute crew member. Seventeen percent output variable, but tests using each individ­ of the crews in the sample had a substitute for ual score and the average indicated that the one of the five officers on the crew. Contrary fir.'t score recorded was the main discrimina­ to the belief that substitutes adversely affect tor among crews. The variance around the crew coordination, there was no significant mean score for the first target was approxi­ difference between the scores of crews with mately five times that of the others. Therefore, and without substitute members. Perhaps the the variance of the first score dominated in explanation lies in sac’s highly standardized the variance of the average, so that each gave crew procedures. essentially the same results. In addition, it was OR1 versus Bar None. There was no signif­ noted that the same bombing method was icant difference between the scores recorded used on the first target, whereas the method by crews flying the ori exercise monitored by varied considerably on the other targets as the Inspector General team and those flying crews evaluated their equipment status after the unmonitored Bar None exercise. the first simulated bomb drop and changed to Crew designations. There were significant alternate bombing modes. Therefore, for rea­ differences between mean scores recorded by sons of both sensitivity and consistency, the crews with different designations—Ready, first score rather than the average score was Senior, or Select. This indicates there was a chosen as the measure of output in this study. qualitative difference between the crews in­ As previously mentioned, a number of qual­ cluded in the sample. These qualitative differ­ itative variables were used to classifv the ences were incorporated in the general model scores in various categories. If there is a signif/ ­ described in the following section, and their icant difference between the mean scores for significance is explained there. each category, the analysis can often be im­ proved by holding these mean effects constant combat crew production function in the regression equation. The remainder of Regression analysis was used to estimate the this section describes the results of these sensi­ parameters of the combat crew production tivity tests. function. Ideally, this technique takes into ac­ Aircraft model. The various B-52 models count the interaction between input factors, have slightly different bombing equipment, and it attributes to each its marginal contribu­ and if these differences significantly affect the tion to output. Sometimes, when the correla­ scores, these effects should be taken into ac­ tions between a set of input variables are ex­ count when evaluating personnel effectiveness. tremely high, as between total flying time, An analysis of variance test indicated that the commissioned service time, and age, it is im­ scores recorded by one model were signifi­ possible to separate the individual influence of cantly higher than those of other models. each input. The technique is normally success­ Therefore, this effect was held constant in the ful, however, in handling lower correlations, regression equation estimated in the following and confidence can be placed in the estimated AIR FORCE REVIEW 51 parameters as long as the T tests are signifi­ Ready, Senior, or Select crews are being con­ cantly high. sidered. This concept is rather difficult to visu­ As an example, total flying time was nega- alize unless some of the factors are held con­ tivelv correlated with educational level (Table stant at their means and the influence of the 2), since a number of the longer-time crew others is expressed in a two-dimensional members entered service through the aviation graph, as in the following subsections. cadet program, for which a college degree was Crew designations. When a crew first at­ not required. More recent entries had college tains combat status, it is given the crew desig­ degrees whether they entered through a serv­ nation Ready. After the crew has performed ice academy, rotc, or ots program. As might also be expected, total flying time was corre­ lated with the qualitative crew variables be­ cause, in general, the Select crew members Table 4 had more flying time than Senior and Ready crew members. In both cases, however, it was Combat Crew Production Function possible to break out the separate contribu­ Bomb circular error == Ci tions of these inputs. 0 7 statistic — 1766.9 (Senior crew) 3.27 The most prominent factors in explaining —2663.9 (Select crew) 4.28 crew bomb scores were the qualitative ratings — 215.6 (1000s of the crew (Ready, Senior, Select) and the of flying hours)" 3.76 + 32.0 (1000s aircraft commander’s experience and educa­ of flying hours)3 5.17 tional level. The estimated production func­ -f 14999.7 (1 educational- tion, using total flying time for the experience level code) 2.24 factor, is presented in Table 4. The T statis­ R3 = .20 Degrees of freedom = 381 tics for each of the estimated coefficients are Educutionul Level Code presented in the right column and are based 06 = high school graduate 10 = 4 yrs of college, 07 =; 1 year of college no degree on the null hypothesis that the coefficient is 08 = 2 years of college 11 = college graduate equal to zero. All tests are significant beyond 09 = 3 years of college 12 = graduate work the 95 percent confidence level. 13 = master's degree The R2 statistic indicates that only 20 per­ cent of the variation in bomb circular errors ce) was explained by this function, but this is not unusual for a relationship estimated by well, the wing commander, taking into consid­ cross-sectional data drawn from an opera­ eration such distinct empirical data as daily tional environment. The fact that 80 percent bombing scores and navigation proficiency, of the ce variation is still unexplained does will promote the crew to Senior rank. The not render the function useless. The T statis­ Select crews are then picked from the Senior tics indicate that bomb ce’s are responsive to crews who have performed in an outstanding changes in the included explanatory variables, manner. so that the e.timated model can be used to The qualitative differences between the examine policy alternatives. three crew categories can be depicted by hold­ The production function defines a three-di­ ing the effects of the flying-time and educa­ mensional surface with output (bomb ce) a tional-level variables constant at their means function of the two inputs, flying time and and adding these effects to the constant a ,. educational level. The level of this surface is The bomb ce’s then become a function of shifted vertically depending on whether only the differences between crews: 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

bomb ce = a; — 1767 (Senior crew) until reaching 4500 flying hours and then — 2664 (Select crew) begin to rise at an increasing rate. In addi­ This equation defines the step function de­ tion, at approximately 2200 flying hours a picted in Figure 1. In this and each succeed­ point of inflection is reached, where the curve begins to bend upward, from increasing to ing figure, one must remember that bomb ce decreasing returns to experience. reflects the miss distance from ground zero. It is interesting to note that the shape of Therefore lower scores are desirable. this particular function conforms closely to that of the traditional production function vis­ ualized in economic theory. If the vertical axis percentage of crewi Ready 17% in Figure 2 is translated so that higher values Senior- 53% Select 30% are desirable, the production function takes IOOO the form shown in Figure 3. It shows increas­ ing returns from additional flying hours in

average CE area A, decreasing returns in area B, and neg­ ative returns in area C. This particular pro­ duction function is complicated, however, by the fact that it takes time to gain experience Ready Senior Select and move out the horizontal axis. Figure 1. Bomb circular errors as a function of crew designation

Figure 1 shows that there is a significant difference between the mean scores by crew category, particularly between the Ready crews and the other two classifications. The wing commander’s qualitative ranking system 1006 2000 >000 4000 >000 4000 7000 can be verified on the basis of ori and Bar None scores—not surprising since his selection process incorporates past performance indica­ tors. Conversely, the crew designation pro­ vides an insight into the expected performance of a crew on the simulated wartime mission. Figure 2. Bomb circular errors Experience factor. The independent effect as a function of experience of experience can be obtained by holding the qualitative crew differences and educational levels constant at their means and observing A regression equation, using commissioned the production equation as a function of only service time, gives essentially the same form as the flying-time variable: that for flying hours. This is to be expected, bomb ce = a3 — 215.6 ( 1000s of flying hours)2 since the two variables are highly correlated. -}- 32.01 (1000s of flying hours)3 A compatible commissioned service scale has This equation defines a cubic relationship and therefore been included in Figure 2 below the is plotted in Figure 2. The bomb ce’ s decrease horizontal axis. It shows that the minimum AIR FORCE REVIEW 53

bomb ce occurs at 4500 flying hours or 11 crews up—unless, of course, aircrews are to be years of commissioned service. The average recruited on a career basis, as some people aircraft commander has somewhat less flying advocate. Barring this, we must still cope with time but more commissioned service than this. the rising ce. The increase in bomb ce’s depicted by the One might also question whether the flying­ right portion of the curve is interesting be­ time mix of B-52s and other aircraft types cause it indicates that there may be a time might not affect the slope of the experience beyond which it is undesirable to keep a pilot curve. The high correlation between B-52 on a combat crew. It should be emphasized, flying time and total time made it impossible to determine these separate effects with any degree of confidence. An analysis of the data, however, showed that approximately 40 per­ cent of each aircraft commander’s total time had been in the B-52. The graph in Figure 2 reflects this mix. Educational level. The final factor influenc­ ing output in the production function is edu­ cational level. Holding the other factors con­ stant at their means gives the following pro­ duction equation: Figure 3 bomb ce = a4 + 15,000( 1 H- Z) where Z is the educational level code. This reciprocal relationship is rather interesting be­ cause when plotted it takes the form shown in however, that the solid experience curve is Figure 4. Positive returns result from higher based on a weighted average of Ready, Sen­ ior, and Select crews. It does not necessarily imply that an older Select crew member will receive higher error scores than a younger Ready crew member. Both the qualitative and quantitative aspects must be taken into con­ sideration. The Select curve falls below the weighted average, and the Ready curve above it. Portions of these curves are shown by the dashed lines in Figure 2. These curves do imply that within each category the younger Figure 4 crews are more effective. One could argue that the rise in ce’s results from a qualitative change in the mix of the force through time as the more effective crew education, but the incremental returns are not members advance to command and staff posi­ as great at higher levels of education as they tions. However, this is a continuing phenome­ are at lower levels. This would appear reason­ non, and it would be inappropriate to deny able for aircraft crew members. The educa­ advancement to the most proficient individu­ tional range for sac aircraft commanders ran als just to keep the average quality of the from high school graduate to master’s degree. 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The actual plot of ce’ s against educational normally have the additional function of in­ level is given in Figure 5. (When comparing structing and evaluating other crew personnel Figures 2 and 5, one should note the differ­ in the organization. All these factors are ence in the vertical ce scale.) weighted in the oer index. Considering this, it is not surprising that the oer index fails to Officer Effectiveness Report provide a particularly good forecast for per­ formance on the simulated wartime exercises. Beyond isolating Select crews, the Officer Effectiveness Report index gave little indica­ tion of how a crew member would perform on T his article outlines the results of a study designed to determine the feasibility of esti­ mating the parameters of a military produc­ tion function. The output measure is the bomb scores generated by sac B-52 crews on a • » simulated wartime mission. These scores are influenced by both qualitative and quantita­ tive factors. Qualitative factors are necessary because there are distinct differences between individ­

• 'MO • uals that cannot be measured by the normal quantitative variables. The wing commander’s 1 ____•______•_ ____9_ ____10_____ II_____ 13_____ '3_ l*.#. high uhool college motier’t g.adwoic grodvoto degree OER mde* Figure 5. Bomb circular errors as a function of educational level

i i the ori and Bar None exercises. Of course, the Select crews scored lower bomb ce’ s , but the bomb CE incremental differences between scores and Reody Senior Select oek’ s bv crew type were not highly correlated. ± OER Ready • Sen.or | A CE; Ready - Senior 2 This is illustrated in Figure 6, using the Ready- OER; Senior • Select 7 ^ CE: Senior - Select 1 crew as a base, where A stands for the differ­ ence in oer’s and ce’s between two crew Figure 6 ranks. It would appear that Select aircraft com­ manders’ oer’s are out of proportion to their performance on the simulated wartime mis­ crew rating (Ready, Senior, or Select) pro­ sion, but a statement such as this must be vides the best input to de cribe this effect. qualified by other considerations. First, the This rating provides a valid estimator of a oer index reflects a number of other factors in crew’s performance on the simulated wartime addition to performance on simulated war­ mission. time exercises. Leadership potential, in partic­ Holding these qualitative differences con­ ular, is highly weighted. Second, Select crews stant, one finds that two of the aircraft com­ AIR FORCE REVIEW 55 mander’s background factors, which can be over a shorter span of time. In addition, an­ quantified, also affect the crew’s output. The other pilot must be found and trained to re­ first of these is an experience factor which can place him, necessitating a trade-off between be represented by either total flying time or an increase in force cost and an increase in total commissioned service. Using either of bomb ce. these variables, when one estimates the tradi­ More than likely, however, the rated indi­ tional production function, he finds first an vidual performing in a nonrated capacity still area of increasing returns to experience, then contributes, at least in part, to the flying mis­ decreasing returns, and, finally, negative re­ sion of the Air Force, making it rather diffi­ turns. cult to figure the amortization of his training The second influential factor in the aircraft cost. For example, how much of his flying is commander's background is his educational productive in the sense that it supports the level. The estimated relationship shows that unit mission and how much is unproductive, we experience positive returns with higher lev­ or straight proficiency flying? If this individ­ els of education throughout the sample range. ual is placed in a nonflying position that re­ The incremental returns, however, are greater quires a rated background, his training cost at lower levels of education than at higher can still be amortized over the original period. levels. The problem then becomes a question of how The results of this study do raise some inter­ many of these command and staff positions esting questions about the possible structuring are available. Surely there will not be enough of our rated force, and they should be investi­ to cover the increased demand if officers are gated with further analysis. For instance, on arbitrarily removed from combat crews after a the curve in Figure 2, the optimal experience given number of flying hours or years of com­ level appears to be at approximately 4500 missioned service. flying hours or 11 years' commissioned service. One proposal that has intuitive appeal is to Beyond this point, effectiveness begins to de­ rotate a number of these officers who are not crease. At about 6700 flying hours or 16 years’ programmed for command and staff positions commissioned service, effectiveness has de­ through flying jobs that are decreasingly rigor­ creased to a point equal to that of a new ous. For example, if it is agreed that combat aircraft commander. Would this be the ideal crew duty in B-52s is a rather strenuous activ­ time to remove a pilot from combat crew- ity, there may be a point at which it would be duty? Not necessarily. It might be somewhat desirable to rotate rated personnel into less before or even after this time. Ultimatelv, it rigorous but still primarily flying jobs. Accord­ will probably depend on how much impor­ ing to this proposal, a hypothetical career pat­ tance is placed on an increase in bomb ce, tern might take a pilot through fighters or which in turn depends on such factors as bombers, and then transports. Before such a weapon lethality, bombing pattern, target vul­ career pattern could be recommended, how­ nerability, and the quality of target intelli­ ever, additional studies—such as this—are gence. needed to determine the sensitivity of effec­ Costs also are important as well as rather tiveness to flying time or length of service for complicated. Cost determination will depend each type of flying activity. on how the individual is utilized after he is The curve of Figure 3, showing the de­ removed from crew duty. If he is placed in a crease in bomb ce’s with increasing education, nonrated position that contributes very little must also be evaluated with caution. For ex­ to the flying portion of the Air Force mission, ample, it appears that a decrease in bomb ce’s then his high training cost must be amortized of approximately 1000 feet could be expected Continued on page 58 itliumu SAC’S ‘‘RBSExpress” scoring (RBS) train provides train provides combat crews realistic scoring (RBS) onResting a siding at aremote site, the radar bomb training.An... airman watches the bomber’s of dropthe on the target,simulated the Express.RBS aboard equipment bomb-scoring electronic the onapproach thetrain. ... A sergeant plots the accuracy ­

58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW as the force moves from one of high school The questions outlined above indicate how graduates to one of college graduates. But valuable well-defined personnel production there is both a social cost and a military cost functions could be as an aid in structuring the involved in procuring a more highly educated military forces. The main purpose of this rated force. The decision-maker must decide study has been to determine the feasibility of whether the increase in effectiveness is worth estimating the parameters of such a function. the higher costs. It must also be emphasized It does appear that reliable statistical results that the results presented in this article pertain can be obtained in areas in which a quantifia­ only to primary aircrew members and not to ble measure of military output does exist. Ad­ personnel occupying higher command and ditional and more detailed research is needed staff positions—positions in which the returns now. to education may be considerably higher. If a substantial number of these positions are to be United States Air Force Academy filled by members of the rated force, educa­ This research was originally described in Air Force tion takes on added emphasis. Academy Technical Report 69-1 dated September 1969. WO days after the North Koreans seized the PUBLIC Tintelligence ship U.S.S. Pueblo, President Lyndon Johnson’s press secretary, George Christian, began briefing AFFAIRS a hastily assembled group of White House correspondents. It was 1125 hours 25 January 1968. ASPECTS Christian had news of one facet of the American response to the seizure. He started by announcing that “the President OF THE has directed Secretary of Defense McNamara to recall to 1968 active duty certain air squadrons and support units of the Air Force and the Navy.” 1 RESERVE After explaining that the Reservists and Guardsmen were being called under Congressional authority provided in the MOBILIZATION Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1967 and that the recallees could be activated for a period of up to 24 months, Christian opened the press conference to questions. Major John D. Wil l iams He responded to several queries and then suggested: “You will have to have your people get details at the Pentagon.” As scon as the reporters left George Christian’s press conference, most began deluging the Pentagon with requests for the promised “details.” Representatives of the wire services, the networks, and the larger newspapers and news magazines relayed their inquiries through their Pentagon correspondents. (Some 35 newsmen maintain office space in the Pentagon and cover military affairs on a full-time basis.) Others called the Press Desk of the Office of the As­ sistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (oasd/ pa ), and still others called direct to the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Informa­ tion ( safoi). 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW When the Press Desk officer receives an in­ Air Force Reserve, laden with fact sheets, quiry, he completes a brief “query form” to strength figures, and assorted information, note the name and organization of the in­ had moved into the Press Desk area to pro­ quirer, the time the inquiry was received, and vide instant expertise and expedite query the specific question. This form is passed to responses. the service involved. As soon as the answers By 1300 hours, less than two hours after are developed and approved for release by Christian’s announcement, the first barrage of appropriate officials, the information is passed inquiries had been handled. In addition, the back to the Press Desk for release to the in­ safoi field offices and the major commands quirer. had been provided with press guidance and Quite often, when an inquiry relates to releasable information.3 some nonvolatile issue or information already Activity had been fast and furious, and of in the public domain—as, for instance, “What course all assigned personnel could not be types of jet fighters do we have in Vietnam?” spared to concentrate on this issue. The usual the formality of a query form is dispensed flow of inquiries about such topics as weapons with and the matter is handled by telephone. research, procurement, and Vietnam opera­ But the mobilization of 372 fighter and tions continued unabated, and specialists in transport aircraft and 14,187 Air National those areas had to ensure that this more rou­ Guardsmen and Air Force Reservists was not tine business was attended to. a routine matter (there had been no major There were, inevitably, some minor foul- reserve force call-up since the Cuban crisis of ups and communications breakdowns in those 1962), and all information had to be carefully first hectic hours. The Military Airlift Com­ scrutinized for accuracy and security prior to mand (mac) called to report that the list pub­ release.2 lished by oasd(pa ) contained an error in the Within three minutes after the Christian designation of one of the mobilized units. press conference, safoi had its first press safoi checked the list, confirmed mac’s ob­ query. The Press Desk called to request a servation, and arranged for the immediate re­ breakdown of the number and types of air­ lease of a corrected list. craft and numbers of personnel assigned to Yet another minor difficulty arose when each unit that had been called. Fred Hoff­ oasd (pa ), about midafternoon, reversed its man, the Associated Press veteran Pentagon position on releasing the individual personnel correspondent, asked if the Air Reserve Trans­ strength figures of the mobilized units. An Air port Units being mobilized were the same as Force colonel assigned to oasd (pa ) had noted those originally scheduled for deactivation. that several of the Navy recalled units were safoi field offices in Los Angeles, Chicago, and only 50 percent manned while most of the Air New York had picked up wire reports of the Force units were well above 90 percent mobilization and wanted to know what was manned. He felt that publication of the man­ releasable. Additionally, a score of callers ning figures would reflect adversely on the from all over the nation asked the question, Navy and wanted to hold up on this point “Is our unit being activated?” These were eas­ until he could confer with Navy public affairs ily and quickly answered because a releasable officials. list of mobilized units had been distributed to The:e minor snags notwithstanding, the all action officers in safoi’s Public Information first test—that of marshaling a tremendous Division. amount of data on very short notice, clearing Shortly before noon, the senior information it for release, and expediting it to waiting officers of the National Guard Bureau and the newsmen—had been passed. AIR FORCE REVIEW 61 On the following day, 26 January, the “in tributed to a very high percentage of men depth" newsmen came in with their requests. “present for duty” at the appointed hour.6 John Mulliken, Time Magazine’s Pentagon reporter, requested strength figures on all Air Force units in the Pacific area. Life wanted to send Sam Angeloff (an Air Force Reservist) to /^ fter the initial excitement and do a feature on the recalled 184th Tactical enthusiasm waned, however, complaints were Fighter Group in Wichita, Kansas. The not long in cropping up. American Broadcasting Company wanted a Some of the mobilized Guardsmen and Re­ complete rundown on the history of reserve servists charged that they had been rushed to activations. These obviously involved a great active duty but now found themselves with deal of leg work and research, but they were little to do. News reports, letters to the editor, the sorts of projects routinely handled by and letters to congressmen publicized the SAFOI. complaints. Since the range of legitimate questions re­ Norman Sklarewitz of the Wall Street Jour­ porters might ask is almost limitless, obviously nal fired the first major volley on 15 March it would be impossible for oasd(pa ) or safoi with a front-page story headlined “Where Are to garner all the answers before the questions They Now? Activated Reserves Just Waiting were posed. Who could have predicted that Around.” 7 This report contained examples of George Wilson of the Washington Post would most of the various types of gripes the men ask the number of pilots affected who were were making. airline pilots or that Hugh Lucas of Aviation He had requested and received Air Force Daily would ask the amount of the monthly cooperation in preparing his story. Telephone payroll of the mobilized units? interviews were arranged with recallees, spe­ As press interest in the call-up announce­ cific questions he asked were processed, and ment subsided, safoi personnel found time to answers in writing were provided. To a ques­ evaluate press treatment of the event, safoi tion on morale, the Tactical Air Command judged that most of the reportage seemed to (which had gained most of the mobilized units be factual and that the reporters had drawn as they came on active duty) responded in realistic inferences. The Associated Press ob­ part: “tac believes the morale of the Air served : “The call-up is generally viewed as an Guard units assigned as part of this command administration effort to put some military bite is commendable.” behind the diplomatic bark directed at the Sklarewitz’s story, however, did not reflect North Koreans who captured the U.S. intelli­ tac’s optimism. In his lead he asked the ques­ gence ship Pueblo.” 4 United Press thought tion, “What ever happened to the 14,787 air that the call-up added “psychological pressure reservists mobilized in January?” And in 800 to these diplomatic] efforts and was viewed or so searing words he answered his own ques­ as a diplomatic signal in itself, directed as tions. Most of the men, he said, were doing much to Moscow as Pyongyang, that the nothing except complaining. One airman re­ United States means what it says in demand­ ported that he spent his day emptying trash ing the return of the Pueblo.” 5 cans. Another remembered doing “not one Both wire services included in their early productive task of any substance.” As for mo­ releases that the mobilized Reservists and rale, most were “disgusted,” and others were Guardsmen were to report to their respective “bugged by all this uncertainty.” units by midnight Friday 26 January. Wide­ The reporter saved his most critical state­ spread publication of the reporting times con­ ments concerning the recallees for his last par­ 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW agraph. “Some military officials also say it is a pared for built-in delays involving staff work good thing the reserves haven’t been sent to as a “Pentagon regular” would have been. Vietnam or Korea. They say the men just After completing his telephone interviews, aren’t prepared to fight.” he posed several additional questions to Sklarewitz painted a dismal picture and in oasd (pa ) on 14 March, safoi tracked the the process revealed that he, too, was dis­ somewhat lengthy answers down and returned pleased with the Pentagon. He charged that the information to the Press Desk for relay to “the Pentagon does not have much to say Sklarewitz on 15 March.8 The story—without about the activated reserves. Officials side­ the answers—had appeared in that morning’s stepped queries for days. . .. As for how long Wall Street Journal. the men will be in, an officer repeated only In this instance the reporter, very likely that the authorization is for up to 24 under the pressure of a deadline, did not wait months.” for the safoi responses for even one day before Sklarewitz obviously felt he was being given filing his story. The incident points up how the runaround. He was not accustomed to one kind of “news management” charge can covering Pentagon news and was not as pre­ originate. Nonetheless, the story appeared in

Control check on a Tennessee Air Guard C-97 used to supplement MAC Pacific runs AIR FORCE REVIEW 63 an influential newspaper and was highly criti­ mind, the units, and the personnel assigned, will be handled in the same manner as the cal. entire Air Force, which means taking normal Others in the same vein began to appear. tours in all theaters of the world under stand­ The Newark News asked safoi to comment on ard Air Force Policies.” an ap report that mobilized Reservists, partic­ ularly college-trained men, were complaining It soon became apparent that “standard bitterlv about being “treated like dirt, safoi Air Force policy” in this matter was to step proposed that some of the rationale developed up training of the mobilized units but to hold for the Sklarewitz queries be used to respond, off on deploying them overseas. Pilots and but oasd(pa ), remembering the short shrift personnel directly associated with the flying given this material by Sklarewitz, rejected the mission were extremely busy during the first proposal and went with a “no comment re­ 90 days of their active duty tours, but some sponse. support and administrative personnel had rel­ The fact was that some of the recallees atively little to do. Typically, this was because were beginning to complain about inactivity. the mobilized units had deployed to Air Force There were likely not nearly so many as Skla­ bases that already had fully manned support rewitz reported nor so few as the “through facilities capable of providing most of the ad­ channels” complaints indicated to Air Force ministrative support required. officials. Some of the pressure of “inactivity” charges An additional mobilization of some 3500 was relieved in May and June as two recalled Air Force Reservists, which was announced fighter squadrons were deployed to Korea and on 11 April, did little to still the rising chorus four were sent to Vietnam. of “inactivity” complaints. However, safoi Even media reports of the deployments, was afforded something of a breather in that however, contained hints of trouble to come. all the units involved in this smaller mobiliza­ Announcing the arrival in Vietnam of the tion were to be given 30 days’ notice prior to Colorado Air Guard squadron, the New York reporting in mid May. Times added: “Most of the service and ad­ Essentially the problem of “inactivity” ministrative personnel would not be sent to arose because of a basic misunderstanding. Vietnam because there was already sufficient The recallees assumed that, because they had support there.” 10 been activated immediately following the On 1 July, Sergeant Robert A. Levy of the Pueblo seizure by the North Koreans, they recalled 113th Tactical Fighter Group (of would be sent almost immediately to Korea to Washington, D.C.) wrote an open letter to the bolster American forces there. Air Force plan­ President, the Congress, and the Department ners, on the other hand, were proceeding on a of Defense.11 In 2000 well-chosen words different set of assumptions. Levy reviewed his unit’s experiences during Early in March, in response to their ques­ the call-up and expressed his carefully tioning why they were called up, safoi issued thought-out opinions. Levy charged that the the following statement, clearly outlining the Air Force was an “unbelievably demeaning Air Force's position: environment” and that all the men did was Although the reserve units were mobilized be­ “participate in chess tournaments and take cause of the Pueblo incident, they were not coffee breaks.” He concluded, “Never have I necessarily called to active duty to serve only seen human resources so tragically wasted.” in Korea. . . . Now that they are on active Prior to his call to active duty, Levy had duty, they comprise a portion of the total earned the Ph.D. (at age 24), authored a book world-wide defense structure. With this in and a dozen articles, and organized his own 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW computer firm. He wrote well and per­ (The same story quoted the 904th com­ suasively. His letter received wide publicity, mander, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Amdur, as and on 12 July it was included in the Congres­ follows: “Twenty to 25 men have protested. sional Record by Congressman Durward G. The rest of the men have served proudly and Hall of Missouri. have not complained.”) 13 Air Force reaction to this sort of publicity Two days later, on 17 July, Senator Javits was prompt. On 13 July a Department of announced that he had wired Air Force Sec­ Defense national news release stated that retary Harold Brown asking for a “compre­ 10,800 of the 15,750 recallees had already hensive senior policy review” of the reassign­ been deployed overseas and in the United ment policy. States with their units. The announcement added that the Air Force had ordered 2200 of the recalled men to replacement assignments overseas and would shortly order the remain­ F rom a public affairs point of ing 2700 men to assignments within the view, the Air Force had jumped from an United States. In response to a press query, the Air Force said that “all reassignment or­ ders should be issued by the end of July.” The-e assignment actions effectively stilled the complaints of inactivity—almost everyone was now going somewhere to fulfill a specific role. But reassigning personnel out of their Re­ serve units raised another hue and cry—the principle of “unit integrity” was being vio­ lated. Basically, unit integrity amounted to a policy of keeping recalled units intact. Na­ tional Guard recruiting drives had stressed the theme, “Train with your buddies, serve with your buddies.” The reassignments were followed by a rash of complaints to congressmen from the af­ fected individuals and by critical media re­ ports. The Xew York Times front-paged its story of the Air Force action and observed: “The announcement followed bitter com­ plaints made publicly and privately by many airmen who have received orders within the past two weeks. These airmen contend it is contrary to Air Force policy for them to be reassigned as individuals.” 12 The next day the Times reported that Sen­ ator Jacob Javits was “looking into” the mat­ ter after receiving hundreds of complaints from members of the mobilized 904th Mili­ tary Airlift Group at Stewart afb, New York. AIR FORCE REVIEW 65 "inactivity” frying pan into a "unit integrity” being ordered to active duty.” He added that skillet. it was not intended that such units be used The “skillet,” however, was to prove a primarily as a source of filler personnel for great deal cooler than the frying pan. The other units, either regular or reserve.11 unit integritv problem had been anticipated as Dr. Theodore Marrs, Air Force Deputy for reassignment plans were being formulated. Reserve Affairs, in an hour-long interview On 13 May, Alfred B. Fitt, Assistant Secre­ with Harold Gal of the New York Times on tary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve 18 July, said that any Reservist called should Affairs, had sent a memorandum to the mili­ assume that he would be utilized—possibly tary departments, spelling out unit integrity outside his home unit and that there was Air policv. He cited a 1959 Defense directive Force, Department of Defense, and Congres­ which clearly stated that, although personnel sional authority and precedent for reassigning would be ordered to active duty only with men out of their units. He declared that reas­ their units, "this does not prohibit the reas­ signments were reviewed by high authorities signment of the personnel of such units after and were based on real need, not whim. He

Mobility processing prior to Southeast Asia deployment . . . Seventh Air Force Commander, General William W. Mornyer, welcoming one of the pilots of the first Guard unit (Colorado Air Guard) to Vietnam . . . Close air support strike typical of Guard and Reserve berformcnce in Vietnam 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW admitted that the Air Force had perhaps over­ safoi's tasks relative to the mobilized units stressed the “Train with your buddies, serve then became routine. Because many of the with your buddies"’ theme and said he regret­ Guard and Reserve units were overseas, infor­ ted it. With these “regrets,” Dr. Marrs ended mation officers in the overseas theaters as­ the Air Force’s public comment on the unit sumed responsibility for issuing releases and integrity issue. responding to most inquiries relative to their Air Force Secretary Harold Brown assured combat performance. Senator Javits that each individual complaint On the morning of 3 October, the Legisla­ would be carefully examined. Paul H. Nitze, tive Liaison office notified the Congress of the then Deputy Secretary of Defense, informed dates of release from active duty of each of Secretary Brown that his personnel utilization the units. Later the same day safoi made the policy was approved with the proviso that information available to the press through the “reserve personnel will be released upon de­ dod Press Desk. Most of the units were sched­ mobilization of the units with which they were uled to return to reserve status by 30 June mobilized, regardless of their assignment at 1969, which meant an active duty tour of the time of the demobilization order.” 15 from 15 to 17 months for most—considerably Later in August, a group of New York Re­ less than the maximum 24 months. servists lost a bid in federal court to block safoi’s Community Relations Division be­ their reassignment orders when the judge gan to work on plans for “Welcome Home” ruled that the President had the right to acti­ and deactivation ceremonies. High-ranking vate them and the Air Force had the right to civilian and military speakers were invited, reassign them. and parades, bands, and aerial demonstrations Doubtless the number of the complaints were planned. and Congressional interest served to make the There were still occasional letters to con­ Air Force give more careful attention to its gressmen (as often as not from Reservists who reassignment policies and perhaps did, in the had been sent to Korea and were irate be­ end, serve to protect some Reservists from cause they were not being sent to Vietnam) being malassigned. And as a direct conse­ which had to be answered. But with all the quence of the furor, the Air National Guard policy decisions now ironed out, drafting re­ dropped or toned down its “Serve with your sponses was made easy. buddies” slogan.10 Senior Air National Guard and Air Force With completion of the reassignment ac­ Reserve officials accepted invitations to ad­ tions and the overseas deployment of addi­ dress various organizations across the country. tional reserve combat units, the public affairs They usually informed their audiences that problems of the call-up virtually disappeared. the recalled units were serving well on active In fact, for the remainder of the active duty duty and presented such statistics as numbers tour the mobilized units were to attract a of combat sorties flown, targets destroyed, tons great deal of very favorable attention by the of cargo airlifted, etc. media. In the fall of 1968, Brigadier General The key to the improved public affairs cli­ Winant Sidle, usa, Chief of Information in mate was that, given meaningful jobs and a Saigon, invited the Air National Guard to sense of mission accomplishment, the recallees send over a special Information team to make performed superbly. Complaints were few. In in-depth reports on combat accomplishments the final analysis, operational performance of of the Guard units. This program was carried the mobilized units—especially those in com­ out with considerable success. bat—merited favorable press coverage. As the active duty tours approached an AIR FORCE REVIEW 67 end, theater commanders sent congratulatory the fanfare of deactivation ceremonies pro­ and appreciative messages to the governors of vided an auspicious ending to an operation the various states to which the units were re­ that at times had been subjected to harsh turning. These messages, which were widely judgments by both the press and the public. reprinted in the various state newspapers, and Austin, Texas

Notes 1. White House News Conference 1108-A transcript, 1125 hours 8. SAFOI-P Answer to Query form dated 14 March 1968. EST 25 January 1968. p. 1. 9. Ibid. 2. The “cleared'' version of Defense Secretary McNamara's testi* 10. New York Times, 3 May 1968, p. 8. mony before a Senate subcommittee on 7 June 1968 was to become 11. Congressional Record, Extension of Remarks, 12 July 1968, a primary source of releasable data on the Pueblo incident. The pp. E6494-95. following excerpt is quoted to illustrate the degree to which 12. New York Times, 14 July 1968, p. 1. security censoring can limit information: “The force structure of the 13. New York Times, 15 July 1968, p. 2. 5th Air Force within South Korea at the time of the "Pueblo" 14. Memorandum from Alfred B. Fill to Assistant Secretaries of seizure consisted of [deleted] F-4C’s, of which [deleted] were the Military Departments, subject: “ Integrity of Mobilized Units," physically located at Kunsan [deleted] and [deleted] at Osan dated 13 May 1968. [deleted]. Therefore, with the exception of [deleted] the [deleted] 15. Memorandum from Paul H. Nitze. Deputy Secretory of Defense, available aircraft within South Korea were [deleted]." to the Secretary of the Air Force, subject: Utilization of Mobilized 3. Interview with Mr. James Newton, action officer. SAF01-P, ANC/Reserve Personnel, dated 2 August 1968. 26 March 1970. 16. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel James Elliot, Public Affairs 4. Associated Press wire story No. 83. 26 January 1968. Officer, National Cuard Bureau, 26 March 1970. 5. United Press wire story No. 203, 25 January 1968. 6. SAFOI-P Answer to Query form dated 29 January 1968. The United Press asked SAFOI what percentage of recalled personnel had Acknowledgment reported for duty. The National Cuard reported thot over 88 percent of their men had reported within three hours after the official announcement. The Air Force Reserves hadno “three-hour" figures This article was prepared with the assistance of but said that over 98 percent of assigned personnel had reported Dr. Robert S. Kahan of the journalism faculty of the by the Friday midnight deadline. Both figures reflected favorably on reserve force readiness and organization, and the United Press University of Texas. release on this matter was regarded by SAFOI as a “ plus." 7. Vail Street Journal, 15 March 1968, p. 1. # J.D.W. Books and Ideas DETENTE OR STATUS QUO IN EUROPE

Colonel John L. Sutton HE people of the Western world have determined to be the German question, with Tlong hoped for a detente, a relaxation of the Berlin problem a kind of core within it. tensions, between Communist and non-Com- The authors conclude rather rapidly that the munist Europe. Some thought it had arrived long-stated U.S. objective of German unifica­ in 1968; instead, Soviet forces arrived in tion is and has been an unrealistic one. No Prague. Some think the cold war is history; Western power could really have faced the others point to the twenty Soviet divisions that prospect of a united Germany allied with Rus­ remain in East Germany. And everyone asks: sia, with Communist power extending to the Will the seventies mean confrontation or ne­ Rhine. Could the Russians accept the con­ gotiation in Europe? trary prospect of a nato at the border of In a short and tightly written volume, two Communist-dominated Poland? Further, since highly qualified experts examine the problem Germany is too large for an “Austrian neu­ of European security for the seventies in terms trality” kind of solution, the authors say: “It of U.S. diplomatic options.f Authors Stanley is hard to reach any conclusion other than and Whitt not only have formidable academic that there are no available solutions in the backgrounds but have also had extensive poli­ short term for the problem of Germany, other cy-making experience in the Department of than minor variants on a status quo w'hich Defense. In addition, both have served with neither side is willing or able to change by the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty force.” (p. 45) Organization—Minister Stanley as second- With regard to the specific problem of Ber­ ranking man in the mission. Moreover, their lin, the authors find it even less susceptible to work was prepared in consultation with an an agreed change from the status quo. They advisory committee that included many for­ do, however, examine possible solutions to mer U.S. ambassadors and military com­ both problems, even including the radical idea manders in Europe. of a buffer state to be known as Middle Ger­ many. This state would be created with land from both East and West Germany and The German Question would lie between the two—a hapless echo of Detente Diplomacy takes the reader the division of Charlemagne’s empire in the through some preliminary history of European ninth century. (We are reminded, however, security before arriving at what are termed lest we think the plan fantastic, that unifica­ the main issues. The heart of the matter is tion by “triplication” was the method used in t Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt, Detente Diplomacy: United States and European Security in the 1970’s (New York: The Dunellen Company, for the Atlantic Council of the United States, 1970, $6.95), xiv and 170 pages. 69 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW 1947 to create the Department of Defense throws up a great many danger signs and and, incidentally, the United States Air warns that complacent projections of the fu­ Force.) ture of Eastern Europe as an area of waning On the German question, Detente Diplo­ Soviet influence should be carefully re-exam­ macy may not satisfy the more optimistic ob­ ined. They go even further and recommend servers. But the authors are not persuaded by that the Western nations “have an interest in the widely held notion that detente is an irre­ the stability and long term development of the versible process and cannot be successfully re­ ‘other political system’ and can pledge them­ sisted by the Soviet Union. And they are less selves not to change it by force or seek to willing to press for movement for its own sake undermine its internal security.” (p. 99) As than are statesmen like Willy Brandt or schol- our British friends might say, this seems a bit ars like Brzezinski. Stanley and Whitt believe much. By its example alone, West Germany that the risks of a true detente appear to be compromises the internal security of East Ger­ well above the post-Czechoslovakia tolerance many. Could we really ask the West Germans level of the Soviet system. A detente becomes, to guarantee Communism in East Germany then, almost by definition, a condition that is by such a pledge? intolerable, or at least a challenge, to the So­ viet system. The delicate question is, How much contact Mutual Force Reductions with the West can the peoples of Eastern Eu­ Unable to find room for substantial move­ rope absorb and still not endanger the Com­ ment in the German question, the authors munist governments of that area and their turn to mutual force reductions. No formula alliances with the Soviet Union? The cases of for agreement has been found to permit Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 phased reductions of U.S. and Soviet forces in are guideposts in determining the answer. Europe, but Congressional pressures are build­ Some observers suggest that the unsettling ef­ ing for some substantial withdrawal of the fect of a liberalization of the Communist more than a quarter million American troops world would concentrate Russia’s attention on in Western Europe. Would a unilateral troop its domestic affairs. Yet there are too many reduction by the U.S. bring about some corre­ historical precedents of governments trying to sponding move by the Soviets? The authors settle problems at home by finding trouble appear to doubt it. They believe the number elsewhere to make this a comfortable conclu­ of Soviet troops that would be removed from sion. Mr. Frederick Wyle, a former Deputy Eastern Europe is strictly limited. Not only do Assistant Secretary of Defense for European these forces represent the potential Soviet solu­ and nato Affairs, writing in The Round tion to another Hungarian or Czech crisis but Table for April 1970, is apprehensive. “Sub­ since the deployments are excessive for inter­ stantially free popular contact and relations nal security reasons alone Soviet planners evi­ between East and West Germany, for exam­ dently consider the possible hostility of satellite ple, is almost bound to endanger the survival forces. An observation worth pondering is that of the Communist government in East Ger­ Czechoslovakia was brought into the Soviet many, and the resultant turmoil in East Ger­ camp in 1948 with only covert Soviet help to many and Berlin may lead to just the sort of the Czech Communist Party, whereas twenty dangerous confrontation that the Soviets wish years later more than a hundred thousand sol­ to avoid.” 1 diers were needed to be sure of keeping it Stanley and Whitt share this apprehension. there. Despite the difficulties facing an agree­ Their examination of the German problem ment, the authors believe that the Soviets BOOKS AND IDEAS 71 might be able to cut back their forces by tween the U.S. and the Russians, leaving no about fifteen percent (five Soviet and five valid cause for anxiety, or that America had satellite divisions). This should be the extent devalued its interest in Europe, thus forcing to which we should set our sights, at least European nations toward accommodation initially. with the East. In either case there would be And what of a substantial cut in U.S. forces an incentive to relax West European defense brought about by Congressional pressures? efforts. In other words the authors argue in The authors show concern here. Starting with favor of the status quo by implying that a the premise that there is rough equality be­ withdrawal of U.S. troops might trigger, not a tween n’ ato and Warsaw Pact forces of about Soviet force reduction, but a reduction of a million men on each side,2 they move gin- friendly forces. Still, can this type of argument gerlv into the question of burden-sharing deflect Congressional pressures for a signifi­ among the nato nations. They seem to say cant reduction? that the European nations are doing more to support nato than many Americans believe. For example, they note that the United States An East-West Conference incurs from one-third to one-half of nato’ s Soviet motives for an East-West security annual defense costs whereas its gross national conference (proposed by the East European product is nearly two-thirds that of all nato states in October 1969) are treated with skep­ nations; that West Europeans have provided ticism. The two proposed agenda subjects, the lion's share of the $1 billion post-Czecho­ renunciation of force and expansion of trade, slovakia increase in nato defense budgets; and are not reassuring. As the authors point out, that the United States now uses more of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty nato’s commonly financed infrastructure than within the Socialist commonwealth (the ex it pays for. These are excellent arguments and post facto justification for the invasion of doubtless reflect the close experience which Czechoslovakia) would pose a prickly item for the authors have had in dealing with their the conference, and a security conference is opposite numbers in the nato headquarters in hardly necessary for improving trade relations. Paris and Brussels. One wonders, however, if It is thus more likely, suggest Stanley and they will be very effective against such less Whitt, that such a conference would become ‘ophNticated arguments as (a) Why does the a propaganda base for the Soviets and take on U.S. devote a higher percentage of its na­ a circus character. tional budget to defense than the European The authors have reason to be skeptical of nations do? and (b) To echo Senator Mans­ conferences sponsored by the Communists: field, why can't Europe, having been made They can achieve a peaceful solution quietly “safe and comfortable” for twenty vears, or­ when it represents no advantage for the Com­ ganize an effective defense against 200 million munist side; but a conference, even if it does Russians who have 700 million Chinese at not become a Communist diplomatic victory, their backs? can be a Communist propaganda triumph or Stanley and Whitt argue, moreover, that an at least a stalemate to be blamed on the other American reduction of forces in Europe might side. The past ten years of disarmament con­ very well lead to a corresponding reduction in ferences—with one (the Eighteen Nation Dis­ West European force levels. The European armament Conference) lasting since 1962 and nations, they suggest, would likely conclude apparently destined to go on forever—have from an American withdrawal either that an yielded very modest results. But the Commu­ arrangement had been made privately be­ nists have obviously relished these low-key 72 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW propaganda forums, using them to extract within its borders. On the other hand, this concessions from the Western powers simply same Soviet government is undertaking ag­ by wearing down their patience over the gressive strategic measures worldwide and en­ years. Stanley and Whitt are undoubtedly cor­ joying a new confidence in its powers, possiblv rect when they say p. 88 that Communist in about the same proportion that uncertainty propaganda machines had a field day with has increased internally. With client states in “general and complete disarmament" for Egypt and Cuba, with 1400 icbm’s, with a nearly a decade, although they imply that by naval presence in the Mediterranean, the In­ finally adopting the phrase ourselves we effcc- dian Ocean, and the Caribbean, the Soviet tivcly nullified it for further use by the Soviets. Union is an expanding world military power. While this last conclusion ma\ be true, to We may be overly optimistic to speak of adopt a propaganda slogan as U.S. policy is a maintaining the status quo in Europe without trickv affair, and sooner or later one must taking into consideration the leverage that can answer the question of who is to be deceived, be exerted from this new Soviet posture. The the Soviets, the U.S. public, or just who? Soviets have or soon will have bargaining weights which have not been included in the set of European balances described by the au­ How Safe Is the thors but which undoubtedly can exert a pro­ Status Quo? found effect upon the European stalemate. The basic message of Detente Diplomacy is What, for example, might be the asking price a sober caution to those who press impatiently for removal of a Soviet submarine base in for detente and who may recommend or pur­ Cuba? Berlin, perhaps? sue policies that outrun the realities of the The authors' response to this criticism moment. A final settlement in Europe, the would probably be that they have isolated and authors emphasize, is an evolutionary process. examined the basic European problem and It would be difficult to fault the Stanley- have not sought to clarify the U.S./Soviet bal­ Whitt analysis on the basis of the European ance worldwide. Yet the Stanley-Whitt analy­ scene alone. Yet. to what extent is it viable sis would be more persuasive if we were deal­ when abstracted from the larger world diplo­ ing with the Soviet Union in its traditional matic and military playing field where the So­ viets are increasingly active? There are indica­ role as a continental Eurasian power. Alas, in tions that the Soviet government at home is the coining decade we must deal with the politically and economically on the defensive, Soviet Union in the full realization of its new­ fearful of events in the East Fairopean states found strength as a world military power. and unable or unwilling to quell dissent Lexington, Kentucky

Notes 1. Fredcrirk S. Wyle, “ Is European Security Negotiable?*' re­ rough balance of ;i million men on each side exists. For example, mi- the article by Frederick Wyle previously cited or a letter by tin- printed in Survival, Jutu* 1070. then Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain Enthoven in Survival, 2. Highly placed L.>. civilian planners have stated that this September l%8. THE USES OF HISTORY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

Herman S. W olk

ISTORY is not obsolete. Not yet, any­ affairs; consequently, radical solutions are re­ Hway. Despite the fact that “relevance” quired. A number of years ago Walter Lipp- and all manner of theoretical nonsense are mann described these self-styled scientific pooh- currently the fashion, there are still, fortu­ bahs as “frightened, irritated, impatient, frus­ nately, a few hardy souls around who continue trated and in search of quick and easy solu­ to apply their intelligence to illuminating the tions.'’ " past and making it comprehensible, thereby They are still with us, and the English mili­ helping us to understand our own age. This tary historian Michael Howard demonstrates has always seemed to me an exhilarating ex­ anew, with his essays in Studies in War and perience, not only because of the excitement Peace,f that the study of history is still a re­ of discovery but because we thereby come to markable cure for the compulsion to look for realize (as we should have all along) that our panaceas. In an essay on Jomini, Howard ob­ own difficulties are not unique after all; they serves that although abstract strategical think­ are not, thank heaven, so overpowering. ing has its place, “it is also dangerous, for a Michael Howard is a refreshing antidote to theorist to think of a theatre of war in terms the Herman Kahns of our time—historical of a ‘chessboard.’ ” analogy instead of theory, insight instead of Howard fuses the traditional discipline of numbers, understanding in place of guess­ the military historian with the largely contem­ work, and a facility with language. One has porary approach of looking at military history little difficulty seeing Kahn, with his imagina­ as only a part of a political-military-econom- tion, as the Norman Mailer of the defense ic-social canvas. From Waterloo and Welling­ intellectuals. Despite the estimable contribu­ ton to William I and the two World Wars tions of social science over the last twenty and their aftermath, he takes a societal ap­ years, the obsession of many social scientists proach. Thus, the First World War still “lies with methodology, model building, and like a dark scar across the history of Europe, inexplicable games has produced an astonish­ an interruption in the development of western ing amount of drivel. Part of this massive over­ society rather than a part of it.” (p. 99) But dose of gamesmanship proceeded from the the First World War should not have been a kind of macabre incantation leveled by Max surprise. It was what Europe had been pre­ Singer of Kahn's Hudson Institute: “Experi­ paring itself for: armies were not really con­ ence," he said, “won't serve as a guide any ceived of as deterrents; they were built to more to practical affairs. The world has be­ fight wars. And the size of these armies was come too complicated.'’1 When up the creek, matched only by their grinding inflexibility. throw away the oar. Primarily it was a matter of mobilization. Apparently without realizing it, the Kahns Now, a little over half a century since the and Singers greased the way for a movement end of World War I, there is a predictable to do away with history. Experience can no tendency for historians to forget the character longer be used as a useful guide to human of that conflict when they write of the great t Michael Howard, Studies in War and Peace (New York: The Viking Press, 1971, $8.95), 262 pages. 73 Air Power Crusaders Brigadier General William ("Billy") Mitchell (1879-1936) commanded air forces of AEF in World War 1, afterward crusaded for recognition of air as fulcrum of military decision. . . . Italy’s General Giulio Douhet (1869-1930) expounded theory of strategic air offensive, influenced thinking of U.S. airmen between World War: I and II—and again in the nuclear age. . . . Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Trenchard, (1873-1956), was Britain’s first Chief of the Air Staff, 1918-29, and was again active in World War II.

campaigns of the Second World War and of was won, as has every other war in history, high strategy in the nuclear age. But World by men, munitions, and morale.3 War I left a powerful legacy. The American Nevertheless, there were those who were air leaders between the wars, in World War appalled. Thoughtful airmen pondered what II. and in the post-1945 period were aware of longer-range bombing planes might accom­ it. The character of the First War had not plish if given the chance. Statesmen, stunned been shaped primarily by air bombardment, by the slaughter in the trenches, began the although this very point could be used by the search for alternatives. The airplane provided air advocates to show that trench warfare was the means to circumvent the carnage of the too overwhelmingly costly and even self-de­ front lines, to attack the enemy deep in his feating to be considered seriously again. The homeland, at the source of his power. The consensus as to the war’s lessons could not population, Howard writes, have been appreciated by far-seeing airmen. . . . must be attacked directly. It must be The wartime Chief of Staff, General Peyton softened and subverted by propaganda. It C. March, pointedly concluded: must be starved and enfeebled by blockade. The war had taught many lessons; the prin­ It must be remorselessly bombed from the ciples of warfare, however, remained un­ air. Its morale must be undermined to a changed. It was not won, as some had point where its capacity for armed resistance predicted it would be, by some new and is fatally weakened, (pp. 108-9) terrible development of modern science; it Consequently, despite the late and limited

74 application of the air weapon, thoughtful ob­ bat, and, besides, it couldn’t span the oceans servers of the Great War had seen enough to that had long protected the United States. become convinced of the potential of the inde­ The task, therefore, would not be an easy one, pendent air offensive. American airmen— nor would success come rapidly. It would take pre-eminently Brigadier General Billy Mitch­ almost thirty years and another world war be­ ell—with the British Independent Air Force fore the air arm would be made an indepen­ as an example and fortified by their own ideas dent service on equal footing with the Army (though little experience), came out of the war and Navy. persuaded that some day their vision of the air The struggle for autonomy in the 1920s offensive as the fulcrum of military decision and 1930s is a fascinating story in itself, would be borne out. Unfortunately, however, marked by paradoxes and nuances in their their powers of persuasion failed to match own way just as interesting as the great their enthusiasm and determination. Mitchell, bomber offensive of the Second World War. a prophetic and dynamic airman, led the cru­ Nevertheless, the bomber campaign under­ sade. But, as with most prophets, he couldn't standably captured the attention of historians convince his contemporaries. The years be­ and the public. Controversy about it still tween the World Wars were marked by the rages. Even with the benefit of hindsight (the airmen's battle to secure a separate air mission realm in which the historian must work), at­ and an independent air force. The airplane tempts at objectivity have often been shoved had not demonstrated its effectiveness in com­ aside by the persistence of dogma and the

Continued on page 78 Bomber Offensives In one daylight attack on the German industrial and transportation hub at Frankfurt am Main, 800 heavy bombers of the Army Air Forces, accompanied by hundreds of fighters, dumped 1800 tons of bombs on the target. . . . India-based Superfortresses of Twentieth Bomber Command flew a ‘‘perfect mission” from the standpoints of weather and observed results of their tons of bombs delivered on a large Japanese supply depot near Mmgaladon airfield in the vicinity of Rangoon, Burma. A 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW frequency with which purportedly critical viewed the air offensive as complementary to analyses have turned out to be obviously self- the invasion of the Continent, the air leaders serving. The fact that these controversies still had other ideas: a belief that the bombing go on stands as a tribute to their continued could bring Germany to her knees. Yet in relevance and to the energy of air bombard­ Europe it took several years, the introduction ment advocates and critics. of new tactics and equipment, and a rebound Howard points out that the doctrine of the from near failure until the bomber offensive Italian theoretician Giulio Douhet —together with other crucial factors— over-estimated both the destructiveness of brought Germany to a collapse. The “thun­ high-explosive bombs and the capacity of derclap” idea, which held that the war could aircraft to deliver them accurately and in be won with a single all-out blow, proved to adequate numbers to their targets in the be a false theory. Long-held assumptions technological conditions then obtaining; while about strategic bombing tactics proved un­ it equally underestimated the capacity of workable in combat—indeed, almost disas­ civilian populations to survive prolonged trous—and until the bombers were accompa­ ordeals which previously might have been nied to the target by long-range escort fight­ considered unendurable, (pp. 191-92) ers, the issue was very much in doubt. Yet, despite Douhet’s shortcomings (under­ In the Pacific a different situation obtained. standable in the circumstances of that period), By early 1945 the Japanese position was in an his reputation as the foremost theoretical ex­ advanced state of deterioration. With B-29s ponent of the strategic air offensive remains the U.S. overcame Japan's will to continue in intact. The great paradox is that technology less time and with fewer bombs than was the after World War II resurrected Douhet; his case with Germany. Japan was vulnerable to doctrine fit the nuclear age peculiarly well. An fire-bombing, and its defenses were inade­ interesting footnote, not pointed out by How­ quate to blunt the onslaught. Invasion proved ard, is that recent scholarship posits that Dou- to be unnecessary; the war ended, and lives het's influence on the Air Corps Tactical were saved. And so, ironically, what the air­ School %vas even greater than that of Billy men hoped for in Europe came true in the Mitchell.1 But that is another story and, like Pacific: the B-29 fire-bomb offensive crum­ most Air Force history, one that has yet to be bled Japan.5 Even to General H. H. Arnold, written fully and with critical perspective. the end came unexpectedly soon. As far as the Second World War is con­ In all of this, one must keep in mind the cerned, it was, says Howard, “like the First— wartime circumstances attending decisions. It a conflict of attrition between highly organ­ is, of coitr.-e, easier to judge the situation now, ised and politically sophisticated societies, in with the knowledge accumulated during a which economic capacity, scientific and tech­ quarter century. Wars are almost never fought nological expertise, social cohesion and civil­ according to plan, and the air offensive not ian morale proved to be factors of no less only over Europe but also over Japan was significance than the operations of armed conducted under serious operational limita­ forces in the field.” (p. 192) tions. Air strategy was governed by feasibility, Strategic air power did not win World War by the existing conditions and forces available, II. It did not by itself win either the battle for not by a theoretical litany expounded in some Europe or the war in the Pacific. It was not obscure classroom. It could not have been oth­ an unqualified success. To argue that it was erwise. It was a dynamic situation fought on a destroys any serious attempt to find the truth. day-by-day, hour-by-hour basis. Decisions, as Although the Allied high command may have Michael Howard observes, “had to be made BOOKS AND IDEAS 79 rapidly, if not hastily, on the basis of evidence Liddell Hart. Both proved to be remarkably known to be inadequate and historians will accurate in their assessments of the strategical debate endlessly whether or not they were shape of the next two decades. right.” (p. 142) Noble Frankland’s observa­ In The Absolute Weapon (1946), Brodie tion is apropos and contains more truth than wrote that no longer would the United States many would care to admit: have the time to mobilize military power as Nor in war, which is not a game of chess, we had done in the Second World War. In should intellectual reasoning be put at a the event of war, we would have to fight with premium even in the highest operational forces in-being. The atomic weapon had revo­ commanders; intuitive judgment, or, as lutionized the concept of warfare. Its tremen­ Napoleon might have put it, luck, is a much dous destructive potential meant that we now more important quality.6 had to deter war. “Thus far the chief purpose The bombing offensive and the results it of our military establishment has been to win achieved need not be exaggerated nor tire- wars,” he observed. “From now on its chief somely defended. Did the bombing win the purpose must be to avert them. It can have war? Could it have won bv itself if even almost no other useful purpose.” 7 Brodie was greater resources had been given over to it? one of the first publicly to outline the doctrine To attempt seriously to grapple with these of deterrence. Others were thinking along the questions is a futile and self-defeating exercise. same lines—some even before the close of the Better to honor the brave participants with an war—including Generals H. H. Arnold and uncompromising search for the truth. Their Carl Spaatz and the Assistant Secretary of uncommon courage and perseverance in the War for Air, W. Stuart Symington. face of uncertainty and great odds deserve no Howard writes of the evolution of the doc­ less from us. Perfection in the conduct of war trine of deterrence and then goes far beyond (and in historiography, it might be added), that concept with an insightful essay entitled especially in a form of warfare never before “Strategy and Policy in Twentieth-Century tried, is almost always impossible. To say that Warfare.” In the nuclear age, the utility of better planning and a more flexible doctrine military power has declined because of the might have achieved results earlier should not tremendous cost—human and material—asso­ be interpreted as an indictment or even criti­ ciated with its use. But it still plays an impor­ cism. It is offered as an explanation. One tant part in world power relationships. Wars, doesn't look for certainty in an appraisal of Howard notes, are not simply acts of violence: the conduct of human affairs. Understanding “They are acts of persuasion or of dissuasion; would seem to be a more modest and attaina­ and although the threat of destruction is nor­ ble goal. mally a necessary part of the persuading proc­ The immediate post-World War II period ess, such destruction is only exceptionally re­ was marked by demobilization, confusion in garded as an end in itself.” (p. 193) the wake of the demonstrated power of the The point is that strategy and policy must atomic bomb, and the enunciation of great— be orchestrated. “In making war,” says How­ but alas, illusory—hopes for peace, already ard, “it is necessary constantly to be thinking being dashed by the budding cold war. Few how to make peace.” (p. 193) For example, governmental and military leaders immedi­ with reference to Vietnam, ately recognized the overarching impact of the . . . a foreign power fights indigenous guer­ atomic weapon. Howard expresses his admira­ rillas under disadvantages so great that even tion, however, for two particularly prescient the most overwhelming preponderance in writers, Bernard Brodie and the late Sir Basil military force and weapons may be insuffi­ 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW cient to make up for them. In such wars . . . in War and Peace? Perhaps foremost, that m ilitary operations are therefore only u.ie however hard we try to chart our way tool of national policy, and not necessarily through the puzzle of human affairs, we the most im portant. They have to be co­ somehow always fail to calculate the whole ordinated with others by a master hand. equation. Events remain unpredictable. The (p. 196, italics added) very best we can do will remain imperfect, Force must be used with precision and re­ imprecise. straint. It must be based on carefully consid­ History will never be an unbroken string of ered policy; if not, it will turn out to be coun­ successes. History is not statistics nor an exer­ terproductive. In the nuclear age, the more cise in piling up facts. Neither is it certitude. powerful the force a nation commands, the History is understanding. It is irony. History is more stringent are the restraints on its use. mistakes. It holds no simple lessons. W hat wisdom can be derived from Studies Silver Spring, Maryland

Notes 1 Quoted in Arthur Her/ng. “ Report on a ‘Think Factory,’ ’’ the Air Corps Tactical School, 1921—1935, Ph.D. dissertation. Uni­ Veto York rimes Magazine, November 10, 1963. versity of Oklahoma, 1965. (Ann Arbor. Michigan: University Micro­ 2. Address to the Women’s National Press Club. January 10, 1962. films. Inc.) 3. General Peyton C. March, “Lessons of World War I." from 5. See Carl Berger. 11-29: The Superfortress, Illustrated History of W orld War II. Weapons Book 17 I New York : Ballantine Books, War Department Annual Reports, 1919 (Washington: Government 1970. paper). Printing Office. 1920), p'p. IT 1 —73. cited in American Military 6. Noble Franklund, Romber Offensive: The Devastation of Europe. Thought, ed. Walter Millis (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1966), Illustrated History of World W ar II. Campaign Book 7 (New York: pp. 353—54. Ballantine Books, 1970. paper), p. 159. •L -See Raymond R. FIuscl, United States Air Power Doctrine: 7. Bernard Brodic. ed.. The Absolute Weapon t New York: Har- A Studv of the Influence of William Mitchell and Giulio Douhct at court. Brace, 1916, p. 76), quoted in Howard, p. 160.

DIPLOMACY AND THE POSSIBLE

Dr . J oseph Churba

OR the old and wise, history is analogous “package deals” reflecting more maneuver Fto the chastening experience of life, induc­ than substance, though portrayed as enhanc­ ing a measure of humility conspicuously ab­ ing the prospects for peaceful change. T he sent among the less scarred and those who historian's unfortunate lot is to view the con­ would ignore its recordings. Unlike the so- temporary scene in the wider perspective of called pragmatic politician of the day, the his­ age-old divisions and enmities that crisscross torian of the Middle East finds little solace in the region and, with a kind of resilience, give the mumbo-jumbo of “peace proposals’’ and conflict and tension an enduring reality from BOOKS A.XD IDEAS 81 which there appears to be no escape. Never­ ment Trust; for the West Bank of the Jordan theless, despite the intense, and as yet fruitless, River, the creation of a Palestinian state; for search for alternatives to violence and diplo­ the Golan Heights, the foundation of a Druze matic paralysis in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Trust territory; and for the City of Jerusalem, there remains hope of defusing what is cer- the drafting and adoption of an international tainly the most intractable political problem statute. of the day. Inasmuch as Professor Reisman’s “creative The Art of the Possible purports to offer diplomacy" represents another concoction for nothing less.f Accordingly, the book offers it­ Israeli withdrawal that clearly does not re­ self to frustrated diplomats and nervous poli- quire Arab governments to sign a peace treaty cv-makers who will read it if onlv out of sheer or to establish diplomatic and commercial re­ desperation. I commend Professor Reisman lations or even to act in a peaceful way with a for his perceptive analysis of the present play neighboring people, his proposals have value of forces in the Middle East. His rejection of only for exploratory purposes. As propositions the commonh held reductive fallacy implying for action, they ignore the religious, political, that the Arab-Israeli problem is the exclusive and emotional heritage of the area. The pro­ and central issue in Middle Eastern politics posed diplomatic stratagem is, indeed, typical places him at least one cut above others who of the mounting cynicism that marks some of will not allow the facts to confuse their preju­ the solutions offered for Middle Eastern af­ dice. Vet, as is so often the case where the fairs. diagnosis of an irrational problem is reason- For example, since Egypt finds no incen­ ablv accurate, the prescribed medicine seems tives for a negotiated peace in her present to have no curative ingredients for the ailment burden of huge defense expenditures, aggra­ itself; instead the prescription would probably vated by a sluggish economic growth rate, by make the patient worse, with new complica­ losses of revenues from the Suez Canal and tions. the Sinai oil fields, and by the fall in tourism, A diplomatic settlement between the parties how likelv is it that Reisman’s suggestion that is somewhat perfunctorily ruled out by Reis­ the Sinai be neutralized will induce her to man. He proposes an alternative that would agree to any formal diminution of her sover­ not be a “quixotic quest for peace" but a eignty in the Sinai Peninsula? An externally search within the realm of the possible, for a supervised Sinai Development Trust would “system of minimum order" that would serve hardly be perceived as an exercise of Egyptian as the groundwork for a future peace. Em­ autonomy. The sdt would have to be a global phasizing the need for “unfettered investiga­ corporation that would float bond issues in tion of new political techniques and legal in- commercial markets and operate indepen- stitutions. he writes of the necessitv for inno­ dentlv of any state. While there would be no vative thinking and “creative diplomacy" that question of Egypt's residual sovereignty over alone can establish the conditions for eventual the peninsula, routine police functions and and lasting peace in the region. Thus, for border supervision would have, to be carried each of the immediate focuses of conflict, the out by the sdt police force of a multinational author proposes a plan: for the Sinai Penin­ character. Perception of these facts by the sula, the establishment of a Sinai Develop­ Egyptians would, it is argued, be offset by “an

t Michael Reisman, The Art of the Possible: Diplomatic Alternatives in the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, $6.00), 158 pages. 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW abundant source of gainful employment" for tion, like his American counterpart, the pro­ the 300,000 Palestinian Arab refugees in ponent ot abm, is motivated by an imperative Gaza and by the prospect of reducing Egypt’s of territorial defense that contemporary chronic unemployment. All of this is predi­ weapons have long since obsolesced. Flying and missile time between Tel Aviv and cated upon converting a wilderness into an Amman is the same no matter who controls economic paradise by finding treasures hidden the West Bank of the Jordan. Israeli control beneath the sand and rocks of the region. of Sinai does not change the missile distance No less difficult is the author’s assumption between Cairo and Tel Aviv. No matter how that third-party palliative economic arrange­ much territory it controls, any state in the ments necessarily diminish the politico-stra­ Mediterranean is open from the sea to quick tegic and emotional significance attached to attack by aircraft flying below the radar the conquered territories. The less optimistic threshold. This is not to suggest that territory easily recall the overwhelming evidence to the has no strategic importance. The strategic contrary, and considerable restraint is neces­ value of territory is a function of a broad, sary not to recite the psychological, political, multifaceted context; in many circumstances, and security liabilities of the “peace" that his­ territory is not of major importance, (p. 57) tory has already recorded. The author seems Presumably, the nightmares are not over to demolish his own case by failing to cite a for Israeli generals. The reversal of the prewar single historical precedent. strategic relationship between Israel and More difficult yet is Reisman's belief in be­ Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and the acquisition nevolent participation by the U.S.S.R. in the by Israel of security in depth are irrelevant. proposed scheme, even to the extent of coerc­ Reisman implies that occupation of Sinai has ing its reluctant protege to cooperate. Now- not really removed the threat of rapid junc­ Middle Eastern specialists may debate the na­ ture between Egyptian and Jordanian forces ture of Soviet intentions in the region, but if across the Negev triangle. Tel Aviv, 300 miles they agree on anything at all it is manifestly from Egyptian forces, is as secure as Cairo— not the suppressed Russian urge to make the now only 80 miles from Israeli forces. That Sinai desert bloom. Surely a region spared air bases in the north of Israel have fallen out from Soviet “benevolence" is a region saved. of Egyptian aircraft range counts for as much Curiouslv, the author does not call for the as the 15-minute loitering time the Israeli Air withdrawal of Soviet missiles and military Force has gained with its new bases in Sinai. forces—clearly the first step toward restoring And if the new bases imply an easier striking Egyptian sovereignty and the creation of a range and a faster turnaround for attacking “system of minimum order." He never really aircraft and larger payloads, “the imperative escapes from the first question: If the Soviets of territorial defense" does not really mean are sufficiently influential to foist a complex much. Indeed, one suspects that Reisman sdt upon the Egyptians, why can’t they sim­ might have a hard time persuading Israelis in ply encourage a genuine dialogue with the at least a score of villages that control of the Israelis, leading to a peace agreement? Golan Heights has eliminated the threat of Syrian artillery. He would certainly rue the The proposals for disposition of the West day he tried to convince Arabs that Israeli Bank and the Golan Heights conform to an troops 40 miles from Damascus and 25 miles avant garde definition of security. Accord­ from Amman constitute no threat to their se­ ingly, we are told that despite Israel’s new curity. borders her defensive posture has not improved. As though the popular mood in Israel were The Israeli proponent of territorial reten­ “expand or perish,” it is a matter of consider­ BOOKS AND IDEAS 83 able ease for Reisman to lecture Israelis on the Arab governments and Palestinian Arabs need sins of “micro-colonialism." Good Christians not recognize the existence of a Hebrew or will take issue with the dubious assertion that Jewish national entity. Thus, with no more Jeremy Bentham’s unheeded call in 1 793 for than a painless stroke of the pen, conflict and emancipation of the colonies was the original tension related to the balance of power in the sin leading to the world’s current crises. Arab East would dissipate in the train of Is­ Israelis are therefore chided not to repeat the raeli largesse inspired from renewed love and error. trust in the United Nations. “Unless Israel has the courage to recognize With attention more upon possible Israeli the demands of the Palestinians and show military expansion than upon the necessity to enough political maturity to deal with men persuade the Syrian government to the wis­ who have terrorized them, a surging source of dom of a political solution, Reisman’s pro­ instability will continue.” (pp. 55-56) Indeed, posal for converting the Golan Heights into a courage would have to be summoned in order Druze Trust Territory, if considered seriously, to submit to the genocidal demands of Yasir is sure to confront the policy-makers with an Arafat’s Fatah, George Habash’s Popular example of how to neglect history and lose Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and that which history has already effectively re­ Naif Hawatmeh’s Popular Democratic Front. solved. One of the more healthy signs in the To be sure, such maturity is at a premium situation is that the warrior-like Druze have among nations which actually face the threat not succumbed to the nationalist bug which of political and physical extinction. The crisp the author roundly denounces as the scourge legal language of the author assuages fear and of Middle Eastern politics. Yet he anticipates reduces the problem to the barest simplicity: an evil day and offers to cede Syrian land to . . . Israel need only announce that it will the Druze so as to “minimize the national and withdraw from the West Bank regions occu­ trans-national tensions involved in eventual pied in 1967 upon formation of a representa­ Druze claims for self-determination.” The tive Palestinian government recognized as generosity is misplaced. A heretical offshoot of independent and sovereign by the United Na­ the Shi'ite Ismailis whose foremost aim is to tions and committed to active compliance preserve their traditional customs and prac­ with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter. Israel would then tices, the Druze of Syria, Lebanon, and Israel permit the United Nations Committee on have managed quite well without the dubious Self-Governing territories to dispatch an ob­ benefits of Chapters XI and XII of the server team to the West Bank, which would United Nations Charter. administer a series of referenda: The inhabi­ Indeed, while the Druze in Israel enjoy reli­ tants would determine the form of govern­ gious autonomy and full citizenship—even ment they wished and would choose their serving in the army—their coreligionists in the political leaders. Israel would thereafter with­ Levant are active in the Arab nationalist draw under a United Nations timetable. The movement and in Syrian and Lebanese politi­ United Nations might station a peace-keeping cal leadership. Why the author seeks to undo force on the eastern or western boundaries of this relatively happy arrangement, as well as the new Palestinian state, but this would be a risk the delicate Christian-Muslim balance in largely symbolic gesture, (p. 52) Lebanon, is as mystifying as the presumed The element of reciprocity is not crucial in greater readiness of Syria to cede the Golan to ReLsman’s concept of international relations. the Druze in preference to the only slightly The burden is upon Israel to act as midwife less despised Israelis. to the projected Palestinian Arab state, but The author, with his talent for “creative 84 AIR L DIVERSITY REVIEW diplomacy,” has yet another proposal. It is for the jurisdiction of the respective religious au­ an international statute for Jerusalem that thorities. Instead, his proposal would incorpo­ would accord Israel only nominal sovereignty rate the International Court of Justice into and would “incorporate effective and enforce­ the decision structure of Jerusalem, thus plac­ able guarantees of autonomy and unimpeded ing the capital city somewhere between nomi­ access by adherents of other faiths to their nal Israeli sovereignty and a corpus separatum respective holy places.” Despite Israel's zeal­ whose mandate would be determined by the ous protection of churches, mosques, and vagaries of international law. To be sure, the proposal is at once symbolic other holy places in Israel (e.g., Capernaum, of and consistent with the overall plan to en­ Tabha, the shrines in Nazareth, the Mount of circle Israel with a number of varying quasi­ Beatitudes, the al Jazar mosque in Acre), the sovereign entities or buffer zones, whose exis­ author does not find it difficult to imagine tence might ostensibly resolve the security di­ Israel's barring certain Christians and Mus­ lemma. The inherent ambiguities of such ar­ lims from the City of David for political rea­ rangements, however, will not be lost upon sons or even reconstructing the ancient temple the security-obsessed Israelis, who in the final where the Dome of the Rock presently stands. analysis would sooner forget Reisman than ei­ In fact, the author does not credit Israel's ther their right hand or Jerusalem. declared readiness to work out an arrange­ Air University Institute for ment for safeguarding the holy places under Professional Development

REFLECTIONS FROM HARRIMAN

Dr . J oseph YV. A nnunziata MBASSADOR W. Averell Harriman has he has produced a fairly complete personal published a compilation of his observa­ memoir of his long experience with Russian- tions concerning fifty vears of U.S. relations American affairs and related activities. It is a with Russia and other countries.f Using as a valuable record which otherwise might not basis a series of lectures he gave at Lehigh have been preserved, because of the active life University, and adding explanations, amplifi­ Harriman continues to lead at age eighty. cations, additional thoughts, and anecdotes, For mam people who identify Harriman f W. Averell Harrim an, America ami Russia in a Changing World (Garden City: Doubleday, 1971, $5.95), 218 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 85 with his anti-Vietnam war views, it will be a with the Russians, has seen them our allies at revelation that he has consistently advocated a one time and our enemies at another and that firm stance against Communists on issues of their temperament and experiences make vital interest to the United States. He first them volatile and easily suspicious. Therefore, became involved with Russia after the 1917 the U.S. must be patient, flexible, persistent Bolshevik Revolution, as a 26-vear-old Repub­ on matters of principle, and constantly on the lican international banker with a manganese lookout for the smallest steps whereby the two concession in the Soviet Caucasus. He soon nuclear superpowers can cooperate rather realized that the revolution was not a passing than have tense relations. On the one hand he thing but would have a long-lasting influence decries the old cold war warrior who sees no on world affairs. change, who still thinks in terms of the Stalin After his first visit to Russia in 1926, he era, with the monolithic structure of interna­ became convinced that the Bolshevik Revolu­ tional Communism looming as the immediate tion was in fact a reactionary one and not threat it used to be. On the other hand he “the wave of the future”; that it denied the decries those who believe that now' the only basic tenets of America—the rights and dig­ difference between us and the Soviets is a nity of the individual and the belief that gov­ matter of economic theory and that all we ernment should express the will of the people. have to do is show love and affection for them Although Harriman switched political parties and everything will be all right. in 1928 to support A1 Smith for President and His driving realization seems to be that, subsequently became a devoted advocate of since the Soviet Union and the U.S. have the Democratic Rooseveltian policies, he has capacity to destroy each other and the better never altered his basic conviction that the Bol­ part of the world, they have a serious respon­ shevik Revolution, for all its manifest achieve­ sibility to find a way to get along on this small ments, has been on balance a tragic step back­ planet in spite of their differences. He pictures ward in human development. In 1945 he was the problem as confused by misunderstand­ actually criticized for saying that Stalin's ings, rigid prejudices, and unrealistic hopes objectives and ours were irreconcilable. that exist in this country and by blind suspi­ Harriman gives many previously unpub­ cions, misinformation, and inhuman ideology lished details of his negotiations with the Sovi­ within the Soviet Union. ets and his positions during the Roosevelt, The Vietnam problem, Harriman believes, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson must therefore be put in a proper perspective, administrations. Presently, he is particularly since it is but one of the significant interna­ concerned about the dangerous effects which tional issues we face today. The only satisfac­ the strategic arms race and the U.S. fighting tory solution he can envision is for South Viet­ in Vietnam are having on U.S.-Soviet rela­ nam's President Thieu to broaden his govern­ tions. As to the future, he foresees continuing ment. He should rally the non-Communist changes in U.S.-Soviet relations and hopes for forces of South Vietnam and form an alliance a steady mutual understanding of the eco­ representative of the majority of the people. nomic, social, political, and military areas “Big” Minh, who was once the most popular where the two countries can coexist; but he of South Vietnamese generals, is willing to do certainly sees no convergence between the two this; the Buddhists, the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, countries as long as the Communist attitude the labor unions, and other non-Communist remains basically antipathetic to American groups could be brought in, with Thieu him­ ideals. self representing the Catholic faction. All \ et Harriman, during his long experience these non-Communist groups are anxious to 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW end the war and remain in their country. believes that, in the past, good as well as bad They know that a military victory cannot be decisions were made; but in any case specula­ won, and they are ready to make a political tion about them will not change them, and we settlement. But they need to organize them­ must go forward from here, doing our best to selves so as to be able to win the political improve the economic and social status not contest that will come after the end of hostili­ only of the U.S. but of other nations of the ties. world whose condition inevitably has an effect Thieu must bring these people in and field on ours. a team in Paris that wants to negotiate. The Finally, one is impressed by Harriman’s result may be a nonaligned, neutral govern­ genuine patriotism and optimism for the fu­ ment in South Vietnam; but that is the best ture of his country. He rejects the rock-throw­ we can expect and is in the long run compati­ ers and the burners because they destroy and ble with our interests. Furthermore, Harriman play into the hands of the most reactionary. believes this solution will entail a separate On the other hand, he praises students and U.S. agreement with Hanoi. The North Viet­ other antiwar dissenters who are taking con- namese are nationalists and want to be inde­ structive action against the tragedy of lost pendent of Peking, from whom they must American lives, the division of the country, now import three hundred thousand tons of and the wartime diversion of resources that rice a year. They are satisfied with the rela­ are urgently needed elsewhere. He concluded tions they have established with France and his Lehigh lectures with this eloquent advice also want to have normal relations with us, so to his student audience: they can have access to our technology and This country has symbolized man’s highest miracle rice. hopes and principles. It has achieved the Throughout this book, one discerns that greatest production the world has ever seen. Harriman’s chief concern, from the very be­ Use all this well. Learn from past mistakes ginning of his diplomatic career, has been eco­ and try to improve on the past. I am utterly nomic and social progress and that he believes impatient with some who talk about over­ political and military means are to be used throwing this whole nation. Put it in the right discretely, with human progress constantly in path, make America live up to her highest mind. Harriman could be labeled a pragmatic principles, even improve the traditions if you humanitarian. His decisions to be conciliatory will. But don't decry the past. Understand or intransigent have usually been dictated by the past. Build on it for a better America. My whether he believed one attitude or the other guess is you will. would best further these overriding goals. He Fairfax, Virginia The Contributors

Opportunity Officer, Pacific. Air Forces, Hn Lam A18, Hawaii. H«: previously filled the same position at Hq Thirteen til Air Force, Clark AH, Philippine*, and at Tftkhll RTAFB, Thailand. Colonel Kcnfroe has flown combat missions in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. He is a graduate of Air Command and Stuff College.

Colonel Francis H. weiland (B.S., University of Marylund) is Executive Officer, International Staff, Inter-Ameri­ can Defense Hoard. He has had assign­ ments in Hq USEUCOM and Hq USAF; as a member of the first Military Assistance Advisory Croup (MAAC), Germany; and as Chief of Logistics, Hq USSOUTHCOM. Colonel Weiland ib a graduate of Air Command and Stall Colonel Kenneth L. Moll (USMA; College and the Inter-American Defense M.A., University of Omaha) is Chief, College and has traveled widely in Latin Coordinated Action Plans Division, America. Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives, Hq USAF. He flew F-80s in Korea and T-39s in Vietnam and has served with ADC, SAC, and the JCS. Lieut en a n t Colonel Herman L. He has written numerous articles on ClLSTER (USMA; Ph.D., Harvard Uni­ military history and strategy, the present versity) is Tenure Associate Professor one while he was USAF Research Asso- of Economics and Management, USAFA. ciate at the Johns Hopkins University He was Air Training Officer, USAfA, Washington Center of Foreign Policy 1955-57, and has been at the Academy Research. since 1963 except for a year as Chief, Tactical Analysis Division. Hq Seventh Air Force, PACAF. His articles have been published in Papers in Quantity tive Economics (University of Kansas Press), in Air University Review, and as USAFA Technical Reports.

Major Joseph W. Kastl (M.S., Troy State University; J.D., Northwestern University) is Staff Judge Advocate, Cannon AFB, N.M. He is a former instructor. Judge Advocate Staff Officer Course, Air University, where he wrote a text on dissent, protest, and civil law. He was one of five students com­ pleting the pilot course. Air Command and Staff College seminar program, in 1970.

Colonel Doyle E. Larson (M.S.. Auburn University) is Deputy National Security Agency Representative to the Department of Defense. He began his Air Force career in language school; after flying training served as an F-94C and Major John Duncan W illiams (M.S., F-89D crew member in Air Defense Com­ Boston University) is a Ph.D. candidate mand. Since his assignment to the USAF in Communication at the University of Security Service, he has activated and Texas, working under the AFIT Program. commanded aecurity squadrons here and He has served as director of information abroad. Colonel Larson is a graduate of at base. wing, and air division levels Squadron Officer School. Armed Forces and a tour in the Office of Information, Staff College, and Air War College. Secretary of the Air Force (SAFOl). In 1967 and 1968 he received the George Washington Honor Medal (Essay Cate­ gory) from the Freedoms Foundation.

Lieu t en a n t Colonel Earl W. Renfroe. JR., (B.A., Omaha University) is Equal 87 Office of Air Force History since 1966. For seven years he was a historian for Hq Strategic Air Command. During the Korean War he served in the U.S. Army information and education program. Mr. Wolk has taught history and lectured on strategic nuclear deterrence and matters related to the cold war. His articles appear frequently in military publications.

Colonel John L. Sutton (Ph.D., University of Geneva), now teaching at the Johnstown branch of the University of Pittsburgh, was head of the AFROTC Department, University of Kentucky, until his recent retirement. A World DR. Joseph W. ANNUNZIATA (Doctorate, War II fighter pilot, he served two University of Paris) is Chief, Research tours at Hq USAF, in the Directorate Branch, Research and Analysis Division, of Pluns and as an intelligence staff Office of the Administrative Assistant to officer. Other assignments were with the Secretary of the Air Force. His re­ SHAPE, U.S. Embassy in Germany, search, writing, and lecturing cover a Hq USAFE, British Air Ministry, Insti­ wide variety of national defense issues. tute for Strategic Studies in London, DR. Joseph CHURBA (Ph.D., Columbia At Air University he held an academic and as professor. U.S. Air Force University) is a member of the Docu­ position with emphasis on West Europe Academy. mentary Research Division, Institute for and Southeast Asia. Dr. Annunziata Professional Development. Air University. was a Fulbright scholar in Paris lor three He was formerly Senior Middle East years, teaching and studying at French Specialist. Office of National Security schools. Studies, and professor of government at Winnipeg and Adelphi universities. Dr. Churba has completed the book- length Egypt and Israel in Africa and published monographs on the Middle East as well as articles and reviews in professional journals.

HERMAN S. Wolk (M.A., American International College) has been with the

4

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “Squadron Officer School, Junior Officers, and You" by Colonel Arthur R. Moore, Jr., USAF, as the outstanding article in the September-October 1971 issue of the Review. C olonel Eldon W. D owns, USAF Editor J ack H. M ooney Managing Editor L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Laun C. S mith, J r ., USAF Associate Editor M ajor Edward Vallentiny, USAF Associate Editor E dmund O. B arker Financial and Administrative Manager J ohn A. W estcott. J r . Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L ia Mid o s i May Patterson Associate Editor, Portuguese Language Edition W il l ia m J. D e P aola Art Editor and Illustrator

C olonel Irving FI. Breslauer Hq Military Airlift Command C olonel Elbert T. IIovatter Hq Air Force Logistics Command, C olonel John W. K eeler Hq Air Training Command C olonel Arthur S. R agen Hq United States Air Force Academy C olonel Boone R ose. J r . Hq Tactical Air Command C olonel J ohn B. V oss Hq Strategic Air Command C olonel S heldon I. G odkin Hq Aerospace Defense Command L ie u t e n a n t Colonel John II. Scrivnfr, J r . Hq Military Assistance Command, Vietnam D r . H arold Helfman Hq Air Force Systems Command F rancis W. Jennings SAF Office of Information STATES AIR FORCE AIRREVIEW UNIVERSITY