HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY spring 2012 CONTENTS

Modern-Day Stories: The Evolving Role of the Me- 6 dia in Solidifying a Cultural Arab Identity BY MINA AL-ORAIBI

Political Success of Egypt’s Salafis 13 Tests U.S. Support for Democracy BY MARA REVKIN

Islam and Government: 20 Examining the Turkish Model BY MATTHEW COHEN

Liberals, Islamists, and the Role of the Middle- Class in the Demise of the Arab Autocracies 31 BY ISHAC DIWAN

The Rule of Law and Arab Political Liberalization: Three Models for Change 55 BY DAVID M. MEDNICOFF

Emerging Trends in Middle Eastern Health Policy BY NORA EL NAWAWI, TERESA CHAHINE, NADEEM AL-DUAIJ, 84 ALI HAMANDI, AND WILLIAM BEAN

The Syrian Uprising: An Interview with Syrian Opposition Member Amr al-Azm 101 INTERVIEWED BY ANYA VODOPYANOV Egypt’s Transition to Democracy: An Interview with Freedom and Justice Politician Amr Darrag 107 INTERVIEWED BY DANIEL TAVANA ii HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY

Co-Editors-in-Chief: Duncan Pickard Daniel Tavana

Managing Editor: Josh Martin

Director of Board Relations: Mariam Mansury

Chiefs of Marketing and Distribution: Stephen Hall Haitham al-Salama

Directors of Outreach: Vivek Chilukuri Asma Jaber

Senior Editors, Articles and Features: Abdullah Al-Khalifa Anya Vodopyanov

Senior Editors, Online Content: Jessica Brandt Alex Shams

Senior Editor, Book Reviews: Jeffrey Karam

Senior Editors, Commentaries: Asad Asad Sybil Ottenstein

Senior Editors, Special Content: Micah Peckarsky Rustin Zarkar

Senior Editor-At-Large: Federico Manfredi

Design and Layout: Monique Zoutendijk

Cover Photo: Federico Manfredi

4he articles coMMentaries interviews © 2012 by the President and Fellows of book reviews and additional editorial Harvard College. All rights reserved. Except content appearing in the Harvard Journal of as otherwise speciled no article or portion Middle Eastern Politics and Policies do not herein is to be reproduced or adapted to necessarily remect the views of the other works without the expressed written editors the sponsoring university or the consent of the editors of the Harvard board MeMbers of the advisory boards. Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policies. ISSN# 2165-9117

iii Editor’s Note

We inaugurate the Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics & Policy amid epochal changes in the and . The Journal’s mission — to contribute thoughtful, policy-relevant analysis on regional politics and interna- tional affairs — has rarely been so critical to policymakers and the academy.

,QRXUÀUVWHGLWLRQRXUDXWKRUVRIIHUVRPHSUHOLPLQDU\FRQFOXVLRQVDERXWZK\ WKHXSULVLQJVDFURVVWKHUHJLRQRFFXUUHGWKHLUFXUUHQWSROLWLFVDQGZKDWZHFDQ JOHDQIURPWKHP,VKDF'LZDQH[SODLQVWKHLPSHWXVEHKLQGWKHUHFHQWXSULVLQJV LQWKHFRQWH[WRI$UDEDXWKRULWDULDQLVP'DYLG0HGQLFRIIH[SORUHVGLIIHUHQWZD\V LQZKLFKODZDQGSROLWLFVKDYHZRUNHGWRJHWKHUWRIDFLOLWDWHGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQLQ WKH$UDEZRUOG

7ZRFRPPHQWDULHVH[SORUHWKHUROHRIUHOLJLRQLQWKHVWDWH0DUD5HYNLQGUDZV LQIHUHQFHVIURPWKH6DODÀVWV·VXFFHVVLQWKH(J\SWLDQHOHFWLRQVDQG0DWWKHZ Cohen offers lessons of the Turkish model of and politics.

:HDUHSOHDVHGWRLQFOXGHWZRLQWHUYLHZVZLWKOHDGHUVIURPWKHUHJLRQ$PU $O$]PRIWKH6\ULDQ1DWLRQDO&RXQFLOSURYLGHVDQXSGDWHRIWKHSROLWLFVRIRS- position in Syria, and Amr Darrag of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood describes the Freedom and Justice Party’s legislative agenda.

We also hope to return discourse on the Middle East to some of the most press- ing questions encountering policymakers before the recent uprisings in order to HPSKDVL]HWKRVHTXHVWLRQVWKDWKDYHQRWUHFHLYHGWKHLUGXHDWWHQWLRQLQWKHSDVW \HDUDQGDKDOI1RUD(O1DZDZL7HUHVD&KDKLQH1DGHHP$O'XDLM$OL+DPDQ- GLDQG:LOOLDP%HDQUHYLHZFKDOOHQJHVRIKHDOWKSROLF\LQWKH0LGGOH(DVWDUJX- ing that the Arab uprisings have made space for long-needed reforms in health policy. Storytelling and its impact on shaping Arab political identities is the focus of Mina Al-Oraibi’s analysis.

3ROLF\PDNHUVWRGD\PXVWUHFNRQZLWKWKHPRVWH[WUHPHUHRUGHULQJRISROLWLFDO VWUXFWXUHVVLQFHLQGHSHQGHQFHZDVDFKLHYHGDFURVVWKHUHJLRQIURPWKHVWR VZKLOHEDODQFLQJSUHH[LVWLQJSXEOLFFKDOOHQJHV7KHDXWKRUVLQWKLVMRXU- nal have sought, in short, to begin the process of addressing these multifaceted problems.

Duncan Pickard & Daniel Tavana Editors-in-Chief

iv v Modern-Day Stories: The Evolving Role of the Media in Solidifying a Cultural Arab Identity BY MINA AL-ORAIBI

torytelling, in its various forms, :KLOHWKHKDNDZDWLRUVWRU\WHOOHU Sis intrinsic to solidifying, and at had an important role to play before times creating, collective identities. the era of mass print or television, in Whether it is the story of a family more recent history, Arabs and Ara- SDVVHGGRZQIURPIDWKHUWRVRQRUWKDW bists in the Middle East and beyond RIDQDWLRQÀJKWLQJIRULWVLQGHSHQ- have been brought together by another dence, the sense of sharing a collective variety of storytelling—one provided past, present, or future brings people by the media. Whether through me- together. One of the greatest collec- diums of print, television, or digital, tions of these stories is One Thousand QHZVFRQWHQWSOD\HGDVLJQLÀFDQWUROH and One Nights, the preeminent fable LQVKDSLQJ$UDERSLQLRQLQWKHWZHQ- SDVVHGGRZQWKURXJKJHQHUDWLRQVLQ tieth century and continues to do so WKH$UDEZRUOGZLWKWDOHVZRYHQIURP LQWKHWZHQW\ÀUVW7KHKLVWRULFHYHQWV YDULRXV$UDEFLWLHVDORQJZLWKWKRVHRI RIVWDUWLQJZLWKWKH7XQLVLDQ Persia and South Asia. Many modern “Jasmine” revolution and spilling into stories are rooted in One Thousand Egypt, Libya, and beyond, are a prime and One Nights or take inspiration example of a cultural identity intensi- from it. While there is much debate ÀHGWKURXJKHYHQWVDQGWKHQHZVRI around the history and origins of One WKRVHHYHQWV7KHXSULVLQJVWKDWZHUH Thousand and One Nights, it is impor- inspired from one Arab city to an- tant to note the strong connection of RWKHUZHUHFDSWXUHGWKURXJKYDULRXV the lauded tales to a historical sense of media—from mobile phone cameras identity that has endured for hundreds to constant television coverage—and of years. It helps to highlight the role FDUULHGDFURVVWKHZRUOG:KLOHLWLV of storytelling in forging the identities impossible to highlight one singular of many peoples in the Middle East factor in explaining the revolutions region and especially amongst Arabs DQGXSULVLQJVRIDQGLQWKH ZKRFRQVLGHURUDWLRQDQGSRHWU\WR $UDEZRUOGWKHPHGLDIDFLOLWDWHGWKH be amongst the most distinguished of UHJLRQDOULSSOHHIIHFWIROORZLQJDQG skills. SXEOLFL]LQJHYHU\PRPHQWDQGHYROX- tion.

6 Modern-Day Stories

The bonds, direct or indirect, that WKHLPSHULDOLVWYLHZRQ$UDEVRFLHWLHV DUHIRUPHGDVDUHVXOWRIQHZVVKDULQJ Yet this reference has been used in a DUHRISDUDPRXQWVLJQLÀFDQFH,QKLV QHZFRQWH[WDVWKH´$UDEVWUHHWµFDPH VHPLQDOZRUN,PDJLQHG&RPPXQL- WROLIHZLWKGHPRQVWUDWLRQVDQGSRSX- WLHV%HQHGLFW$QGHUVRQ  PDNHV ODUH[SUHVVLRQLQ$QGWKLVPRYH- DFRPSHOOLQJDUJXPHQWDERXWWKHZD\ PHQWZKLFKGRPLQDWHGQHZVSDSHU communities are forged based on a KHDGOLQHVWRRNRYHUWKHQHZVEXOOHWLQV collective sense of understanding. His of major Arab satellite broadcasters HPSKDVLVRQWKHSULQWHGZRUGDQGLWV DQGLQMHFWHGQHZG\QDPLVPLQVRFLDO role in fostering “imagined communi- media exchanges. It has become the fo- ties” resonates both historically and FDOSRLQWRIDQHZVHQVHRILGHQWLW\IRU in the present day. Anderson explains many Arabs. While the actual events KRZ´SULQWDVFRPPRGLW\LVWKHNH\ ZHUHRIFRQVLGHUDEOHVLJQLÀFDQFH WRWKHJHQHUDWLRQRIZKROO\QHZLGHDV domestically, the instant and constant of simultaneity” that came to play an discussion of the developments in integral part in developing national one country had an immediate impact FRQVFLRXVQHVV $QGHUVRQ  across borders. This is especially true The element of “simultaneity” is as at the start of an uprising. Key slogans LPSRUWDQWDVWKH´FRPPRGLW\µRIQHZV OLNHLUKDOPHDQLQJGHSDUWZHUHSLFNHG LWVHOIDQH[SHULHQFHLVPDJQLÀHGZLWK up from the chants of demonstrators in the understanding that others are go- the streets of Cairo and Sana’a, in- LQJWKURXJKLWWRR7KHVLJQLÀFDQFH VHUWHGLQPHVVDJHVRQOLQHDQGZULWWHQ here is the consumption of the same on banners of protestors outside the QHZVLWHPRQDZLGHVSUHDGOHYHOHYHQ embassies of unpopular governments though it is accompanied by varying in London and Washington, DC. One individual reactions. ZRUGFKDQWHGE\DFWLYLVWVWKRXVDQGV of miles apart and enforced by the Readers and audiences in general media’s repetition, became a rally- IRUPDNLQVKLSZLWKRWKHUVLQWKHVDPH ing cry for revolution. As the Syrian DXGLHQFHRIWHQZLWKRXWHYHQEHLQJ uprising developed, many protestors conscious of the realities of this bond. EHJDQWRFDUU\SODFDUGVZLWKVORJDQV Paul Vierkant from the University of GLUHFWHGDWVSHFLÀFFRXQWULHVSDU- Berlin builds on Anderson’s analysis, ticularly Arab states that expressed explaining that “the reader—being opposition to the Syrian regime, in DZDUHRIWKLVLQGLUHFWO\VKDUHGH[SH- order to get their message across the rience—imagines his community of DLUZDYHVDQGWKURXJKF\EHUVSDFH7KH IHOORZUHDGHUVµ  7KH´FRP- sharing of this experience via media PXQLW\RIIHOORZUHDGHUVµRI$UDEV DURXQGWKHZRUOGKDVFUHDWHGDVHQVH DQGPRUHUHFHQWO\IHOORZYLHZHUVQRZ RIDIÀQLW\WKDWKDGDSSHDUHGWREH VKDSHVDGLVWLQFWIHDWXUHRIZKDWLV PLVVLQJDPRQJVWPDQ\$UDEVZKR often named the “Arab street.” It must ZHUHULGGOHGE\VWULIHDQGFRQÁLFWE\ be noted that there are several nega- WKHHQGRIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\ WLYHFRQQRWDWLRQVZLWKWKHWHUP´$UDE street,” including a criticism that the It is important to distinguish be- many cities and countries of the Arab WZHHQFXOWXUDOERQGVWKDWFUHDWHDIÀQ- ZRUOGFDQQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGRQHVWUHHW LW\EHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWSHRSOHVDQG$UDE ZKLOHRWKHUVVHHLWDVDQH[WHQVLRQRI nationalism. Without a doubt, there

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 7 Commentary

DUHPDQ\FXOWXUDOGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ in its most inclusive terms that is Arabs, according not only to their na- embraced by Arab-language speakers, tionality but also to their sect, religion, Arabs and non-Arabs alike, and it is or socioeconomic circumstances. Fur- this Arabism that is reinforced by the thermore, there are clear distinctions in Arab-language media. cultural backgrounds and experiences EHWZHHQ$UDEVOLYLQJLQ$UDEPDMRULW\ While cities and countries have their FRXQWULHVDQGWKRVHZKRDUHSDUWRI RZQGLVWLQFWGLDOHFWVZULWWHQ$UDELF WKH$UDEGLDVSRUDDURXQGWKHZRUOG LVVWDQGDUGL]HGLQIXV·KDIRUPDORU And yet, various components such classical Arabic. This helps unite Arabs as language and aspects of a shared WKURXJKWKHZULWWHQZRUG,WLVDOVR KHULWDJHFRQVWLWXWHOLQNVEHWZHHQWKHVH WKHGLDOHFWXVHGLQQHZVEXOOHWLQVDQG communities. While there are many as- EURDGFDVWVZKLFKDJDLQKDYHPDGH pects to be considered regarding Arab pan-Arab channels accessible to an QDWLRQDOLVPRUTDZPL\D³HVSHFLDOO\ HVWLPDWHGPLOOLRQ$UDEVZRUOG- ZLWKWKHQXPHURXVFULWLTXHVRI$UDE ZLGH 8QLWHG1DWLRQV3RSXODWLRQ)XQG politicians that have used nationalism   for opportunistic ends, including that 0HGLDRXWOHWVDOORZ$UDEVLQWKHLU of Egypt’s former President Gamal home countries and abroad to sustain Abdel Nasser—the aim here is not to this Arabism, particularly through the credit or discredit Arab nationalism. ZULWWHQZRUG7KHWZRSULPHSDQ$UDE 5DWKHUWKHUHLVDQHHGWRDFNQRZOHGJH QHZVSDSHUV$VKDUT$O$ZVDWDQG threads of commonality and cultural Al-Hayat, are both based in the United experience forging an identity amongst .LQJGRPEXWKDYHDGHHSUHDFKZLWKLQ Arabs and Arab-language speakers. WKH$UDEZRUOG$VKDUT$O$ZVDW $GHHG'DZLVKDH[SODLQVWKHDSSOL- ZDVHVWDEOLVKHGLQLQ/RQGRQ FDWLRQRIWKHWHUP´QDWLRQµLQZULWLQJ ZKLOH$O+D\DWZDVLQLWLDOO\VHWXSLQ about Arab nationalism as being “a LQ%HLUXWWKRXJKWKH/HEDQHVH KXPDQVROLGDULW\ZKRVHPHPEHUV &LYLO:DUIRUFHGLWVFORVXUHLQ believe that they form a coherent cul- ,WZDVUHIRXQGHGDQGEHJDQSXEOLVK- WXUDOZKROHDQGZKRPDQLIHVWDVWURQJ LQJDJDLQLQIURPLWVQHZEDVHLQ desire for political separateness and .HQVLQJWRQ/RQGRQ%RWKQHZVSDSHUV VRYHUHLJQW\µ  +HH[SODLQV describe themselves as “pan-Arab” that the “linguistic, religious, histori- and continue to attract readership the cal, and emotional bonds that tie the ZRUOGRYHU$QGZKLOHWKHSDVWWZHQW\ Arabic–speaking people to each other” to thirty years have seen the rise of lead to a “cultural uniformity that serious competition through satellite ZRXOGEHWHUPHG$UDELVPµKHGLIIHU- DQG,QWHUQHWQHZVVRXUFHVWKHWZR entiates this cultural uniformity from QHZVSDSHUV·:HEVLWHVDOORZWKHPWR ´$UDELVPZLWKWKHDGGHGHOHPHQWRI PDLQWDLQVLJQLÀFDQWLQÁXHQFH a strong desire (and preferably articu- %HJLQQLQJLQWKHVWKHFRPPRQ ODWHGGHPDQGV IRUSROLWLFDOXQLW\LQD SDQ$UDEQHZVSDSHUVZHUHYDVWO\ VSHFLÀHGGHPDUFDWHGWHUULWRU\³WKDW LPSURYHGZLWKWKHDGYHQWRIVDWHOOLWH LVZKDWZLOOEHWHUPHG$UDEQDWLRQDO- FKDQQHOV:KLOH$VKDUT$O$ZVDWZDV LVPµ  :KLOH'DZLVKDVSHDNV WKHÀUVW$UDEODQJXDJHQHZVSDSHUWR of “cultural uniformity,” it is Arabism transmit its pages via satellite to four-

8 Modern-Day Stories

WHHQFLWLHVSDQ$UDEFKDQQHOVZHUH .DOWKRXPDFURVVWKH$UDEZRUOGORQJ beamed directly into homes all over EHIRUHWKHWLPHRIZLGHVSUHDGWHOHYL- WKHZRUOGWKDQNVWRVDWHOOLWHWHOHYLVLRQ VLRQ7KLVDOORZHG$UDEVLQYDULRXV WHFKQRORJ\ $VKDUT$O$ZVDWQG ,W countries and from different socio- is no exaggeration to say that satellite economic backgrounds to share the WHOHYLVLRQUHYROXWLRQL]HGLQIRUPD- experience of listening to the singer’s tion generation and consumption for VRQJV3ROLWLFDOO\6DZWDO$UDEZDVD WKH$UDEZRUOG:KHQ0%& 0LGGOH key tool that Egyptian leaders (most (DVW%URDGFDVWLQJ&HQWHU 7HOHYLVLRQ SURPLQHQWO\1DVVHU XVHGWRVSUHDG ODXQFKHGIURP/RQGRQLQEHFRP- WKHLUUHYROXWLRQDU\GRFWULQH6DZWDO LQJWKHÀUVWIUHHWRDLU$UDELFVDWHOOLWH $UDEZDVODWHUODUJHO\GLVFUHGLWHGDVD FKDQQHOLWFDSWXUHGPLOOLRQVRIYLHZ- SURSDJDQGDWRROHVSHFLDOO\DIWHULWZDV ers in the Middle East, , and discovered that its reports of a “glori- WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV,WVZRUNIRUFHZDV RXVYLFWRU\µLQWKHZDUDJDLQVW a mix of journalists from across the ,VUDHOZHUHIDOVHDQGOHGWRGHYDVWDWHG $UDEZRUOGEDVHGSULPDULO\LQ/RQ- expectations after the harsh defeat of don. Rather than directing coverage to WKH$UDEVWDWHVLQWKHZDU -DPHV  local audiences, MBC set the stage for DQHZHUDRIVDWHOOLWHWHOHYLVLRQWKDWLV In more recent times, the Arab radio WRGD\GRPLQDWHGE\$O-D]HHUDDQG$O station funded by the U.S. government, $UDEL\DEURDGFDVWLQJWRDQ$UDEZLGH 5DGLR6DZDKDVEHHQPXFKPRUH audience. successful than the American-funded Arab-language satellite channel Alhur- ,QDGGLWLRQWRSDQ$UDEQHZVSDSHUV UDZKLFKWUDQVODWHVWR´WKH)UHH2QHµ and satellite channels, radio is another 0L[LQJPXVLFZLWKEULHIQHZVEXOOHWLQV form of traditional media that crosses EURDGFDVWWKURXJKRXWWKH$UDEZRUOG boundaries to reach out to Arab audi- 5DGLR6DZDUHDFKHVWZHOYHFRXQWULHV ences and helps in forging a cultural on FM transmission and an additional identity and experience. Radio played seven countries via AM transmission. an intrinsic part in the pan-Arab na- WLRQDOLVPWKDWVZHSWWKH0LGGOH(DVW The spectrum of Arab-language me- LQWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\DQGFRQQHFWHG dia outlets today is vast, particularly its Arab-language audiences. The fa- in terms of political aims and fund- PRXV´+RQD/RQGRQµRSHQLQJZKLFK ing. Yet overall, they have collectively translates to “This is London,” is a become instrumental in fostering ties ZHOONQRZQSKUDVHWKDWZDVVSUHDG EHWZHHQ$UDEV7KHHYHQWVRI RQWKHDLUZDYHVWKURXJK%%&$UDELF WRRNWKLVVKDUHGH[SHULHQFHWRDQHZ UDGLRVHUYLFHZKLFKZDVODXQFKHGLQ OHYHOZKLOHPDLQWDLQLQJWKHVDPHEDVLF -DQXDU\DQGFRQWLQXHVWRUHLJQ premise of shared identity through today amongst Arab-language radio WKHZULWWHQZRUG+RZHYHUWKLVZRUG channels. ZDVQRORQJHUSULQWHGLQDQHZVSDSHU LVVXHGDQGGLVWULEXWHGGDLO\LWZDV ,Q-XO\DYLWDOQHZUDGLRVWDWLRQ typed electronically and dispersed in ZDVDGGHGWRWKHDLUZDYHV6DZWDO F\EHUVSDFHZLWKLQVHFRQGVDURXQG $UDEZKLFKWUDQVODWHVWR´WKH9RLFHRI WKHZRUOG$VVRFLDOQHWZRUNLQJVLWHV WKH$UDEVµ -DPHV ,WFDUULHGWKH became a critical source of information songs of the time, particularly those of for the historic developments of the the legendary Egyptian singer Uum Arab revolutions and uprisings, the

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 9 Commentary

Internet quickly became the center of UHPDLQVORZVDWHOOLWHWHOHYLVLRQLVWKH VKDUHGH[SHULHQFHVEHWZHHQDFWLYLVWV main medium to send simultaneous and reporters not only in a particular messages out and create mass impact. FRXQWU\EXWUHJLRQZLGHDQGEH\RQG :KLOHUHFHQWVWDWLVWLFVVKRZWKDW percent of households in the Middle Of course, the phenomenon is not East have Internet access, there is great RQO\UHVWULFWHGWRWKH$UDEZRUOGDV GLVSDULW\EHWZHHQYDULRXVFRXQWULHV WUHQGLQJWRSLFVRQ7ZLWWHU³WKRVHGH- According to the United Nations’ In- ÀQHGE\DKDVKWDJ³DUHTXLFNO\SLFNHG ternational Telecommunication Union XSE\PLOOLRQVRIXVHUVZRUOGZLGH ,78 SHUFHQWRIWKH8$(·VSRSXOD- 7ZLWWHUXVHUVGLVFXVVHYHU\WKLQJIURP WLRQKDVDFFHVVWRWKH,QWHUQHWZKLOH pop songs to international affairs, but ,UDT·V,QWHUQHWSHQHWUDWLRQVWDQGVDW WUHQGLQJWRSLFVDUHQRZVSOLWDFFRUGLQJ SHUFHQW ,78QG 2QWKHRWKHUKDQG WRORFDWLRQFODVVLÀFDWLRQV7ZLWWHU:HE it is rare to pass a house in the vast designers have selected the United majority of urban centers in the Arab $UDE(PLUDWHV 8$( DVWKHVROH ZRUOGZLWKRXWDWUDGHPDUNVDWHOOLWH ORFDWLRQLQWKH$UDEZRUOGWRUHÁHFW dish on its roof. 7ZLWWHUXVHUV·WUHQGLQJWRSLFVLQWKH UHJLRQ2Q)HEUXDU\WKHPRVW 2QHVLJQLÀFDQWH[DPSOHRIWKHYDOXH WUHQGLQJWRSLFZDV´.KDGHU([LVWVµ of merging various types of media to in reference to Khader Adnan, the carry messages emerged during the Palestinian detainee in an Israeli prison (J\SWLDQUHYROXWLRQRIZKHQWKH ZKRVHKXQJHUVWULNHFDSWXUHGQHZV ´VSHDNWRWZHHWµLQLWLDWLYHEURXJKW headlines and conversations amongst volunteers together from various cit- $UDEVDQG$UDELVWVDURXQGWKHZRUOG ies to transcribe and translate phone 7KLVFRQYHUVDWLRQZDVQRWUHVWULFWHG messages from Arabic to six different to Palestine and Palestinians. When languages. When the regime of former QHZVRIWKH,VUDHOL6XSUHPH&RXUW·V Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak GHFLVLRQWRUHOHDVH$GQDQZDVVHQWRXW GHFLGHGWRVKXWGRZQWKH,QWHUQHWRQ satellite channels and Internet streams -DQXDU\DWWKHKHLJKWRIWKH LQVWDQWO\FDUULHGWKHQHZVZKLOHLFRQLF Egyptian revolution, Arab activists the KHDGOLQHVDQGSKRWRVZHUHSXEOLVKHG ZRUOGRYHUJRWWRJHWKHULQDFURZG- WKHIROORZLQJGD\LQ$UDELFODQJXDJH sourcing project to transcribe and QHZVSDSHUV7KHLPDJHVRIWKHVXFFHVV translate short messages from Egyptian RIDQRQYLROHQWDFWRIUHVLVWDQFHZHUH FDOOHUVDQGVHQGWKHPRXWDVWZHHWV SRLJQDQWDVWKH\ZHUHFDUULHGLQWKH 7KHWZHHWVZHUHVHQWRXWLQ$UDELF Arabic language to audiences in the to maintain pressure on the Egyptian region and beyond. regime and translated into other lan- guages like English, French, and Italian While Web sites and social media WRUDLVHDZDUHQHVV,WZDVDPRPHQW SOD\DQLQVWUXPHQWDOUROHLQQHZVJDWK- of coming together of Arab voices for ering and dissemination, satellite chan- DFDXVH³QRWRQHGHÀQHGE\$UDEQD- nels are the true provider of Internet WLRQDOLVPEXWRQHWKDWZDVPRYHGE\D PHVVDJHVWRPLOOLRQVDURXQGWKHZRUOG sense of Arab youth solidarity. YouTube videos and messages released on Facebook pages reach millions as ,WLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWPDQ\$UDEV WKH\DUHUHSRUWHGLQQHZVEXOOHWLQV$V from urban centers in Arab countries ,QWHUQHWSHQHWUDWLRQLQWKH$UDEZRUOG DUHÁXHQWLQ(QJOLVKDQGRIWHQXVHLWDV

10 Modern-Day Stories a preferred language, especially online. GHÀQLQJFRQWHPSRUDU\LVVXHVZKLOHVL- $ERRNUHOHDVHGDIHZPRQWKVDIWHUWKH multaneously carrying on the heritage Egyptian revolution in order to chroni- of their predecessors. cle the events of the revolution is titled 7ZHHWVIURP7DKULUEXWLQWHUHVWLQJO\ The strength of the collective re- the authors chose to select English- sult of Arab media cannot be over- ODQJXDJHWZHHWVE\RQO\WKRVHOLYLQJLQ estimated. Both Arab and non-Arab Cairo to tell the story of the revolution governments are conscious of this ,GOHDQG1XQQV 7KHDXWKRUV fact, today more than ever. Whether it H[SODLQWKDW´LQ(J\SWWKRVHZLWK LVWKH866WDWH'HSDUWPHQW·V7ZLW- laptops and smart phones are the more ter account titled “USA bilAraby,” DIÁXHQWLQVRFLHW\DPRQJZKRPWKH ZKLFKPHDQV´WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQ use of English is quite common. These $UDELFµRUZKHWKHULWLVFRXQWULHV ZHUHWKHSHRSOHZKRGLVFXVVHGWKH like France, China, and Russia set- events online, although on the ground WLQJXSWKHLURZQVDWHOOLWHFKDQQHOVLQ WKH\ZHUHSDUWRIDPXFKZLGHUPRYH- the Arabic language, the competition ment that included the urban poor” for the attention of Arab audiences is ,GOHDQG1XQQV  unprecedented. This threatens to create a fragmentation of the identity of the 7UDGLWLRQDO$UDEMRXUQDOLVWVZULWLQJ DXGLHQFH\HWWKHWKUHDWSDOHVLQVLJQLÀ- LQQHZVSDSHUVOLNH$VKDUT$O$ZVDW FDQFHZKHQFRPSDULQJWKHEHQHÀWVRI and broadcasting on stations like BBC multiple sources of information being $UDELFDUHQRZFRPSOHPHQWHGE\ developed in the Arabic language. active bloggers, social media activists, DQGZULWHUVOLNH6XOWDQDO4DVVHPLD Thomas L. Friedman coined the 8$(EDVHGFRPPHQWDWRUZKRUHDFKHG SKUDVH´WKHZRUOGLVÁDWµLQKLVERRN celebrity-level status through his RIWKHVDPHWLWOHWRHSLWRPL]HWUHQGV 7ZLWWHUIHHGDQGEORJ:KLOHGLYHUVH FUHDWHGE\JOREDOL]DWLRQLQWKHWZHQW\ in their outlooks and media, these ÀUVWFHQWXU\:KLOHWKHUHDUHDUJX- varied actors are competing for the PHQWVIRUDQGDJDLQVWWKLVFKDUDFWHUL]D- attention of an audience spread across tion, Friedman’s points regarding the $UDEFRXQWULHVDQGDOORYHUWKHZRUOG potential that technology and travel through the Arab diasporas from Tur- has for bringing people together are NH\WR$XVWUDOLD5H]D$VODQGHVFULEHV highly relevant in the study of identity WKHZULWHUVRIWKH0LGGOH(DVWUHJLRQ and collective experiences. Friedman IURPWRDVFRPLQJIURP´DQ argues that “one of the unintended HUDWKDWKDVZLWQHVVHGWKHULVHRIDQHZ FRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHÁDWZRUOGLVWKDW DQGJOREDOL]HGJHQHUDWLRQRIZULWHUV it puts different societies and cultures unburdened by many of the political LQPXFKJUHDWHUGLUHFWFRQWDFWZLWKRQH and religious preoccupations of their DQRWKHUµ  7KLVDSSOLHVWR literary forebears yet nevertheless WKHPRVDLFRI$UDELGHQWLWLHVZKRVH VWLOOJUDSSOLQJZLWKVLPLODULVVXHVRI variations can be based on socioeco- personal identity and social inequal- nomic, geographic, sectarian, or other LW\µ $VODQ[[LL :KLOH$VODQ IDFWRUVGHWHUPLQLQJWKHLUVWDWHVSHFLÀF here is speaking directly to literary attitude and sentiment. And yet, Ara- GHYHORSPHQWVLQWKHUHJLRQWKHZULWHUV bism perseveres beyond state boundar- UHSUHVHQWD´JOREDOL]HGJHQHUDWLRQµ LHVEHFDXVHRIWKHSRZHURIFRPPXQL- FDWLRQVSHFLÀFDOO\GHÀQLQJHOHPHQWV

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 11 Commentary

such as media headlines, broadcasts, REFERENCES DQGWZHHWVLQWKH$UDELFODQJXDJH $QGHUVRQ%HQHGLFW,PDJLQHGFRPPXQL- WLHV5HÁHFWLRQVRQWKHRULJLQDQGVSUHDGRI Modern-day media, in an era of nationalism. London: Verso. WZHQW\IRXUKRXUQHZVF\FOHVDQG FLWL]HQMRXUQDOLVPFRQWLQXHVWRSOD\ $VKDUT$O$ZVDWQG$ERXWXVRQ$VKDUT$O DSDUDPRXQWUROHLQGHÀQLQJQRWRQO\ $ZVDW:HEVLWH ZZZDVKDUTHFRP$ERXW8V DVS  political opinions but also identities, unconstrained by nationality or citi- $VODQ5H]DHG7DEOHW SHQ/LWHUDU\ ]HQVKLS6WRU\WHOOLQJLQEUHDNLQJQHZV ODQGVFDSHVIURPWKHPRGHUQ0LGGOH(DVW1HZ bulletins or in-depth features, contin- York: W.W. Norton & Company. XHVWRHYROYHZKLOHPDLQWDLQLQJLWV 'DZLVKD$GHHG$UDEQDWLRQDOLVPLQWKH traditional status in bringing together WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\)URPWULXPSKWRGHVSDLU Arabs near and far. Princeton: Princeton University Press. )ULHGPDQ7KRPDV/7KHZRUOGLVÁDW 7KHJOREDOL]HGZRUOGLQWKHWZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\ London: Penguin. MINA AL-ORAIBI IS ASSISTANT EDITOR-IN- CHIEF OF ASHARQ AL-AWSAT, THE INTERNA- ,GOH1DGLDDQG$OH[1XQQVHGV7ZHHWV TIONAL DAILY NEWSPAPER. SHE WAS PREVI- from Tahrir: Egypt’s revolution as it unfolded, in OUSLY WASHINGTON, DC, BUREAU CHIEF WKHZRUGVRIWKHSHRSOHZKRPDGHLW1HZ

12 Political Success of Egypt’s Salafis Tests U.S. Support for Democracy BY MARA REVKIN

VQHZFRPHUVWRWKHIRUPDO be a mistake to forgo an opportunity ASROLWLFDODUHQD(J\SWLDQ6DODÀ IRUHQJDJHPHQWZLWKDIDFWLRQWKDW SDUWLHVZHUHWKHXQGHUGRJVRI(J\SW·V holds a quarter of the seats in Egypt’s ÀUVWSRVW0XEDUDNSDUOLDPHQWDU\ QHZO\HOHFWHGSDUOLDPHQW HOHFWLRQVVWDUWLQJLQ1RYHPEHU Although the success of the Muslim $QDWRP\RIWKH6DODÀV· Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Unexpected Political Debut Party—one of Egypt’s oldest and most 6LQFHWKH(J\SWLDQ6DODÀV·HPHU- RUJDQL]HGSROLWLFDOIRUFHV³ZDVZLGHO\ JHQFHLQWKHVWKLVSXULWDQLFDO DQWLFLSDWHGIHZSUHGLFWHGWKDWWKH Islamist movement has sought to nascent and politically inexperienced restore an orthodox interpretation of Islamist coalition led by the hard-line Islamic faith and practice, emulating 6DODÀ1RXU3DUW\ZRXOGZLQDWOHDVW the conduct of the Prophet Muham- SHUFHQWRIWKHVHDWVLQERWKKRXVHV PDGDQGWKHÀUVWWKUHHJHQHUDWLRQV of parliament (Egypt Independent of Muslims (Agence France-Presse E $VWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVHHNV 0RJKDGDP(XEHQDQG DYHQXHVRIHQJDJHPHQWZLWK(J\SW·V =DPDQ[YLL 6DODÀVKDGDOZD\V next leaders, the political success of SXUVXHGWKHLU,VODPL]LQJVRFLDOSURMHFW WKH6DODÀPRYHPHQWZKLFKVWULYHVWR outside of the formal political arena, bring Egyptian society into compli- WKDWLVXQWLOWKHIDOORI0XEDUDNZKHQ DQFHZLWKWKHSUDFWLFHVDQGYDOXHV they unexpectedly joined a cornucopia of the Prophet Muhammad and his RIQHZO\OLFHQVHGSDUWLHVVHHNLQJWR IROORZHUVDUJXDEO\DWWKHH[SHQVHRI FDSLWDOL]HRQ(J\SW·VÀUVWIUHHDQGIDLU PLQRULW\DQGZRPHQ·VULJKWVSRVHV HOHFWLRQVVLQFHWKHPLOLWDU\FRXS a formidable challenge to U.S. policy While many skeptics initially ques- PDNHUV%XWZKLOH:DVKLQJWRQPD\EH WLRQHGWKHPRELOL]LQJFDSDELOLWLHVRI UHOXFWDQWWRLQLWLDWHDGLDORJXHZLWKDQ this historically apolitical movement, ,VODPLVWJURXSZKRVHSROLWLFDODJHQGD the Nour Party’s stunning electoral deviates substantially from interna- VXFFHVVLQWKH3HRSOH·V$VVHPEO\ tional human rights standards and elections demonstrated that Egypt’s $PHULFDQVWUDWHJLFLQWHUHVWVLWZRXOG 6DODÀVKDYHVXFFHVVIXOO\FRQYHUWHG

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 13 Commentary

WKHLUODWHQWJUDVVURRWVSRZHUEDVHLQWR WKHPRVWFRORUIXOZLOGFDUGLQDOLYHO\ a formidable campaign apparatus and spectrum of postrevolutionary political political machine. forces, the Nour Party is injecting both uncertainty and anxiety into debates The prerevolutionary roots of the over the future of Egyptian society and 6DODÀV·SROLWLFDOVXSHUVWDUGRPFDQEH the structure of its political system. traced to the movement’s expansion under the former regime of Hosni Islamists and liberals alike are com- 0XEDUDNZKRVHJRYHUQPHQWWROHU- LQJWRWHUPVZLWKWKHIDFWWKDW6DODÀV DWHGDQGGLUHFWO\EHQHÀWHGIURPWKH ZLOOEHDIRUFHWRUHFNRQZLWKLQWKH VSUHDGRI6DODÀLQÁXHQFH7KURXJK next parliament. As political green- PRVTXHVDQGFKDULWDEOHRUJDQL]DWLRQV KRUQV6DODÀVZLOOHQWHUWKH3HRSOH·V the movement’s leaders preached a $VVHPEO\ZLWKRXWDQ\WUDFNUHFRUG doctrine of unconditional acquies- DVSROLF\PDNHUVPDNLQJLWGLIÀFXOW cence to political leaders, no matter WRSUHGLFWKRZWKH\ZLOOSHUIRUPDQG KRZDXWKRULWDULDQ ,VPDLOE  ZKDWSRVLWLRQVWKH\PD\WDNH%XW )RUWKLVUHDVRQ6DODÀFOHULFVLQLWLDOO\ some of the preliminary public state- denounced antigovernment protests ments by Nour party leaders—sug- at the start of the January uprising (El- gesting bans on alcohol and beach +HQQDZ\ %XWZLWKWKHUHPRYDO tourism and rejecting democracy as a of Mubarak’s regime and the rapid heretical form of governance—have SUROLIHUDWLRQRIQHZSROLWLFDOSDUWLHV raised concerns in Egypt and inter- WKHPRYHPHQWUHFRJQL]HGHOHFWRUDO QDWLRQDOO\ $O$KUDP(J\SW SROLWLFVDVDSRZHUIXOQHZPHFKDQLVP ,QGHSHQGHQWE  IRUSURPRWLQJWKH,VODPL]DWLRQRI Egyptian society. ,WLVFOHDUWKDW6DODÀFDQGLGDWHVDUH promoting policies that do not resonate 7KH6DODÀPRYHPHQWH[SDQGHG ZLWKPDLQVWUHDP(J\SWLDQVRFLHW\\HW considerably after the petro-boom of DQLPSUHVVLYHPLOOLRQ(J\SWLDQV WKHVDVUHOLJLRXVO\FRQVHUYDWLYH YRWHGIRUWKH1RXU3DUW\LQWKHÀUVW establishments sought to leverage URXQGRIWKH1RYHPEHUSDUOLD- rising oil revenues into patronage of mentary elections (Egypt Independent 6DXGLLQVSLUHG6DODÀVLQ(J\SWDQG D 7KHXQH[SHFWHGHOHFWRUDOYLF- HOVHZKHUHLQWKH,VODPLFZRUOG6LQFH WRU\RI6DODÀFDQGLGDWHVFDQEHODUJHO\ WKHQ6DODÀVKDYHFRPHWRFRQWURO DWWULEXWHGWRWZRSRVWUHYROXWLRQDU\ E\VRPHHVWLPDWHVDVPDQ\DV trends: deteriorating economic condi- Egyptian mosques, and the movement WLRQVDQGDQLQÁX[RIIXQGLQJIURP ERDVWVPRUHWKDQWKUHHPLOOLRQIROORZ- conservative religious foundations in HUV 3HUU\ 7KH,VODPLVWSUHVLGHQ- the Gulf States. tial candidate Abdel Moneim Aboul )RWRXKUHFHQWO\HVWLPDWHGWKDW6DODÀV 3RYHUW\)XHOV5HOLJLRXV outnumber Muslim Brotherhood mem- &RQVHUYDWLVP EHUVE\DUDWLRRIWZHQW\WRRQH 3HUU\ )RUWKHSHUFHQWRI(J\SWLDQV  )RUWKHÀUVWWLPH6DODÀIROORZ- ZKRDUHOLYLQJEHORZWKHSRYHUW\OLQH ers have the opportunity to express WKH6DODÀPRYHPHQW·VHPSKDVLVRQ their loyalty at the ballot box, and social justice and equality represents FDQGLGDWHVIURPWKHQHZO\OLFHQVHG a compelling alternative to the crony 1RXU3DUW\DUHUHDSLQJWKHEHQHÀWV$V

1414 0oLitiCaL SUCCess oF %GyPts SaLals 4ests 5S SUPPort For DemoCraCy capitalism promoted by Mubarak’s 7KH6DODÀVKDYHSURYHQWKHPVHOYHV JRYHUQPHQWZKLFKRYHUWLPHEHFDPH WREHVNLOOIXOSROLWLFDORUJDQL]HUV³LQ V\QRQ\PRXVZLWKVWDWHVSRQVRUHG some cases driving voters directly to corruption and moral bankruptcy. their polling stations and enlisting Karim Helal, a board member of one children to disseminate their campaign of Egypt’s most prominent investment propaganda—but their success cannot ÀUPVDWWULEXWHGWKH6DODÀV·HOHFWRUDO be solely attributed to dedicated vol- victory to rising religious conservatism unteering and voter outreach (Masriya fueled by economic grievances. Helal 

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 1515 Commentary

DIWHUHOHFWLRQV´:KHQZHUXOHZH·OO Secretary of State William J. Burns bring in a lot of money,” said Shaa- and Freedom and Justice Party leader EDQ'DUZLVKDPHPEHURIWKH1RXU 0RKDPHG0RUV\LQODWH-DQXDU\ Party’s supreme committee (Egypt %DU·HL WKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUD- ,QGHSHQGHQWE 7KLVVWHDG\ÁRZ WLRQKDVZLVHO\GHWHUPLQHGWKDWIDLOXUH RIFDVKZLOOKDYHVLJQLÀFDQWLPSOLFD- WRFRPPXQLFDWHZLWKWKHSDUW\QRZ WLRQVIRUWKHIHDVLELOLW\RIWKH6DODÀV ZLHOGLQJDQXQGLVSXWHGSROLWLFDOPDQ- political agenda in the next parliament GDWHZRXOGPHDQDORVVRIOHYHUDJH and beyond. ZLWKIXWXUH(J\SWLDQJRYHUQPHQWVLQ ZKLFKWKH%URWKHUKRRGZLOOXQGRXEW- 6DODÀ6XFFHVV3UHVHQWV8QLWHG HGO\KROGDVLJQLÀFDQWVWDNH:KHQ 6WDWHVZLWK8QDQWLFLSDWHG3ROLF\ DVNHGLQ2FWREHUZKHWKHUWKH Dilemma 8QLWHG6WDWHVZDVSUHSDUHGWRHQJDJH ZLWK,VODPLVWV866HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH At the outset of the parliamentary Hillary Rodham Clinton pledged, “We FDPSDLJQVHDVRQLQ1RYHPEHU ZLOOEHZLOOLQJWRDQGRSHQWRZRUNLQJ WKHFDQGLGDWHVSXWIRUZDUGE\ÁHGJ- ZLWKDJRYHUQPHQWWKDWKDVUHSUHVHQ- LQJ6DODÀSDUWLHVZHUHSRUWUD\HGLQWKH WDWLYHVZKRDUHFRPPLWWHGWRQRQ Western media as bearded religious YLROHQFHZKRDUHFRPPLWWHGWRKXPDQ ]HDORWVZKRVHIXQGDPHQWDOLVWSODW- ULJKWVµ 'LS1RWH :LWKWKH IRUPVZHUHWRRIDUUHPRYHGIURPWKH 0XVOLP%URWKHUKRRGQRZGRPLQDWLQJ Egyptian mainstream to earn broad parliament, U.S. policy makers recog- popular support. Many in Washington QL]HWKHSUDJPDWLFQHFHVVLW\RIEXLOG- SUHPDWXUHO\XQGHUHVWLPDWHGWKH6DODÀV LQJEULGJHVZLWKDJURXSWKDWKROGVWKH as “harmless, pious, and orthodox keys to Egypt’s democratic transition 0XVOLPVµZLWKGLPSROLWLFDOSURVSHFWV and the blueprint for the future politi- as described by Ed Husain, a senior cal system. As Brookings scholar Shadi IHOORZDWWKH&RXQFLORQ)RUHLJQ5HOD- Hamid explained, “The Brotherhood WLRQV  %XWQRZWKDW6DODÀ03V is a fact on the ground, and you have hold one out of every four parliamen- WRÀQGDZD\WRZRUNZLWKLWWRWDON tary seats, their policy prescriptions— ZLWKLW7KH86LVQRZIRUFHGWRWU\WR ranging from Islamic banking systems ÀQGDZD\WRFRH[LVWZLWKWKH%URWKHU- to prohibitions on alcohol and beach KRRGµ .KDQ %H\RQGWKHDGPLQ- tourism—can no longer be dismissed istration, a delegation of U.S. Senators as laughable pipe dreams (Ismail PHWZLWKPHPEHUVRIWKH%URWKHUKRRG E  and Freedom and Justice Party in With the Muslim Brotherhood’s )HEUXDU\LQDQHIIRUWWRQHJRWLDWH Freedom and Justice Party claiming a a resolution to Egypt’s indictment of decisive majority of the parliament’s American NGO employees over allega- elected seats, the United States has de- tions of operating illegally on Egyp- FLVLYHO\DIÀUPHG³DIWHU\HDUVRITXLHW WLDQVRLO :HUU 7KHLQFUHDVHG XQGHUWKHUDGDUHQJDJHPHQWZLWK frequency of meetings and dialogue Brotherhood MPs—the strategic neces- EHWZHHQ86SROLF\PDNHUVDQGWKHLU sity of initiating open and high-level Islamist counterparts indicates that FRQWDFWVZLWKWKHSDUW\·VOHDGHUVKLS Washington regards the Brotherhood As evidenced by the heavily publi- DVWKHXQFKDOOHQJHGSRZHUEURNHUDQG FL]HGPHHWLQJEHWZHHQ86'HSXW\ LQWHUORFXWRUIRUGLSORPDF\ZLWKWKH

1616 0oLitiCaL SUCCess oF %GyPts SaLals 4ests 5S SUPPort For DemoCraCy post-Mubarak Egypt. of impoverished Egyptians reliant on WKHLUFKDULW\DQGSDWURQDJH6DODÀV While Washington may have come ZLOOUHPDLQDQLQÁXHQWLDOSRZHUEURNHU DURXQGWRWKHLGHDRIZRUNLQJZLWK in the post-Mubarak political order. the more moderate strand of political $OWKRXJKWKH6DODÀSROLWLFDOGLVFRXUVH Islam represented by the Freedom and ZLWKLWVHOHPHQWVRILQWROHUDQFHDQG -XVWLFH3DUW\WKHSURVSHFWRIZRUNLQJ fundamentalism, is deeply troubling ZLWKKDUGOLQH6DODÀVZKRGUDZLQVSL- to many U.S. policy makers, refusing ration from Saudi Arabia’s ultracon- WRHQJDJHZLWKFRQVHUYDWLYH,VODPLVWV servative clerical establishment is a far ZRXOGSXVKWKHPIXUWKHUWRZDUGWKH PRUHELWWHUSLOOWRVZDOORZ7KHSROLWL- ideological fringe of Egyptian soci- FDOVXFFHVVRI6DODÀVKDVFRQIURQWHG ety by casting them as illegitimate 86SROLF\PDNHUVZLWKWKHSHUHQQLDO opponents of liberal democracy. As dilemma of democracy promotion: -RQDWKDQ%URZQDSURIHVVRURI,VODPLF supporting free and fair elections in 6WXGLHVDW*HRUJHWRZQQRWHVPDU- (J\SWPD\YHU\ZHOOHPSRZHULOOLEHUDO JLQDOL]LQJ6DODÀVFRXOGEDFNÀUHE\ SROLWLFDOIRUFHVZKRVHDJHQGDVDUHDW UDGLFDOL]LQJWKHPIXUWKHU2QWKHRWKHU RGGVZLWK$PHULFDQYDOXHVRIVHFXODU KDQG%URZQSUHGLFWV´WKHGHPRFUDWLF governance, religious pluralism, and process, political involvement, and HTXDOULJKWV%XWZKLOH86RIÀFLDOV HOHFWRUDODFFRXQWDELOLW\ZLOOFRQWLQXH PD\EHUHOXFWDQWWRHQJDJHZLWK WRPRGHUDWH6DODÀYLHZVDQGSROLFLHV (J\SW·V6DODÀVLWZRXOGEHDVWUDWH- RYHUWKHORQJWHUPµ %URZQ  gic error to forgo an opportunity for HQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKHVHFRQGODUJHVW Although the U.S. Embassy’s deci- political faction in Egypt’s postrevo- VLRQWRPHHWZLWKUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIWKH OXWLRQDU\JRYHUQPHQW7KHRQO\ZD\ 6DODÀ1RXU3DUW\LQ&DLURLQ-DQXDU\ for the United States to maintain UDLVHGVRPHH\HEURZVLQ:DVK- OHJLWLPDF\DQGOHYHUDJHZLWK(J\SW·V LQJWRQWKLVJHVWXUHZDVDSRVLWLYHVWHS QHZOHDGHUVLVWRUHFRJQL]HWKHPDV WRZDUGWKHSROLF\RIHQJDJHPHQWWKDW legitimately elected representatives is crucial to maintaining U.S. lever- RIWKHSHRSOHKRZHYHUWKHLUYDOXHV DJHZLWKWKH(J\SWLDQJRYHUQPHQW DQGSROLWLFDODJHQGDPD\FRQÁLFWZLWK Egypt’s next leaders, regardless of their international human rights standards. LGHRORJLFDOGLVSRVLWLRQZLOOEHXQOLNHO\ 5DWKHUWKDQVKXQHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKH WRULVNGHVWDELOL]LQJDELODWHUDOSDUWQHU- 6DODÀV³DPRYHWKDWFRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\ ship that yields considerable economic VWLJPDWL]HDQGUDGLFDOL]HWKHPIXU- DQGVHFXULW\EHQHÀWV =D\DQ %XW ther—the United States should employ at the same time, Egypt could easily GLSORPDF\WRLQFHQWLYL]HFRPSOLDQFH WXUQHOVHZKHUH³WKH*XOIPRQDUFKLHV ZLWKGHPRFUDWLFSULQFLSOHVLQH[FKDQJH Russia, and China—for support if the IRUWKHHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOUHZDUGV United States snubs an Islamist-domi- RIFRRSHUDWLRQZLWKWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV nated government. Already, in Febru- DU\DSURPLQHQW6DODÀSUHDFKHU 3DWKZD\VIRU86(QJDJHPHQW reacted to the controversial indictment ZLWK(J\SW·V6DODÀV of American NGOs in Cairo by calling for an end to U.S. military and eco- $VORQJDV(J\SWLDQ6DODÀJURXSV nomic assistance to shield Egypt from FRQWLQXHWREHQHÀWIURPDVWHDG\ foreign intervention (Egypt Indepen- LQÁX[RI*XOIIXQGLQJDQGWKHOR\DOW\

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 1717 Commentary

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(XEHQ5R[DQQH/DQG0XKDPPDG4DVLP =DPDQ3ULQFHWRQUHDGLQJVLQ,VODPLVW thought: Texts and contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 1919 Islam and Government: Examining the Turkish Model BY MATTHEW COHEN

he nature of the relationship be- VHFXODULVP %XODo 0DQ\JURXSV TWZHHQUHOLJLRQDQGJRYHUQPHQW including Islamist groups, in Middle has been debated from the beginning Eastern countries have also expressed of recorded history. Of late, Western admiration for the Turkish model. democracies have largely been struc- +RZHYHUGHWDLOVRI7XUNLVKVHFXODU- tured as secular, albeit Christian, states. ism and its origins, goals, and ongoing Nations in predominantly Muslim changes have rarely been discussed in regions vary among secular dictator- these media. Without a clear under- ships, Islamic kingships, and theocra- standing of secularism in Turkey, it is cies. This is a time of ferment across a not possible to adequately debate the large number of Arab countries, and merits of the Turkish model or its ap- the road ahead for Muslim nations is plicability to other nations. This article, unclear. E\FOHDUO\GHÀQLQJWKH7XUNLVKPRGHO aims to more fully inform discussions Against this background, Turkey DERXWSRVVLELOLWLHVWKDWPD\IROORZWKH provides an important case study and Arab uprisings. This essay examines example of a predominantly Muslim, the emergence of the Turkish model democratic, and secular nation. It is DQGKRZWKHFXUUHQWUXOLQJSDUW\WKH QRW\HWFOHDUZKDWZLOOIROORZWKHVHULHV -XVWLFHDQG'HYHORSPHQW3DUW\ NQRZQ of democratically inspired revolutions most often by its Turkish acronym, NQRZQSRSXODUO\DVWKH$UDE6SULQJ $.3 XQGHUVWDQGVDQGSUDFWLFHVVHFX- $IHZFRXQWULHVKDYHKHOGHOHFWLRQV larism in an Islamic country. Against some are in transition, and others are that background, debate must con- VWLOOHQJDJHGLQFRQÁLFW:KDWV\V- WLQXHDQGRWKHUVPXVWGHFLGHZKHWKHU WHPVRIJRYHUQPHQWZLOOHPHUJHDQG aspects of the Turkish model might be ZKDWUROHWKHVH0XVOLPFRXQWULHVZLOO applied to Arab nations. choose for the relationship of religion and government is also uncertain. In 6HFXODULVPDQGWKH5LVHRIWKH the West, numerous media commen- AKP tators have argued that Arab states VKRXOGIROORZWKH´7XUNLVKPRGHOµRI 3ULRUWRWKH$.3·VULVHWRSRZHULQ VHFXODULVPLQ7XUNH\ZDVGHÀQHG

20 Islam and Government

E\VHOISURFODLPHG.HPDOLVWVZKR often look to make radical changes to EHOLHYHGWKH\ZHUHIROORZLQJWKHGH- society and the political order. sires of the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk. There are three central The AKP’s secularism has its roots ideas that drive Kemalism: the state in more extremist Islamic parties of VKRXOGEHIUHHIURPUHOLJLRXVLQÁX- WKHV3UHYLRXV,VODPLVWSDUWLHV HQFHWKHVWDWHVKRXOGFRQWUROUHOLJLRXV often looked to change the structure SUDFWLFHVDQGUHOLJLRQDQGSXEOLFOLIH of the Turkish state and make severe VKRXOGEHFRPSOHWHO\VHSDUDWH

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 2121 Commentary

services and drive some aspects of (UGRJDQLQD6HSWHPEHUVSHHFK government policy. The AKP employs LQ(J\SWVDLGWKDWKHYLHZVVHFXODULVP grassroots efforts on the basis of reli- as ensuring the government does not gious ties, its members often endeavor- LQWHUIHUHZLWKUHOLJLRXVSUDFWLFHV+H LQJWRFKDQJHODZVLQ7XUNH\WRDOORZ argued the state must stay equidistant for greater freedom of expression for from all religions (Associated Press 6XQQL0XVOLPFLWL]HQVDQGRUJDQL]D-  7XUNLVK'HSXW\3ULPH0LQLVWHU tions. The AKP is, therefore, a synthesis %XOHQW$ULQFKDVVWDWHGWKDWWKHGHÀQL- party that blends secular and religious tion of secularism should be debated policies, but it does so from a platform and argued that secularism should RIUHOLJLRXVOHJLWLPDF\ )LQGOH\  become a mechanism for social peace and compromise rather than a tool for ([SORULQJ7XUNLVK0XVOLP6HFX- VWDWHFRQWURORIUHOLJLRQ

2222 Islam and Government he has also said that “before anything Religion in Public Life HOVH,DPD0XVOLPµ

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 2323 Commentary

WKH'5$5HOLJLRQFODVVHVZHUHLQWUR- some measure of control over splinter GXFHGE\WKHPLOLWDU\DIWHUWKH groups or minorities in their country coup in order to undermine funda- and both desire the unity of the state: mentalist religious schools and teach a the AKP under Islamic nationalism state-approved version of Islam (Pope and the Kemalists under Turkish DQG3RSH5DEDVDDQG/DUUDEHH nationalism. The AKP has furthered  0DQ\QRQ6XQQL0XVOLPVKDYH a system created by the Kemalists in objected to the religion classes as they ZKLFKQRQ6XQQL0XVOLPVDUHUH- teach only Sunni Muslim thought SUHVVHGDQGKDVVKRZQOLWWOHGHVLUH 2OJXQ 'HVSLWHKRSHVWKH$.3 to include non-Sunni Muslims in its ZRXOGFDQFHOWKHFODVVHVRUDOORZRWKHU SDUW\:KLOHWKH$.3DOORZVRWKHU Muslim religious groups to have a faiths to practice their religions, Sunni YRLFHLQWKHPWKHQHZ$.3DSSRLQWHG Islam receives preferential treatment, '5$GLUHFWRU0HKPHW*RUPH]VWDWHG receiving state backing (as it did under that religion classes need no changes WKH.HPDOLVWV DQGWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\WR and are crucial because: “You may not guide government policy (as it did not be a believer but you have to learn the XQGHU.HPDOLVP  basics of this social reality for healthy UHODWLRQVµ 'HPLUWDV $JURXSRI Sharia and the AKP parents in Turkey, mostly Alevi Mus- While the AKP has not made calls lims, sued the government over these for sharia to be introduced, the party classes in the European Court of Hu- has pushed through for legal changes man Rights. The court ordered Turkey LQVSLUHGE\VKDULD %XEDORHWDO  to change its curriculum, but the AKP Islamist parties call for the entirety of has yet to fully do so. In September public life and government to be run WKH$.3GLGDJUHHWRLQFOXGH according to Muslim values (Aslan instruction on Alevi beliefs in the cur-  :KLOHWKH$.3KDVLQWURGXFHG ULFXOXPEXWWKLVKDV\HWWRPDWHULDOL]H PRUHODZVEDVHGRQ0XVOLPEHOLHIVLW $QDWROLD1HZV$JHQF\G  does not appear insistent that Islamic 7KH$.3·V$SSURDFKWR1RQ0XV- LGHDOVGHÀQHDOODVSHFWVRI7XUNLVKOLIH OLP)DLWKV In regards to European affairs, In regard to non-Muslim faiths, the Erdogan has stated that he has broken AKP has taken a moderate approach. ZLWKKLVPRUHDQWL(XURSHDQSDVW+H The other major religious groups VWDWHGLQDLQWHUYLHZWKDW´:H LQ7XUNH\DUH-HZVDQG&KULVWLDQV KDYHRSHQHGDQHZSDJHZLWKDQHZ :KLOH-HZVDQG&KULVWLDQVLQ7XUNH\ JURXSRISHRSOHDEUDQGQHZSDUW\ DUHODUJHO\DOORZHGWRZRUVKLSIUHHO\ ZHZHUHDQWL(XURSHDQ1RZZH·UH there have been setbacks, including SUR(XURSHDQµ 3RSHDQG3RSH  7XUNH\·VUHIXVDOWRDOORZ$UPHQLDQ ,QKLVÀUVWQHZVFRQIHUHQFHDIWHUWKH and Greek Christians to open churches $.3·VHOHFWLRQYLFWRU\(UGRJDQ (XURSHDQ8QLRQ 7KHVHSROLFLHV said, “We don’t plan to disturb any- are not unique to the AKP, as the same RQH·VZD\RIOLIHµ 3RSHDQG3RSH SROLFLHVZHUHHQIRUFHGE\WKH.HPDO-  ,QIDFWWKH$.3KDVEHHQPRUH ists, and the reasons for many of the ZLOOLQJWKDQDQ\SDUW\LQWKHSDVWWR restrictive policies are similar for both push for EU membership and to enact JURXSV%RWKJURXSVZLVKWRH[HUFLVH UHIRUPVWRZDUGWKDWHQG 3KLOOLSV

2424 Islam and Government

2QLV*O\SWLV 7KH$.3DOVR WRPHOGHFRQRPLFVXFFHVVZLWKUHOLJLRQ DSSHDUVWREHDZDUHWKDWLWPD\QRW by framing the economic issues as survive in Turkey if it relies on Islam to religious obligations both to prosper drive all its ideas, in large part because personally and to help those in need. the military might step in and stage a coup, as it has done many times in the The AKP, Women, and the Family SDVWLQDQHIIRUWWROLPLWWKHJURZWK ,QUHJDUGVWRZRPHQ·VLVVXHVWKH RIWKHSRZHURIUHOLJLRXVJURXSV7KH AKP holds a mixed record. The AKP AKP needs a democratic nation that implemented a program encourag- provides protections for civil and ing religious leaders to give sermons political rights in order to advance its against domestic violence. Moreover, VRFLDOFDXVHV 'DJL  the AKP has increased numbers of bat- (FRQRPLF3ROLF\ WHUHGZRPHQ·VVKHOWHUVWKURXJKRXWWKH FRXQWU\7KHPXUGHUUDWHIRUZRPHQ The AKP appeals to a broad range of KRZHYHULQFUHDVHGSHUFHQW interests and voters, including individ- EHWZHHQDQG $QDWROLD1HZV XDOVZKRSUHIHUWKH$.3·VHFRQRPLF $JHQF\F ,QWKH*OREDO*HQ- policies over policies offered by other GHU*DS,QGH[7XUNH\UDQNHGWK parties. Unlike previous Islamic parties RXWRIQDWLRQVRQZRPHQ·VULJKWV in Turkey, the AKP does not see the The report places some of the blame free market and Islam as incompat- directly on AKP policies (Hausmann ible. Previous Islamic parties opposed HWDO &RPPHQWVIURP$.3 the free market, citing competition as OHDGHUVVKRZZK\SURJUHVVKDVEHHQ harmful to societal harmony. The AKP VORZ0DQ\LQWKH$.3EHOLHYHWKDWD sees liberal economics as a means to ZRPDQ·VUHVSRQVLELOLW\LVWRKDYHFKLO- LPSURYHSHRSOH·VOLYHVZKLOHLWDOVR dren and maintain the house. Erdogan XQGHUVWDQGVVXFKSROLFLHVFDQZLQ has stated that he does not believe in YRWHV %XEDORHWDO7XJDO  gender equality, and that rather than The business realm used to belong to ÀQGHPSOR\PHQWZRPHQVKRXOGKDYH the Kemalists, but the AKP has begun WKUHHEDELHVDQGÀQGIXOÀOOPHQWLQ WRSXVKEHOLHYHUVWRZDUGHFRQRPLF home life or though volunteering for success and remove the free market as WKH$.3 3RSHDQG3RSH +H a bastion of Kemalism. KDVFULWLFL]HGWKHXVHRIFRQWUDFHSWLRQ %UHPPHU DQGRSSRVHGRSHQLQJ While these economic policies have QHZGD\FDUHFHQWHUV (FRQRPLVW  FRQWULEXWHGWRWKHUDSLGO\JURZ- ing Turkish economy, they have also Erdogan has also expressed concern increased economic inequality and over the increase in the divorce rate. consequentially increased the need +HVWDWHGWKDWZKHQWKH$.3DWWHPSWV IRUVRFLDOVHUYLFHVDVZHOO7KH$.3 WRZULWHDQHZFRQVWLWXWLRQKHSODQV has encouraged the use of Islamic WRLQFRUSRUDWHQHZUXOHVWKDWZRXOG QHWZRUNVVXSSOHPHQWLQJWKHVHUYLFHV provide “guarantees for the integrity provided by the state, to help provide of the family.” While his exact inten- DVVLVWDQFHIRUWKHQHHG\

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 2525 Commentary

JXHG´2QHPDMRUGLIIHUHQFH>EHWZHHQ VLRQZDVQHHGHGIRUFRQFHUWVWRVHUYH secularists and the Islamists is] the alcohol, and alcohol could not appear Kemalists’ strong belief in ‘modernity,’ in ads. The most controversial change VSHFLÀFDOO\DPRGHUQLW\FKDUDFWHU- ZKLFKZDVODWHUVWUXFNGRZQE\7XU- L]HGE\DQHPSKDVLVRQWKHVXSHULRU- NH\·VWRSDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFRXUW ZDVWKH ity of individualistic, goal-seeking LQFUHDVHLQWKHGULQNLQJDJHIURPWR behavior over deference to ‘traditional’  $QDWROLD1HZV$JHQF\D  forms of family and communal au- WKRULW\³HVSHFLDOO\ZKHQWKHODWWHU While the TAPDK insisted there FRQYHUJHGZLWK,VODPLFGRFWULQHDERXW ZDVQRLGHRORJLFDOFRPSRQHQWWRWKH WKHSODFHRIZRPHQLQWKHKRPHLQ restrictions, opposition politicians cite UHODWLRQVZLWKLQWKHIDPLO\DQGYLVj the “oppressive mentality” the AKP YLVPHQµ :KLWH $VDQH[DPSOH HQIRUFHGXSRQWKRVHZKROLYHDVHFXODU it seems likely that religious convic- lifestyle. Erdogan has publicly noted tion also drove the AKP to attempt to his disapproval for alcohol consump- FULPLQDOL]HDGXOWHU\LQ 5DEDVD WLRQDQGLQVWDWHGKHGLGQRWXQ- DQG/DUUDEHH ,QWKHHQGXQGHU GHUVWDQGZK\SHRSOHGULQNZKHQWKH\ extremely heavy pressure from the EU FRXOGMXVWHDWWKHJUDSHV %%&  DQGLQWHUQDOIRUFHVWKH$.3ZLWKGUHZ Arinc, Turkey’s deputy prime minis- the proposal. Nevertheless, the inci- ter, stated there are limits on freedom, GHQWKLJKOLJKWHGWKHLQFUHDVLQJSRZHU including freedom for adults to drink of Islamic ideals in Turkey. $QDWROLD1HZV$JHQF\E ,WLVFX- ULRXVWKDWWKHVHQHZUHJXODWLRQVZHUH Alcohol and the AKP implemented just for the purpose of protecting youth, as TAPDK claimed, The consumption of alcohol has been DVIHZFRXQWULHVFRQVLGHU\RXWKWREH DVRXUFHRIFRQWHQWLRQEHWZHHQVHFXODU- PRUHWKDQWZHQW\\HDUVRIDJH7KH ists and the AKP. Sunni Islam forbids FKDQJHVZHUHOLNHO\LPSOHPHQWHGWR drinking alcohol, and the AKP has please Erdogan. Secular groups have repeatedly placed restrictions on its noted their opposition to the changes, sale and consumption. Before becom- but their demands have been met ing prime minister, Erdogan served as ZLWKKRVWLOLW\(UGRJDQ·VUHVSRQVHWR the mayor of Istanbul. While mayor, he WKHRXWFU\ZDV´/HWWKHPGULQNXQWLO banned the serving of alcohol in dining WKH\VSHZXSµ .L]LOWDQ :KLOH IDFLOLWLHVRZQHGE\WKHFLW\ %UHPPHU WKHVHQHZJRYHUQPHQWSROLFLHVKDYH  :KHQWKH$.3FDPHWRSRZHULQ not banned the consumption of alcohol WKHHOHFWLRQVLWLPSRVHGPDVVLYH outright, they certainly have made it VAT increases on alcohol (Erimtan more expensive and, therefore, less ac-  (DUO\LQWKH$.3DS- cessible to the people. The AKP’s poli- pointed Tobacco and Alcohol Market FLHVRQDOFRKRODUHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH 5HJXODWRU\$XWKRULW\ 7$3'. SODFHG party’s belief that individuals living QHZOLPLWVRQWKHFRQVXPSWLRQRI under a democratic government are DOFRKRO&DWHULQJÀUPVZHUHUHVWULFWHG subject to religious constraints. IURPVHOOLQJDOFRKRODWRXWGRRUZHG- GLQJVDOFRKROVDOHVZHUHEDQQHGDW 7KH(GXFDWLRQ6\VWHP PXQLFLSDOLW\RZQHGHVWDEOLVKPHQWV sports teams could not use the names The AKP has also altered the school- RIDOFRKROLFGULQNVZULWWHQSHUPLV- ing system in Turkey. The basis of

2626 Islam and Government

Turkey’s education system is a mod- H[LVWEXWZLWKVLJQLÀFDQWUHVWULFWLRQV ern secular design similar to that of The AKP has mostly focused on us- WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV 0L]LNDFL ,Q ing Islam to provide services to those Turkey, the state operates both secular LQQHHGDQGFRQVHTXHQWLDOO\WRZLQ schools and religious schools (called elections, but has not used Islam as the ,PDP+DWLSRU,+/V 7RHQWHUD only force that guides the nation. The university in Turkey, one must earn main attributes of TMS can be summed DKLJKHQRXJKVFRUHRQDQDWLRQZLGH XSE\WKHIROORZLQJ706DOORZVIRU VWDQGDUGL]HGH[DP:KHQWKHPLOLWDU\ greater space in the public sphere for intervened in government affairs in religious opinions. It ensures that re- LWSODFHGVWXGHQWVZKRVWXGLHG ligious people have the right to shape at IHLs at a disadvantage by auto- their policy opinions according to their matically reducing their exam scores ZRUOGYLHZDQGWRDFWRQWKHVHRSLQ- 7XJDO 7KH$.3DGGUHVVHGWKLV ions. The state remains centered on E\LQWURGXFLQJOHJLVODWLRQWKDWZRXOG IXOÀOOLQJVHFXODUDQGQDWLRQDOLVWQHHGV restore lost exam points to those EXWLQGLYLGXDOVDUHDOORZHGWRSXEOLFO\ students in compensation. While there proclaim their faith, and individual ZDVDQRXWFU\IURPVHFXODUJURXSV liberties can sometimes be curtailed this step did not appear to stem from based on religious belief. TMS largely Islamic-centered motivations. In many accepts the principles of Kemalism and Western nations, religious schools VHFXODULVPIRUKRZWKHVWDWHVKRXOG are an accepted part of the education operate but believes that the behav- system and can be highly regarded. ior of individuals can and should be The IHLs teach the same curriculum as dictated by religious values. The AKP WKHQRQUHOLJLRXVVFKRROVZKLOHUHTXLU- ZDQWVWRSURWHFWUHOLJLRQIURPWKHVWDWH ing students take additional classes EXWRQO\LQWKHVHQVHWKDWLWZDQWV RQ,VODP .XUX ,QIDFW$.3 Muslim, especially Sunni Muslim, VXSSRUWHUVVDZWKHOLIWLQJRIWKH,+/ groups to be free to practice their faith restrictions not as Islamist but as an in public and express their opinions. opportunity to encourage individuals $WWKHVDPHWLPHWKH$.3ZDQWVWR to embrace religion and professional- maintain control of religious practice LVP 7XJDO 7KH$.3·VDOWHUDWLRQV through the DRA. TMS mainly applies to Turkey’s schooling system thus WR0XVOLPJURXSV,VODPLVDOORZHGWR represent the party’s overall emphasis LQÁXHQFHSXEOLFGHFLVLRQVDQGLVDOVR on both religion and secularism. protected in the system. Other faiths are not granted the same social or gov- .H\3RLQWVRI7XUNLVK0XVOLP ernmental acceptance or protections. 6HFXODULVP :KLOHWKHJRDORI706LVWRÀQGD Overall, the AKP attempts to in- EDODQFHEHWZHHQ,VODPVHFXODULVPDQG crease the role of Islam in the govern- democracy, TMS gives a special role to PHQWZKLOHVWLOOUHVSHFWLQJVHFXODUSRS- Islam in the affairs of the state. Along ulations. While the AKP has instituted WKHVHOLQHV706YLHZV,VODPQRW VLJQLÀFDQW,VODPLFLQVSLUHGFKDQJHVLW nationality, as the unifying mechanism has not abandoned Turkish national- for society and as a key in relations to ism or turned the state into a religious other Muslim states. The method of WKHRFUDF\7KH$.3KDVDOORZHGVHFX- accomplishing this shift in secularism lar life and minority religious sects to

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 2727 Commentary

LVE\ZRUNLQJZLWKLQWKHV\VWHPDQG In this regard, Turkey’s institutions through legitimate democratic means. have been kept secular. The legislative TMS seeks to defend pluralism, human and judicial processes are not in the ULJKWVDQGWKHUXOHRIODZEXWORRNV institutional control of a religious body to greatly increase the role of religion, LQIDFWLWLVWKHRWKHUZD\DURXQGWKH VSHFLÀFDOO\6XQQL,VODPZLWKLQWKDW JRYHUQPHQW·V'5$FRQWUROVUHOLJLRQ  UXOHRIODZ)XUWKHUWKH$.3KDVXQ- and the constitution maintains tech- like most previous Islamic parties in QLFDOQHXWUDOLW\WRZDUGDOOUHOLJLRQV Turkey, embraced the free market. The .XUX  AKP believes that Islam is the path to creating a more harmonious, moral, Religion plays a limited, but impor- and ethical society. Thus, the AKP has tant, role in AKP decision making. The attempted to change Turkish culture AKP is trying to stand for both Turkey E\LQFUHDVLQJWKHLQÁXHQFHRI,VODPWR DQG,VODPDQGLVDWWHPSWLQJWRÀQGD achieve that goal. Just as the Kemal- V\QWKHVLVEHWZHHQWKHWZRWKDWEHQHÀWV LVWVQDWLRQDOL]HGWKHLUVHFXODUZD\RI ERWK7KHUHDUHPDQ\FDVHVZKHUHWKH life and made it the cultural norm, AKP has pursued an “Islamic” agenda. ,VODPLFDFWRUVDUHQRZQDWLRQDOL]LQJ +RZHYHULWLVQRWMXVW,VODPWKDWGULYHV their Islamic-based culture (Turam WKHSDUW\1DUURZO\UHOLJLRXVSDUWLHV  7KH$.3KDVEHHQYHU\VXFFHVV- have not been successful in modern ful in Turkey’s economic affairs and GHPRFUDFLHVDWOHDVWQRWRQHVZLWK LVQRWOLNHO\WRMHRSDUGL]HWKDWVXFFHVV VL]DEOHPLQRULWLHV$VDPRGHOIRU$UDE by pushing the country too far and too FRXQWULHVWKH$.3KDVVKRZQWKDW IDVWWRZDUG,VODP UHOLJLRXVSDUWLHVFDQVXFFHHGZKHQ they appeal to a large segment of the 3ROLWLFDO,VODPLFQHWZRUNVKDYH SRSXODWLRQQRWVLPSO\WRWKHLURZQ DOZD\VH[LVWHGLQ7XUNH\7KH$.3KDV ideological constituents. VLPSO\HQFRXUDJHG,VODPLFQHWZRUNVWR more safely express their faith publicly The Arab Spring nations must decide and to become more politically ac- IRUWKHPVHOYHVZKDWPRGHOVWKH\ZLOO tive. The AKP believes that democracy choose regarding the future relation- includes the freedom to live a conser- VKLSEHWZHHQUHOLJLRQDQGVWDWH7KH\ vative religious lifestyle, and it tries to have Western models, but these are DFKLHYHLWVJRDOVE\VWD\LQJZLWKLQWKH ODUJHO\IURPFRXQWULHVZLWKRYHU- boundaries of a democratic system. A ZKHOPLQJO\&KULVWLDQSRSXODWLRQV key component of TMS is that it largely In Turkey, a close neighbor, the Arab accepts Kemalism for the state but not Spring nations have a different kind for the individual. of model—an Islamic secularist one. 7KHJRYHUQPHQWVWKDWZLOODULVHLQWKH The leaders of the AKP are not Arab Spring nations, and those in the generally Islamic theorists or scholars. West that hope to guide these nations They are far more interested in pro- and aid them in their transitions, may moting “everyday Islam,” for example, EHQHÀWIURPDGHHSHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ the increased taxes on alcohol (Rabasa of the Turkish model. Its history and DQG/DUUDEHH 7KH$.3EHOLHYHV practices have useful lessons to teach. that religious policies can control an The AKP has created a democratic individual’s actions so long as the gov- V\VWHPLQZKLFKVHFXODUDQGUHOLJLRXV ernment continues to be democratic. populations are largely free to express

2828 Islam and Government their opinions and desires. While there REFERENCES LVVRPHWLPHVFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQUHOLJLRXV $QDWROLD1HZV$JHQF\D1HZDOFRKROUXOHV persons and secularists (as in the case trigger call for sober assessment in Turkey. Hur- RIWKHDOFRKROUHJXODWLRQV VXFKGLV- UL\HW'DLO\1HZV-DQXDU\ DJUHHPHQWVDUHGHEDWHGSXEOLFO\ZLWK- ³³³E&+3FRQGHPQVGHSXW\7XUNLVK RXWYLROHQFHDQGDUHGHFLGHGZLWKLQ PM’s remarks on sex, alcohol. Hurriyet Daily a democratic system of elections and 1HZV-DQXDU\ checks and balances. Overall, TMS is a PRGHOLQZKLFKUHOLJLRQSOD\VDFHQWUDO ³³³F0XUGHUDIDFWRIOLIHIRUZRPHQLQ 7XUNH\+XUUL\HW'DLO\1HZV)HEUXDU\ role in society and government but GRHVQRWVWLÁHRSSRVLQJYLHZSRLQWV,W ³³³G7XUNLVKVFKRROERRNVWRLQFOXGH took Turkey roughly ninety years after $OHYLVP+XUUL\HW'DLO\1HZV6HSWHPEHU its founding to create this system, and $VODQ5H]D+RZWRZLQDFRVPLFZDU it should not be assumed that it can 1HZ

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HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 2929 Commentary

Commission of the European Communities. 7XJDO&LKDQ3DVVLYHUHYROXWLRQ$EVRUE- Brussels: SEC. ing the Islamic challenge to capitalism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. )LQGOH\&DUWHU9DXJKQ7XUNH\,VODPQD- WLRQDOLVPDQGPRGHUQLW\1HZ+DYHQ&7

)ULHGPDQ7KRPDV/7KHZRUOGLVÁDW :DOEHUJ(ULF7XUNH\UHGUDZV6\NHV3LFRW 1HZ

*O\SWLV/HGD$JDSL7KHFRVWRIUDS- :KLWH-HQQ\%,VODPLVWPRELOL]DWLRQLQ prochement: Turkey’s erratic EU dream as a Turkey. Seattle: University of Washington Press. FODVKRIV\VWHPLFYDOXHV7XUNLVK6WXGLHV   

.L]LOWDQ%HUIX'LSORPDF\RQWKHEULQN )URP]HURSUREOHPVWR]HURWROHUDQFH+XUUL\HW 'DLO\1HZV)HEUXDU\

.XUX$KPHW76HFXODULVPDQGVWDWHSROL- FLHVWRZDUGVUHOLJLRQ&DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\ Press.

0HUDO=L\D/DwFLWHUHOLJLRQDQGVRFLRSR- litical dissociative personality disorder in Turkey. The Foreign Policy Centre.

0L]LNDFL)DWPD3URVSHFWVIRU(XURSHDQ integration: Turkish higher education. Higher (GXFDWLRQLQ(XURSH  

2OJXQ+DNDQ5HOLJLRQVWDWHUHODWLRQV in Turkey: The prospect of European Union membership and the Lutheran doctrine of the ´WZRNLQJGRPVµ5HOLJLRQ6WDWH 6RFLHW\   

2QLV=L\D'RPHVWLFSROLWLFVLQWHUQDWLRQDO norms and challenges to the state: Turkey-EU relations in the post-Helsinki era. Turkish Stud- LHV  

2]\XUHN(VUD1RVWDOJLDIRUWKHPRGHUQ Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

3KLOOLSV'DYLG/7XUNH\·VGUHDPVRIDF- FHVVLRQ)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV  

3RSH+XJKDQG1LFROH3RSH7XUNH\ unveiled: A history of modern Turkey. The Overlook Press.

5DEDVD$QJHODQG)6WHSKHQ/DUUDEHH The rise of political Islam in Turkey. RAND Cor- poration: National Defense Research Institute.

3030 Liberals, Islamists, and the Role of the Middle Class in the Demise of the Arab Autocracies BY ISHAC DIWAN

ABSTRACT:

his article argues that a split in the ruling class has driven the demise of the Tautocratic bargain in the Arab world, ushered in by the uprisings of 2010-2011. The bargain authoritarians struck with their societies in the recent decade is best char- acterized as a repressive regime that relied on a narrow elite base. This article explores the dynamic factors that have affected this bargain over time, in particular, the increased autonomy of the middle class, the rise of crony capitalism, the increased popularity of Political Islam among the middle class, and the “indignities” associated with unpopular foreign alliances. The recent political changes are interpreted as the moment when the middle class, traditionally allied with the autocrats and affected by these latent pull and push factors, preferred to “tip” its support to a transition toward a democratic settle- ment. The three-player model I develop is shown to explain the characteristics of the ongoing Arab Spring and the key future challenges facing the region better than the clas- sical autocratic bargain model. Introduction

0DQ\RIWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHUHFHQW$UDEXSULVLQJVDUHSX]]OLQJ:K\ GLGWKHVHXSULVLQJVRFFXUDWWKHHQGRIZKHQWKHUHZHUHQRDSSDUHQWGLUHFW triggers such as declines in subsidies or shifts in foreign alliances rather than VRPHWLPHLQWKHVZKHQWKHZHOIDUHVWDWHVWDUWHGEHLQJUROOHGEDFN":K\ GLGWKHUHYROXWLRQVEHJLQLQ7XQLVLDDQG(J\SWWKHFRXQWULHVZLWKVRPHRIWKH KLJKHVWHFRQRPLFJURZWKLQWKHUHJLRQLQWKHSUHFHGLQJIHZ\HDUVUDWKHUWKDQLQ FRXQWULHVVXFKDV6\ULDRU

7KHVHTXHVWLRQVDUHLPSRUWDQWDQGZLOORFFXS\UHVHDUFKHUVIRU\HDUVWRFRPH

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 31 Article

7KH$UDEZRUOGLVDWDFURVVURDGV liberal youth have been the leading ini- IDFLQJHQRUPRXVFKDOOHQJHVDVZHOODV tiators of the revolts across the region, opportunities that can lead to either the claim that the youth bulge caused a democratic path or an authoritarian the revolutions is not convincing. The retrenchment. In the absence of a better PHGLDQDJHLQWKH$UDEZRUOGLVWZHQ- understanding of the transformations W\ÀYHDVRSSRVHGWRWKLUW\VHYHQLQ that have led to the uprisings, reforms WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV,WLVZHOOHVWDEOLVKHG ZLOOUHPDLQORVHDQGFRQWUDGLFWRU\DQG that poor economic prospects are very can even be counterproductive from a threatening to this group, but one may long-term perspective. DVNZK\LWGLGQRWULVHEHIRUHLQ IRUH[DPSOHWKHPHGLDQDJHZDVWZHQ- In this article, my goal is to explore ty-four and the economic situation in the usefulness of structural approaches (J\SWDQG7XQLVLDZDVPXFKZRUVH to understanding recent change. The WKDQLQZKHQWKHHFRQRPLHVZHUH intellectual model that has been most JURZLQJDWSHUFHQWSHU\HDU7KXV commonly used to describe the lack the cause behind the rebellion by the RIGHPRFUDF\LQWKH$UDEZRUOGLV youth needs to be related to other fac- the autocratic or elite bargain model, tors that have changed over time. ZKLFKGHVFULEHVDGHDOVWUXFNEHWZHHQ Arab autocrats and their populations, The goal of this article is to offer an ZKHUHE\WKHIRUPHUGHOLYHUHFRQRPLF DOWHUQDWLYHYLHZWKDWLVEHWWHUDGDSWHG security in the form of jobs and a WRVW\OL]HGIDFWV,DUJXHWKDWWKHDX- VWURQJZHOIDUHVWDWHDQGWKHODWWHU WKRULWDULDQEDUJDLQLQWKH$UDEZRUOG forgo their political rights (the seminal in the past decade is better character- paper in this literature is from Gandhi L]HGDVDFORVHDOOLDQFHEHWZHHQHOLWH DQG3U]HZRUVNL 7KLVYLHZRI capital and elements of the middle WKHZRUOGVXJJHVWVWKDWVXFKDEDUJDLQ FODVVWKDWGHOLYHUHGHFRQRPLFEHQHÀWV ZRXOGIDFHWHQVLRQVDQGSRVVLEOHFRO- to the coalition members. The poor in ODSVHZKHQWKHVWDWHLVUROOHGEDFNLQ WKHPHDQWLPHZHUHGHQLHGHFRQRPLF response to more scarcities. This model advantages and their political move- is unsatisfying in explaining the Arab PHQWVZHUHVHYHUHO\UHSUHVVHG7KH Spring because the state started being model presented in this article sug- UROOHGEDFNPRUHWKDQWZHQW\ÀYH JHVWVWKDWWKH$UDE6SULQJRI \HDUVDJRDIWHUWKHÀUVWFROODSVHRIRLO is the result of long-term changes in prices. This then begs the question of factors that affected the relative incen- ZKDWLWLVWKDWVXVWDLQHGDXWRFUDFLHV tives of the middle class, a pivotal during this long interim period. The player, to support the ruling regimes LGHDRIDEDUJDLQZRXOGLPSO\WKDW and encouraged them instead to defect ZKHQWKHVWDWHKDGWRUHGXFHHFRQRPLF and support a transition to a demo- EHQHÀWVWRWKHSRSXODWLRQLWZRXOG cratic order. compensate by offering greater politi- FDOULJKWV+RZHYHUWKLVLVQRWZKDW The analysis starts by arguing that happened in much of the region. the middle class had become more autonomous in the recent past as a Others have attributed the onset of result of market-based reforms. It then the revolts to the Arab youth bulge focuses on three factors to explain the 'KLOORQDQG

3232 Liberals, Islamists, and the Role of the Middle Class

HYHU\ZKHUH RI´EUHDGOLEHUW\DQG In the next section, the article dis- national dignity.” First, I argue that FXVVHVWKHLQVXIÀFLHQFLHVRIWKHVLPSOH HFRQRPLFOLEHUDOL]DWLRQLQDQHQYLURQ- autocratic bargain model in under- ment of heavy repression, favored the VWDQGLQJWKHUHFHQWSDVWDVZHOODVWKH GHYHORSPHQWRIDORZJURZWKFURQ\ UHYROXWLRQVRI7KHDUWLFOH FDSLWDOLVPZKLFKLQFUHDVHGLQHTXDOLW\ then develops an alternative model to the detriment of the middle class ZLWKWKUHHSOD\HUVDQGQRQHFRQRPLF and had a poor record creating skilled considerations to explore the condi- jobs and delivering quality services. WLRQVXQGHUZKLFKWKHPLGGOHFODVVFDQ Second, increased repression led to the VKLIWIURPDQDOOLDQFHZLWKWKHDXWRFUDW abuse of human rights that increasing- to democratic regime. It next offers ly became unacceptable to the middle a cursory look at the evidence and class. And third, the support provided describes the dynamic factors leading by the West to the autocratic order cre- to the uprisings. Finally, the article con- DWHGD´GLJQLW\JDSµEHWZHHQSRSXODU FOXGHVE\GUDZLQJRXWWKHHFRQRPLF preferences and policies. and political challenges of the future.

Superimposed on this class analy- 7KH&ODVVLFDO$XWRFUDWLF%DUJDLQ VLVLVDQLPSRUWDQWVHFXODULVW,VODPLF 0RGHO'LFWDWRUVDQG&LWL]HQV GLFKRWRP\ZKLFKKDVSOD\HGDQLP- portant role in political developments It is useful to start the analysis by RYHUWKHSDVWIHZGHFDGHV,QWKHSDVW UHYLHZLQJWKHVWDQGDUGPRGHORI VHFXODULVPDQGVRFLDOOLEHUDOLVPZHUH autocratic bargains used to explain the popular among the rich and middle QDWXUHRISRZHUUHODWLRQVLQWKH$UDE FODVVDQG,VODPLFPRYHPHQWVZHUH ZRUOG *DQGKLDQG3U]HZRUVNL popular among the poor. Islamic 'HVDLHWDO 7KHPRGHOKDVWZR parties (and there is a large range SOD\HUVDQDXWRFUDWDQGFLWL]HQVWKH\ RIWKHPIURPUDGLFDOWRPRGHUDWH  HQJDJHLQDUHSHDWHGWZRSHULRGJDPH became the main opposition to the and bargain over the distribution of UXOLQJDXWRFUDWVDQGWKH\ZHUHKHDY- HFRQRPLFEHQHÀWVDQGWKHVHWWLQJRI ily repressed. Secularists felt threat- noneconomic policies. The autocrat HQHGE\,VODPLFPRYHPHQWVZKLFK PRYHVÀUVWDQGRIIHUVFLWL]HQVDEXQGOH WKH\IHDUHGZRXOGUHGXFHWKHLUFLYLO of economic goods (jobs, subsidies, rights, and this pushed them to seek support for particular regions and the autocrat’s protection. Over time, JURXSV DQGQRQHFRQRPLFJRRGV KRZHYHU,VODPLVWSDUWLHVEHFDPHPRUH (such as social policies, some limited moderate and more popular among DPRXQWRIFLYLOULJKWV ,QUHVSRQVH the middle class. The preferences of the FLWL]HQVPXVWGHFLGHZKHWKHUWRDFFHSW middle class play an important role in the offered bargain or to engage in an its past support of autocracy and its effort to displace the autocrat, starting recent defection to support a transition DUHYROXWLRQZLWKDFHUWDLQSUREDELOLW\ WRGHPRFUDF\+RZHYHUWKHÁHGJLQJ RIVXFFHVV.QRZLQJWKLVWKHDXWRFUDW QHZGHPRFUDWLFRUGHUWKDWLVHPHUJLQJ ZLOOPDNHDQRIIHUWKDWLVDWWUDFWLYH ZKLFKEULQJVWRJHWKHU,VODPLFSDU- HQRXJKIRUFLWL]HQVWRJLYHXSWKHLU WLHVWKDWQRZGRPLQDWHWKHSRVW$UDE revolutionary option. In a cooperative 6SULQJODQGVFDSHZLWKVHFXODUOLEHUDOV HTXLOLEULXPFLWL]HQVSURYLGHWKHDXWR- constitutes a risky bet that may or may FUDWZLWKSROLWLFDOVXSSRUWDQGFRQVHQW not survive and consolidate. WRZLWKKROGWKHLUSROLWLFDOULJKWV HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 3333 Article

So autocrats are driven to compro- the evolution of Arab politics in a PLVHVXIÀFLHQWO\WRDYRLGFRVWO\LQVXU- UDWLRQDOIUDPHZRUNZKHUHLPSRUWDQW rections. They do so by transferring constituencies interact to produce a rents and subsidies and by deviating political settlement. In this section, I from their preferred social policies. DUJXHWKDWWRYLHZWKHSDVWVLWXDWLRQ Crucially, if they come under pressure, DVDQDXWRFUDWLFEDUJDLQEHWZHHQD they compromise more to keep the GLFWDWRUDQGFLWL]HQVLVWRRUHGXFWLRQLVW bargain alive. For example, if economic LWGRHVQRWH[SODLQWKHSDVWZHOODQG FRQGLWLRQVGHWHULRUDWHWKH\ZLOORIIHU it cannot explain the recent uprisings concessions on the social and political ZHOOHLWKHU side. :KHQFRQVLGHULQJWKHSDVWDYLHZ 9DULDQWVRIWKHVHPRGHOVDOORZIRU focused on an autocratic bargain fails the existence of critical constituencies WRH[SODLQZK\LWGLGQRWFROODSVH %XHQRGH0HVTXLWDHWDO$F- much earlier and also fails to ac- HPRJOXDQG5RELQVRQ UXOHUV count for the mix of co-optation and PD\ÀQGLWSURÀWDEOHWRWDUJHWIDYRUV repression that emerged in the past to some groups and to repress others. WZRGHFDGHV$ORRNDWNH\HFRQRPLF 7KXVJURXSVZLOOEHLQFOXGHGRUH[- performance indicators for the Arab cluded from the ruling coalition based developing countries as a group, from RQDFRVWEHQHÀWFDOFXOXV WRGHSLFWHGLQ)LJXUH reveals several marked trends. First, A Critique LWVKRZVWKDWWKHUROOEDFNRIWKHVWDWH EHJDQWZHQW\ÀYH\HDUVDJR*RYHUQ- 7KHUHDUHYDULRXVZD\VWRGHVFULEH

 Figure 1 ˆ Macroeconomic indicators. Notes: All variables are averages across the Middle East and North Africa developing coun- tries group, which includes 4unisia, Algeria, Morocco, 9emen, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Source: 7orld "ank /pen Data 7eb site.

3434 Liberals, Islamists, and the Role of the Middle Class

PHQWH[SHQGLWXUHVVKRWXSLQWKHV 7KHRQO\ZD\WKHDXWRFUDWLFEDUJDLQ — government expenditures peaked model can explain regime durability, DWSHUFHQWRIJURVVGRPHVWLFSURG- therefore, is by suggesting that to deal XFW *'3 LQZKLFKLVRXWVLGH ZLWKWKHGHFOLQHLQHFRQRPLFUHVRXUFHV the graph — on the back of rising oil and consequent social pressure, the ZHDOWKLQWKHUHJLRQEXWWKH\IHOOSUH- autocratic rulers relaxed political and FLSLWRXVO\LQWKHVUHDFKLQJSHU- social policy. But Figure 2 suggests that FHQWRI*'3LQWKHHDUO\VDORZ LQIDFWWKHRSSRVLWHKDVEHHQWKHFDVHLW ÀJXUHE\LQWHUQDWLRQDOVWDQGDUGV$Q- depicts freedom and repression indices ZDU6DGDWODXQFKHG(J\SW·V,QÀWDKLQ &LQJUDQHOOLDQG5LFKDUGVDOVR DQG7XQLVLD·VSULYDWHVHFWRUSXVK see the Cingranelli-Richards [CIRI] DOVREHJDQLQWKHVEXWLWLVLQWKH +XPDQ5LJKWV'DWDVHW )LUVW)LJXUH ODWHVWKDWWKHVHFRXQWULHVDQGRWK- illustrates the evolution of an index of ers started their structural adjustment SROLWLFDOULJKWVFDOOHGWKH(PSRZHU- programs that forced governments to PHQW5LJKWV,QGH[EHWZHHQDQG cut subsidies and public spending. The 7KHUHJLRQZDVSROLWLFDOO\OHVV UHIRUPVLQWKH$UDEZRUOGWHQGHGWR RSHQLQWKDQLQWKHPLGV hurt the poor (subsidies to agriculture ZLWKWKHDYHUDJHVFRUHIRUWKHUHJLRQ ZHUHGHHSO\FXWIRUH[DPSOH DVZHOO IDOOLQJIURPDKLJKRILQWKHHDUO\ DVWKHPLGGOHFODVV HVSHFLDOO\LQORZHU VWRLQRQDVFDOHIURPWR SXEOLFVHFWRUZDJHVDQGDVWRSWRKLU- ZLWKGHSLFWLQJFRPSOHWHGLFWDWRU- LQJ DQGWKH\OHGWRSURWHVWVDQGEUHDG ship. Today, this is broadly a fall from riots across the region, but they fell the level of a Turkey to the level of the VKRUWRIOHDGLQJWRGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ Democratic Republic of the Congo. This period consolidated the alliances EHWZHHQWKHDXWRFUDWVDQGHOLWHFDSL- 6RKRZGLGWKHDXWRFUDWVPDQDJH WDO%\WKHPLGVWKHROGVRFLDO WRVXUYLYH":KDWVHHPVXELTXLWRXV FRQWUDFWZDVDOUHDG\GHDG 'LZDQDQG DERXWWKH$UDEZRUOGDIWHUWKHVLV :DOWRQ  the mix of repression and co-optation. 7KHDXWRFUDWVVRXJKWWRPD[LPL]HWKH %XWWKDWZDVPRUHWKDQWZHQW\\HDUV XVHRIWKHLUGZLQGOLQJDVVHWVGLYLGLQJ ago. What sustained autocracies dur- FLWL]HQVLQWRWZRJURXSVRQHRIZKLFK LQJWKLVORQJLQWHULPSHULRG",Q/DWLQ EHQHÀWHGIURPFRRSHUDWLRQZKLOHWKH $PHULFD LQWKHV DQG$IULFD LQ RWKHUZDVVXEMHFWWRUHSUHVVLRQ)LJXUH WKHV VLPLODUVWUXFWXUDODGMXVW- 2 also depicts average levels of repres- ments had led to a near synchronous sion in the region, as measured by the ZDYHRIGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ6RPHKDYH Physical Integrity Index (also from argued that other forms of external &,5, RQDVFDOHIURPZKHUHLV UHQWVIRUH[DPSOHZRUNHUV·UHPLWWDQF- maximum repression. The average val- HVSOD\HGDUROH%XW)LJXUHVKRZV ue of the index for the Arab countries that remittances declined in impor- IHOOIURPLQWKHHDUO\VWRLQ tance over time. Moreover, remittances ZKLFKLVDIDOOIURPWKHOHYHORID usually travel directly to communities, %UD]LOWRWKHOHYHORI(WKLRSLD bypassing formal institutions, so it is hard to argue that this source of in- That repression has become an FRPHZDVDIDFWRULQWKHDXWRFUDWV·VXU- essential tool in the preservation of YLYDO2IÀFLDODVVLVWDQFHDOVRUHPDLQHG DXWRFUDWLFUHJLPHVLQWKHODWHVLV UHODWLYHO\ORZ also attested to by the level of spend- HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 3535 Article

Figure 2 ˆ Repression and freedom indexes Notes: 4he Physical Integrity Index is an additive index constructed from the torture, extraJudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 no government respect for these four rights to  full government respect for these four rights . 4he Empowerment Rights Index is an additive index constructed from the foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, workers rights, electoral self-determination, and freedom of religion indicators. It ranges from 0 no government respect for these seven rights to 1 full government respect for these seven rights . Source: Cingranell-Richards CIRI Human Rights Dataset 7eb site Cingranelli and Richards 1 .

LQJRQVHFXULW\PDWWHUV 'UR]9LQFHQW as the police and other secret agencies %HOOLQ 0LOLWDU\H[SHQGL- have, through the use of spies, inform- WXUHVDUHKLJKHULQWKH$UDEZRUOG ers, and Baltajia, appointed “their WKDQLQDQ\RWKHUUHJLRQDWDERXW men” in various civilian sectors and in- SHUFHQWRI*'3LQWKHHDUO\V3R- stitutions, including universities, labor lice and security forces have also been unions, professional associations, the beefed up in recent years to provide an PHGLDDQGHYHQWKHÀQDQFLDODQGEXVL- H[WUDOD\HURIVXSSRUW7KHDFWXDOVL]H ness sectors. Moreover, security forces of these forces in Egypt and Tunisia have been given access to economic EHIRUHWKHGRZQIDOORIWKHUHJLPHVLV UHQWVZKHQHYHUEXGJHWVKDYHEHFRPH debated, but conservative estimates WLJKWHU %HOOLQ  SXWWKHQXPEHUDWDVODUJHDVPLOOLRQ DQGPHQUHVSHFWLYHO\,QDOO With that said, autocrats also sought Arab countries, the government and to strengthen their coalition by co- the various state security agencies, RSWLQJWKHPLGGOHFODVVZKRZDV LQFOXGLQJWKH´0XNKDEDUDWµDVZHOO perceived as a pivotal ally because

3636 Liberals, Islamists, and the Role of the Middle Class

RILWVOHJLWLPL]LQJUROHZLWKLQWKH FRQYLQFLQJDFFRXQWRIZKDWKDSSHQHG dominant state narrative of national- ought to bring the middle class cen- LVPDQGPRGHUQL]DWLRQ&RRSWDWLRQ trally into the analysis. ZDVDFKLHYHGLQODUJHSDUWWKURXJK GLUHFWHFRQRPLFEHQHÀWVLQWKHIRUPRI ,QWKHPRGHOGHYHORSHGEHORZ, subsidies for goods that are consumed WDNHWKHYLHZWKDWWKHUHFHQWSROLWLFDO relatively less by the poor, such as changes resemble situations in Latin petroleum and energy (earlier, sub- $PHULFDDQG$VLDZKHUHVSOLWVZLWKLQ sidies for small-scale agriculture and the ruling coalition led to politi- IRUEDVLFIRRGLWHPVZKLFKEHQHÀWWKH FDOFKDQJH,IROORZWKHWUDGLWLRQRI SRRUKDGEHHQUHGXFHGRUHOLPLQDWHG  *XLOOHUPR$2·'RQQHOOHWDO   ,QWKHODVWGHFDGHWKHVHVXEVLGLHVJUHZ DFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKFUDFNVDSSHDULQ WREHFRPHDERXWSHUFHQWWKHFRP- QRQGHPRFUDWLFUHJLPHVZKHQWKH\JHW bined budget of health plus education under pressure, and there are often LQLQ(J\SWDQGSHUFHQWLQ GLYLGHVEHWZHHQKDUGOLQHUVZKRZDQW 7XQLVLD7KHVHVXEVLGLHVZHQWSUH- to use force and repression to preserve dominantly to the middle class and WKHV\VWHPDQGVRIWOLQHUVZKRSUHIHUD WKHULFK³LQ(J\SWIRUH[DPSOH soft transition to democracy. percent of the subsidies accrued to the %ULQJLQJLQWKH0LGGOH&ODVV$ WRSGHFLOHLQ $ERXOHLQHLQHWDO 7KUHH3OD\HU0RGHO  7KHVLWXDWLRQLQ6\ULDDQG,UDQLV DOVRVLPLODU$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHÀVFDO ,IRFXVRQDJDPHZLWKWKUHHJURXSV regime in most Arab countries had also — the rich, the middle class, and the become more pro-rich over time: tax poor — and take the initial situation to UDWHVKDYHEHHQUHODWLYHO\ORZDQGJHQ- EHRQHZKHUHWKHULFKFODVVLVLQFKDUJH erally regressive — for example, Egypt but as part of a coalition that includes KDVDÁDWSHUFHQWLQFRPHWD[DQG WKHPLGGOHFODVV0RUHRYHU,ZLOODV- DODUJHYDOXHDGGHGWD[ 9$7 $VD sume that the middle class is a pivotal result, underfunded universal services player in the sense that the rich cannot have decayed in most countries. UXOHDXWRFUDWLFDOO\ZLWKRXWLWWKLVLVWKH critical assumption alluded to earlier, The simple autocratic bargain model ZKLFK,GHIHQGLQPRUHGHWDLOLQWKH does not have much to say about the next section. Democracy can emerge if recent uprisings either. Focusing on it is supported by the middle class and WZRSOD\HUVRQO\VHHPVWRRUHGXFWLRQ- E\WKHSRRU,ZLOODOVRDVVXPHWKDWWKH ist to describe the onset of the upris- threat of revolutions, initiated by the ings and to apprehend the future. SRRULVFUHGLEOH)LQDOO\,ZLOODVVXPH $IRFXVRQWZRSOD\HUVRQO\ZRXOG that autocratic bargains that include suggest, for example, that Islamic a commitment to redistribute that movements, as representing the poor are not incentive-compatible ex post and as the main political actor that has are not credible. This means that to emerged in post-uprising elections, prevent the poor from taking over, the KDYHÀQDOO\ZRQWKHLUORQJIRXJKWEDW- UXOLQJFRDOLWLRQKDVRQO\WZRHIIHFWLYH tle against liberal autocrats. The reality FKRLFHVWRUHSUHVVRUWRGHPRFUDWL]H is more nuanced. The “revolutions” 6RLQHIIHFWGHPRFUDF\LVDZD\WR ZHUHLQIDFWOHGE\VHFXODUPLGGOHFODVV FKDQJHWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRISRZHUWKXV youth, not hardened Islamists. A more creating a credible commitment to pro-

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 3737 Article

poor policy. The focus is on a transition there is an optimum level of taxation from an autocratic regime to a demo- ti for each of the groups, and it is easy FUDWLFUHJLPHWKHLVVXHRIGHPRFUDWLF WRVKRZWKDWRSWLPDOO\Wr VLQFHWKH FRQVROLGDWLRQKRZHYHULVEH\RQGWKH ULFKGRQRWEHQHÀWRQQHWIURPUHGLVWUL- scope of this article. bution. To simplify the analysis further, ,ZLOODVVXPHLQWKHUHVWRIWKHVHFWLRQ My main goal is to explore the that the poor forms a majority and thus SRVVLEOHUHDVRQVZK\WKHLQWHUHVWVRI WKDWWKHPHGLXPWD[SD\HU DQGYRWHU  the rich and the middle class become is poor, that is, that yp y but ym!y. misaligned, leading the middle class This assumption implies that tm DV to split from the ruling coalition and ZHOODQGWKDWWp! support democracy. I adapt the form of the game from Daron Acemoglu Utility functions are taken to be lin- DQG-DPHV$5RELQVRQ  IROORZ- HDULQ DIWHUWD[ LQFRPHDQGDUHJLYHQ ing their notation for ease of reference. by: The game is over the determination i i of income redistribution, funded by a  9    W \ >W&  @y uniform income tax. Different income :HDUHQRZLQDSRVLWLRQWRGHVFULEH JURXSVZLOOKDYHYDU\LQJLQFHQWLYHV WKHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHJDPHZKLFKLVGH- ZLWKWKHULFKIDYRULQJDORZWD[DQG SLFWHGLQ)LJXUH$VWKHJDPHVWDUWV the poor favoring a high tax and large WKHULFKPRYHVÀUVWDQGGHFLGHVZKHWK- UHGLVWULEXWLRQ7KHVL]HRIHDFKJURXS er to develop an autocratic bargain is given by diZLWKL 503 VXP- ZLWKRXWUHSUHVVLRQ WRGHPRFUDWL]H PLQJXSWR ZKHUH5VWDQGVIRUULFK or to repress. Being a pivotal player M for middle class, and P for poor. ZKRVHVXSSRUWLVQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHULFK 'HQRWHWKH SUHWD[ LQFRPHRIHDFK WRVWD\LQSRZHUWKHPLGGOHFODVVWKHQ group by yi, the average income in the QHHGVWRPDNHWZRVHWVRIGHFLVLRQV economy by y, and the share of group ÀUVWWRHVWDEOLVKWD[UDWHVLQHDFKRIWKH i in the economy by hi (summing up to regimes (except in the democratic re-   JLPHZKHUHWKHWD[UDWHLVHVWDEOLVKHG We have: E\WKHPHGLDQYRWHU DQGVHFRQGWR GHFLGHZKHWKHULWZDQWVWRVXSSRUWWKH  \i Ki yGiIRUL 503 decision of the rich to repress or not. 7KHYDULRXVUHJLPHVZLOOEHUHSUH- We assume that: sented by the subscripts NO, D, and 2 12IRUQRUHSUHVVLRQZKLFKLVWKH  KrGr!KmGm!KpGp autocratic bargain, D for democracy, Which simply says that the rich is DQG2IRUUHSUHVVLRQZHZLOOUHVHUYH ULFKHUWKDQWKHPLGGOHFODVVZKLFKLV 5IRUUHYROXWLRQ 5HSUHVVLRQLVFRVWO\ richer than the poor. and reduces national income by K.

The political system determines a )LQDOO\WKHSRRUGHFLGHVZKHWKHUWR WD[UDWHW•WKHSURFHHGVRIZKLFK XQGHUWDNHDUHYROXWLRQRUQRWLWFDQGR are distributed in a lump sum fashion so in all cases except in the repression DPRQJDOOFLWL]HQV7KHUHLVDQDJJUH- UHJLPH,IWKHSRRUUHEHOVLWZLOOWDNH JDWHFRVWRIWD[DWLRQ& W \ZLWK&·  ! over and appropriate all the income DQG&··   ,QVXFKDQHQYLURQPHQW in the economy, but a fraction r of the

3838 Liberals, Islamists, and the Role of the Middle Class

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ƉŽŽƌWŽŽƌ DŝĚĚůĞĐůĂƐƐDŝĚĚůĞ ůĂƐƐ ĞŵŽĐƌĂĐLJ sŝͿ ZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ZĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ EŽ WŽŽƌƉŽŽƌ ZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ sŝ;Z͕ƌͿ sŝ;EKͿ sŝ;K͕<ͿͿ ZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ EŽZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ

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HFRQRP\ZLOOJHWGHVWUR\HGLQWKH QHWSURFHHGV:HZLOODVVXPHLQWKH process. sequel that this constraint holds. In the presence of some redistribution t, the ,WVXWLOLW\ZRXOGWKHQEH WKUHVKROGFRPHVGRZQPHDQLQJWKDW UHYROXWLRQVKDSSHQOHVVRIWHQPRUH  9p 5U   U yGp and JHQHUDOO\U W LVGHFOLQLQJLQWPHDQ- Vr 5U  9m 5U   ing that the higher the tax rate, the less rebelling becomes attractive. Denote 7KHSRRUZLOOEHEHWWHURIIQRWUHEHO- by r* the threshold that corresponds OLQJZKHQ to the poor optimal tax rate tp:HZLOO DOVRDVVXPHEHORZWKDWU!U ZKLFK  9p W !9p 5U HQVXUHVWKDWZKHQWKHSRRUFDQVHWLWV Where Vi W LVXWLOLW\ZKHQWKHUHLV preferred level of redistribution, it does no revolution and there is a tax rate t. not rebel.

5HYROXWLRQVWDNHSODFHZKHQWKH\ Let us start by determining the DUHQRWWRRFRVWO\8VLQJHTXDWLRQV   best move of the rich. The autocratic WR  ZHFDQGHULYHDWKUHVKROGOHYHO bargain regime is an inferior move of r that determines if the poor prefers KHUHDQGLWZLOOQRWEHVHOHFWHG7KLVLV WRUHEHORUQRWZLWK EHFDXVHLILWZHUHVHOHFWHGWKHPLGGOH FODVVZRXOGWKHQVHWWKHWD[UDWHDWW   U W   Kp ²W> Gp – hp Gp&  @  UHFDOOWKDWSUHFRPPLWPHQWVDUHQRW possible and that decisions must there- 1RWHWKDWZKHQW WKHVHFRQG fore be incentives compatible from an WHUPGLVDSSHDUVDQGZHDUHOHIWZLWK H[SRVWSHUVSHFWLYH DQGWKHSRRUZLOO WKHEDVLFUHYROXWLRQFRQVWUDLQWLQ rebel since the revolution constraint is the absence of any redistribution, the assumed to hold. So to the extent that SRRUZLOOVWDUWDUHYROXWLRQZKHQWKH RWKHUUHJLPHVGHOLYHUDZHOIDUHOHYHO costs of doing so are smaller than the DERYH]HURWKLVUHJLPHZLOOEHLQIHULRU

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 3939 Article

7KHULFKZLOOWKXVKDYHWRFKRRVHEH-  ,I.!.r both the rich and the WZHHQGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQDQGUHSUHVVLRQ PLGGOHFODVVSUHIHUGHPRFUDF\ZKLFK Under repression, the middle class is then the equilibrium. ZLOOGHWHUPLQHWKHWD[UDWHVHOHFWHG m DQGLWZLOOEH]HURJLYHQRXUDVVXPS-  ,I. . then both prefer tions. If the rich chooses repression, UHSUHVVLRQZKLFKLVWKHHTXLOLEULXP WKHPLGGOHFODVVZLOOKDYHWRGHFLGH  ,I.LVZLWKLQ>.m, Kr], then the ZKHWKHUWRDJUHHRUWRVSOLWDQGFKRVH middle class splits and there is a demo- GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ8QGHUGHPRFUDF\ cratic equilibrium. WKHWD[UDWHZLOOEHGHWHUPLQHGE\WKH PHGLDQYRWHUDQGZLOOEHJLYHQWKXVE\ 6WDUWLQJIURPDVLWXDWLRQZKHUHWKH p W W ,QHIIHFWWKHFKRLFHEHWZHHQWKH ruling group, both rich and middle WZRUHJLPHVZLOOGHSHQGRQZKHWKHU class, favors repression, movement in WKHUHSUHVVLRQFRVWVDUHDERYHRUEHORZ the exogenous variables can change a certain threshold. It is intuitive that the incentives of the middle class and WKHWKUHVKROGIRUWKHPLGGOHFODVVZLOO PDNHLWGHFLGHWRVSOLW7ZRYDULDEOHV EHORZHUWKDQWKDWIRUWKHULFKVLQFH are of particular interest: inequality its preferences are closer to that of and the cost of repression as perceived WKHSRRUHVSHFLDOO\ZKHQWKHULFKJHW by the middle class. Let us take these richer, making redistribution more in turn. attractive to the middle class. To see WKLVOHWXVFRPSDUHWKHWZRUHJLPHV When inequality rises in the sense IURPWKHSRLQWRIYLHZRIHDFKRIWKH that the rich gets a larger share of ULFKDQGWKHPLGGOHFODVV7KHZHOIDUH income to the detriment of the middle of the rich and the middle class in the class, the interests of the middle class repression regime, given a cost K for and those of the poor become more repression, is given by: aligned. As a result, there is more often GLVDJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQWKHULFKDQGWKH i i  9 2.   . \ ZLWKL 50 middle class about repression, and the PLGGOHFODVVZLOOIDYRUGHPRFUDF\RYHU $QGZHOIDUHXQGHUGHPRFUDF\JLYHQ repression more often. Formally, it is WKDWWKHWD[UDWHZLOOEHVHWDWWp is: easy to see that Km is increasing in hm.  9i '   W \i Wp& y 8QWLOQRZ,KDYHDVVXPHGWKDW &RPSDULQJWKHWZRHTXDWLRQVZH FLWL]HQVRQO\FDUHDERXWWKHLULQFRPH can derive: But in reality, there are ideological preferences that also color people’s  .i  Ki >Gi&  ²Wp (di – hi @  SUHIHUHQFHVRYHUUHJLPHV+HUHZHDUH L 50 FRQFHUQHGZLWKWKUHHDVSHFWVRIWKH preferences of the middle class: ,WLVHDV\WRVKRZWKHQWKDW.m .r JLYHQ    7KHSRVVLEOHH[WUDGLVXWLOLW\LW may perceive from a democratic order :HFDQQRZVWDWHRXUPDLQUHVXOW LILWWKLQNVWKDWWKHSRRUZLOODSSO\WKH values of Political Islam if it comes to Assume that dp! Kp !U! SRZHUDQGLILWRSSRVHVVXFKYLHZV IRU r*(tp WKHQ example, on issues such as secularism DQGFLYLOULJKWV

4040 Liberals, Islamists, and the Role of the Middle Class

2. The possible disutility it may IRUWKHZHOIDUHRIWKHRSSRVLWLRQZKHQ feel in a repressive autocracy if the LWWUXVWVWKDWWKHRSSRVLWLRQZLOOPDQ- SRRU,VODPLVWRSSRVLWLRQLVYLROHQWO\ DJHWKHHFRQRP\ZHOODQGZLOOQRWKXUW UHSUHVVHGZKLFKZRXOGGHSHQGRQLWV LWVFLYLOULJKWVDQGZKHQLWGLVOLNHVWKH YLHZVDERXW3ROLWLFDO,VODP policy conditions of pivotal foreign supporters of the autocratic regime.  )LQDOO\WKHXWLOLW\RUGLVXWLOLW\ ,QWKHGLVFXVVLRQEHORZZHZLOODUJXH it may feel in an autocracy relating to that these factors largely explain both the nature of other non-economic poli- WKHSHUVLVWHQFHRIWKHDXWRFUDWVDVZHOO FLHVIROORZHGLQWKHDXWRFUDWLFUHJLPH as the likely success (or lack of suc- such as foreign policy FHVV RIWKHUHFHQWUHYROWVLQWKHYDULRXV countries in leading to democracy. It is possible to introduce the middle- class ideological concerns into the $SSO\LQJWKH0RGHOWRWKH$UDE model in a simple fashion by assuming World that its utility function is additive in consumption and a term that captures The goal of this section is to convince the middle-class ideological prefer- the reader that the model described HQFHV,QSDUWLFXODUOHWXVQRZDVVXPH DERYHH[SODLQVZHOOWKHORQJHYLW\RI WKDWLWVXWLOLW\FDQEHZULWWHQDV\m%iy autocracy and its ultimate demise. The ZKHUHL 2'DQGZKHUHWKLVIDFWRULV model is parsimonious and reality is QRUPDOL]HGE\DYHUDJHLQFRPH6RIRU FRPSOH[VRWKHDUJXPHQWVZLOOEHQDW- H[DPSOHZKHQWKHPLGGOHFODVV´IHHOVµ urally impressionistic. More analysis at ZLWKWKHUHSUHVVHG,VODPLVWVZHZRXOG WKHFRXQWU\OHYHOZRXOGEHQHHGHGWR have Bo 7KHVDPHZRXOGKDSSHQ produce richer accounts. Nevertheless, ZKHQLWLVXQKDSS\ZLWKWKHH[WHUQDO WKHDQDO\VLVEHORZDLPVWRVKRZWKDW policy conditionality attached by piv- VXFKDFFRXQWVZRXOGQHHGWRORRNFDUH- otal foreign allies. If the middle class fully into the structure and incentives does not trust Islamists in a democracy, of the middle class and the role played ZHZRXOGWDNH%d to be negative and by crony capitalism. Arab politics can ODUJH,IWKDWPLVWUXVWGLVDSSHDUVDQG EHTXLWHZHOOGHVFULEHGE\UHIHUHQFH or if the middle class starts think- to three constituencies (rich, poor, and LQJWKDW,VODPLVWVZRXOGPDNHJRRG PLGGOHFODVV %XWZKLOHFODVVVWUXF- managers of the economy, or that their ture is preponderant, a major added YLHZVRQFLYLOULJKWVKDYHFKDQJHG complexity relates to the dynamic then BdZLOOULVHDQGEHFRPHSRVLWLYH LGHRORJLFDOIDXOWOLQHEHWZHHQVHFXODU- LVWVRFLDOOLEHUDOVDQG,VODPLVWVZKLFK 6ROHWXVGHULYHWKHQHZOHYHOVRIWKH also needs to be taken into consider- m threshold K by adding the ideologi- ation in any serious political analysis. cal factors to the utility functions in $VDVWDUWLQJSRLQWZHFDQWKLQNRI HTXDWLRQV  DQG  :HQRZQHHG Islamic parties as representing the poor m m o to compare V 2.   .  \ % y  initially and scaring the secularists m m d ZLWK9 '   W  \ % y  W& y. It is in the middle class because of differ- m HDV\WRVKRZWKDWWKHUHVXOWDQWK (. , HQWYLHZVDERXWVRFLDOSROLF\EXWWKHQ o d o B , B LVLQFUHDVLQJLQ% and decreas- becoming more driven by moderate d ing in B . This result is highly intuitive: elements and expanding their appeal 7KHPLGGOHFODVVZLOOEHPRUHGULYHQ among the middle class. Let us start WRPRYHWRGHPRFUDF\ZKHQLWFDUHV ZLWKDGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHPDLQSOD\HUV

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 4141 Article

and the changing characteristics of the ist and merchant classes that initially middle class before coming back to EHQHÀWWHGIURPOLEHUDOL]DWLRQWKH WKHG\QDPLFVRIWKHVHFXODULVW,VODPLF skilled labor that became employed in divide. WKHJURZLQJFRUSRUDWHVHFWRUDQGWRD lesser extent over time, the bureaucrats  7KHDXWRFUDWLFFRUHFRDOLWLRQ that lost out from the demise of the old ZKLFKDOZD\VLQFOXGHGWKHVHFXULW\ social contract. In ethnically divided forces and the army, broadened over countries, this group has also tended to time to include elite capital and the attract the minorities. In the past, this rich. Much of the neoliberal policies group largely espoused secular and LPSOHPHQWHGVLQFHWKHVODUJHO\ liberal values and feared a takeover by EHQHÀWWHGWKLVJURXSZKLFKDOVREH- 3ROLWLFDO,VODPWKDWZRXOGUHGXFHLWV FDPHPRUHFORVHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKH civic rights. security apparatus through intermar- riages and business associations. * Finally, the rest of the popula- tion includes the urban and rural poor. 2. The second circle of regime They have been represented by hard VXSSRUWHUVZKLFKUHSUHVHQWVLQPDQ\ and soft opposition groups, including ZD\VWKHVRIWXQGHUEHOO\RIWKHUH- ,VODPLFPRYHPHQWVDVZHOODVOHIWLVW gimes, included a large segment of the SDUWLHVZKHUHWKH\FRQWLQXHGWRH[- middle class, such as the industrial- ist. Islamist parties initially took root



Figure  ˆ Income groups, as a share of the total population. Notes: 4he middle class is delned as having an income between -10 day, the rich as having an income above 10 per day, and the poor as having an income below  a day, all measured in purchasing power parity 2000 dollars. 4he countries included belong to the Middle East and North Africa developing country group cited in Figure 1. Source: Authors calculations using the 7orld "ank PovcalNet 7eb site.

4242 Liberals, Islamists, and the Role of the Middle Class

DPRQJWKHSRRU7KH\ZHUHUHSUHVVHG DQGWKHSRRUDWDERXWSHUFHQW2YHU and rarely given political rights, and WKHSDVWWZRGHFDGHVWKHUHZDVDVPDOO this encouraged some factions to enter decline among the poor and a small occasionally in a state of open rebel- rise among the middle class. These lion. ÀJXUHVDUHLOOXVWUDWLYHDQGZLOOYDU\RI FRXUVHE\FRXQWU\DQGE\WKHGHÀQL- So overall, the class structure of tion of class. The more general point, these three groups is broadly similar KRZHYHULVWKDWLQFRPHGLVWULEXWLRQ WRWKDWZKLFKLVUHSUHVHQWHGLQWKH has remained fairly constant over time. model. Given the preponderant role my storyline affords to the middle The main element of change over class, it is useful to look in more detail WKHSDVWWZRGHFDGHVKDVEHHQLQWKH DWKRZWKLVJURXSKDVHYROYHGLQWKH FRPSRVLWLRQUDWKHUWKDQLQWKHVL]HRI recent past. Three issues are discussed the middle class. The old middle class EHORZWKHPLGGOHFODVV·VHYROYLQJVL]H ZRUNHGLQODUJHSDUWIRUWKHVWDWHDQG HFRQRPLFSRZHUDQGSROLWLFDOZHLJKW has gotten poorer over time as a result RIWKHUROOLQJEDFNRIWKHVWDWH/RZ 7KH(YROYLQJ0LGGOH&ODVV SXEOLFVHFWRUZDJHVKDYHIXHOHGSHWW\ corruption in areas such as health and A rapid exploration of household- education, generating another impor- level data reveals that income distribu- tant source of discontent. In Egypt, WLRQDQGWKHVL]HRIWKHPLGGOHFODVV IRUH[DPSOHUHDOZDJHVLQWKHSXEOLF seem to have remained fairly constant sector declined over time. The mini- over time in the region. To provide a PXPZDJHZKLFKDQFKRUVDOOZDJHV VHQVHRIPDJQLWXGH,HVWLPDWHWKHVL]H KDVGHFOLQHGIURPSHUFHQWRISHU of the income classes for the region FDSLWD*'3LQWKHHDUO\VWRDPHUH DVDZKROHXVLQJ:RUOG%DQN   SHUFHQWLQ $EGHOKDPLGDQG GDWDRQLQFRPHGLVWULEXWLRQWKLV (O%DUDGHL 7KLVFDQDOVREHVHHQ data is collected from country-level very sharply at the macro level: by KRXVHKROGVXUYH\V,GHÀQHWKHSRRU SHUFHQWRIWKH(J\SWLDQODERU in an expanded manner to include IRUFHZRUNHGIRUWKHVWDWHEXWHDUQHG WKRVHW\SLFDOO\WKRXJKWRIDVWKHORZHU DWRWDOZDJHELOORIOHVVWKDQSHUFHQW PLGGOHFODVVVSHFLÀFDOO\DOOSHRSOH RI*'3LPSO\LQJWKDWDYHUDJHZDJHV ZKRKDYHDGDLO\LQFRPHEHORZ WKH ZHUHLQWKHQHLJKERUKRRGRIRQHWKLUG WLJKWHUGHÀQLWLRQVRIWKHSRRUDQGXOWUD RI*'3SHUFDSLWDZKLFKLVH[WUHPHO\ poor that are usually reported refer ORZE\LQWHUQDWLRQDOVWDQGDUGV7KH WRSRYHUW\OLQHVRIDQGDGD\ QHZHQWUDQWVLQWRPLGGOHFODVVVWD- UHVSHFWLYHO\ ,GHÀQHWKHPLGGOHFODVV tus have tended to be merchants and DVWKRVHKDYLQJDQLQFRPHEHWZHHQ LQGXVWULDOLVWVWKDWKDYHEHQHÀWHGIURP DQGDGD\ZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWRD WKHPDUNHWRULHQWHGUHIRUPVDVZHOODV middle and upper middle class clas- the small but expanding skilled labor VLÀFDWLRQDQGWKHULFKDVWKRVHKDY- force of the formal private-sector labor LQJDQLQFRPHDERYHSHUGD\7KH market. results over a multiyear time span as UHSUHVHQWHGLQ)LJXUHDUHVWULNLQJWKH Assessing changes in inequality PLGGOHFODVVVWDQGVDWDERXWSHUFHQW — the share of national income com- of the population for the region as a manded by the middle class — is ZKROHWKHULFKDWDERXWSHUFHQW trickier. Generally, household surveys

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 4343 Article

reveal that inequality (as measured OHJLWLPDF\RQWKHSURJUHVVRIDQHZ E\*LQLFRHIÀFLHQWVIRUH[DPSOH KDV modernist middle class, but its effec- LQFUHDVHGLQWKH$UDEZRUOGLQWKH WLYHLQÁXHQFHRQSROLFLHVZDVORZDVLW SDVWGHFDGH %LELDQG1DEOL  ZDVPDLQO\PDGHXSRIFLYLOVHUYDQWV ZLWKWKHLQFRPHRIWKHULFKULVLQJ DQGHPSOR\HHVRIVWDWHRZQHGHQWHU- faster than average incomes. But the SULVHVZKLFKUHGXFHGLWVDELOLW\WRSOD\ increase seems small relative to other WKHUROHRIDQDXWRQRPRXVDFWRU$QHZ UHJLRQV+RXVHKROGVXUYH\VKRZHYHU middle class of urban private agents, are notorious for undercounting the ERWKPHUFKDQWDQGLQGXVWULDOZKLFK rich. There are many signs to suggest URVHLQWKHODWHVLQUHVSRQVHWR WKDWWKHZHDOWK\$UDE´SHUFHQWµKDV HFRQRPLFOLEHUDOL]DWLRQKDVEHHQSR- JURZQUDSLGO\LQWKHODVWGHFDGHDQG litically more active than the old (Nasr QRZFRPPDQGVDODUJHVKDUHRIQD-  5HFHQWVXUYH\VLQ(J\SW 3HZ tional income. One sign is that average 5HVHDUFK&HQWHU VKRZWKDWWKH consumption as reported by consump- PLGGOHFODVVLVQRZVSOLWEHWZHHQVHFX- WLRQVXUYH\V ZKLFKXQGHUFRXQWWKH larist liberals and Islamists. The recent ULFK KDVLQFUHDVLQJO\GLYHUJHGIURP election results in Tunisia suggest a average consumption as reported similar phenomenon. The middle class by national accounts. For, example, SDUWLFXODUO\WUDGHUVRIWKH%D]DDU  average consumption in Egypt, as per played an important role in securing household survey data, has remained the success of the Iranian revolution in ÁDWEHWZHHQDQGZKLOH ,Q7XUNH\LWKDVEHHQWKHGULYLQJ GXULQJWKLVSHULRG*'3KDVJURZQ force behind the rise of the AKP, the according to macroeconomic data by Justice and Development party, and PRUHWKDQSHUFHQW:KLOHWKHUHDUH LQGHHGLWEHQHÀWWHGKDQGVRPHO\IURP PDQ\UHDVRQVZK\WKHVHGLIIHUHQWGDWD DQDOOLDQFHZLWKWKHVXSSRUWSURYLGHG VRXUFHVZRXOGQRWEHFRQVLVWHQWWKLV WRVPDOODQGPHGLXPVL]HGHQWHUSULVHV divergence nevertheless suggests that 60(V DQGWKHULVHRIZKDWEHFDPH DODUJHVKDUHRIWKHJURZWKPXVWKDYH NQRZQDVWKH$QDWROLDQWLJHUV60(V DFFUXHGWRWKHULFK7KLVLVFRQÀUPHG WKDWGURYHJURZWKLQ7XUNH\LQWKHSDVW by other observations such as the large GHFDGH 'HPLUDOS*XPXVFXDQG increase in the number of millionaires 6HUW  ZKLFKLVUHSRUWHGSXEOLFO\E\VRPH international banks such as Credit 7KH5LVHRI&URQ\&DSLWDOLVP 6XLVVH WKHOX[XU\UHDOHVWDWHERRPV The perceived “corruption” of the of many Arab capitals, and the decline SROLWLFDODQGEXVLQHVVHOLWHVZDVDNH\ LQWKHVKDUHRI*'3JRLQJWRZDJHV driving force of popular discontent. ZKLFKLVREVHUYHGLQQDWLRQDODFFRXQWV )RUH[DPSOHWKH3HZ5HVHDUFK&HQWHU More research is needed in this area. In  VXUYH\UHYHDOVWKDWLQFRU- terms of the model, this suggests that UXSWLRQZDVWKHWRSFRQFHUQRI(J\S- hm has declined. WLDQVZLWKSHUFHQWOLVWLQJLWDVWKHLU 5HJDUGLQJSROLWLFDOZHLJKWXQWLOUH- main concern, ahead of lack of democ- cently, Middle Eastern scholars did not racy and poor economic conditions. seem to believe that the middle class :HQRZNQRZWKDWWKLVZDVQRWMXVW could play an active role in leading about perceptions. In both Tunisia and political change. The military leaders Egypt, the ongoing trials of the main that led Arab nationalism based their business leaders are starting to shed 4444 Liberals, Islamists, and the Role of the Middle Class light on the enormous corruption that foster accumulation and the develop- took place: the granting of monopoly PHQWRIQHZVHFWRUVDVKDGKDSSHQHG rights to close associates of the rulers, ZLWK.RUHD·V&KDHEROVIRUH[DPSOH,Q WKHVHOOLQJRISXEOLFÀUPVDQGODQGDW WKH$UDEFRXQWULHVKRZHYHULWDSSHDUV reduced prices, and the manipulation that insiders appropriated large rents RIWKHÀQDQFLDOPDUNHWVIRUWKHEHQHÀWV LQZD\VWKDWZHUHQRWDOLJQHGZLWK RIDIHZLQVLGHUV,Q(J\SWWKHWUHQG ZHDOWKFUHDWLRQ,QGHHGPXFKRIWKH ZDVDFFHOHUDWHGLQWKHODVWGHFDGHZLWK SURÀWVZHUHQRWUHLQYHVWHGDWKRPH the “market” reforms led by Gamal Private investment remained stagnant, Mubarak, the president’s son and LQWKHQHLJKERUKRRGRISHUFHQWWR presumed successor. In Tunisia, the SHUFHQWRI*'3 VHH)LJXUH DV Ben Ali and Trabulsi families literally opposed to the rising and much larger PRQRSROL]HGEXVLQHVVRSSRUWXQLWLHV DPRXQWVLQJURZLQJUHJLRQVRI(XURSH Similar stories about favoritism and in- DQG$VLD$VDUHVXOWJURZWKZDV siders abound in Syria, Libya, Yemen, unable to absorb the rising number of DQG$OJHULDZKHUHSROLWLFDOFURQLHV educated labor, and unemployment control large chunks of the private among the educated youth stayed sector. KLJK,QFUHDVHGSULYDWHSURÀWVVHHP WRKDYHIXHOHGFDSLWDOÁLJKWUDWKHU In terms of encouraging the ultimate WKDQGRPHVWLFLQYHVWPHQWLWKDVEHHQ defection of the middle classes, crony- estimated, for example, that during the LVPFDQRSHUDWHLQWZRZD\VÀUVWE\ ODVWGHFDGHFDSLWDOÁLJKWRXWRI(J\SW increasing inequality and reducing the DYHUDJHGELOOLRQD\HDUDQG share of output going to the middle billion a year out of Tunisia (Kar and class, a central part of our argument, &XUFLR 2QHK\SRWKHVLVLVWKDW ZKLFKKDVEHHQGLVFXVVHGDERYHDQG WKLVZDVGXHWRSROLWLFDOXQFHUWDLQW\ second, by affecting the ability of the concerning the future of these regimes, HFRQRP\WRFUHDWHVXIÀFLHQWMREVIRU ZKLFKPDGHLWVFDSLWDOLVWVP\RSLF,Q the educated youth, an aspect of the terms of our model, it is as if y re- discussion that has not been formal- mained depressed by perceptions of a L]HGLQRXUPRGHO WKHGHWHUPLQDQWV high risk of a future regime shift to the of y 7KDWTXHVWLRQZK\$UDEFDSL- detriment of the elite. talism has been so unresponsive to UHIRUPVDQGZK\LWKDVXQGHUSHU- This similarity in the patterns in formed in terms of job creation, given ZKLFKFURQ\LVPVSUHDGLQDOO$UDE ZKDWORRNHGRQSDSHUOLNHLPSHFFDEOH countries begs an important question: market reforms, has been debated KRZGR\RXH[SODLQWKLVFRLQFLGHQFHLQ for years. Some have argued that the time and form especially considering reforms have not gone far enough that these countries differ in their his- :RUOG%DQN 7KHDQVZHULVQRW WRULFDODQGVRFLDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV"0\ simple. After all, the concentration of preferred hypothesis lies in the simi- ZHDOWKDQGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI´VWDWH larity of the deployment of neoliberal capitalism,” is not necessarily bad for SROLFLHVLQHQYLURQPHQWVFKDUDFWHUL]HG JURZWKDQGGHYHORSPHQWLIFDSLWDOLVWV by political repression. All countries KDYHFRQÀGHQFHLQUHJLPHVXUYLYDO faced the challenge of opening up the 0XVKWDT.KDQ  LQSDUWLFXODU HFRQRP\LQFOXGLQJWUDGHDQGÀQDQFH GHVFULEHVKRZLQGXVWULDOSROLF\FDQ LQWKHPLGV%XWDWWKHVDPHWLPH

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 4545 Article

the rise of repressive and exclusionary XWLOL]HGWKHVHFXULW\IRUFHVDQGFDSLWDO politics also compelled these countries market regulators to directly intervene to restrict potential competitors from ZKHQSROLWLFDOFRPSHWLWRUVQHHGHGWR becoming autonomously rich, since be bankrupted, and in the Moroccan WKLVZRXOGKDYHVWUHQJWKHQHGWKHLU case, the King managed to dominate RSSRVLWLRQ7KLVSXVKHGUXOHUVWRÀQG private banking directly through his QHZZD\VRIUHVWULFWLQJHQWU\LQWR PDMRULW\RZQHUVKLSRIDODUJHFRQ- economic activity by political rivals, JORPHUDWHWKH21$ZKLFKDFTXLUHG LQFOXGLQJWKHZD\LQZKLFKUHJXOD- shares in leading banks and turned WLRQVZHUHHQIRUFHGDQGLQFHQWLYHV them into a corporate arm of the ZHUHSURYLGHGWRWKHÀQDQFLDOV\VWHP ´0DNK]HQµ WROHQGWRODUJHDQGIULHQGO\ÀUPV only and sometimes in more direct /LEHUDOVDQGWKH0RGHUDWLRQRI ZD\VOLNHVHFXULW\VHUYLFHVGLUHFWO\ 3ROLWLFDO,VODP FORVLQJGRZQWKUHDWHQLQJHPHUJLQJ We have often referred to the impor- sectors of the economy like Islamic WDQFHRIWKHVRFLDOOLEHUDOVHFXODUSR- ÀQDQFH7KHVHGHIHQVLYHEDUULHUVWR litical Islam dichotomy in the discus- entry at the same time created rents to sions above. Four themes have been LQVLGHUVZKRZHUHDOORZHGWRFRQWURO UHFXUULQJZKLFKZLOOEHGLVFXVVHGLQ the heights of the economy. In other more detail here: ZRUGVWKLVVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHJURZWKRI y is itself affected by repression K. The  7KHVHFXODUPLGGOHFODVVEHLQJ rise of crony capitalism and the politi- a pivotal ally of the autocrats cal role it played in the past is another area that needs to be investigated more 2. This same group being in thoroughly in the future. WKHSDVWYHU\ZHDU\RIDWDNHRYHUE\ Islamic parties because of economic, $QDGGLWLRQDOFRUUXSWLQJIDFWRUZDV social, and political concerns WKHLQÁXHQFHRI*XOIFDSLWDOHVSHFLDOO\ LQQHZVHFWRUVVXFKDVWHOHFRPWRXU-  7KHPLGGOHFODVVFRPLQJWR ism, and real estate. The tradition of oppose repression of Islamists as Politi- LQVLGHUGHDOVEHWZHHQUR\DOW\DQGWKH FDO,VODPVSUHDGLQLWVRZQUDQNV local merchant entrepreneurs dates WRWKHV:KHQWKHVHPHUFKDQWV  7KHPLGGOHFODVVFRPLQJWR EHFDPHODUJHÀQDQFLDOJURXSVWKH\ trust over time that the more moderate H[SRUWHGWKLVZD\RIGRLQJEXVLQHVVWR Islamic parties could be good demo- WKHUHVWRIWKHUHJLRQ +DQLHK  crats.

There is little scholarly literature on 5HJDUGLQJWKHÀUVWWKHPH$UDEDXWR- the subject, but there are masses of crats have valued keeping the main press reports. One exception is a care- secular liberal parties in the governing IXODUWLFOHE\&OHPHQW+HQU\   ´SROLWLFDOVHWWOHPHQWµHLWKHUZLWKLQ WKDWGRFXPHQWVWKHGLIIHUHQWZD\VLQ the governing coalition or as part of ZKLFKUXOHUVLQ(J\SW7XQLVLDDQG the legal opposition, due to both their Morocco adjusted their clientelistic LPSRUWDQWOHJLWLPL]LQJUROHDQGWRWKH methods to offset the impact of the skills of the middle-class professionals OLEHUDOL]DWLRQRIWKHLUÀQDQFLDOPDUNHW that they historically represented. For LQWKHÀUVWWZRFDVHVWKHFRXQWULHV the regimes in place, secular and lib-

4646 Liberals, Islamists, and the Role of the Middle Class

HUDOLGHRORJ\ZDVDWWKHFHQWHURIWKHLU needing each other to survive, the $UDEQDWLRQDOLGHRORJLHVRIWKHV regime held the Brotherhood up as a ZKLFKXVKHUHGLQOHDGHUVVXFKDVIRU- VFDUHFURZDUHPLQGHURIWKHWKUHDWWKH mer Tunisian President Habib Bour- %URWKHUKRRGZRXOGUHSUHVHQWVKRXOG guiba and former Egyptian President the regime fall.” Gamal Abdel Nasser, bringing in the $WDWUNPRGHORIPRGHUQL]DWLRQEDVHG But as more moderate Islamic parties on secular and nationalist ideologies. WRRNURRWZLWKLQWKHPLGGOHFODVVRYHU For the Arab autocrats, losing their time, their repression came increasing- liberal anchors is tantamount to losing ly to be resented by a large part of the o all legitimacy and turning into naked middle class (in terms of our model, B GLFWDWRUVKLSVZLWKQRRSHUDWLRQDOQDU- EHFDPHQHJDWLYH ZKLFKEULQJVXVWR rative. So treating the middle class as the third theme. When moderate ele- DSLYRWDOSOD\HUDVZHGLGGRHVPDNH PHQWVZLWKLQ,VODPLVWSDUWLHVLQVHYHUDO VHQVHHVSHFLDOO\ZKHQVSHDNLQJDERXW countries, including Egypt and Tunisia, the traditional “liberal” middle class. WULHGWRUHDFKDJUHHPHQWZLWKOLEHUDO and leftist forces on joint political Moving on to the second theme, SURJUDPVRYHUUHSUHVVLRQZDVXVHG Political Islam posed a threat to these VWUDWHJLFDOO\E\GLFWDWRUVWRUDGLFDOL]H UHJLPHVE\RUJDQL]LQJWKHSRRUDQG the Islamists (in terms of our model, ZDVVHYHUHO\UHSUHVVHGEXWWKHFRVWRI E\XQGHUJRLQJDFWLRQVWKDWZRXOGOHDG repression (the variable K in the mod- WRDVLWXDWLRQZKHUH%dZRXOGIDOO $ HO ZDVORZ%HVLGHVEHLQJVXEVLGL]HG much-cited example from Egypt is the IURPWKH:HVW VHHQH[WVHFWLRQ WKHUH LQFUHDVHLQUHSUHVVLRQDURXQGIRO- ZHUHDOVRLQGLUHFWEHQHÀWVJHQHUDWHG ORZLQJ,VODPLVWV·VWURQJSHUIRUPDQFH by this repression that reduce its net LQWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\HOHFWLRQV costs further. This is related to the fact and the appearance of becoming an WKDWGLYLVLRQVDORQJWKHVHFXODULVP increasingly credible alternative to the UHOLJLRXVFRQVHUYDWLYHIDXOWOLQHVZHUH UXOLQJUHJLPH 2VPDQ 7KHSUHV- GHHSLQWKHHDUO\VZLWKVRFLDO VXUHFUHDWHGGHHSGLYLVLRQVZLWKLQWKH liberals fearing a takeover by Islamic 0XVOLP%URWKHUKRRGRYHUZKHWKHULW SDUWLHVEHFDXVHRIWKHGLIIHUHQWYLHZV should abandon the political process, these parties held on a broad range and in this atmosphere, the conserva- of social issues such as civil rights, tives managed to displace the moder- separation of mosque and state, the DWHVDQGHOHFWDQHZ6XSUHPH*XLGH UROHRIZRPHQLQVRFLHW\DQGIRUHLJQ ZKRVXSSRUWHGGLVHQJDJHPHQW 2W- SROLF\7KLVDOORZHGWKHUXOLQJHOLWHVWR WDZD\%XEDORHWDO  reduce the temptation for the middle- FODVVOLEHUDOVWRVZLWFKWKHLUVXSSRUWWR Regarding the fourth theme, the the opposition, even as other changes TXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHU3ROLWLFDO,VODP PD\KDYHEHHQIDYRULQJVXFKDVZLWFK can be a trusted actor in a democracy (In terms of our model, BdZDVLQLWLDOO\ has been debated for a long time. The QHJDWLYHDQGODUJH )RUH[DPSOH'DODO IXWXUHZLOOWHOOEXWDWWKLVVWDJHLW %L]UL  FKDUDFWHUL]HVWKHUHODWLRQ- is clear that the voters in Egypt and VKLSEHWZHHQWKH,VODPLFRSSRVLWLRQ Tunisia seem to believe that it can. In and the ruling regime in Egypt as: WKHPHDQZKLOHWKHLQWHOOHFWXDOGHEDWH ´DQROGFRXSOHDOZD\VDWRGGVEXW on these issues continues. Against the ZHOONQRZQ%HUQDUG/HZLVFULWLTXH

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 4747 Article

RWKHUV 3ODWWHDX KDYHDUJXHG Foreign Support that Islam is not inimical to the separa- tion of mosque and state. The experi- External supporters have had a vital ence of eighteenth-century Europe role in keeping the Arab autocratic demonstrates that, in similar condi- state alive for so long, but much more tions, Christian movements did end in the form of political and military up playing by the democratic rule, support than in the form of direct albeit Catholics had the advantage of a economic support (in the form of binding mechanism in the form of the ORDQVJUDQWVRUWUDGHDJUHHPHQWV  9DWLFDQ·VGRPLQDQFHZKLFKDWOHDVW )LJXUHVKRZVWKDWRIÀFLDODVVLVWDQFH Sunni Islam does not have (Kalyvas KDVEHHQRQDYHUDJHEHWZHHQSHUFHQW  %XWFRPPLWPHQWFDQDOVREHGH- DQGSHUFHQWRI*'3LQWKHUHJLRQ YHORSHGE\ZHOORUJDQL]HGSDUWLHVZLWK SHDNLQJDWSHUFHQWLQWKHHDUO\V ORQJWHUPYLHZVWKURXJKPHFKDQLVPV DWWKHWLPHRIWKHÀUVW*XOI:DUDQG RIRUJDQL]DWLRQDQGWUDQVSDUHQF\DV DJDLQDURXQG*LYHQWKHDXWR- GHPRQVWUDWHGE\-LOOLDQ6FKZHGOHU crats’ reliance on repression in a global  LQKHUFRPSDUDWLYHDQDO\VLV HQYLURQPHQWRILQFUHDVHGGHPRFUDWL]D- about the participation of Islamic par- tion, political support must have been ties in governments in both Jordan and extremely valuable. Unlike in the cases

4848 Liberals, Islamists, and the Role of the Middle Class anti-U.S. sentiment (after the inva- LQFOXGHWKH,VODPLVWVKRZHYHUZKDW VLRQRI,UDT DQGLQFUHDVHGDQWL,VUDHO LVQRWHZRUWK\LVWKDWWKHIHDURIWKH VHQWLPHQW DIWHUWKHZDUVRQ*D]DDQG Islamists did not stop them from ask- /HEDQRQ ZLWKDQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRQ LQJIRUUHJLPHFKDQJHXQOLNHZKDWKDG their client regimes. KDSSHQHGLQWKHSDVW7KHZHDNOLQNV that led change include the youth, im- &RXQWU\$FFRXQWVDQG5HJLRQDO poverished bureaucrats, and business- Contagion SHRSOHFRQÀQHGWRWKHLQIRUPDOVHFWRU E\DFRUUXSWUHJXODWLRQIUDPHZRUN In the model described above, GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQVXFFHHGVZKHQWKH Some have argued that the revolts middle class decides to defect. In this ZHUHFDXVHGE\WKHH[SORVLRQRIHOHF- FRQWH[WZHFDQWKLQNRIXSULVLQJVDV WURQLFSODWIRUPVWKDWDOORZHGIRUWKH a bet by revolutionary entrepreneurs exchange of information and for better WKDWWKHLUDFWLRQZLOOSUHFLSLWDWHVXFKD RUJDQL]DWLRQ2XUPRGHOGRHVDWWULEXWH shift. Uprisings can also be attempts at H[SODQDWRU\SRZHUWRDQLPSURYHPHQW real revolutions of the poor. By all ac- in the exchange of information. The FRXQWVWKHIRUPHUGHVFULSWLRQÀWVWKH middle-class individuals had imperfect situation more in most Arab countries. LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWKRZRWKHUVLQWKH 6RPHZRXOGEDONDWDGHVFULSWLRQRI VDPHJURXSZHUHHYDOXDWLQJWKHLURZQ WKH´$UDE5HYROXWLRQVµDVDVZLWFK preferences, given the lack of political of the liberal middle class. But the fora and the repression of all political uprisings in both Tunisia and Egypt parties in the past. It is in this respect ZHUHGULYHQE\VHFXODUPLGGOHFODVV that social media played a key role in \RXWKVZKRKDGEHFRPHGLVHQFKDQWHG PRELOL]LQJOLNHPLQGHGUHYROXWLRQDULHV ZLWKWKHGHDOWKHLUSDUHQWVKDGVWUXFN in the only free space available: cyber- ZLWKWKHDXWRFUDWVDQGZHUHFRQFHUQHG VSDFH +RZDUGHWDO  about social justice, rights, and their IXWXUH7KHLUDFWLRQHVVHQWLDOO\ZDV Does the model say something about to create and hold to a “foco,” a free UHJLRQDOFRQWDJLRQ",QRWKHUUHJLRQV VSDFHLQZKLFKSURIHVVLRQDODVVRFLD- ZKHUHFRQWDJLRQKDVEHHQREVHUYHG tions came to demonstrate their rejec- WUDQVLWLRQVWRGHPRFUDF\ZHUHFDXVHG WLRQRIWKHDXWRFUDWLFRUGHU,WLVZKHQ by a common external factor. In Africa, the liberal-led associations of journal- the fall of the Soviet Union and the ists, engineers, doctors, university HFRQRPLFFULVLVRIWKHVSURYLGHGD professors, teachers, and judges came common cause for the fall of dictator- out to demonstrate that the regimes of VKLSVZKLFKZDVDFKLHYHGE\SRSXODU Tunisia’s Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and SUHVVXUHZRUNLQJKDQGLQKDQGZLWK Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak started to un- changing patterns of international fold. The battle cry of “Al Shaab Yurid assistance that insisted on democratic ,VTDWDO1L]DPµ WKHSHRSOHZDQWWKH transitions as preconditions for sup- GRZQIDOORIWKHUHJLPH ZRXOGKDYH SRUW %UDWWRQDQGYDQGH:DOOH  been much less effective if chanted In Latin America, it has been argued E\,VODPLVWVDORQH,WZDVWKHVHFXODU WKDWWKHGHEWFULVLVRIWKHPLGVOHG middle-class voice that made the dif- WRWKHWKLUGZDYHRIGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ ference. Perhaps many of the youth +DJJDUGDQG.DXIPDQ ,Q(DVW- ZRXOGQRWUHFRJQL]HWKHLUDFWLRQDVRQH ern Europe, the fall of the Soviet Union RIVKLIWLQJWRDQHZVHWWOHPHQWWKDWZLOO led to the rapid fall of dictators across

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 4949 Article

WKHZKROHUHJLRQ:KDWDUHWKHFRP- a crony oligarchy, and liberals and mon forces that displaced Ben Ali and Islamist movements had operated a Mubarak and led to uprisings all over rapprochement over the years. For WKHUHJLRQZLWKLQDIHZPRQWKV" many observers, political change could have happened earlier as the middle 'LGQHZVDERXWWKHXSULVLQJVLQ7X- FODVVKDGRXWJURZQWKHDXWRFUDWLF nisia and Egypt contain important in- repressive model of governance many IRUPDWLRQIRURWKHUFRXQWULHV",WFDQEH \HDUVDJRDQGZDVZDLWLQJIRUDVSDUN plausibly argued that the contagion in to coordinate efforts and rise against uprisings can be explained by a sense the established order. of commonality across countries such DVVKDUHGFXOWXUHDQGKLVWRU\ZKLFK In both Libya and Yemen the revolu- HQFRXUDJHGHPXODWLRQ%XWWKLVZRXOG WLRQVZHUHPHWE\ÀHUFHUHVLVWDQFHE\ not necessarily lead to regime change if the autocrats. Given the poor state of VWUXFWXUDOYDULDEOHVZHUHQRWVXSSRUW- WKHLULQVWLWXWLRQVWKHQHZUHJLPHVDUH ive. The interesting question then is likely to struggle before they can estab- ZKHWKHUWKHUHDUHFRPPRQIDFWRUVVXS- OLVKWKHPVHOYHV(OVHZKHUHUHJLPHVLQ porting regime change and the march SRZHUKDYHPDQDJHGVRIDUWRUHVLVW WRZDUGGHPRFUDF\LQVHYHUDOFRXQWULHV change. In Iraq, Bahrain, and Syria, Indeed, of the key drivers of change ethnic factors have complicated the ZHFRQVLGHUHGVHYHUDOKDYHRFFXUUHG political change equation. To the extent UHJLRQDOO\ZLWKVRPHGHJUHHRISDUDO- that they are important supporters of lelism. First, there is a simultaneous the regime, minorities fear the “tyr- rise in an autonomous middle class, DQQ\RIWKHPDMRULW\µDQGZRXOGQRW borne out of the simultaneous reforms HDVLO\VZLWFKWKHLUVXSSRUWXQOHVVWKH\ RIWKHPLGV WLPLQJLVKHUHUHODWHG UHFHLYHJXDUDQWHHVWKDWWKH\ZLOOQRWEH to the oil shock that hit all Arab states discriminated against in the future (i.e., DOLNH 6HFRQGWKHUHLVWKHVLPXOWDQH- their BDLVODUJHO\QHJDWLYH $OJHULD ous moderation of Political Islam and KDGVWDUWHGWRGHPRFUDWL]HHDUOLHULI its success in developing deep roots only partially. Arab monarchies have ZLWKLQWKHPLGGOHFODVVH[SODLQHG ZHDWKHUHGWKHVWRUPEHVW7KLVPD\EH by the regional and global nature of GXHWRWZRIDFWRUV,QRLOULFKFRXQWULHV theological debates. Third, there is the government spending has increased, simultaneous spread of crony capital- YHU\PXFKDORQJWKHOLQHVWKDWZRXOG ism across the region, driven by the be suggested by the classical autocratic FRLQFLGHQFHRIWKHWLPLQJRIOLEHUDOL]D- PRGHOWKHVHDUHFRXQWULHVWKDWFDQDI- WLRQDQGUHSUHVVLRQ$QGÀQDOO\PRVW ford to pay for allegiance. The non-oil of the regimes have been supported by monarchies, Morocco and Jordan, have WKHVDPH:HVWHUQSRZHUV LQLWLDWHGFKDQJHIURPZLWKLQLQUH- VSRQVHWRSRSXODUSUHVVXUHV7LPHZLOO 7KDW7XQLVLDDQG(J\SWZHUHWKH tell if these are serious or cosmetic con- FRXQWULHVZKHUHWKHWLSSLQJSRLQWIRU cessions, but it does seem as if king- WKHPLGGOHFODVVZDVGLVFRYHUHGÀUVW doms have a larger ability to credibly is not surprising. In both countries, pre-commit to deliver more popular WKHPLGGOHFODVVZDVODUJHUGXHWRWKH SROLFLHVLQWKHIXWXUHLQRUGHUWRGHÁHFW relative success on the economic front, rising opposition, due to the long-term the middle class’s economic interests KRUL]RQRIWKHLUUXOHUV,QGHHGNLQJ- ZHUHEHLQJLQFUHDVLQJO\VTXHH]HGE\

5050 Liberals, Islamists, and the Role of the Middle Class doms have been much more stable in try to deliver the challenging politi- WKHSDVW 0HQDOGRQG  cal and economic reforms that their VXSSRUWHUVDVSLUHWR1HZJRYHUQ- &RQFOXVLRQV ments may be tempted by short-term populist policies. The postrevolution- I have argued that the short-lived DU\$UDEZRUOGZLOOEHVKDSHGE\WKH period of Arab “exceptionalism” can ZD\LQZKLFKWKHVHWZRPRYHPHQWV in fact be explained by structural and evolve and interact. If broad parties institutional factors related to the cannot establish themselves credibly, political incentives of the middle class, a clientelistic patronage system may VLPLODUWRZKDWKDVEHHQFDSWXUHGLQ evolve. To prevent political fragmenta- models of transitions in other regions, WLRQ,VODPLFSDUWLHVZLOOQHHGWRDGMXVW for example, in Latin America. This WKHLULGHRORJLFDOWHQHWVLQZD\VWKDW DQDO\VLVDOVRHPSKDVL]HGWKHVHFXODU DOORZVIRUFRH[LVWHQFHZLWKVHFXODULVWV ,VODPLFGLFKRWRP\DQGKRZWKHWUDQVL- DQGWKHOLEHUDOPRYHPHQWZLOOQHHG WLRQZDVPRVWOLNHO\GHOD\HGE\VHYHUDO to reinvent itself and make a credible decades due to the formation of a re- comeback. SUHVVLYHUHJLPHWRÀJKW3ROLWLFDO,VODP More recently, the decay of the authori- The challenges of the moment are tarian system and broadened appeal compounded by high popular expecta- of Political Islam have precipitated the tions and the problematic inheritance fall of the Arab autocratic bargain by RIWKHSDVW(FRQRPLFSROLFLHVZLOOEH encouraging the middle class to sup- ODUJHO\GHWHUPLQHGE\KRZSROLWLFDO port regime change and start the march FKDOOHQJHVZLOOEHDGGUHVVHG8QOHVV WRZDUGDZRUNDEOHGHPRFUDWLFRUGHU QHZVXUSULVHVDULVHWKHFRQWRXUVRI WKHHPHUJLQJSROLWLFDOVHWWOHPHQWZLOO The analysis suggests that the his- LQFOXGHIHZHUIDYRUVIRUHOLWHFDSLWDO torical challenges of the moment are to But there should also be attempts to DODUJHH[WHQWSROLWLFDOZLWKDFHQWUDO PDNHSHDFHZLWKWKHFDSLWDOLVWVDQGWR focus on consolidating democracy convince them to invest in the future, and avoiding reversions to nega- UDWKHUWKDQZLWKGUDZDVKDSSHQHG tive closures. In Egypt and Tunisia, ZLWKWKHVRFLDOLVWUHYROXWLRQVRIWKH the post-Spring elections have been V$QRWKHUVRXUFHRISROLWLFDO divisive, and it can be expected that HFRQRP\XQFHUWDLQW\FRQFHUQVKRZWKH ZULWLQJFRQVWLWXWLRQVZLOODOVRVKDUSHQ LQWHUHVWVRIWKHSRRUZLOOEHEDODQFHG social differences and preferences as ZLWKWKRVHRIWKHPLGGOHFODVV PDQ\FRQWHQWLRXVLVVXHVZLOOKDYH to be addressed, such as the limits of %XWWKHUHZLOOEHWHFKQLFDOFKDOOHQJHV EODVSKHP\ODZWKHQDWXUHRIIUHHGRP WKDWZLOOEHGLIÀFXOWWRUHVROYHLQDQ\ of speech, and the application of sharia case, even if politics is supportive. RQIDPLO\ODZ/LEHUDOVHFXODUIRUFHV These relate to the agendas of short- may be tempted to offset their electoral WHUPVWDELOL]DWLRQRIWKHHFRQRP\WKH defeats by attempting to reconstitute PRGHUQL]DWLRQRIVWDWHVHUYLFHVDQG DQDXWRFUDWLFRUGHUZLWKWKHVXSSRUW job creation. A democratic order does of the military. Leaders of the victori- not make these challenges easier to ous Islamic parties may be tempted to WDFNOH %HVOH\DQG.XGDPDWVX  UHSODFHWKHROGHOLWHVLQFRDOLWLRQZLWK armies, rather than to take risks and 7KHÀUVWFKDOOHQJHLVHFRQRPLFVWD-

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 5151 Article

ELOL]DWLRQ5LJKWDIWHUWKHUHYROXWLRQV found and implemented. The greatest in Egypt and Tunisia, the attitude of contribution of the “revolutions” to the transitional regimes has been to these perennial challenges should be in favor expansionary policies in order to fostering greater popular participation offset the negative shocks experienced in the decision-making process. It is E\WKHHFRQRPLHVZKLFKLQFOXGHDORVV WKHVHQVHRIHPSRZHUPHQWRIQHZDF- of tourism revenues and a collapse in tors, such as labor unions, employers’ investment. There are risks of entering associations, student groups, and other a negative vicious cycle. For example, FLYLOVRFLHW\JURXSVZKRFDQFURVV WKHÀQDQFLDOVLWXDWLRQLQ(J\SWFRXOG ideological lines to represent social deteriorate before a stable government interests and hold their representatives FRXOGEHIRUPHG7KLVLQWXUQZRXOG accountable that at the end of the day make the formation of a stable govern- constitutes the real revolution. PHQWPRUHGLIÀFXOW

The second area of focus concerns WKHPRGHUQL]DWLRQRIWKHVWDWHDQG the rehabilitation of public services, especially health, education, and social SURWHFWLRQ7KHQHZFRDOLWLRQVKRXOG be able to agree on both redirecting H[SHQGLWXUHVWRZDUGVRFLDOVHUYLFHV DQGDZD\IURPVXEVLGLHVWKDWDUHQRW pro-poor and making taxation more progressive. Improvements require, among other things, increased public- VHFWRUZDJHVEXWDQH[WUHPHO\FRP- SOLFDWLQJIDFWRUZLOOEHWKHODUJHVL]HRI the civil service.

The third agenda concerns the busi- ness environment and job creation. Past experiences and especially the failures of both socialism and state capitalism limit the choice of an Arab model. Part of the agenda is clear, but VROXWLRQVZLOOQRWEHHDV\LQSDUWLFXODU ZKHQLWFRPHVWRLPSURYLQJFRPSHWL- WLRQGHPRFUDWL]LQJWKHFUHGLWPDUNHW and reducing the constraints faced by the informal sector.

These are all complicated challenges, technically, politically, and adminis- WUDWLYHO\,QWKHHQGZKDWZLOOPDNH DGLIIHUHQFHLVWKHSURFHVVE\ZKLFK solutions adapted to the particular environments of each country are

5252 Liberals, Islamists, and the Role of the Middle Class

ISHAC DIWAN IS A LECTURER IN PUBLIC POLICY REFERENCES AT THE JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOV- $EGHOKDPLG'RKDDQG/DLOD(O%DUDGHL ERNMENT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY AND THE DI- Reforming the pay system for government em- RECTOR FOR AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST AT ployees in Egypt. Egyptian Center for Economic THE GROWTH LAB OF THE CENTER FOR INTERNA- Studies Working Paper. TIONAL DEVELOPMENT. HIS CURRENT RESEARCH Abouleinein, Soheir, Heba El-Laithy, and Hanaa INTERESTS INCLUDE GROWTH STRATEGIES, THE .KHLU(O'LQ7KHLPSDFWRISKDVLQJRXW POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT, AND THE subsidies of petroleum energy products in PROACTIVE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURC- Egypt. Egyptian Center for Economic Studies ES, WITH A SPECIAL INTEREST IN AFRICA AND Working Paper. THE MIDDLE EAST. DIWAN IS ALSO DIRECTING $FHPRJOX'DURQDQG-DPHV$5RELQVRQ THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMA- Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. TION PROGRAM OF THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, FORUM. DIWAN RECEIVED HIS PHD IN ECO- reprint edition. NOMICS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA %HOOLQ(YD&RHUFLYHLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGFRHU- AT BERKELEY IN 1984. HE TAUGHT INTERNA- cive leaders. In Authoritarianism in the Middle TIONAL FINANCE AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY’S East, edited by Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. BUSINESS SCHOOL BEFORE JOINING THE WORLD BANK IN 1987, INITIALLY IN THE RESEARCH Besley, Timothy J., and Masayuki Kudamatsu. COMPLEX, WORKING ON THE DEBT CRISIS OF THE 0DNLQJDXWRFUDF\ZRUN/RQGRQ&HQWUH 1980S. IN 1992, DIWAN JOINED THE WORLD for Economic Policy Research. BANK’S MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT, FIRST %LEL6DQG01DEOL(TXLW\DQGLQHTXDO- AS THE COUNTRY ECONOMIST FOR THE WEST ity in the Arab region. Economic Research BANK AND GAZA AND, LATER, AS A REGIONAL )RUXP3ROLF\5HVHDUFK5HSRUW1R ECONOMIST, WHERE HE LED ECONOMIC TEAMS %L]UL'DODO(J\SW·V0XVOLP%URWKHU- IN JORDAN, EGYPT, MOROCCO, LEBANON, AND KRRGDQGWKH-DQXDU\UHYROXWLRQ,Q3HRSOH·V YEMEN. HE CONTRIBUTED TO THE CREATION SRZHU7KH$UDEZRUOGLQUHYROW+HLQULFK%|OO OF THE PRIME NETWORK OF ECONOMISTS IN Foundation. THE MIDDLE EAST, THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle. FORUM, AND A REGIONAL POLICY FORUM, THE 'HPRFUDWLFH[SHULPHQWVLQ$IULFD5HJLPH MEDITERRANEAN DEVELOPMENT FORUM. IN transitions in comparative perspective. Cam- 1996, DIWAN JOINED THE WORLD BANK IN- bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. STITUTE AND LED THE ECONOMIC POLICY GROUP, Bubalo, Anthony, Greg Fealy, and Whit Mason. CREATING THE ATTACKING POVERTY PROGRAM =HDORXVGHPRFUDWV,VODPLVPDQGGH- AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE INITIATION OF THE PRFUDF\LQ(J\SW,QGRQHVLDDQG7XUNH\/RZ\ GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT NETWORK. IN THE PAST Institute. TEN YEARS, DIWAN WAS POSTED IN AFRICA %XHQRGH0HVTXLWD%UXFHHWDO7KHORJLF AS THE COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR THE WORLD of political survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. BANK FOR COUNTRIES IN EAST AND THEN WEST AFRICA, BASED IN ADDIS ABEBA AND LATER IN Cingranelli, David L., and David L. Richards. 0HDVXULQJWKHOHYHOSDWWHUQDQGVHTXHQFH ACCRA. of government respect for physical integrity ULJKWV,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WXGLHV4XDUWHUO\   

'HPLUDOS6HGD7KHULVHRI,VODPLFFDSLWDO and the decline of Islamic radicalism in Turkey. &RPSDUDWLYH3ROLWLFV  

Desai, Raj M., Anders Olofsgård, and Tarik M.

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5454 The Rule of Law and Arab Political Liberalization: Three Models for Change BY DAVID M. MEDNICOFF

ABSTRACT:

The rule of law is an important set of political ideals and institutional arrangements in general and has been particularly salient in the Arab world before and especially since the 2011 popular uprisings that removed the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. Despite this, the rule of law is used by analysts and activists in vague ways that are particularly unclear with respect to the law’s role in aiding a more accountable and democratic political process. This article sheds light on how legal ideals and legal growth might contribute to political opening in Arab countries in two ways. First, the article discusses the general background in which legal ideals and institutions are viewed in the Arab world, with an emphasis on the general impact of homegrown Islamic law and the legacy of the joining of Western sociolegal ideals to authoritarian colonial political prac- tices. Second, the article describes and analyzes in detail three possible Arab pathways to political opening through the rule of law. These are: (1) the “slow and steady” growth RIOHJDODFWRUVLQQRQRLO$UDEPRQDUFKLHVH[HPSOLÀHGE\0RURFFR  WKH´IXOOVSHHG ahead” hyper-globalized development of younger, expanding oil monarchies, illustrated by Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, and (3) the “reboot” pattern of societies that have just overthrown their governments and seek new relationships between law and politics, as shown in Tunisia and Egypt. Taken together, these three possible pathways suggest that there are particular dynamics in Arab societies around the rule of law and more open politics, which should be studied in greater depth by those hoping to under- stand and contribute to legal and political change in the Middle East and North Africa. Introduction

7KHUXOHRIODZLQ$UDEFRXQWULHVDVHOVHZKHUHKDVEHHQERWKDVWURQJLI YDJXHLGHDODQGDVHWRIQRUPVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQV 0HGQLFRII6KDODNKDQ\  

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 55 Article

EULQJLQJGRZQORQJVWDQGLQJUHJLPHV political practices meet to facilitate in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya and put- GHPRFUDWL]LQJSROLF\GHYHORSPHQWLQ ting in their place dynamic political WKH$UDEZRUOG" VSDFHVZLWKKHDY\HPSKDVLVRQWKH UXOHRIODZ This article responds to the above question in recent comparative histori- Despite this, and legalism’s broad cal terms. I suggest three pattern trajec- JOREDOVLJQLÀFDQFHUHODWLYHO\OLWWOH WRULHVWKURXJKZKLFKOHJDOFKDQJHPD\ ZRUNPDNHVVHQVHRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLS contribute to more open politics in the EHWZHHQOHJDOLGHDVOHJDOLQVWLWXWLRQDO Arab countries of the Middle East and GHYHORSPHQWDQGGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ North Africa. One possible pattern This is particularly true outside of the LVD´VORZDQGVWHDG\µPRYHWRZDUG :HVWHUQZRUOG7KHSUREOHPKHUHLV gradual regime political accountability WKDWODZLVDQH[FHSWLRQDOO\DFWLYHDUHD WROHJDOLGHDOVDQGSRSXODUSUHVVXUHV RISROLF\UHIRUPHYHU\ZKHUHDQGSDU- Morocco is the exemplar. A second, WLFXODUO\LQWKH$UDEZRUOGZKHUHQHZ distinct trajectory is the “full speed constitutional arrangements are focal DKHDGµK\SHUJOREDOL]HGSUHVVXUHVIRU points of active contestation as these legal development and global reliabil- ZRUGVDUHZULWWHQ,IWKHUHODWLRQVKLS LW\LOOXVWUDWHGE\FRXQWULHVOLNH4DWDU RIOHJDOLGHDVVSHFLÀFLQVWLWXWLRQVDQG DQGWKH8QLWHG$UDE(PLUDWHV 8$(  open, accountable politics is under- Both of these possible trajectories differ VWRRGRQO\YDJXHO\KRZFDQSROLF\EH from the third, the activist eruption IRUPXODWHGLQWKLVDUHDZLWKVRPXFK DQGUHJLPHV\VWHPRYHUWKURZUHSUH- at stake for Arabs and the rest of the sented by Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya ZRUOG" LQ:KLOHWKLVWKLUGWUDMHFWRU\LV LQVSLULQJFUHDWLQJLQLWVZDNHWKHSURV- Any hope to address this concern SHFWIRUDG\QDPLFDQGGHPRFUDWL]LQJ should take into account both global “restart from scratch,” its volatility and internal Arab understandings of VXJJHVWVWKHXWLOLW\RIDQDO\]LQJWKH the political and institutional mean- RWKHUWZROHVVGUDPDWLFSDWKVDORQJ- LQJVRIODZSDUWLFXODUO\QRZWKDWLWKDV VLGHLW,GRWKLVEHORZDIWHUSURYLG- EHFRPHFOHDUWKDWWKHXSULVLQJV ing some background on the general LQWKH$UDEZRUOGKDYHEHHQIUDPHG contours of Arab legalism. in legal terms. For instance, the policy GHEDWHVDPRQJDFWLYLVWVDQGRIÀFLDOVLQ %DFNJURXQG WKH0LGGOH(DVWDQG:HVWZLWKUHVSHFW WRZKDWUROH,VODPLFODZVKRXOGSOD\ The Rule of Law and Political Change in guiding legislation in Arab constitu- 7KHUXOHRIODZ´VWDQGVLQWKH tions are heating up after the events peculiar state of being the preemi- RI HJVHH5HXWHUV 

5656 The Rule of Law some theorists to dismiss the utility stitutions and actors to encompass the RIDQDO\]LQJWKLV´ELWRIUXOLQJFODVV importance of dominant social ideas FKDWWHUµ 6KNODU $IUHTXHQW DQGEHKDYLRUZLWKUHVSHFWWRODZ$OO FRUHDVSHFWRIWKHUXOHRIODZLV-RKQ RIWKLVLVLQOLQHZLWKDQDSSURDFKWKDW Adams’s formulation “a government LVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKSHUKDSVWKHPRVWID- RIODZVDQGQRWRIPHQµ  

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 5757 Article

mestic and external reformers that cut unelected regimes had multiple tools across Islamic and secular discourse. to subvert the legal complex’s poten- 7KLVKDSSHQHGIRUH[DPSOHZLWKIDP- tial to challenge their legitimacy until LO\ODZ PXGDZZDQD UHIRUPLQ recent events, often framed in terms of in Morocco, a government that has OHJDOLGHDOVSURYHGWKLVZURQJ survived recent regional upheavals. )LJXUHLOOXVWUDWHVWKHVLPSOHDS- The complex political picture of pealing, logical assumption that the WKHUXOHRIODZLVFRPSOLFDWHGIXUWKHU UXOHRIODZKHOSVWRPDNHDFRXQWU\·V because national and global praxis politics more open and accountable to around the issue is grounded in at least WKHFLWL]HQU\ZKLFKLQWXUQFDQDPSOLI\ WZREURDGDLPV)LUVWLVDQHFRQRPLF WKHUXOHRIODZLQDYLUWXRXVFLUFOH%XW stake in facilitating stable market trans- the mechanisms for this are not very actions for transnational capital. Sec- ZHOOWKHRUL]HG0RUHRYHUDVQRWHG RQGDUHSROLWLFDOSUHVVXUHVIRUFLWL]HQV· HDUOLHUWKHUXOHRIODZLWVHOILVXVHGLQ rights and regime accountability. These GLYHUVHDQGFRQIXVLQJZD\V7KHUHVW WZRJRDOVPD\QRWEHPXWXDOO\UHLQ- of this essay suggests three possible forcing. Indeed, efforts to enhance the SDWKZD\VIURPWKHUHFHQW$UDEZRUOG UXOHRIODZWRKDUPRQL]HWUDQVQDWLRQDO WKDWPD\ÁHVKRXWWKLVDSSHDOLQJEXW market transactions can accompany amorphous, virtual circle, particularly ORZFLYLOULJKWVDQGSROLWLFDODFFRXQW- WKHOLJKWHUFDXVDODUURZDWWKHWRSRI ability, as has been true in some Asian WKHÀJXUH countries. Thus, high levels of legal development may have more to do ZLWKUHSUHVVLRQDQG´WKHUXOHE\ODZµ WKDQZLWKDFFRXQWDELOLW\RUHPSRZHU- PHQW *LQVEXUJDQG0RXVWDID  My project tries to sort out legal and political conditions for the latter in Arab states.

,WFDQWKHUHIRUHEHGLIÀFXOWWRVRUWRXW KRZDQGZKHQWKHOHJDOFRPSOH[PD\ EHDEOHWRPRELOL]HOHJDOLGHDOVRUUH- &igure  ˆ Simple depiction of the rule of forms that can advance more political law and political opening1 opening. Contemporary authoritarian JRYHUQPHQWVKDYHPXGGLHGWKHVHZD- Legalism in Arab Politics: How Do ters by their frequent public symbolic History and Sharia Inform Current political expressions of their adherence Issues?2 to global legal norms. Such symbolic expression can represent efforts at In one form or another, the rule of SDUWLDOFRPSOLDQFHZLWKJOREDOKXPDQ ODZKDVORQJEHHQFULWLFDODVGRFWULQH  rights or other standards or aspirations LQWKH$UDEZRUOG . Thus, discussion for legal reform. But it can also be part DERXWWKHUXOHRIODZLQ$UDEVWDWHV RIQRQHOHFWHGUHJLPHV·DGURLWQHVVZLWK FDQQRWSURFHHGZLWKRXWUHFRJQLWLRQ respect to fending off international that the concept has deep Middle East- OHJDOFULWLFLVP,QWKH$UDEZRUOGLW ern roots. Indeed, Islam’s long history seemed reasonable to conclude that RISULRULWL]LQJODZDQGPHFKDQLVPVIRU

5858 The Rule of Law its evolution means that one indige- UXOHUV7KLVOHGWKHFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQ QRXV$UDEYHUVLRQRIUXOHRIODZLGHDOV WKHHPSRZHULQJDQGSRZHUHQDEOLQJ remains very popular today (Feldman WHQGHQFLHVRIODZWRUHVROYHXOWLPDWHO\ .DVVDE  WRZDUGWKHODWWHU6HFRQGWKHLGHDOV RI,VODPLFSROLWLFVDQGWKHUXOHRIODZ 0RUHVSHFLÀFDOO\,VODPRULJLQDWHG have remained a useful political lan- as a social system that combined “din guage after the end of Islamic govern- ZDGDZODµRUUHOLJLRQDQGSROLW\1DW- ment in much of the Middle East and XUDOO\ODZHPHUJHGDVWKHFHQWUDOJOXH North Africa. Moreover, the scholarly, WRJXLGHWKHJURZWKDQGDGPLQLVWUD- QRQFRGLÀHGKLVWRU\RI,VODPLFODZLV tion of the millions of people through- closer to the Anglo-American com- out the Middle East, North Africa, and PRQODZWUDGLWLRQWKDQVXEVHTXHQW 6RXWKHUQ(XURSHZKRFRPSULVHGWKH PDMRUOHJDOLQÁXHQFHVLQPDQ\0LGGOH early Islamic empire from the seventh Eastern countries. I expand on each of through the thirteenth centuries. While these points in turn. facets of contemporary Western and JOREDODUWLFXODWLRQRIWKHUXOHRIODZ 2QWKHÀUVWSRLQW,VODPHPHUJHG FDQQRWVLPSO\EHUHWURÀWWHGRUUHDG rapidly as a system of social gover- into Islamic political history, the core nance and also as a creed. Thus, it is WHUPIRU,VODPLFODZVKDULDSULRULWL]HV KDUGO\VXUSULVLQJWKDWDODZIRUPLQJ legal order and brings together legal class of Muslims also developed doctrine and judicial decisions. In oth- TXLFNO\5HOLJLRXVVFKRODUVZHUHWKH HUZRUGVWKLVWUDGLWLRQDO$UDE,VODPLF natural source for legal interpretation, WHUPLWVHOILVRQHZD\RIWUDQVODWLQJ because Muhammad’s Islamic status as if not necessarily transplanting, some *RG·VÀQDOSURSKHWPHDQWWKDWHLWKHU RIZKDWLVXQGHUVWRRGDVWKHUXOHRI KLVUHFRUGHGSURSKHFLHVLQWKH4XUDQ ODZLWLVOLNHO\WREHYLHZHGE\PDQ\ RUWKHVD\LQJV +DGLWK DWWULEXWHGWR Muslim Arabs as the correct Arabic KLPRWKHUZLVHFROOHFWLYHO\NQRZQ term for the concept. In general, then, as the Sunna, formed the basis of the WKHLGHDRIWKHUXOHRIODZZDVFHQWUDO most reliable dicta for ordering society. DQGZHOOGHYHORSHGZLWKLQ,VODP Moreover, the relatively small num- SROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOSUDFWLFHZDVWKH ber of explicitly legal passages in the SUREOHP $ERX(O)DGO 4XUDQDQGWKHJRYHUQLQJFKDOOHQJHV +DOODT  WKDWJUHZZLWKWKHVSHFWDFXODUH[SDQ- sion of Islam in the several centuries The complex political and doctri- after Muhammad’s death meant that nal history of sharia merits far-more OHJDOQHHGVDQGVRXUFHVZHUHWRR detailed treatment than can be un- GLYHUVHWRDOORZIRUVLPSOHGHULYD- GHUWDNHQKHUH

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 5959 Article

lasting system of jurisprudence and term for foreign non-Islamic govern- VRFLDOJURZWK ment enforcement and bureaucratic FHQWUDOL]DWLRQ One of the central, enduring doc- WULQHVRI,VODPLFMXULVSUXGHQFHZDVWKH The failure of Muslim Arab states leader’s status as custodian of com- to resist modern Western domination PXQDOODZUDWKHUWKDQDVLWVSURJHQL- doomed Islamic government in most WRU7KXVUXOHUVZHUHWREHMXGJHGE\ of the Middle East for much of the TXDOLÀHG,VODPLFVFKRODUVDQG0XVOLPV colonial and early postcolonial periods. generally on their record of executing Yet, the second important point here is DQGHQIRUFLQJ,VODPLFODZ7KLVFOHDU that Islamic political theory remained theoretical limit to the leader’s legisla- DVLJQLÀFDQWVRXUFHRIEDVLFLGHDOV WLYHSRZHUVDQGGLVFUHWLRQZDVVXE- SDUWLFXODUO\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHUXOHRI MHFWWRWKHUHDOLWLHVRIDGHSROLWLFL]HG ODZ 'XSUHW 2QHUHOHYDQWQRU- GLIIXVHSUHPRGHUQLPSHULDOFLWL]HQU\ PDWLYHLQÁXHQFHLVMXVWLFHDVDYDOXH ZKLFKFRXOGHLWKHUDOORZFHQWUDOL]HG that is centrally embedded in Islam. political excess or heighten the impor- Justice as a concept and a discourse is WDQFHRIWKHVFKRODUV·ZRUN

6060 The Rule of Law

SURGXFHGDSDWFKZRUNRIOHJDORU- colonialism in the Middle East—an ders in a given society rather than the emphasis on control backed by force UHODWLYHO\ORQJVWDQGLQJJURZWKRID WKDWZDVPHDQWWRVHUYHWKHEHVWLQWHU- unitary national legal system such as HVWVRIWKHFRORQL]HUUDWKHUWKDQLQGLJ- occurred in the United States. Second, HQRXVFLWL]HQV7KHSROLWLFDOH[DPSOH it set up an authoritarian norm that WKDWVRFLDOL]HG$UDEQDWLRQDOLVWHOLWHV ODZZRXOGLQIDFWEHVXERUGLQDWHGWR ZDVFRORQLDOUHJLPHV·GHSOR\PHQWRI LPSHULDOSROLWLFDOSRZHU 3RVXVQH\DQG invented political forms like mandates $QJULVW $QGWKLUGLWVSXUUHG and protectorates to occlude their ex- on a tendency for constitutions to HUFLVHRIUDZSRZHU/HJDOQRUPVDQG H[LVWZLWKRXWDVLJQLÀFDQWKLVWRU\RI institutions under colonialism made judicial interpretation. In some states, readily apparent the contradictions such as Morocco, this led to frequent EHWZHHQVWDWHGDQGWUXHSXUSRVHV postcolonial redrafts of the constitu- WLRQWRUHÁHFWFKDQJHVLQWKHSRZHURU At the same time, these norms and preoccupations of political authority, in LQVWLWXWLRQVZHUHVRPHZKDWVXFFHVVIXO FRQWUDVWZLWKWKH86QRUPRIDVLQJOH DWFHQWUDOL]LQJSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLF basic constitutional document that can DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ+RZHYHUPXFK$UDE RQO\EHPRGLÀHGZLWKGLIÀFXOW\ nationalists rebelled against colonial rule, they also learned that the lofty The legal system of every contempo- promises of colonial political ideas rary Arab nation is a unique mixture of ZHUHJHQHUDOO\VXEVHUYLHQWRUHYHQLQ Islamic, Ottoman, European, and post- contrast to the reality of police control. LQGHSHQGHQFHODZVHYHQLIWKLVLVOHVV Facing economic and other challenges, WUXHLQWKH*XOI %URZQ 7KLV these nationalists unsurprisingly built mélange of legal sources in most Arab on, instead of dismantling, the legacies societies did not in itself preclude legal of authoritarian rule that they inher- FODULW\RUFKHFNVRQDXWKRULW\+RZ- ited. HYHUDORQJZLWKWKHODSVHVLQWHUULWRULDO and ethnic logic that European colonial To be sure, the ideal of the rule of SRZHUVIUHTXHQWO\HPSOR\HGLQVHW- ODZZLOORIWHQEHDWRGGVZLWKWKH ting borders for many contemporary FHQWUDOL]LQJWHQGHQF\RIJRYHUQPHQWV nations of the Middle East, the lack of Yet Arab states in the Middle East in legal systemic unity in Arab states has JHQHUDOKDYHKDGDQHVSHFLDOO\ZLGH WZRFRQVHTXHQFHVIRU:HVWHUQHIIRUWV JDSEHWZHHQWKHLGHDODQGWKHUHDOLW\ WRHQKDQFHWKHUXOHRIODZ 2ZHQ because of the combination of the rela-  ,WPHDQVWKDWWKHMXULVSUXGHQWLDO tive lack of autonomous, precolonial, UHIHUHQFHSRLQWVRIODZ\HUVLQWKH XQLÀHGOHJDORUGHULQWKHVHVWDWHVDQG United States are not likely to be of the repressive nature of colonial and, direct use to most Arab societies. And later, postcolonial governments. More it has contributed to political situations VXEWO\WKHGLVFRQWLQXLW\EHWZHHQWKH LQZKLFKSRVWFRORQLDO$UDEOHDGHUV rational, legalistic values preached by have had many incentives to central- European administrators and their L]HWKHLUDXWKRULW\DQGQRUHDOOHJDO practice of resource extraction and impediments to doing so. police rule tainted the global, secular LGHDORIWKHUXOHRIODZLQDZD\WKDW This latter point is even more obvi- HQFRXUDJHVFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQORFDODQG ously related to the primary legacy of JOREDOODZ

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 6161 Article

,QVKRUWLWLVHDV\IRU$UDEVWRYLHZ democratic rule. A second is the vague WKHUXOHRIODZLQWKH:HVWLQDPDQQHU FROOHFWLYHNQRZOHGJHDQGPHPRU\RI similar to some American legal schol- DQHDUOLHUHUDZKHQMXULVWVDQGMXGJHV ars on the left, as primarily an ideology PDQDJHGWRGHYHORSODZWKDWFRXOG of political control not as a possible FKHFNDQGGHOHJLWLPL]HDXWKRULW\EXW check on political abuse or a guarantee ZLWKLQWKHFOHDUQRUPVDQGERXQGVRI of individual rights. This is important Islamic faith. because it implies that Western-based HIIRUWVWRUHIRUPWKHUXOHRIODZXVLQJ Thus, the theory and practice of Western models, and particularly cen- WKHUXOHRIODZLQFRQWHPSRUDU\$UDE tral legal institutions, are not neces- politics has had a fragmented qual- VDULO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKSROLWLFDORSHQ- ity. On the one hand, Islamist political LQJZLWKLQ$UDEVRFLHWLHV$VWULNLQJ LGHRORJ\JUHZWKURXJKRXWWKH0LGGOH H[DPSOHRIKRZZHOOIRUPXODWHGLGHDV (DVWLQWKHVDQGVWREHFRPH RIWKHUXOHRIODZFDQH[LVWDORQJVLGH the dominant current trope of political UHSUHVVLYHSROLWLFDOWHQGHQFLHVZDVWKH discourse and opposition. As a result, SXEOLFDWLRQE\DQ,UDTLODZSURIHVVRU Islam and sharia remain at the rhetori- RIDWKRXJKWIXOWUDFWRQWKHUXOHRIODZ cal and actual center of discussions of as an ideal in Iraq at the very same ODZLQFRQWHPSRUDU\$UDEVWDWHV,Q WLPHWKDW6DGGDP+XVVHLQZDVEHJLQ- particular, many Arab constitutions ning to consolidate his particular style FOHDUO\HQGRUVH,VODPLFODZDVWKHSUL-  of brutal and often legally arbitrary mary source for legislation . The most DXWKRULWDULDQUXOH 7DZÀT  frequent rallying cry or demand of op- SRQHQWVEHIRUHWKHUHFHQWZDYHRI$UDE Despite this authoritarianism, Arab uprisings, and a strong slogan since, regimes have not lacked clear legal FRQFHUQVWKHDPSOLÀFDWLRQRUUHVWRUD- structures. For example, most Arab WLRQRIVKDULDODZ )HOGPDQ  VWDWHVKDYHEDVLFODZVRUFRQVWLWXWLRQV Such Arab constitutions exist and may 7KHH[WHQWWRZKLFK,VODPDQGVKDULD matter, but they have had little history VKRXOGLQIRUPWKHUXOHRIODZDQGZKDW RILQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQDQGLQGHSHQGHQW forms this should take is currently a judicial interpretation, although this is complicated area of great debate and OLNHO\WRFKDQJHLQWKHSRVW$UDE discussion among Arab and non-Arab ZRUOG,WLVWKHUHIRUHZRUWKXQGHU- Muslim scholars. Adding to the com- scoring the challenge that the juxtapo- plexity of this issue is the theoretical sition of formal legality and political FRQWUDGLFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH,VODPLFLGHDO UHJLPHVZLWKIHZJHQXLQHOHJDOFKHFNV of siyasa al-shari’a (the government of poses for building broad social sup- *RG·VODZ DQGVL\DGDWDOTDQXQ WKH port, or even judicial competence, for VRYHUHLJQW\RIPDQPDGHODZ 7KH JOREDOLGHDOVRIWKHUXOHRIODZ ODWWHUWHUPWKHJHQHUDOZD\LQZKLFK WKH:HVWHUQLGHDRIWKHUXOHRIODZLV 7KXVPDQ\$UDEFLWL]HQVKDYHKDG WUDQVODWHGLQWR$UDELFFRQYH\VZLWK WZREURDGKLVWRULFDOWRXFKVWRQHVZLWK it a patina of illegitimacy to some, UHVSHFWWRWKHUXOHRIODZ2QHLVWKH although by no means all, Muslims. WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\H[SHULHQFHRIFRGL- ÀHGODZIURPQXPHURXVLQFOXGLQJ Like other broad ideological frames, Western, sources, most often being ,VODPDOORZVIRUGLYHUVHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ XVHGWRVXSSRUWFHQWUDOL]HGQRQ- DERXWODZDQGSROLWLFVDQGLVFRPSDW-

6262 The Rule of Law

LEOHZLWKWKHDFWXDOFRQWHPSRUDU\$UDE GHQWVDQGOD\FLWL]HQVVSHDNDUWLFXODWH- practice of mixed legal norms and O\DERXWWKHUXOHRIODZDQGUHVSHFWLWV institutions. For this reason, a broad limited success and broader promise to majority of government and opposi- improve rights, fairness, and political tion fealty to sharia exists alongside transparency. To be sure, in Tunisia, more secular courts, bureaucrats, and (J\SWDQGHOVHZKHUHORFDOODZ\HUV· ODZ\HUV·DVVRFLDWLRQVLQPDQ\FRXQ- NQRZOHGJHRIJOREDOOHJDOVWDQGDUGV tries, the forces combined for analytical KHOSHGWDSLQWRDSRSXODUODFNRIFRQÀ- purposes as the “the legal complex” in dence in authoritarian legal and politi- DUHFHQWVWXG\RIODZDQGGHPRFUDWL]D- cal institutions. But a century of popu- WLRQ +DOOLGD\HWDO  lar historical associations of Western OHJDODQGSROLWLFDOLGHDOVZLWKFRORQLDO Yet the standing of members of the and postcolonial Western involvement Arab legal complex is the second side has also made non-Islamic frames for RIWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\UXOHRIODZ·V WKHUXOHRIODZOHVVSRSXODUQRZWKDW IUDJPHQWHGQDWXUH/DZ\HUVDUHVRPH- freer elections are taking place. In WLPHVSDUWRIDQDFWLYHDQGJURZLQJ VKRUWKRZHYHUÁXLGWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\ transnational movement of Arabs, EDODQFHEHWZHHQ,VODPLFDQGQRQ linked to global rights’ nongovern- Islamic sources of legal legitimacy may PHQWDORUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGUXOHRIODZ EHLQWKHSRVW$UDEZRUOGWKH advocates, and are open to more direct QHJDWLYHSRSXODUH[SHULHQFHZLWKQRQ import of Western ideas or experi- Islamic legal ideals in practice remains HQFHVZLWKOHJDOLVWUHIRUP5HÁHFWHG an aspect of ongoing politics. in international fora and documents such the Arab Human Development Pressures and Prospects for the Rule of Reports, this posture does not reject Law and Arab Reform Generally the importance of Islamic identity or ODZSHUVH5DWKHULWLVDSUHIHUHQFH &RQIURQWHGZLWKWKHGLOHPPDRI RUDWOHDVWDZLOOLQJQHVVWRDUWLFXODWH EDODQFLQJSRSXODUVXSSRUWIRUÁXLG theories of legal and political reform in LGHDOVRI,VODPLFODZDQGVXSSRUWLQJ terms translated directly from global more secular legalist practices, Arab usage such as dimaqatriyya (democ- political systems have had one basic UDF\ KXTXTHOLQVDQ KXPDQULJKWV  response. This has been to highlight and siyadat al-qanun. This tendency RIÀFLDOO\DQGRIWHQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\WKH can be grounded in skepticism about importance of sharia in their governing the possibility of traditional Islamic SULQFLSOHVZKLOHDFWXDOO\IRVWHULQJOH- terms adapting to modern political de- gal structures that are at least on paper bates, a desire to avoid overburdening FORVHWRWKHUXOHRIODZLQ:HVWHUQDQG UHOLJLRXVFRQFHSWVZLWKH[FHVVFRQWHP- global arenas. Thus, most states have porary meaning, or both. ZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGPHFKDQLVPVIRUOHJDO HGXFDWLRQWKHUHJXODWLRQRIODZ\HUV +RZHYHUWKLVLQGLJHQRXV$UDE and legislative development, even UHIRUPLVWWHQGHQF\ZLWKLQSRUWLRQVRI WKRXJKDOHYHORIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZVXI- the legal complex has been less likely ÀFLHQWIRUFKHFNLQJSRVVLEOHDEXVHVRI WRÀQGEURDGVRFLRSROLWLFDOVXSSRUW SRZHUE\UXOHUVKDVEHHQDEVHQW unlike Islamist political expression. In diverse Arab countries such as Egypt, What has differed across Arab re- 0RURFFRDQG4DWDUODZ\HUVODZVWX- JLPHVLVWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKXVHRIWKLV

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 6363 Article

Figure 2 ˆ 7orld "ank voice and accountability governance indicators for Arab countries, 2010 and 2000.Source: 7orld "ank n.d.

6464 The Rule of Law strategy of championing sharia but fa- counterparts have not: they have inte- voring secular over Islamic legal actors JUDWHG,VODPLFSROLWLFDOJURXSVDQGRU has led to gradual political opening or Islamic legitimation directly into their strong repression. In general, Arab mil- governance pattern. Morocco is a clear LWDU\UHSXEOLFVOLNHWKRVHRYHUWKURZQ H[DPSOHRIWKLVDQGDFRQWUDVWZLWK in Egypt and Tunisia, have decreased 7XQLVLDLQWKHPRQDUFK\·VRIÀFLDOXVH WKHSROLWLFDOVSDFHIRUODZ\HUVDQG of Islamic symbols and tolerance for other members of the legal complex Islamic political parties since Moham- UDWKHUGUDPDWLFDOO\ZKLOHPRQDUFKLHV PHG9,DVVXPHGWKHWKURQHLQ have let this space stay more stable. -RUGDQDOVRDOORZHGWKH0XVOLP%URWK- erhood to become a political party One illustration of this can be found 6FKZHGOHU  in the yearly indicators of voice and DFFRXQWDELOLW\ 92$ WKDWWKH:RUOG 3DWWHUQV Bank prepares each year, one of sev- eral compilations of diverse sources Monarchical Reform and the Rule of on governance. As Figure 2VKRZV Law: Slow and Steady Wins the Race? EHWZHHQDQGWKHDPRXQWRI What pattern of legal development YRLFHDQGDFFRXQWDELOLW\FLWL]HQVJHQ- and political implications do Arab erally had in diverse Arab countries PRQDUFKLHVVKDUH"$VDOUHDG\VXJJHVW- decreased across all countries (except ed, this differs among long-standing %DKUDLQ +RZHYHUWKHDYHUDJHZDV nations like Morocco and more recent, higher in the monarchies than in the K\SHUJOREDOL]LQJVWDWHVLQWKH$UDE republics. Generally, the measurements *XOIOLNH4DWDU&RXQWULHVOLNH0RURFFR in voice and accountability decreased KDYHLQFRPPRQZLWKWKHLUQRQPR- VRPHZKDWPRUHRYHUDOOLQWKHUHSXE- narchical peers, such as Tunisia, a rela- OLFVWKDQLQWKHPRQDUFKLHV)LJXUH WLYHO\ZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGOHJDOFRPSOH[ VKRZVPRUHGHWDLOHGWLPHVHULHVGDWD 7KHGLIIHUHQFHLVLQWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK HYHU\WZR\HDUVIURPEDFNWR ODZ\HUVLQHDFKFRXQWU\DUHDEOHWRDG- for the same VOA governance indica- YDQFHZRUNDURXQGULJKWVDQGUHIRUP tor for six representative Arab monar- ZLWKLQWKHLUV\VWHPV0RURFFR·VSDW- chies and republics. tern in this regard diverges from that Arab republics, led by long-standing of Tunisia. In Morocco, the monarchy UXOHUVZLWKPLOLWDU\RUVHFXULW\EDFN- has opened political space up for con- grounds, such as the former regimes of tested legislative elections, permitted Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, decreased GRPHVWLFKXPDQULJKWVJURXSVWRZRUN their space for political dissent and openly in the country, and launched civil rights advocacy from an already LQWKH$UDEZRUOG·VÀUVWQDWLRQDO ORZVWDUWLQJSRLQWLQWKHSDVWGHFDGH commission devoted to identifying and In contrast, Arab monarchies have compensating victims of past domestic KDGDEHWWHUWUDFNUHFRUGRIDOORZ- human rights abuses, the Equity and LQJFLWL]HQVYRLFHDQGDFFRXQWDELOLW\ 5HFRQFLOLDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQ ,(5  even if the World Bank’s indicator has All of these developments have in- declined during the past decade of volved members of the legal complex, WKHZDURQWHUURUDQGJOREDOHFRQRPLF DOORZLQJWKHPSROLWLFDOVSDFHWRSXVK crisis. Each of the Arab monarchies IRUJUHDWHUDGKHUHQFHWRUXOHRIODZ has done something that their military

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 6565 Article

Figure  ˆ 7orld "ank voice and accountability governance indicators, time-series data for six Arab societies every two years from 2010 to 1.pngSource: 7orld "ank n.d.

6666 The Rule of Law ideals in a relatively open manner. In the public sphere, a nondemocratic DGGLWLRQWRWKHDERYHWKHHYHQWV regime needs to invoke less the level of OHGWRUHIRUPZLWKLQWKH0RURFFDQ emergency and repression that shuts system, including the establishment out legal activists and chills voice and RIDQHZFRQVWLWXWLRQUDWKHUWKDQWKH accountability more generally. This UHJLPHRYHUWKURZWKDWRFFXUUHGHOVH- has been the secret to the survival of ZKHUH7KLVLVDPRUHUHFHQWLQGLFD- neo-traditional Arab monarchies like WLRQWKDWHYHQZLWKRXWSHWURGROODUV Jordan and Morocco, at least to the end PRQDUFKLHVOLNH0RURFFR·VZHUHDEOH RI to accommodate more legal activity WKDQFRXQWULHVZLWKHTXDOO\GHYHORSHG %\EOXUULQJWKHERXQGDULHVEHWZHHQ but more repressed, legal complexes, the traditional and modern, and OLNH7XQLVLD7KXVLIODZ\HUVJHQHUDOO\ EHWZHHQWKH,VODPLFDQGVHFXODUD SUHIHUVWDELOLW\DQGVORZFKDQJHHLWKHU monarchy like Morocco’s has managed to revolution or repression (Halliday WRDOORZIRUDEURDGHUVSDFHIRUOHJDO HWDO'H7RFTXHYLOOH  and other public contestation than Arab monarchies offer better models other Arab regimes. This is particularly than the more overtly secular military notable given its large territorial and republics. SRSXODWLRQVL]H,WKDVPHDQWDZHOO developed, mature system of regula- The reason for this divergence goes WLRQRIODZ\HUVDQGOHJDOHGXFDWLRQ back to an earlier part of this article. 0RUHVSHFLÀFDOO\LWKDVDOORZHGWKH Monarchies like Morocco have claimed legal complex and legal measures to historical continuity to give them some EURNHUFRQÁLFWVDURXQGSOXUDOLVPDQG legitimacy in terms of Islam. Much of expression that are readily associated this is, to be sure, constructed, as in the ZLWKFLYLODQGSROLWLFDOULJKWVJHQHUDOO\ SVHXGR,VODPLFEH\·D DOOHJLDQFH WKDW is an annual televised reimagination of Among the examples of such mea- a traditional political contract ceremo- sures are: Q\WKDWZDVQHYHUPHDQWWRDSSO\WRD * /RQJVWDQGLQJULJKWVIRU-HZV modern, bureaucratic state. DQGRWKHUUHOLJLRXVPLQRULWLHV Moroc- The point in such contemporary sim- FR·VIRUPHU.LQJ+DVVDQ,,ZKRUXOHG ulations of Islamic historical tradition IURPXQWLOKLVGHDWKLQZDV LVQRWWKDWFLWL]HQVQHFHVVDULO\VHHWKHP NQRZQDVDVNLOOHGPDQLSXODWRUZKRVH as binding representations of their paternal expressions of the country’s idea of political or religious legitimacy. SROLWLFDORSHQQHVVZHUHQRWDOZD\V Rather, Arab monarchs have mytholo- FRQVLVWHQWZLWKIUHTXHQWSHULRGVRI JL]HGDQGPRGHUQL]HGWKHLUKLVWRULFDO repressing strong political opposition relevance to Islam to make it harder 0HGQLFRII0HGQLFRII 

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 6767 Article

functioned as both a highly trumpeted IRUDYRWHRQDQHZFRQVWLWXWLRQ7KH symbol of Moroccan openness and a obvious interpretation of this docu- JHQXLQHFRQWUDVWZLWKWKHPRUHH[SOLFLW PHQWDQGWKHYRWHWKDWIROORZHGZKLFK FRQWUDFWLRQRIWKHQDWLYH-HZLVKFRP- NHSWPRVWRIWKHNLQJ·VVWURQJSRZHUV munity that took place in more ostensi- LQWDFWZDVRIDUHODWLYHO\LQVLJQLÀFDQW bly secular Arab states like Tunisia and effort to stave off demands for broader Egypt. change. Yet this ignores real concerns about political instability that have * 7KH,(5:KHQ+DVVDQZDV fostered general loyalty to the ruling succeeded by his eldest son Moham- PRQDUFK\ 2WWDZD\DQG0XDVKHU med VI on the throne through a  0RUHRYHUWKHQHZGRFX- SHDFHIXOWUDQVLWLRQLQLWWRRN ment explicitly represents the politi- WKHQHZNLQJRQO\DIHZ\HDUVWRVDFN cal expression rights of the minority, his father’s strongman and institute indigenous Berbers, that have been WKH$UDEZRUOG·VÀUVWFRPPLVVLRQWR a contentious issue for decades. This investigate and compensate victims of again marks Morocco as comparatively prior human rights abuses. Since the SURJUHVVLYHLQWDNLQJQHZLIVORZ FRQFOXVLRQRIWKH,(5·VZRUNWKURXJK VWHSVIRUZDUGRQDSDWKWKDWOLQNVOHJDO WKHUHOHDVHRILWVUHSRUWLQWKH change and possible political reform. public climate for critiquing human rights abuses in the past and for speak- Morocco is the main Arab example ing more openly about rights issues in of gradual legal and political reform. general has improved. -RUGDQDOVRLOOXVWUDWHVWKLVWUHQGZLWK DVLJQLÀFDQWSUHVHQFHIRU:HVWHUQ * The mudawwana. Morocco’s UXOHRIODZDQGULJKWVDFWLYLVWVDQG IDPLO\ODZUHIRUPLVDIUHTXHQWO\FRP- VRPHSURJUHVVLQZRPHQ·VULJKWVDQG mented example of feminist reform judiciary. At the same time, Jordan’s of traditional Islamic marriage and WUDMHFWRU\LVPRUHÀWIXOPRVWQRWDEO\ divorce provisions that both improved in the stalling of a process of politi- ZRPHQ·VULJKWVDQGDWWUDFWHGWKH cal opening begun rapidly at the end support of activists focused on both of the late King Husain’s regime that secular and religious discourses (Mal- included bringing Islamic groups into ODW %RWKLQWKLVUHJDUG WKHOHJDOSROLWLFDOSURFHVV 6FKZHGOHU and more substantively, it has been   regarded as a success. Indeed, cham- pioned by the government, the major

6868 The Rule of Law the end of monarchies that rule and standing legal establishment, and pos- inspired elected republican systems in sibly unprecedented speed in rapid, former colonies like the United States. JOREDOL]HGJURZWKVXJJHVWDGLIIHUHQW Yet this took place over a long span of G\QDPLFRIOHJDOJURZWKDQGSRVVLEOH centuries, under very different techno- SROLWLFDOFKDQJHWKDQWKHVORZDQG logical and historical conditions than VWHDG\SDWKMXVWGHVFULEHG,QRZWXUQ WKRVHRIWRGD\·V$UDEZRUOG WRWKLVSRVVLEOHQHZHUPRGHO

7KXVLIWKHSDWWHUQRI´VORZDQG Gulf Hyper-Globalization and the steady” legal development and politi- Rule of Law: Full Speed Ahead? cal opening that occurred in the West is assumed to apply to contempo- Indeed, the Arab Gulf has been UDU\$UDEPRQDUFKLHVZLWKVLPLODUO\ exceptional in its political youth and highly attenuated processes of political unusual economic resources. This may OLEHUDOL]DWLRQVHYHUDOLVVXHVSUHVHQW VXJJHVWDSDWKZD\IRUOHJDOUHIRUPDQG WKHPVHOYHV)LUVWIRUNLQJVLQSRZHU SROLWLFDOOLEHUDOL]DWLRQWKDWLVEDVHGQHL- the end result of a gradual process of ther on the very gradual opening of the JURZWKLQWKHOHJDOFRPSOH[ZRXOG non-Gulf monarchies nor on the sys- seem to be an end to royal rule sooner WHPLFRYHUWKURZWKDWKDVRFFXUUHGLQ RUODWHUZKLFKWKHNLQJVWKHPVHOYHV non-monarchies. The recent historical PD\QRWZLVK6HFRQGDVZDVWUXHLQ exceptionalism lies in Arab Gulf states’ Western history, the long nature of the JHQHUDOODFNRILQWHQVLYHFRORQL]DWLRQ transition from political absolutism ZKLFKPHDQVWKDWWKHWULSOHFRPELQD- WRWKHUXOHRIODZLVKDUGWRJDXJHLQ WLRQRIWKHJURZWKRIVWURQJFRHUFLYH terms of managing peaceful transi- institutions, the radical diminution of tions. When is an extended period of sharia’s scope, and the mosaic hybrid- YHU\VORZDQGVWHDG\OHJDOH[SDQVLRQ LW\RIWKHOHJDOV\VWHPZDVPXFKOHVV and modest more open politics enough SRWHQWKHUHWKDQHOVHZKHUHLQWKH$UDE WRDSSHDUUHDOWRZRXOGEHFLWL]HQ ZRUOG7KLVFUHDWHGDSROLWLFDOEDFN- DFWLYLVWV":KHQLQVWHDGPLJKWLWVHHP JURXQGLQZKLFKRQWKHRQHKDQG so glacial as to provoke regime over- VWDWHLQVWLWXWLRQVZHUHOHVVFHQWUDOL]HG WKURZHVSHFLDOO\LQWKHFRQWH[WRISRVW DQGGHÀQHGDQGRQWKHRWKHUKDQGDV- $UDEFLWL]HQGLVVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWK sociations of Western legal ideals and SROLWLFDOUHSUHVVLRQ")URPWKHSHUVSHF- SUDFWLFHVZLWKFRHUFLRQDQGK\SRFULV\ WLYHRIFLWL]HQVZKRZDQWJUHDWHUULJKWV ZHUHOHVVVKDUSO\HWFKHG DORQJZLWKEDVLFVWDELOLW\KLVWRULFDO %HWKLVDVLWPD\ZKDWPDUNVWKH DQDORJXHVRIVORZDQGVWHDG\OLEHU- $UDE*XOIDVPRVWGLVWLQFWZLWKUHVSHFW DOL]DWLRQIURPWKH:HVWWRWKH$UDE to legal and political reform is its ZRUOGHYHQLIWKH\KDYHUHOHYDQFHDUH recent pattern of petrodollar-driven opaque as models for extending the K\SHUJOREDOL]DWLRQ and the par- UXOHRIODZ ticular combination of possibilities for Another group of Arab monarchies FKDQJHZLWKLQWKHV\VWHPWKDWLWPD\ shares political structural features entail. The extraordinary, perhaps LQFRPPRQZLWKFRXQWULHVOLNH0R- unprecedented, trajectory of rapid rocco and Jordan. At the same time, development of Gulf cities like Doha this group’s much shorter period of DQG'XEDLIURPXQLPSRUWDQWWRZQVWR political independence, lack of long- FLWLHVRIJOREDOLQÁXHQFHKDVUHTXLUHG

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 6969 Article

DQHQRUPRXVLQÁX[RISURIHVVLRQDO and the daily extent of sociocultural H[SHUWVLQPDQ\ÀHOGVLQFOXGLQJODZ variation that it has brought. 8QOLNHHOVHZKHUHLQWKH$UDEZRUOG these Gulf societies lack centuries, or ,QWHUPVRIODZWKLVPHDQVDQ even decades, of indigenous tradi- LQWHQVLÀFDWLRQRISRLQWVRIFRQWDFWEH- tion around the teaching, practice, WZHHQGLYHUVHSHUVSHFWLYHVDQGDFWRUV DQGUHJXODWLRQRIODZDQGKDYHKDG UHOHYDQWWRWKHUXOHRIODZ7KHPXOWL- to build legal infrastructure in a very plicity of these actors because of the short time. This has entailed a very LQÁX[RIZRUNHUVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVIURP ÁXLGHQYLURQPHQWIRUERWKFRQÁLFW DOORYHUWKHZRUOGDQGWKHKHLJKWHQHG and consensus around global and local international scrutiny this entails, cre- legal ideas and practices. ate variation and hybridity around the UXOHRIODZWKDWLVXQXVXDOSDUWLFXODUO\ I am not suggesting, therefore, that given Arab Gulf societies’ relative \RXQJ$UDE*XOIFRXQWULHVÀWLQWRD dearth of legal and other sociopolitical VLPSOHSDWWHUQRIOHJDOJURZWKEDVHG infrastructure prior to the oil boom. on Western-propelled solutions to 7KHPRVWVLJQLÀFDQWRIWKHVHK\SHU their relative legal underdevelopment. JOREDOL]HGOHJDOSRLQWVRIFRQWDFWDUH 5DWKHUWKHZHDOWKDQGJOREDODPEL- WLRQVRI*XOIFRXQWULHVWRJHWKHUZLWK * /HJDOHGXFDWLRQ)RUJURZ- WKHLUSULRULQVXODWLRQIURPZLGHVSUHDG ing hubs like Dubai and Doha, having global legal penetration, create diverse resources and incentives to develop and intense opportunities and encoun- legal education that is appropriate ters around different notions of locally for their expanding global roles has appropriate best legal practices. meant hiring Arab and Western legal consultants from other countries to *OREDOL]DWLRQWKURXJKRXWWKHZRUOG provide guidance on best practices in PHDQVDQLQWHQVLÀFDWLRQRIORFDODQG OHJDOHGXFDWLRQ/DZIDFXOWLHVLQWKHVH global legal actors’ access, and ongo- ballooning economies have brought ing connections, to each other. Yet on resident faculty from all over the *XOIK\SHUJOREDOL]DWLRQDGGVWRWKLV ZRUOG$OORIWKLVPHDQVWKDWODZ intensity both because of the relative VFKRROVDUHDSODFHRIÁXLGLQWHUDFWLRQ VKDOORZQHVVWRWKHLQGLJHQRXVOHJDO around legal pedagogy and practice establishment in relation to the extent LQDZD\WKDWLVXQWUXHIRUVWDWHVZLWK of recent global integration and the either less money or better-established overall extent of diversity of residents LQGLJHQRXVODZVFKRROV ZLWKLQWKHVHQHZVRFLHWLHV&RXQWULHV OLNH4DWDUDQGWKH8$(DUHXQSUHF- * ,QFUHDVLQJSUHVHQFHRISURIHV- HGHQWHGLQWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\ZRUOG VLRQDOZRUNHUVZLWKVWURQJDZDUHQHVV in terms of the sheer proportion of RIJOREDOOHJDOQRUPV QDWLYHDQG QRQFLWL]HQZRUNHUVZKRKDYHFRPHRQ QRQQDWLYH  While anyone can make a ZRUNHUFRQWUDFWVWRWKHVHPDJQHWVRI FODLPDURXQGOHJDOIDLUQHVVZRUNHUV JOREDOJURZWK1DWLYHFLWL]HQSRSXOD- LQZKLWHFROODUFDUHHUVJHQHUDOO\KDYH WLRQUDWHVRIMXVWSHUFHQWWRSHUFHQW training and experience in asserting of the total residents of these Gulf legal rights. Moreover, natives and societies merely scratch the surface of IRUHLJQHUVZKRKDYHOLYHGLQRWKHUVR- the diverse demographic issues that FLHWLHVZLWKORQJVWDQGLQJOHJDOQRUPV DUHUDLVHGE\K\SHUJOREDOL]HGJURZWK and institutions have high expectations

7070 The Rule of Law around legal fairness and predict- have transformed the Gulf area into ability. This frequently asserts itself a hub of sophisticated journalistic in driving standards and rules of the GLYHUVLW\(YHQLIWKHRIÀFLDOGRPHVWLF URDGZKHUHUHVLGHQWVZKRDUHXVHGWR media of some Gulf countries is less stricter and more uniformly enforced politically open than more regional WUDIÀFUHJXODWLRQVSUHVVIRUWKHVDPH RQHVWKHFOLPDWHRIPHGLDJURZWKDQG in Gulf societies, given the very high MRXUQDOLVWLFVRSKLVWLFDWLRQDOORZVIRUD accident rate in their expanding cities. great deal of public discussion around Equity concerns about the kefala sys- important legal issues, such as, for WHPWKHGHSHQGHQFHRIJXHVWZRUNHUV example, through the BBC program, RQWKHLURIÀFLDOFRUSRUDWHRULQGLYLGXDO “The Doha Debates.” sponsor, have also led to diverse legal LQÁXHQFHVZLWKUHVSHFWWRZRUNHUV· * /DZHQIRUFHPHQW As noted rights and cases of abuse. DERYHZLWKUHVSHFWWRGULYLQJUHJX- lations, concerns about the nature, * $FWLYLVPDURXQGKXPDQ H[WHQWDQGIDLUQHVVRIODZHQIRUFHPHQW ULJKWVBecause most Gulf societies are raised inevitably in the hyper- DUHVRKLJKO\JOREDOL]HGGHSHQGHQW JOREDOL]HGFUXFLEOHRIWKHFRQWHPSR- RQQRQQDWLYHZRUNHUVDQGRSHQZLWK UDU\*XOI7KHHIÀFLHQF\DQGHTXLW\ tourist visas for residents of other of both the police force and judges are prosperous societies, they are an easy highly visible challenges in cities like destination for international human Dubai and Doha, given their global ULJKWVREVHUYHUV,QGHHGWKHEL]DUUH prominence and the strong presence demographics of these societies of diverse foreigners in the ranks of EURXJKWRQE\WKHVSHHGRIJOREDOL]D- cops, courts, and criminal suspects. tion raise obvious global legal concerns )RUH[DPSOHWZRFULPLQDOSURVHFX- DURXQGQRQFLWL]HQZRUNHUULJKWVDQG tions in the UAE of a British couple LOOHJDOWUDIÀFNLQJ$WWKHVDPHWLPH for public fornication and a member the very success of Gulf hyper-global- of the Emirati royal family for beating L]DWLRQUDLVHVFRQFHUQVRQWKHSDUWRI an Afghan contract merchant brought some local residents that their societ- global attention and extended debate ies receive too much scrutiny in terms DURXQGWKHQDWXUHDQGIDLUQHVVRIODZ RILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLQVSLULQJGLYHUVH HQIRUFHPHQWLQK\SHUJOREDOL]HG*XOI UHVSRQVHVLQFOXGLQJWKH4DWDU/DZ societies. Forum. In short, international legal rights as a general issue opens broad The above areas each entail diverse GHEDWHVDURXQGWKHUXOHRIODZLQ*XOI ideas about the meaning of the rule of societies. ODZDQGMXVWLFHWKDWDOORZIRUYDULHG outcomes and do not generally reduce * 0HGLDH[SDQVLRQDQGRSHQ- WRVLPSOHFRQÁLFWVEHWZHHQWKHUHOL- QHVV7KHJRYHUQPHQWRI4DWDUWULJ- gious and the secular or the Western gered an Arab media revolution, and and the Arab. Indeed, contemporary perhaps helped the recent overall Arab Gulf societies are also marked by UHYROXWLRQLQHVWDEOLVKLQJWKHÀUVW their strong non-Arab populations RSHQSDQ$UDEVDWHOOLWHQHWZRUN$O and highly diffuse South Asian and -D]HHUD7KHVWDWLRQLWVHOIWKH(QJOLVK 6RXWKHDVW$VLDQFXOWXUDOLQÁXHQFHV ODQJXDJHVSLQRIILWVSDZQHGDQGWKH 7KXVERWKFRQÁLFWLYHDQGFRQVHQVXDO regional competitors it inspired, all HOHPHQWVRIUXOHRIODZLGHDOVDQG

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 7171 Article

institutions are highly visible in the  0RUHSHUYDVLYHODZHQIRUFH- Arab Gulf. Western governments, and PHQWLQQRQULJKWVDUHQDVOLNHWUDIÀF HYHQLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZFDQEHYLHZHG ODZVWKURXJKWKHHODERUDWH6DOLNWROO E\PDQ\UHVLGHQWVZLWKVXVSLFLRQ system and other measures EXWZLWKRXWWKHGHHSOHJDF\RIFRORQLDO FRQWURODQGIRUHLJQOHJDOK\EULGL]DWLRQ * Increasing use of courts, that permeated other Arab societies. LQFOXGLQJDJDLQVWSURPLQHQWFLWL]HQV like the Sheikh Issa trial, mentioned 7KXV*XOIFRXQWULHVOLNH4DWDU earlier and the UAE have found themselves having to expand unusually rapidly  ,QFUHDVHGULJKWVIRUQRQFLWL]HQ the density and sophistication of their ZRUNHUVEDVHGRQVXEVWDQWLDOODERU OHJDODSSDUDWXVHVZKLOHKDYLQJH[SR- ODZRYHUKDXO 0HGQLFRIIQG sure to an equally unusual collection of The above sorts of reform only indi- legal examples, legal norms, and legal UHFWO\UHODWHWRWKHRLOZHDOWKRI$UDE reformers-for-hire. Amidst this caul- Gulf countries. The rapid developmen- dron of unfolding explosive expansion tal imperatives that hydrocarbon rev- LQWKHUXOHRIODZWKHUHDUHVLJQVWKDW enues made possible have facilitated, legal reforms have emerged that might but not required, dynamic patterns of EHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKHQKDQFHGLGHDVRI global and native interactions around FLWL]HQVKLS )DRXUDQG0XDVKHU  ODZERWKZLWKLQWKHUHVLGHQWSRSXOD- and more democratic politics. tions and across borders. These latter ,Q4DWDULQUHFHQW\HDUVWKHVHLQ- interactions, based on Gulf govern- clude: PHQWVWUDWHJLHVWRVRZWKHVHHGVIRU post-oil economies, create possibili-  7KHVSOLWRIWKH&ROOHJHRI/DZ ties for legal change that is politically IURPVKDULDZLWKLQ4DWDU8QLYHUVLW\ opening. ZLWKJOREDOOHJDOLQÁXHQFHDQGFXU- ricula reform through American and At the same time, as is evident in RWKHUUXOHRIODZH[SHUWV FRPSDUDWLYHGLVFXVVLRQRI4DWDUDQG the UAE, distinctions in development * The formation of and efforts strategy also suggest possible differ- WRHVWDEOLVKVWDQGDUGVIRUD4DWDU%DU ences in legal reforms and their politi- Association FDOFRQVHTXHQFHV)RULQVWDQFH4DWDU KDVSULRULWL]HGHGXFDWLRQDOUHIRUP  7KH4DWDU/DZ)RUXPDVGLV- through Education City and other de- cussed earlier velopments, and regional media open- QHVVWKURXJK$O-D]HHUDLWVHPSKDVLV * The dedicated tribunal for has been on building legal educational international commercial and civil dis- and associational infrastructure. More SXWHVWKDWZDVKLJKOLJKWHGDWWKH4DWDU RSHQGLVFRXUVHDPRQJODZ\HUVDQGWKH /DZ)RUXP SXEOLFZKLFKKLJKOLJKWVWKHSROLWL-  7KHRSHQLQJRIWKHQHZ FDOO\OLEHUDOL]LQJSRWHQWLDORIODZVXFK QDWLRQDO5XOHRI/DZDQG$QWL&RUUXS- DVWKH4DWDU/DZ)RUXPH[HPSOLÀHG WLRQ&HQWUHLQ'HFHPEHU ZRXOGVHHPWREHWKHUHVXOW

In the UAE, examples might be: While legal education and process

7272 The Rule of Law

DUHDOVRJURZLQJUDSLGO\LQWKH8$( QRWDEO\LQWKHFRQWUDVWEHWZHHQ$EX the latter’s developmental strategy Dhabi’s relative conservatism and SULRULWLHVWRZDUGUDSLGHFRQRPLFDQG Dubai’s breakneck expansion. This WRXULVWJURZWKKDYHIDYRUHGOHJDOUHJX- presents a more problematic picture ODWLRQWKDWPD[LPL]HVÀQDQFLDOWUDQV- ZLWKUHVSHFWWRSROLWLFDOOLEHUDOL]DWLRQ actional stability and order. Thus, in- creased Emirati use of courts, and even At the same time, differences among FODULÀHGULJKWVIRUZRUNHUVPD\VHUYH VRFLHWLHVOLNHWKH8$(DQG4DWDU the interests of procedural smoothness though important, need not obscure more than political opening. Indeed, WKHSUHVHQFHRIDPRUHJHQHUDOL]HG the use of the judicial system to SRVVLEOHWHPSODWHIRUK\SHUJOREDOL]HG threaten politically outspoken Emiratis legal development. This can be il- LQWKHVSULQJRILVDVLJQRIWKH lustrated by looking at additional potential for increased legalism to be comparative data from the World used as a tool of repression, rather than %DQNJRYHUQDQFHLQGLFDWRUVVKRZQLQ UHIRUP +XPDQ5LJKWV:DWFK  )LJXUHV Ultramodern systems like the Salik toll In terms of political voice and inter- V\VWHPWKDWDWWHPSWWRUHJXODWHWUDIÀF nal governmental contestation, Arab problems also exemplify sophisticated *XOIK\SHUJOREDOL]HUVDUHKDUGO\WUDLO- tracking technology that can buttress EOD]HUV+RZHYHUFRPSDUDWLYHOHJDO ODZDVDPHFKDQLVPRIFRHUFLYHFHQWUDO indicators present a different picture. control. Whether in terms of the World Bank’s  ,QVKRUWERWK4DWDUDQGWKH8$(LO- DQQXDOUDQNLQJVRIWKHUXOHRIODZ , OXVWUDWHDK\SHUJOREDOL]HGFRQÁXHQFH political stability, or control of corrup- RIIRUFHVRIOHJDOFKDQJHDQGJURZWK tion, Arab Gulf countries perform con- Yet their divergent emphases in de- sistently better than other Arab cases YHORSPHQWEHWZHHQWKHJOREDOL]DWLRQ GLVFXVVHGLQWKLVDUWLFOH4DWDUDQGWKH of discourse and learning versus the UAE share much better performance JOREDOL]DWLRQRIFRPPHUFHDQGWRXU- in nearly all of these areas than their ism may also point to some contrast in SHHUVDVZHOODVFRPSDUHGZLWKPRVW OHJDOUHIRUPDVGHPRFUDWL]LQJYHUVXV non-Arab states. In a leading index of FRHUFLYH4DWDUKDVVKRZQDVWURQJ public perceptions of government cor- DELOLW\WRPRGHUDWHFRQÁLFWVEHWZHHQ UXSWLRQ4DWDUDQGWKH8$(QRWRQO\ and among domestic and global rule- VWDQGLQWKHWRSÀIWKRIDOOFRXQWULHV RIODZLVVXHVLWPD\WKHUHIRUHH[HP- 4DWDULVUDQNHGKLJKHUWKDQWKH8QLWHG  SOLI\WKLVQHZHUSRVVLEOHSDWKZD\IRU States . SROLWLFDOOLEHUDOL]DWLRQZLWKRXWV\VWHP 7KXVWKHXQXVXDOLQÁX[RILQFRPH RYHUWKURZWKDWLVOHGE\K\SHUJOREDO- and developmental ambition that L]DWLRQ7KH8$(KDVEHHQOHVVVXFFHVV- petrodollars brought to the Arab Gulf IXODWPLWLJDWLQJWKHVHFRQÁLFWVRUSHU- have led to something else, something KDSVKDVPRUHGLPHQVLRQVRIFRQÁLFW SRVVLEO\QHZ1DPHO\VWDWHVOLNHWKH because of its larger overall population 8$(DQG4DWDUKDYHDUDSLGO\JURZ- DQGUHODWLYHO\UHFHQWIHGHUDOLVPZKLFK LQJUXOHRIODZWKDWLVHIIHFWLYHLQDW KDVDOORZHGVHYHUDOPRGHOVRIZKDW OHDVWVRPHVLJQLÀFDQWZD\VEXWZLWK- K\SHUJOREDOL]HGGHYHORSPHQWPHDQV out a long-established indigenous legal for politics and society to emerge, most complex. This leads to many important

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 7373 Article

Figure  ˆ 7orld "ank rule-of-law governance indicators, 2010 and 2000, for four Gulf and six non-Gulf Arab country cases.Source: 7orld "ank n.d.

7474 The Rule of Law

Figure  ˆ 7orld "ank political stability governance indicators, 2010 and 2000, for four Gulf and six non-Gulf Arab country cases.Source: 7orld "ank n.d.

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 7575 Article

Figure  ˆ 7orld "ank control of corruption indicators, 2010 and 2000, for four Gulf and six non-Gulf Arab country cases.Source: 7orld "ank n.d.

7676 The Rule of Law

LVVXHVDQGG\QDPLFVZLWKUHVSHFWWR a system of constant suppression of WKHUXOHRIODZLQWKHVHVRFLHWLHV)RU rights, these regimes put themselves instance, one senior legal policy maker DWRGGVZLWKPDQ\ODZ\HUVDQGQRUPV in the Emirati government noted that DURXQGWKHUXOHRIODZ,WLVWRRVRRQWR the commitment to legal reform is high NQRZH[DFWO\KRZLPSRUWDQWODZ- ZLWKLQWKH8$(SROLF\FRPPXQLW\ yers and other members of the legal EXWQRUPVDURXQGSXWWLQJODZDERYH FRPSOH[ZHUHWRWKHPRELOL]DWLRQDQG LQWHUSHUVRQDOSROLWLFVDUHVWLOOQRWZHOO RYHUWKURZRIWKH7XQLVLDQDQG(J\S- understood, especially among older WLDQJRYHUQPHQWVLQ,WLVFOHDU leaders. KRZHYHUWKDWSURWHVWVRIZLGHVSUHDG JURXSVRIODZ\HUVLQ(J\SWLQ 7KLVUHÁHFWVWKHEURDGHURSSRUWXQLW\ DQGLQ7XQLVLDLQSOD\HGLQWRWKH DQGFKDOOHQJHIRUK\SHUJOREDOL]HG broad activism that caused regime VWDWHVLQWKH$UDE*XOIZLWKUHVSHFWWR change. Moreover, the outrage that ODZDQGJUDGXDOSROLWLFDORSHQLQJ:LOO Tunisians experienced as a result of the various pressures to marry socio- WKHVHOILPPRODWLRQLQODWHRID political continuity and rapid global SXVKFDUWYHQGRUZKRFRXOGQRWREWDLQ integration in these countries encour- a permit for his business fairly, and age the expansion of legal rights and much subsequent framing of the Arab SROLWLFDOWUDQVSDUHQF\RUZLOOLWOHDG protests generally, clearly suggest the WRJUHDWHUOHJDOVXUYHLOODQFHDQGODZ LPSRUWDQFHRIEDVLFUXOHRIODZLGHDOV HQIRUFHPHQWUHSUHVVLRQLQVWHDG" of fairness and government account- DELOLW\DVFHQWUDOWRHYHQWV System Collapse and the Promise of Restarting from Scratch ,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRHPSKDVL]HWKDW Tunisia and Egypt have had long Surveillance and legal repres- traditions around the importance VLRQZHUHFHUWDLQO\VWHDGLO\JURZLQJ DQGLQÁXHQFHRIWKHOHJDOFRPSOH[,Q features of republics like Egypt and Tunisia, the movements that led to a 7XQLVLDGHVSLWH RUSHUKDSVEHFDXVHRI  fairly peaceful independence struggle WKHLUYHU\ZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGVHFXODUL]HG IURPWKH)UHQFKZHUHFDOOHG´&RQVWLWX- legal complexes (Posusney and Angrist WLRQµ GHVWRXU DQG´1HZ&RQVWLWX-  ,QGHHGXQOLNHWKHPRQDUFKLHV WLRQµ QHRGHVWRXU UHÁHFWLQJDVHQVH these systems currently in major transi- of the need for a country grounded in WLRQKDGPLOLWDU\UXOHUVZKRZHUH OHJDOLW\7KHFRXQWU\·VÀUVWSUHVLGHQW XQDEOHRUXQZLOOLQJWRDFFRPPRGDWH +DELE%RXUJXLEDZDVD)UHQFKWUDLQHG Islamic political groups in the public ODZ\HUZKRFKDPSLRQHGWKHUXOHRI space. Aging ex-leaders like Egypt’s ODZZLWKSHUKDSVWKH$UDEZRUOG·V Hosni Mubarak or Tunisia’s Zine al- strongest initial emphasis on gender Abidine Ben Ali consistently raised and civil rights. Tunisia’s number of the specter of radical Islamic political ODZ\HUVEDVHGRQP\LQWHUYLHZVZLWK WDNHRYHUDVDMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUFXWWLQJ VHYHUDOODZSURIHVVRUV is slightly back on civil liberties and continuing a KLJKHUWKDQRQHODZ\HUIRUHYHU\ VWDWHRIHPHUJHQF\WRWKHLUFLWL]HQVDQG FLWL]HQVRUODZ\HUVSHUSHR- to Western government allies. ple, a number that compares favorably By using repressive tactics against ZLWKPDQ\QRQ:HVWHUQDQGVRPH political activism and perpetuating :HVWHUQFRXQWULHV *DODQWHU 

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 7777 Article

Egypt has a similarly impressive characteristic of a legal complex that legal complex. Indeed, Egypt’s DWWHPSWVWRH[SDQGWKHUXOHRIODZ Supreme Constitutional Court stands 7KHUXOHRIODZDVDVORJDQWKHUROH DORQHLQWKH$UDEZRUOGIRULWVSRVW RIODZ\HUVDQGRWKHUPHPEHUVRIWKH LQGHSHQGHQWKLVWRU\RIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZ legal complex as central members of 7KHUXOHRIODZKDVEHHQFHQWUDOWR WKHQHZ$UDEJRYHUQPHQWVDQGWKH Egyptian political discourse for more UHDOPRIFRQVWLWXWLRQZULWLQJDVFULWLFDO WKDQDFHQWXU\ 6KDODNKDQ\  to establishing a more just order are all Egypt has supplied many of the lead- DWWKHKHDUWRISRVW7XQLVLDQDQG LQJODZSURIHVVRUVDQGOHJDOSHGDJRJL- Egyptian politics. The long-frustrated FDOWH[WVLQ$UDELFIRUWKH$UDEZRUOG simmer and eventual explosion of the for decades. legal complex in these societies raises KRSHIRUDPRGHORIOHJDOOLEHUDOL]DWLRQ

7878 The Rule of Law more open politics. This variation in DAVID M. MEDNICOFF IS ASSISTANT PROFES- legalist patterns and political reform SOR OF PUBLIC POLICY AND HONORS PROGRAM DPRQJ$UDEFDVHVDQGEHWZHHQ$UDE DIRECTOR OF THE SOCIAL THOUGHT AND PO- cases and the historical trajectory of LITICAL ECONOMY PROGRAM AT THE UNIVERSITY :HVWHUQZRUOGDUHZRUWKNHHSLQJLQ OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST. HIS AREAS OF PLQGIRUJOREDOODZUHIRUPZRUNHUV EXPERTISE INCLUDE MIDDLE EASTERN LAW AND and the policy community more gener- POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, ally for at least several reasons. GLOBALIZATION, AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLI- CY. MEDNICOFF HOLDS A BA FROM PRINCETON First, looking at this variation clari- AND MA, JD, AND PHD (POLITICAL SCIENCE) ÀHVWKDW:HVWHUQUXOHRIODZHIIRUWVWR DEGREES FROM HARVARD. HIS PUBLICATIONS contribute to legalism in individual AND ONGOING RESEARCH DEAL BROADLY WITH Arab cases cannot assume the rel- INTERDISCIPLINARY CONNECTIONS BETWEEN evance of general Western historical LEGAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIMXGLFLDOJURZWKDQG AT THE NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL LEVELS, SROLWLFDOOLEHUDOL]DWLRQWRSDUWLFXODU PARTICULARLY AS THESE RELATE TO CURRENT Arab countries. Second, breaking the POLICY ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE IS LGHDRIWKH$UDEZRUOGGRZQLQWRPRUH CURRENTLY COMPLETING A BOOK MANUSCRIPT VSHFLÀFVHWVRIFRXQWULHVWKDWPD\VWLOO ON THE POLITICS OF THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOC- EHFRQGXFLYHWRVRPHJHQHUDOL]DWLRQV RATIZATION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN FIVE PD[LPL]HVWKHSRVVLELOLW\IRUQXDQFHG ARAB SOCIETIES. MEDNICOFF IS ALSO ENGAGED policy analysis that pays attention IN A RELATED PROJECT ON RELIGION IN ARAB to meaningful regional variation at a CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS SINCE THE 2011 critical time for many countries’ legal UPRISINGS. and political futures. Third, and more MEDNICOFF COMMENTS FREQUENTLY ON VSHFLÀFDOO\DPRGHORIOHJDOUHIRUP MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND U.S. FOREIGN WKDWSULRULWL]HVDFRPSOHWHVHSDUDWLRQ POLICY IN AMERICAN AND GLOBAL MEDIA. HE RIFKXUFK RUPRVTXH DQGVWDWHLILW HAS PRESENTED HIS WORK AT THE CARNEGIE DFWXDOO\H[LVWVDQ\ZKHUHLVXQOLNHO\ ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, to hold much appeal in contemporary THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE SAUDI $UDEVWDWHVDWOHDVWIRUQRZ,QGHHG ARABIAN INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMATIC STUDIES, the current Arab moment of more open AND CAMBRIDGE, GEORGETOWN (QATAR), SROLWLFDOFRQWHVWDWLRQDPLGUHQHZHGH[- HARVARD, AND STANFORD UNIVERSITIES, ternal concerns around Islamist politics AMONG OTHER PLACES. MEDNICOFF’S TEACH- LVSUHFLVHO\RQHGXULQJZKLFKODZ·V ING HONORS INCLUDE A UNIVERSITY-WIDE LILLY variation and opening potential may TEACHING FELLOWSHIP FOR PROMISING JUNIOR be most useful, at least if these can be FACULTY, THE U. MASS. COLLEGE OF SOCIAL DQDO\]HGLQFOHDUKHDGHGFRPSDUDWLYH AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES OUTSTANDING ZD\V TEACHER AWARD, AND A NATIONAL PRIZE FOR INNOVATIVE TEACHING RELATED TO THE UNITED STATES AFTER 9/11. MEDNICOFF WAS A FUL- BRIGHT SENIOR SCHOLAR IN LAW IN QATAR IN 2006-2007, WHERE HE HELPED DEVELOP AN INNOVATIVE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MAJOR AT QATAR UNIVERSITY. IN 2010-2011, HE WAS A RESEARCH FELLOW IN THE DUBAI INITIA- TIVE OF THE BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 7979 Article

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AT THE JOHN F. KEN-  This is on the basis of preliminary qualitative NEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AT HARVARD VXUYH\VWKDW,KDYHDGPLQLVWHUHGWRODZ\HUVDQG ODZVWXGHQWVLQ0RURFFRDQG4DWDUDVZHOODV NIVERSITY U . VHYHUDOORQJHULQWHUYLHZV+RZHYHU,DPVWLOO collecting this data and am careful at this stage to OLPLWJHQHUDODQGVSHFLÀFFRQFOXVLRQVXQWLOGDWD collection is further along.

,Q)LJXUHVFRORUVDUHEDVHGRQWKHSHUFHQ- WLOHUDQJHIRUHDFKJRYHUQDQFHLQGLFDWRUZLWK ENDNOTES UHG OHVVWKDQWKSHUFHQWLOHSLQN  SHUFHQWLOHRUDQJH \HOORZ DQG  By “political opening,” I mean changes in JUHHQ  JRYHUQPHQWVWUXFWXUHVDQGFLWL]HQV·ULJKWVWKDW provide either more avenues for regime account-  Note that World Bank data is graphically DELOLW\WRWKHSRSXODWLRQRURYHUDOOFLWL]HQDQG displayed from more to less recent years. De- media civil liberties and freedom of political tailed explanations of the different governance H[SUHVVLRQRUERWK$WHUPOLNHWKLVDOORZVWKH indicators and their methodology can be found use of cross-national governance indicators, such at World Bank n.d. as those of the World Bank, Freedom House, DQGRWKHURUJDQL]DWLRQVWRKHLJKWHQFRPSDUL-  See, for example, an assessment of Jordanian sons across regime types. But I mean to describe UHIRUPSODQVE\&KULVWRSK:LOFNH  $VSDUW processes that can be measured around regime RIUHFHQWHIIRUWVWREROVWHUWKHMXGLFLDOUHYLHZ DFFRXQWDELOLW\DQGFLWL]HQOLEHUWLHVWKDWDUHRIWHQ FDSDFLW\RI-RUGDQ·V-XGLFLDO&RXQFLOZKLFKKDYH understood by more ambiguous terms like “lib- LQYROYHGH[WHQVLYHFRQVXOWDWLRQVZLWK$PHULFDQ HUDOL]DWLRQµRU´GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQµ UXOHRIODZHQWLWLHVDVZHOODVHYHQEURDGHU DWWHPSWVWRERRVWZRPHQ·VULJKWVWKHVLJQLÀ- 2 Note that this article does not include in its FDQFHRIZRPHQMXGJHVLQ-RUGDQKDVDOVREHHQ relevant cases either Lebanon or Palestine for KLJKOLJKWHGUHFHQWO\ +D]DLPHK  VRPHZKDWVLPLODUUHDVRQVRIWKHLUTXDVLGHP- ocratic internal nature and frequent periods of %\´K\SHUJOREDOL]DWLRQµ,UHIHUWRWKHDFFHOHU- questionable internal sovereignty. DWHGSURFHVVRIJOREDOL]DWLRQWKDWKDVWDNHQSODFH LQVRFLHWLHVOLNH4DWDUDQGWKH8$(7KHSURFHVV 7KH0LGGOH(DVWHUQRULJLQRIWZRRIWKHPRVW is distinguished by both the speed of change UHQRZQHGDQFLHQWOHJDOFRGHV³WKH&RGHRI and the scope of change, the latter evident from Hammurabi and the Judeo-Christian Bible— WKHFRPSDUDWLYHO\OLPLWHGVL]HDQGJOREDOFRQ- should not be forgotten. More to the point, nectedness of these societies prior to the past Islamic and Ottoman sociolegal traditions that several decades of petroleum revenue–funded FRQWULEXWHWRFRQWHPSRUDU\$UDEODZSUHGDWHWKH dynamism. I am not using the term in the more $QJOR$PHULFDQFRPPRQODZE\FHQWXULHV VSHFLDOL]HGDFDGHPLFVHQVHRIWKH´K\SHU JOREDOL]DWLRQWKHVLVµZKLFKVXJJHVWVWKDWUHFHQW (YHQDFRXQWU\ZLWKDVGHYHORSHGVHFXODU LQFUHDVHGJOREDOL]DWLRQJHQHUDOO\KDVUHGXFHG legal and social traditions as Egypt makes Islam the scope of action for national leaders (Huber its basic source for legislation in article 2 of its DQG6WHSKHQV  constitution. For a discussion of this, see Dupret  7KHSURVHFXWLRQRIWKH%ULWLVKFRXSOHZDVOX- ULGHQRXJKWREHDIHDWXUHRIJOREDOQHZVUHSRUWV  One of the signs of both legal pluralism and LQWKHVXPPHURI VHHIRUH[DPSOHWKH the relative novelty of the Western notion of the L.A. Times article by Jeffrey Fleishman, “British UXOHRIODZLQ$UDEFRXQWULHVLVWKDWWKHUHLVQR Couple in Dubai Get Prison Terms in Sex Scan- single phrase that is used in every country to GDOµ2FWREHU6KHLNK,VVDDEURWKHURI translate the term. For example, in Morocco, the WKHUXOHURIWKH8$(ZDVSURVHFXWHGLQWKHZDNH FRQFHSWLVRIWHQUHIHUUHGWRDVGDZODHOKDTZ·DO of global outrage after a video of him beating the TDQXQ WKHUXOHRIULJKWDQGODZ LQVWHDGRIVL\D- $IJKDQPHUFKDQWLQEHFDPHZLGHO\YLHZHG dat al-qanun. This term gained currency through VHHIRUH[DPSOH7KH1DWLRQDO·V-DQXDU\ the Moroccan monarchy’s efforts to employ it as article by Marten Youssef, “Sheikh Issa Acquit- DVORJDQIRULWVRZQSXUSRUWHGIHDOW\WRWKHLGHDO tal: Government ‘Does Not Interfere’ in Court RIWKHUXOHRIODZ Matters.”

8080 The Rule of Law

,P\VHOIH[SHULHQFHGWKLVVXVSLFLRQWRZDUG REFERENCES LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLQJXHVWWHDFKLQJDFODVVLQ $SULODWWKH'XEDL6FKRRORI*RYHUQPHQW $ERX(O)DGO.KDOHG,VODPDQGWKHFKDO- ZKHUHVRSKLVWLFDWHGGLYHUVH$UDEDQGRWKHU lenge of democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton non-Western graduate students voiced deep University Press. FRQÀGHQFHDERXWWKHLUVRFLHWLHV·DELOLWLHVWRPDQ- DJHJOREDOL]DWLRQDQGJURZWKDORQJVLGHPLVWUXVW $GDPV-RKQ1RYDQJOXVZULWWHQLQ RIVLJQLÀFDQWDVSHFWVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZDQG ,Q7KHZRUNVRI-RKQ$GDPV9ROXPHHGLWHG institutions. E\&KDUOHV)UDQFLV$GDPV%RVWRQ/LWWOH%URZQ and Company.  As suggested earlier, I use the World Bank’s UXOHRIODZLQGLFDWRUFDXWLRXVO\EHFDXVHLWLQ- $Q1DCLP$KPHG$EGXOODKL,VODPDQG FOXGHVPHDVXUHVRIERWKODZDVFRHUFLYHHQIRUFH- the secular state: Negotiating the future of PHQWDQGODZDVULJKWVDQGSROLWLFDODFFRXQW- shari`a. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University DELOLW\ZKLFKWKLVDUWLFOHWUHDWVDVQRWQHFHVVDULO\ Press. consistent. %HUPDQ3DXO6FKLII*OREDOOHJDOSOXUDO-  See Transparency International’s annual LVP6RXWKHUQ&DOLIRUQLD/DZ5HYLHZ &RUUXSWLRQ3HUFHSWLRQV,QGH[,QWKHHGL- WLRQWKH8$(LVUDQNHGWZHQW\HLJKWDQG %URZQ1DWKDQ-7KHUXOHRIODZLQWKH 4DWDUWLHGIRUWZHQW\WZRJOREDOO\ZLWKWKH $UDEZRUOG&DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV 8QLWHG6WDWHVUDQNHGLPPHGLDWHO\EHORZ4DWDU DWQXPEHUWZHQW\IRXU7KHUHSRUWLVDYDLO- &DURWKHUV7KRPDVHG3URPRWLQJWKHUXOH DEOHDWKWWSFSLWUDQVSDUHQF\RUJFSL RIODZDEURDG,QVHDUFKRINQRZOHGJH:DVKLQJ- UHVXOWV&RXQWU\5HVXOWV WRQ'&&DUQHJLH(QGRZPHQWIRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO Peace. )URPDFRQÀGHQWLDOLQWHUYLHZFRQGXFWHGE\ WKHDXWKRU'XEDL$SULO &KHVWHUPDQ6LPRQ$QLQWHUQDWLRQDOUXOH RIODZ"$PHULFDQ-RXUQDORI&RPSDUDWLYH/DZ )RUFRQÀUPDWLRQRIWKLVVHHWKHIROORZLQJ  HVWLPDWHE\D7XQLVLDQODZ\HUZKROLVWHGWKH PHPEHUVKLSRIWKH7XQLVLDQ%DUDVPHP- 'H7RFTXHYLOOH$OH[LV'HPRFUDF\LQ EHUVLQZZZDEGHUUD]DNNLODQLQHWDFWLY- $PHULFD%LEOLR/LIH2ULJLQDOO\ZULWWHQLQ LWHVGHOHJBFDQDGDKWPO,FRPSXWHGODZ\HUVSHU SRSXODWLRQDQGIRUHYHU\FLWL]HQVXVLQJ 'XSUHW%DXGRXLQ/D&KDUL·DHVWODVRXUFH RYHUDOOSRSXODWLRQÀJXUHVRI de la législation: Interprétations jurispruden- from Tunisia’s National Institute of Statistics tielles et théories juridiques. In L’état de droit KWWSZZZLQVQDWWQLQGH[HQSKS  GDQVOHPRQGH$UDEHHGLWHGE\$KPHG Mahiou.  Indeed, one estimate of Egypt’s Bar Associa- WLRQPHPEHUVKLSIURP\LHOGVDÀJXUHRIRQH )DRXU0XKDPPDGDQG0DUZDQ0XDVKHU ODZ\HUIRUHYHU\(J\SWLDQVZKLFKLVDVKLJK (GXFDWLRQIRUFLWL]HQVKLSLQWKH$UDEZRUOG.H\ as many countries in the West. See this estimate WRWKHIXWXUH&DUQHJLH(QGRZPHQWIRU,QWHUQD- RIODZ\HUVRXWRIDQRYHUDOOSRSXOD- tional Peace. WLRQRIDWKWWSQHZVHJ\SWFRP HQQHZVHJ\SWQHZVSRRU )HOGPDQ1RDK7KHIDOODQGULVHRIWKH turnout-in-egypt-bar-association-elections.html. Islamic state. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 7KLVDUWLFOHDOVRVXJJHVWVORZPRUDOHDPRQJ Press. (J\SW·VOHJDOFRPSOH[SULRUWRWKHPRELOL]DWLRQ *DODQWHU0DUF0RUHODZ\HUVWKDQSHRSOH against Mubarak. The global multiplication of legal professionals. ,Q7KHSDUDGR[RISURIHVVLRQDOLVP/DZ\HUVDQG the possibility of justice, edited by Scott L. Cum- PLQJV1HZ

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8282 The Rule of Law

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HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 8383 Emerging Trends in Middle Eastern Health Policy BY NORA EL NAWAWI, TERESA CHAHINE, NADEEM AL-DUAIJ, ALI HAMANDI, AND WILLIAM BEAN

ABSTRACT:

Health policy is a crucial yet largely overlooked component of sociopolitical reform amidst the ongoing transformation of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Currently no formal review exists of health reform in MENA. This article provides a summary of progress to date in four selected countries, based on the authors’ collective experiences in these countries, with the objective of identifying preliminary patterns to inform future research and policy making. Success stories and lessons learned over the past decade are shared from Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Jordan, highlighting the diversity, commonalities, and crosscutting issues affecting the region. Examples of health SROLFLHVIURPWKHVHFRXQWULHVUHÁHFWWKHFRPSOH[LQWHUSOD\RISROLWLFDOHFRQRPLFDQG social factors in the region. Further research is necessary to fully understand the diverse needs and challenges in MENA and to identify opportunities for mobilizing resources to improve health within the context of reform and development at the country and region levels. Introduction

$VWKHZRUOGWXUQVLWVH\HVWRWKH0LGGOH(DVWDQG1RUWK$IULFD 0(1$  UHJLRQSROLWLFDOUHIRUPDQGJRYHUQPHQWUHVWUXFWXULQJDUHEHLQJYLHZHGWKURXJK WKHOHQVRIGHPRFUDF\EXLOGLQJDQGSRYHUW\UHGXFWLRQ´3HRSOHSRZHUµDWHUP many have used in reference to the movements in multiple MENA countries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ÀWV'UDZLQJRQWKHLUÀQGLQJVDQGLQFRUSRUDWLQJWKHPLQWRWKH dialogue during this crucial time creates an opportunity to reformulate the poli-

84 Emerging Trends

Table 1 ˆ Selected (ealth Indicators by 7orld (ealth /rganiZation 7(/ Region Millennium Development Goals, Selected Health Indicators WHO Region Maternal Mortality +,9$,'6 Malaria Tuberculosis 5DWLRQSHU   Among HIV-  Negative Pop.  African Region >²@ >²@ >²@ >²@ Region of the Ameri- >²@ >²@ >²@ >²@ cas Southeast Asia Region >²@ >²@ >²@ >²@ European Region >²@ >²@ >²@ >²@ Eastern Mediterranean >²@ >²@ >²@ >²@ Region :HVWHUQ3DFLÀF5HJLRQ >²@ >²@ >²@ >²@ Global >²@ >²@ >²@ >²@

cies and outputs that stakeholders are LQJPXFKRIWKHGHYHORSLQJZRUOG seeking across multiple sectors of the particularly sub-Saharan Africa and sociopolitical arena. Southeast Asia, the MENA region as DZKROHKDVIDUHGUHDVRQDEO\ZHOOLQ 7KH$UDE6SULQJUHSUHVHQWVDZDWHU- SXEOLFKHDOWKRXWFRPHV+RZHYHU VKHGPRPHQWIRU0(1$DVZHFRO- there exist substantial health issues in OHFWLYHO\ZLWQHVVHGSROLWLFDOXSKHDYDO this diverse region, from the high in- LQ7XQLVLD/LE\DDQG(J\SWLQ fant mortality rates observed in poorer and anxiously observe the situation nations to the alarming rates of obesity as it unfolds in Syria. In other MENA in the Gulf States. Noncommunicable nations, the call for reform has been GLVHDVHV 1&'V VXFKDVKHDUWGLVHDVH less violent or less visible to Western cancer, and diabetes are increasing, eyes, yet the lesson of reform has not ZKLOHDFFHVVWRFDUHLVRIWHQOLPLWHGWR been lost on any government in the WKRVHZKRFDQDIIRUGLW7DEOHFRP- UHJLRQSROLWLFDOOHDGHUVKDYHFKRVHQWR pares selected health indicators and UHVSRQGLQGLIIHUHQWZD\VEXWGHPDQG KHDOWKZRUNIRUFHVWDWLVWLFVIRU0(1$ for reform is undoubtedly ubiquitous FODVVLÀHGXQGHUWKH:RUOG+HDOWK and authorities are responding. Once 2UJDQL]DWLRQ·V5HJLRQDO2IÀFHIRUWKH political stability has returned to these (DVWHUQ0HGLWHUUDQHDQ WRWKRVHRI QDWLRQVRUDQHZHTXLOLEULXPKDVEHHQ other regions. HVWDEOLVKHGLQFRXQWULHVZKHUHWKHUH ZDVQRGUDVWLFXSKHDYDOWKHQHHGIRU 7KH0(1$UHJLRQLVRIWHQYLHZHGDV reform in other fundamental areas one monolithic bloc by those unfamil- ZLOOEHFRPHSDUDPRXQWNH\DPRQJ LDUZLWKLWVKLVWRU\FXOWXUHDQGSHR- WKHVHZLOOEHWKHHGXFDWLRQDOVHFWRUDQG ples, yet the region itself is uniquely di- health systems. verse. Through this article, the authors seek to highlight both the diversity Given the burden of disease plagu- and the commonalities of this region in

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 85 Article

Source: 7orld (ealth /rganiZation 11b $JH6WDQGDUGL]HG0RUWDOLW\5DWHVSHU Health Workforce SRSXODWLRQE\&DXVH  SHUSRSXODWLRQ 

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          terms of health reform and policy chal- Despite the recent turmoil, the lenges by providing examples from UHJLRQ·VJHRSROLWLFDOVLJQLÀFDQFHDQG selected countries. Due to the lack of GDLO\QHZVSDSHUKHDGOLQHVLQWKH:HVW VXIÀFLHQWDQGFRPSUHKHQVLYHGDWDWR there is actually a paucity of research LQFOXGHDOO0(1$FRXQWULHVZHKDYH in the area of health policy in the chosen four countries for an initial 0(1$UHJLRQ .HQQHG\HWDO SLORWUHYLHZLQRUGHUWRLQIRUPIXWXUH (O-DUGDOLHWDO(O-DUGDOLHWDO research and policy-making efforts. We  7KLVDUWLFOHVHHNVWRFRQWULEXWH KLJKOLJKW(J\SW/HEDQRQ.XZDLWDQG WRWKLVOLWHUDWXUHE\ÀUVWSURYLGLQJ -RUGDQSURYLGLQJDEULHIRYHUYLHZRI key highlights of recent reforms in the progress to date in health reform ef- selected MENA countries of Egypt, forts since the turn of the century and /HEDQRQ-RUGDQDQG.XZDLW7KH discussing the factors affecting these article then discusses crosscutting fac- changes. The four nations have been WRUVLQÁXHQFLQJKHDOWKSROLF\UHIRUP VHOHFWHGDVDUHVXOWRIÀHOGZRUNFRQ- LQWKHVHFRXQWULHVDQGFRQFOXGHVZLWK ducted by the authors previously on KRZWKHVHIDFWRUVFDQEHXVHGWRLQ- WKHJURXQGE\ZRUNLQJDQGFRPPXQL- form future research and initiatives by FDWLQJZLWKPLQLVWULHVQRQJRYHUQPHQ- governments and policy makers. WDORUJDQL]DWLRQV 1*2V XQLYHUVLWLHV and other institutions in these coun- +HDOWK3ROLF\5HIRUP6QDSVKRW tries. While this article by no means RI&XUUHQW6WDWXVDQG5HFHQW'H- UHSUHVHQWVDFRPSUHKHQVLYHUHYLHZRI YHORSPHQWV health systems and policy changes in Health Reform in Egypt: 1997 to the region, success stories and les- Present sons learned from these four countries UHÁHFWHPHUJLQJKHDOWKSROLF\WUHQGVLQ The Egyptian health care system is the MENA region and provide a source composed of a combination of private- of insight for future studies and policy VHFWRUKHDOWKFDUHRUJDQL]DWLRQVDQG directives. 86 Emerging Trends public-sector agencies, the latter of list of essential services to their ben- ZKLFKSUHGRPLQDWH7KHSXEOLFVHFWRU HÀFLDULHVWKHVHHVVHQWLDOVHUYLFHVDUH is dominated by the Egyptian Ministry UHIHUUHGWRDVWKHEDVLFEHQHÀWVSDFN- RI+HDOWKDQG3RSXODWLRQ 02+3  DJH %%3 7KH)+)ZHUHUHVSRQVLEOH ZKLFKLVWKHSULPDU\SURYLGHUIRU for accreditation of providers, monitor- the Egyptian people and administers ing and evaluation of the quality of DSSUR[LPDWHO\KHDOWKIDFLOLWLHV services, and providing performance- DQGPRUHWKDQEHGVQDWLRQZLGH EDVHGLQFHQWLYHV :RUOG%DQN  (Ministry of Health and Population 7KHLQWHQWZDVWRDGRSWDVLQJOHSD\HU  DVZHOODVWHDFKLQJDQGXQLYHU- system in order to maintain a sustain- sity hospitals, the public Health Insur- DEOHÀQDQFLDOPRGHOZLWKRXWUHOLDQFH DQFH2UJDQL]DWLRQDQGWKH0LQLVWULHV on external donors. RI,QWHULRUDQG'HIHQVHZKLFKHDFK have a minor health care role in their 7KHLQLWLDOIRFXVRIWKH+653ZDVWR UHVSHFWLYHGRPDLQV *HULFNH  improve primary health care and tar- The private, nongovernmental sector JHWKLJKPRUWDOLW\UDWHVIRUH[DPSOH includes independent clinics, hospitals, LQWKHUHZHUHGHDWKVXQGHU DQGSKDUPDFLHVZKLFKDUHSULPDU- ÀYH\HDUVRIDJHSHUOLYHELUWKV LO\IRUSURÀWRUJDQL]DWLRQVZKLOH DQGPDWHUQDOGHDWKVSHU mosques and churches provide some OLYHELUWKV 2NDLO ,WZDVDOVR QRQSURÀWKHDOWKVHUYLFHV +DOH\DQG assumed that this single-payer model %pJ+HLQDQG.RKOPRUJHQ  IRUSULPDU\FDUHZRXOGRSWLPL]H health gains per Egyptian pound spent &RRUGLQDWLRQEHWZHHQDQGZLWKLQ :RUOG%DQN  entities in both the public and private sectors is largely lacking, a problem 7KHUHIRUPSURFHVVZDVGLYLGHGLQWR WKDWKDVEHHQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHFXU- WKUHHSKDVHVFRUUHVSRQGLQJZLWKWKH rent shortcomings of Egypt’s health three levels of care: primary, second- FDUHV\VWHPDVUHÁHFWHGE\SRRUKHDOWK DU\DQGWHUWLDU\,QWKHÀUVWSKDVH outcomes, disparities in access, and ZKLFKEHJDQLQSLORWSURMHFWV ÀQDQFLDOXQVXVWDLQDELOLW\ :RUOG%DQN ZHUHODXQFKHGLQWKHJRYHUQRUDWHVRI  7KH+HDOWK6HFWRU5HIRUP3UR- $OH[DQGULD0HQRÀDDQG6RKDJDQG JUDP +653 ZDVIRUPXODWHGLQ involved extensive upgrading of the in an attempt to address these issues, primary health care facilities, introduc- and it proposed a complete revamping WLRQRIQHZPDQDJHPHQWV\VWHPVDQG of the health care system. training of family health staff. Basic SULPDU\FDUHXQLWVZHUHHVWDEOLVKHG HSRP proposed a universal cover- ZLWKWKHLQWHQWRISURYLGLQJWKH%%3 DJHVRFLDOLQVXUDQFHPRGHOWRLQWH- DQGDUHNQRZQDVWKH)DPLO\+HDOWK JUDWHWKHFRPSDUWPHQWDOL]HGÀQDQFLQJ 8QLWV )+8  %HUPDQHWDO 7KH structure of the Egyptian health sector SLORWSURMHFWVZHUHUHSRUWHGWREHVXF- into a single National Health Insurance FHVVIXODQGE\WKHUHZHUHVL[W\ )XQG :RUOG%DQN ,QVXUDQFH VL[)+8VLQRSHUDWLRQE\WKLV entities called Family Health Funds QXPEHUKDGVZHOOHGWR $EGHO )+) ZHUHHVWDEOLVKHGDWWKHJRYHU- 5DKPDQ+DOH\DQG%pJ  QRUDWHOHYHOZLWKDPDQGDWHWRFRQWUDFW ZLWKSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHSURYLGHUVWKDW Despite the progress the HSRP had ZRXOGKDYHWKHFDSDFLW\WRGHOLYHUD GHPRQVWUDWHGE\VHYHUDOREVWD-

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 87 Article

cles emerged that hindered a smooth had typically delivered primary health SURJUHVVLRQWRSKDVHVWZRDQGWKUHH FDUHZKLOHVSHFLDOW\FDUHVHUYLFHVZHUH These included changes in funding dominated by the private sector (World mechanisms, changes in government %DQN 7KLVQHZSROLF\ZDV RIÀFLDOVDQGFKDQJHVLQWKHYLHZVDQG intended to provide a safety net for the priorities of the health minister at the uninsured as these primary health care time. centers charge only nominal fees and E\ODZGRQRWGLIIHUHQWLDWHEHWZHHQLQ- ,QWKHWXUPRLODQGFKDQJHWKDW VXUHGDQGXQLQVXUHGSDWLHQWVSULYDWH gripped Egypt and the MENA region hospitals, on the other hand, charge at not only resulted in the ousting of the levels that are often beyond the means former president after thirty years of the poor and uninsured segments of RIUXOHEXWDOVRJUDQWHGDZLQGRZRI the population. opportunity to reconstruct the coun- try’s institutions. With the population $ORQJWKHVHOLQHVSROLFLHVZHUHDOVR demanding equitable access to health implemented to regulate the MOPH care and better quality, the HSRP may FRQWUDFWLQJZLWKSULYDWHKRVSLWDOV again have an opportunity to proceed 3UHYLRXVO\FRQWUDFWLQJZDVEDVHGRQ VZLIWO\RQFHDVWDEOHJRYHUQPHQWLVLQ bed capacity and resulted in annual place. overruns of the ministry’s budget. In WKLVDSSURDFKZDVUHSODFHGE\ Health Reform in Lebanon: 1998 to VHWWLQJÀ[HGDQQXDOÀQDQFLDOFHLOLQJV Present IRUHDFKKRVSLWDO:KLOHWKHQHZSROLF\ DOORZHGIRUPRUHHIÀFLHQWFRQWURO :KLOHWKHODVWGHFDGHRIWKHWZHQ- of expenditures by the ministry and WLHWKFHQWXU\ZDVGHYRWHGODUJHO\WR UHVROYHGWKHSUREOHPRIKRVSLWDOL]DWLRQ the recovery and rebuilding of the budget overruns, it did not necessar- GDPDJHGKHDOWKVHFWRUIROORZLQJWKH LO\WUDQVODWHLQWRDQLQFUHDVHLQHTXLW\ HQGRIWKHFLYLOZDULQ/HEDQRQWKH in practice, the private hospitals often ÀUVWGHFDGHRIWKHQHZPLOOHQQLXP XVHGWKHVHIXQGVDWWKHLURZQGLVFUH- XVKHUHGLQDQHZZDYHRIKHDOWK WLRQDQGKDGWKHULJKWWRWXUQDZD\ system reform aimed at streamlining patients in need once these funds had VHUYLFHSURYLVLRQDQGÀQDQFLQJDQG been depleted. Another policy aimed improving access to care. A number of at providing incentives for effective reforms targeted the management and health spending in the private sec- administration of the health system, tor, in addition to improving quality though this article focuses primarily of care in both the private and public on policy-oriented measures and their KRVSLWDOVZDVWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIDQ impact on health system performance, accreditation system for all hospitals. A JRYHUQPHQWÀQDQFHVDQGSRSXODWLRQ UHLPEXUVHPHQWSROLF\ZDVDOVRLQWUR- KHDOWKRXWFRPHVDQGXWLOL]DWLRQ duced to reduce hospital bills using As in Egypt, one of the primary pol- set rates for surgical procedures rather icy reforms instituted by the Lebanese than the previous mechanism of fee 0LQLVWU\RI3XEOLF+HDOWK 023+ ZDV for service, a practice that had created the introduction of incentives for the incentives for over-doctoring (Ammar SURYLVLRQDQGXWLOL]DWLRQRISULPDU\   health care services. Previously NGOs 7KHSULFLQJVWUXFWXUHRIGUXJVZDV

88 Emerging Trends another target for policy reform in cross-sectoral collaboration provides /HEDQRQZLWKWZRPLQLVWHULDOGHFL- DYHQXHIRUPRELOL]LQJUHVRXUFHV VLRQVLVVXHGLQWRFRQWUROWKH and freeing up MOPH funds. Policy importation, dispensing, and overpric- H[SHUWVLQ/HEDQRQZRXOGOLNHWRVHH LQJRIH[SHQVLYHGUXJV7KHÀUVWVHWRI more MOPH funds used to support DGMXVWHGSULFHVZDVEDVHGRQFRP- WKHKHDOWKQHHGVRIWKHORZLQFRPH SDULVRQZLWKQHLJKERULQJFRXQWULHV population. LQFOXGLQJ-RUGDQDQG6DXGL$UDELDWKH VHFRQGSURYLGHGDQHZVWUDWLÀHGSULF- Health Reform in Kuwait: 1999 to LQJVWUXFWXUHWKDWORZHUHGSUHYLRXVO\ Present set markups and introduced a mecha- In an attempt to overcome the rising nism for revising prices periodically. health care expenditures linked to a 7KHVHSROLF\UHIRUPVZHUHSULPDU- JURZLQJEXUGHQRIFKURQLFGLVHDVHV ily developed and implemented by LQFUHDVLQJGHPDQGIRUQHZWHFKQRORJ\ the Ministry of Public Health in close and an expanding expatriate popula- FRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKWKHWUHDVXU\0DQ\ WLRQRYHUWKHSDVWGHFDGH.XZDLWKDV RIWKHSROLFLHVZHUHSDVVHGLQWKHHDUO\ VRXJKWZD\VWRUHFDSWXUHSDUWRIWKH stages of the administration that took expenditures it has made for health RIÀFHLQVKRUWO\DIWHUWKHDVVDV- VHUYLFHV7KHSRVW*XOI:DUÀVFDO sination of the former prime minister. GHÀFLWH[SHGLWHGWKHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ 7KLVKHDOWKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQZDVVXV- to implement a health care strategy tained for multiple terms that spanned focused on the reduction of expense QHDUO\VL[\HDUVDQGUHFHLYHGVLJQLÀ- and entitlements. cant funding and support from outside 8QWLOERWKQDWLRQDOVDQGH[SD- GRQRUVVXFKDVWKH:RUOG%DQNZRUN- triates had free access to all services LQJFORVHO\ZLWKJOREDOKHDOWKDJHQ- provided through the Ministry of cies, international consultants, and Health, by far the largest provider academic experts (Lebanese Republic LQWKHQDWLRQDVSDUWRIWKHZHOIDUH  &XUUHQWHIIRUWVLQ/HEDQRQDUH VWDWH7KH/DZ1RRIRQ$OLHQ ongoing to extend MOPH coverage Health Insurance and the Imposition to the large proportion of the nation’s RI)HHVDJDLQVW0HGLFDO6HUYLFHVZDV population that is currently uninsured subsequently enacted and required .URQIRO  all expatriates, a nonvoting majority The primary obstacles experienced and largely considered voiceless, to in Lebanon over the past decade have obtain health insurance coverage prior not been in the development and pas- WRUHFHLYLQJZRUNSHUPLWV $UDE/DZ sage of policy making, but rather in 4XDUWHUO\ 7KHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRQWKHJURXQGWKLVLV DQGPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKLVSURJUDPZDV DUHVXOWRIWKHQDVFHQWGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ delegated to the private sector due to of the system and the lack of capacity LQVXIÀFLHQWWHFKQLFDOFDSDFLW\ZLWKLQ and transparency among the hospital the Ministry of Health. In subsequent QHWZRUNDQGKRVSLWDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQV \HDUV.XZDLWZLWQHVVHGDPRGHVW While the heavy reliance on charities JURZWKLQWKHSULYDWHKHDOWKLQVXU- and other NGOs has been interpreted DQFHLQGXVWU\+RZHYHUGXHWRWKH as a sign of arrested development in ODFNRIEDVLFKHDOWKFDUHODZVUHJXODW- Lebanon’s public sector, in many cases ing fraud, solvency, bankruptcy, and

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 89 Article

patient protection, the basic coverage $UDE7LPHV.XZDLW7LPHV  RIIHUHGWRQRQQDWLRQDOVZDVYDULDEOH Concurrently, the Ministry of Health, DQGRIWHQLQDGHTXDWH)ROORZLQJD ZLWKWKHVXSSRUWRISULYDWHEXVLQHVV VFDQGDOLQWKHPLGVZKHQDUHSRUW consultants, submitted a similar pro- revealed that several hundred million posal to implement health insurance .XZDLWL'LQDUVZHUHQRWUHLPEXUVHGWR for nationals and to revise coverage for the government, the Ministry of Health expatriates. The former involved the took control of this insurance scheme HVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDIRUSURÀWLQVXU- .XZDLW7LPHV2[IRUG%XVLQHVV DQFHFRPSDQ\WKDWZRXOGFRYHUHYHU\ *URXS  .XZDLWLZLWKDFRPSUHKHQVLYHEHQHÀW package and offer the enrollee unre- $VLQ/HEDQRQ.XZDLW·VKHDOWKV\V- stricted access to both private and pub- tem has historically favored a curative lic providers. Given the lack of income PRGHOVLQFHWKHODWHVDQGV taxation in the region, the premiums HPSKDVLVZDVSODFHGRQSURPRWLQJ ZRXOGEHSDLGIRUE\WKH*RYHUQPHQW secondary and tertiary care services. In RI.XZDLW7KHSURSRVHGUHYLVLRQWR .XZDLW·VFDVHWKLVZDVLQSDUWGXHWR the expatriates’ coverage emulated the the limited local public health capac- 86KHDOWKPDLQWHQDQFHRUJDQL]DWLRQ ity and to the need to seek short-term +02 PRGHOE\FUHDWLQJDQRWKHUIRU solutions, a persistent trait stemming SURÀWSXEOLFSULYDWHSDUWQHUVKLSWKDW from the nation’s rapidly attained ZRXOGHQIRUFH/DZ1RDWWKUHHGHV- ZHDOWKDQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHGHYHORS- ignated secondary care facilities and PHQW7KHZHOOGRFXPHQWHGODJLQ DGR]HQSULPDU\FDUHFOLQLFV .XZDLW social and human development and ,QYHVWPHQW$XWKRULW\QG %\ the merchant origins of the Arab states KRZHYHUWKH+HDOWK$XWKRULW\SURMHFW of the Gulf have resulted in distorted had been put on hold, though the pro- perceptions of needs (Dadush and SRVDOIRUWKH+02IRUH[SDWULDWHVZDV )DOFDR ,QIDFWWKHRYHUVXSSO\ LQFOXGHGLQWKHELOOLRQ of business graduates at the expense .XZDLW'HYHORSPHQW3ODQE\SDVVLQJ of social scientists has led to the rapid the legislative process. adoption of private-sector solutions to ZKDWPDQ\SHUFHLYHDVEHLQJSXEOLF /RFDOFLYLOVRFLHW\DQG1*2VZLWK VHFWRUIDLOXUHV7KLVLVDPSOLÀHGE\ the support of international experts, the political instability resulting from have challenged these proposals due to short-lived tenures of decision mak- WKHLUQRQFRPSOLDQFHZLWKLQWHUQDWLRQDO HUV .XZDLW1HZV$JHQF\ $VD standards and global health policy result of these sociocultural dynamics HYLGHQFH +VLDR5REHUWVHWDO DQGWKHJURZLQJSXEOLFGLVFRQWHQW &DUULQHWDO 7KHVHJURXSV ZLWKWKHQDWLRQ·VKHDOWKVHUYLFHVQHZ have also offered a comprehensive proposals for health-sector improve- SODQWRUHIRUP.XZDLW·VKHDOWKV\VWHP ments have recently emerged. building on examples from prior suc- cessful international experience. Their ,QPHPEHUVRIWKHODVW3DUOLD- principal recommendations include mentary Health Committee proposed equal coverage of the entire population DODZRQKHDOWKLQVXUDQFHIRU.XZDLWL through a social insurance scheme, re- nationals and the establishment of vising provider payment mechanisms a Health Authority to regulate and to incorporate incentives, decentral- oversee health services for the nation

90 Emerging Trends

L]LQJ0LQLVWU\RI+HDOWKKHDOWKFDUH improve health system performance. facilities, and implementing various Other achievements under the strategy ODZVDVDEDVLVIRUKHDOWKVHFWRUUHJXOD- include health information system WLRQ 35:HE reforms, such as the establishment of disease registries, and attempts at im- Health Reform in Jordan: proving the quality of health services, 1998-Present such as by creating a National Hospital $FFUHGLWDWLRQ3URJUDPLQ2Q Based on gross outcome measures, the legal front, the civil health insur- such as infant mortality and life DQFHODZZDVDPHQGHGGXULQJWKH expectancy, Jordan’s health indicators HDUO\VWRFRYHUVHJPHQWVRIWKH are above average for upper middle– population previously not covered, for income countries, both regionally and example, government female em- ZRUOGZLGH,PPXQL]DWLRQUDWHVDUH ployees. Additionally, several projects high, and maternal and child health pertaining to strengthening primary services are generally available and health care services have been pursued used by most of the population. Never- E\LQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQVPDLQO\ theless, domestic disparities exist, and the U.S. Agency for International -RUGDQVWLOOGRHVQRWSHUIRUPDVZHOODV 'HYHORSPHQW :RUOG+HDOWK2UJDQL]D- the best middle-income country per- WLRQ  IRUPHUVDQGLQGXVWULDOL]HGFRXQWULHV :RUOG%DQN 7KHODUJHEXUGHQ In spite of the aforementioned of disease attributable to NCDs, for undertakings, Jordan currently faces example, suggests that there is room critical long-term challenges in the con- for improvement. NCDs account for text of health-sector reform. Prominent DSSUR[LPDWHO\SHUFHQWRIDOOGHDWKV among these challenges is Jordan’s LQ-RUGDQ :RUOG+HDOWK2UJDQL]DWLRQ KLJKSRSXODWLRQJURZWKUDWHWKDWZLOO D  result in the doubling of the popula- WLRQE\WKDWLVIURPPLOOLRQ The government of Jordan has un- WRPLOOLRQSHRSOH :RUOG+HDOWK dertaken a series of reforms in the past 2UJDQL]DWLRQ 7KLVFKDOOHQJH decade to strengthen its health sector is compounded by a strained health ZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIEXLOGLQJPDFUR- FDUHV\VWHPZLWKLQDGHTXDWHSULPDU\ HFRQRPLFVWDELOLW\7KLVEHJDQZLWKWKH health care services and other issues adoption of a national health strategy pertaining to equity of access and LQWKDWLQFOXGHGEURDGV\VWHP ÀQDQFLQJ goals, such as implementing a national health insurance system. Under this Notably, the physical availability of strategy, the High Health Council primary health care centers is not a ZDVHVWDEOLVKHGZKRVHPLVVLRQLVWR limiting factor in Jordan. The Ministry formulate health policies in the king- of Health operates a primary health dom and to develop strategies for their FDUHQHWZRUNFRQVLVWLQJRIYLOODJH implementation. Its main contribution KHDOWKFOLQLFVSULPDU\KHDOWKFDUH has been the development of National FHQWHUVDQGPDWHUQLW\DQGFKLOG +HDOWK$FFRXQWVZKLFKDUHD:RUOG FHQWHUV:LWKDERXWFHQWHUVSHU +HDOWK2UJDQL]DWLRQWRROGHVLJQHGWR SHRSOHDQGZLWKDQDYHUDJH assist policy makers in their efforts to patient travel time of thirty minutes understand their health systems and to the nearest center, this represents a

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 91 Article

high-density system by international important to consider in formulating a VWDQGDUGV :RUOG+HDOWK2UJDQL]DWLRQ multidimensional approach to health   UHIRUPLQ-RUGDQZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRI PDFURHFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGSROLWLFDO The most pressing and recurring stability. public health issue appears to be -RUGDQ·VIUDJPHQWHGKHDOWKÀQDQFH (PHUJLQJ7UHQGVLQ+HDOWK system and its impact on access, af- Reform fordability, and quality of care (World %DQN:RUOG+HDOWK2UJDQL]D- Political Trends WLRQ(NPDQ 7KH-RUGDQLDQ Despite having developed in strik- health system consists of several differ- ingly different contexts, health reforms ent prepayment programs, both public in these four nations share a number of and private. Due to economic, social, commonalities that underscore the po- and political forces, Jordan currently litical trends in the region. While Egypt spends more than other middle-income ZDVDPRQJWKHÀUVWWRZLWQHVVWKH countries on health: approximately $UDE6SULQJXSULVLQJVRI/HED- SHUFHQWRIJURVVGRPHVWLFSURGXFW non lived through a similar revolt in *'3 FRPSDUHGZLWKDQDYHUDJHRI WKDWUHVXOWHGLQWKHZLWKGUDZDORI SHUFHQWIRURWKHUPLGGOHLQFRPH Syrian troops that had been occupying FRXQWULHV (NPDQ 'HVSLWHWKLV SDUWVRIWKHFRXQWU\VLQFHWKHUH- URXJKO\SHUFHQWRIWKHSRSXODWLRQLV forms that occurred immediately after uninsured, the majority being the poor- WKHUHYROWLQ/HEDQRQZHUHLQUHVSRQVH est segments of the population (Ekman to the call for measurable change by +LJK+HDOWK&RXQFLO  WKHSRSXODWLRQ6LPLODUO\LQ.XZDLW In addition to the aforementioned WKH*XOI:DUZDVWKHSUHFLSLWDWLQJ challenges, it is important to note event for a series of reform activities that Jordan is home to more than WKDWEHJDQLQWKHODWHV-RUGDQ UHIXJHHVODUJHO\3DOHVWLQ- represents one of the more politically ian, Iraqi, and most recently, Syrian. VWDEOHFRXQWULHVRIWKH0(1$UHJLRQ The United Nations Relief and Works KRZHYHULWDQGVLPLODUJRYHUQPHQWV $JHQF\ 815:$ SURYLGHVSULPDU\ such as Saudi Arabia have begun tak- care services for Palestinian refugees. ing steps related to public health and +RZHYHUWKHKHDOWKQHHGVRI,UDTL other social issues in order to prevent and Syrian refugees are largely unmet SRSXODUGLVFRQWHQWLQWKHZDNHRIWKH 0RZDÀDQG6SLHJHO0RZDÀ UHJLRQ·VSROLWLFDOWXUPRLOLQ  0RUHRYHUWKHODUJHPLJUDQW The structure and functions of the population contributes to the poverty various governmental bodies and DQGXQHPSOR\PHQWIRXQGQDWLRQZLGH administrations in Egypt, Lebanon, 8SWRSHUFHQWRI-RUGDQLDQVOLYHEH- .XZDLWDQG-RUGDQDUHPRUHFRP- ORZDSRYHUW\OLQHVHWDWDPHDJHU plex than they appear on paper and per capita annual income level. Ad- UHÁHFWWKHKLVWRULFDOGHYHORSPHQWRI GLWLRQDOO\WKHUHLVDUHODWLYHO\ORZOHYHO WKHUHJLRQDVDZKROH(J\SWLVWHFK- of participation in civil society and a nically a constitutional democracy, perceived lack of personal freedom, though under Hosni Mubarak it could especially in terms of public discourse not truly be considered a democratic :RUOG%DQN 7KHVHIDFWRUVDUH

92 Emerging Trends

VWDWH.XZDLWDFRQVWLWXWLRQDOHPLUDWH have often focused on solutions that PDLQWDLQVDQXQHDV\EDODQFHEHWZHHQ address these political needs rather LWVOHJLVODWLYHEUDQFKWKHÀUVWSDUOLD- than solutions that mirror sound global ment in the Gulf, and its ruling family, health policy evidence. a situation that has been interpreted as one reason for the nation’s apparent In the MENA region, reform in gridlock in advancing major devel- KHDOWKSROLF\DSSHDUVWRIROORZJHQ- RSPHQWSODQV &HFLUH :KLOH eral unrest or outright political revolt. Lebanon’s political system developed Given the current state of affairs in this as a participatory structure, for years it region and the burgeoning demands KDVEHHQSRSXODUO\FKDUDFWHUL]HGDVUH- of the populace, activists are beginning sembling an oligarchy in function and WRDGYRFDWHIRUWKHLUOHDGHUVWRUHÁHFW practice, representing multiple stake- upon the long-term health of the popu- KROGHUVWKDWZHUHFORVHO\DOOLHGZLWK lation, rather than expedient short- counterparts in neighboring countries. term solutions, and build sustainable Jordan, a constitutional monarchy, has health care systems that provide equi- strong though not fully democratic table care for their nations. political institutions, effective security Macroeconomic Trends and the Role forces, and a high level of political sup- of the Private Sector port from the international community. +RZHYHUIDLOXUHWRDGGUHVVLWVVRFLDO 7KH0(1$UHJLRQDVDZKROHLV and economic realities—including FRQVLGHUHGDORZWRPLGGOHLQFRPHUH- poverty, unemployment, public debt, gion. In terms of health outcomes, the and high dependency on foreign aid— region has higher indicators than the may pose a threat to social and politi- extreme-poverty regions of Southeast cal stability in the country, especially Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, though it given the political frustration linked lags behind the more developed coun- to unresolved problems in the region tries in Europe and North America. VXFKDVWKH$UDE,VUDHOLFRQÁLFWRQJR-

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 93 Article

vices. This is a common trend observed $IIDLUV'LUHFWRUDWH:RUOG+HDOWK LQRWKHUKLJKLQFRPHQDWLRQVZKHUH 2UJDQL]DWLRQ 7KHGHFHQWUDOL]D- high income disparities exist among tion efforts of the ministries of health both nationals and immigrants. in Egypt, Lebanon, and other countries have therefore targeted the strengthen- 8QWLOODWHWKHUHJLRQVHHPHGRQ LQJRISURYLGHUVZLWKLQWKHSULPDU\ track in recovering from the global eco- FDUHQHWZRUNVRIWKHVHQDWLRQV QRPLFFULVLV*URZWKDFFHOHUDWHGIURP SHUFHQWLQWRSHUFHQWLQ :LWKWKHJURZLQJUROHRIWKHSUL- GULYHQSULPDULO\E\WKHUHJLRQ·V vate sector in health care delivery and oil exporters (International Monetary ÀQDQFLQJVXFKLQHTXLWLHVDUHERXQGWR )XQG +RZHYHUWKHVORZJURZWK persist and potentially increase should equilibrium of the past years did not these populations remain marginal- generate enough jobs or greater liber- L]HGIURPWKHSROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVV WLHVVRPXFKVRWKDWSHRSOHSRZHU Health reforms in Egypt and Leba- triumphed. The unfolding events make non have already included measures it clear that reforms and economic WRUHJXODWHSULYDWHVHFWRUSURYLGHUV JURZWKFDQQRWEHVXVWDLQHGXQOHVVMREV KRZHYHUWKHSURJUHVVKDVEHHQLQFRP- DUHFUHDWHGIRUWKHUDSLGO\JURZLQJ SOHWH.XZDLW·VDWWHPSWWRWUDQVIHUWKH population and are accompanied by national insurance system to private social policies for the most vulnerable HQWLWLHVZDVXQVXFFHVVIXODQGWKH HJWKHSRRUDQGWKHLQIRUPDOVHFWRU  government subsequently reassigned )RUJURZWKWREHVXVWDLQDEOHLWPXVW this responsibility to the public sec- be inclusive and broadly shared, not tor. Jordan’s health reforms have been FDSWXUHGE\DSULYLOHJHGIHZ ODUJHO\IRFXVHGRQKHDOWKÀQDQFLQJ ZLWKWKHWDUJHWHGJRDORIUHGXFLQJ :LWKDSURSHQVLW\IRUSULYDWL]DWLRQ KHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUHVDVKLIWDZD\IURP GHVSLWHLPPDWXUHKHDOWKÀQDQFLQJ SULYDWL]DWLRQPD\WKHUHIRUHEHLPPL- schemes, many MENA health care sys- nent. Notably, despite the consistent tems, including those of the four coun- efforts to reduce health expenditures WULHVUHYLHZHGKHUHUHTXLUHDODUJH in the four countries discussed above, contribution of out-of-pocket pay- results have been mixed (see Figure ments from patients. This represents  -RUGDQPDGHPHDVXUDEOHSURJUHVV a major barrier to health care access EHWZHHQDQG\HWH[SHULHQFHG for these populations and increases DULVHLQUHFHQW\HDUV.XZDLW·VWRWDO disparities in health among the under- health expenditure as a percentage of VHUYHGORZHULQFRPHVHJPHQWVRIWKH *'3VDZDVKDUSULVHLQIROORZHG SRSXODWLRQ,QFRXQWULHVZLWKORZLQ- by a gradual yet inconsistent decline. FRPHLPPLJUDQWZRUNHUVVXFKDV.X- Lebanon stands out as having reduced ZDLWDQGWRVRPHH[WHQW/HEDQRQWKHUH H[SHQGLWXUHVVLJQLÀFDQWO\ZKLOH(J\SW is very little affordable private health KDVVKRZQOLWWOHSURJUHVV care for these populations. Concerns of health equity inevitably arise around Health Administration, Leadership, the issue of availability and access to and New Public Management KLJKTXDOLW\ORZFRVWKHDOWKFDUHIRU underserved populations along the One of the greatest gaps that MENA entire spectrum, from primary health nations in transition must address is care to tertiary or specialty care (Policy the distribution, operation, enforce-

94 Emerging Trends

&igure 1 ˆ Total health eXpenditure, percentage of GD0 Source: 5nited Nations Environment 0rogramme nd

ment, and accountability of personnel tions. These factors have long been the in government administrations such target of reform projects in the pub- as health ministries. In Egypt, for OLFVHFWRUVXFKDVWKHSROLFHV\VWHP H[DPSOH'U)RXDG$(O1DZDZ\WKH similar reforms in the health system current health minister, cited obstacles are lagging far behind. For example, stemming from policies on hiring the MOHP in Egypt does not currently DQGÀULQJVXFKSROLFLHVDUHEDVHGRQ provide information to its personnel ODZVGDWLQJEDFNWRWKHHDUO\QLQH- about allocated and forecasted budgets WHHQWKFHQWXU\ IURPD)HEUXDU\ WKDWZRXOGKDYHDOORZHGLWWREHKHOG LQWHUYLHZZLWKRQHRIWKHDXWKRUV  accountable for the health care needs Such archaic policies and procedures of the population, thus creating an in- propagate the brain drain as educated VWLWXWLRQDOSUHFHGHQWLQZKLFKDFFRXQW- MENA youth choose to pursue oppor- ability is lacking. Such a policy has not tunities abroad rather than applying only created an institutional precedent their training in moribund adminis- LQZKLFKDFFRXQWDELOLW\LVODFNLQJEXW trative, management, and leadership KDVDOVRSURSDJDWHGDODFNRIHPSRZ- positions at home. HUPHQWDPRQJJRYHUQPHQWZRUNHUV WRVKRZOHDGHUVKLSDQGRZQHUVKLSRQ This issue is compounded by the national programming, management, lack of transparency, governance, DQGDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ'HFHQWUDOL]D- HPSRZHUPHQWDQGDFFRXQWDELOLW\LQ WLRQUHIRUPVFRXSOHGZLWKUHYLVHG government institutions across the local health care curricula to include region, particularly in transitioning na- management and leadership training,

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 95 Article

FRXOGSURYLGHDSRZHUIXOVROXWLRQWR reform in the MENA countries through restructure such policies, resulting in WKHUHSOLFDWLRQDQGDPSOLÀFDWLRQRI increased autonomy to local branches measures to improve incentives, ef- of the health care administration as ÀFLHQF\DQGTXDOLW\LQKHDOWKVHUYLFH ZHOODVLQFUHDVHGWUDQVSDUHQF\DQG provision. This is particularly relevant reduced bureaucracy throughout the for regulating the private sector (as dis- system. FXVVHGSUHYLRXVO\ DQGLWVLQDGYHUWHQW role in expanding health care inequi- 7KHWHUP´QHZSXEOLFPDQDJHPHQWµ ties rather than mitigating them. 130 UHIHUVWRDVHWRISULQFLSOHVWKDW :HVWHUQJRYHUQPHQWVKDYHERUURZHG :KHWKHU130LVRUZRXOGEHVXF- IURPWKHSULYDWHVHFWRUVLQFHWKHV cessful in MENA countries is a coun- In health care, NPM has emerged WU\VSHFLÀFLVVXHDQGEH\RQGWKHVFRSH as the shift in system management of this article, but initial steps that IURPDPRUHFHQWUDOL]HGDQGSDVVLYH ensure the correct institutional infra- leadership style to an incentive-based structure for proactive management management style that focuses on ef- and increased transparency are timely ÀFLHQF\DQGDFKLHYLQJGHVLUHGRXW- and should be adopted simultaneous comes. In MENA countries, NPM is to political transformation. Such efforts VWLOODUHODWLYHO\QHZFRQFHSWWKDWKDV may involve training leaders and staff EHHQVSDUVHO\DGRSWHGDQGZLWKGLIIHU- of local health system stakeholders in ing degrees of success. What is critical the latest trends in health care manage- in this approach is creating a culture of ment, accounting, and health econom- accountability and implementing in- LFVGHYHORSLQJFDSDELOLWLHVWRPHDVXUH FHQWLYHVWKDWZLOOSURPRWHDQGEDODQFH FRVWVDQGEHQHÀWVRIKHDOWKFDUHSURFH- HIÀFLHQF\LQV\VWHPPDQDJHPHQWZLWK GXUHVDQGHQDEOLQJVRPHDXWRQRP\ high quality of care. MENA nations freedom of expression, and decision may choose to examine and adapt making at public health care institution success stories from Eastern Europe levels. These activities have inherent and other regions that have undergone EHQHÀWVDQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHFUHDWH similar transitions in order to strength- the context for NPM implementation HQWKHLURZQGHPRFUDFLHVHFRQRPLHV if MENA governments seek to adopt DQGKHDOWKV\VWHPV $QWRXQHWDO NPM principles and practices. 3HWWHUVHQ&DLGHQ  )XWXUH'LUHFWLRQV :LWK130UHSUHVHQWLQJDVLJQLÀFDQW philosophical shift, the traditional )RUWKH$UDE6SULQJWREORVVRPZLWK LPDJHRIDKLJKO\FHQWUDOL]HGYHUWLFDO health policy reform and serve its decision-making authority acting on SRSXODWLRQVPRUHHIIHFWLYHO\FLWL]HQV EHKDOIRISDVVLYHIROORZHUVKDVLQVWHDG must ensure that a change in leader- evolved into an authority that acts as ship is accompanied by a dramatic DFDWDO\VWLQV\QFKURQL]LQJWKHHIIRUWV change in governance style. Novel RIHQOLJKWHQHGDQGDFWLYHIROORZHUV DWWLWXGHVWRZDUGDFFRXQWDELOLW\KDYH While these principles have informed KHOSHGFUHDWHDZLQGRZRIRSSRUWXQLW\ popular demonstrations for political IRUHVWDEOLVKLQJDQHZHUDRISXEOLF reform throughout the Arab Spring, PDQDJHPHQWLQWKH0(1$UHJLRQIRU they have yet to be translated into JUHDWHUIRFXVRQKHDOWKFDUHWKLVQHZ health reform. NPM can inform health accountability must be tied to such

96 Emerging Trends measurable outcomes as improved KHDOWKUHIRUPZKHUHUHJLRQDOXQUHVW population health. has become a serious challenger to the VWDWXVTXRZKHUHQHZOHDGHUVKLSPXVW ,QOLJKWRIWKHFXUUHQWZDYHRIFLYLO inevitably rethink its approach, and and political unrest seen throughout ZKHUHSXEOLFGLVFRQWHQWKDVUHDFKHG the MENA region, policy makers DQDOOWLPHKLJK+RZHYHUVXVWDLQ- DQWLFLSDWHDUHDOL]DWLRQE\WKHJHQHUDO DEOHFKDQJHZLOOEHFRPHDUHDOLW\RQO\ population that the regional politics ZKHQORFDOFDSDFLW\LVEXLOWDGLIÀFXOW of reform must undergo a radical task by any standard. paradigm shift. In the health sector, evidence indicates that the current 7KHIUDJLOHIRXQGDWLRQXSRQZKLFK course is unsustainable: the MENA many MENA health systems are built region is expected to have one of the requires an extensive revision and highest noncommunicable disease EURDGUHIRUPLQPDQ\FDVHV,WZLOO mortality rates, and already, many of QRWVXIÀFHWRDGRSWDQHZÀQDQFLQJ WKH*XOI6WDWHVUDQNZLWKLQWKHQDWLRQV VFKHPHLQVLWXDWLRQVZKHUHRWKHUIDF- KDYLQJWKHPRVWGLDEHWHVDQGZHLJKW tors (outdated payment systems, cen- SUREOHPV $OZDQ1JHWDO WUDOL]HGPLQLVWULHVRIKHDOWK ZLOOOLPLW 0RZDÀHWDO 7KHSROLFLHVRIWKH the incentives needed to upgrade the past decade have focused on promot- quality of services provided. Similarly, LQJDQGGHYHORSLQJORZ\LHOGFXUDWLYH DQ\UHIRUPLQÀQDQFLQJSD\PHQWDQG interventions, and local policy mak- RUJDQL]DWLRQPXVWEHXSKHOGE\DUHOL- ers continue to neglect cost-effective able and accountable regulatory sys- preventive and primary care measures. WHP(QIRUFHPHQWRIKHDOWKFDUHODZV With health care costs rising among the through an effective judicial system is ranks of geopolitical priorities, sustain- imperative. DEOHÀQDQFLQJLVDQGZLOOFRQWLQXHWR EHDFULWLFDOLVVXHHYHQIRUWKHZHDOWK\ While addressing the basic struc- states of the Gulf (World Health Orga- WXUDODQGV\VWHPLFGHÀFLWVRIWKHIRXU QL]DWLRQ+DPGDQ :HFDQ health systems highlighted in this thus expect discussions about health DUWLFOHLWZLOOEHFUXFLDOWRWDUJHWDQG insurance to intensify and lead to the replicate established best practices in DGRSWLRQRIQHZOHJLVODWLRQLQWKHFRP- WKHUHJLRQDOÀJKWDJDLQVWWKHJURZLQJ ing years. rate of costly and debilitating NCDs. 7KHHYLGHQFHEDVHGVWUDWHJLHVGHÀQHG 5HIRUPWRGDWHKDVQRWDOZD\VIRO- E\WKH:RUOG+HDOWK2UJDQL]DWLRQDQG ORZHGDQRUGHUO\DSSURDFKHPSOR\- collaborating agencies strongly empha- ing needs assessments and other such VL]HWKHUROHRIKLJK\LHOGSUHYHQWLYH evaluations prior to engaging in strate- policy changes to address the most gic planning and implementation. This important causes of mortality and mor- disconnect in process may help explain bidity in the MENA region (Beaglehole WKHREVHUYHGGLVFRQQHFWEHWZHHQWKH HWDO 7KHVHSROLF\FKDQJHV input of leading health policy experts FRXSOHGZLWKVWUHQJWKHQLQJSULPDU\ from academic institutions or health KHDOWKFDUHVHUYLFHVZLOOSDYHWKHZD\ agencies and the expectations of local for behavioral changes to reduce popu- policy makers. Many countries may lation risk and improve chronic care ZHOOEHRQWKHYHUJHRIDWULIHFWDRI management.

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 97 Article

In conclusion, examining this group NORA EL NAWAWI, MD, MPH, IS A CLINI- of four countries based on the authors’ CAL RESEARCH FELLOW AT THE DANA FARBER collective experience has highlighted CANCER INSTITUTE AND THE BRIGHAM AND several trends in health policy and WOMEN’S HOSPITAL IN BOSTON, MASSACHU- UHIRUPRYHUWKHSDVWWHQWRÀIWHHQ\HDUV SETTS. SHE RECEIVED HER CLINICAL TRAINING WKDWUHÁHFWWKHFRPSOH[LQWHUSOD\RI AT CAIRO UNIVERSITY AND HER MASTER’S OF political, economic, and social factors PUBLIC HEALTH FROM THE HARVARD SCHOOL OF in the MENA region. Further research PUBLIC HEALTH. is needed to fully understand the TERESA CHAHINE RECEIVED HER SCD FROM diverse needs and challenges in the THE HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, region and to identify opportunities WHERE SHE IS A RESEARCH FELLOW FOCUSING ON IRUPRELOL]LQJUHVRXUFHVWRLPSURYH SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN PUBLIC HEALTH. KHDOWKZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIUHIRUPDQG SHE DIVIDES HER TIME BETWEEN BOSTON AND development at the country and region BEIRUT AND HELPED LAUNCH HEALTH SYSTEMS level. There is clearly much to be done, REFORM, A CONSULTANCY FOCUSING ON HEALTH DQGWKHUHLVJURZLQJPRPHQWXPIRU POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH FKDQJHWKDWPXVWEHH[SORLWHGZKLOH AFRICA REGION. WKHZLQGRZRIRSSRUWXQLW\LVRSHQ DR. NADEEM AL-DUAIJ IS COFOUNDER OF THE KUWAIT HEALTH INITIATIVE, A NONPROFIT DEDICATED TO PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH. HE RECEIVED HIS MEDICAL DEGREE FROM THE UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE, HIS MPH FROM HAR- VARD, AND HOLDS APPOINTMENTS AT HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL AND BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY’S HELLER SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND MANAGEMENT. ALI HAMANDI IS SET TO RECEIVE HIS MSC AT THE HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN MAY 2012 AND WILL CONTINUE WORK TOWARD HIS PHD AT HARVARD. HE IS INTERESTED IN HEALTH FINANCING AND HAS WORKED FOR THE WORLD BANK ON HEALTH FINANCE REFORM IN JORDAN. WILLIAM BEAN IS AN INSTRUCTOR AT THE HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND A FORMER MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT. HE RECEIVED HIS PHD IN NEAR EASTERN STUDIES FROM PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, HIS MBA FROM THE WHARTON SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, AND HIS MPH FROM THE HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH.

98 Emerging Trends

REFERENCES Evidence from one middle-income country using national household survey data. Health Research $EGHO5DKPDQ03ULPDU\KHDOWKFDUH 3ROLF\DQG6\VWHPV infrastructure national development project: 3URJUHVVUHSRUWXQWLO-DQXDU\(J\SW (O-DUGDOL)DGLHWDO(OLFLWLQJSROLF\PDN- ers’ and stakeholders’ opinions to help shape $OZDQ$OD'LDEHWHVDQG1&'VLQWKH health system research priorities in the Middle MENA region: The rising burden and an impera- East and North Africa region. Health Policy and tive need for health system reforms. Keynote 3ODQQLQJ   VSHHFK0(1$'LDEHWHV/HDGHUVKLS)RUXP Dubai. ³³³HWDO+HDOWKSROLF\DQGV\VWHPV UHVHDUFKLQWZHOYH(DVWHUQ0HGLWHUUDQHDQ $PPDU:DOLG+HDOWKUHIRUPLQ/HEDQRQ countries: A stocktaking of production and gaps Key achievements at a glance. Lebanon Ministry  +HDOWK5HVHDUFK3ROLF\DQG6\VWHPV RI3XEOLF+HDOWK'RFXPHQW'*+./ 

Antoun, Joseph, Frank Phillips, and Tricia *HULFNH&$&RPSDULVRQRIKHDOWKFDUH -RKQVRQ3RVW6RYLHWWUDQVLWLRQ,PSURY- ÀQDQFLQJLQ(J\SWDQG&XED/HVVRQVIRUKHDOWK ing health services delivery and management. reform in Egypt. Eastern Mediterranean Health 0RXQW6LQDL-RXUQDORI0HGLFLQH   Journal (La revue de santé de la Méditerranée RULHQWDOHDO0DMDOODKDOʫLɭɭĦ\DKOLVKDUTDO $UDE/DZ4XDUWHUO\.XZDLW/DZ1RRI PXWDZDVVLʵ    RQ$OLHQ+HDOWK,QVXUDQFHDQGWKH,PSRVL- WLRQRI)HHVDJDLQVW0HGLFDO6HUYLFHV$UDE/DZ +DOH\'RQDOG5REHUWDQG6DPD$%pJ 4XDUWHUO\   The road to recovery: Egypt’s healthcare reform. The International Journal of Health Planning and $UDE7LPHV.XZDLW3DUOLDPHQWKHDGLQJ 0DQDJHPHQW   WRZDUGVIUHHKHDOWKLQVXUDQFHSODQIRUFLWL]HQV -XQH +DPGDQ6DUD5DSLGLQFUHDVHRIGLDEHWHV VWUDLQV0LGGOH(DVW·VKHDOWKDJHQFLHV1HZ

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.XZDLW1HZV$JHQF\ .81$ .XZDLWWR equity. Oxford University Press. contract Canadian university for better cancer WUHDWPHQW$XJXVW United Nations Environment Programme. n.d. Environmental Data Explorer. Available at .XZDLW7LPHV+HDOWK0LQLVWU\WDNHV KWWSJHRGDWDJULGXQHSFKUHVXOWVSKS FKDUJHRILQVXUDQFHRYHUQRQSD\PHQW$X- gust. :RUOG+HDOWK2UJDQL]DWLRQ+HDOWKV\VWHP SURÀOH-RUGDQ5HJLRQDO+HDOWK6\VWHPV2EVHU- ³³³+HDOWKDXWKRULW\WREHVHWXSLQ vatory. )HEUXDU\1RYHPEHU ³³³+HDOWKV\VWHPVÀQDQFLQJ7KHSDWK /HEDQHVH5HSXEOLF(FRQRPLFDFFRXQWV to universal coverage. The World Health Report. RI/HEDQRQ3UHVLGHQF\RIWKH&RXQFLORI Ministers, Economic Accounts Mission. ³³³D1&'FRXQWU\SURÀOH-RUGDQ

0LQLVWU\RI+HDOWKDQG3RSXODWLRQ6HUYLFH ³³³E:RUOGKHDOWKVWDWLVWLFV:RUOG provision assessment survey. Population (Eng- +HDOWK2UJDQL]DWLRQ3XEOLFDWLRQV OLVK(GLWLRQ (J\SW :RUOG%DQNQG:RUOG%DQNGDWDEDQN%\ 0RZDÀ+DQL&RQÁLFWGLVSODFHPHQWDQG FRXQWU\.XZDLW health in the Middle East. Global Public Health    ³³³+DVKHPLWH.LQJGRPRI-RUGDQ Health sector study. World Bank Publications. ³³³DQG3DXO6SLHJHO7KH,UDTLUHIXJHH FULVLV)DPLOLDUSUREOHPVDQGQHZFKDOOHQJHV ³³³(J\SW·VKHDOWKVHFWRUUHIRUPDQG -$0$   ÀQDQFLQJUHYLHZ:RUOG%DQN3XEOLFDWLRQV

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100 The Syrian Uprising: An Interview with Syrian Opposition Member Amr al-Azm INTERVIEWED BY ANYA VODOPYANOV

PUDO$]PLVDVVLVWDQWSURIHVVRURI0LGGOH(DVWKLVWRU\DQGDQWKURSRORJ\ ADW6KDZQHH6WDWH8QLYHUVLW\DQGDQDFWLYHPHPEHURIWKH6\ULDQRSSRVL- WLRQ+HZDVDÀUVWKDQGREVHUYHUDQGSDUWLFLSDQWRIWKHUHIRUPSURFHVVHVLQVWLJDW- ed by Bashar Al-Assad, and he serves on the executive committee of the Antalya *DWKHULQJ &RQIHUHQFHIRU&KDQJHLQ6\ULD +HKDVWDXJKWDWWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI 'DPDVFXV  DQGZDVDYLVLWLQJDVVLVWDQWSURIHVVRUDW%ULJKDP

-0(33 emboldened. And that’s the impact of :KDWVSDUNHGWKHVSUHDGRI ZKDWKDSSHQVDURXQG>\RX@LQWKDW GHPRQVWUDWLRQVLQ6\ULD":DVLWWKH it emboldens people. But the griev- YLROHQFHRIWKHUHJLPHRULQVSLUDWLRQ ances are there, and they are deep-set. IURPQHLJKERULQJUHYROXWLRQV" The other background issue that you should also bear in mind is that par- AL-AZM ticularly in the rural areas [of Syria], in I think you have to put it into the the years of Bashar [Al-Assad] taking JUHDWHUFRQWH[WRIZKDW·VJRLQJRQLQ RYHUIURPXSWRPDQ\RI the country. People have had enough. these areas have been suffering long :KHQ\RXSXWWKDWDJDLQVWZKDWZDV QHJOHFW³GURXJKWV7KHUHZDVDOPRVWD KDSSHQLQJLQWKH$UDE6SULQJZKDW four-year drought in Dera’a and those KDGKDSSHQHGLQ&DLURZKDWKDG areas. So there is a sense of despair KDSSHQHGLQ7XQLVLDZKDWZDVKDS- permeating throughout the country. pening in Libya, I guess people became At the same time, you have another

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 101 Interview

DGGHGSUREOHPZKLFKRFFXUVZKHQ GHQWVDQGPD\EHDFWLYLVWVZKRKDG +DIH]DO$VVDGWRRNSRZHUDQGKLVRI- ZRUNHGRUHQJDJHGLQVRPHIRUPRI ÀFHUVDQGWKH$ODZLWHFOLTXHFDPHZLWK DFWLYLVPEHIRUHZKRZHUHLQWHUHVWHGLQ KLP+DIH]DO$VVDGZDVDEOHWREXLOG WDNLQJWKLVIXUWKHU7KHUHUHDOO\ZDVD this merchant-military complex by rural-urban divide. But as the protests EDVLFDOO\DOORZLQJIRUWKLVFRH[LVWHQFH spread, as the repression of the regime EHWZHHQWKHPHUFKDQWFODVVHVZKR LQFUHDVHG,WKLQNLQPDQ\ZD\VDVWKH FRQWLQXHGGRLQJZKDWWKH\GLGDVPHU- events of Dera’a unfolded, the people FKDQWVLQSDUWQHUVKLSZLWKWKHPLOLWDU\ ZHUHHPEROGHQHG$QGPRUHDQGPRUH people became engaged. It’s taken “Don’t give the regime the urban centers a little longer, particularly the professional time to breathe.” classes. It’s taken the shopkeepers DQGEXVLQHVVRZQHUVDOLWWOHORQJHU HOLWH%XWE\WKHWLPHZHUHDFKZH to get engaged. And their engagement KDYHQRZVHFRQGDQGWKLUGJHQHUD- has come for different reasons. WLRQFKLOGUHQDQGQRWDOORIWKHPZDQW WREHRIÀFHUVOLNHWKHLUIDWKHUVWKH\ I think as the revolution spread and VWDUWWRZDQWWKHLURZQOLYHVHVSHFLDOO\ increased, you had more and more as business entrepreneurs. people engaged. And initially, I think the urban community, the urban popu- To tie into that, there’s a huge ODWLRQVWKHSURIHVVLRQDOFODVVHVZHUH JURXQGVZHOORIUHVLVWDQFHDQGUHVHQW- DIUDLGEHFDXVHWKHUHYROXWLRQZDVVWDUW- ment to the regime building up. And ing up in these rural areas by people so, by the time the events of Dera’a ZKRKDGQRWKLQJWRORVH1RZ\RX occur, they’re not occurring out of KDYHZKROHFLWLHVOLNH+RPVDQG+DPD nothing. They’re not occurring from ZKRDUHHQWLUHO\DJDLQVWWKHUHJLPH WKLQDLU

102102 The Syrian Uprising

-0(33 shift to the opposition arming them- 'R\RXWKLQNSHRSOHDUHGHYHORSLQJ VHOYHV7KH\ZHUHZLOOLQJWRJRRXW DIDWLJXHRIVRUWV",VWKHUHDIHHOLQJRI LQWRWKHVWUHHWLIWKH\FRXOGÀQGVRPH GHVSDLUZLWKLQWKHRSSRVLWLRQPRYH- ZD\RISURWHFWLQJWKHPVHOYHV7KH\ PHQWWKDWWKLVFRXOGWDNH\HDUV" ZHUHZLOOLQJWRJRRXWDQGSURWHVWDQG do this peacefully, but they needed AL-AZM SURWHFWLRQ$QGWKH\ZHUHQ·WJHWWLQJ I’m sure some people are think- it. The international community, for LQJOLNHWKDW,WZRXOGQRWEHQRUPDO ZKDWHYHUUHDVRQVZDVQ·WDEOHWRÀJXUH LIWKLVZHUHQRWKDSSHQLQJ:KHQ, RXWDZD\WRSURYLGHWKDW$QGZKHQ think, across the board, is the uprising WKH61&>6\ULDQ1DWLRQDO&RXQFLO@ZDV VSUHDGLQJLQFUHDVLQJRUGHFUHDVLQJ" LQLWLDOO\IRUPHGRQ6HSWHPEHU Are more people joining the opposition the people on the streets came out and RUOHVV"$UHPRUHSURWHVWVÁDULQJXS ZHUHMXELODQWEHFDXVHWKH\H[SHFWHG HYHU\ZHHNRUOHVVÁDVKSRLQWVRFFXU- the SNC to go there immediately and ULQJ"$QGVRIDUWKHFXUYHLVXSDQG demand the protection of the protes- KLJKDQGZHKDYHQ·WHYHQSHDNHG\HW WRUVDQGWKDWWKHUHZDVJRLQJWREH So, yes, there must be people thinking DLUVWULNHVRUDQRÁ\]RQHDQGVDIH “I think people have realized there is no going back. Now, everybody knows that if they stop, it’s a death sentence. There’s no escape—the genie is out of the bottle, and there’s no going home.” that, but at the same time, the fact is KDYHQV$QGDIWHURQHPRQWKZKHQ WKDWLW·VJHWWLQJZRUVHQRWEHWWHU QRQHRIWKDWPDWHULDOL]HGWKH\WXUQHG on the SNC and said you failed us. We -0(33 DFFHSWHG\RXDQGZHHPEUDFHG\RX 7RZKDWH[WHQWGR\RXWKLQNWKH RQWKHFRQGLWLRQWKDW\RXZHUHJR- RXWFRPHRIWKLVFULVLVDFWXDOO\GH- LQJWRJRDQGÀJKWIRUWKLV$QG\RX SHQGVRQH[WHUQDOIRUFHVDQGSRZHUV failed. It’s unfair to the SNC, but these RULQWHUYHQWLRQ" ZHUHXQUHDOLVWLFGHPDQGV%XWZKHQ WKH\IDLOHGWKH\EHFDPHXSVHWZLWK AL-AZM WKH61&7KDW·VZKHQ\RXVWDUWWRVHH I think there’s a dual side to this. WKHPLOLWDU\VLGHZKLFKZDVSLFNLQJ On the one hand, the real opposition up pace because of defections from the for me is the opposition on the inside, 6\ULDQPLOLWDU\%\IDOOWKHUHZDVWKLV on the ground. They have come to the PLOLWDUL]DWLRQDVWKHSURWHVWRUVUHDOL]HG UHDOL]DWLRQDOEHLWEHODWHGO\WKDWWKH\ protection is not going to come from really have to do things themselves. NATO, it’s not going to come from the 7KDW·VZK\\RX·YHKDGWKLVGUDPDWLF West, it’s not going to come from the

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 103103 Interview

7XUNV³ZH·UHJRLQJWRKDYHWRVWDUW WLRQQHHGVWRZRUNRQ7KDWVDLGPDQ\ SURWHFWLQJRXURZQSURWHVWV minorities are also uncomfortable and increasingly critical of the regime, if QRWZLWKWKHUHJLPHLWVHOIEXWZLWKWKH -0(33 regime’s handling of the uprising. :K\KDYHZHQRWVHHQPDVVGH- IHFWLRQVRQWKHVFDOHWKDWZHVDZLQ /LE\D" -0(33 ,IDWUDQVLWLRQJRYHUQPHQWLVHYHQ- AL-AZM WXDOO\IRUPHGZKDWZLOOLWORRNOLNH" I think in part because the opposition has not yet truly articulated a vision AL-AZM RIZKDWDSRVW$VVDG6\ULDLVJRLQJWR ,IWKHUHJLPHIDOOV,WKLQNWKHUHZLOO look like. You really need that in order be a serious problem if a group from to be able to address the key issues: WKHRXWVLGHVXGGHQO\WULHVWRZDONLQ ZKDWKDSSHQVZKHQWKHUHJLPHIDOOV KRZVHULRXVDUH\RXDERXWPDQDJLQJ -0(33 WKHFRXQWU\KRZDUH\RXJRLQJWRGHDO ,VWKH61&UHJDUGHGDVDQRXWVLGH ZLWKPLQRULW\LVVXHVHWF+RZDUH\RX JURXS" going to keep the country running AL-AZM ZKLOH\RXWUDQVLWLRQLQWRGHPRFUDF\" Pretty much, yes, even though it Everybody is afraid of the Iraq sce- likes to think it isn’t. Although, since it QDULRDQG\RXKDYHWRVKRZWKDW\RX VWDUWHGWRH[SDQGZLWKQHZHUDGGL- DUHQRWJRLQJWRDOORZWKHFRXQWU\WR tions, it is changing and morphing. degenerate into chaos like things did Some members are pressuring the SNC in Iraq. to restructure completely, because they understand there are serious leader- -0(33 VKLSJDSV7KH\UHDOL]HWKH\QRZ 'R\RXVHHWKHPLQRULWLHVDEDQGRQ- have a problem because of leader- LQJWKHUHJLPHLQWKHQHDUIXWXUH" VKLSFKDQJHV³ZKHQ>61&3UHVLGHQW@ Burhan Ghalioun’s tenure runs out, I AL-AZM think there’s going to be a scrap over ,WKLQN\RXSHHOPLQRULWLHVDZD\ ZKRWDNHVRYHU:KHQWKHUHJLPHIDOOV from the regime by creating a narra- DQGLILWIDOOV,WKLQNWKHUHZLOOSURE- WLYHRI\RXURZQWKDWLVFRQYLQFLQJDQG ably be a transitional phase that is reassuring. They are increasingly con- comprised of members of the existing cerned by the behavior of the regime UHJLPHZLWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRIRIÀFLDOV and more concerned by the fact that close to Assad. You’re going to have to WKHUHJLPHQRZQRORQJHUORRNVOLNH keep the hospitals open, you’re going such a safe bet. The problem is still that to have to keep the electricity running, HYHQWKRXJKWKH\DUHQRWKDSS\ZLWK you’re going to have to keep the bread ZKDWWKHUHJLPHLVORRNLQJOLNHWKH\·UH RYHQVZRUNLQJ\RX·UHJRLQJWRKDYH VWLOOQRWVXUHRIZKDW·VRXWWKHUHDVDQ keep distributing gas, so on, so forth. alternative. I don’t think they are that You’re going to need to keep some of H[FLWHGZLWKWKHLGHDRIUHSODFLQJDW\U- the military, and even the security forc- DQQ\RIWKHPLQRULW\ZLWKDW\UDQQ\RI es, because you need to have some sort the majority. They need some reassur- RIODZDQGRUGHULQSODFH2WKHUZLVH ance, and this is something the opposi-

104104 The Syrian Uprising

\RX·OOKDYHDWRWDOEUHDNGRZQRIODZ transition. And for us, this is totally and order. You’re going to also need unacceptable. members of the opposition as part of Russia is pushing dialogue ZLWK$VVDGEXWZHZLOOKDYH “The real opposition for no dialogue. We’ll have dia- me is the opposition ORJXHZLWKWKHUHJLPHEXWQRW ZLWK$VVDG:H·UHQRWMXVW on the inside, on the talking about the Baath Party— the regime is the Assad fam- ground. They have come ily, a huge institution. So you FDQKDYHGLDORJXHZLWKVRPH to the realization, albeit PHPEHUVEXWQRWZLWKWKHLQQHU circle. belatedly, that they re- There could be negotiations, ally have to do things there could be a transition under the assumption of Assad themselves.” leaving. I don’t think the street RUDQ\ERG\HOVHZLOODFFHSWD this transition, and there’s going to be GHDOWKDWDOORZV$VVDGWRVWD\ PD\EHVRPHHOERZLQJLQWHUPVRIZKR LQWKHFRXQWU\LQDQ\ZD\VKDSHRU gets to be there. And I think it’s going form. So he’s out. And that’s the best- to need to come from the inside, from case scenario in terms of a negotiated the street. settlement. But I don’t see them giving XS7KH\·UHJRLQJWRÀJKW,WKLQND likely scenario could be that elites start -0(33 to increasingly lose control of some of :KDWGR\RXVHHDVOLNHO\VFHQDULRV the main cities and they end up having XQGHUZKLFK$VVDGFRXOGIDOO" WRZLWKGUDZLQWRWKHLUHQFODYHV$QG then it turns sectarian, and you could AL-AZM start to see ethnic cleansing. That’s one ,IZHKDYHQRWUDQVLWLRQSODQLQ possible scenario. Another possible place, then it’s going to be tough. VFHQDULRLVDSDODFHFRXSZKHUHVRPH 7KDW·VZK\LW·VUHDOO\LPSRUWDQWWRFRQ- RIWKHJX\VMXVWWKURZ$VVDGXQGHUWKH WLQXHZRUNLQJDQGSURGXFLQJWKLVWUDQ- EXVD7DQWDZLNLQGRIGHDOVLPLODUWR VLWLRQSODQ,WKLQNLWZRXOGEHYHU\ ZKDWKDSSHQHGLQ(J\SW7KH\PLJKW hard in the current environment for declare [Vice President Farouk] al- Assad to be given immunity inside the Sharaa the interim president, and then country. And I don’t think that there a government of unity is formed. That ZRXOGEHDQ\NLQGRIWUDQVLWLRQWKDW may be an option. IRUHVHHV$VVDGVRPHKRZKROGLQJRQWR SRZHUDQGQHJRWLDWLQJ7KHVWUHHWKDV completely and totally rejected it. And -0(33 any member of the opposition that is What advice would you give to ZLOOLQJWRÁLUWZLWKWKDWLVLQVWDQWO\ :HVWHUQRU$PHULFDQSROLF\PDNHUV RXW7KLVLVZK\LW·VVRLPSRUWDQWWR ZRUNLQJRQUHVROYLQJWKHKXPDQLWDU- the opposition to really lock them out, LDQFULVLV" because they represent a threat to a

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 105105 Interview

AL-AZM Keep pushing. Keep pressing the regime. Don’t give the regime time to breathe. Every time you give it time to breathe, it revives itself. And every time you give it another month, an- other thousand people die. In order to go through the charade of Arab League REVHUYHUVPRUHWKDQSHRSOH GLHG:DVLWUHDOO\ZRUWKLW",QRUGHUWR get a couple of Arab countries like Al- JHULDDQG,UDTWRVD\\HVZHZLOODOORZ WKLVWRJRWRWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO people had to die. That’s just horrible. 7KDW·VZKDWKDSSHQHG

ANYA VODOPYANOV IS A PHD STUDENT IN GOVERNMENT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY AND SERVES AS JMEPP’S SENIOR EDITOR FOR ARTICLES AND FEATURES.

106106 Egypt’s Transition to Democracy: An Interview with Freedom and Justice Politician Amr Darrag INTERVIEWED BY DANIEL TAVANA

mr Darrag currently serves as the Secretary-General of the Freedom and A-XVWLFH3DUW\LQ*L]DZKHUHKHLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRURUJDQL]LQJWKHSDUW\·V *L]DGHOHJDWLRQLQ3DUOLDPHQW+HUHFHQWO\UDQDVDQLQGLYLGXDOFDQGLGDWHIRUWKH 3HRSOH·V$VVHPEO\LQ*L]D·VWKLUGGLVWULFWZKLFKLQFOXGHVWKH'RNNL,PEDED DQG$JRX]DQHLJKERUKRRGV+HZDVDIRXQGLQJPHPEHURIWKH)UHHGRPDQG Justice Party. He is a professor in the Faculty of Engineering at Cairo University.

-0(33 government should have been doing $IWHUVHYHUDOPRQWKVRIFDPSDLJQ- DQGZKDWZDVUHDOO\GRQH:HKDYH LQJDQGHOHFWLRQVLWORRNVOLNHWKH a reputation of being sincere, honest, )UHHGRPDQG-XVWLFH3DUW\²OHG'HPR- QRQFRUUXSWDQGZHKDYHDOVRSURYHQ FUDWLF$OOLDQFHZLOOVHFXUHMXVWXQGHU WKDWZHKDYHSODQVDQGSURJUDPVWR SHUFHQWRIWKHVHDWVLQWKH3HRSOH V tackle the problems Egypt is facing. $VVHPEO\+RZZRXOG\RXH[SODLQ So in terms of experience, dedication, WKHSDUW\ VUHFHQWVXFFHVV" DQGEHLQJLQWKHVWUHHWV,WKLQNLWZDV quite reasonable to secure this number DARRAG RIVHDWV$VDPDWWHURIIDFWZHZHUH I think the Egyptian people put not expecting to get more than that WKHLUFRQÀGHQFHLQRXUSDUW\DQGRXU EHFDXVHZHEHOLHYHWKDWLWLVQRZWLPH alliance, and this is based on several IRUFROODERUDWLRQEHWZHHQDOOSROLWL- IDFWRUV)LUVWRIDOODV\RXNQRZWKH FDOIRUFHVLQ(J\SWWRWDFNOHSUREOHPV 0XVOLP%URWKHUKRRGZDVEHKLQG these problems are so big and are establishing the Freedom and Justice beyond the capability of any single Party, and the Brotherhood has a long SROLWLFDOSRZHU6R,JXHVVLWLVDOVR KLVWRU\RIEHLQJZLWKWKHSHRSOHDQG reasonable and quite explainable, and responding to their needs and tak- ZHZLOOWDNHLWIURPWKHUH LQJFDUHRIWKHJDSEHWZHHQZKDWWKH

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 107 Interview

-0(33 \RXGUDIWDQHZFRQVWLWXWLRQ\RXKDYH :KDWGR\RXWKLQNPRVWSHRSOHDUH to secure an overall consensus other- ORRNLQJIRUWKHSDUW\WRGRQRZWKDW ZLVHWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQZLOOEHPHDQLQJ- WKHHOHFWLRQVDUHÀQLVKHG" less. So this is our plan, to cooperate ZLWKHYHU\ERG\DQGPDNHVXUHWKDW DARRAG everyone is really represented. The expectations of the people are quite high, and the people are quite ea- JHU%XWZHEHOLHYHWKDWWKHFXUUHQWSUL- -0(33 orities of Egyptian society are related :RXOGWKHSDUW\OLNHWRVHHDSUHVL- to ensuring the security of the environ- GHQWLDORUSDUOLDPHQWDU\V\VWHP" PHQWZHDUHOLYLQJLQ(FRQRPLFDOO\ DARRAG ZHPXVWVHFXUHMREVDQGGHYHORSPHQW Our program used to have tenden- and start getting rid of the deep-rooted FLHVWRZDUGVD3DUOLDPHQWDU\V\VWHP corruption that has been hindering %XWULJKWQRZDIWHUPXFKGLVFXVVLRQ virtually all kinds of progress. After- and taking into account the current ZDUGVWKH(J\SWLDQSHRSOHH[SHFWXV SROLWLFDOVFHQHZHEHOLHYHWKDWWKH WRZRUNRQDOODVSHFWVRIGHYHORSPHQW PL[HGV\VWHPZRXOGEHEHWWHUIRU including industry, hosting economic (J\SWDPL[WXUHEHWZHHQSUHVLGHQ- DFWLYLWLHVDQGZRUNLQJRQKHDOWKFDUH tial and parliamentary systems, like DQGHGXFDWLRQ$GGLWLRQDOO\ZHPXVW France, for example. In order to adopt tackle problems like the governmental a successful Parliamentary system, EXGJHWGHÀFLWDQGWKHODFNRIIRUHLJQ \RXKDYHWRKDYHWZRRUWKUHHVWURQJ currency. What the Egyptian people DQGSRZHUIXOSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVZKRFDQ are really interested in is security, em- implement long-term plans to ensure a ployment, and a better environment in stable government. If you have a lot of ZKLFKWROLYHLQ ZHDNSDUWLHVQRQHRIWKHPZLOOEHDEOH WRVHFXUHDPDMRULW\DQG\RXZLOOKDYH -0(33 a lot of room for instability. This is not 2QHRIWKH3DUOLDPHQW VUHVSRQVL- needed for this particular stage. So ELOLWLHVZLOODOVRLQFOXGHWKHGUDIWLQJ almost everybody in Egypt is in agree- RIDQHZFRQVWLWXWLRQ+RZLVWKH PHQWZLWKDPL[HGV\VWHP SDUW\DSSURDFKLQJWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDO SURFHVV" -0(33 DARRAG 7KHFLYLOUHOLJLRXVEDODQFHLQWKH 7KHSURFHVVZLOOVWDUWE\IRUPLQJD FRQVWLWXWLRQKDVEHHQYHU\LPSRUWDQW committee dedicated to balance and WRWKHFDPSDLJQVRIPDQ\PHPEHUV WKHQWKHSDUOLDPHQWZLOOKDQGOHLWV +RZLVWKHSDUW\DSSURDFKLQJWKH RZQDIIDLUVDQGOHDYHWKDWWRWKHFRP- FLYLOUHOLJLRXVEDODQFHDQGLQWHUSUHWD- PLWWHH$QGZKDWZHDUHSODQQLQJWR WLRQVRIVKDULDODZ" GRZLWKRXUFROOHDJXHVIURPRWKHUSDU- DARRAG ties is to form a committee that repre- First of all, there is a misconception sents all spectrums of Egyptian society. WKDWWKHUHLVDFRQWUDGLFWLRQEHWZHHQ 0HPEHUVRI3DUOLDPHQWZLOOUHÁHFWWKH civil and religious preferences. In our ZLGHVSHFWUXPRI(J\SWLDQRSLQLRQV RSLQLRQWKHUHLVQRQHZHKDYHDFLYLO not just from the majority forces. When SDUW\ORRNLQJIRUDFLYLOVWDWHEXWZLWK

108108 Egypt’s Transition to Democracy an Islamic preference. Several states VRFLHWLHVDQGWLPHSHULRGV7KDWLVZK\ across the globe look for a civil state the sharia has been alive for such a yet have different preferences, such as long time. In actuality, the sharia has a capitalist or socialist preference. But, been incorporated into the constitution RYHUDOOZHZDQWDFLYLOV\VWHPDQGD VLQFHHYHQEHIRUHWKH0XVOLP civil regime, so there is no contradic- %URWKHUKRRGZDVHVWDEOLVKHG tion. We believe that Islam provides WKHPHDQVWRZDUGVDUHDOFLYLOVRFLHW\ +RZHYHUZKHQ\RXGHYHORSODZV %\FLYLOZHPHDQWKDWSRZHULVLQWKH you have to take into account the main KDQGVRIWKHSHRSOH³ZLWKFLYLOUDWKHU spirit of Islamic sharia, calling for than military authority. Addition- justice, equality, freedom, and provid- DOO\ZHZDQWDFLYLOVWDWHZLWKRXWDQ\ LQJWKHHQYLURQPHQWIRUSURSHUZRUN FRQWUROIURPWKHRORJLVWVZKRFODLP Injustice does not mean just political they have direct access to God in order injustice but also economic injustice. to enforce something on society. In :HGRQ·WZDQWDOLPLWHGQXPEHURI IDFWWKLVLVLQFRQWUDGLFWLRQZLWK,VODP SHRSOHZKRKDYHWKHGRPLQDQWWRROVWR WKHZRUGRI,VODPFDOOVIRUWKHGLUHFW control the overall economy. UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHSHUVRQDQG When people talk about the basic God. No one can claim to take over as values of sharia, particularly in the :HVWZKDWFRPHVWRWKHLU “Anyone should be able to minds is the criminal DVSHFWVRIVKDULDZKLFK wear whatever he or she is a limited and minor wants or to drink anything thing. Just like any other IRUPVRIODZFULPLQDO they want. We are against ODZLVRQO\DOLPLWHGSDUW Also, in order to imple- anything that is confining PHQWFULPLQDOODZWKHUH are many conditions that the freedom of the people.” need to be secured—al- most all of these condi- a middleman. This is really the most tions are not really available at the important thing in having a civil state moment. So this is not a priority at the rather than a theocratic state. There is moment. You need to have a proper so- DGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHFRQFHSWRID ciety, a proper democracy, and proper theocratic state, like those in Europe opportunities for everybody before GXULQJWKH0LGGOH$JHVZKHUHWKH VWDUWLQJWRWKLQNDERXWKRZWRSXQLVK FKXUFKKDVSROLWLFDOSRZHU:HDUHQRW people for crimes they had to commit. calling for this. So this is our approach. :KHQZHWDONDERXWVKDULDODZ DQGRSSUHVVLYHVKDULDODZLWLVRQO\D -0(33 EDVLFSUHIHUHQFH%\VKDULDZHPHDQ +RZZLOOWKHSURFHVVJXDUDQWHHWKH the main principles that guide society SURWHFWLRQRIPLQRULWLHV" UDWKHUWKDQGHWDLOHGODZV7KHUHLVÁH[- LELOLW\LQWKHODZVEDVHGRQWKH,VODPLF DARRAG sharia that account for differences in We don’t believe there are minorities

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 109109 Interview

in Egypt. When you refer to Christians, ULJKWVVLQFHWKHVDOPRVWDFHQ- ZHYLHZWKHPDVIXOOFLWL]HQVVDPHDV WXU\DJR5LJKWQRZZRPHQDUHZHOO Muslims. They have the same rights educated and active, and they span all and similar opportunities. In terms of professions including politics so there religion and faith, yes they are a mi- is no reason to discriminate against QRULW\%XWZKHQZHWDONDERXWSROLWL- them. cal parties and government this does not apply anymore. As a matter of fact, -0(33 our preference is that non-muslims $VLGHIURPGUDIWLQJWKHFRQVWLWX- should be given better chances for WLRQZKDWDUHWKHSDUW\·VPDLQOHJLVOD- being involved in society. This is re- WLYHSULRULWLHVIRUWKHQHZ3DUOLDPHQW" ally based on the true values of Islam: against injustice and against inequality. DARRAG Also, Christians in Egypt have been in- We believe that priorities should volved in all the patriotic events in the focus on the interests of the people. last three-hundred years starting from %HVLGHVWKHFUHDWLRQRIDQHZFRQVWLWX- H[SXOVLRQRIWKH%ULWLVKÀJKWLQJLQDOO WLRQRXUSULRULW\ZRXOGEHWRLVVXH RIWKH(J\SWLDQZDUVDQGEHLQJYHU\ ODZVDJDLQVWFRUUXSWLRQWRWUXVWUXOHRI VWURQJO\VXSSRUWLYHRIERWKWKH ODZDQGWRWU\WRLPSURYHWKHVHFXULW\ DQGUHYROXWLRQV6RWKH\DFWXDOO\ issues that have plagued the people. GHVHUYHWKHIXOOVWDWXVRIFLWL]HQVKLS 2IFRXUVHRWKHUWKDQWKDWZHZDQWWR ,QWHUPVRIUXQQLQJDVWDWHZHGRQRW FUHDWHODZVWKDWHQFRXUDJHLQYHVWPHQWV look at them as minorities. As a mat- and guarantee the security of these ter of fact, it is not in the Christians’ investments, Egyptian and foreign. We interests to behave like a minority are encouraging everyone to come and and be isolated. We really encourage invest in Egypt. We have to pave the all Christians to actively get involved ZD\IRUWKDWZHKDYHWRFOHDUDZD\ in society, politics, and all aspects of all the bureaucratic obstacles that are Egyptian life. UHDOO\ZRUNLQJDJDLQVWXV7KHUHDUH DOVRODZVWKDWDUHQHHGHGWRLPSURYH -0(33 the quality of life of Egyptians, such +RZZLOOWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURFHVV DVODZVWRLPSURYHLQIUDVWUXFWXUH$W EHPRUHLQFOXVLYHRIZRPHQ" the moment, many things need to be WDFNOHGDQGGLVFXVVHG$FWXDOO\ZH DARRAG KDYHEHHQZRUNLQJWRZDUGWKLVVLQFH We are the party that provided the WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKHSDUW\ZH KLJKHVWQXPEHURIZRPHQFDQGL- have established committees to look at dates in the elections. We are going DOOWKHVHLVVXHVDQGWREHUHDG\ZKHQ WRSURYLGHPDQ\RIWKHZRPHQZKR WKHWLPHFRPHV,EHOLHYHZHDUHUHDG\ ZLOOPDNHLWWRWKH3DUOLDPHQW:RPHQ at least to trigger things and to start are very active in our party. Egyptian GLVFXVVLQJDOOWKHVHLVVXHVZLWKRWKHU ZRPHQKDYHVHFXUHGDORWRIEDVLF political parties. rights, some of these rights even before WKH\ZHUHVHFXUHGLQWKH:HVWOLNHWKH -0(33 ULJKWWRYRWHLQHOHFWLRQVZKLFKZDV Some have alleged that the party not granted in several Western states will attempt either to ban alcohol or for some time. We have had these

110110 Egypt’s Transition to Democracy

WRPDQGDWHWKHZHDULQJRIWKHKLMDE 7XUNLVKPRGHOWKDWZDVGHYHORSHG :KDWLVWKHSDUW\ VRIÀFLDOVWDQFHRQ IRUW\RUÀIW\\HDUVDJRZKLFKDOORZHG WKHVHDQGRWKHUVRFLDOUHVWULFWLRQV" the military to intervene in the political OLIHZKHQHYHUWKH\ZDQWHGZKHQHYHU DARRAG WKH\GRQ WOLNHWKHRXWFRPH5LJKWQRZ 2XURIÀFLDOVWDQFHLVWKDWZHDUH Turkey is achieving good progress DOZD\VLQVXSSRUWRIVHFXULQJWKHIUHH- because they are getting rid of this and dom of people, of individuals. We are PRYLQJWRZDUGUHDOGHPRFUDF\:HGR not aiming to provide any sort of rule QRWZDQWWRZDLWIRUÀIW\PRUH\HDUVWR to limit personal freedoms. Anyone UHSHDWWKLVNLQGRIH[SHULHQFH6RZH VKRXOGEHDEOHWRZHDUZKDWHYHUKHRU are not sure about their intentions, but “We are not planning anything that would contradict U.S. interests.”

VKHZDQWVRUWRGULQNDQ\WKLQJWKH\ RXUUROHWRJHWKHUZLWKWKH(J\SWLDQ ZDQW:HDUHDJDLQVWDQ\WKLQJWKDWLV SHRSOHDQGDOOSROLWLFDOSRZHUVLVWR FRQÀQLQJWKHIUHHGRPRIWKHSHRSOH make sure this does not happen. The And this is also based on our Islamic DUP\LVZHOOUHVSHFWHGDQGZHUHDOO\ preferences because in Islam, every- ZDQWWRPDNHVXUHZHKDYHDYHU\ body is free to adopt or not to adopt capable and modern army that is able WKDWIDLWK7KLVLVRXUEHOLHIDQGZHDUH to do its original function. going to have that stance. Of course, OLNHDQ\VRFLHW\ZHQHHGWRPDNH VXUHWKDWZKDWHYHUWKHVHIUHHGRPV -0(33 are, [they] do not contradict the basic 0DQ\DUHZRUULHGWKDWWKHSDUW\·V YDOXHVRIWKHVRFLHW\RUWKHZHOOEHLQJ DVFHQGDQFHZLOOOHDGWRGLIÀFXOW RIWKHJURXS,W·VDEDODQFHEHWZHHQ UHODWLRQVZLWK,VUDHODQGWKH8QLWHG the individual and the group like any 6WDWHV+DVWKHSDUW\HVWDEOLVKHGD modern society. GLDORJXHZLWKHLWKHUFRXQWU\" DARRAG -0(33 1RQRWZLWK,VUDHOQRWDWDOOZLWK $UH\RXFRQÀGHQWWKH6XSUHPH ,VUDHO%XWZLWKWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWKHUH &RXQFLORI$UPHG)RUFHV 6&$) ZLOO have been some public meetings. U.S. XSKROGLWVFRPPLWPHQWWRWKHWUDQVL- Senator [John] Kerry and the ambassa- WLRQ" dor to Egypt attended the last meeting. 7KH\PHWZLWKWKHSDUW\VHFUHWDU\JHQ- DARRAG HUDODQGWKHUHZHUHLPSRUWDQWGLVFXV- :HDUHFRQÀGHQWWKDWWKH\ZLOO:H sions about the Egyptian-American are not sure about their intentions af- UHODWLRQVKLS,WKLQNZHQHHGPRUHRI WHUZDUGZKLFKLVRIPRUHLPSRUWDQFH these discussions in order to secure They made suggestions regarding a SURSHUUHVSHFWEHWZHHQWKH8QLWHG special position above the constitu- States and Egypt in the future. We WLRQDERYHWKHHOHFWHGERGLHVZKLFK believe that the United States is a great LVWRWDOO\XQDFFHSWDEOH7KH\ZHUH country, but the image of the U.S. has VRPHKRZORRNLQJWRDQGDGPLULQJWKH been badly hurt because it supported

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 111111 Interview

the old oppressive regime against its PHQWDQGWKLVLVVRPHWKLQJWKDWZRXOG declared values of democracy. That’s have to involve all of Parliament. ZK\XQIRUWXQDWHO\WKH86LVQRW Secondly, the opinion of almost all of WUXVWHGE\WKH(J\SWLDQSHRSOHWKH\ the Egyptian people is that Israel has KDYHVHHQZLWKWKHLURZQH\HVWKDW not been respecting the terms of the almost all of the problems over the peace treaty. They have been doing all WKLUW\\HDUVZHUHPDLQO\FDXVHGE\D sorts of practices against even the basic UHJLPHWKDWZDVVXSSRUWHGE\WKH86 common behavior. Egyptian soldiers :KDWWKH(J\SWLDQSHRSOHZRXOGOLNH have been killed many times at the to see is a relationship based on mutual ERUGHUE\,VUDHOLVROGLHUVZLWKRXWDQ\ UHVSHFWZLWKRXWEHLQJERXQGWRDQ\ KHVLWDWLRQDQGZLWKRXWDQ\UHDVRQ NLQGRISUHVVXUHV8QIRUWXQDWHO\ZH $OVRRQWKHZD\WKH3DOHVWLQLDQVDUH have seen indications that the U.S. EHLQJWUHDWHG,VUDHOLVQRWZLOOLQJWR still is trying to apply pressure to af- DFNQRZOHGJHWKHULJKWRIWKH3DOHVWLQ- fect Egyptian politics. This is totally ians to get back to their lands that have XQDFFHSWDEOHDQGWKLVZLOORQO\OHDGWR been occupied. Israel has been apply- ZLGHQLQJWKHJDSEHWZHHQ(J\SWDQG LQJDYHU\XQMXVWVLHJHRQ*D]DIRU the U.S. We are not planning anything DORQJWLPH(YHU\ERG\LQWKHZRUOG WKDWZRXOGFRQWUDGLFW86LQWHUHVWV NQRZVWKDWWKLVLVXQMXVW\HWQRRQH As DPDWWHURIIDFWZHEHOLHYHWKDW is doing anything. I don’t think that WKHVHLQWHUHVWVZRXOGEHH[SDQGHGDQG all this provides an environment that UHDOL]HGWKURXJKFROODERUDWLRQEXWDS- ZRXOGLQYLWHGLDORJXH,WKLQNWKH plying pressure and using the foreign ball is in the Israeli court to rethink DLGFDUGZLOOQHYHUZRUN the terms of the equation and change

112112 Egypt’s Transition to Democracy of the peace treaty but still thinking of SHRSOHVHHXVZLWKHQRXJKLQWHJULW\ ZD\VWRPRGLI\LW,WKLQNWKDWLIWKLV DQGWUXVWZRUWKLQHVVWREHDEOHWRVROYH DOOFKDQJHGWKHUHZRXOGEHKRSHIRU the problems on the ground. These are dialogue. the main ingredients for a successful SDUW\DQ\ZKHUHLQDQ\VRFLHW\ -0(33 'RHVWKHSDUW\KDYHDQ\LQWHUHVW -0(33 LQFKDQJLQJWKHSHDFHWUHDW\RULVLW What advice would you give Ameri- FRPPLWWHGWRWKHWUHDW\DVLWFXUUHQWO\ FDQDQG:HVWHUQSROLF\PDNHUVDV H[LVWV" WKH\UHWKLQNWKHLUUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK WKH$UDEZRUOG" DARRAG We are all committed to all treaties DARRAG WKDWZHUHVLJQHGE\SUHYLRXVJRYHUQ- Democracy is democracy every- ments, provided that the other side ZKHUH

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DARRAG 7KH\UHÁHFWWKHKRSHVDQGEHOLHIV of the majority of the people in the DANIEL TAVANA IS A 2012 MASTER IN PUBLIC UHJLRQ7KH\ZHUHRSSUHVVHGIRUDORQJ POLICY CANDIDATE AT THE JOHN F. KENNEDY time. Despite all the oppression that SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AT HARVARD UNI- ZHVXIIHUHGZHLQVLVWHGRQVWD\LQJLQ VERSITY AND SERVES AS JMEPP’S CO-EDITOR- WKHVWUHHWVDPRQJWKHSHRSOHZRUNLQJ IN-CHIEF. WRJHWKHUZLWKWKHSHRSOHWRVROYHWKH SUREOHPVDQGPHQGWKHJDSVWKDWZHUH not handled by the government. So the

HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY 2012 113113 HARVARD JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND POLICY

7KH+DUYDUG-RXUQDORI0LGGOH(DVWHUQ3ROLWLFVDQG3ROLF\ -0(33 LVDQDQQXDO VWXGHQWUXQQRQSDUWLVDQUHYLHZWKDWSXEOLVKHVLQWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\ZRUNVRQ Middle Eastern politics and policy making. The Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy is published by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

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