Political Economy of Central Banking in India Partha Ray / Preliminary Draft / November 17, 2014
Political Economy of Central Banking in India Partha Ray / Preliminary Draft / November 17, 2014 Political Economy of Central Banking in India1 Partha Ray2 1. Introduction Apart from matters of detail, can the political economy of an economic institution be captured in terms of the political economy of the aggregate economy? If the Indian economic policy configuration gets dictated by a confluence of elite interest groups such as bureaucrats, big business, and big farmers, does the political economy of the central bank in India not get defined by the same groups? If answers to such questions are in the affirmative, then looking into the political economy of a central bank could be superfluous. However, it has been noted, “The paradox is that while the state in India has been powerful (and often heavy-handed) in its regulatory and interventionist role, it will not be described as what the political economy literature calls a ‘strong state’” (Bardhan, undated).3 It is in this context that the political economy of central banking in India deserves special attention. Admittedly, to a large extent, in mainstream economics, central banks have been widely seen as technocratic institutions handling monetary policy (and banking supervision in many cases), essentially enjoying a monopoly over monetary policy. Then the obvious question is: why can’t a central bank perform as a specialized government department? After all, in a representative democracy, at a level of broad generalization, peoples’ aspirations are expected to be reflected in the elected
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