The Catholic Church, Kin Networks and Institutional Development*
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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, KIN NETWORKS AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT* Jonathan F. Schulz†‡ Job Market Paper This version: Nov. 13, 2018 Most recent version here Abstract – Political institutions vary widely around the world, yet the origin of this variation is not well understood. This study tests the hypothesis that the Catholic Church’s medieval marriage policies dissolved extended kin networks and thereby fostered inclusive institutions. In a difference-in-difference setting, I demonstrate that exposure to the Church predicts the formation of inclusive, self-governed commune cities before the year 1500CE. Moreover, within medieval Christian Europe, stricter regional and temporal cousin marriage prohibitions are likewise positively associated with communes. Strengthening this finding, I show that longer Church exposure predicts lower cousin marriage rates; in turn, lower cousin marriage rates predict higher civicness and more inclusive institutions today. These associations hold at the regional, ethnicity and country level. Twentieth-century cousin marriage rates explain more than 50 percent of variation in democracy across countries today. Keywords: Democracy, Family, Kin networks, Religion, Cousin Marriage, Institutions JEL classification Number: O10, N20, N30, Z10 *I would like to thank Alberto Alesina, Marcella Alsan, Antonio Alonso Arechar, Duman Bahrami-Rad, Jonathan Beauchamp, Pablo Balan, Johannes Buggle, Dennie van Dolder, Nicholas Christakis, Yarrow Dunham, David Eil, Mario Francesco, Oded Galor, Simon Gaechter, Johannes Haushofer, Leander Heldring, Joseph Henrich, Benedikt Herrmann, Carla Hoff, Martin Huber, Erik Kimbrough, Gordon Kraft-Todd, Giampaolo Lecce, Sara Lowe, Ralf Meisenzahl, Michael Mitterauer, Joel Mokyr, Nathan Nunn, David Rand, Jared Rubin, Petra Thiemann, Jan Luiten van Zanden and seminar participants of the ASREC conference 2017, the economic history of religion conference and the economics history seminar at Northwestern the history workshop and political economy of religion seminar in Harvard, the macro lunch at Brown University, the NBER Political Economy Program Fall Meeting 2016, and Nicholas Christakis’, Joe Henrich’s and David Rand’s lab meeting for helpful comments and suggestions. I’d like to thank Cammie Curtin and Anna Monieta for valuable research assistance. Financial support from the European Research Council (AdG 295707), the Philosophy and Science of Self-Control Project (Florida State University) and the John Templeton Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. † Harvard University, Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, E-mail: [email protected] ‡ Center for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), University of Nottingham, Sir Clive Granger Building, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK. 1 I. INTRODUCTION Political institutions, ranging from autocratic regimes to inclusive, democratic ones, are widely acknowledged as a critical determinant of economic prosperity (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). They create incentives that foster or inhibit economic growth. Yet, the emergence and global variation of growth-enhancing, inclusive political institutions in which people broadly participate in the governing process and the power of the elite is constrained, are not well understood. Initially, inclusive institutions were largely confined to the West. How and why did those institutions emerge in Europe? This article contributes to the debate on the formation and global variation of inclusive institutions by combining and empirically testing two long-standing hypotheses. First, anthropologist Jack Goody (1983) hypothesized that, motivated by financial gains, the medieval Catholic Church implemented marriage policies—most prominently, prohibitions on cousin marriage—that destroyed the existing European clan-based kin networks. This created an almost unique European family system where, still today, the nuclear family dominates and marriage among blood relatives is virtually absent. This contrasts with many parts of the world, where first- and second-cousin marriages are common (Bittles and Black 2010). Second, several scholars have hypothesized that strong extended kin networks are detrimental to the formation of social cohesion and affect institutional outcomes (Weber, 1958; Todd, 1987; Augustine, 1998). Theologian Augustine of Hippo (354–430) pointed out that marrying outside the kin group enlarges the range of social relations and “should thereby bind social life more effectively by involving a greater number of people in them” (Augustine of Hippo, 354-430 / 1998, p. 665). More recently, Greif (2005), Greif and Tabellini (2017), Mitterauer (2010), and Henrich (forthcoming) combined these two hypotheses and emphasized the critical role of the Church’s marriage prohibitions for Europe’s institutional development. Kin-based institutions constitute a basic building block of societies. In many parts of the world, people live within complex and dense extended kin networks that are characterized by co-residence of extended families, organization based on clan and lineage, and the presence of cousin marriage (Schulz et al. 2018). Dense kin networks most likely became increasingly important during the Neolithic transition as people began to invest in land and animal breeding. In contrast to hunter-gatherer groups where out-reaching, exogamous marriage 2 practices allow for risk hedging, dense kin networks facilitate the defense and succession of property (Johnson and Earle, 2000; Walker and Bailey, 2014; Schulz et al. 2018). Strong economic and social interdependencies among the kin group’s members, provision of protection and insurance make the kin group essential for survival. Loyalty demands may be quite strong given the ease of monitoring in closely-knit networks and the potentially extreme cost of ostracism in a society that does not provide protection through impartial, well- functioning institutions. Behavior that does not aid the kin group may be viewed as immoral. This can manifest as protecting family members from prosecution, facilitating nepotism, accepting bribes, voting according to group identity as opposed to individual preferences (Hillman, Metsuyanim and Potrafke, 2015) or other activity that benefits the kin group at the expense of larger society. As such, societies may find themselves stuck in an equilibrium where it is individually optimal to support their kin group, while at the same time such support hinders the development of more efficient large-scale, impartial institutions that promote individual rights and include more people in the political process. Several factors reinforce this equilibrium. Closely knit kin networks—where, due to cousin marriage, oftentimes new members cannot even join through marriage—decrease interaction with outsiders. This prevents trust and cooperation from spreading beyond the confines of the family and creates an “amoral familism” (Banfield, 1958; Yamagishi, Cook and Watabe, 1998; Fukuyama, 1995; Alesina and Giuliano, 2014; Tabellini, 2008b). The biological theory of kin selection predicts that the higher genetic relatedness among kin implied by cousin marriage increases altruistic behavior among kin (Hamilton, 1964).1 At the same time, human psychology adapts to the incentives of dense, hierarchical kin-based institutions. This is reflected in greater obedience to authority and a morality that, for survival, favors in-group loyalty over impartial standards (Schulz et al., 2018).2 Yet, to prevent an elite from taking over 1 In the absence of inbreeding, the genetic relatedness between siblings is 1/2. The relatedness coefficient increases only slightly, by 1/16, in offspring of (first-degree) cousins. Yet, after a long prior history of inbreeding, the relatedness coefficient in the local (kinship) group increases further. At the boundary of the local group there is a drop in genetic relatedness (see Hamilton 1975). Galor and Klemp (2015) make the argument that the non- cohesiveness in genetically more heterogeneous populations fosters autocratic rule. A similar argument can be made in the case of cousin marriage. However, the difference is that heterogeneity increases between kin groups. 2 Furthermore, evolutionary game theory models on cooperation predict that increased network fluidity promotes cooperation among unrelated others since it allows the clustering and rewiring of network ties (Perc and Szolnoki, 2010). Rand, Arbesman and Christakis (2011) experimentally demonstrate how network fluidity increases cooperation. Strong kin networks, however, hamper the fluidity of networks and thereby cooperation and the creation of a broad coalition in society. Consistently, Henrich et al. (2001), Herrmann et al. (2008) and Gächter and Schulz (2016) find that in more individualistic, market-integrated or WEIRD societies (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010), cooperation and honesty are higher than in more collectivistic ones. Lastly, Barr, Packard and Serra (2014) link cooperation in lab experiments to increased political participation outside the lab. 3 the government, a broad coalition in society must actively take part in the political process across the boundaries of kin groups by making politicians accountable for their actions (e.g. through voting), volunteering in committees, and impartially following rules such as those set out by a constitution.3 Thus, as Weber (1958) argues, the dissolution of strong extended kin groups is likely an essential precondition for the formation