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THE SHAPING OF UNITED STATES BIODEFENSE POSTURE

Douglas R. Lewis A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of George Mason University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Biodefense

Committee:

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Date: (j~ dl d.-Ol"d- Spring Semester 2012 George Mason University Fairfax, VA

The Shaping of United States Biodefense Posture

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

Douglas R. Lewis Master of Science Pennsylvania State University, 1997 Bachelor of Science United States Air Force Academy, 1991

Chairman: Trevor Thrall, Associate Professor College of Humanities and Social Sciences

Spring Semester 2012 George Mason University Fairfax, VA

Dedication

This work is dedicated to my support team Cristina, Matthew and Cooper. Your encouragement, support and sacrifices made all the difference. Thank You

“Do you not know that those who run in a race all run, but only one receives the prize? Run in such a way that you may win. Everyone who competes in the games exercises self-control in all things. They then do it to receive a perishable wreath, but we an imperishable.” 1 Corinthians 9: 24-25

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank he members of my committee. Without their guidance, advice and knowledge this effort would not have been possible.

I would also like to thank Ms. Janice F. Goldblum from the National Academy of

Sciences and Mr. Jeffery K. Smart from US Army RDECOM for allowing me access to their archives.

Finally, I would like to thank the Army for providing this opportunity.

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Table of Contents

Page List of Tables ...... vii List of Abbreviations ...... viii Abstract ...... x Ch1. Introduction ...... 1 U.S. Biodefense Capabilities: Not Ready For Prime Time ...... 2 Explaining the State of U.S. Biodefense Capabilities...... 5 Argument and Outline of the Dissertation ...... 15 Ch 2. Explaining the Development of Biodefense Doctrine ...... 18 Organizational Frames ...... 18 Bureaucratic Politics ...... 31 Realism ...... 38 Testing...... 42 Structure ...... 46 Scoring ...... 48 Sources ...... 49 Conclusions ...... 52 Ch 3. Biological Agents, Chemical Agents and Current U.S. Defensive Capabilities .....54 Confusion in Terminology ...... 54 Weapon Characteristics ...... 56 Similarities and Differences ...... 67 Current Defensive Systems ...... 78 Conclusions – Chapter Three ...... 84 Ch 4. 1939-1946, The World War Two Period ...... 86 iv

Historical Setting ...... 86 Organizational Frames and Biodefense, 1939-46 ...... 94 Imperialism and Biodefense, 1939-46 ...... 99 Realism and Biodefense, 1939-46 ...... 109 Conclusions – The World War Two Period ...... 115 Ch 5. 1946 – 1970, The Rise and End of the U.S. Offensive Program ...... 117 Historical Setting ...... 117 Organizational Frames and Biodefense, 1946-70 ...... 122 Bureaucratic Politics and Biodefense, 1946-70 ...... 150 Realism and Biodefense, 1946-70 ...... 168 The Decision to End the Biological Program ...... 186 Conclusion - 1946-1970 ...... 193 Ch 6. 1971 – 1991, The Cold War to the First Gulf War ...... 196 Historical Setting ...... 196 Organizational Frames and Biodefense, 1971-91 ...... 201 Bureaucratic Politics and Biodefense, 1971-91 ...... 229 Realism and Biodefense, 1971-91 ...... 238 Conclusions – 1971-1991 ...... 251 Ch 7. 1991- Today, U.N. Sanctions, Terrorism, and Anthrax in the Mail...... 254 Historical Setting ...... 254 Organizational Frames and Biodefense, 1991 - Today ...... 259 Bureaucratic Politics and Biodefense, 1991 - Today ...... 294 Realism and Biodefense, 1991-Present...... 311 Conclusions – 1991- Present ...... 325 Ch 8. Results ...... 329 Findings...... 329 Criticisms – Alternative Explanations ...... 342 Conclusions ...... 349 Ch 9. Significance and Recommendations ...... 351 v

Significance – Impacts on the program ...... 351 Recommendations ...... 369 Future Research ...... 373 Last Thoughts...... 373 Appendix – Additional Information ...... 376 Works Cited ...... 381

List of Tables

Table Page Table 1: Military Attendance at WBC, ABC and DEF Committee Meetings ...... 106 Table 2: Chemical Corps Research Program Totals ...... 124 Table 3: Summary of Tests Performed Under Project 112, 1963-74 ...... 180 Table 4: Chemical and Biological RTDE Programs 1995-2007 ...... 276 Table 5: Predominant Behaviors by Threat and Organizational Age ...... 338

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List of Abbreviations

AMC ……………………………………………………………Army Material Command BIDS ……………………………………………..Biological Integrated Detection System BW ………………………………………………………...Biological Weapon or Warfare BWC …………………………………………………….Biological Weapons Convention CB ……………………………………………………………………Chemical/Biological CBDP ……………………………………………..Chemical Biological Defense Program CBR …………………………………………………...Chemical/Biological/Radiological CBRN …………….…………………………..Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear CCTC ……………………………………………..Chemical Corps Technical Committee CIA …………………………………………………………...Central Intelligence Agency CW …………………………………………………………Chemical Warfare or Weapon CWS …………………………………………………………...Chemical Warfare Service DNA ………………………………………………………………Deoxyribonucleic Acid DOE ………………………………………………………………...Department of Energy DTRA …………………………………………………Defense Threat Reduction Agency FY ……………………………………………………………………………...Fiscal Year GAO ..…………..……...General Accounting Office /Government Accountability Office HHS ………………………………………………………..…Health and Human Services JBAIDS …..…..………….…Joint Biological Agent Identification and Detection System JBPDS ………………………………………..….Joint Biological Point Detection System JBTDS ………………………………………..Joint Biological Tactical Detection System JCS ……………………………………………………………………Joint Chiefs of Staff LAC ………………………………………………………………....Large Area Coverage

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NAS ………………………………………………………...National Academy of Science NBC ………………………………………………………...Nuclear/Biological/Chemical NIE ………………………………………………………...National Intelligence Estimate NSC …………………………………………………………….National Security Council PCR …………………………………………………………...Polymerase Chain Reaction PSAC …………………………………………….President’s Scientific Advisory Council RW………………………………………………………Radiological Weapon or Warfare VHP ………………………………………………………...Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide WBC …………………………………………………………..War Bureau of Consultants WMD ………………………………………………………Weapons of Mass Destruction WRS ………………………………………………………………..War Research Service

Abstract

THE SHAPING OF UNITED STATES BIODEFENSE POSTURE

Douglas R. Lewis, Ph.D.

George Mason University, 2012

Dissertation Director; Dr Trevor Thrall

The First Gulf War highlighted significant shortcomings in the ability of the

United States military to detect and defend against biological weapons. A subsequent examination of U.S. capabilities reveals that historically defenses against biological weapons have never been regarded as adequate.

In spite of seventy years of effort the U.S. still struggles with the biological weapons threat. It is hypothesized that there is a bias inherent in the biological defense program which is hindering the development of more effective defensive measures.

This dissertation conducts a historical analysis utilizing a congruency/process tracing test designed to determine the level of influence behaviors associated with three distinct theories have had over the U.S. biological program. The history of the program is examined for evidence of behaviors associated with; organizational frames, realism, and bureaucratic politics. From the historical data it is determined that while behaviors associated with each theory have exerted some influence, a chemical frame has exerted the greatest influence over the program. It is argued that this influence has blinded those within the program to the unique nature of biological weapons and has subsequently hindered the development of effective countermeasures. Based upon this finding, the impact of organizational frames upon the program is examined and possible solutions are explored.

Ch1. Introduction

“Many books also quoted General Schwarzkoph’s statement about Iraq’s potential for chemical- biological warfare attacks: ‘We just thank goodness that they didn’t.’ No one was bothering to ask why the U.S. military, having the skills and resources of the Army Chemical Corps so readily available, was unprepared for an opponent using World War I and II chemical-biological agents in 1990.” (Mauroni 1998)

In 1993 the United States General Accounting office (GAO) investigated chemical and biological detection capabilities relative to the Gulf War and found, “at the outset of Operation Desert Storm, U.S. military forces had the capability to detect all known Iraqi chemical agents and to warn its forces of an attack. However, they had an extremely limited capability to detect biological threats.” (United States General

Accounting Office 1993)

This realization caused concern for the U.S. and led to increased emphasis on biological defense. Yet, in 1996 the GAO found that “Units designated for early deployment today continue to face the same problems experienced by U.S. forces during the Gulf War. Activities…are improving the readiness of U.S. Forces…

However…shortcomings persist and are likely to result in needless casualties.” (U.S.

General Accounting Office 1996) Fourteen years later in 2010 a witness testifying before

Congress regarding biological terrorism succinctly states, “… let me be direct—America

1 is not prepared.” (Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security

2010)

This dissertation conducts a historical analysis in an attempt to understand the disparity in the effectives of U.S. defenses against chemical weapons vs. biological weapons. Why is the U.S. better able to defend itself against chemical weapons than biological weapons? Is it lack of effort? Does the U.S. not possess the technical capabilities? Has the U.S. paid too little attention to biological weapons? Has the U.S. made explicit decisions to forge investment in biodefense? Or, have some other factors prevented the U.S. from developing effective biodefense?1

U.S. Biodefense Capabilities: Not Ready For Prime Time

Researching the current state of U.S. biological defense capabilities reveals numerous concerns and criticisms of current capabilities. Koblentz assesses that biological detection systems “will remain imperfectly reliable, environmentally sensitive, slow, range-limited, and difficult to operate for the foreseeable future."' (Koblentz 2003)

A 2006 report lists six major technical challenges and two critical challenges facing detection capabilities, all of which reference biological detection. (Deparment of

Defense 2006) The GAO found that there is “neither a comprehensive national strategy nor a focal point…to guide the efforts to develop a national biosurveillance capability.”

(Government Accountability Office 2010) The National Academy of Sciences reviewed

1 The statements and conclusions expressed in this dissertation are entirely the opinion of the author. They do not reflect official policy nor are they endorsed by the Department of Defense or the US Army. 2 the current BioWatch2 system and found that the system needs better testing, and only offers an advantage over traditional public health systems under a limited set of circumstances. (National Research Council 2011)

As it will be discussed in later sections many defensive measures combine the chemical and biological threat making an assessment of the biological component difficult. Detection technology represents the best example of a dedicated biological program. An Air Force study of detector performance identified significant operational issues with one of two currently deployed biological detection systems. Looking at the

Portal Shield system the study found that one in 500 samples were false positives for the top three biological agents of concern. The study also identified issues with readings generated by the particulate counter associated with the system.

Based upon these concerns, simulations of trigger devices showed significant operational issues. Simulations based upon Met-1 equipped Portal Shield performance data predicted the system would trigger 100 times per day if utilized to trigger portal shield, or 19 triggers per day if operating in “smart mode.”3 Ultimately the simulations predicted false alarm rates would range from 1-100 false alarms per day depending upon background aerosols. (Jensen 2007)

Such high incidents of false alarms greatly reduce the usefulness of these systems.

Military commanders are unwilling and unable to alert the base and put their units in

2 The BioWatch system is a biological detection program/system administered by the DHS. It is deployed in several major U.S. cities. The program uses a filter to collect environmental samples which are periodically analyzed for the presence of select biological agents. 3 The Met-1 units is a particle counter which can serve as a trigger device for a secondary biological detection devices 3 protective equipment multiple times per day in response to false alarms. As a result current systems are often turned off. One must question why the military would produce and field a system which is so cumbersome and un-reliable commanders routinely turn the system off?

Contrary to the state of biological defense, the U.S. has consistently had a more robust chemical weapon defense capability. Simply looking at detection capability in

1999 the U.S had 17 fieldable chemical detection systems (see appendix A) but only two fielded biological detection systems. This trend continues today, not only in number of system but actual hardware. For example in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 the U.S fielded 8,393 chemical detectors, 171 combined systems, and 453 biological detectors. (Department of

Defense 2010) In FY 2010, 25,454 chemical specific detectors were fielded, 843 combined chemical, biological and radiological systems were fielded, yet only 40 biological specific detectors were fielded. (Webber 2011)

While a small sample of the many official statements expressing concern over biological defense have been quoted, there is less concern regarding defenses against chemical agents. A simple search of the GAO report database querying deficiencies in biological agent detection produce multiple results. Yet similar searches for chemical weapons produced far fewer results, and the reports that have been produced focus almost exclusively on the state of chemical weapon destruction relative to the Chemical Warfare

Convention. In fact the only significant recent finding in the GAO archives relative to chemical agent detection faults the Department of Defense (DoD) for not having a

4 strategy to deal with low level (sub clinical) chemical weapons exposure. (United States

General Accounting Office 1998)

Successful understanding of the mechanisms that produced the defensive gap is of significant interest military and national security agencies. Chemical agents and biological agents represent unique and real threats to the military and the country.

Acquisition and research programs to defend against biological weapons account for a significant amount of money each year. The hardware and doctrine produced by our defense organizations are relied upon by the military and government agencies to provide the best possible defenses against an attack.

Yet, the solutions developed to date have significant capability gaps resulting in physical vulnerabilities and arguably represent a significant waste of resources.

Identification of a variable contributing to this gap would be significant as an academic exercise, but more importantly could have practical applications in helping defensive organizations re-focus their efforts resulting in improved defensive capability and more efficient use of resources.

Explaining the State of U.S. Biodefense Capabilities

Previous work aimed at explaining the development of military doctrine, foreign policy, and national behavior more generally provides three potential explanations for the current state of US biodefense. First, the rational actor paradigm suggests that the capabilities gap may in fact be intentional, the product of numerous explicit policy decisions over time. For example Kinnard documents President’s Eisenhower’s debate

5 over where to allocate funds for force modernization and his decision to expand nuclear weapons in order to save funds on reduced conventional forces. (Kinnard 1977) On an international politics scale Palmer shows that in alliances, smaller states will reduce the amount of funds they dedicate to defense, on the assumption that the larger states will contribute enough resources to adequately address the threat. (Palmer 1990) A military budgeting model described as a “balanced budget” has direct applicability to this dissertation. In this model the budget is balanced when the allocation of funds is optimizes so moving funds from one defense function to another yields no increase in benefit. (Massey 1963) It would be possible for a rational actor to make a similar argument that based upon relative threat the maximum benefit to the military was achieved by allocating greater resources towards chemical defense.

Realism theory is associated with authors such as Waltz and Morgenthau. In his works Waltz establishes the assumption that the international arena exists in an anarchic state. (Waltz 1979) As there is no higher authority, states must act in their own self interest to preserve their existence. Under this model, power politics, perceived threats and relative threats all factor into a state’s security decisions. Morgenthau also cautions that prudence should trump morality or politics when making decisions. (Morgenthau

2004)

Implicit in realism is the assumption that states are rational actors. State decisions are based upon cost benefit analysis. When a state responds to a threat it seeks to maximize its investment by establishing balance between the perceived threats other threats and available resources. (Allison and Zelikow 1999) As the international 6 environment is fluid, external threats will change over time. As a result, programs under the influence of external threat will change to reflect the changing international environment.

There is reason to believe external threat has influenced the U.S. biological program.4 Since World War Two the U.S. has known that biological weapons posed a degree of external threat to the state. For almost 30 years the U.S. had an active biological weapons program. In addition, the United States has had allies, and faced enemies, with known or suspected chemical weapons and/or biological weapons. While the full extent of enemy programs has not always been known, the U.S. has always suspected it faced some level of threat from biological weapons. Realism would predict that firsthand knowledge of the agents, combined with external threats would necessitate a defensive response by the state.

Realism also predicts that (if the distinctions between chemical agents and biological agents are fully appreciated) the two weapons classes will be viewed as distinct threats. As such it would be a reasonable expectation that the two threats would receive different amounts of resources, and that the level of resources would change over time. Realism would also predict that biological weapons would be weighed against all other external threats as well. Therefore, if defense organizations were operating under

4 Over part of the time period examined in this dissertation the U.S. had both an offensive and defensive biological program. The U.S. renounced all use of biological weapons in 1969, ending the offensive component of program. While today the program is referred to as “bio-defense” or a “biological defense program” the term “defense” will not always be used in this dissertation. This terminology is reflective of the historical offensive and defensive biological program and in no way implies the existence of a current offensive program. 7 the influence of realism one would predict a positive correlation between the level of perceived threat and corresponding defensive postures.

There are several possible explanations for the existence of the defensive capabilities gap. It is possible that this inequality is intentional. The U.S. may have decided that when threat and resources are considered, biological weapons represented less of a threat to the state than chemical weapons. In this case the discrepancy would be the result of a rational choice to maximize total security in the face of finite resources.

Of the possibilities, an intentional/rational actor explanation is the least troubling.

If it can be demonstrated the state is behaving in a realist manner then the fix, while not necessarily easy, is the most straightforward. Under this model the present inequality would be the manifestation of incomplete intelligence, an incorrect calculation, or a result of the threat evolving faster than the state can respond. If so, rational assessment of the situation and re-allocation of resources will reduce the discrepancy.

It is also possible that this inequality is unintentional. Biological defense is conducted by large organizations which operate within a bureaucratic universe. As such they are subject to inter and intra organizational influences and biases. It may be the case that the discrepancy is not based upon rational calculations but is the result of biases which blinded the organizations to the true nature of the threat and corresponding defensive capabilities.

The second potential explanation, commonly applied to understanding bureaucratic outcomes, is the “Model II” theory popularized by Graham Allison.

An alternative term “Bureaucratic Politics” is utilized by Smith as a term to capture the organizational behaviors described Allison as well as authors such as, Wilson and Halperin. This theory impacts behavior at the organizational level and shares some of the same characteristics Eden attributes to organizational frames theory (discussed below). However, imperialism is a behavior described by Allison which is unique to this theory. As described by Allison imperialism is when organizations seek to grow budgets, personnel and territory. Imperialism is also seen in organizations seeking to “colonize” new profitable territories. (Allison and Zelikow 1999)

Several authors have written slightly different descriptions of imperialistic like behaviors driving organizational decisions. Holden writes that organizational power is obtained by creating a “favorable balance of constituencies.” (Holden 1966) Wilson takes a slightly different approach, arguing that organizations seek to maximize autonomy. (J. Wilson 2000) Halperin writes that organizations seek “influence in order to pursue their own objectives” and that “Stands on issues are affected by the desire to maintain influence.” (Halperin 1974) Regardless of the measure of power, the common theme is that imperialistic organizations consider the good of the organization as a major factor when making decisions.

There are several examples of imperialistic behaviors within the DoD. While federal law places some constraints on the roles and responsibilities of the organizations, there is still room to expand and conquer. Wilson cites Air Force/Army conflict over close air support, the scramble for nuclear weapons, and the battle over a unified Joint

Chiefs of Staff as examples of DoD inter-service and intra-service organizational 9 struggles. (J. Wilson 2000) Likewise Kinnard describes competition between the services over modernization funds in the Eisenhower defense budget. For example he notes that the Army developed the Jupiter missile, even though the Air Force had been designated to have operational responsibility for long range nuclear missiles. (Kinnard

1977)

Imperialistic behavior does not negate the existence of external threat based inputs towards defensive posture. However, a strong imperialistic influence will create an alternative biological defensive posture. It would not be un-expected to see a new organization claim an external threat as justification for a new program. What imperialism does predict is that resulting programs or actions will seek to maximize organizational health, rather than maximizing state security.

Evidence for imperialism would be evidenced by organizations basing decisions not necessarily on the needs of the nation, but would reflect organizations fighting for money and power in an attempt to remain relative to the issues at hand. Some specific instances of imperialism would include power struggles and the existence of multiple parallel programs and organizations. (Smith 2009)

There is reason to believe imperialism has influenced the U.S. biological program.

New missions and new threats can easily be used by imperialistic organizations to justify additional responsibility, prestige, personnel and resources. The biological threat rose to national attention in the late 1930’s, representing a “new” threat available for colonization. Though the importance of the biologic threat has waxed and waned over

10 history, there have been several instances where the biological threat represented a significant source of resources making it a tempting target for imperialistic organizations.

Imperialism predicts its own unique national biodefense posture. Like realism chemical agents and biological agents will be regarded as separate threats. However, under imperialism this separation will be driven by organizations seeking to create new mission areas for colonization, rather than optimizing national resources. Therefore an imperialism influenced posture will appear almost as a patchwork of different components indicative of multiple parallel and competing organizations.

As already discussed the chemical/biological discrepancy may have been a rational choice. However, if the source of the discrepancy is unintentional its existence is more troubling and the solutions more difficult. Evidence in support of an unintentional discrepancy would mean the defense program thought it was addressing the problem, but in actuality was not providing the best possible solutions. If this is in fact the case, fixing the discrepancy will not only require identifying the source of the bias, but then implementing programmatic and organizational changes to eliminate its influence.

Finally, a more recent explanation for bureaucratic behavior has emerged, organizational frames theory.

Organizational frames theory is developed in the book Whole World on Fire by

Lynn Eden. (Eden 2004) In this book she traces the history of U.S. nuclear damage assessment, concentrating on the fact that the U.S. did not account for thermal effects5

5 A nuclear blast can cause damage through blast and shock, radiation and light and heat. The blast and shock damage are not different than a conventional weapon, save the magnitude of blast relative to the amount of material causing the explosion. Unlike conventional explosives nuclear weapons also emit a 11 when developing models to predict the damage caused by nuclear weapons. Tracing the history of damage modeling, she proposes that organizations responsible for understanding bomb damage developed a blast “frame” in World War Two which impacted the modeling of nuclear weapons.

In World War Two the U.S. relied upon precision, daylight bombing with conventional bombs. During the war the U.S. made a significant effort to understand how blast damage affected targets which resulted in an organizational blast frame.6 As the U.S. developed nuclear capabilities, the same modelers (under the influence of the blast frame) were given the responsibility to predict damage from nuclear weapons. She argues that under this frame they adequately modeled blast effects, but underestimated the thermal effects of nuclear weapons as this type of damage was foreign to the blast frame. Ultimately, she proposes that a theory where organizations which develop an organizational bias or “frame” in response to one problem tend to view subsequent problems in the same frame, resulting in less than optimal solutions to the new problem.

While Eden proposes the “Organizational Frames” other authors have made similar observations. Shrivastava and Schneider propose that one of the dangers associated with organizational frames of reference can be limited viewpoints which can create blind spots in organizations. These organizations may also become sluggish, have greater inertia and may fail to support creative solutions. (Shrivastava and Schneider

1984) Authors such as Simon and Entman also have published work on frames. As with large amount of radiation. Some of this radiation is in wavelengths which can impart enough thermal energy to cause materials to combust. 6 This is contrary to the British strategy of nighttime bombing where they relied in part on incendiary weapons, creating a different frame of reference for their bombing campaign. 12

Eden they propose several potential biases that frames can introduce into an organization.

Frames can function to create reality for an organization, influence how organizations define the problem and can influence how solutions are selected. (Simon 1991; Entman

1993) While any organization should strive to avoid these pitfalls, the more lethal the problem facing an organization the greater the peril associated with organizational failure.

There is reason to believe an organizational frame has impacted U.S. biological defense posture. Other authors have demonstrated incidents of organizational frames affecting perceptions of biological weapons. Smith argues that the military has historically approached biological weapons through a kinetic weapons frame. (Smith

2009) Franz makes a frame based argument that a nuclear weapons based model will not work for control of material in biological laboratories. (Franz, et al. 2009)

Observing the history of the U.S. biological program one notes parallels between the biological program and the United States’ efforts to predict nuclear weapon damage.

As the U.S. relied upon those familiar with blast damage to model nuclear weapons, the

U.S. delegated the biological program to organizations established to address the chemical weapons threat.

The Chemical Weapons Service (CWS) was created in World War One to develop offensive and defensive chemical capabilities. After the war the CWS was retained as an organization and given the responsibly for the U.S.’ offensive and defensive chemical programs. In World War Two it was the CWS which was ultimately given the “new” mission to develop an offensive and defensive biological weapons 13 program. By the time the CWS received the biological mission it had been dealing exclusively with chemical weapons for almost 20 years, ample time for an organizational frame to take hold.

While the organizations responsible for the chemical and biological have changed over time, program leadership for both chemical defense and biological defense has been drawn from historically chemical organizations. The CWS was re-designated the

Chemical Corps which retained responsibility for the chemical and biological programs through the 1960’s. After a re-alignment of mission, chemical officers continued to serve in leadership roles for chemical and biological programs. When Congress established a joint service chemical and biological defense program, the Army was designated the lead agency for acquisition of chemical and biological defensive equipment.

Given the culture, mission and conditions present at its inception, is it reasonable to believe the organizations responsible for biological defense are operating under an

Organizational Frames paradigm as described by Eden? Is it possible that the early Corps and its leadership developed a successful frame for chemical defense which influenced how it viewed and addressed biological agents? If so, has this frame existed long enough that it is now accepted by the DoD, and national leadership as the norm when dealing with biological weapons?

If such frame exists, what are the implications for biological defense? If initial conditions set organizational frames, the military was conditioned on chemical weapons and may have attempted to solve biological weapons defense utilizing a chemical frame of reference. The development of similar chemical and biological detection equipment, 14 protective equipment and doctrine, in spite of the differences between the two weapons classes, would suggest that biological defense is being addressed through a chemical weapons frame.7 A failure to address the unique aspects of biological agents would result in sub-optimal solutions.

Argument and Outline of the Dissertation

In the end I will argue that organizational frames theory provides the most insight into how U.S. biodefense capabilities have evolved since World War Two. I will show that the U.S biological program began in World War Two under the influence of external threat. However, as the war ended the influence of the external threat waned and a chemical frame came to dominate the program until the first Gulf War. The recent revelations of state biological programs combined with the increased terrorism threat has weakened, but not eliminated the frame. Today it is possible to observe behaviors associated with all three theories of interest.

This is not to say that the other factors had no influence over the time periods dominated by the influence of frames. Each theory exerts pressure on the program at a different point in the decision making process. External threat influences state policy, imperialism influences inter organizational behavior and frames works primarily at the intra organizational level. Thus an external threat can be used by an organization to legitimize a new program which is subsequently executed through a chemical frame.

7 The physical differences between chemical agents and biological agents will be discussed at length in chapter three. 15

However, while all three can be involved in the decision, ultimately U.S posture will reflect one dominant influence.

In order to put these three explanations to the test I conduct a historical analysis utilizing a congruency/process tracing analysis of the U.S. biological program to determine the influence of the different behaviors on biological posture. Chapter two describes methods that will be used to conduct this analysis. This chapter also provides more detailed discussion of the three theories, as well as descriptions of specific behaviors associated with each theory.

A critical assumption in this test is that biological weapons and chemical weapons are in fact distinct weapons. Chapter three will provide background information on biological agents and chemical agents. It highlights areas of significant differences between chemical agents and biological agents. The chapter also provides a summary of current defensive capabilities.

The actual historical analysis is broken into four chronological sections composing chapters four through seven. Chapter four examines the World War Two period and the birth of the U.S. biological program. Chapter five examines the early Cold

War period through the end of the U.S. offensive biological program. Chapter six examines the remainder of the Cold War through the first Gulf War. Chapter seven examines the program following the Gulf War through the present.

Chapter eight summarizes the findings and presents the conclusions reached through this analysis. Chapter nine is the final chapter which discusses the significance

16 of the findings relative to current and future defensive programs. It also provides recommendations for a more effective biological defense program.

Ch 2. Explaining the Development of Biodefense Doctrine

[Those] who have an excessive faith in their theories or in their ideas are not only poorly disposed to make discoveries, but they also make very poor observations. Claude Bernard (1813-78) French physiologist, 1865

Biological weapons have been regarded as a threat for over 70 years. Yet in spite of the dedicated efforts of the U.S. government to address the threat from biological agents, there are gaps in our defensive capabilities. These gaps appear even more prominent when compared with chemical defensive capabilities. It would be wrong to assert that these gaps were the result of negligence or a conscious decision to create inferior defenses against biological weapons. It is reasonable, however, to assume that the gaps may be the result factors which have influenced the development of the biological program.

Three established theories have already been identified which logically could be responsible for this gap. This chapter will provide additional information on these theories and will describe the analytical methods used in this dissertation.

Organizational Frames

In the book Whole World on Fire, Lynn Eden explores the question of why U.S. military planners focused on blast damage and ignored thermal effects when they

18 calculated the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons. Her study led her to propose that some organizations operate as prescribed by a model she terms Organizational

Frames.

As described in Eden’s book organizational frames have several impacts on how an organization operates. One key aspect of the theory is that the initial conditions/problems which exist when the organization is formed set the frame of reference for future action by that agency. As Eden describes it:

“As those in organizations engage in problem solving, they allocate organization attention and resources, develop and draw on expertise inside and outside the organization and in general build organizational capacity to solve certain problems but not others. Ultimately, organizations are likely to create new knowledge and organizational routines which contain such knowledge. Once created, knowledge-laden routines enable actors in organizations to carry out new actions. At the same time, they constrain what those in organizations can do.” (Eden 2004)

As she examines the thermal damage puzzle she identifies a frame and traces it back to the origins of the Army Air Corps in World War Two. She argues the predominant U.S. strategy of precision daylight bombing using conventional explosives necessitated a deep understanding of blast damage caused by conventional bombs. As the Air Force developed its nuclear capabilities the same individuals that researched blast damage in World War Two assumed lead roles developing damage estimates for nuclear weapons. Lacking any clear guidance from key leaders as to what the estimates should contain, they continued within the established blast damage frame. Subsequently they 19 paid little attention to damage caused by thermal effects, which were outside of the blast damage frame developed during World War Two. Eden argues that as a result of ignoring thermal effects, the U.S. vastly under-estimated the damage that would be caused by a nuclear exchange.

While Eden claims the term “organizational frames” other authors have discussed frames of reference relative to organizational behavior. As described by Entman, frame theories are “often defined casually, with much left to the assumed tacit understanding of reader and researcher.” He proposes several characteristics that define the concept of frames. In his model frames; select a reality, provide salience to that particular reality, they define the problems which helps diagnose causes, make judgments and then suggests remedies. (Entman 1993)

In their paper describing organizational frames Shirvasta and Schneider also list several characterizes of organizational frames. In their model organizational frames include: cognitive elements which influence basic assumptions, experimental biases and language; cognitive operators which influence ordering of information cognitive maps and analytical framework; and reality tests which validate knowledge and express the connection between organization events and society. They also characterize the domain of the frames, how they influence the culture and definition of the organization, and articulation of the frames within organizational plans and policies. As a result of these frames a filter is created “through which a future events are screened and organized, creating a self-perpetuating system.” (Shrivastava and Schneider 1984)

March and Simon also describe many aspects of organizations which would contribute to the development of frames. They propose organizations can re-enforce conditions through selective perception and rationalization, through in-group communication, and selective exposure to environmental stimuli. They also propose that when faced with new problems organizations will turn search for a solution within immediate internal knowledge and gradually expand the search outward, only creating a new solution or organization if no solution is available. Inherent in this process is the idea that an organization will stop the search once an acceptable solution is found, so rarely are “all-possible” solutions considered. (March and Simon 1993)

Once established, it may be difficult for military organizations to break the frame.

For an organization to change Mahler argues that the organization must learn and many cultural factors can influence that learning. One point she makes is that learning is more likely when it is possible to see how outcomes impact the organization. (Mahler 1997)

As military organizations have high turnovers, and are relatively unaffected by poor program outputs one would not expect these organizations to quickly learn and change in the face new problems.

The rapid turnover of military program management could also contribute to the establishment of frames within the organization. Several authors discuss organizational learning and memory in the problem solving process. Learning helps organizational knowledge survive turnovers, but can also lock in certain routines. (Simon 1991) The time constrains associated with high turnover and need to quickly learn and start

21 producing could increase the instances of “selective perception” described by March.

(March and Simon 1993)

It is possible to imagine a scenario where an organizational frame established itself within the U.S. military’s chemical and biological defensive programs. In World

War One the military was faced with a new class of weapons (chemical), it was forced to establish new organizations and to develop novel offensive and defensive solutions tailored to the chemical weapons threat. Once validated, the early chemical solutions would set the frame for the development of new equipment and doctrine as the chemical program evolved. The new chemical agency then had a period of approximately 20 years to focus exclusively on chemical weapons, allowing the frame to re-enforce itself. Then, just prior to the U. S. entering World War Two, the nation decided biological weapons posed a threat. After some civilian research into the nature of biological agents, the offensive and defensive biological missions were eventually handed to the CWS.

When faced with the challenges of defending against biological weapons the

CWS was put in a situation where effective technologies were not available. In this situation Mahler proposes “when program technology are not well understood…the search for ways to adjust or redesign them must fall back on other kinds of knowledge, including organizational beliefs…Thus culture plays a role in learning by filling in gaps in technological understanding.” (Mahler 1997) If the leadership and culture of the organization was operating under a chemical frame they may have responded with familiar technical solutions based upon the characteristics of chemical weapons, not necessarily well matched for biological weapons. 22

If the Chemical Corps8 did respond to the biological weapons defense problem utilizing a chemical weapons frame it is possible to make predictions as to the outputs of the program. It should be possible to observe similarities in how the military addressed the biological and chemical threats, in spite of the fact that biological and chemical weapons have many different characteristics which would suggests dissimilar strategies.

Such similarities could be observed in the construction, operating parameters and employment of sensor hardware. Other hardware solutions such as protective and decontamination equipment would exhibit similar characteristics. Even non physical characteristics such as operational doctrine, officer education and even budgets should make sense if they are viewed through a chemical weapons perspective, but would not appear optimal (to the outside observer) to address the biological threat.

Hypothesis – The presence of a chemical frame has shaped the development of the United States biological posture.

It is hypothesized that the organizations responsible for developing U.S. biological doctrine were “imprinted” with a chemical weapons frame established in

World War One. This chemical frame subsequently influenced the DoD’s efforts to develop effective biological defensive measures resulting in less than optimal solutions.

This hypothesis is based in part on an assumption that the different nature of chemical and biological weapons should result in different approaches to defense.

8 References in general to the Chemical Corps are inclusive of earlier incarnations of the Corps such as the Chemical Warfare Service 23

If initial conditions set organizational frames, the military was conditioned on chemical weapons and attempted to solve biological weapons defense with the same frame of reference. This hypothesis would predict DoD chemical and biological defensive solutions should be similar in approach. It would also predict behaviors and traits in organizations that are indicative of a chemical weapons frame such as jargon, education, and symbolism. It would also be expected that there is a greater linkage between chemical and biological weapons programs than would be expected based upon the nature of the weapons.

For this and each subsequent theory a series of predictive statements will be generated. The historical analysis will then score the presence of these behaviors as evidence that the factors associated with the theory are exerting influence over the program.

ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES

The presence of a chemical frame can be “read” in organizational routines or products, when observed from outside the organization.

This prediction is developed in part from the March and Simon idea that an organization will approach a new problem utilizing solutions that have worked in the past. The organization will only look for a novel solution if the old solutions do not work, and will stop looking as soon as an adequate solution is found. (March and Simon

1993) Similarly Montjoy describes how organizational performance can be steered by dominant coalitions within an organization operating with “A consistent set of

24 preferences and beliefs about cause and effect relationships exhibited by such a group will be termed the goals and world view, respectively, of the agency.” (Montjoy and

O'Toole 1979)

It can be proposed that an organization operating in this manner would approach a new problem (for example biological detection) by first looking at previously successful chemical detection solutions or referring to the dominant mode of thought within the organization. While there obviously could not be a 100 percent direct correlation between sensor technologies, the underlying performance parameters such as time to detect, limit of detection, employment strategies etc. which were successfully developed for a chemical problem may be retained to address the biological problem. Therefore it is possible to propose the following predictive statements.

1. Chemical and Biological defensive equipment will exhibit similar requirements, construction and employment. Chemical and Biological defensive equipment is often developed by the same organization. For example almost every office responsible for biological defense is also responsible for chemical defense. One significant example is the Chemical and Biological Defensive Program (CBDP) which is currently responsible for the entire joint DoD defensive program. If a frame is present within such an organization it would be realistic to expect the organization to view both weapons through the same frame, and respond accordingly. Such behavior would be observable in the operating characteristics of the hardware and systems produced by the organizations. Similarities is operating behavior in spite of differences in the two weapons would be expected. A high degree of similarity (independent of weapons 25 characteristics) in performance parameters such as, time to alarm, level of detection, number of agents, standoff distance, level of decontamination, employment would serve as an indicator as to the presence of a frame.

2. DoD chemical and biological doctrine will be more similar than the difference in weapons would predict. As with hardware development, the individuals responsible for developing Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear weapons doctrine are almost always within the same office. In this case the product is not a piece of hardware, but rather written guidance on how to conduct military operations in an environment that has been impacted by one of these weapons. The presence of a dominant frame could influence the products produced by these offices. Such an influence could be evident doctrine which prescribes similar actions in response to an attack by disparate weapons.

Examples of such an influence could be a tendency to refer to a “chemical or biological attack” or a “chemical/biological sensor.”

3. The DoD will utilize similar scenarios to conduct both chemical and biological training. As with doctrine and hardware, defensive training for chemical and biological weapons is often conducted by the same organization. Individuals working in this field can be influenced by an organizational frame through the official doctrine they are responsible for teaching or through culture, having been exposed to the frame through their own education and growth within the organization. Evidence of a frame would be manifest in similar training parameters, such as time periods, scenarios, operational impact, when conducting chemical and or biological training.

ATTENTION AND RESOURCES

As a result of a chemical frame, biological agents will not receive the same level of attention or emphasis as chemical agents. This inequality is not as a response to external threat, or an overt decision to fund one at the detriment of another. Instead through a chemical frame biological agents and chemical agents appear similar.

Therefore as programs are developed they will be shaped by chemical requirements, with an assumption that the same or similar program will cover biological agents as well. This will result in a situation where resources appear to be preferentially given to combat chemical agents.

1. Biological defense will be subsumed in overarching chemical defense issues when written, discussed or testified to. The threat from chemical weapons and biological weapons to the military and to the country has existed for many years. Military officials, government officials and scholars have all made public statements, written works and provided testimony regarding these weapons. The terminology and vocabulary used in these sources can indicate the presence of a frame. A chemical frame would predict that verbal or written products would tend to describe the threat in terms of chemical weapons. Such indicators could include a preponderance of use of one term over the other, attaching one weapon to a more general threat (a “chemical officer” responsible for chemical and biological weapons), or using terms specific to one weapon to describe both

(using “vapor” to describe either weapon).

2. WMD personnel will be described/qualified in terms of chemical qualifications. Similar to the public statements referenced above, there is also internal 27 communications within defensive organizations. Job descriptions, job qualifications and organizational identity are all subjective items produced by organizations for internal and external advertising. The presence of an organizational frame could be indicated by a disproportionate use of chemical terminology or descriptors relating to jobs or personnel having responsibilities outside of the chemical threat.

3. Resources (budgets) will be unequally distributed and this inequality is not related to external threat. Realism, discussed in more detail later, predicts that resources allocated by the state to defend against external threats will be distributed relative to the severity of the threat. As the relative threats are not static a doctrine based upon external threat could and should produce an uneven distribution of resources between chemical and biological weapons.

However, a disparity in resource allocation could be observed if frames theory was influencing behavior. Many of the authors referenced above refer to frame theories influencing learning, and influencing decisions. Individuals responsible for funding decisions would have grown up in a frame culture and their decision making may be influence by a chemical frame which could result in an imbalance of funding favoring the chemical threat. This imbalance would not be based upon intelligence estimates, but rather based upon internal and organizational frame biases.

In this case the historical distribution of funds would indicate which of the two theories was predominant. A consistent bias towards chemical could indicate an organizational frame, while a choppier pattern, which correlates to threat level, would indicate a program influenced by external threat. 28

4. Military units will dedicate more resources/time training for chemical attacks.

Military training requires the expenditure of resources in the form of time and money to conduct training. Therefore training patterns, and the resources allocated for training can be expected to behave in a similar manner to the allocation of financial resources as described above.

ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND LEARNING

Authors writing on organizational theories highlight the role of learning and culture within the organization as an important influence on the output of the organization. In particular learning and culture play a key role in maintaining an organizational frame. Simon describes successful learning within an organization when

“If it works as predicted, it demonstrates an emergent property of an organization-a persistence of pattern that survives a complete replacement of the individuals who enact the pattern.” (Simon 1991) If an organization is being influenced by an organizational frame, it should be possible to find evidence of the frame (chemical bias) in the day to day operations of an organization.

1. Professional writings will demonstrate a chemical culture/bias. All military personnel to complete advanced military education programs as they progress throughout their career. As part of the education personnel are often required to write thesis or research papers. Additionally, many career fields publish professional journals featuring input from members of the career field. These written documents can be examined for evidence of a chemical bias. An example of an organizational frame would be a

29 continued association of chemical and biological weapons, or a continued use of chemical specific terms to describe a biological attack.

2. Professional military education will demonstrate a chemical centric teaching model. As military officers and NCO’s progress in rank they attend professional education. Biological weapons are one of many topics covered. Evidence of an organizational frame in professional education could be observed in the topics or amount of time dedicated to each weapon. Lessons which use a combined threat, or show a bias towards chemical weapons could indicate the presence of a chemical frame. Separation of the two weapons classes would be predicted by both realism and bureaucratic politics theories.

PREVIOUS SUCCESS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

A consistent theme within the description of organizational frames theory is that organizations tend to rely upon previously successful solutions when facing new problems. While not perfect, the DoD has developed and fielded adequate chemical defensive measures. Therefore, if an organizational frame was the dominant influence, it would be expected organizations would follow previously successful models when addressing new threats.

1. Defensive organizations will respond to new/unique biological challenges by incorporating biological programs within existing chemical infrastructure. Of the two weapons classes, chemical weapons were the first to directly threaten the DoD. The DoD responded by creating an organization and research program dedicated to the chemical

30 weapons threat. Frame theory predicts that the mission to address a new weapon with similar characteristics to an older weapon (chem. and bio both invisible gasses) will be assigned to the organizations created to deal with the original threat.

2. Previously successful solutions (hardware and doctrine) will be used as models to address new problems. It has already been argued that the similar view of chemical agents and biological agents can result in similar hardware and doctrine. However, it is possible to produce similar outputs when an organization assumes that what worked for one agent will work for another agent, in spite of distinct physical differences. An example of this behavior is the repeated attempt by states to use existing chemical dispersal techniques when initiating an offensive biological weapons program.

3. A corollary to the influence of successful programs on future development is the impact of historical failures on future development. Just as a successful approach will be utilized for new programs, frames theory predicts previously unsuccessful approaches will not be considered for new program. For example, medical pre-treatment has never been a significant contributor to chemical defense. A similar (relative) lack of interest with medical treatment is evident for biological defense, in spite of the significant potential medical countermeasures have in combating the biological threat.

Bureaucratic Politics

Smith derives the bureaucratic politics theory from behaviors described as “Model

II” by Allison and Zelikow, and from Halperin’s book Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign

Policy. In Allison’s book Essence of Decision, Model II is an organizational level theory 31 examined as a possible explanation of the U.S. response to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

This model proposes that the course of action taken in governments or large companies is a result of the interaction and competition between smaller organizations within the larger body. While an external event may initiate the need for organizational action, the event may simply serve as a justification for a sub-organization to expand its position. As a result the final course of action may be of more benefit to the sub-organization than to the company or government as a whole.

In the Allison model, decisions must be reached by compromise or competition with other organizations. Solutions that are developed may be more dependent upon organizational power and makeup that the appropriateness of the solution. Several of the traits Allison uses to describe this model are common to the traits used to describe organizational frame theory such as organizational culture, priorities, and routines.

However, there is one specific (and relatively easily identifiable) trait listed by

Allison which is distinct from the organizational frames theory: imperialism. Allison describes the trait of imperialism as when organizations “define the central goal of

‘health’ as synonymous with ‘autonomy.’ They therefore seek growth in their budget, personnel, and acquiring new territory. Thus issues that arise in areas where boundaries are ambiguous and changing, or issues that constitute profitable new territories are dominated by colonizing activity.” (Allison and Zelikow 1999)

Holden defines imperialism as “a matter of inter-agency conflict in which two or more agencies try to assert permanent control over the same jurisdiction, or in which one agency actually seeks to take over another agency.” He further characterizes the 32 tendencies for bureaucracies to expand, maintain or retrench, with expansion most often exhibited in newer organizations. (Holden 1966).

Halperin also identifies imperialistic behaviors in the government decisions making process in his book Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign Policy. In the organizational section he makes similar observations about organizations, power and decisions. Regarding conflict he states “organizations may bend over backwards to avoid giving reason to increase their bureaucratic competitors share of the responsibility.”

Looking at autonomy he states “organizations tend to agree on proposals which exclude any joint operations and which leave each free to go its own way.” And regarding enhancing its “essence” an organization “will seek to protect these functions by taking on additional functions if it believes that foregoing these added functions may ultimately jeopardized its sole control.” (Halperin 1974)

In the book Bureaucracy Wilson describes possible imperialistic behaviors exhibited by organizations. While Allison takes issue with the definition of imperialism vs. autonomy described by Wilson, the behaviors reflect the idea that organizations must compete whether it be for resources or autonomy. Wilson observes organizations looking to create a niche; “seek out tasks not being performed by others…fight organizations which seek to perform your task…avoid tasks that differ significantly from those that are at the heart of the organization’s mission,…be wary of joint or cooperative ventures…avoid learned vulnerabilities.” (J. Wilson 2000)

There is reason to believe that imperialism could be influencing the development of chemical and biological defensive equipment. The military has often been accused of 33 creating or enhancing threats (such as China, ballistic missiles, or biological weapons), in order to secure more funding or resources. (Gavin 2010; Pan 2006; Ryan 2004; Tucker and Sands 1999) There is also a long history of inter agency competition for resources, both within and between the branches of the armed forces, such as the race for all three services to have service specific nuclear weapons, or for example the Navy which has its own air power and ground elements putting it at conflict with the Air Force and the

Army.

In the case of biological weapons, the realization of a new national threat and the commitment by the government to respond with an effective offensive and defensive program constituted an entirely unclaimed mission space. This new mission could provide a large amount of financial resources and national prestige to the organization responsible for the program. Therefore, it would be logical to expect evidence of competition between organizations seeking to claim the biological weapons mission space.

Hypothesis: Imperialistic behaviors predicted by Bureaucratic Politics have shaped the development of the United States biological posture.

It is realistic to envision a scenario where the biological weapons threat would be embraced by an organization wishing to use a new threat, or the existence of a failed response to the threat, as justification for more money and personnel. Such behavior could put it in competition with other organizations also looking for additional resources.

Organizations wishing to expand power would propose new programs and fight for the authority (and budget) to claim responsibility the biological threat. Inclusion of chemical agents within biological proposals would support the status quos (and be indicative of a chemical frame) and weaken the arguments made by newer or “upstart” organizations. Once responsibility for the new mission is acquired these organizations would justify gains in personnel or budget acquired based upon the unique biological threat. Such organizations would not combine the threats but would emphasize the unique nature of the biological threat, and the special abilities their organization possessed to address the threat. To test for the influence of imperialism a series of predictive behaviors are proposed.

ORGANIZATIONAL IMPERIALISM

Historically biological weapons were a new threat when compared with chemical weapons. The bureaucratic politics theory predicts organizations would regard this new threat as a source of resources, missions or prestige. Therefore the behaviors associated with this theory will be indicative of organizations embracing the new threat and exhibiting an overt desire to take on the new mission area.

1. Multiple organizations will attempt to claim responsibility (and corresponding resources) for new threats.9 A straightforward observation associated with imperialistic behavior would be intra-agency completion for a new mission. Example behaviors that

9 Even thought there is an established mission structure within the DoD it is still possible to have multiple agencies compete for a mission. For example there are at least four agencies on Air Staff which claim some part of chemical and biological defense. 35 would be indicative of this dynamic could include; high level involvement in the issue, multiple agencies with similar organizations, official testimony as to an agency’s superiority in a mission area, lobbying of decision makers, and eager allocation of personnel and resources to the issue.

2. Official testimony and statements will validate the unique threat and reflect belief that one’s organization is best able to address the threat. In order for a new area to be a target for expansion the resources or potential resources allocated to the new area must be substantial to the organization. While the DoD and services have some ability to move money within their organizations, any significant change in resources must come from Congress. It would be reasonable that an organization which desires to take on a new threat, and receive the associated resources, would have interest in highlighting and emphasizing the severity of the new threat. In effect sowing the field it hopes to later claim. It would be expected that this behavior could be found in Congressional testimony, official agency reports or findings.

3. Organizations will fight for what they gain. The bureaucratic and budgetary environments are not always conducive to organizational expansion. As already noted

Holden includes maintenance and retrenching behaviors in his work on imperialism.

Observation of these behaviors in an organization may indicate past expansive behavior, or an attempt by an organization to retain the power and resources it already possesses.

While such behavior is not unexpected or necessarily bad, taken to the extreme the organization may put its self interest ahead of the program as a whole.

4. Imperialistic organizations will favor the offense. This idea is advanced by

Posen as he argues an offensive doctrine requires more resources than a defensive or retaliatory doctrine. Therefore organizations looking to justify new weapons or additional manpower may advocate the nation adopt an offensive based doctrine.

DOCTRINE THROUGH IMPERIALISM IS RUDDERLESS

If successful, imperialistic behavior can result in several organizations claiming responsibly for or even performing the same mission. Without an overarching authority the resulting doctrine can become chaotic and disjointed.

1. The national strategy will be disjointed and leaderless. Bureaucratic Politics predicts competition between organizations to claim mission space. Within government department there is a recognized chain of command which can delineate mission requirements. However, inter-departmental (and un-checked intra-departmental) competition may result in the creation of several parallel programs. This may result in the existence of several organizations claiming to speak for the nation with regard to biological defense.

2. Acquisition programs will be developed which do not reflect mission requirements. As organizations strive to colonize new mission space, they may take on new programs and hardware on their own, solely to get there foot in the door without necessarily identifying an operational need or end user. As a result organizations may be able to “sell” the new program to those responsible for allocation of resources, without establishing a strong tie to an end user or stated operational requirement.

3. Imperialistic actions will result in a “patchwork” national posture. The components of the national posture such as, research programs, hardware and doctrine will be produced by multiple competing organizations attempting to advance unique ideas. The stronger the imperialistic influence, the less likely there is to be an authority

“sheepherding” the development of a coordinated posture.

Realism

Behaviors associated with the realism theory of international politics could also be controlling the development of chemical and biological defensive capabilities. As described by Waltz, realism examines international relationships between states. The theory starts with the assumption that the international system in an anarchic state, where all states must practice self-help looking out first for themselves to ensure their survival.

Waltz also proposes that states are rational actors, using cost and benefit analysis to make decisions.

Under realism theory, alliances treaties and other agreements can be made if they benefit the state. However, these agreements they must always be viewed with caution and can be broken if conditions shift and they threaten the wellbeing of the state.

Ultimately the state is dependant solely upon itself for survival, and must take all actions necessary to ensure such survival. (Waltz 1979; Waltz 2001)

While examining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison develops a decision making model for states operating as predicted in realism. In this decision making model one assumes; a state is a unified actor, is rational, and seeks to maximize the return on

38 investments based upon relative threats. The state then asks; what are the threats, what is the utility function, and then what is the best choice to maximize objectives? (Allison and

Zelikow 1999)

The realism models described by Waltz and Allison differ from the other two theories already discussed in that realism focuses in the international arena and is concerned with how states react within that arena. While not directly concerned with how decisions are made within the state, it assumes that the state will ultimately react in a manner which is in its best interest relative to the threat at hand. Therefore under this model the state’s perception of a potential threat has great bearing on predicting how the state should react.

There is reason to believe that factors associated with the realism model should influence the U.S biological weapons program. Historically the U.S. had developed both offensive chemical and biological weapons, and had a good understanding of these weapon’s capabilities. The U.S. also knew that prior to the Biological Weapons

Convention (BWC) many other states had biological weapons programs. Even after the treaty was ratified realism predicts the U.S. should have viewed other states with caution and not relied entirely upon the treaty to eliminate the threat. Morgenthau cautions that while political realism is aware of moral and political factors, prudence must remain the supreme value in politics. (Morgenthau 2004) Therefore under the realist model the U.S. should have viewed biological weapons as a valid threat to the state, and the state response would be to maintain a capability to defend against the possible threat.

As with bureaucratic politics realism also predicts a recognized distinction between chemical agents and biological agents. In addition to the distinct physical threats posed by the two weapons classes, it is likely that potential adversaries will have a different mixture of chemical and biological capabilities. Treating the threats posed by chemical agents and biological agents in a monolithic manner is not consisted with the maximizing functions associated with realism.

Hypothesis – The national response to external threat has shaped the development of the United States biological posture.

Realism would predict the chemical and biological programs operating under this model should behave relative to the perceived threat facing the U.S. Under the influence of external threat the output from the programs would be optimized to protect national interests and would not necessarily show high correlation between the two weapons categories. Therefore based upon the physical differences between chemical and biological agents, combined with changing levels of relative threat it would be logical to expect a distinct chemical agent/biological agent relationship. It would be further expected that the programs would experience changes in priorities, budgets and manpower based upon changing intelligence estimates and real world events. As with the other two theories, a series of predictive statements will be used to test the historical influence of behaviors based upon realism theory.

RELATIVE THREAT DRIVES A PROPORTIONAL RESPONSE

Realism theory is perhaps the most straightforward of the three proposed theories.

It lends itself to a series of statements based upon a simple predictive model that threat drives response. The state makes a rational choice based upon the perceived severity of the threat, and the availability of resources. As resources are finite each threat/response must be weighed relative to all other threats facing the state. Behaviors predicted by realism reflect a changing doctrine based upon changing world events.

1. How the United States views the threats from chemical agents and biological agents (in absolute and relative terms) is dynamic, and will change over time. While this not a direct statement of how the state will respond, it sets an important condition that the international arena is not static and threats to the state will change over time. As threats change, realism predicts state behavior will change in response. The change in threat can occur as the result of an external event such as the discovery of Iraqi program. The change in threat may also be internal, as the state re-assesses its perception of the threat such as the increase in concern over the biological threat under the Clinton administration. (Wright 2007)

2. Official policy and statements on threat level will change over time relative to new intelligence or world events. This statement flows from the previous assumption that international threats, and specifically the threats of chemical weapons or biological weapons, are not static and change relative to each. These threats also change relative to other threats such as conventional forces or nuclear warheads. If realism holds true, official U.S. positions relative to all threats should change over time. Evidence for this 41 change will be found in sources such as intelligence estimates, official testimony, or military doctrine.

3. Budgets, force structure and hardware will be built to reflect the current threat level. Realism predicts that the state will respond to protect itself against perceived external threats. In the case of biological and chemical weapons the relative threat posed by these weapons to the U.S. has changed over time. If external threat is the dominant factor influencing U.S. policy one would expect U.S response, as a measured by dollars, personnel and hardware, to vary as threat perception varies.

4. Military forces will train and exercise relative to current threat level. The U.S. military dedicates substantial resources into training its fighting forces. However as training resources are not infinite the military must prioritized the threats, and allocate resources as appropriate. Realism would then predict military training will change over time, emphasizing the most likely threats facing the nation at that moment in time.

Realism would also predict that training would be tailored to meet the threats particular to each region and each branch of service.

Testing

This dissertation will test the degree of support for the three theories by developing a series of expected behaviors for each theory. The historical record will then be examined for evidence of these behaviors. The strength of each particular factor’s influence over the program will be scored by the prevalence of the predicted behaviors evident in the historical record.

In addition to predictive behaviors, it is possible to construct a logical pathway which flows from each theory to a distinct biological posture. The presence of predicted behaviors, combined with the existence of a logical pathway provides re-enforcing evidence as to the importance of a particular theory. It may be possible to find many different behaviors in the history which do not ultimately impact U.S. biological doctrine.

But the existence of a pathway demonstrating linkage between the predicted behaviors and the expected doctrine will provide greater confidence as to the importance of a particular theory.

There is precedence for the use of these testing methods within the literature. In the book The Sources of Military Doctrine Posen seeks to explain how military doctrine is developed relative to two competing theories. (Posen 1984) To test his theories Posen makes a series of predictive statements of behaviors which would be observed if the theory was influencing doctrine. After looking at the historical record for evidence of these behaviors he makes a judgment as to which of the two theories is best supported by the historical observations.

Allison and Zelikow conduct a historical analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In their work they examine the historical record from three distinct theoretical perspectives.

As they examine the data they attempt to re-create decision making process which drove

U.S. and Soviet actions during the crisis.

The methods use by Posen, Allison and used for this dissertation reflect a combining of the congruency and process tracing analytical methods described in Case

Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences by George and Bennett. (George 43 and Bennett 2005) These methods are particularly suited to historical case studies and allow the researcher to make authoritative conclusion as to the significance of a particular theory or theories. In a congruence test the measure of significance is based upon the relative fit and level of support for a theory. In a process trace analysis the scoring is more rigorous, based upon the existence of a logical cause and effect chain of events.

The two methods are similar and, as George and Bennett note, process tracing can be a method utilized in support of a congruence test.

As described by George and Bennett in a congruency test the “investigator begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome of a particular case.” After examining these data “If the outcome of the case is consistent with the theory’s prediction, the analyst can entertain the possibility that a causal relationship may exist.” Scoring standards for a congruency test are based upon strength in the similarities between “hypothesized causes and observed effects.” The greater the expected variation in direction, magnitude and dimension the greater the degree of

“congruity.”

The strengths of using the congruency test are that it allows flexibility in its design, and that it does not require access to all data relative to a particular causal pathway. It can also be combined with other research methods to provide greater validity to the conclusions.

However, there are weaknesses in the test as well. Researchers must guard against “unjustified” attribution of causality to a causal relationship. One way to strengthen the causality claim is to include alternative theories in the analysis and 44 determining which demonstrates superior congruency. Including multiple theories supports causality by “invoking the superior standing of the theory employed or by resorting to process-tracing, the investigator may be satisfied that the within-case approach suffices…”

Therefore a basic congruency method will serve as the foundation of this dissertation. To address the method’s weaknesses and add rigor to the conclusions multiple theories are included in the analysis, and process tracing will also be employed as a supplemental method.

Process tracing is a testing method described by George and Bennett that can stand on its own or be included within a congruency test to support a claim of causality.

Process tracing seeks to “identify the intervening causal processes—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between and independent variable and the outcome of the dependant variable.” Process tracing relies upon linking independent observations “in particular ways to constitute an explanation of the case.” Process tracing can be used to support causality through developing straightforward linear cause and effect or even congruency of multiple chains.

The authors also note two limits to process tracing, it needs an uninterrupted causal path, and there may be more than one possible causal path. Focusing on the chemical/biological agent relationship and resulting posture should address these issues by forcing all theories to be examined along the same path. Data which interrupt the causal path is acceptable and actually expected as all three theories should not be expected to predict the same outcome. 45

George and Bennett list several varieties of process tracing, invoking different levels of detail and analysis. Their category of “More General Explanation,” is an appropriate mechanism to complement the proposed congruency method. This type of process tracing relies upon a “general explanation rather than a detailed tracing of the casual process.” The relatively large time period, and inability to obtain or process all data for this time period make the general approach appropriate for this study. However, the proposed logic train that the chemical agent biological agent relationship will influence research, acquisition and policy development, which will result in an identifiable and distinct U.S. biodefense posture is a logical sequence well suited to the process trace method.

Therefore a congruency test supported by “general” process tracing to add rigor to claims of causality will be the investigative mechanism used for this dissertation.

Structure

This dissertation will utilize the three theories to explain the development of U.S. biodefense posture. A series of empirical statements are derived from each theory which predict behaviors consistent with the particular theory. Historical data will then be examined for evidence of behaviors indicative of each theory. As the U.S. Army’s

Chemical Corps was the original DoD organization responsible for chemical agents and biological agents (both offensive and defensive) this thesis will focus on the Chemical

Corps in the earliest time periods. In the mid 1960’s re-organizations within the Army and the DoD resulted in a change in the function of the Chemical Corps, with the

46 chemical and biological missions moving through a series of different agencies. The analysis will then follow the primary organization(s) responsible for biological defense over these time periods.

The development of U.S. biodefense strategy will be analyzed historically. The analysis will start with the first serious national concern over biological weapons just prior to World War Two, and will continue through the present day. This time period will be broken in to a series of segments for individual analysis. The demarcation for the time periods is as follows:

 1939-1946 – World War Two, initial significant concern over biological agents and birth of U.S. biological program  1946-1970 – Cold War, development of U.S. chemical and biological programs through termination of the offensive biological program by President Nixon  1970-1991 – U.S. Defensive program through the end of the Cold War, the First Gulf War and discovery of active Iraqi biological program  1991 – Present – Increased scrutiny of U.S. biological and chemical capabilities post Gulf War, impact of 9/11 and a new view of the terrorist threat

There is valid concern with many authors that an analysis based upon a single case may be insufficient to make a valid claim as to the processes at work. However, even in Designing Social Inquiry the authors make a concession that it may be possible to examine a single case in such a manner as to generate many observations allowing more rigorous support of the claims generated by the study. (King, Keohane and Verba 1994)

By breaking the case into four different time periods, examined relative to three different theories this dissertation will generate twelve observations which should lend sufficient rigor to support to the final conclusions. 47

Scoring

For this work, congruency scoring of each theory is based upon the “more credible” measurement. The historical record will be examined relative to the predicted behaviors associated with each theory. The greater the presence of the observed behaviors the more credible the explanatory power for the parent theory. The “winning” theory will be determined by observing which theory has the greatest historical evidence and eliminating the theories with lesser evidence.

The process tracing method adds support to the “best fit” scoring associated with the congruency method. Process tracing requires the creation of a logical pathway which explains the observed doctrine. The presence of data which support a logical pathway will lend support to the parent theory. Evidence which contradicts the pathway will force the parent theory to be eliminated from that period of analysis, or at a minimum the proposed pathway of the parent theory must be modified to account for all available data.

Therefore, a general best fit congruency approach, supported by process tracing where possible will serve as the scoring standards for this research. Based upon this scoring method the three theories will be tested to determine if their predicted behaviors are exerting significant influence over biodefense posture for each time period.

There is precedent within the literature to support this scoring scheme. As already mentioned Posen utilizes the congruence/process tracing method described by George and Bennett. In his book Posen utilizes two methods to test his theories, empirical statements and theory comparison.

As Posen describes testing empirical statements he argues that:

“A theory can be tested by logically deducing from it a series of ‘empirical statements.’ If it turns out that the empirical statements are true the theory appears ‘more credible.’ The more times one can accomplish this, the more credible a theory becomes. The hypotheses introduced in this in this chapter are empirical statements of this kind. To the extent that they are confirmed by the cases examined later in this book, the theories from which they are deduced gain more credibility.” (Posen 1984)

Posen utilizes the first technique to validate the applicability of a particular theory, and then uses a second strategy of pitting theories against each other to identify the most likely explanation for the phenomenon of interest. By eliminating the most likely alternative theories the author can argue as to the credibility of the remaining theory

Sources

To support the proposed hypothesis it is necessary to obtain data which provide insight into the decisions which influenced U.S. doctrine. It is necessary to observe the thoughts and behaviors of the individuals and the organizations responsible for developing the program. By understanding the decisional inputs and observing the doctrinal output it will be possible to support/fail to support the behavioral hypothesis generated by each respective theory.

Primary sources will provide the most straightforward evidence as to the presence of a particular bias in the decision making process. Such primary sources include letters, meeting minutes, committee proceedings and official testimony. These sources provide

49 insight into the thoughts and beliefs of the individuals which led to decisions impacting the development of doctrine. The archives of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), as well as several databases contain a wealth of data in the form of letters and committee proceedings, in particular prior to the mid 1960’s.

Unfortunately, the nature of this work combined with the sheer number of documents makes it impossible to obtain data for every decision made over the last 70 years. For classified data, the more recent the datum, the likely it is to be classified.

Therefore, it will be impossible to conduct this analysis based entirely upon these primary sources.

Committee notes and letters are not the only sources of primary data available. It is also possible to deduce the influence of a particular factor based upon “outputs” of the organization which will reflect the inherent biases of the individuals/organization producing the outputs. Examples of “outputs” to be examined include official reports, military regulations, military training syllabi, training manuals, organizational briefings, program briefings, and official statements. The hardware produced, and the areas researched are additional observable outputs which reflect the decision making of the organization.

It is also important to obtain data which reflect the culture and biases present within the individuals members of the defensive organizations. Sources for this data include professional writings, professional publications and official testimony. These sources, as well as doctrinal documents are important in that they set the tone for the rest

50 of the military. This can allow a bias within a small organization to influence the thinking of the entire military and even governmental leadership,

In addition to the National Academy of Sciences there are number of databases on the web which contain publically available documents of interest to the question. Some of the web sources of data include; DOE Open Net, Defense Technical Information

Center, Air University, CIA, Homeland Security, Federation of American Scientists,

Lexis Nexus Congressional, the Government Accountability Office, National Security

Archive, Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Defense Information Analysis

Center Naval Post Graduate School, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the Department of Defense. Many of these sites contain extensive collections of previously classified documents that are now available due to routine downgrades or

Freedom of Information requests. In addition I was able to access the Research

Development and Engineering archives in Aberdeen Proving Ground which contain wealth of technical data and program reports.

While making every effort to be as thorough as possible, it is impossible to claim that this analysis will capture every possible source of information available on the U.S. biological weapons program. First, it would be nearly impossible to find and analyze every document produced on this subject, by numerous bureaucratic organizations, over the period of nearly 70 years. Secondly, the nature of the biological threat and program requires classification of many of the program’s details. While many early documents have been de-classified and are available for analysis, recent documents and those which contain detailed descriptions of weapon production or defensive capability remain 51 classified. Therefore, the analysis and conclusions presented in this work are only valid based upon the available evidence. There may be available in the future evidence that contradicts the evidence presented in this work.

Conclusions

The history of the U.S. biological program will be examined in an attempt to understand if the three theories of interests played a significant role in determining the program’s posture. While each theory operates at a different level of decision making, the three theories are associated with unique behaviors, which logically lead to three distinct biological postures.

To conduct this test a congruency/process trace test will be utilized. To perform this test a series of unique predictive behaviors have been developed for each theory. The presence of a behavior indicates that its associated theory is influencing U.S. posture at that point in time.

It is expected that behaviors associated with all three theories will be observed over each period of analysis. However, as proposed by Posen and the congruency method, it is the theory with the greatest support over a particular time period which will be judged as the most significant for a particular time period. While it is impossible to prove a negative, lack of observed behaviors (especially in the presence of other behaviors) will be scored as a lack of significance for a particular theory.

As each theory is associated with a unique view on how biological weapons and chemical weapons are viewed, it is important that the reader have a basic understanding

52 of these two weapons classes. The next section will provide basic information on these weapons classes. It will also provide examples of how the weapons differ and includes information on current defensive capabilities.

Ch 3. Biological Agents, Chemical Agents and Current U.S. Defensive Capabilities

“Putting all three (WMD) weapons systems in one common view is much like comparing an M1 rifle, a 203mm mortar, and an 8-inch howitzer and deciding that the military should use the same defense against all three. (Mauroni 2000)

My arguments are grounded upon the distinct physical differences between biological agents and chemical agents. I argue that these differences are of such significant that biological agents and chemical agents should be considered distinct weapons classes in their own right. Yet I will provide evidence that these weapons are often regarded as one weapon type. The objective of this section is to provide the reader enough background information to understand basic nature of each type of weapon 10

Confusion in Terminology

The name associated with something has influence over how that item is perceived. Biological, Chemical, Nuclear, Radiological and even Explosive weapons have historically been placed in a single category of weapon. These weapons have gone by several acronyms such as; Nuclear, Chemical Biological (NBC), Chemical Biological,

10 As with most aspects of science almost every rule has several exceptions. The information in this section is accurate but general in nature. Many exceptions to the general statements do exist, but do not alter the arguments presented in this chapter. 54

Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive (CBRNE), or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Seth Carus traces the development and significance of the term WMD and proposes that while the term can be confusing and often has different meanings, the term has been accepted and will continue to be used in policy and public debate. (Carus 2006) The use of these terms reflects a belief that somehow these weapons are all the same, while in actuality they are distinctly different.

Two representative statements from Congressional testimony demonstrate both the long history over this debate and the confusion which can be observed when disparate threats are combined within one term such as WMD. Senate reports dating back to 1969 call for “the separation of the C-B ‘twins.’” (Special Subcommittee on the National

Science Foundation 1969) Yet the confusion over terminology is still present today as testimony in 2010 relates, “Many leaders in this town … fail to understand the growing threat of bioterrorism. That was best demonstrated when the bipartisan leadership in

Congress created the WMD Commission. The words biology, biological and bioterrorism did not appear in the enabling language. It was if the U.S. Congress thought

WMD was an acronym for nuclear.” (Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and

Homeland Security 2010)

While the purpose of this paper is not to debate the merits of the term WMD, the term Weapons of Mass Destruction gives a clue into the perception of these weapons and may indicate a frame of reference that influences the organizations responsible for understanding and defending against these weapons. While nuclear weapons clearly cause physical destruction on a massive scale, biological agents and chemical weapons, 55 while lethal, do not cause massive physical destruction of the target area. Biological weapons are based upon living organism, while chemical weapons are based upon small molecule chemical poisons. Yet we consistently consider these weapons as one in the same which can be indicative of an organizational frame of reference which will ultimately influence how individuals view the solutions for each weapon.

Weapon Characteristics

To understand the debate, and the issues caused by such an association it is necessary to understand the nature, similarities and differences of chemical agents and biological agents. The following section will provide a basic description of biological agents and chemical agents relative to their characteristics, detection and threat. A key assumption for this paper, supported by this section, is that chemical agents and biological agents are distinctly different classes of weapons, and that they should not be considered in the same category when designing defenses.

BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

Biological weapons are based upon living11 microscopic organisms found in nature, which have the ability to infect and cause disease in a target population.12 There are two main categories of biological weapons, bacteria and viruses. Some organisms naturally infect humans, while other organisms only make effective weapons after

11 While one can debate if a virus is truly alive the debate is best reserved for a dissertation in virology. For the purposes of this paper they will be considered alive in that they can be inactivated from an infectious to a non-infectious state. 12 While generally thought of as anti-human weapons, biological weapons can be used against animals and plants as well. 56 specific steps are taken to weaponize the organism, exposing it to the target in a manner not naturally encountered in nature.

While every organism is different, there are characteristics shared by most biological agents. The objective of a biological attack is to cause an outbreak of a disease in a target population. Biological agents are capable of infecting the target through the respiratory system, digestive system, mucous membranes and broken skin.

Generally respiratory based attacks are the most effective, which require the agent to be delivered as an aerosol with particles 1-10 microns in size.13 While an aerosol attack is the most effective, it is also possible to conduct biological attacks through other methods, such as contamination of food or water supplies.

As there is a wide range in the severity of natural disease, there is a wide range of possible effects from a biological attack. Each biological agent is unique in how it interacts with its host, and every species has a limited number of hosts which are acceptable for growth. Of the agents that can infect humans, there are a wide range of possible effects. The causative agents for plague and anthrax often cause extensive damage, resulting in death of the host. Other agents may produce less damage resulting in relatively mild disease while others can produce severely incapacitating but non-lethal diseases.

Like any other disease, biological agents have an incubation period. This means there is a delay between a target’s exposure to the agent, and when the target begins to exhibit symptoms. This delay is can range from one or two days to over a week

13 Particles of 1-10 microns are the optimal size to be transported deep into the human lung. 57 depending upon the agent. In terms of military tactics, this delay makes biological weapons effective as strategic weapons, but they provide limited tactical advantage.

As each species of agent is unique in how it infects a host there is also a wide range in the number of infectious particles needed to cause an infection. For some agents the inhalation of 1-10 infectious particles will result in an infection, while other agents may require a dose of thousands to cause an infection. Infectious dose is also dependent upon the target organism. Research has shown differences in infectious dose as high as two orders of magnitude between different host organisms exposed to the same agent.

(Heine, et al. 2007)

Each biological agent also has a particular set of environmental conditions in which it can remain viable for an extended period of time. If a biological attack occurs under the appropriate environmental conditions, the agent may persist in the environment for a significant amount of time after the attack. However, if the target of an attack does not have the appropriate environmental conditions the agent will begin to die off, following a half life decay model. Therefore there is a wide range in possible persistency of a biological agent after an attack. Anthrax spores14 are probably the best known and most resilient biological agent, capable of surviving in certain environments for years or even decades. On the other hand agents such as Tularemia are extremely fragile, with a half life measured in minutes to hours.

14 A bacterial spore is in many ways a bacterial “seed” and as such is well suited to remain dormant in harsh environments for long periods of time waiting for appropriate conditions to “germinate” and begin active growth and reproduction. 58

Another type of persistency that is unique to biological agents is that some agents are contagious. This means that for these agents, infected individuals have the potential to cause secondary infections in individuals not initially exposed to the biological agent.

Un-treated, an attack utilizing a contagious agent could cause many rounds of infection and spread to a significant portion of the target population. Use of a contagious agent on the battlefield would impose significant logistical, operational and medical challenges which could not effectively be addressed from a chemical weapons frame.

As bacteria and viruses are ubiquitous in our environment, the human immune system has evolved capabilities to fight infections. The immune system provides everyone with some basic level of protection against biological warfare. Effective biological weapons are ones which are delivered in massive infectious dose, overwhelming the immune system, or weapons which utilize organisms able to counter or avoid the immune system of the host.

The immune system can be augmented by medical intervention, which is a legitimate component of a defensive program against biological warfare. Bacterial infections can often be treated with antibiotics, which can serve as an effective defense against a biological attack. However, in many cases antibiotic treatment must be administered within a relatively short amount of time post infection to be effective.15 A defensive strategy based upon antibiotic countermeasures would rely upon a biological

15 Generally drug treatments are much less effective after the onset of overt symptoms. Thus drug treatments need to work in tandem with a detection strategy to ensure treatment is stared in time to be effective. 59 detection capability, stockpiles of the drug, and the capability to rapidly distribute mass quantities of the treatment to the target population

It is also possible to pre-condition the immune system through vaccination. In this case the immune system is intentionally pre-exposed to the agent in a safe manner.

This allows the immune system to develop antibodies to the agent. Antibodies help the immune system “remember” the agent making the system faster and more effective at fighting off future challenges from the same organism.

While both drugs and vaccines can be strong components of a biological defense strategy they have weaknesses. Vaccines are often organism specific, and organisms can develop resistance to drugs. Additionally development of a medical countermeasure involves significant amounts of time, research and resources. It can take 5-10 years and tens-hundreds of millions of dollars to develop one new medical capability. Therefore, while it is possible to combat many biological agents with medical countermeasures, this strategy requires a significant amount of resources and several years of lead time if countermeasures are to be available in the event of an attack.

While most biological agents share similar characteristics there is a significant difference between bacteria and viruses. Bacterial are single cell organisms which possess all the “machinery” necessary for independent energy production and independent reproduction.16 As bacteria have this machinery, they are generally more

16 Rikettsia are a sub class of bacteria which live within the cells of a host. They are said to “straddle the line” between bacteria and viruses as they may be unable to live or reproduce without help from the host cell. 60 resilient in the environment making them more persistent and more difficult to decontaminate than viral agents.

Within the host, bacteria use resources found within the host to reproduce. While bacteria reproduction may cause some physical damage to the host, it is not the primary cause of injury to the host. Most physiological effects associated with a bacterial infection are the result of toxins or waste products produced by the bacterial and released into the host organism.

Viruses are the second major class of organisms which are most often considered likely agents for use as biological weapons. A virus is an infectious particle, much smaller and of simpler construction than a bacterium.17 Unlike bacteria a virus is not able to produce energy or reproduce on its own in the environment. The virus life cycle is dependent upon infecting a host cell. After entering the host cell the virus “hijacks” the host cell causing it cease its normal function and instead causes it produce more viral particles. As a result of the hijacking the host cell is often destroyed through viral reproduction, which is the main cause of disease symptoms produced by viruses.

Compared to bacterial agents, viruses have some significantly different characteristics. Generally viruses are more fragile than bacteria, so viral agents generally are less persistent than bacteria. While vaccines can be developed against viruses, antibiotics have no effect on a viral infection. There are some antiviral drugs available, but they number much less than the number of available antibiotics. Whereas some

17 A general virus construct consists of an outer capsule composed of one or more proteins which encloses a strand of genetic material. The virus particle contains no structures for energy production, metabolism, repair or growth as would be found in a bacterial or eukaryotic cell. 61 antibiotics are “broad spectrum”18 anti-viral drugs are generally effective against a specific viral agent.

In addition to bacterial and viral agents there are other types of biological weapons such as toxins. While a brief description of these types of weapons is included, this dissertation will only concern itself with bacterial and viral agents.

In the context of biological weapons the term “Toxins” is generally associated with toxic chemicals produced by living organisms through metabolic processes. This is different than a chemical weapon which is the product of a series of chemical reactions conducted in an industrial setting. Toxins can be produced by organisms such as bacteria, fungi, plankton, or reptiles. They can be harvested, such as the case of venoms, or produced through industrial bacterial fermentation (bacterial toxins).

Once removed from their biological origin, toxins are more similar to chemical weapons than biological weapons. As molecules, toxins do not live or reproduce within the host. The effects associated with toxins are caused when the toxin impacts a biological function of the host organism. Unlike bacteria or viruses some toxins may be absorbed through the skin, similar to some chemical agents discussed below.

For these reasons there has been debate as to how to categorize biological toxins, as biological weapons or as chemical weapons? As this debate adds little to my basic arguments, and will only serve to confuse the issue I do not include toxins as either chemical agents or biological agents in this dissertation. References in this dissertation to

18 A broad spectrum antibiotic is capable of treating infections caused by many different bacterial agents. 62 biological agents imply a bacterial or viral agent, while references to chemical agents imply a nerve, blister or blood agent (discussed below).

Finally there are other types of biological agents I will address only in passing. In theory any living organism which can cause harm to the enemy could be a biological agent. The U.S. conducted extensive research into the ability to use fungi to infect Soviet wheat crops. A fungal attack is similar to a bacterial/viral attack against a human target in that if the fungal spore finds an appropriate host it will begin to grow at the expense of the host plant, causing damage and possible death to the plant.

Examples of more exotic biological attack scenarios could include the introduction of an invasive insect species to destroy crops, bombarding the enemy with poisonous animals, or using dead animals to contaminate the enemy’s water supply. As with biological toxins, I do not include these types of attacks in this analysis, and focus on the most common bacterial and viral anti-human weapons.

CHEMICAL AGENTS

Whereas biological agents are living entities, chemical agents are as their name implies chemical compounds, manufactured through industrial chemical reactions. They are not found in nature and are designed to have specific physiological effects on a target organism. As chemicals these agents can exist as all three phases of matter.

Chemical weapons can act through the skin, mucous membranes, or through the oral/respiratory route. While some agents are employed as vapors to attack the lungs, they can also be employed as liquids where they can represent a contact hazard, or slowly

63 off-gas to create a vapor hazard. Because of the multiple routes of entry, effective chemical protection requires respiratory and barrier protection.

Chemical weapons begin to show effects relatively quickly after exposure. The fast acting nerve and blood agents cause effects within minutes, while some slower acting blister agents may take a few hours to one day to show effects. Many chemical weapons are also dose dependent. They exhibit a range of sub-lethal to lethal effects depending upon total dose and time of exposure.

Chemical agents can be classified as persistent or non-persistent, a characteristic which describes their ability remain a hazard in the area where they are employed. Non- persistent agents are delivered as gasses, or as liquids which quickly evaporate into gas, which quickly dissipate through the prevailing weather conditions. Of the chemical agents there are nerve, blood, choking and tear agents which are categorized as non- persistent.

Persistent agents are often thick or oily liquids which remain on surfaces where they are capable of causing casualties for hours to days after employment. They present a contact hazard to exposed personnel operating a contaminated area. Persistent agents will slowly evaporate over time, creating a potential respiratory danger as well for some time after their use.19 The most common persistent agents fall within the nerve and blister agent categories.

19 The period of residual hazard from a chemical agent is a complex problem dependent upon conditions such temperature, humidity, substrate, wind, precipitation etc. There are extensive data tables available which attempt to predict the length of the residual threat, the details of which are beyond the scope of this paper. There is also disagreement between services as to which set of data to accept when determining residual chemical hazard. 64

The use of persistent versus non-persistent agent is dependent upon the military mission. Non-persistent agents quickly cause casualties then dissipate, allowing attacking forces to move into the area without needing extensive protective equipment.

Likewise, forces which survive an attack with a non-persistent agent (through the use of protective equipment) can return to normal operations within a relatively short period of time.

Areas exposed to persistent agents, on the other hand, remain hazardous for many hours to a several days. Personnel operating in a persistent chemical environment must remain in protective equipment for extended periods of time. The continued toxic hazard, combined with the physical effects of the protective equipment greatly reduces the effectiveness of personnel in such an environment. Persistent agents would be used in situations such as contamination of terrain to slow movement of enemy troops, or contamination of sea ports or airfields to slow operations.

Traditionally chemical weapons have been categorized based upon their method of action. Categories include nerve, blister, choking, vomiting, blood, tear and incapacitating. Of these categories nerve and blister agents are of the most concern to modern military forces, as blood, choking and vomit agents are generally regarded as obsolete and tear agents are mainly used in riot control. (D'Agostino and Chenier 2006)

There are several nerve agents with VX, Sarin (GB), Soman (GD), and Taubun

(GA) being the most common nerve agents. As their name implies, nerve agents act by interfering with nerve function causing seizures, paralysis and death. Nerve agents can be employed as liquids or gasses. They exhibit a wide range of persistency with VX 65 being a true persistent agent, while Sarin is non-persistent. The other agents exist between the two extremes and are regarded as semi-persistent. The persistent agents can penetrate and harm many surfaces. Full barrier and respiratory protection is required to ensure adequate protection against nerve agents.20

Nerve agents are absorbed through the lungs, mucous membranes or the skin.

Their effects are dose dependant, but a lethal dose can cause symptoms in less than a minute and death can occur within five minutes of the onset of symptoms. There is a short window of opportunity post-exposure where an antidote, atropine, can be administered. While there is generally no medical “vaccination” capability for chemical weapons, it is possible to provide some advanced protection against nerve agents by administering Pyridostigmine pre-exposure.21

The chemical agent “Mustard” is the most common blister agent, and has a long history of use in warfare. Blister agents act upon the skin, mucous membranes and the lungs. The purpose of these agents is to cause chemical burns on exposed skin or tissue.

These effects usually appear several hours post exposure, with the blisters lasting for several days. There is no effective drug treatment pre or post exposure.

While blister agents are generally associated with the skin, they cause damage to any tissue they contact. Inhalation and of a blister agent into the lungs can cause pneumonia and can be fatal. Exposure of a blister agent to the eye can result in

20 Respiratory protection only may be adequate in a purely vapor hazard environment, but would leave an individual susceptible to contact with any liquid agent, such as larger droplet precipitation or residual ground contamination 21 Pre-treatment does not offer absolute protection, but works to in conjunction with antidotes administered post exposure to improve overall survival rates. 66 blindness. These agents are generally deployed as liquids, and are persistent in the environment.22 Mustard agent can penetrate many surfaces, and causes damage to many militarily significant materials. Protection against blister agents is accomplished through filtration and barrier materials.

Blood agents are designed to inhibit the body’s ability to transport oxygen. They are primarily absorbed through the lungs or mucous membranes. Effects of these agents are evident within minutes of exposure. Drugs are available for post exposure and the body is able to rapidly clear these toxins from the body. Army guidance is that anyone conscious and breathing five minutes after exposure will most likely recover spontaneously. (USACHPPM 2002) Respiratory protection is of most concern for blood agents.

Similarities and Differences

A key assumption for this dissertation is that there are significant differences between chemical agents and biological agents. Just as one would not consult a microbiologist for an industrial chemical accident, nor consult a chemical engineer to decontaminate an operating room, why would the DoD attempt to develop single solutions to deal with both problems? Below I highlight some of the most significant differences in the weapons classes as well as the implications these differences have on military actions.

22 Pure mustard agent is a solid below 14oC and may be mixed with other agents if it is used at lower temperatures 67

PHYSICAL NATURE

There is a significant physical difference between chemical agents and biological agents. Chemical agents are relatively small chemical molecules composed of a known ratio of elements with a specific bonding pattern. As molecules they can exist as any state of matter, liquid, solid or gas and behave as such. For example they can seep into cracks, penetrate into other materials, dissolve materials, and move through extremely small openings.

The chemical agent’s elemental composition, as well as the physical arrangement of the molecule and bond structures determines the agent’s characteristics such as lethality, vapor pressure, and persistence. The chemical composition and shape of the agent allows it to interfere with a physiological process, resulting in damage to the target organism. It is also this specific combination of elements and bonds which are generally targeted by decontaminants or detectors.

Compared to chemical agents, biological agents are large, complex assemblies of multiple large molecules which interact to perform the functions associated with a living organism. The (relative) large size of biological agents means they behave as particulates, significantly different than the behavior of gaseous or liquid chemical agents. Biological agents are subject to physical behaviors such as settling and filtration.

They can settle in small openings, but lack the ability of chemical agents to dissolve surfaces, or diffuse within other substances.

The relative infectivity and lethality of a biological agent is a function of the agent’s ability find a suitable environment within a host. The damage caused by a 68 biological agent is a result of the physical growth of the agent within the target organism.

Whereas chemical weapons demonstrate a dose dependant reaction biological agents are more binary in their effects (you are either sick or well). The behavior of a biological agent is controlled by its DNA. DNA is a molecule common to all bacterial and viral agents and serves as a signature targeted by some detection methods.

Operationally there are two significant differences in chemical agents and biological agents; time to act and potency. The incubation time associated with biological weapons has already been discussed. Compared to the rapid action of chemical weapons biological weapons would offer minimal utility as a tactical battlefield weapon, as any military action would most likely be concluded before the effects became apparent. It is also worth noting the relative potency of biological weapons compared to chemical weapons. The low infective doses of biological agents, combined with the small size of the agent means pound for pound biological weapons can cover vastly larger areas of territory than a similar volume of a chemical agent.

PROTECTION

The physical nature of the two agent classes generates different challenges when designing defensive capabilities. Physical protection is one area which has vastly different requirements depending upon the nature of the threat agent. Chemical agents present unique challenges such as dissolving other substances, penetrating through substances and their extremely small size. Effective barrier protection can be obtained by using materials impermeable to the agents, or constantly replacing semi-permeable

69 barrier material prior to breakthrough by the agent. Chemical agents can be filtered by exposing them to other chemicals which bind or sequester the agent. Many agents can penetrate human skin, so total body protection is required.

As already discussed biological agents are particulates. They generally cannot penetrate intact human skin, nor can they penetrate most barrier materials. The most significant threat will be in the form of an aerosol in the 1-10 micron range. Alternative attacks such as contaminated food or water are possible, but would be more limited in their effects. Regardless of the challenge, the filtration of biological agents is possible through physical entrapment of the infectious particle.

Protection therefore represents two distinct physical challenges. Significant protection against a biological agent can be obtained through respiratory and mucous membrane protection. Additional physical barriers can augment protection by protecting non-intact skin, and can serve to prevent spread of contamination. Protection against chemical agents requires respiratory protection, as well as significant barrier protection for the skin, which usually imposes a significant thermal burden as well. Therefore designing a system to protect against both threats results in unnecessary protection and imposes additional costs relative to a biological attack.

DETECTION

Most strategies employed for detecting chemical agents focus on identifying the chemical properties of the agents, such as elemental composition, bond type and

70 arrangement, or rely upon chemical reactions with other substrates.23 Utilizing chemical reactions which produce a visible color change in the presence of a chemical agent is one of the simplest detection techniques and is utilized in chemical detection paper issued to soldiers facing a chemical threat.

There are many automated chemical sensors, which have been developed and employed. These detectors utilize various technologies but generally rely upon spectroscopy or chromatography to identify signatures unique to a particular agent. Each chemical agent has a unique combination of mass, elements and bonds which can be characterized and recorded as its unique signature. Detection systems then look for the presence of the same chemical signature in the field and sound an alarm as to the presence of the chemical agent.

These detection techniques are rapid and sensitive, allowing currently fielded sensors to detect militarily significant levels of agent within seconds of exposure. While the background environment is generally “clean” there are chemicals in the environment which can cause false alarms from these detectors. More detailed identification or detection of lower levels of contamination generally requires more sophisticated capabilities and longer time periods.

The requirement to discriminate a biological agent of hostile origin, from the vast background noise found in nature presents a significant challenge to biological detection.

The environmental background is vastly different for biological agents relative to

23 It is possible to construct chemical detectors based upon biological principles, such as monitoring cellular activity for specific reactions associated with chemical agent exposure. 71 chemical agents. While a molecule of a chemical agent would be relatively unique in nature, the natural environment is full of countless numbers and species of bacteria and viruses.24 This vast background noise imposes significant challenges in detection of biological agents. The natural existence of infectious organisms in nature also raises the issue that the detection of a biological agent may not necessarily indicate a hostile attack.

The biological background also presents the problem of “near neighbors” when attempting to develop detection strategies. Near neighbors are organisms native to an environment which may differ from a biological agent by only a few genes. Yet, while they may appear almost identical to a virulent biological agent they do not cause disease.

Because of their similarities, many biological detectors may interpret the presence of a near neighbor as a biological attack sounding a false alarm.

Compounding that problem is the extremely low infectious doses of some agents.

In extreme cases providing effective protection requires a detector capable of identifying as few as ten infectious particles within the environmental background. While there are several technologies capable of meeting these parameters, they do not work rapidly or in field environments. It is the need to quickly sift through all the biological material in nature, and reliably identify only agents of interest which adds significant challenges to biological detection.

In theory the same chemical analysis detection techniques used to identify chemical agents could be used to detect/identify biological agents as all living things are ultimate a collection of chemicals. The challenge to this approach is identifying a

24 By some estimates scientists have only characterized 5% of the bacteria present in the environment. 72 chemical unique to the particular bacteria or virus agent, not present in any other naturally occurring bacteria or virus.

The best use of this type of approach to date has been to produce basic biological identification devices which interrogate an air sample for “living” bacterial organisms, vs. “dead” particulates such as pollen or environmental dust. The best these systems can do is to identify a rapid increase in the number of bacteria present in the air, which may or may not be indicative of a biological attack. Currently they have no capability to identify the organism associated with the increasing numbers.

The most successful biological identification systems employed to date have relied upon DNA analysis or antibody binding detection strategies. Antibodies are molecules produce by animal immune systems in response to an infection. They are molecules which recognize and bind to a specific component of an invading organism.

Antibodies can be harvested and used to capture specific agents from an environmental sample as they would within the blood of an animal.

Once an agent is sequestered by the antibodies, secondary techniques are used to detect the presence of the captured agent. Antibody based detectors are relatively fast (5-

15 min) but are prone to cross reactions with environmental contaminants generating a significant number of false alarms. They also require a relatively large amount of target agent, often requiring air samples to be concentrated prior to testing which can add 15-60 minutes to the testing time.

DNA is the molecule which contains the source code for the growth and function of all living things. As such it is truly unique to each living species on earth. DNA 73 analysis provides the most detailed identification of a biological agent. However, analysis takes hours to days, depending upon the desired level of detail. While

Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) identification provides an extremely reliable identification capability, it does not provide results in time to offer any protection from infection. 25

With both chemical agents and biological agents personnel (and other living organisms) exposed to the agents represent the final detector, although with different response times. In the event of a chemical attack the effects are almost instantaneous, so even lacking detection equipment adjacent personnel will be aware a chemical attack is underway. However, in a biological attack the effects are not evident for days, providing no indication to adjacent personnel. And even when the evidence of a biological attack appears, the first indication may be individuals presenting themselves with nondescript

“flu like” symptoms. Therefore, the medical community’s ability to ascertain an unusual disease pattern is an important component of the detection process.

DECONTAMINATION

In a post attack environment there may be a need to decontaminate items either by neutralizing the contaminating agent or diluting the agent to a level where it no longer presents a health hazard. Historically the U.S. has pursued a strategy of developing fast acting, universal decontamination agents, capable of neutralizing all chemical and

25 The PCR technology allows target DNA to be copied in an exponential manner. In theory one strand of DNA can yield a million copies for analysis. This process takes 30-60 min, not including preparation time. The replication process is combined with DNA sequence analysis, allowing strain specific identification of biological agents. 74 biological threats. To date this program has had minimum success,26 and continues to present a significant technical challenge. Decontamination also presents a significant logistical challenge, as decontamination equipment and substrates must be transportable, require as little power as possible and be able to operate over a wide temperature range.

Active decontamination of a chemical agent requires the molecular structure of the agent be altered so it is no longer toxic to personnel. Most decontaminants contain a reactive molecule (such as chlorine or peroxide) which attacks molecular bonds, inactivating the agent. The stronger the bonds of the chemical agent, the more reactive the needed decontaminant. The difficulty with reactive molecules is that they may also react with the equipment being decontaminated making it unsafe or unusable.

The ability of chemical agents to penetrate substrates presents a significant challenge to chemical decontamination. Chemical agents can penetrate many surfaces encountered on a military base such as concrete, paint and canvas. The ability of chemical agents to penetrate and remain sequester in painted surfaces presents a significant decontamination challenge as all military equipment from vehicles to aircraft is painted.27

There are alternatives to reactive based decontamination. Lowering the level of the toxic agent below a point where it affects personnel can be achieved through diffusion or dilution. Weathering of equipment can allow for diffusion, while also allowing a low

26 The need to preserve the equipment being decontaminated places a significant constraint on the decontaminant. There are many extremely reactive chemicals or harsh physical processes (fire) which would serve as universal decontaminants but they would also destroy the equipment being decontaminated. 27 The military actually uses CARC, a Chemical Agent Resistant Coating as paint for many types of equipment. However, after several months of use the paint loses its resistant capability. Chemical agents are typically able to penetrate CARC within 30-60 min of deposition. 75 level of environmental chemical inactivation (hydrolysis) to take place. It is also possible to alter molecular structures through physical processes such as ultraviolet light, heat or radiation. Another alternative is to sequester the agent (absorbent paint for example) then seal it in place or physically strip the contaminated absorbent material from the surface of the equipment. While these approaches work under certain conditions the challenge is to employ the technology in a realistic field environment without damaging equipment.

Decontamination of a biological agent requires, at the most basic level, altering the agent so it is no longer able to reproduce within the host, therefore unable to cause disease. As biological agents are living organisms they will eventually die without a suitable environment for growth and reproduction28 giving each biological agent a measurable half life relative to the type of environment where it is employed. Therefore weathering of biological agents has significant potential in reducing the hazard below an infectious level. As a general rule it is possible to state that biological agents are much more fragile and easy to decontaminate when compared to chemical weapons.

There are several additional options available to alleviate a biological threat. As biological functions are based upon the actions of proteins and DNA any mechanism which can damage these molecules can render an agent safe. Such methods can include heat, desiccation, denaturing, reactive molecules, radiation, or sequestration/coating of receptor molecules. Several common household cleaners would be effective at decontaminating many biological agents of concern.

28 As already mentioned biological agents show an extreme range in their ability to survive in the environment, with Anthrax spores remaining viable for years in the environment. In such extreme cases weathering would not be an acceptable method of alleviating the hazard. 76

As with protection the U.S. has pursued a decontamination program based upon a combined biological/chemical view of the threat. Many potential decontaminants can eliminate the hazard from chemical agents or biological agents. The challenge is to find decontaminates which can decontaminate all agents, yet meet the additional requirements imposed by material effects, safety and logistics.

The doctrine of addressing all of these issues with one decontaminant places almost insurmountable requirements on the program. A former colleague perfectly summarized the decontamination “problem” by observing that a car detailing company may use dozens of different products to clean the different materials found on a car, yet the military insists upon a universal decontaminate capable of addressing all threats and all materials. (Mueller 2007) As a result the U.S. has voluntarily made the decontamination problem exceedingly difficult. A decontaminate may be ideal for 80-

90% of the threats, yet is rejected because it cannot address one or two particular agents.

As observed with protection, developing decontaminates to address the remaining 10-

20% of the problem results in over engineering for most other agents. It is possible to identify many existing agent specific decontamination products (in particular for biological agents as would be found in a hospital) which could be employed today if the

U.S. chose to adopt a system based upon multiple decontaminates which could be tailored and deployed based upon the expected threat.

The differences listed above represent some of the most significant and obvious differences in responses to chemical agents or biological agents. However ignoring the physical differences between the two agents impacts all aspects of battlefield operations. 77

Additional areas where preparation against one agent would result in less than optimal solutions for another agent include response measures, operational effects planning, maneuver, training, casualty assumptions, and logistics.

Any time two disparate problems are addressed with one solution there is a compromise. As the military attempts to protect against both chemical agents and biological agents the combined approach necessitates defensive measures that are over- engineered for all but the most challenging threat. The combined approach also imposes excessively difficult technical requirements which ultimately doom many programs to failure. While a combined defense does offer some advantages (logistics, training, communications) it is also associated with a cost that may not always be considered when developing a defensive program.

Current Defensive Systems

Each of the three theories of interest for this dissertation predicts a different relationship between chemical agents and biological agents. Part of this relationship is dependent upon the physical aspects discussed in the previous section. However, to fully understand the nature of the defensive posture it is important to have a basic understanding of current defensive capabilities.

Reviewing reports from the Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) supports the contention that the U.S. has a greater capability to defend itself against chemical agents than biological agents. The 2008 modernization plan rates current capabilities in both areas. Chemical capabilities are rated yellow, compared to biological 78 capabilities which are yellow/red.29 The report also projects that chemical defenses will reach a green status prior to biological defenses. (Joint Requirements Office 2008) As it is not feasible to review every piece of defensive hardware current detection capabilities will serve as a proxy for the current state of defensive capabilities.

CURRENT BIOLOGICAL DETECTION CAPABILITIES

The 2009 CBDP program report to Congress lists only two deployed automated biological sensors, Portal Shield (314 fielded) and the Joint Biological Point Detection

System (JBPDS) (517 fielded), both of which utilize antibody based detection systems.

(Chemical and Biological Defense Program 2009) The Joint Biological Agent

Identification and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS) is a third system employed by the military and can function as an identification system. The JBAIDS system itself is a PCR detection system, and does not include sample collection. Therefore the JBAIDS relies upon collectors such as dry filter units, or other manually collected samples such as environmental swabs. (Joint Project Management Office; Medical Identification and

Treatment 2006) Currently the JBAIDS system is regarded as a medical asset rather than a biodefense asset. (Joint Program Executive Office for Chemcial and Biological

Defense n.d.) As the JBAID relies upon PCR technology it is much more accurate and sensitive than the Portal Shield or JBPDS devices, but is slower (1-2 hours to analyze a sample) and cannot provide an alarm in time to prevent exposure.

29 Rankings are presented as colors on a stoplight chart. Green=good, red=bad. Both programs are predicted to be green by 2019 79

Currently, there are two programs in development by the DoD that are attempting to address the current weaknesses in our current biological detection capabilities. The

Joint Biological Tactical Detection System (JBTDS) will be a “lightweight biological agent system that will detect, warn, and provide presumptive identification and samples for follow-on confirmatory analysis… The JBTDS will be one-man-portable and capable of being battery operated. The JBTDS will be employed organically.” (Scarbrough and

Reed 2010) The proposed fully fielded system will consist of 7,500 detector/samplers combined with 2,000 identifiers. (Defense 2009) As of 2011 specific detection technology has been identified, and the status of this system is in “Technology

Development” with an anticipated fielding date of 2018. (JPEO-CBD 2011)

The second system under development is a standoff detection system. Real time standoff detection continues to be a technological challenge. The history shows a continued desire to produce such a device starting in the 1950’s. To date such programs have been unsuccessful. Congressional testimony from 2008 captures predictions of the impending fielding of a standoff biological detector. (Senate Committe on Armed

Services 2008) However, technological challenges resulted in that particular device being relegated to service as a test bed device. (Joint Program Executive Office for

Chemcial and Biological Defense n.d.) As of 2009 plans for the newest standoff detection device called for technical development starting in late 2010 with production starting no earlier than 2015.30 In these plans the developers state several significant

30 As of Jan 2012 the status of this system was listed as technology development, and the anticipated fielding date has slipped to 2020. (JPEO-CBD 2012) 80 technical challenges with standoff detection, including; detection and discrimination at a distance, false alarm rate, day/night capability, performance projection to live agents, and the ability to integrate the system into existing detection platforms. (Joint Project Manger,

Biological Defense 2009)

The DoD is not the only department developing detection capabilities. The

Automated Pathogen Detection System is a PCR system with automated collection and detection capabilities integrated in to the same device. It has been evaluated by the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a possible replacement for current BioWatch sensors. (Department of Homeland Security 2009) This system addresses some of the issues with previous systems, utilizing dual collection (impinge/dry filter), and dual detection (multiplexed immunoassay/PCR) allowing up to 100 tests per sample.

(Hindson, et al. 2005) The use of dual technologies helps reduce the incidence of false detections and the multiplex addresses issues of throughput. The integration of collection and detection also reduces the need for separate analysis of filters, as is currently required by the BioWatch system. Co-location of the collection and detection hardware also reduces the time and cost of transporting samples for independent analysis, increasing the usefulness of the system. However, Emanuel identifies several limitations of such systems, such as; detection is optimized for specific matrices, there is a tradeoff of sensitivity/selectivity in favor of speed, and the increasing number of samples may overwhelm the sites. (Emanuel, et al. 2005)

While the U.S. Government’s desire to produce real time biological detection has yet to produce an effective detection capability, there are numerous alternative detection 81 strategies proposed in the literature, which are not currently funded by the DoD. Several authors have proposed systems composed of dispersed constellations of smaller sensors rather than large stationary devices situation at or near the target, as has been the approach utilized in the preponderance of historical strategies.

Fielding an array of small networked sensor would allow greater coverage of the target (Senate Committe on Armed Services 2008) as well as providing information on the movement and scale of the attack cloud. (Ivnitski, et al. 2003) Such a system may be composed of a hybrid network where alarm type sensors will detect deviations from the baseline and can function to alert identification systems which would have greater ability to characterize the anomaly and identify biological threats. (Ivnitski et. al. 2003) The

Defense Science Board also examined the detection problem and recommended affordable, widely dispersed sensors, a large signature database, and improved communication. A Congressional Research Service analysis of biological detection capabilities also advocates the use of layered sensor capabilities based upon multiple small cheap sensors deployed in a wide ranging network. (Shea and Lister 2003)

CHEMICAL DETECTION CAPABILITIES

While not perfect, current chemical detection capabilities are much more robust that current biological detection capabilities. While the 2009 CBDP report shows the

DoD had two fielded biological detection systems, the same report lists twelve deployable chemical detection systems.31 (Chemical and Biological Defense Program

31 A complete listing is found in the Appendix 82

2009) The reports show that the DoD has an extensive inventory of chemical point sensors. These sensors are designed to be deployed on the front lines and alert forces to hazardous levels of chemical agent within seconds. There are also more sophisticated detectors that can detect lower levels of chemical agents, although these detectors take longer to alarm. These detectors are generally employed for conformation, de-masking or forensics. What is missing is a standoff chemical agent detector. The Joint Standoff

Lightweight Chemical Agent Detector is under development and has had issues meeting performance parameters. In spite of these issues it still received an endorsement from the

Army to proceed with development and acquisition. (Chemical and Biological Defenese

Program 2008)

Perhaps the best indication as to the health of chemical detection capability is the lack of Congressional concern. As already noted searches of GAO reports regarding biological agent detection produce multiple results, while similar searches for chemical weapons produced far fewer results. In fact the only significant recent finding in the

GAO reports relative chemical agent detection faults the DoD for not having a strategy to deal with low level (sub clinical) chemical weapons exposure. (United States General

Accounting Office 1998)

This finding is of particular note as serves as a preview as to the issues associated with a how chemical and biological weapons are viewed. In some aspect low level chemical agent exposure is more like biological weapons exposure (slow acting, no immediate impact on force strength, possible low level chronic physical problems) than

83 an incapacitating chemical weapons exposure. Therefore it is not surprising that the same issues plaguing biological detection are noted for this aspect of chemical detection.

Conclusions – Chapter Three

This chapter provides a basic background on chemical agents and biological agents. In addition to providing a basic physical description of the agent this section also provides a general overview of how these differences relate to military functions such as detection and decontamination. Finally a brief description of available detection equipment is provided.

From the evidence provided it should be apparent that biological agents and chemical agents represent distinctly different weapons. The argument taken forward is that the combined chemical/biological view prevalent in the biological defense program is not a logical solution, given the distinct physical differences between the two classes of threat agent. It is argued that the physical differences are so distinct that separate defensive programs would be warranted.

However the U.S. has more often than not pursued a strategy based upon a joint threat. While there may be financial and logistical advantages with combined hardware, there is also a significant cost in efficiency or effectiveness. Attempting to address both agents with one solution complicates the problem, over-engineers solutions and excludes legitimate 80% solutions that fail to address one particular threat agent.

The next four chapters of this dissertation will examine the historical evidence in an attempt to understand this relationship between chemical weapons and biological weapons and its impact on the country’s defensive posture.

Ch 4. 1939-1946, The World War Two Period

The solitary aircraft made three passes over the city, dropping a mixture of wheat and rice balls…A week later, the first victim, an eleven-year-old girl died of plague. By December many Chang Teh residents were dead of plague. Overall, as a conservative estimate between 400 and 500 persons in Hunan Province perished from Ota’s field tests. (Harris 2002)

The first period of analysis starts prior to serious U.S. interest in biological weapons and ends with the conclusion of World War Two, by which time the U.S had established a permanent offensive and defensive biological weapons program. In order to set the stage, and establish the case for a chemical frame, the analysis briefly reviews the use of chemical weapons in the First World War and the creation of the Army service component dedicated to chemical warfare. The actual analysis of the biological program starts just prior to the U.S. becoming involved in the Second World War.

Historical Setting

While the U.S. had minimal interest in biological agents prior to World War Two, it is important to address the role of chemical agents and the military starting with the

First World War. As there was no formal biological program for this time period it is not possible to conduct an analysis. However, looking at the history of the CWS it is

86 possible to observe some of the imperialistic and bureaucratic behaviors that will be formally investigated staring in 1939.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

World War One saw the first wide spread use of chemical agents as weapons of war. Following the first wide spread use of chlorine by the Germans at Ypres, all sides began to develop offensive and defensive chemical capabilities. By the end of the war chemical warfare had taken on a significant role in the conflict and the U.S. had created a dedicated organization, the CWS to handle offensive and defensive chemical operations.

To investigate the chemical weapon / biological weapon relationship it is important to examine how the CWS viewed itself, how it viewed chemical weapons, and how it behaved as an organization in the inter-war period. The Army published an extensively detailed history of the CWS in the interwar period.32 (Brophy and Fisher

2004) Pulling from this history it is possible to identify several important organizational decision points which influenced culture of the CWS.

The original anti-gas mission was given to the Bureau of Mines in 1917 based upon their experience with mine gas accidents. Later in 1917 the mission was transferred to the newly established Gas Service, which was part of the American Expeditionary

Force. In 1918 the Gas Service was re-designated the Chemical Warfare Service.

The two original tasks give the Gas Service were to obtain personnel and obtain a protective mask. As the Service grew it took on two distinct missions in the war. Some

32 Unless otherwise cited Brophy and Fisher serves as the source for this historical summary 87 members saw combat in Europe employing chemical weapons, while others remained in the U.S. focusing on offensive and defensive research. This dual personality of the CWS created tension within the organization and continued to fester as the organization would define itself and matured as a service.

After the end of the war the CWS fought many of the organizational and bureaucratic challenges relative to chemical weapons that would be repeated with biological weapons after World War Two. Originally slated to be disbanded six months after the end of hostilities, the CWS needed to convince military leadership and the U.S. government that it was still relevant and should be retained as a permanent organization.

This fight put the CWS in a re-trenching posture. To survive the organization highlighted the importance of the unique chemical missions which would be best performed if retained by the CWS. These missions included maintaining chemical warfare specialists, research and experimentation, and training of the army. While the

CWS was fighting to remain an organization it was also cementing its organizational identity.

In 1920 Congress made the CWS a permanent organization, and added smoke and flame weapons to their mission. When the CWS had to fight through military cuts in the1920’s it exhibited imperialistic behavior as it emphasized additional capabilities such as exterminating boll weevils, while at the same time asserting itself as the prime research organization (over the Navy) for chemical issues. An Army historical review captures the bureaucratic fight waged by the CWS as it fought to remain relevant.

“Official publications about gas warfare formed another category. In the years immediately following WWI, the government agencies dealing with CW, being ‘Johnny-come-latelies,’ had to fight hard for continued support during the peacetime drives to cut back military establishments. These pressures led to public and intergovernmental publications in which sometimes extravagant claims for the munitions were made, apparently to publicize agencies or possibly influence appropriations.” (Operations Research Office, Tactics Division 1959)

The CWS also faced challenges from within the Army. Over this period the service fought with the Ordinance Corps over missions such as design, fill, and delivery of chemical munitions as well as the responsibility for incendiary munitions. The service also faced doctrinal challenges to its existence/mission as the Army debated the merits of a centralized chemical organization, a doctrine based upon chemical experts dispersed among combat units, or possibly moving the CWS within the Corps of Engineers.

(Operations Research Office, Tactics Division 1959)

While the CWS was often fighting the Army to remain relevant, the Army did embrace the CWS and its ability to address the chemical threat when it played into its advantage. In 1924 the War Department General Staff highlights the chemical threat, arguing, “Our peacetime preparations in chemical warfare will be based on opposing effectively any enemy employing chemical weapons.” Chemical weapons were also viewed as a source of power and retaliatory capability, much as nuclear weapons are today. Also stated by the General Staff, “In a broader sense, an implicit function of the

CWS was to provide military support for a national policy that of dissuading others from resorting to the gas weapon” (Operations Research Office, Tactics Division 1959)

Similar arguments are reflected in the run-up to World War Two where the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service makes several statements regarding the weakness of the

U.S. chemical capabilities and the subsequent effect on national defense. In a memo to the Army Chief of Staff he laments as to the lack of resources and attention given to the

CWS stating “We have no approved program embracing plans covering essential chemical items required by national defense to meet wartime needs.” (Brigham 1936)

Upon his retirement the next year Brigham again cautions that U.S. chemical capabilities are “…seriously weak in this feature of national defense” whereupon he makes several recommendations to improve manufacturing capabilities and recommends increases in defensive equipment. (Brigham 1937)

Ultimately the CWS became primarily as much as a research organization as a combat organization. However, this was not achieved without substantial internal debate.

In response to a 1920 organizational plan which would define the duties of the CWS,

“That now troops of the Chemical Warfare Service should be assigned within the Army as combat organizations, but that this service should carry on research and development.

This is a supply service…” to which the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service submitted “the most vigorous possible protest against this devitalizing of the Chemical

Warfare Service.” (Fries 1920)

This debate is also captured in an article describing the history of the Chemical

Corps insignia, which is composed of a benzene ring and a set of laboratory instruments known as retorts.

“But the crossed retorts and benzene ring were not popular with all who wore it. The scientific symbolism was lost to some of the CWS Soldiers serving overseas on the battlefields of Belgium and France, especially those whose primary role was to drop gas munitions on enemy positions. The Chief of the Overseas Gas Service Section, Lieutenant Colonel Amos Fries, voiced their dissent: "We in the field," he wrote, "emphasized the fighting value of chemical warfare.... “However, in the United States, a large proportion of the officials in control were research and development, production, and chemical engineers. They looked upon the CWS as predominantly chemical and developed the insignia from that point of view.” (Lindberg 2006)

It is possible to observe a parallel pattern with the CWS and chemical weapons as

Eden observed with blast damage vs. thermal damage. Eden asserts that a critical component of her Organizational Frames model was the U.S.’ focus on understanding the effects of blast damage caused by aerial bombs during World War Two. She then argues this focus on blast damage subsequently influenced nuclear damage assessment. In a similar manner the culture and biases which developed with the CWS over the inter-war period were to have a direct impact on how the U.S. would view biological weapons

For approximately 20 years the chemical services focused on understanding the offensive and defensive aspects of chemical weapons. By the beginning of World War

Two the CWS viewed itself as a research focused organization. It had produced chemical respiratory protection, protective clothing, and detection capabilities. The military had incorporated chemical weapons in its doctrine and expected their use in the next conflict.

Accordingly chemical doctrine was well established, creating a frame of reference for non-kinetic, invisible, gas-like weapons. It was this organization and culture which was

91 then handed responsibility for the new class of non-kinetic biological weapons as the U.S entered World War Two.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The analysis proper for this dissertation starts immediately prior to World War

Two. This time period saw a fundamental change in the way the U.S. Government and military viewed biological weapons. The U.S. entered this period aware but relatively unconcerned with biological weapons but finished the war having established a dedicated offensive and defensive weapons program. Over these few years the country created civilian and military organizations responsible for the new biological weapons program and constructed dedicate biological weapons research laboratories, production facilities and open air test ranges. This period of time has significant importance in that decisions, attitudes and organizations in place at the beginning of the program can have long term impacts on the subsequent behavior of the program.

While the U.S. was greatly concerned with chemical weapons prior to World War

Two it showed no similar interest in biological weapons. Prior to World War Two the

U.S. was aware of the concept of biological warfare, but showed no great interest in the weapons. While there had been discussion and even international treaties that addressed biological agents in this time period, the United States had not created a government entity whose prime focus was biological warfare. The national sentiment is best captured in a sentinel 1939 article written by Army Major Fox (Medical Corps) regarding the use of bacteria as weapons of war. In this article his conclusion was that “insurmountable

92 technical difficulties prevent the use of biological agents as effective weapons of warfare.” (Fox 1942)

However, contrary to the U.S.’ position other countries were serious about biological warfare. The Japanese had had been conducting offensive biological weapons research as early as 1932 (Harris 2002) and the British had been concerned with biological warfare starting in the mid 1930’s. (Balmer 2001) At this point while the U.S did not have a dedicated weapons program the country was aware of foreign programs and the U.S Army Surgeon General was becoming concerned with a potential biological threat.

This concern was manifest in July 1941 when the Surgeon General of the Army made a formal request of the National Research Council to evaluate the biological weapons threat. This request eventually resulted in Secretary of War Stimson requesting the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the National Research Council formed a committee, the War Bureau of Consultants (WBC) committee, to examine the threat of biological weapons. The committee was formed in 1941 and issued a report in 1942 stating that “Biological warfare is regarded as distinctly feasible. We are of the opinion that steps should be taken to formulate offensive and defensive measures.” (Turner 1944)

After the report was issued a second civilian organization, the War Research

Service (WRS) was formed to initiate and advance a U.S biological weapons program, in coordination with the military services. As this organization and the biological weapons program matured the WRS increasing integrated its program with the CWS. The CWS’

93 involvement in the weapons program continued to increase until 1944 when the program was transferred entirely to the CWS.

By the end of the war the U.S. had made significant strides in biological weapons given its lack of interest only four years before. The U.S. had developed a 100lb anthrax bomb and was in the process of constructing a full scale production plant. The program had made such progress that in 1945 it was considered as an alternative attack method against Japan, should the nuclear program fail. (Kirby 2007)

Organizational Frames and Biodefense, 1939-46

In the run up to the Second World War it would be expected that the CWS would have developed chemical frame by default. It is important to remember the role of chemical weapons in military operations prior this point. In the period prior to World

War Two nuclear weapons were nothing more than theoretical concepts in specialized laboratories. True biological weapons were yet to be developed and the historical use of biological “weapons” consisted primarily of primitive attempts to induce disease in opposing armies.

Therefore the main “unconventional” weapons of this period were chemical agents, which had been used extensively in World War One and were expected to be used in the next major war. To military leaders at the time chemical weapons were just another weapon available for their use. Military writings from the period objectively examine chemical usage and debate how to best employ chemical weapons in future

94 battles. Thus the CWS fully expected chemical weapons play an important part in any future conflict, and had paid little attention to the possible use of biological weapons.

As already discussed, chemical weapons were also regarded as a strategic, mass casualty weapon. Early air power advocates wrote of strategic bombing campaigns utilizing poison gases. This line of thinking made chemical weapons a threat to the civilian population as well. The civilian threat was taken as seriously at this point in history as nuclear weapons were at the high of the Cold War. For example a 1941 two week civilian defense course dedicates one whole week to chemical defense with all other subjects (explosives, protection, air raids, incendiaries etc.) combined in the second week. (U.S. Office of Civlian Defense 1941)

As the nation and the CWS became interested in biological weapons, it would be reasonable to expect the existing chemical culture would influence how these new weapons were viewed. For some, biological agents simply represented an extension of chemical weapons technology. Both weapons could be used to fulfill the same mission requirements; mass casualties, denial of terrain, and degradation of performance. (Kirby

2007)

CONFUSION OVER CHARACTERIZATION

Faced with this new type of weapon, there was some confusion over how to classify it. In 1941 the Adjutant General of the Army recommends the CWS conduct studies on the “chemical phases” of bacterial toxins. (Jacobs 1941) Early work of the

WBC committee also indicates some confusion over what would be considered a

95 biological weapon citing concerns over how to classify bacterial and plant toxins, and plant growth inhibitors. They note that some agents may be neglected if not placed in a particular category and conclude that “It is probable that there may be overlapping with certain chemical warfare agents.” (W. B. C. Committee 1942)

Evidence also exists that chemical and biological agents were being thought of as a single strategic weapons category. A directive from the Secretary of War in 1944 states

“In view of the similarity of application of BW with chemical warfare, responsibility for carrying out BW should be vested in the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service, in coordination with the Surgeon General for the defensive aspects, all under the direction of the Commanding General of the Army’s Service Forces.” (War Research Service

1944) In a 1945 DEF33 committee meeting Dr Mueller raises the question as to U.S. retaliatory policy by questioning the ability of the U.S. to respond in kind to a biological attack and offering that a chemical retaliation might be more effective. (DEF Committe

1945) An undated memo (1944 or later) from Harvey Bundy (Assistant Secretary of

War) to the Secretary of War reflects a similar thought process, requesting the President approve “immediate use by the Theater Commanders of gas and B.W. when ready in retaliation for B.W. or C.W use by the enemy.” (Bundy n.d.)

Actions within the CWS may also indicate tendency to subjugate biological weapon programs under existing chemical weapon programs. In a 1944 historical CWS report the author discusses responsibilities for biological weapons research and

33 In addition to the WRS, two additional advisory committees were formed the ABC committee (1943-44) and the DEF committee (1944-48). The ABC and DEF acronyms had no meaning, and were so named based upon the secret nature of their work. 96 production but states “General administration of the Special Projects Division over each of the camps rests with individuals who are not specially trained in this field.” (Baldwin

1944)

While there are some instances of combining biological weapons in the chemical weapon category there is also evidence that the unique nature of biological weapons was recognized and biological weapons were not arbitrarily placed with chemical weapons as the frame theory would predict. For example, the Secretary of War stated to the

President that the matter of biological warfare “deals primarily with the Public Health and to some extent with matters ordinarily in charge of the Department of Agriculture.”

(War Research Service 1944) A memo from Dr. Fred (Chairman WRS committee), who served in the CWS, did not recommend the CWS have responsibility for biological weapons, but rather suggested the formation of an independent Army organization reporting directly to the Chief of Staff. (E. B. Fred 1942) Finally, after the CWS did receive full responsibility for the program, Secretary Stimson established a separate

Biological Weapons Committee in Oct 1944 to oversee and coordinate the U.S. biological program. (Department of the Army 1977)

There are also examples where the difference in weapons required specialized information. In an ABC committee meeting discussing intelligence on enemy biological weapons it was recognized that intelligence officers have no knowledge of biological weapons and a recommendation was made that the Surgeon General place suitable officers to work with medical intelligence. Also of note is the recommendation that the

97 intelligence collected was to flow from G-234 to Medical Intelligence and finally to the

WRS and CWS. (ABC Committee 1943) However, by1944 this intelligence function was moved from the WRS to the CWS. (War Research Service 1944)

COMBINED WEAPONS DESIGN

Early dissemination studies reflect perhaps the greatest evidence of a chemical frame. As with many other nations the U.S. attempted to use chemical dispersal methods for biological agents. A CWS report notes the “CWS had developed bombs with would disperse liquids such as mustard, and these bombs offered possible application to BW suspensions.” (Cook n.d.) The first bombs tested as biological weapons were chemical bombs utilizing explosive dissemination. Utilizing these bombs presented scientist with competing interests in that greater coverage could be achieved with a greater explosion, but a greater explosion was harmful to bacterial agents. (Moon 1999)

Subsequent historical analysis by the military of this time period also captures a chemical centric view of weapon employment. The report notes that tests were done focusing on amount of liquid disseminated, without attempts to determine if infectious particles were generated.35 It also notes the reliance upon explosive dissemination and the damage caused to living organisms. Finally almost all the weapons tested for biological use were originally developed and optimized for the dispersal of chemical agents. (D. Miller 1952)

34 G-2 is Army shorthand for the intelligence section. 35 To efficiently enter the lungs a particle needs to be approximately 5 microns. Larger droplets will be captured by the nasal passages and may not result in infection. 98

CONCLUSION –FRAMES

There is some evidence that a chemical frame influenced the program during the war. The most compelling evidence for the existence of a chemical frame in this time period is the combining of the chemical and biological threat. It is possible to view this combined approach in the development of biological weapons and in some written documents from military leadership. However, this view does not dominate the biological program, as will be evidenced in the post war period.

While there is some evidence the frame was influencing decision making, there is also evidence that biological weapons were not automatically viewed as the same as chemical weapons and were treated as a separate threat. While it is true that the CWS did emerge from this time period responsible for the biological weapons program, there are stronger bureaucratic and external threat explanations as to how the program was created.

Therefore it does not seem that chemical frame behavior is exerting significant influence over this time period.

Imperialism and Biodefense, 1939-46

Overall there is little evidence that imperialism played a significant role in the development of doctrine over this time period. Many of the organizational actions taken over this time period were directed by high ranking government officials. The direct involvement of national leadership in the development of the program, inoculates it from

99 competition among lower level organizations which would be more likely to exhibit imperialistic behaviors.

The decision to begin investigating biological agents was taken by the War

Department with the Secretary requesting help from civilian researchers which represents a voluntary sacrifice of autonomy, contrary to imperialistic predictions. Ultimately the decision to give the biological mission to the Chemical Corps was made by President

Roosevelt, avoiding potential organizational fights. At the same time the nation was involved in World War Two, providing much more lucrative targets for turf battles (i.e. responsibilities for theaters of operation) than the relative insignificant resources associated with biological weapons.

While there does not seem to be an overwhelming body of evidence indicating a chemical frame exerted significant influence over program, there is evidence that some bureaucratic behaviors influenced the biological weapons program. However, it must be noted that while some of the evidence shows bureaucratic characteristics, it does not necessarily reflect the imperialistic behaviors that would be associated with the “empire building” nature of Allison’s Model II.

THE CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY

Of importance in this time period is that the major effort to research biological weapons was initiated within a series of civilian committees composed of prominent scientists. Correspondence from the committee members indicates that in some ways the eventual decision to assign the role of biological weapons to the Chemical Corps was

100 somewhat arbitrary and made by committee chairmen and military officers “above the pay grade” of the CWS.

Reading reports and meeting notes from the various committees involved in the biological weapons program reveals an initial civilian program with military liaisons.

Military involvement slowly increased and in 1943 the military was given prime responsibility for the program. The early composition of the program is captured in a letter from Frank Jewett36 who acknowledges the wide range of potential players in the biological issue but recommends that “the work of all these agencies will have to be coordinated in a single new agency. This might be a small commission of very distinguished men. I have underlined ‘very’ because it seems to me that to have coordination in the hands of any but the best is to court disaster.” (Jewett 1942)

The initial meetings concerning biological warfare were conducted by civilian members of the NAS with military liaisons present. It was a meeting of the NAS on 20

Aug 41 that set the initial conditions for the U.S. biological weapons program to include; the creation of civilian organizations with primary responsibilities for research, and the splitting of responsibility for offense and defense between the CWS and the Army

Surgeon General (SG). Also resulting from these decisions was the relegation of the

Navy to a status of being “informed of these plans and their collaboration invited.” (War

Research Service 1944)

36 president of the National Academy of Sciences 101

The subject of greater military involvement in the biological program was present early in the program. A letter from E.B. Fred (WRS) to V. Bush37 in 1942 discussed his thoughts on the role of the military in relation to biological weapons. Among his recommendations he identified the Army as the most likely service for prime responsibility but felt that it should not have prime responsibility for research but should be limited to an advisory role. He also recommends the Army set up a distinct organization responsible for biological weapons, reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, and not under the CWS.38 He also identifies a potential biological threat to the civilian population and recognizes the Public Health Service as having a significant role in civilian defense. (E. B. Fred 1942)

After the decision was made to initiate the biological weapons program, the initial physical research was conducted by the WRS a civilian organization under George

Merck. As the WRS began to conduct research it realized some issues were beyond its capabilities and began to request assistance from the CWS. The WRS actually went to the

Chief of Staff of the Army Forces with a request of assistance from the CWS. As a result of this request the CWS was given a verbal directive by the Chief of Staff in November

1942 to “maintain close liaisons with the WRS and to carry forward studies or other activities relating to biological warfare which might be recommended by the director of

WRS.” (DEF Committee 1944) A formal directive was then issued by Headquarters,

Army Service Forces on 10 November 1942 specifically directing that the military

37 Bush the director of the Office of Science Research and Development , reporting directly to the President 38 Of interest here is that Fred served in the CWS during World War One but does not seem to have internalized a chemical frame. 102 portion of the biological mission be placed within the Special Assignments Branch of the

CWS. (Defandorf 1942)

The WRS continued to turn to the CWS for assistance. In 1942 the WRS requested CWS assistance for “supplemental research and development, “in the areas of dissemination of stimulants, dispersal of agents destructive to animals, and design of an anthrax bomb. (Merk 1942) Subsequent requests for help with an anthrax bomb were made in 1943, specifically asking for help with large scale production, developing a military application and developing protective measures against anthrax. (Merk 1943) In a 1944 Memo the WRS requests CWS assistance from Ft. Detrick with Glanders and

Meliodosis, citing the lack of adequate personnel within the WRS. (Merk 1944)

At the same time as the CWS was becoming more involved in the biological program there is some evidence that there may have been empire building on the civilian side. In a letter to the NAS Merck identifies the increasing participation of the military in the biological weapons program. His is concerned about the change in the civilian/military balance. More significantly he identifies a “considerable” increase in future research associated with biological warfare, and states his feeling that the new problems should be investigated by civilian scientists. (Merck 1944a)

Merck’s recommendations appear not to have been followed. As the WRS continued its research (with assistance from the CWS) it recognized the issues associated with biological weapons were outgrowing its capabilities and it recommended to the War

Department that responsibility for the program be transferred. The War Department concurred, writing a memo to the President stating: 103

“When the War Research Service was first established, the primary considerations were research and secrecy so far as military participation was concerned. Therefore, this activity was placed in a civilian agency for more perfect cover. The immediate urgency now is one of military development, planning and preparation. This leads up to the conclusion that the responsibilities for biological warfare should now be unified and centralized within the military establishment.” (Stimson 1944a)

President Roosevelt responded by endorsing Stimson’s recommendations, transferring the biological mission to the War Department on 8 June 1944. (Roosevelt 1944)

IMPERIALISM BY THE MILITARY

While the civilian researchers recruited into the WRS were enthusiastic about their job, there is evidence that the military services were opposed to the biological mission. Such behavior is contrary to the empire building strategy predicted by a bureaucratic politics model.

In a 1941 report prepared by the CWS referencing biological warfare states that

“The Chemical Warfare Service and the Medical Corps, working jointly, are the proper organizations in the Army for carrying out this work, although it must be admitted that no one in our Army likes the idea of being connected with this problem.” (Barker 1941)

This reluctance in the military went as high as the Secretary of War who wrote to the

President expressing his opinion that “Some of the scientists consulted believe that this is matter for the War Department but the General Staff is of the opinion that a civilian agency is preferable, provided proper Army and Navy representatives are associated with it.” (War Research Service 1944)

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Additional correspondence indicate specifically the Army Surgeon General was not interested in empire building by acquiring the biological mission. A 16 Aug 1941 memo (just after the SG requested help with BW research) states the Surgeon General’s office’s did not want to be involved in offensive research but would work to protect lives and develop capabilities to prevent disease. (Office of the Surgeon General 1941)

The Surgeon General also turned down an empire building opportunity related to a perceived biological threat against Hawaii. A 1942 Surgeon General memo regarding a possible biological attack on Hawaii acknowledges the potential threat and recommends an officer be appointed to be responsible for biological weapons defense. The memo specifically recommends the officer “be on the staff of the Department Chemical Warfare

Officer, and that he have as assistant a medical officer with special training in the laboratory sciences.” (McAfee 1942)

Personnel assignments by the services also do not indicate an empire building strategy. An organization interested in expanding might attempt to influence the trajectory of a program by filling all available positions with the best personnel available.

Committee meeting minutes capture civilian leaders complaining of receiving officers without scientific abilities. (DEF Committee 1944) There were also complaints by the

CWS and WRS that the Surgeon General was not providing adequate personnel for biological related projects. (Converence on Personnell Matters 1943)

Was there any evidence that military organizations did want the biological mission? One measure of how much importance an organization places upon an issue can be gauged by attendance at meetings. Relative importance can be measured by the 105 number of members attending the meeting, and also the rank of those attending the meetings. The table below shows attendance at biological weapons related meetings in the 1941-45 time period.

Table 1: Military Attendance at WBC, ABC and DEF Committee Meetings

Meeting USA SG USA CWS USN SG War Dept Public Agriculture Date Health

21 Oct 41 3 1 (WBC) (6/5/2) (6) 18 Nov 41 1 3 1 1 (WBC) (6) (5/5/2) (6) (5) 28 Dec 41 2 3 1 1 1 (WBC) (6 /6) (5/5/3) (6) (5) 16 Oct 42 1 2 1 1 1 (ABC) (6) (7/6) (6) 1-2 Jun 43 4 6 2 1 1 2 (WBC) (7/6/4/3) (6/5/4/4/3/3) (6/5) (5) 18 Nov 43 2 1 1 1 1 (ABC) (7/7) (6) (6) 7 June 44 3 1 1 1 (ABC) (7/6/5) (Dr) (6) 12 Oct 44 4 2 1 (DEF) (7/6/5/Dr) (Dr/5) (6) 12 Jun 45 3 1 (DEF) (7/6/Dr) (7) Table 1 – the first number in each column is the total number representing each organization. The numbers in parentheses indicate the ranks of those attending in military designation of O-X where X equals 7=Brigadier General; 6 = Colonel; 5 = Lt. Colonel; 4 = Major, 3 = Captain; 2 = 1st Lieutenant; Dr = high ranking civilian member w/PhD such as deputy director/chief scientist

Looking at attendance rosters from meetings in this time period it appears as though the Surgeon General actually has greater interest in the biological weapons problem than the CWS. The numbers captured in this table show a gradual escalation of

106 attendance in both number and rank, possibly indicating that the Medical Corps and CWS were concerned with their ability to influence the meeting, with the Medical Corps showing a slightly higher representation in rank. However, as already discussed the

Surgeon General’s stated position was not to be involved in offensive biological warfare.

Meeting attendance would also indicate that the Navy was at best there to monitor developments and at worst only there because they had to be, as their number and rank representation did not change over 3 years of meetings.

While the overall impression is that the military did not view biological weapons as a prime area for colonization, there is at least one example of imperialistic behavior.

In 1941 the chief of CWS technical services raised the possibly of disseminating bacteria by airplane. He also suggested CWS and Medical Corps should be charged with the biological mission (joint or split with CWS on offense, and the Medical Corps defense).

Interestingly he also recommended a separate medical division be established within his technical services branch. (War Research Service 1944)

CONCLUSIONS - IMPERIALISM

From the available evidence it is possible to observe many bureaucratic actions and concerns, but not necessarily the imperialist behavior associated with bureaucratic politics. Looking at the history surrounding the development of the biological weapons, the program was created under the control of by civilian organizations, with Army and

Navy advisors present. Over time this pattern shifted and the military began to exert more influence over the program.

107

While the military did gain influence over the program, there is little evidence this was accomplished by overt imperialistic behavior. The Army Surgeon General took an early position that his office would not be involved in the offensive aspects of biological warfare. This left the CWS as the primary military organization assisting the biological weapons program. While the Navy did contribute personnel to Ft. Detrick, there is little evidence the Navy was interested in leading any aspect of the program. As the program outgrew the capacities of the WRS, prime responsibility for the program was handed to the CWS in a decision by President Roosevelt.

While some of the activities cited above are most certainly bureaucratic in nature and show a complex interaction between military services and civilian organizations there is little evidence of the empire building behaviors predicted by the bureaucratic politics model. Contrary to the theories’ predictions, the military repeatedly stated they were not interested in the biological mission.

In many ways the weak evidence for empire building is not unexpected given that this program was developed during wartime. It would probably be safe to argue that all branches military had plenty of other missions which they regarded as higher priority and were not worried about the relative low amount of additional resources they could gain by acquiring the biological weapons mission. Therefore many of the incentives associated with empire building (prestige, manpower, financial resources) would have been insignificant relative to other bureaucratic battles of the time period, such as the

Army/Navy struggle to be prime service in the Pacific.

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Realism and Biodefense, 1939-46

While the evidence in support of organizational frames or imperialism does not appear conclusive, data from the World War Two time period strongly supports the realist argument that the external threat had a significant impact on the development of the U.S biological weapons policies and programs. As already discussed in the inter war period there was a low level awareness of bacteria and their potential impact on the battlefield, but there is little evidence that the government or the military had given biological weapons a high priority. However, facing the specter of a world war, combined with the belief that the Japanese had a significant biological program, the nation quickly took steps to respond to the emerging threat.

THE EVOLVING THREAT

The previously referenced paper by Fox is cited by many authors as capturing the prevailing attitude of the U.S Government just prior to entering World War Two. Fox acknowledges the impact disease could have on a battlefield, but dismisses the ability of an enemy to produce or employ a bacteriological weapon with any efficiency. (Fox

1942)

While this was the prevailing attitude, it was not an exclusive view. At the same time other authors as well as government and military officials were becoming more concerned with biological weapons. In 1939 the CWS determined that it was possible to disseminate bacteria by aircraft, but cautions the lack of control over the weapons diminished their military value. (Barker 1941) A memo written in 1941 to the Secretary

109 of War serves as a literature review of sources expressing concern over biological warfare. In addition to the 1939 CWS study the memo includes; a 1940 opinion from the

Chief CWS warning not to dismiss the biological threat without further consideration, a

1940 letter from the surgeon general of the opinion that the chief biological danger was

“nuisance actions,” a 1941 memo from G-2 (intelligence) citing reports of Japanese biological use and training, and a 1941 letter from the Adjutant General reporting possible German development of Botulinum toxin for deployment by airplane. (Jacobs

1941)

These concerns are set against the backdrop of German and Japanese aggression and fears of imminent U.S. involvement in the wars. Of particular concern to the U.S. was reports biological weapons use by the Japanese in China, and incidents of Japanese scientists attempting to obtain pathogens from U.S laboratories. On July 15 1941 the

Surgeon General of the War Department sent a memo to the National Research Council requesting “A committee of civilian experts be formed for the purpose of advising the

Surgeon General on the problem of biological warfare.” (Office of the Surgeon General

1941a)

In response to this memo, and other concerns, Secretary of War Stimson established a civilian committee (the WBC committee) to investigate the threat of biological weapons. The committee was formed on October 1 1941, with its enabling language specifically referencing external threat stating “Because of the dangers that might confront this country from potential enemies employing what may be broadly

110 described as biological warfare, it seems advisable that investigations be initiated to survey the present situation and future possibilities.” (Stimson 1941)

The committee was formed in 1941 with the general objective “To be prepared for biological warfare from the enemy and for retaliatory measures if necessary.”

(W.B.C. Committee 1942) After examining the biological issue the committee issued its report in 1942 stating that “Biological warfare is regarded as distinctly feasible. We are of the opinion that steps should be taken to formulate offensive and defensive measures.”

(Turner 1944)

The actions of the civilian committees created as a result of this finding has been discussed in the previous section. I have also argued that the actions of these committees do not seem to exhibit behaviors associated with a chemical frame or imperialism.

However, when the actions of these committees are viewed in light of the external threat, it is possible to find a preponderance of behaviors predicted by realism.

External threat influenced the direction of the program for the entire World War

Two period, as officials cited both fear of attack, and a need to retaliate. Having suffered the surprise attack by the Japanese the U.S. was particularly sensitive to further attacks against Hawaii and the homeland. In 1942 the surgeon general assessed concerns of a biological attack against Hawaii as “real and not theoretical,” and recommended the

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department appoint a counter BW officer. (McAfee

1942) In 1943 the Office of the Provost Martial cited “reliably reported” threats of

German and Japanese biological threats to the homeland when issuing policy letters for

111 protection of public water supplies, blood plasma, drugs and biological products. (War

Department 1943; War Department 1943a)

Additional correspondence to the Secretary of War cites 1943 intelligence reports indicating possible German use of anthrax in their cross channel weapons. The same memo ends with a request that the President authorize use of biological weapons (when ready) in retaliation to enemy chemical or biological attacks. (Bundy n.d.) The added focus on German biological threats in the 1943 time period is also significant as the U.S was preparing for the D-Day invasion to take place the next year. (Moon 1999) Clearly the U.S. felt it was facing the real danger of a biological attack and this fear was the overriding factor driving the development of the biological program.

PROTECTION

While arguments will be made in later chapters that a chemical frame influenced biological defensive and detection equipment, defensive work in this period appears dominated by the external threat. Importantly the defensive work appears cognizant of the differences between chemical agents and biological agents. For example new protective masks were developed as it was discovered a biological mask needed to be

1,000,000 times more efficient that the standard chemical mask. (Moon 1999) Likewise while recognizing intact skin provided effective biological protection, clothing was tested for filtration and bactericidal properties.39 (Gantz 1944)

39 This is in contrast to future protective equipment which focuses on barrier protection. 112

It could be argued that use of chemical clothing for protection represents a chemical frame. However, I argue that for this time period these steps fall under realism and not a frames model. Based upon demonstrated protective capabilities, facing a perceived imminent threat, and lacking any other available solutions the decision was made to use chemical protective equipment as biological equipment as well. The key behaviors in this case are the steps taken to research the bactericidal and filtration properties of existing chemical gear. The decision was based upon physical properties of the equipment which countered the new biological threat (which would be predicated by realism), and not simply a decision that “similar weapons = similar protective equipment”

(as would indicate an organizational frame). A more detailed examination of protective equipment, from the 1940’s to today is included in chapter seven.

MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

The last area to be examined in this section is medical countermeasures. While a complete analysis of this program would require a dedicate dissertation, some information on the program is provided. This is particularly important in that the chemical frame predicts medical countermeasures will not receive a high priority, nor be regarded as an effective form of defense.

Hoyt relays that World War Two produced many medical advances and saw significant vaccine production. External threat appears to be the driving factor behind the program at this time. Part of the emphasis was due to the biological weapons threat, and

113 part was due to the relatively new capabilities offered by vaccination to prevent common disease among tightly quartered military recruits.

There is also a bureaucratic component to the success of the program as there were 16 federal institutions involved in vaccine research, as well as all of the major pharmaceutical companies. Hoyt specifically cites the flow of information between military and industry as a key factor in the development and testing of new vaccines.

She also proposes that this close relationship is the reason the U.S. was able to develop so many vaccines in the 1950’s. (Hoyt 2012)

CONCLUSIONS – EXTERNAL THREAT

When looking at the behavior of the U.S biological program over this period it is easy to construct a logical external threat  response process indicative of realism. In this historical time period of total world war the U.S. was fighting for its existence and it could not ignore what it thought was a real and significant threat to its military power.

The only response available to the country was to understand the threat, and once verified, responded by developing its own capability.

The evidence that the external threat was directing U.S action can be found in the repeated references to German and Japanese advances in biological warfare found in many decisions ranging from theater combat operations to homeland defense. The

Japanese threat is also specifically cited in many of the early decisions which led to the creation of the civilian committees and military organizations established to assess and

114 then produce biological weapons. These types of actions are expected and easily explained by realism.

Conclusions – The World War Two Period

As the U.S. was involved in a world war, it is of little surprise that the external threat exhibits a significant influence over the biological program at this time. The U.S. had suffered a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese had beaten the U.S back to

Midway, and the Germans were preparing to invade the United Kingdom. In this type of war any significant advance in weaponry could result in a significant power shift and influence the outcome of the war. Such concerns are repeatedly observed in the original justification for the program, and in subsequent decisions to expand the program. As predicted from a rational actor standpoint the nation responded in the only manner it could. It studied the weapons, found they might be effective, and subsequently developed both a defensive and an offensive program in order to preserve power relative to the Axis forces.

While external threat played a dominant role in the program, there is little evidence of the empire building behavior predicted by bureaucratic politics model.

While there were definitely bureaucratic actions which created organizations and moved missions, they do not support this particular theory. None of the military services make any attempt to grab power or resources by attempting to take ownership of the biological problem. To the contrary there are several examples of military organizations

115 specifically stating their desire not to be involved with biological weapons, clearly contrary to an empire building strategy.

Also of significance the U.S. did not simply hand the biological problem to the

CWS based upon perceived similarities in weapons, as would be predicated by organizational frames theory. While the mission unlimitedly ended up with the CWS, and they were involved in the biological problem from the start, the main players in the initial biological program were a series of civilian experts judged best able to asses and respond to the new and unique threat. Here the country was recognizing a new threat and responding by allocating resources as realism would predict.

Therefore, for this particular time period, of the three theories being considered the observed behaviors are most consistent with those predicted by realism. As this period concludes at the end of World War Two, the nature of the external threats facing the U.S. are set to change drastically in the following time periods. Realism would predict a corresponding change in the U.S. biological program. It is also possible that the new bureaucratic environment may result in a different influence dominating the U.S. posture in the following years.

116

Ch 5. 1946 – 1970, The Rise and End of the U.S. Offensive Program

In view of the worsening world conditions, the biological weapon may soon be destined to assume a place in military strategy. (D. Miller 1952)

The United States will similarly renounce the use of all other methods of bacteriological/biological warfare. The United States bacteriological/biological programs will be confined to research and development for defense. President Nixon– NSDM 35, 1969

Historical Setting

The period immediately following the Second World War through 1970 saw highs and lows for the United States’ biological weapons program. The previous section found that for the World War Two period external threat was the primary influence driving U.S. biological posture. However, there is reason to believe that as hostilities ended and the external threat changed, other factors could replace external threat as the dominant influence over posture.

Unfortunately the U.S. did not enjoy a totally peaceful post war environment.

The nation was soon faced with a new emerging enemy in the Soviet Union. The emergence of the communist threat and the game changing introduction of nuclear weapons made for an entirely new strategic environment. In the early years of the Cold

War the U.S. found itself with a small number of nuclear weapons and fear that it was the underdog in a potential war with the Soviet Union. For at least the first few years after 117 the war biological weapons were viewed as potential equalizers in the nuclear weapons gap. (Kirby 2007)

As the U.S. acquired more nuclear weapons, biological weapons lost some of their prestige and alternative missions were explored. Advocates for biological weapons proposed a concept of “large area coverage” where the military sought to maximize amount of terrain denied to the enemy, relative to the size of the munition. For this mission biological weapons were particularly suited in that they do not cause widespread damage to infrastructure, something of concern to military planners experienced with reconstituting German and Japanese infrastructure after the war. (Kirby 2007)

Incapacitation was a second mission area that emerged in this time period. The concept of incapacitation was that a more “humane” battle could be fought and objectives obtained with minimal casualties.

Both of these new missions had financial impacts on the biological program.

Responding to negative assessments of the biological weapon at the time, the DoD countered that better effects could be obtained by better agents which, by the way, could be developed with a significant increase in funds. Likewise the need for incapacitating agents, in conjunction with changes in U.S. doctrine, was cited many times as a need for new funding. (Goldman 2009)

The Korean War did not have a drastic impact on the biological program, although the U.S. was accused of using biological weapons in the conflict. The Chemical

Corps did see action in the war, primarily in smoke and flame support roles. The Army

118 did note that the War accelerated established biological programs, and was the source of additional funding for the program.

The early 1960’s saw the implementation of project 112, so named because it was the 112th program in an encompassing review of national defense implemented by

Secretary McNamara. In conjunction with changing U.S. policies on the use of biological weapons this project contributed to a large increase in funding to both chemical weapons and biological weapons in research and development, as well as a significant increase in testing. By the end of the 1960’s the U.S. had conducted a series of live agent tests in the Pacific Ocean. At the conclusion of these tests, biological weapons were considered an operational reality, as aerial tests with live agent demonstrated the ability to cause casualties over a 100 square mile area.

Just as biological weapons were gaining prestige and funding President Nixon issued orders that the U.S. would abandon any use of biological weapons as well as any offensive research, but would retain a defensive program. The details of this decision will be discussed in greater depth below, but ironically it was as series of chemical weapons incidents that played a significant role in the U.S. decision to abandon its biological program.

In 1968 several hundred sheep died near Dugway Proving Ground in Utah following a series of open air chemical weapons tests. While the actual cause of death has never been absolutely proven, reports of the sheep kill combined with revelations that the U.S. was dumping old chemical weapons in the ocean caused enough public outcry that an official review of U.S. chemical/biological program was initiated. 119

While the review was underway there was an accidental leak of chemical agent in

Okinawa which poisoned several service members. While the accident was significant, more so was the fact that the presence of chemical weapons on Okinawa was kept secret to the U.S. and Japanese governments. At the same time it was revealed that the U.S. had stockpiled chemical weapons in Germany, while being less than forthright with the

German government about the presence of the weapons.

Ultimately after an extensive inter-agency review and bureaucratic bargaining process the DoD faced losing both its chemical and biological weapons programs. At this point the DoD was involved in the Vietnam war, relying heavily on riot control agents, and herbicides which were also being considered as part of the chemical weapon cuts. While the DoD argued to keep everything, the best it could do was to keep its riot control, herbicides and retaliatory chemical capabilities, at the cost of the offensive chemical program as well as the biological program. This decision was made official

U.S. policy by President Nixon in November 1969.

Just as the strategic view of chemical weapons changed over this period, the organizations responsible for the biological program saw a series of significant changes.

As discussed in the previous section, the CWS was given primary responsibility for the biological program in 1944, but still operated under the Research and Development

Board. This arrangement continued until 1950 when the Chemical Corps40 assumed prime responsibly for executing committee recommendations and was forced to take a

40 The CWS was re-designated the Chemical Corps in 1946 120 more active role in the biological program after attempts to use contractors failed.

(Department of the Army 1977)

A significant organizational change took place in response to a 1951 DoD instruction to increase Chemical Biological and Radiological (CBR) readiness. In this case the Army identified a need to separate chemical and biological elements of the program. In 1953 the Army created an Assistant Chief Chemical Officer for BW, which was subsequently abolished in 1954. In 1962 the Army instituted a major reorganization which abolished the chiefs of the technical services. As a result Chemical Corps technical operations were assigned to Munitions Command under Army Material

Command, staff functions were assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and biological testing was assigned to Test and Evaluation Command.

This period also saw a several changes in U.S. policy regarding the use of biological weapons.41 The first U.S. policy was established by President Roosevelt in

World War Two, where he stated the U.S. would not be the first to use chemical or biological weapons, but reserved the right to respond in kind if the U.S. was attacked. By the 1950’s the DoD began to lobby for greater leeway for the use of biological and chemical weapons. In 1953 the Secretary of Defense stated each service should be prepared to employ CBR weapons if directed to do so, and in 1956 President Eisenhower changed U.S. policy such that first use was an option if authorized by the President.

41 As will be discussed in more detail later, all of the U.S. policies of use at the time were chemical/biological strategies and not specific for use of biological weapons. 121

This policy was never announced publicly but was continued by the Kennedy administration. In 1966 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed an even more offensive oriented program based upon incapacitating agents. While this policy was never approved by the President, the DoD was beginning to assume it would be the new policy, until President Nixon made his announcement regarding chemical weapons and biological weapons.

From this brief historical overview it is possible predict that any of the factors of interest could find fertile ground in which to exert influence. The rise of the Soviet

Union and the Cold War established a significant external threat to the nation. The bureaucratic battles over usage strategy, new mission areas, and potential cuts all provide conditions conducive to imperialism. While some of these behaviors were observed, almost all of these changes in strategy and debates over national policy were conducted in reference to the U.S. “chemical/biological” program. Perhaps indicating that the combined weapons view predicted by the frames model was playing a significant role in the status of the U.S. biological posture over this time period?

Organizational Frames and Biodefense, 1946-70

From the previous chapter there were some indications that a chemical frame was present in the World War Two period. While external threat was found to dominate the

World War Two period, analysis of this time period identifies a significant presence of behaviors predicted by the organizational frames model. There is an abundance of data available from the various committees and councils responsible for the chemical,

122 biological and radiological programs. Analysis of these records demonstrates numerous examples of chemical weapons receiving higher priority than biological weapons, extensive combination of chemical and biological weapons in statements and doctrine, and the development and procurement of hardware for this period is more similar than would be expected based upon the differences of chemical weapons versus biological weapons.

FRAMES IN OVERSIGHT

This time period captures the maturation of the biological program under the military’s influence as the biological mission was given to the Army towards the end of the Second World War. While the Chemical Corps was responsible for executing the biological mission, several committees existed which had oversight over the program.

Data from these sources reveals many behaviors associated with a chemical frame.

Evidence of a frame in oversight committees would serve to re-enforce the frame within the executing organizations.

The Chemical Corps Board was an early high level advisory board. It existed as

“a reviewing and policy-making staff organization, operating directly under the Chief of the Chemical Corps” but had no operational responsibilities. (Chemical Corps Board

1947) Given its position relative to the leadership of the Corps, recommendations from the board would carry a heavy weight in program development.

Analysis of the board’s organizational chart and mission statements reveals that a chemical bias was already in place at this early stage of the program. Reviewing the

123 mission statements of each of the board’s divisions reveals references to chemical weapons yet no reference to biological weapons. For example, the Protection Division was responsible for all protective items, yet mission statement specifically references chemical agents but includes no reference to biological agents. The only division that does mention biological weapons is the Agents Division which was responsible for the testing all foreign agents (where biological is mentioned) and also served as the chemical and biological consultant to the other divisions. The composition of the Chemical Corps

Board also demonstrates a chemical bias as the educational distribution of experts on the board consisted of two mechanical engineers, four chemical engineers, one chemical warfare agent technologist, one biochemist, and one physical chemist. (Chemical Corps

Board 1947)

Another early indicator of a chemical frame is observed in the relative number of chemical programs and biological programs. The early periods are of particular interest, as frames theory predicts the early actions of the organization will set the frame for later action. From the data below, it appears that based upon numbers, chemical programs were preferred over biological programs.

Table 2: Chemical Corps Research Program Totals Year Chemical Biological

1948 44 0 1950 94 84 1954 110 60 1956 41 25 (Research Council of the Chemical Corps 1948; Chemical Corps 1950; Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1954; Chemical Corps 1956)

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It is not only the numbers of program that show a frame but also the priority given to the research projects that show a bias. While every organization must have a number one priority, the important point is that of all the priority statements found none designated a biological weapons program as top priority. For example in 1950 the committee states the “design of a G agent manufacturing and munitions loading plant has no parallel with in the Chemical Corps.” (Chemical Corps Procurement Office 1950) In

1954 the committee gives the Muscle Shoals Project 42 the “highest priority within the

Chemical Corps.” (Chemical Corps Advisory Council 1954) And in 1955 the committee states “The major emphasis” is “Operational Requirement CW-03401, supporting the

Chemical Corps in the Design and development of projectiles, bombs and rockets as suitable CW munitions.” (Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1955)

Another indicator of the chemical frame which will be repeatedly observed is the behavior of addressing chemical agents and biological agents as one threat. The presence of this behavior early in the program again indicates a chemical frame existed early within the leadership structure. In 1947 the Advisory Board recommends “… that work on BW be correlated and coordinated with other parts of the Chemical Corps program with a view to effecting economies in each.” Reflecting upon limited budgets they recommend, “… it is felt that any increase in the proportion devoted to BW at the expense of other parts of the program connected with items and devices of proven utility

42 Muscle shoals was the location of a chemical weapon production facility 125 would be most unwise. It is strongly felt that economies can be affected by merging related parts of the program in the Chemical Corps. In addition to economies, this coordination would probably tend toward greater efficiency in the program.” (Chemical

Corps Advisory Board 1947)

There are many additional examples of the councils combining chemical and biological weapons as predicted by the chemical frames model. Examples include recommendations to: look at agents (chemical, biological and radiological) as “one general picture,” (Chemcial Corps Advisory Board 1947) or to “consider RW, BW and

CW jointly and severally in protection, decontamination, dissemination and detection.”

Specific recommendations to treat the agents the same is reflected in a decontamination procedure to adapt a smoke generator to “accelerate hydrolysis of CW agents, kill BW agents and assist in the decontamination of RW agents.” (Research Council 1949) Even the names of the committees reflect the combined view as in the Research and

Development Coordinating Committee on Biological and Chemical Warfare.

The military also sought input from experts outside the DoD. In 1947 an advisory board was formed by the American Chemical Society, consisting of a committee of civilian scientists assembled to assist the Chemical Corps. Early research council meeting notes are similar to the opinions of other agencies. They felt biological weapons were not yet ready for strategic or tactical warfare, but did represent a potentially potent weapon for sabotage or destruction of crops. This recognition and separation of capabilities vs. chemical weapons in some ways shows that a frames model was not in total control. However, in recommended future work the committee reverts to the model 126 by recommending a “research project for studying the effects of explosion on dispersion of chemical and BW weapons.”43 But, indicative of the frame, the three subsequent paragraphs which describe this research objective make reference only to chemical munitions. (Chemical Corps Advisory Board 1947)

However, there is evidence that the Research Council was not operating entirely under a chemical frame. In 1948 members of the council raised concern over their ability to advise the Chemical Corps on biological issues due to lack of reports and information.

However, the response from the military representative to the council captures the chemical frame when he states chemical and biological “viewpoints must be tied together” and there was “great advantage in cross membership of the committees.”

(Research Council of the Chemical Corps 1948)

In addition to the advisory committees it is possible to observe behaviors consistent with a chemical frame in the organizational actions within the Chemical Corps.

A 1951 DoD directive to evaluate chemical and biological efforts, resulted in recommendations that were presented to and accepted by a panel of Army generals. The report recommended the Chemical Corps vertically split chemical and biological agents within the organization. As a result of this split a short lived position of “Chief Chemical

Officer for BW” (a title which in itself reflects a chemical frame) was appointed in 1953.

This position was when abolished in 1954 when a new command structure was implemented. The next year the Chemical Corps had an external committee review is

43 Initial chemical weapons were based upon a bursting type weapon. A regular pattern in many countries is an attempt to utilize chemical dispersion techniques for biological weapons. 127 mission and structure. The committee made several organizational recommendations but not one recommendation suggested any delineation between work on chemical agents or biological agents. (O. Miller 1955) One of the recommendations from the committee was to move some of the training responsibility from the Chemical Corps to the Army. While previously the Corps made no effort to retain the biological position, it exerted significant effort to retain its training responsibilities. (Chemical Corps 1956) Also at this time period the Army made an effort to contract out a significant portion of the biological program. (Department of the Army 1977) This deal fell through, but as a result the morale within biological research laboratories plummeted. (D. Miller 1957)

These actions reflect behaviors expected of a chemical frame in that the Corps quickly reverted to a previous organizational model, rejecting the biological and chemical split. The organization also attempted to relegate the biological program to the status of contractor subunit of the program. While supporting the chemical frame, these actions are contrary to those expected from imperialism. The bureaucratic model predicts the

Chemical Corps would use the proposed split in the chemical and biological weapons programs to its advantage. In this case an external power had actually directed the organization to grow itself and create a new division, yet the Corps reverted to a previous organization, abandoning potential new requirements and resources associated with the division.

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FRAMES IN TRAINING

If a frame existed within the Chemical Corps, and the Corps had prime responsibility for the biological program and chemical program, it is logical that the

Corps would have spread the frame through training. Analyzing the training materials that are available the general perception is that chemical weapon training was a common occurrence in the forces yet biological training was much less frequent. This is observable as early as 1947 when the War Department restricted biological training chiefly to the Chemical Corps. (D. Miller 1952)

Several training manuals from the period reflect this bias. One example is an

Army training guide for members being assigned overseas. This manual covers all CBR threats within the same document using phrases such as “CBR warfare conditions,” or

“CBR tactics.” While the document does have discrete weapons sections they reflect a chemical bias. The chemical section has 30 distinct paragraphs or sub-paragraphs, the radiological section has 14 paragraphs, yet the biological section has only ten.

(Department of the Army 1954) Similarly in a 1961 Army CBR training course, descriptions of employment or use of weapons always utilized the term “chemical and biological weapons” when the weapons are referenced in the syllabus. (The United States

Army 1961)

The chemical agent emphasis is also observed in an Army manual which prescribes training requirements for a Decontamination Specialist. Totaling the hours of training prescribed in the lesson outlines shows 50 hours dedicated to combined chemical, biological and radiological training. Total training hours dedicated to each 129 individual weapon class show 30 hours dedicated to radiological training, 30 hours for chemical, ten for biological and nine for combined chemical/biological training.

(Department of the Army 1967)

The field manual which prescribed Army CBR training shows a similar bias. The manual was written for unit “CBR” training and supports the “principles of chemical and biological operations and nuclear warfare.” Examples of topics covered by the manual include gas chamber, Mustard training, nerve agent training, exercises with toxic chemical agents, and exercises in nuclear and radiological defense. There is no section dedicated to biological weapons. Looking at the individual training tasks is also informative as five tasks are of general “CBR” nature, four are chemical specific, and only one is biological specific (clean your food after a bio attack). (Department of the

Army 1964)

In some cases there was not even a training manual. Early attempts by other services to train personnel found that no specific biological training existed. In the early

1950’s the Air Force realized it faced a significant shortage of officers who understood biological weapons. In an attempt to train 100 new biological officers in three years they developed a new training program in conjunction with the Chemical Corps. Reflecting the general lack of biological emphasis the program was abandoned after only two years due in part to low morale, lack of support and a poor evaluation of the training program.

(D. Miller 1957) Other examples of biological training being overshadowed by chemical training include exercises that incorporated chemical weapons attacks but not biological,

(The Chemical Corps School 1954) and CBR Weapons Orientating Courses where “CBR 130 field demonstrations” consisted solely of chemical artillery. (The United States Army

1961)

There are data showing there was awareness of the training gap, yet little action seems to have been taken to address it. A 1954 Chemical Corps Technical Committee

(CCTC) training review describes the state of biological training as “limited to conferences at our service schools and an occasional discussion of its potential in troop training programs.” (Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1954a) Interestingly in the same report the committee feels “training seems to be well underway to give us a reasonable defensive-offensive capability in CBR except in one single factor; the dosimeters….If our forces were attacked by atomic weapons, they would operate under a great handicap for some time.” This in spite of the fact they had already identified a significant lack in biological weapons training, and that there were no operational biological detectors at this time.

The disparity between chemical training and biological training was also evident to personnel in the field. Referencing this disparity of training in his military college thesis Burnett summarizes his experience as “What officer has not seen or otherwise been exposed to mustard, nerve agents, flame, smoke and tear gas in the chemical family of weapons? But how many officers have ever seen, or otherwise been exposed to an offensive biological weapons system?” (Burnett 1963)

In the same paper Burnett raises two examples of how a realism based assessment of biological weapons influenced the perception of the weapons among military officers.

He asserts that because the decision to use biological weapons resided with the President 131 the average military planner did not routinely concern themselves with their use or employment, as that decision would be made for them in the eventuality they were used.

He also theorizes that at the tactical level the slow action of the weapons, coupled with no visible effect of their employment, made them impractical for immediate battlefield use.

This slow action, combined with decisions related to biological agents being made above the level of most officers, created a situation where the thought of biological weapons was not considered by the average officer planning a battle. These two points of view can help explain how the operational military member would not spend time thinking about (or creating a frame of reference for) a weapon they would never plan to use in a battle. In this situation if the officer were challenged with a biological weapon they would most likely draw upon knowledge obtained by the chemical experiences described by Burnett.

While the author’s arguments are grounded in realism, the point made by the author underscores the presence of a chemical frame. The author makes reference to his experience and training with chemical weapons, almost expecting their use in combat. At the same time he notes the absence of similar biological training. However until 1969 there was no difference in national policy regarding use of chemical weapons or biological weapons. In both cases use of the weapons required Presidential approval, yet as the author relates, the military routinely trained its personnel with live chemical agents. This is reflects another manifestation of the chemical frame; weapons that do not conform to the established frame are relegated to lesser status or not considered in the solution. 132

FRAMES IN OTHER AGENCIES

A testament to the strength of the chemical is how far it propagated. As it has been established the frame existed within the Chemical Corps, was that frame propagated as the Corps interacted with other governmental agencies? Evidence that the Air Force had adopted the chemical frame is demonstrated when the Air Force imitated the Army by placing responsibility for biological weapons under the Air Chemical Officer. (D.

Miller 1952)

The chemical frame is also evident outside the military. For example the CIA was given a task to explore how the government should address its new biological and nuclear weapons (in addition to its existing chemical weapons) when making public statements. The wording of the task given to the CIA was “To establish a procedure for the development and promulgation of policy guidance for the content of governmental statements with respect to the existence, development and contemplated use of weapons using atomic power for propulsion or explosion, guided missiles and biological radiological and chemical weapons.” (Psychological Strategy Board 1951)

The above statement brings forth several points, first from the syntax of the quote biological, radiological and chemical weapons are defined as one weapons class, again demonstrating an artificial linkage. A second point is that this quote arose from a CIA document, showing the linkage was evident outside the DoD. Finally, this document goes on to recommend that the DoD be responsible for developing such policy. The significance of this recommendation is that if a frame existed within the DoD, that frame

133 would be re-enforced and shown to the public as the DoD developed the public “face” of these weapons.

Most importantly as to the strength of the frame is the ability to find significant examples of combined chemical agent and biological agent terminology at highest levels of the government and the DoD. Observing a combined threat at this level indicates significant support for organizational frames and appears to diminish arguments that the country was responding proportionally to individual threats as would be predicted by realism. Some of the many examples are demonstrated below.

It is possible to find the chemical frame at the top of the DoD only a few years after the Army assuming responsibly for the program. When assessing an appropriate

U.S. policy on these weapons in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) restates the World War Two “gas” policy and simply adds biological weapons as one sentence within the policy. (Bradley 1950) A 1951 DoD directive makes ten references to a combined chemical/biological weapon threat, but only once refers to a distinct biological weapon or chemical weapon threat. (Lovett 1951)

Evidence of the frame is also found in national level documents from this period.

House Report 815 combines chemical agents, biological agents and radiological agents as one class stating “If CBR is to be considered a deterrent force in the U.S. arsenal of weapons, the program of research and advocacy here will have to be accompanied by an adequate program of manufacture and deployment of CBR munitions.” (Department of the Army 1960) A1960 a National Security Council (NSC) study on limited warfare breaks out nuclear warfare, from the CBR class but consistently combines chemical 134 weapons and biological weapons as one operational concept. (National Security Council

1960) A 1962 Joint Chiefs of Staff memo re-enforces the combined threat referencing a chemical/biological offensive doctrine, defensive doctrine and research program. 44 (Joint

Chiefs of Staff 1962) At the same time the Army was requesting other services assist in creating a Joint manual for CBR doctrine and operations. (W. Richardson 1962)

Even in capability reports there is a chemical frame as estimated casualties and weapons characteristics are described in terms of “CB weapons systems.” (Director of

CBR Operations 1962) Congressional testimony by Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1967 also shows a chemical frame starting with multiple references to “CB” warfare. When questioned as to the Soviet rational for biological warfare in Europe, he responds that they expect the Soviets to attack port facilities with lethal chemicals. Also when questioned on Soviet “CBW” doctrine, he talks about chemical weapons, ignores biological weapons, and goes on to talk about tactical nuclear weapons. (Department of

Defense 1970)

There is evidence that some officials were concerned with the WMD terminology, although not for the implied artificial linkage of disparate weapons. A memo to the

Secretary of Defense identifies issues with the term “weapons of mass destruction.”

However at issue in the memo is how the term impacts the U.S. view on the morality of these weapons, rather than a concern with the differences between the weapon classes.

(C. Hutchin 1951)

44 More references and the exact wording are listed in the Appendix 135

The examples above are only a small sample of vast number of combined strategies, statements or studies. This abundance of this behavior is perhaps the most significant evidence for the chemical frame, both in the sheer number of examples and the fact that even though imperialism and external threat were the impetuous for many of the projects, it always seems that they were ultimately implemented through a chemical frame.

With the almost ubiquitous combination of chemical, biological and even radiological weapons within the same category contrarian views serve to highlight the difference of the two weapons. The fact that individuals or committees, especially those somewhat removed from the programs, identified the combination of the weapons as an issue lends support to the idea that those close to the programs were operating under the influence of a frame.

A prime example of such an evaluation is the 1950 Ad Hoc committee assembled at the request of the Secretary of Defense. This committee was composed of educators, corporate executives and senior government civilians. One of their findings relative to the perception of chemical and biological weapons was “Chemical, biological, and radiological warfare have been mistakenly assumed to have enough significant characteristics in common to warrant their being grouped together as CEBAR for administrative and operational purposes.” The committee recognizes that there may be administrative advantages with a combined weapons threat, but again cautions that

“many of the problems connected with these three weapons require totally different treatment.” (Ad Hoc Committee 1950) 136

Another quote from the committee seems to foreshadow the pitfalls associated with the creation of a chemical frame:

“The Committee questions any approach to the weapons which would produce in either the public or military thinking a feeling that there was an inseparable association between chemical, biological, and radiological warfare. While psychological and public information aspects are quite similar for the three weapons, there are fundamental differences in the situation with respect to each of them which call for different handling in research, development, and production programs.” (Ad Hoc Committee 1950)

This sentiment was not unique and is observable at other points in this period. A similar sentiment was expressed in a 1961 meeting of the Defense Science Board (DSB)

“Dr. Horsfall suggests separation of biological and chemical warfare areas and revision of the name from warfare to defense, separate mentors (by two DSB members-at-large) as well as office reorientation. The Directorate of Research, identified so as to include its basic as well as applied aspects... This would mean such reorientation might be part of general revision of conceivably Biological Defense.” (Director of Defense Research and Engineering 1961)

Likewise, in a National Security Council meeting, the President’s Advisor for Science and Technology states “a sharp distinction should be made between chemical warfare and biological warfare.” (National Security Council 1960)

FRAMES IN HARDWARE

One of the predictive statements for organizational frames is that past success will influence future development. During World War two the CWS successfully developed many pieces of chemical hardware. Some of their successes included the M4 Vapor 137

Detector Kit; M5 liquid detector paint; M6 liquid detector paper; and the M7 detector crayon and the M9 Chemical Agent Detector Kit. (Smart n.d.)

Moving into the post war period the Chemical Corps was given prime responsibility for chemical and biological hardware. The organizational frames model predicts research into biological hardware would be based upon previous chemical successes. Such behavior is captured in an Army history which states, “In the early years the research and development essentially paralleled the experience gained in the development of CW munitions during WWII.” And “research on protective masks, particulate filters, protective clothing and shelters was closely integrated with the chemical defense program.” (Department of the Army 1977)

This attitude is also reflected in meeting minutes early in the biological program’s development. An advisory committee to the Chemical Corps raises the question “In the preliminary studies, should there be any differentiation between chemical and biological agents which are dispersed as aerosols?” and relating to defense “Major defense must fall back on chemical measures to neutralize agents as they are used, materials and methods for destroying the chemicals and agents to destroy the life of the virus or the bacteria, and the developed of some method of detection of particular biological agents.” (American

Chemical Society 1947)

Eventually the biological program and chemical program were administratively separated. However, by then the chemical frame was strong enough that it continued to exert influence through the combined reference. Contained within the chemical and radiological research plan are specific goals relating to chemical, radiological and 138 biological weapons. Included are: “Improved CBR collective protecting,” “Improved

CBR respiratory and body protection,” and “improved agents, equipment and techniques for CBR warfare.” (Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1955a)

It is also possible that the bureaucratic acquisition system which made the

Chemical Corps the lead for the biological program may have helped entrench the chemical frame in other services as well. Miller notes that Air Force knowledge of biological weapons was not complete and that the Air Force could at best describe

“requirements in the form of statements of military characteristics” that they “did not describe a definite item,” and served “chiefly as a guide to the developing agency.” It is logical to assume that given significant leeway, the Chemical Corps would implement these requests through a chemical frame. (D. Miller 1957)

In fact over this time period it was difficult to find examples of independent biological programs, contrary to the existence of independent chemical programs. Some examples of combined chemical and biological program descriptions include Air Force projects 5064 and 5066 which were “BW-CW” warheads for the B-62 and B-64 missiles respectively. While the program documentation did have distinct chemical and biological requirements sections, the text for the biological warhead requirements is identical to the text for the chemical warhead paragraph save the replacement of “biological” for the word “chemical.” (Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1954b) A subsequent report highlights the practice of assuming chemical delivery systems will work for biological weapons. The committee notes the delivery technique “will be primarily applicable to

139 delivery of CW munitions, consideration will be give to possible application to biological warfare.” (Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1955)

Many other Air Force program requests exhibit similar behavior. An early Air

Force detection device was for an “airborne instrument capable of rapid detection and identification an airborne toxic (CW and BW) agent.”45 (Chemical Corps Technical

Committee 1955) A 1960 program requires the development of drones for “CBR

Warfare.” In this program request the desired capabilities are identical and actually reference chemical and biological agents within the same requirements statements. (US

Army Chemical Corps Historical Office 1961) Another Air Force request for a “CB

Detection and Warning” system is actually only a request for a chemical detector, and a request for “CB protective equipment simply references a “CB attack” requiring “CB protection” (Air Force Systems Command 1964)

These Air Force requirements are not isolated as there are additional program requirements that continue to reflect the combined chemical/biological view. In 1960

NORAD established a requirement for “a system to detect and report enemy employment of biological and/or chemical agents…This system must be capable of providing positive and timely detection of the agent, or agents employed, and the instantaneous reporting of such employment to the NORAD Combat Operations Center.” (North American Air

Defense Command 1960)

The trend to combine weapons classes continues in the 1960-65 technical directives established by the CCTC. This document contains many requirements that are

45 This request was subsequently identified as impossible and split to a mainly chemical agent detector. 140 combined For example the areas of rapid identification, prophylaxis, therapeutics, anti- material agents, and anti-food agents all used a combined chemical and biological reference in their descriptions. One program, development of an incapacitating agent does not describe either a chemical or biological solution, only referencing an “agent.”

(Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1961)

Within this directive there were two areas written with separate references made to each type of agent. Offensive agents and defensive measures, specifically the detection requirements are written with a separate chemical and biological sub section. It may be the difference in available technology driving this separation. For example chemical detection requirements call for “research and development to obtain a warning and detection system,” while biological detection requirements’ call for “research leading to the development of detection and warning systems.” (Emphasis added)

In addition to combined program requirements there is evidence that the agents themselves were regarded as similar with regard to production, stockpiling and weoponization. As was noted in the previous section nations developing biological weapons seem to base their first biological weapons on chemical weapon design. In her post war assessment Miller identifies the issue of a chemical frame influencing munitions design, noting that until 1950 biological weapons had utilized explosives for dissemination.46 (D. Miller 1957) She expands further on the chemical frame stating,

“The term ‘CEBAR’ implies the development of a single weapon—and that is not the

46 While explosive dissemination is adequate for chemical weapons, it severely reduces the effectiveness of biological weapons. 141 case. The three do not represent a combined munition…Any attempt to treat them as a unit in evaluating their military worth is not realistic.” (D. Miller 1952) Yet through this period weapons systems were routinely developed as a combined chemical/biological system.

In 1950 the Chemical Corps was of the opinion (referencing biological agents),

“storage of munitions filled with such agents will be comparable to storage of chemical munitions.” 47 (Creasy 1950) A 1959 Chemical Corps report shows this was not actually the case as captured in a debate over the desire to produce and then store biological weapons for future use (as is possible for chemical weapons) ignoring the physical reality that biological agents lose viability over time.48 Only when faced with a $5.5 million dollar requirement to maintain a 72 hour delivery capability did the Army opt instead for a 90 day plus 72 hour deliver standard, saving $2 million.49 (US Army Chemcial Corps

Historical Office 1959)

Not all programs were combined; there were distinct biological programs as well.

However, many of these programs also reflect a chemical frame in that biological programs were often derived from chemical centric requirements. Examining the operational requirements from the defensive chemical programs under development at the time helps develop a feel for the characteristics of the hardware being developed by the military. Generally chemical detectors had to be small, automated and provide instantaneous detection of agent. Using the chemical requirements as the baseline,

47 The reference was to the more hearty biological agents, but is still indicative of a chemical frame. 48 Chemical agents will de-nature over time as well but a significantly slower rate than biological weapons. 49 A 72 hour delivery system would require continuous growth an weponization of the agent to replenish older stocks, hence the high cost 142 requirements for biological systems are extremely similar. 50 And in instances where distinct detectors were proposed, future modifications called for the system to be combined. For example, requirements for a standoff G-Agent detector specifically include future plans to modify the detector to identify biological agents using identical performance parameters. 51 (Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1954)

As in other areas the existence of contrarian views highlights the existence of the frame. In the case of weapons there are reports from civilian research organizations that do a good job of addressing the differences between biological weapons and chemical weapons. A study on warhead design, although reflecting a combined chemical/biological title breaks out chemical agents from biological agents. It highlights critical differences such as diameter of the aerosol, fragile nature of biological agents, and the need for temperature control. (Cook Research Laboratories 1955) Likewise a

Rand report on anti-personnel BW/CW war also highlights the differences in delivery systems, defense, and military applications. (Tamplin 1962) The Air Force, while making requests for combined CB equipment, at least recognizes that the Army approach of small, light detectors is not optimal for large static air bases. (Air Force Systems

Command 1964)

50 More specific requirements are listed in the Appendix 51 Subsequent evaluation of the detector in 1956 identified major issues of limited range(300 yd), no BW capability, excess weight and high power consumption 143

FRAMES IN DOCTRINE

In addition to hardware, another output of the weapons programs is doctrine directing how forces should fight and train. The Organizational frames model predicts that a chemical frame will result in development of similar doctrine for chemical weapons and biological weapons. This similarity will also be greater than would be warranted by the distinct nature of the two weapons classes.

In the military manuals of the time, the manuals written solely in reference to biological weapons generally do a good job avoiding a chemical bias. They address many of the differences discussed in chapter three such as loss of viability, optimal aerosol size, delayed effects and medical treatments. For example when addressing the delay in effects and battlefield use one manual advises, “Biological attacks must be timed sufficiently in advance of the planned coordinated exploitation to allow for the incubation period.” (Department of the Army 1966)

However, it is possible to find some minor chemical frames within these documents. One manual advises that response to a biological attack is similar to a chemical attack response and emphasizes the use of masks for protection. However this is after the manual states the U.S. possessed no capability to detect a biological attack.

(Department of the Army 1964) Another manual reflects the combined decontamination approach noting, “the materials available for biological decontamination consist of those which are use for decontaminant of toxic chemicals, plus a few items necessary for special use.” (US Army Chemical Corps School 1960)

144

While the biological specific documents generally avoid a chemical frame, some of the combined use documents show a strong chemical frame. The 1964 Armed Forces

Doctrine for Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment and Defense uses the term

“CB” in every section. Within this document weapons characteristics, planning, defense and combat support are all described relative to a generic CB weapon. In addition to providing inadequate information for both weapons it highlights how a combined view can result in inaccurate statements, such as developing immunity to a “CB” weapon. Or stating “detection and warning of and countermeasures against these weapons delivery systems normally are in operation regardless of the degree of threat” in spite of the U.S. having no biological detection capability. (Department of the Army 1964)

The 1968 version of FM 100-5 Operations of Army Forces in the Field is another combined document showing a chemical frame. This manual was the capstone document guiding operational doctrine for the Army at the time. It makes extensive use of the NBC acronym, but at one point does break nuclear weapons from chemical and biological weapons refereeing to “…nuclear weapons (often referred to as mass-destruction weapons) and biological or chemical agents,” which are subsequently referred to as

“mass-casualty” weapons. (Department of the Army 1968)

When chemical agents or biological agents are discussed separately from nuclear weapons this manual makes almost exclusive use of a combined chemical/biological weapon class or threat, reflected in section titles such as “Biological and Chemical operations” or “Biological and Chemical Munitions.” The manual does make some

145 references to independent use of chemical weapons, but never references a unique biological attack or defensive event.

The only independent reference to biological weapons in the manual is a brief description of biological agents. The manual highlights the relatively long action of biological agents, noting their lack of applicability to tactical operations. Interestingly the manual then includes biological weapons in a tactical situation when it recommends the use of chemical or biological weapons as appropriate for securing a structure (i.e. a bridge) without causing physical damage.

A general observation is that when compared to manuals written in the 1970’s and

1980’s manuals from this period do the best job in describing biological weapons as a distinct category of weapon. This may be due to the existence of the offensive program which required the military to plan for the use of biological agents on the battlefield, and also provided a larger base of individuals with firsthand knowledge of biological weapons. Both of which would become less pronounced after the President Nixon’s

1969 decision.

MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

The last significant area which shows a predominant chemical frame is medical defense. While the medical/vaccine program appeared driven by external threat during the War, there appears to be a declining emphasis on medical countermeasures as a major contributor to the nation’s defensive posture. The general consensus seemed to be that preventative medicine was the best defense against biological weapons.

146

Hoyt relates that the 1950’s and 1960’s were the heyday of U.S. vaccine production. She cites the military/civilian relationships developed in World War Two, along with a general sense of duty to country by pharmaceutical companies as driving development over this period. She identifies eighteen “new”52 vaccines developed over this time period, a number not matched in any subsequent period of analysis. (Hoyt 2012)

However, there is a general attitude from the DoD that vaccinations would not serve as adequate protection. A 1947 annual report from the Army Medical Research and

Development Board shows little interest in vaccine development, and has no programs dedicated to biological warfare issues. (U.S. Army Surgeon General 1947) What vaccines that were being developed in 1950 focused on diseases such as mumps, more of a concern in crowded barracks than the battlefield. (Committe on Medical Sciences

1960)

Available evidence also indicates countermeasures were not regarded as a significant component the biodefense strategy. An assessment of warfare in the Far East notes “It is believed that immunization against all of the diseases which the Communists could possibly employ in the Far East presents a difficult and impractical technical and administrative problem.” (Pace 1952) A Rand report notes that vaccination is not applicable for all agents. (Tamplin 1962) Miller also notes that the enemy could utilize an agent with no known vaccine, and references the excessive time line associated with developing new vaccines. (D. Miller 1957) The Chief of the Chemical Corps also

52 In her book Hoyt analyzes the number of vaccine licenses which were issued for novel or new vaccines, versus licenses issued for modifications of existing vaccines, such as delivery method or formulation. 147 identifies the fear that a massive attack could overwhelm vaccinations as well as noting the difficulty in predicting which agents would be used. (Creasy 1950)

There is also a concern that antibiotics may not be effective due to the lack of detection capability and the need to administer the drugs prior to the onset of symptoms,

(D. Miller 1957) as well as their lack of effectiveness against viral agents. (Tamplin

1962) However, one report does make the argument that in the case of a large scale biological attack there would be sufficient unexploded ordinance available that an identification could be made (for some organism) in time for antibiotics to be effective.

(Weapons Systems Evaluation Group 1952)

There are also indications that there was a general lack of urgency to develop medical countermeasures, as a medical committee notes concerns over a general lack of communication between the Surgeon General and the Chemical Corps. (Chemcial Corps

Advisory Committee 1958) The same report also notes a bias against vaccines recommending therapeutics be utilized to protect laboratory workers instead of vaccinations. A different report notes that budgetary constraints had prevented the services from acquiring the amounts of countermeasures prescribed by mobilization estimates. (Johnson 1952)

It is evident that there was substantial work by the military and civilian laboratories to produce medical countermeasures to biological weapons over this time period. However, as shown, medical countermeasures were not widely embraced for defense against a biological attack. It is entirely possible that this is a manifestation of a

148 chemical frame, as the idea of prevention (vaccination) or treatment (antibiotics)53 of an attack is foreign to chemical warfare and does not appear to be a significant component of biological defense planning at the time.

CONCLUSIONS - FRAMES

From the evidence presented there is a substantial argument to be made that a strong chemical frame existed during this period. While it appears the chemical frame was overshadowed by external threat during World War Two, the chemical frame emerged in the following years. The distinction between chemical agents and biological agents became blurred over this period and the two weapons were more often than not regarded as one threat or one class of weapon requiring one solution. This combined approach is observable in hardware, doctrine, policy and training. The chemical frame is also evident in organizations outside the military, evidence that it had become engrained within the national lexicon.

The fact that a chemical frame was able to establish itself so early and strongly within the program indicates that the frame was probably already in existence when the

Chemical Corps was given responsibly for the biological program. The establishment of the frame at this point in history creates a condition where for the next 40 years biological defense will be approached through a chemical defense model, setting the stage for some of the issues highlighted by the First Gulf War.

53 Medical treatment of nerve agent is possible, but it is characterized by the administration of an antidote immediate after exposure. It does not reflect the concept of medical diagnosis and treatment which would follow a disease model. 149

While there is substantial evidence of a chemical frame there are other significant events, such as the debate over Large Area Coverage, Project 112, and the decision to end the program that would provide opportunities for other factors to influence the program as well. The next of these theories to be considered is imperialism.

Bureaucratic Politics and Biodefense, 1946-70

From the evidence presented so far it is evident that other factors, beyond external threat, have emerged to exert greater influence in the post war period. While a substantial amount of evidence has been presented as to the emergence of a chemical frame, it is also logical to propose that the changing nature of the threat, changing national policies and the organizational changes could provide environments conducive to imperialistic behavior.

Examining the same historical sources for imperialistic behavior it is possible to find examples of imperialism, such as attempts to justify budget increases by embracing new or vague threat data, selling new capabilities, programmatic confusion, and turf battles between newly established organizations. These turf battles may have been enhanced by the historical realties of the time such as the assignment of the biological mission to the Chemical Corps, the downsizing of the military and the creation of the Air

Force.

However, while there are examples of imperialism over this period, the level of support for this factor does not rise to the support seen for the chemical frame. Part of this may be explained by the fact that within the military missions and responsibilities are

150 usually prescribed by regulation. Therefore, while there can be some external challenge and conflict it will often be resolved when the disagreement reached an appropriate decision authority. Alternatively, it may simply be that a chemical frame or external threat exerted a greater influence over this time period.

EXPANSION OF MISSION AND RESOURCES

The desire to obtain additional funds is an imperialistic behavior predicted by the bureaucratic politics model. For this time period, there are instances of organizations using the chemical, chemical/biological or the CBR threat to justify additional resources. There is no doubt the Chemical Corps used such strategies acquire resources as captured in a description of the Corps arguing for the construction of a chemical production plant.

“One can theorize that immediately following World War II military spending stared to recede significantly. Previously, related unessential projects often had little difficulty getting funded. But in the late 1940’s this was no longer true. To get “big money” the purse holders had to be convinced that a program was absolutely essential to the preservation of democracy. The Chemical Corps convinced the War Department that (1) we had no adequate lethal CW capability, (2) we had to produce more agents quickly and in quantity, especially in view of the fact that the G- agent capability developed by Germany had been taken over by the Russians, (3) that mass casualty weapons such s CW agents were essential for our defense, and (4) that we had the technical knowhow to produce G- Agents. But no one told, or at least convinced, the proper authorities that the U.S. did not have the technical expertise and pilot plant data to support this claim.” (Hylton 1972)

In addition to chemical agents, there is evidence the Chemical Corps viewed the radiological threat as a source of new resources. In the case of radiological weapons in 151

1947 the Research Council re-affirmed the position that the Chemical Corps should have

“full responsibility” for the development of radiological bombs and also put forward the recommendation that other government agencies refer to the Chemical Corps for “all aspect of atomic energy, production and use of fissionable materials and fission products and related subjects.” (Chemical Corps Advisory Board 1947)

Ten years later the Corps was still fighting for the mission and the associated resources. A 1957 memo from the Chief of the Corps re-states the policy assigning radiological warfare to the Chemical Corps, states his views of the “diversification” of

Army effort in the area, then request augmentation to assist with the Chemical Corps executing its assigned duties. (Creasy 1957)

There are examples of the Chemical Corps advocating for biological weapons as well. In a 1950 presentation for the Secretary of Defense the Chemical Corps sells biological weapons stating “it is the considered opinion of the Chemical Corps that attacks with anti-personnel BW agents will be effective.” To fulfill this claim the Corps states it is “essential” it be provided with sufficient funds, personnel and facilities to conduct the appropriate research. The sales pitch also reflects a chemical frame when it talks of off-the-shelf munitions with “no unusual difficulties are predicted in the production of BW munitions and their transportation and delivery on the target.” (Creasy

1950)

In a 1960 report to Congress the Army addressed the CBR threat, highlighted the need for better intelligence and understanding of the threat then made the following recommendation in regards to research funding: 152

“The best immediate guarantee the United States can possess to insure that CBR is not used anywhere against the free world is to have a strong capability in this field too…At the present time, CBR research is supported at a level equivalent to on one one-thousandth of our total defense budge. In light of its potentialities, this committee recommends that serious consideration bet given to the request of Defense officials that this support be at least trebled. Only an increase of such size is likely to speed research to a level of attainment compatible with the efforts of the Communist nations.” (Department of the Army 1960)

This quote demonstrates the interaction of all three theories. First there is clearly a combination of the chemical, biological (and radiological) weapons associated with a chemical frame. Secondly there is a definite realist argument that other un-friendly states posses these weapons and the U.S. must respond in some manner. However, it also demonstrates how an imperialistic organization can utilize a realist argument to support a request for more funding for the organization. Another subtle attempt to sell the biological program is captured in a 1963 Chemical Center report. This report highlights the advantages of a biological attack vs. a nuclear attack when the target has a small industrial base, and a large rural population base (like China). (Milly and Hollingsworth

1963)

Imperialism can also result in organizations developing programs simply to maintain the relevancy of the organization. Programs developed with no clear user and the absence of linkages between programs with user requirements requirement may be evidence of an organization setting its own agenda without regard to the actual threat, or needs of their constituents. There are examples of such behavior in the Chemical Corps through this time period. In 1949 the research council recommends “in spite of the lack 153 of requirements, it is believed that continuation of the development of an integral mechanized flame thrower and request for funds should be vigorously pursued.”54

(Research Council 1949)

There is evidence of similar behavior with regards to biological weapons. For example in the early 1960’s (after the biological program had been in place for several years) the Chemical Corps conducted projects Wasp and Scorpion. These programs were meetings with the Air Force and Navy respectively to establish user needs and requirements for biological weapons.55 Another quote captures the debate over incapacitating agents noting, “General concepts for the use of incapacitating agents have been developed from time to time by the Chemical Corps; however, never has any potential user stated a concept. Thus those presented herein can only be assumed as possible applications.” (Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1962)

LARGE AREA COVERAGE

Incapacitating agents are also related to the military’s attempt to develop a Large

Area Coverage (LAC) weapon. Part of the genesis of the program was an alternative use for biological and chemical weapons in light of increased U.S. nuclear capability. The program was also partly in response to the military attitude adopted by the U.S. reflected by Curtis LeMay who asked “Why don’t you guys make a bomb to blow up all of

54 The Chemical Corps also had responsibility for flame, smoke and obscurants, hence the concern with development of a flamethrower. 55 As with most all other major programs of this nature, Scorpion and Wasp identified issues with chemical and biological weapons. As would be expected from a chemical frame. 154

Russia?” (Kirby 2007) While the LAC story shows imperialistic origins, it ultimately failed due to a chemical frame.

Over this period in history nuclear weapons were being developed, as was associated nuclear doctrine. Kirby relates that early in the Cold War the U.S. was concerned that its supply of nuclear bombs was inadequate for a war with the Soviet

Union, and for a brief time biological weapons were placed at the same organizational level as nuclear weapons. (Kirby 2007) While this may seem a realist based response, the fact that the organization which was established was a chemical/biological organization highlights how an external threat was addressed through a chemical frame.

As the U.S. accumulated greater nuclear capability the interest in the biological program waned but a doctrinal debated emerged as to the role of weapons which affect large areas. This new Large Area Coverage mission served as a potential new mission area for biological (and chemical) weapons. Relative to nuclear weapons the Chemical

Corps held a belief that atomic bombs would be best used against populated areas, but chemical or biological weapons could be better against ground forces dispersed in the field. (Chemcial Corps Advisory Board 1947)

For several years there was confusion over how to conduct the program. A former member of the biological weapons program noted that in the early “research and development suffered because using agencies did not develop doctrine and target requirements for our agents.” (Patrick 2010) In 1950 the Director of the Biological

Department mad a similar statement saying “the service had been given no firm guidance as to the place that BW was to take in overall war plans.” (D. Miller 1952) Miller makes 155 an additional observation that even in after the Air Force had been given a retaliatory mission there was still confusion at the JCS level over the program, and “that there is still a selling job to be done to the people who make the decisions as to whether we step up production.”

Eventually the DoD did issue guidance directing the Air Force deploy an operational biological weapon. As a result the Air Force and Chemical Corps found themselves talking past each other as neither really understood what was needed, and what was technically capable. The Corps found it had oversold its ability to quickly produce and weaponize a biological agent and the Air Force established many arbitrary requirements and deadlines with no understanding of the science. (D. Miller 1957)

Eventually the program did produce a biological weapon utilizing the agent Brucella suis, which presented the service with several unique issues.56

One of the issues with this weapon was the realization that unlike chemical weapons that remained potent for years, this biological agent had a shelf life measured in weeks. As a result the Chemical Corps was required to repeatedly produce and refrigerate new batches of agent to ensure the weapons were available if needed. Even then, if the weapons were to be deployed, the bombs had to be filled and then flown into theater under environmentally controlled conditions. Subsequent evaluation of the weapon by the Weapons System Evaluation Group (WSEG) found that the weapon was inefficient, especially when compared to atomic weapons. (Coggeshall 1952)

56 Brucella suis is the causative bacterial agent for brucellosis. Symptoms of the disease appear approximately 1 week after exposure. The fatality rate is relatively low (5%). However, the disease is debilitating causing fever, malaise, and joint pain. 156

However, in true imperialistic fashion the military spun this negative report in to a bureaucratic win when the Research and Development Board argued that the evaluation was based upon the currently fielded weapon. They argued that the report did not consider alternative more effective agents, nor did it address the fact that biological weapons could spare the physical target. (Whitman 1952) In a subsequent letter

Whitman suggests the Secretary of Defense allocate another $10 million to develop new and better agents, and makes requests for additional facilities and greater participation by the Navy and Air Force. (Whitman 1952a)

Further evidence that the Corps oversold the program is presented a few years later when the President’s Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC) noted “In the past BW and CW have suffered from the overzealous efforts of their protagonists who have attempted to demonstrate these types of warfare are more devastating than nuclear warfare. This thesis could never be substantiated.” The report also noted an issue how the Corps sold the program stating “The justification of offensive programs on the basis of providing information for the defense is an old one and can be overdone.” (Scoville

1959)

The execution of the LAC mission provides evidence for both frames and bureaucratic politics theories. It shows an attempt by the organization to identify a new mission area and an attempt to use Chemical Corps capabilities to fill the new gap. Faced with nuclear weapon and a need for diverse weapons to address the Soviet threat Miller relates “The Chemical Corps... suggested that this requirement might be met by the development of toxicological warfare weapons. No other field appeared so promising.” 157

(D. Miller 1952) The result of the Corps sales pitch was a strong push by the Air Force for an incapacitating biological weapon. This push helped keep the Chemical Corps in business but resulted in a bureaucratic plan executed through a chemical frame.

There is reason to believe that some of the problems associated with the program arose from an attempt to execute it through a chemical frame. Evidence has already been presented as to how biological weapons and chemical weapons were prescribed in the same terms. It has also been noted that the early testimony from Creasy had a chemical frame when he described the benefits of the biological program. The presence of a frame is also reflected in the PSAC report which identified issues with “BW and CW” weapons.

The combined weapons view also negated the full advantage of biological weapons over chemical weapons for area coverage.57 Finally, a chemical frame is observed in the testing of the concept, as the massive thousand mile coverage claims were based upon tests utilizing inert particles.58 (US Army Chemical Corps School 1960)

In addition to issues with weapons themselves, the PSAC identifies behaviors within the Chemical Corps as an organization which are similar to behaviors associated with the chemical frame. The committee notes “I have found that the Chemical Corps, particularly at the higher echelons has lacked imagination.” (Scoville 1959) A similar tone is noted by the President’s Security Advisor who identifies a “lack of creativity and ingenuity” with the Corps applied research of agents and development of defensive items.

(Mares 1959)

57 Pound for pound biological agents offer the greatest efficiency in area contaminated vs. amount of material required. 58 The coverage test focused mainly on the coverage of particulates released at high level. While the tests revealed coverage a thousand miles from the release, little evidence is available to show that tests were conducted to evaluate the ability of agents to survive that long in the environment. 158

While the Chemical Corps seems to execute its imperialistic behavior through a chemical frame, there is at least one example of a civilian agency utilizing the biological threat to justify a program with no chemical program attached. In 1960 the

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security came to the “unequivocal conclusion that the absence of defense against clandestine BW attack is a serious threat to internal security.” To solve this issue they requested $8 million to develop rapid identification and detection capabilities. (National Security Council 1960)

This request resulted in a series of memos ultimately recommending that the request be disapproved, in part due to similar work underway by defense and public health agencies. Of particular interest is that while the request shows a possible imperialistic behavior some of the questions posed by the National Security Council brief clearly indicate the presence of a chemical frame (or as a minimum a general lack of knowledge of biological agents). For example questions are asked as to why the request is limited to biological weapons versus “clandestine attack by other than BW weapons,”59 or questions as to the technical differences between detecting and identifying biological agents.

CONFLICT

Another behavior associated with imperialistic behavior is conflict. This conflict can be external with other organizations, resulting from attempts to obtain new missions.

59 This statement re-enforces the misunderstanding of the nature of biological weapons. While the requesting agency may have appreciated that only biological weapons are truly “clandestine,” the individual preparing the briefing notes did not appreciate it is difficult to have a clandestine nuclear or chemical attack. 159

It can also be internal as leaders within the organization fight to increase the power of their power within the organization.

From the beginning of this period the CWS found itself in organizational conflicts as it was forced to defend its existence. In the post war period serious consideration was given to combining the CWS with the Ordinance Department. In an attempt to secure its future the CWS put forward a multi point argument, including biological weapons as justification for its existence. These points included; a need for a dedicated agency to conduct chemical and biological research, that this research was “new” and (ironically) should not be subject to “shackles of existing weapons and channels of thought,” that

Ordinance was concerned with commercial research and had no experience with biological weapons, and finally a propagandistic approach was needed for effective research programs. (Brophy, Miles and Cochrane 2010) However, from the evidence presented in the previous section, although he Corps was willing to push biological weapons as a justification for existence, it reverted to a chemical frame while executing the subsequent program.

The Air Force became a separate service in 1947 and as a new organization it may have been tempted to acquire as many missions as possible, putting it at conflict with the

Chemical Corps. An Air Force memorandum dated 1953 reflects imperialistic behavior by Air Force relative to chemical and biological weapons. In the memo the Army objects to Air Force plans to evaluate previous Army reports and programs. Also in the memo the (Air Force) author advocates “Wherein the Air Force does not concur with these studies, every effort should be made to resolve the differences between the Army and the 160

RDB in the Air Forces’ favor.” (Seller 1953) Miller also relates that although there was a process to resolve conflict between the Chemical Corps and other services “The fact that many of the technical advisors had some association with the Chemical Corps led them to believe that the Chemical Corps interests received prior consideration.” (D. Miller 1957)

Additional evidence of inter-service friction can be found in 1947 meetings of the research council. In this meeting one member takes a shot at Navy research characterizing it as research for research sake with the “pious hope” that some of it may help the Navy. The council expressed the opinion that this type of research was not an

Army function and should be for the National Science Foundation. (Chemical Corps

Advisory Board 1947) While the initial criticism of the Navy could have led to an imperialistic move, the recommendation to defer to the National Science Foundation shows lack imperialism on the part of the Army.

An exchange of correspondences between the Chemical Corps and NORAD reflects conflict between these two organizations. A 1960 Joint Chiefs of Staff summary of communication from NORAD to the Chemical Corps states NORAD’s responsibility for North America and its requirement to detect chemical and biological weapons. The commander then request that the Chemical Corps meet with NORAD to discuss detection requirements. The exchange of correspondences seems to indicate that input from the

Joint Chiefs of Staff was required to settle the matter and that there was pressure for both organizations to have input into future systems development. (Blouin 1960) Also of interest in this exchange is that while it demonstrates possible tension between the organizations, the initial request by NORAD demonstrates the linkage of weapons 161 indicative of a chemical frame when they request a system to detect enemy employment of chemical and/or biological weapons.

Perhaps the largest conflict the Chemical Corps faced was in 1962 when the

Army abolished the heads of the technical service. Interestingly at the same time the

Chemical Officer advanced a plan to create a DoD wide Armed Forces Special Weapons

Agency which would be responsible for all chemical agent and biological agent development, which at the time was the responsibility of the Chemical Corps.

While at first this proposal appears to make no sense, it does make sense given the timing. At the time the Chemical Corps was facing an impending loss of autonomy over the chemical and biological program. By proposing a DoD level agency it could preserve the integrity of its core functions, as well as creating a high level DoD organization, for which it would be the logical lead. Also of note the proposed plan highlights how the new agency would be able to address requirements from the newly established Project

112, which is discussed in more detail below. (Stubbs 1962)

Ultimately this plan was not adopted, and the Army abolished the Chief Chemical

Officer position and the chemical and biological mission was assumed by Army Material

Command. While the Chemical Corps still existed, it no longer had the exclusive responsibility for chemical and biological weapons as before. 60

While there is evidence of inter-agency competition there are also many examples that imperialism did not dominate every decision. There are numerous instances where

60 From a research standpoint the move to Army Material Command represents a significant absence of subsequent data, as AMC committee records are still classified. 162 the organizations fall in line with established command relationships rather than attempting to make a play for greater authority. There are even examples of organizations willingly offering up mission areas to other organizations.

In 1947 when the Chemical Corps was facing budgetary reductions the Advisory board proposed giving some biological weapons (anti-crop BW agents) research to the

U.S. Department of Agriculture. (Chemical Corps Advisory Board 1947) A 1954 Air

Force request for development of a cluster bomb specifically states that the Chemical

Corps will furnish technical personnel, equipment and facilities to accomplish the project.

(Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1954c) In the Air Force requests for chemical and biological sensors cited above the Air Force cedes that it has no responsibility to develop chemical sensors, and that the Chemical Corps will be the agency responsible for sensor development. (HQ US Air Force 1954) Similar behavior is reflected in the majority of program documents examined from this period.

While such behavior is not indicative of imperialistic behavior, it could have inadvertently served to re-enforce the chemical frame of reference. As the other services went through the Chemical Corps, or relied upon the Corps’ expertise to execute their programs, they perpetuated the Chemical Corps dominance in the field. Their lack of involvement also removed a possible source of a fresh outside perspective on the biological weapons program.

Finally, there is one telling anecdotal example of biological weapons almost falling through the organizational cracks of the Chemical Corps, which would not be expected if biological weapons represented a rich target for imperialistic behavior. It is 163 captured in a historical interview conducted by the Chemical Corps Historian of Sigmund

Eckhaus. When asked about his experiences of being a division chief within the chemical weapons program he responded, referencing a reorganization, “…and when I looked at my job description I found it included BW…” (Smart 1985)

IMPERIALISM AND FIRST USE

A final area of historical importance relative to imperialism and external threat is how the U.S. intended to use its biological and chemical weapons. In his book, Posen proposes the hypothesis that organizational theories (imperialism) would almost always favor offensive doctrine, as offense is better able to justify greater expenditures in materials and research. He also argues that retaliation based strategies are associated with balance of power (realist) theory.

The initial U.S. policy regarding the use of chemical weapons and biological weapons was established by President Roosevelt during the Second World War. He stated that the U.S. would not be the first to use either weapon, but would respond in kind if so attacked. This policy remained until 1954 when President Eisenhower changed U.S. policy such that chemical weapons or biological weapons could be used first in a conflict, but only upon Presidential approval.

While the Eisenhower decision was never publically acknowledged, President

Kennedy continued the Eisenhower policy as part of his flexible response doctrine. In

1966 the Joint Chiefs of Staff advanced a National Security Action Memorandum

(NSAM) arguing for even fewer restrictions on the use of these weapons stating it was

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“in the national interest of the United States to be prepared to employ chemical and biological (CB) weapon to maintain offensive and defensive capability because it could deter their use by an enemy” (Goldman 2009) This proposal was never adopted as debate over it was subsumed within President Nixon’s 1969 policy on chemical weapons and biological weapons which will be discussed in greater detail later.

Looking at the debates behind these decisions it is possible to find many imperialistic statements from the DoD which advocated a greater role for chemical weapons and biological weapons. The 1950 Ad Hoc committee report specifically calls out the U.S policy of retaliation as detrimental to our national security. (Ad Hoc

Committee 1950) The Technical Committee raises the concern again in 1954 when it cautions that the fact chemical weapons have only previously been used in retaliation must “not deter achievement of realistic preparedness in chemical or biological warfare.”

The same report also contains guidance from the Secretary of Defense directing the services to maintain “offensive and defensive CW-BW” training. (C. Wilson 1954)

Department of Defense policy in 1956 reflects similar concerns, stating that forces “must be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons” and that these weapons would be used to “enhance the effectiveness of the armed forces.” (Robertson 1956)

As Posen proposes offense is attributed with more resources, so some of these statements may be the result of imperialistic organizations chasing funds. For example,

Goldman contends the 1956 decision by Eisenhower was partly influenced by the perception that the “military services were not adequately funding fundamental R&D in the field because they were uninterested in purely retaliatory weapons.” (Goldman 2009) 165

This thought is echoed in the Air Force history which notes the “retaliation only” policy had placed a low priority on the biological program, hindering research and development.

(D. Miller 1957)

Goldman’s contention may be true because just a couple of years after President

Eisenhower’s decision the perception of biological weapons had changed. In 1959 “The

Chemical Corps mission reached a height of emphasis unprecedented since WWII. The military services were submitting requirements for BW munitions, which included dissemination means for artillery, missiles, drones and other lesser weapon systems.”

(Department of the Army 1977) There is also evidence that President Eisenhower’s change in policy created momentum to further alter funding and doctrine. National

Security Council meeting notes from 1960 reflect concern from the budget director who stated “We were spending too much money on chemical and biological weapons if we did not intend to use them and too little money if we did.” The notes then identify future work in developing incapacitating chemical agents and biological agents as work important to the nation. (National Security Council 1960)

While these behaviors indicate imperialistic behavior, it is important to note that when these policies and programs were debated, they were always addressed as a combined chemical/biological program, indicative of a chemical frame. As stated by

Miller, “biological warfare was associated so closely with chemical warfare that the policy for both was assumed to be the same. (D. Miller 1957) It was not until the decision by President Nixon that the U.S. differentiated between the use of biological weapons or chemical weapons. So while imperialistic behaviors may have exerted some influence 166 over these decisions, they were consistently executed through the lens of a chemical frame.

CONCLUSIONS

Like organizational frames, bureaucratic politics was overshadowed by realism in the World War Two period. As the overt external threat from World War Two faded, and the country faced the new external threat of the cold war, it could be expected that imperialism would emerge as a dominant influence over this time period.

It is clear that the Chemical Corps exhibited imperialistic behaviors. Some of the programs, organizational conflicts and attempts to justify organizational relevance are consistent with predicted behaviors. There is evidence of the Corps utilizing, smoke, incapacitating agents, nerve agents, biological agents and radiological agents as threats to support an imperialistic agenda.

However, when the Corps did advocate its biological capabilities to justify a program it was often combined with a chemical program. What is generally not observed within these programs is the independent biological threat predicted by the bureaucratic politics mode. The lack of this indicator means that while the programmatic decisions appear imperialist, most of the execution utilizes a chemical weapons approach or a combined chemical/biological threat. Thus, these data points indicate when the Corps was subject to imperialistic behavior, it was most often accomplished through a chemical frame.

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The lack of significant imperialistic influence over the program is a negative for

U.S. biological posture. Facing a stagnant program, competition generated by imperialism can force organizations to create new programs and new approaches to justify their existence. Therefore imperialism can serve as a counter to an organizational frame, and help move a program in a new direction. However, what these data show is that even when new programs were proposed, the chemical frame was too strong, and new ideas ultimately ended up being executed through a chemical centric approach.

Realism and Biodefense, 1946-70

For the World War Two period, it has been demonstrated that the fear of a

Japanese and then German biological program drove the development of the U.S program. There is reason to believe, even though open hostilities had ended, external threat would continue to drive the program. First of all, the external threat was rapidly filled by the Soviet Union. Secondly, this is the only time period of analysis in which the

U.S. had an active biological program with operational weapons.

As the victor in World War Two the United States was able obtain ground truth information on the state of German and Japanese biological weapons programs. As already discussed it was in part concern of a Japanese biological program which initiated

U.S. work in biological weapons. Fears of German biological weapons were also cited in many threat assessments from the war period.

In the case of Germany it was discovered that the Germans did not have a large biological weapons effort. However, of great concern, it was discovered the Germans

168 had made substantial advances in chemical warfare, having developed “G” nerve agents.

Also of great importance to the realist was the fact that the Soviets had captured significant portions of the German chemical production infrastructure, potentially placing the U.S. at a disadvantage in chemical agent production capability. (Wiseman 1951)

The Japanese, on the other hand, revealed a large and aggressive biological weapons research program including reports of possible weapons use in China, as well as large scale testing of agents on human prisoners. The extent of the program is captured in detail in Harris’ book Factories of Death. (Harris 2002) Harris also documents the subsequent efforts of U.S. and Soviet governments in their attempts to acquire access to

Japanese biological researches and the data they obtained from their test program.

While there is some debate as to how far the Japanese progressed with their program, and how useful the information obtained by the U.S. was, the realist could point to concrete evidence that an enemy state had allocated significant resources to biological weapons. The U.S. also knew that the Soviet Union had likely obtained as much

Japanese data on biological weapons as they had.

A source of debate (which continues today) over the biological threat is the fact that biological weapons have never seen large scale battlefield use. This is significant in that for most weapons it is possible for the U.S. to frame the threat based upon an actual historical use of the weapon, which is not possible for biological weapons. However, unique to this time period, the U.S. had an active weapons program. The program served as a source of test data and information on the effectiveness and threat posed by biological weapons. Access to these data should have allowed the U.S. to make the most 169 concrete threat based decisions relative to any other time period examined in this work.

Access to this information would provide valuable data to decision makers utilizing a realist model.

PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT

One way to assess the importance the U.S. placed on the biological threat by looking at statements made by high level officials and intelligence estimates. While a rational actor would be able to find evidence within these statements to support a Soviet biological threat there are also questions as to the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence capabilities. The estimates also reflect a general feeling that Soviet chemical capabilities were greater that its biological capabilities, an important delineation for a rational actor decision model.

As early as 1949 there was concern in the government that the Soviets were prepared for biological warfare, and would use it in a large scale war. (D. Miller 1952) In

1950 an Ad Hoc Committee was commissioned by the Secretary of Defense to assess biological and chemical weapons. The committee puts forth several key points which reflect a rational assessment of biological weapons relative to chemical weapons.

Specifically the committee found that the chemical threat was more concrete based upon prior use in warfare. They also noted the Soviets had a substantial stockpile of G agents, as well as captured German production facilities and technicians.

However, the committee did not dismiss the threat from biological weapons. The committee assessed that biological weapons may become exceedingly important, and that

170 the U.S. was at danger from a variety of possible biological attacks. Overall the committee found that the U.S. was not prepared for biological warfare or chemical warfare. They blame indecisiveness associated with the post war period as contributing to this lack of ability and recommend increase assets be given to the biological and chemical weapons programs. (Ad Hoc Committee 1950)

The concern over biological weapons expressed by the committee is echoed in intelligence estimates from several different government agencies. A 1951 report states a

“high probability” that the Soviets had a biological program while also stating the Soviets had a “known” chemical program. (Central Intelligence Agency 1951) A 1952 CIA memo concludes “The USSR is well aware of the basic principles or Biological Warfare and has the capabilities to produce BW agents and munitions” and also states, “In general Biological Warfare…is a serious threat which must have a place in all planning for defense.” (Central Intelligence Agency 1952) Another 1952 CIA document estimates the Soviet military had capabilities to “Carry out sabotage and clandestine attacks against

U.S. and its allies with atomic, biological and chemical weapons” (Central Intelligence

Agency 1952)

A 1954 Air Force assessment of current intelligence “establishes the capability of the enemy to wage biological warfare against the United States.” (Chemical Corps

Technical Committee 1954) The threat was not confined to European battlefields as in

1960 NORAD stated a concern with chemical and/or biological agents being employed in

North America. (North American Air Defense Command 1960) Meeting notes from the

National Security Council in 1960 reflect the attitude that the “US has a relatively poor 171 posture vis-à-vis the USSR,” noting the U.S. only had 1/30th the troops trained in chemical/biological operations that the Soviets had. Interestingly these notes also capture a subsequent discussion on incapacitating agents, and notes “bright” prospects for the

U.S. “CB” program. (National Security Council 1960)

It is also possible to find quotes taken from the Soviet Union referencing their weapons capabilities. Several of these statements are presented in a 1960 U.S. Army report to Congress. The Army cites a quote which appears to establish a biological component to Soviet doctrine, citing “Soviet Admiral Gorshikov has stated that future war will be characterized by ‘various means of mass destruction, such as atomic, thermonuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons.’” They also provide evidence that the Soviets were pursuing the development of biological weapons stating;

“Soviet medical and technical reports which have been published show that they are equally, well-versed in biological warfare. Their BW tests have been conducted over a long period of time. Their drug industry is capable of supporting large-scale BW on short notice... Soviet General Drugoves said: Many of our scientists ‘regard research on the actions of poisons and on the development of antidotes to be their patriotic duty’” (Department of the Army 1960)

While there are many statements of a biological threat, there are also statements that lack confidence in the biological threat. A 1952 memo describes intelligent on the

Soviet biological as “sparse” and “does not provide a satisfactory basis for overall evaluation.” (Lovett 1952) Writing five years after her first history Miller’s view of the available biological intelligence had dropped, noting the U.S. was unable to identify one

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Soviet production facility. Yet in spite of this (and reflected in the statements above from subsequent time periods) there was still a general feeling that the soviets had a biological program. (D. Miller 1957) A 1969 CIA report also reflects a decreases assessment of

Soviet biological capability. Whereas the 1951 report assesses a “high probability” that the Soviets had a biological program, in 1969 Soviet biological capability was described as “conducting research and development on the possible military application.” The same report describes chemical weapons as a “known” Soviet capability. (Director of

Central Intelligence 1969)

While intelligence estimates were questionable, the U.S. did have one known factor that was available to assist in the threat calculation; the U.S. offensive program.

While the U.S. program did not always deliver as promised, by the end of the 1960’s the

U.S. had a well developed biological capability which demonstrated the biological threat.

The U.S. had matured its program to a point where the military had demonstrated the capability to contaminate over a hundred square miles with a single aircraft. (J. Tucker

2002) As intelligence threats are often based upon mirror images of one’s own capabilities, it is reasonable to expect we assumed the Soviets had the same capability.

Based upon the conflicting intelligence information it is impossible to make an absolute case that the external threat was crystal clear and was driving U.S. posture. It is possible to speculate that individuals interested in advancing a particular program would be able to find an appropriate intelligence estimate to justify their proposal. Based solely on intelligence estimates the best argument that could be made is that external threat

173 could be used to support imperialistic programs as needed, and that the chemical threat was more concrete than the biological threat.

VULNERABILITIES

If a state believes it faces a threat, realism predicts that it will take action to alleviate the threat. Regardless of the accuracy of the intelligence, the U.S. did believe that biological weapons were a threat, and that the nation lagged the Soviet Union.

There are examples that show the U.S. was concerned with its biological and weapons capability and felt it was in an inferior position relative to the Soviet Union. A

1952 memo to the Secretary of Defense expresses concern over current U.S. capabilities stating; “If the signal to ‘retaliate’ were given tomorrow, or even within the next year, the

United States could make little more than a token effort. While there is a greater awareness of the need for CW and BW readiness, the accelerated programs in these fields probably will not place the United States in a position to have a significant CW and BW capability before mid-1954.”61 (C. E. Hutchin 1952)

This feeling was still present in 1962 when Major General Stubbs (chief of the

Chemical Corps) testified as Soviet capabilities to arm ICBM’s with dry biological agents and achieve 30% casualties in the total of the U.S. In the same hearing the Army Chief of Research and Development testified that one sixth of Soviet ground potential in

61 This date seems to constantly slip with each new program, as will be evidenced in this section. The continued change in the expected date of operational readiness could be due to technical complications. It could also reflect that the country was paying lip service only to the external threat, and not really allocating the appropriate resources to fully implement the programs. 174

Europe was chemical. Stubbs concluded by confirming that in his opinion there was a chemical and biological “gap” between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. (Baar 1960)

The realism model also predicts that national capabilities should be proportional to the degree of the perceived threat. There are several examples showing concern over the need for greater understanding of the threat, and statements directing the program to respond as dictated by the threat.

For example in 1954 the SECDEF directed departments to develop defensive readiness based upon threat and called for greater intelligence collection. (Chemical

Corps Technical Committee 1954a) The defense department also directly told agencies

“To develop and maintain an adequate defensive posture…based upon estimates of potential enemy capabilities.” (Department of Defense 1954) In 1955 the Chemical

Corps took a realist approach to justify its program stating “foreign research and development, will be studied to insure an essential margin of superiority in our weapons and equipment.” (Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1955a) Likewise the Air Force stated a requirement for biological detection system that was consistent with the intelligence information that the agents were available to potential enemy nations.

(Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1954)

THE MILITARY RESPONSE

As the U.S. perceived an external threat from chemical and biological weapons, and then assessed that as a state it was vulnerable to the threat, realism predicts that the state will take action to counter the threat. Defensive actions reduced vulnerabilities, and

175 offensive actions increased relative power, combined these actions would balance the perceived Soviet advantage in this area.

One of the first actions taken by the U.S. was to increase its biological weapons capability. There is plenty of evidence that the nation feared Soviet use of chemical weapons and biological weapons and that it indented to use them itself in battle if needed.

The short lived high priority Air Force CW/BW office is explained by the nation seeking to increase its relative power vs. the Soviet Union in the face of a perceived weakness in nuclear weapons.62 (Kirby 2007)

In 1952 the SECDEF issued a directive relative to chemical warfare and biological warfare that “the three military departments were directed to increase their support of, and participation in programs to bring us to the required state of readiness.”

Some specific service responses to this direction included; the Army allocated funds for a second GB production facility, increased inter-service and scientific assessment of requirements, development of navy chemical warfare and biological warfare doctrine, and a time phased Air Force plan to have CW-BW capabilities by 1954. (C. E. Hutchin

1952)

Two years later the SECDEF issued additional guidance relative to chemical weapons and biological weapons. This guidance contained general recommendations that had greater emphasis offensive chemical warfare than biological warfare. In areas such as intelligence, defense and training the guidance utilized a combined chemical

62 Two items of note in regards to this office. One, it is a Chem/bio office reflective of a chemical frame. Second, this was an Air Force organization, and primary responsibility for biological weapons remained with the Army. 176 agent/biological agent view. Regarding chemical weapons, direction was issued giving chemical ammunition the same priority as conventional ammunition, stockpiling of offensive and defensive material was directed, and maximum effort was given to the fielding of the agent GB. Biological weapons received less operational priority but continued research and development was directed with an emphasis on the development of a lethal agent/munitions combination by July of 1955. (Office of the Adjutant General

1954)

In addition to directing research and development of hardware the U.S. took actions to improve the capabilities of its operational forces relative to the threat. Realism predicts the military would develop doctrine and increase training (offensive and defensive) to address the realities of the new weapons. Several of the training documents produced over this period have already been examined in the frames section. They show that the U.S. was taking steps to address chemical threat and biological threat, but often the chemical frame resulted in inadequate biological training. There are a few additional pieces of data which show the external threat/training relationship.

For example the 1952 SECDEF memo cited above directs the services to address readiness issues partly through enhanced training. Additional guidance from the

Department of Defense also directed services to “insure that training in offensive and defensive biological and chemical warfare keeps pace with the development of doctrine, tactics and techniques. (Department of Defense 1954) There are examples of the services taking action to improve training. A 1954 CCTC memo regarding the status of CBR is critical of current chemical training calling for a “considerable increase in emphasis on 177 training in the light of Soviet G-Gas capability in the past year.” The same memo also addresses the radiological threat, calling it an “Increasingly important part of field exercises.” 63 (Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1954a)

In addition to defensive training, the DoD developed doctrine for employment of chemical weapons and biological weapons. As the U.S. programs matured, the DoD considered chemical agents and biological agents as options for future battle and developed doctrine for their use. A 1950 Air Force war plan assumed that by 1954 strategic bombers would deliver nuclear and biological weapons on the same strike mission. (D. Miller 1952) A1962 memo from the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the services to “Immediately evaluate and modify operational plans as necessary, to provide for the specific employment of chemical and biological weapons, so as to be prepared for the use of these weapons if directed. Stockpiles of modern munitions should be strategically positioned to support these operational plans as soon as possible.” (Joint

Chiefs of Staff 1962)

By these actions it is clear that the U.S perceived biological weapons as both a threat to the nation and as weapon to be used in future wars. The actions to increase defenses and increase weapons capabilities represent two power balancing actions by reducing vulnerability, and at the same time increasing offensive capability. However it needs to be noted, that the majority of the policies addressing biological weapons were joint, addressing chemical weapons and biological weapons in the same power equation.

63 Note there is no reference to biological weapons training 178

PROJECT 112

One of the most intriguing programmatic responses occurs towards the end of this time period. Under Secretary McNamara a comprehensive review of the U.S. military was initiated. The 112th program to be reviewed was the chemical and biological program. From this review a multi-year test program, Project 112 was developed. It was also important to note that this program was developed at the same time the Kennedy administration was investigating the “flexible response” national strategy.

Most of the information regarding Project 112 remains classified today. Forced by Congress to reveal the basic details of the program the DoD revealed that the program consisted of 54 named test, with each named test composed of a series of sub-tests. The testes involved either chemical agents, or biological agents sometimes live and sometimes simulated. Some tests even utilized human volunteers. While some of the imperialistic implications of the program have already been discussed, there is also an external threat component to the program as related in testimony.

In recent statements before Congress the program is defended as purely defensive in nature, developed as a direct response to the external threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Examples of such statements include; “This project, conducted during the 1960’s through the early 1970’s, had similar purpose in U.S. military efforts to remain an superpower during the cold War,” (Committee on Vetrans Affairs 2002) and “The results of the testing program were used to develop defense mechanism against enemies’ potential use of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons.” (Committee on Vetrans Affairs 2003)

179

However, there is one reference to offensive testing when a member of the committee states “but we were testing, at least in part, for offensive application, as you stated earlier, we stopped this when we changed our doctrine on the use of chemical weapons as an offensive tool” (Committee on Vetrans Affairs 2002) Likewise a 1962

Chemical Corps memo also hints to offensive and defensive considerations when it is described affects to date of the program as “increased awareness at various levels of command of the potentially of an adequate CBR capacity, and an increased interest in the problems attendant to the achievement of this capability.” The same memo also mentions the financial benefits to the Chemical Corps from the program such as; new requirements from other services, issuances of money, advancements on multiple new munitions programs and additional funding for production facilities. (Stubbs 1962a)

Table 3: Summary of Tests Performed Under Project 112, 1963-74 Year Biological Live Agent Chemical Live Agent 1963 4 0 2 1 1964 4 1 3 3 1965 3 0 7 6 1966 3 0 6 5 1967 3 2 1 1 1968 2 0 3 3 1969 3 1 3 1 1970 3 0 1 0 1971 No Tests No Tests 1972 No Tests No Tests 1973 1 0 0 0 1974 0 0 2 0

Totals 26 4 28 20 (Force Health Protection 2003)

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While almost all of the information on the program remains classified, the DoD has published a web site which lists the type of test and date performed. From this data

26 tests were biological in nature, 4 of which utilized live agents. Likewise there were 28 chemical tests, 20 of which use live agent.64 The table also reveals the impact President

Nixon’s decision had on the testing program, as the program essentially ended in 1970.

The ratio of chemical tests to biological tests is relatively even, although there is a higher prevalence of live agent testing involving chemical agents. This balance is not often observed in other programs of the time, and may indicate a greater external threat influence over the program versus the chemical frame.

One other note of interest is that of the tests designed to test employment of an actual weapon delivery system, chemical agent tests outnumbered biological agent tests twelve to six. This may indicate chemical weapons doctrine was more advanced, or it may be a continuation of the chemical frame behavior of intending to utilize chemical dispersal methods for biological agents.

Looking at the purpose of the tests many are defensive in nature, designed to test the effectiveness of protective equipment. Some were developed directly from external threat such as observations of Soviet long range bombers equipped with heated bomb bays.65 Many, though, showed the influence of Vietnam. There were several tests that examined the ability of chemical agents as well as biological agents to penetrated and disperse within jungle canopies, especially in the mid 1960’s. Such tests indicate a strong

64 These are the numbers of named test programs. Each named program consisted of several sub- tests. The total number of tests performed could easily range from 500 to over 1000. 65 Heated bomb bays would indicate the aircraft was modified to carry biological agents which would be degraded if exposed to ambient conditions at flight altitude. 181 external threat influence over the program, although it is not clear if the biological tests were conducted in a manner that would be indicative of a chemical frame. (Force Health

Protection 2003)

FINANCIAL RESPONSE

Changes in doctrine or programs are associated with changes in resource allocation. Realism predicts that resources will be allocated relative to the threat. It is possible to see changes in funding levels which correlate to some of the significant historical events already discussed.

The biological program suffered in resources immediately after World War Two.

For example, the number of personnel involved in the program dropped from 4,000 to

400 the year after the war ended. (D. Miller 1952) The 1950 Ad Hoc Committee also noted the low level of resources. It contained specific references to Soviet biological capabilities and corresponding weakness in U.S biological capabilities while noting inadequacy in funding for biological weapons research. (Ad Hoc Committee 1950) At this point the budget for the program was $5.6 million in 1950, $8.8 million in 1951 and

$ 7.6 million for 1952. (D. Miller 1957) The Ad Hoc report was issued just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. The increased threat from the wartime environment helped secure some of the additional funding advocated by the report, as well as placed pressure on the Chemical Corps to accelerate implementation of the committee’s recommendations.66 (Department of the Army 1977)

66 Interestingly, in the available data there is little reference to the Korean War. 182

In the years after the Korean War, the Corps was faced with another drawdown.

While statements have already been cited demonstrating concern over the external threat, budget and personnel allocations did not always correlate. In 1956 the Corps noted a

$1.8 million decrease in funding, to the lowest level since 1952. The same report also notes the Corps was unable to fill five percent of its authorized positions. (Chemical

Corps 1956) As already discussed in 1954 President Eisenhower changed U.S. policy in reference to first use of chemical weapons and biological weapons. It is possible to observe requests for increased in funding after this announcement. In 1959 the Secretary for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation recommended a fivefold expansion over a five year period. (Department of the Army 1977) In 1960 the recommendation was made to treble the investment in biological weapons, with a note that the entire CBR budget for 1960 of $35 million was 1/1000 of the defense budget. (Department of the

Army 1960)

As already discussed, in 1961 President Kennedy increased emphasis on incapacitating agents, as well as implemented Project 112. Some of the financial resources dedicated to the biological program as a result of the project included; resuming the anti-crop program, starting work on Q fever, starting work on tularemia, establishment of the Desert Test Center, an allocation of $20 million for Pine Bluff 67 and

$2.3 million for the acquisition of broad spectrum antibiotics. (Department of the Army

1977)

67 Pine Bluff was a biological production facility 183

The increase in programs and testing associated with the program were matched by increases in funding. Funding in the years prior to Project 112 (1958-60) averaged about $40 million per year. (Department of Defense 1970) In the subsequent years funding for the entire program doubled from a projected $206 million to $412 million for the 1964-68 time frame (Goldman 2009) of which the biological program’s share grew to

$38 million in 1966. This figure matched the entire chemical and biological program budget from only eight years prior. 68 (Department of the Army 1977)

It is not possible to make an argument that all the increases in funding are entirely based upon external threat. The increase in funding associated with the Korean War is easily predicted by realism. The increase in funding after President Eisenhower’s change in doctrine could be explained by a technical definition of realism in that when the head of state changes policy, the state’s organizations take action to follow the new policy.

However as Goldman stated the military lobbied for the change (possibly by overselling incapacitating agents?) in order to justify increases in funding, implying imperialism may have had a role in this increase. (Goldman 2009)

Finally Project 112 may represent both external threat and imperialistic influences. It is possible to argue, as reflected in the cited Congressional testimony that the project and its associated funding were in response to perceived external threat, clearly a realist based interpretation. However, it is difficult to identify a historical event which brought about such a significant change in external threat to justify the massive

68 The biological program was still receiving fewer resources than the chemical program as this number is only 1/3 of the entire program budget of $115 million for1966. 184 increases. The best realist argument that can be made is that the program was initiated due to a “weak” military and a need to catch up with the Soviet Union.

However, this program also began at the same time as President Kennedy was implementing the “flexible response” doctrine. This could be interpreted as a realist attempt to expand state power, as in some ways the President is the state. However, it is also possible to make an imperialistic based interpretation. If the decision was based upon an arbitrary decision, or a new Secretary’s interpretation of military mission the program begins to appear bureaucratic in nature. It is also possible, much as the

Chemical Corps used the LAC mission to advocate for new funds, the military viewed flexible response as a new mission area. The incapacitating agents under development by the programs would fit well with this doctrine. Once established this program would serve, as many government programs do, as a perfect way to perpetuate funding for testing and new weapon development.

CONCLUSIONS - REALISM

Examining the data presented in this section it is possible to find evidence that the

U.S. did respond in some instances to the external threat as predicted by realism. The state faced a new threat, assessed its vulnerabilities and then took steps to reduce that vulnerability. Therefore, it must be concluded that external threat influenced the U.S. biological posture over this time period.

However, the fact that there is evidence for behavior predicted by realism does not necessarily mean that the influence exerted by external threat dominated the U.S.

185 posture over this period. Evidence of realism dominance would include not only recognition of the threat, but a respond based upon perceived severity of each individual threat. From the intelligence it was acknowledged that the chemical threat was concrete, while the Soviet biological threat was assumed but never conclusively proven.

A purely realist response to this threat picture would require a separation of the threat posed from biological agents from the threat posed by chemical agents. In the case of biological weapons, a realist response would be demonstrated by an allocation of resources relative to how the biological weapons threat ranked relative not only to chemical weapons but also to the nuclear and conventional threats facing the U.S. at the time.

Examination of the defensive programs does reveal a bias towards chemical weapons, possibly as a result of the external threat influence. What does not reflect the greater chemical threat is fact that the majority of the behaviors are based upon a combined threat. The presence of the combined threat is not predicted by the external threat model but is associated with the chemical frame. Therefore it is not possible to state external threat was the dominant factor influencing U.S. posture for this time period.

Instead this is another example of input from one factor be executed through a chemical frame.

The Decision to End the Biological Program

Beyond the decision to initiate a biological program, the decision to end the offensive program was the most significant event to affect U.S. biological posture. While

186 some of the details surrounding this decision have already been discussed, a more detailed examination of this decision shows how all three theories interact, and ultimately how a chemical frame results in the elimination of the U.S. biological program.69

These events are significant to the realist augment, as the military was involved in the Vietnam War, and considered riot control agents, as well as herbicides as important weapons in the war. The fight to retain these weapons was not only internal to the U.S. but within the United Nations as well. In 1966 Hungary had proposed a resolution to the

United Nations declaring any use of chemical or biological weapons a crime. The U.S., and in particular the DoD was against this resolution, as the JCS understood it was to

“politically imperiled current United States policies in the use of riot control, incapacitating, defoliant and anti-crop agents.” (Wheeler 1966) In subsequent correspondence the military is explicit in making sure the U.S. response is worded to discriminate between “poisonous” agents and “incapacitating agents,” reflecting the priority placed upon herbicides and tear gas by the DoD. (Kirn 1966)

While the U.N. resolution was ultimately amended allowing, the U.S. to continue its current employment strategy, this incident highlighted the importance the DoD placed upon riot control and herbicides. The debate also foreshadowed the issues that would be raised two years later in an internal debate to determine the fate of the entire program.

The beginning of the decision to end the program coincides with the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s National Security Action Memorandum from 1966 which has already

69 Unless otherwise cited the history of this decision is derived from articles by Goodman and Tucker. (J. Tucker 2002) (Goldman 2009) 187 discussed. Just as the military was advocating fewer restrictions on the use of chemical agents and biological agents, in particular incapacitating agents, a series of events brought the program under increased scrutiny from Congress and the public. In 1968 the sheep kill in Skull Valley Utah took place. While at the time it was not widely reported, when this incident was combined with revelations that the U.S. was dumping old chemical weapons in the ocean70 the public became concerned and demanded action. In response to Congressional pressure President Nixon issued National Security Study

Memorandum (NSSM) 59 in May of 1969, directing a review of both chemical weapons and biological weapons. Subsequent to the issuing of the NSSM a chemical accident in

Okinawa forced the Army to reveal that it had chemical stockpiles in Japan and

Germany, which were put in place without the express knowledge of the host governments.

Initially the DoD responded to the review by advocating a position which increased the role of chemical and biological weapons in the national strategy, and retaining the first use policy.71 However, the DoD was facing an increasingly negative public perception of the chemical program and biological program. As the different departments announced their positions the DoD found itself the only one advocating such an increase in the role of these weapons.

As the review directed a review of both chemical and biological weapons, the

DoD also found itself at odds with itself over the effectiveness of biological weapons.

70 This practice was referred to as CHASE, which stands for Cut Holes And Sink Em. Under this program old munitions were loaded on obsolete ships, which were then towed out to sea and sunk. 71 First use with Presidential authorization. 188

While the JCS submitted a report reflecting the utility of chemical weapons and biological weapons, the PSAC submitted a report stating that biological weapons were un-reliable and were less effective than chemical weapons based upon their relatively short shelf life. (J. Tucker 2002) Based upon the conflicting reports Secretary Liard withdrew the JCS report and re-assigned responsibility for the DoD assessment of biological weapons to the Office of International Security Affairs.

Tucker notes that the ISA office was under-staffed and inexperienced in chemical and biological weapons so it ended up relying heavily upon the PSAC report to formulate the DoD position, moving the DoD’s position much closer to the position taken by the

Department of State. At the same time Congress had legislatively linked chemical agents and biological agents as one program through the McIntyre Amendment which placed prohibitive restrictions on funding and oversight of the programs, with no distinction between the two weapons classes.

By the time the principle agencies met to make a final decision, the only attendee in favor of retaining both chemical weapons and biological weapons was the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Wheeler quickly realized he was outnumbered, as “The civilian members of the NSC, however, quickly formed a united front in opposing the arguments of the Joint Chiefs.” (J. Tucker 2002) The best the military could get from the meeting was to make a stand over retaining riot control and herbicide agents, sacrificing the biological program and the offensive use of chemical weapons to do so. The final decision was announced on November 25, 1969 when President Nixon renounced use of lethal, as well as all other methods of biological warfare under all circumstances. The 189

President also stated that the U.S. would continue to have a defensive research program.

(H. Kissinger 1969)

While it would seem this declaration ended the problem, the issue of biological toxins was then raised. The JCS expressed a desire to retain production of incapacitating toxins, recommending they be considered chemical weapons. (National Security Council

1970) This resulted in President Nixon issuing National Security Study Memorandum

85, directing a review of U.S. policy towards toxins. (H. Kissinger 1969a) After debate on similarity of bacterial and toxin production and the ability to synthetically synthesize toxins the President decided the U.S. policy on toxins would mirror his previous statement on biological warfare.

Looking at this particular decision point it is possible to see how all three theories are at work, and how organizational frames played a significant role in the final decision.

There are two significant realist components to the final decision. Most significantly the military was involved in the Vietnam War, and was heavily reliant upon herbicides and riot control agents. Relative to this concrete need, biological weapons and even offensive lethal chemical weapons were judged as less important, and were used by the military as bargaining chips in order to keep what it considered its most important weapon at the time.

A second realist component is based upon the results of the Project 112 tests, which demonstrated the potential of biological weapons. While it has never been officially stated, several authors have proposed that the U.S. was actually scared by the biological capability it had developed, and intentionally gave up the biological program. 190

The logic behind this argument was part disinformation and partly to prevent a full scale international biological arms race.

When discussing the internal debates Tucker makes a series of statements which demonstrate how imperialistic behaviors were also influencing the decision making process. For example:

“Laird had become increasingly concerned that the NSSM study process was out of control….Because the NSSM study groups were autonomous, it was not clear to him how the various issues and options were being chosen and why. Laird worried that the opinions would simply reflect the prejudices and parochial interest of bureaucrats far down the chain of command”

Noting the decision to move the report from the JCS to the ISA Tucker notes,

“Laird…intended to serve only one term as secretary in pursuit of a defined set of policy goals, he did not hesitate to take independent position from those of the uniformed military. On the issues of biological weapons, he showed no ‘downward loyalty’ to the

Army Chief of Staff.”

Finally, in language reflective of Wilson’s arguments about the power of constituencies he identifies a “Lack of institutional support for biological warfare from within the armed services—with the sole exception of the Army, which defended the interest of the Chemical Corps” 72 and notes, “Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons,

72 This highlights a danger with increased autonomy. While keeping control of the program gave the Chemical Corps power, it also prevented the other services from developing a strong investment in the program. As a result, they had much less to lose when the program was identified for cuts and made little effort to fight for the program. 191 biological weapons did not have powerful constituencies either inside or outside the U.S. government.” (J. Tucker 2002)

While these examples show the interplay of external threat and imperialism within the decision process, an important point to remember is that the decision to terminate the biological program arose from a series of chemical accidents. Prior to the accidents the public and even members of the countries’ leadership were un-aware of the biological program. However, the response to the accidents was to review the

“chemical/biological” program, an action strongly indicative of a chemical frame. It is also interesting to note that although NBC term is ubiquitous within the military, nuclear weapons were not included for review, showing the severability of nuclear, but the tight chemical/biological association.

It can also be argued that because of the significant amount of effort that went into drafting this policy, at least some high level officials realized the difference between chemical agents and biological agents and, at least temporarily, broke the chemical frame. Leading up to the decision one official suggested “CBW” be broken into seven distinct categories to facilitate decision making. (Halperin 1969) By executive order

President Nixon officially broke the frame (at least on paper) on November 25 1969 when he decided that “The term chemical and biological warfare (CBW) will no longer be used. The reverence henceforth should bet to the two categories separately – The

Chemical Warfare Program and the Biological Research Program.” (H. Kissinger 1969)

This guidance was then expanded upon by Secretary Laird who issued his own directive on CBW terminology. He states it “connotes a general interrelationship 192 between chemical and biological fields when, in fact, no such relationship exits.” He further states that “it is virtually impossible however, to conceive of the circumstances in which chemical warfare and biological warfare, in a simultaneous or joint way, would be planned for and implemented.” Finally he addresses the perception perpetuated by the combined term stating its use “… will continue to confuse the American public, our allies, our potential adversaries, and even those in our own government responsible for defense programs.” (Laird 1969) The fact that officials of such high positions within the

U.S. government had to issue directives on how these two programs were to be viewed indicates how strong and widespread the chemical frame had become.

To summarize the interaction of the three theories in this decision, it was the chemical frame, which drug the biological program into the review as it was viewed as part of the chemical program. Then after the military was forced to assess the benefits of both programs was the frame broken in favor of the need to address an external threat

(Vietnam) which was solved in a bureaucratically negotiated compromise.

Conclusion - 1946-1970

The overall conclusion drawn for this time period is that a chemical frame exerted the strongest influence over the status of the U.S biological posture. Even when other factors were influencing U.S. actions, more often than not these actions were executed through a chemical frame.

This period in history saw the rise of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the

Cold War. The United States found itself facing an enemy super power with the

193 capability to cripple the U.S. should it engage in a direct military confrontation. Not surprisingly, this period was characterized by significant concern over the strengths of the two nations in all aspects of power, a fertile environment for realist theory. Yet analysis of these data indicates organizational frames dominated the development of U.S. biological doctrine over this time period.

There is evidence that external threat did influence aspects of U.S. policy over this period. The nation exhibited concern over perceived threats and responded by strengthening itself relative to those threats in classic realist fashion. The country allocated resources, trained forces and created defenses based upon the Soviet threat.

However, when looking specifically at the execution of these actions as reflected in the relationship between chemical agents and biological agents they are often considered as one threat, providing evidence a chemical frame was shaping actions taken in response to the external threat.

There is evidence of bureaucratic politics influencing biological posture over this time period as well. It is possible to argue that Project 112, first use doctrine, and Large

Area Coverage all have imperialistic components. Definite imperialistic behaviors were observed in the decision to end the biological program. However, the same observation that negates the external threat argument negates the imperialistic case as well. While some of the actions are imperialistic, they are imperialistic for a chemical/biological program. Again this demonstrates an instance where actions taken under one theory were ultimately executed through a chemical frame.

194

The most consistent observation is that regardless of the threat, program or decision, the chemical program and the biological program are viewed as one in the same. The close relationship between chemical agents and biological agents provides the greatest support to the theory that a chemical frame was influencing the trajectory of the

U.S. biological posture. The preponderance of the behaviors observed in organizational structures, hardware development, official statements, research programs and priorities are consistent with the behaviors proposed by the organizational frames model.

Therefore, a reasonable interpretation of this time period is that while the nation itself responded in a realist manner the resulting doctrine is reflective of a chemical frame. This is possible when the individual organizations, which may have used external threat data to justify their programs, were composed of individuals under the influence of a chemical frame. As a result the hardware produced and the working level execution of executive orders occurred in a chemical frames environment, ultimately producing a U.S. biological posture most reflective of a chemical bias and not optimally configured to address the biological threat.

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Ch 6. 1971 – 1991, The Cold War to the First Gulf War

In the run-up to Operation Desert Storm in 1990, the Department of Defense (DOD) had no systematic understanding of or approach to prosecuting a regional war against an adversary armed with and prepared to use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. (Bernstein, Caves and Carus 2009)

Historical Setting

This period starts with the and biological weapons community being forced to adjust to a radical change in the U.S. biological posture, as President Nixon had just issued his executive order regarding U.S. policy on the weapons. While the last section discussed the decision to end the program, it would be expected that the effects of such a change would be observed in the years following the decision.

The conclusion from the last section was that a chemical frame had controlled the development of the U.S. biological posture. As the frame appeared strong and well entrenched there is reason to believe that it would continue through this time period.

However, there is reason to believe the dominance of the chemical frame might be challenged. As already discussed, the debate prior to President Nixon’s decision forced many high ranking individuals to become familiar with the U.S. chemical program and biological program. I argue in the previous section, that at least in the upper levels of government, the frame had been broken on paper by specific references to distinct 196 chemical programs and biological defensive programs. If high level interest in these policies continued it should eventually trickle down into all levels of the program, lessening the influence of the frame over this time period.

This period witnessed several historical events that would be expected to influence the effects of the factors being examined in this dissertation. The first few years of this period saw the U.S. withdrawing its forces from Vietnam. The military and the nation were demoralized and there was little desire to invest in the military, creating a hostile environment for imperialistic behaviors.

At the same time the U.S. was withdrawing from Vietnam, the Chemical Corps was facing the most significant challenge to its existence to date. In 1973 the Army

Chief of Staff recommended to Congress that the Corps be disbanded. The Corps received little input into the plan, and after it was announced moral dropped, with approximately one third of the Chemical Officers leaving the Corps for other career fields. The reasoning behind this plan is reflected in thoughts expressed by General

Abrams, “The combat services were the ones that had to live and die on the battlefield, and it was their responsibility – not some technician’s responsibility – to make sure they had defensive capability against CBW agents.” As Mauroni summarizes, the Corps had become “too technical.” (Mauroni 2000)

Even though the Army desired to disband the Chemical Corps, it was up to

Congress to officially act upon the recommendation. Congress took no immediate action, and while they were debating the issue there was another Israeli/Arab war in October of

1973. This war was significant in that the Arab forces were equipped with modern Soviet 197 equipment and the war was used by many as a proxy to evaluate the relative effectiveness of U.S. and Soviet weapons.

Of particular significance to the biological program was the massive amount of

Soviet chemical defensive equipment such as protective suits, gas masks and nerve antidotes found on the battlefield. The presence of this equipment alarmed the Israelis and caused the U.S. to re-assess its view on the Soviet threat from chemical weapons and to some extent biological weapons. Plans to eliminate the Corps were put on hold while the Army conducted studies on the problem. In 1976 the Army decided to keep the

Corps and initiated plans to re-build the personnel base which had been decimated over the last few years.

Another significant event took place in 1974 when Congress ratified the 1925

Geneva Protocol on Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases. A few months later in

1975 President Ford issued Executive order 11850 which modified U.S. policy on the use of chemical weapons, renouncing the first use of herbicides and riot control agents, which had been strongly fought for by the military prior to President Nixon’s 1969 decision.

Another significant diplomatic event took place in the early 1970’s when the

Biological Warfare Convention entered into force in 1975.73 While the U.S. has generally regarded this treaty as flawed and un-verifiable, it did not significantly alter the

U.S. position on biological weapons as President Nixon had already disavowed any use of such weapons. However, the Congressional debate and interests associated with the

73 Books have been written on the U.S.’ position on this treaty, and the politics there of. An in depth analysis of the treaty is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 198 two treaties could serve as focusing events, re-enforcing the distinction between chemical weapons and biological weapons.

As the Arab/Israeli war shocked the U.S. relative to chemical weapons an accident in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk served as a similar shock to how the U.S. viewed the biological threat. In 1979 an outbreak of inhalation Anthrax was reported in

Sverdlovsk. While the Soviets blamed the outbreak on contaminated meat, it appeared to western intelligence that the outbreak was the result of an accident at a Soviet biological weapons production plant. At about the same time the U.S. was also concerned with

“yellow rain” an alleged use of Soviet supplied biological toxins in Laos. This was amplified by concerns over the use of Soviet supplied chemical weapons in Laos,

Kampuchea and Afghanistan in the late 1970’s.

The external threat associated with the Soviet Union and the Cold War continued for almost all of this period. It was punctuated by periods of higher tensions such as the

Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and the buildup of the U.S. military initiated by

President Regan. The intensity of the Cold War did begin to wane in the latter years of this period as the Soviet Union faced severe economic challenges, and initiated a series of openness policies resulting in a gradual loss of influence over the Eastern Bloc of countries.

As the U.S. began to relax its posture, it found itself faced with a war over the

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In the run-up to the war the U.S. military realized it was facing an enemy with a known chemical capability and a suspected biological capability. It also realized it was under stocked in defensive equipment, and possessed no fielded capability 199 to detect biological weapons. It was this lack of defensive capability which initiated this dissertation, and one which sets the stage for the final period of analysis in the next chapter.

It is possible to identify historical events which would suggest involvement from any of the three theories. In addition to a possible continuation of the already strongly established chemical frame, there is reason to believe external threat would influence

U.S. posture over this time period. The Cold War proxy conflicts, biological accidents and military build ups could all be utilized as a catalyst to alter national policy in response to external threat. As the U.S became increasing suspicious of a Soviet biological program, a realist would expected to see a corresponding change in U.S. defensive posture.

There is also reason to believe that imperialism influenced U.S posture over this period. While the 1970-75 time frame was bleak for the Chemical Corps the U.S. changed course towards the end of the 1970’s and began to re-build up the program and the military in general. The associated increase in resources would create an environment conducive to imperialistic behavior.

As with the previous period of analysis evidence is available which demonstrates behaviors associated with all three theories. However, as with the previous period, this period continues to be dominated by a combined chemical/biological frame of reference, indicating the chemical frame ultimately dominates this time period.

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Organizational Frames and Biodefense, 1971-91

The argument was made in the previous section that a chemical frame significantly influenced the direction of the DoD’s biological program. It was also noted that the national debate over the fate of the chemical program and the biological program broke the frame for those at high levels of in the government. One might expect that with such attention the frame would be broken at the lower levels as well.

However, many of the behaviors associated with a chemical frame observed over the previous time period are observed in this time period as well. Behaviors such as combining chemical and biological threats in training and doctrine, combining weapons in policy development, unequal priority, and developing combined hardware and defensive measures predicted by organizational frames are observed within the defensive programs of this time period.

It is also significant to note the observation of these behaviors in organizations outside of the immediate chemical weapons and biological weapons defense community.

Evidence of combined threat in sources such as Navy training programs, general Army operational doctrine, and Congressional testimony demonstrate that a chemical frame had re-asserted its influence throughout the entire Department of Defense and national leadership.

It is important to note that over most of this period the Soviets and U.S. maintained overt chemical programs while claiming they were complying with the ban on biological weapons. This perceived difference in threat could explain some of the

201 observed bias towards chemical weapons as would be expected if rational choice was influencing the defensive program.

Today we know that the Soviets maintained an extensive offensive biological program over this time period. The intelligence estimates cited later in this section do indicate there was a basic and growing suspicion that the Soviets were maintaining an offensive biological program. This information would have been available to the decision makers from this time period, and therefore one would expect concern over a

Soviet biological weapons threat in addition to the chemical threat. However, allocation of resources over this period shows a strong bias towards chemical agents, in spite of available data indicating a substantial threat from biological weapons.

BIASED ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

Looking at the overall effort allocated to biological defense over this period there is an inherent bias towards chemical programs beyond what would be expected from a rational actor response. Military expenditures over this period are on such area which reflects a chemical bias. Funding levels from 1970-1976 are relatively flat for both national defense (approx $100 billion), and for chemical defense ($30-40 million). The same period saw a steady decline in biological defense, as spending dropped from $20 million to $10 million, likely in part to President Nixon’s 1969 policy decision.

Starting in 1976 both the national defense spending and chemical defense spending began to increase. Spending on Chemical defense increased from approximately $40 million in 1976 to $210 million in 1986, where it then fluctuated from

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$200 - $280 million through 1992. In contrast spending on biological defense remained flat at about $20 million through 1982 when it finally began to increase, reaching $80 million by 1987, where it remained through 1992. While both programs received significant increases in funding, the increase in biological defense occurred eight years after the increase in chemical defense. In addition to timing the magnitude of increase favors the chemical program as the funds allocated to chemical defense increased sevenfold over 1976 levels, while funds for biological defense only increased fourfold.

(Mauroni 2000)

Part of this disparity may be explained by the timing of the 1973 Arab/Israeli war and the 1979 accident at Sverdlovsk. There was a corresponding rise in defense spending approximately three years after these events which would be expected as a response to changing external threat. However, it does not explain the imbalance in the relative increase in funds for each program.

In addition to financial imbalance, a chemical frames theory predicts and imbalance in other resources such as time and effort allocated to training. Generally training for this period was regarded as poor, a 1975 report notes that since 1966 the

“training program has been continuously degraded. The hours devoted to training have been reduced, and the quality of instruction has deteriorated.” (Parker, Galloway and

Spendlove 1975) Similar quotes are cited later from defense officials assessing the ability of U.S. troops to fight in a chemical environment in light of the 1973 war’s impact on the perceived chemical threat. (Test and Evaluation Command 1977)

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A 1972 Navy training guide highlights these behaviors.74 Reflecting a chemical frame this manual contains no specific biological threat/scenario while addressing distinct chemical and nuclear scenarios. The training manual had seven recommended training stations to include; five specific to chemical agents, two specific to nuclear attack, with and none specific to biological agents. Other sections also show a similar bias such as;

“Protective Measures” which has a Nuclear section and a “Chemical or Biological” section, “Ship Decontamination” is regarded as nuclear or “chemical and biological,” and

“Warning and Alarms” is taught as nuclear or “BW/CW.” (Naval Schools Command

1972)

Similarly, examining the recommended training scenarios in Army Field Manual

21-48, Planning and Conducting Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) and Nuclear

Defense Training shows five chemical scenarios, four nuclear scenarios, four chemical radiological/nuclear scenarios, eight chemical, nuclear, biological, radiological scenarios and only one biological scenario. (Department of the Army 1973) There is even evidence that the Soviets were subject to the chemical frame. A translated copy of a Soviet training course reflects the same references to WMD or nuclear with a chemical/biological threat description but does mention biological weapons any more than U.S. documents. 75 (McMahon 1980)

74 An interesting side note is the overall priority in which this training is regarded. This manual reflects the relative significance of training when it states “NBC situations must be integrated in such a manner that they do not seriously impair primary training objectives.” 75 The expectation that Soviet forces would face a biological threat reflects is similar to the view expressed by defectors such as Alibeck. In part they justified their program on the “knowledge” that the U.S. must be cheating on the treaty and maintaining a covert offensive biological program. Thus the Soviets fully expected the U.S. to use biological weapons in a war. 204

While the perceived threat will be addressed later, by 1985 the biological threat had become greater, yet the training bias has remained the same. For example the 1983

Command and General Staff syllabus contains a section on “NBC” operations.

Examining the description of this section shows it addresses the impact of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, smoke on the battlefield, NBC threat, CB clothing, and staff operations in a NBC environment, yet has no section dedicated solely to biological weapons. (Bardill 1983)

A nuclear, biological and chemical training manual developed as a thesis for the

Air Command and Staff College shows the same chemical frame.76 In many cases biological agents are not addressed at all. For example the three threat scenarios listed under the “Decontaminate your skin and personal equipment” task are; a chemical attack, transit of chemical contamination or exposure to nuclear fallout. Similarity, chemical attack scenarios are used to set the conditions for tasks addressing drinking and sleeping, changing protective gear, and un-masking. There is no scenario with a dedicated biological threat, and any time a biological agent is included in the training scenario it is combined as a chemical/biological threat environment. (Silvernall 1985)

While the preponderance of the training material is chemical centric, there are some training materials that provide a balanced approach. An Army correspondence course in decontamination has equal lessons dedicated to chemical, biological and radiological weapons. By addressing the distinct nature of biological agents this course serves as a counter to the chemical frame. It shows that in at least one training

76 The author of this work was actually an Army officer, with Chemical Corps experience 205 developers mind the difference between chemical and biological weapons justified distinct chapters on both weapons. (US Army Ordnance Center 1976)

It is evident that the military was dedicating an unequal amount of time to chemical training relative to biological training, and addressed biological training as combined with chemical training. While it would be possible to argue this imbalance in time and effort was driven by chemical weapons representing a greater external threat, the combined chemical/biological view is not associated with externals threat but is prescribed by a chemical frame.

PERCEPTIONS

In addition to the manifestation of the chemical frame in resources, it would be expected to observe evidence of the frame in how individuals perceived biological weapons. If a chemical frame was influencing perceptions, such behavior would be observable in sources such as reports, testimony and organizational behaviors.

Examining these sources reveals the strong chemical agent, biological agent relationship indicative of a chemical frame. This relationship exists at the highest levels of government, indicating how widespread the chemical frame had become.

Perhaps the most direct acknowledgment that a chemical frame had influenced the interdependent status of biological and chemical weapons was expressed in the 1969 memo from Secretary of Defense Laird quoted in the previous section which established proper terms for the chemical program and biological program. However, it appears that this was not embraced as a subsequent memo was produced stating, “Current documents

206 of various agencies continue to use the terms “CBW”…even though such terminology is seriously misleading and should be stricken from our lexicon…Because there exist no generic interrelationship between the chemical and biological fields” (Guhin 1970)

Also cited in the previous section was guidance over the correct terminology originating from the White House. As with Secretary Laird’s original statement the

White House guidance does not appear to have taken hold within the community. The

1969 wording is repeated in Presidential Directive/NSC-28 issued in 1978. This directive again states “The term Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) will no longer be used.

The references should be to the two categories separately – the Chemical Warfare

Program and The Biological Research Program.” (Brzezinksi 1978)

The publication of directives addressing the chemical program/ biological program separation indicates that the chemical frame (as manifest in the combined chemical/biological approach) had been recognized at high levels of the government, and was considered inappropriate. However the need to repeat the guidance shows that it failed to make an impact on the lower levels within the government and military who continued to work under the influence of the chemical frame.

Examination of various reports and studies in the years following the directives shows the guidance to separate the weapons did not make much of an impact. As observed before, there is a constant combination of chemical weapons and biological weapons as one. It is also possible to observe the inclusion of a weapon in a report that according to the title should have nothing to do with that weapon whatsoever.

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The frame is observed in a 1971 study by the Army to assess CBR defense.

Taken directly from the study, its mission is to “The approved study purpose is to examine CBR/N defensive doctrine, organization, and equipment as a system in order to ensure adequate CBR defense.” When defining the threat the authors of the study combine chemical and biological weapons stating “and since both chemical and biological agents exhibit greater agent effects/physiological symptoms at these temperatures, the analyses will consider the use of CB agents principally during the period of Jul-Sep in the conflict areas.” 77 (Combat Developments Command 1971)

Another Army study in 1977 dedicated to biological defense is indicative of several different behaviors associated with the influence of the chemical frame. First while the title of the study, The Biological Defense Protocol: The Biological Defense

Preparedness of U.S. Army Forces suggests a biological focus, the study is made in terms of “cost effectiveness, and the increased emphasis in chemical defense,” and cites the

1973 Middle East war as increasing the need for chemical defense. The inclusion of chemical weapons in the study would indicate the presence of a chemical frame, but could also support realist behavior based upon a greater perceived level of chemical threat vs. the biological threat. However this is probably not the case as the study acknowledges a biological threat as well, citing intelligence information of “extensive”

Soviet biological defense training for both military and civilians. (Test and Evaluation

Command 1977)

77 This statement appears arbitrary and overly broad. Higher temperatures would increase the evaporation rate of some chemical weapons. However, as biological weapons are living organisms, each has an ideal temperature range. However, (while countering a broad statement with another broad statement) most biological agents retain greater viability at lower temperatures. 208

Irrespective of the threat level the study makes several statements exhibiting the combining of biological and chemical threats predicted by the fames model. Quotes from the report include; “the attitude in the armed forces regarding biological warfare was a general complacency. This same attitude extended to chemical defense as well,” and

“Biological defense is allied with chemical defense in that the protective mask and protective shelters…defend against both,” and most reflective of the frames model,

“Though many commanders and staff officers view an adequate chemical defense as an adequate biological defense, some aspects of biological defense are not associated with chemical defense.”

A Defense Science Board study in 1985 again demonstrates the combining of chemical and biological weapons predicted by a frames model starting with the title of the report itself a report on “Chemical Warfare/Biological Defense.” However, contrary to the title, the letter initiating the report requested a study focused on chemical weapons.

Specifically it requested information on chemical intelligence, adequacy of chemical research and development, medical treatment of chemical or “other,” and to assess the impact on biotechnology on Soviet capabilities.

A specific recommendation from this report deals with using biotechnology to develop “Anti-CW/BW vaccines or antidotes,” specifically mentioning broad receptor site responses.78 Another example (which may be in error) is one of several instances where advances in biotechnology are cited in the as increasing the threat of biological and

78 Cellular receptor cites are often targeted by nerve class chemical weapons. With biological weapons, cellular receptor cites are important for toxins and some viruses but less important for many bacterial agents. 209 chemical weapons. “Biotechnology techniques now make it possible for a potential adversary to field new CW agents…” While the subsequent paragraph is redacted, a possible explanation is that biological toxins have at various points in history have flipped between being considered biological or chemical weapons. (Defense Science

Board 1985)

A report issued the next year by the GAO exhibits the same behavior of an almost default inclusion of biological weapons anytime chemical weapons are addressed. In this case the report is titled Chemical Warfare: Progress and Problems in Defensive

Capability, and was written with the purpose to “Review the Department of Defense program to improve its defensive chemical warfare capabilities.” (United States Gemeral

Accounting Office 1986) While the report does follow the title and assesses chemical defense it also includes 115 references to biological weapons. Some of these references are generic statements such as “chemical and biological defense” regarding sections on training, doctrine threat and defense. However the report does make specific references to vaccines, drug development and medical training specifically to counter biological agents.

Also of interest is the fact that the authors are aware that nuclear is not part of the chemical problem in spite of the repeated use of NBC terminology. This is evident in a chart listing defense agreements which “omits the agreements on nuclear defense that have no relevance to biological and chemical defense.” Yet there is no evidence of similar distinction with biological weapons. Of the 17 entries on the chart, 13 make

210 reference in some way to biological weapons and only one is specific to chemical weapons.

There are also many examples of chemical and biological weapons being combined within the same strategic debate. A 1970 report to Congress on chemical and biological warfare raises issues on adequate deterrence for chemical/biological attacks as well as questioning how to educative the public on chemical/biological weapons. The report also includes Congressional funding language which is blunt in combining chemical and biological weapons as one category. (Interdepartmental Political-Military

Group 1970) The official military response to this report does separate chemical and biological weapons in the discussion, but then reverts to a combined chemical and biological frame when discussing deterrence, retaliation, and intelligence. (Irwin 1971)

A final manifestation of a chemical perception within an organization is what type of education is required to perform a “WMD” job. As in other areas there is a bias towards individuals with chemical backgrounds. An internal memo within the office of

Defense Research and Engineering demonstrates the combining of chemical and biological qualifications. The memo appears to be one justifying the existence of personnel and lists several critical jobs. One such listing is “Deputy for Chemical

Technology” whose responsibilities include monitoring programs in “Chemical Warfare and Biological Defense.” Also identified are areas of required knowledge to include

“chemistry, microbiology, environment and weapons used in defense and attack.” The position is “the single focal point for all OSD, JCS and Military Department action and planning in chemical warfare and biological defense.” Interestingly there is also 211 identified a “Deputy for Biomedical Research and Technology,” who is the only physician within the organization. However, their responsibility is focused on medical research, biomedical research and environmental pollution effects. (Director of Defense

Research and Engineering 1970)

Another example of a bias in personnel is evident in the educational distribution of scientists and engineers associated with the program. The FY 1981 Chemical Systems

Laboratory history lists the distribution of scientists and engineers as; 71 chemical engineers, 73 other engineers, 167 chemists, 31 physicists, and 144 other combined consisting of physical scientist, mathematicians and biologists.79 (Chemical Systsems

Laboratory 1981)

A 1986 Planning brief to industry produced by the U.S. Army Armament

Munitions Chemical Command contains a similar report. While this command was responsible for chemical and biological defense, it reports the educational background of its scientists as; 149 chemists, 136 chemical engineers, 83 physical scientists, 86 mechanical engineers, 62 general engineers, 27 physicist, 21 biologists, and 5 pharmacologists. (Dimmick and Hinkle 1986)

FRAMES IN TESTIMONY

In addition to written policies and documents, frames theory predicts that biological weapons will be similarly treated in oral statements and testimony. Looking at

79 While name of this organization is “chemical,” this organization was responsible for biological programs such as, NBC remote detection, protective clothing, mathematical predictions of a biological attack, and the XM19 biological detection system 212

Congressional testimony and official statements, it is again possible to find numerous examples of chemical weapons taking precedence over biological weapons, and examples of chemical and biological weapons being regarded as a single weapons class or threat.

Of particular interest are Congressional hearings immediate following President Nixon’s decision, when would be expected to observe non-frames behavior.

In 1970 the Committee on Foreign Affairs conducted a multi-day hearing titled

“Chemical-Biological Warfare: U.S. Policies and International Effects.” Starting with the title and reinforced by the testimony of many senior members of the U.S. government, the transcript demonstrates behaviors predicted by a chemical frames model.

Examples include; referring to nuclear vs. “chemical/biological” weapons classes, claiming chemical or biological weapon can be put in (referencing weapons) “almost anything we have got,” combining chemical and biological weapons as one in employment, defense, and retaliation considerations, and when characterizing the Soviet threat. (Committe on Foriegn Affaris 1970)

In the same testimony there are examples of behavior in-consistent with the chemical frame. Testimony from a member of the Secretary of Defense’s staff proposes five categories of weapons; chemical-lethal, chemical-non-lethal, biological-lethal, biological non-lethal, and anti-plant. Also included is the text of a Congressional investigation of Chemical, Biological Warfare and National Security, which recognizes

“The term ‘chemical and biological warfare’ is a misleading one. It is not a form of warfare, but rather a conglomeration of weapons which must be incorporated into the military strategies and doctrines.” As in other areas, the fact that individuals outside the 213 traditional program identified problems with how chemical weapons and biological weapons were viewed serves to support the existence of a chemical frame.

Looking at more testimony in the years immediately following President Nixon’s decision, there is limited evidence that the frame was broken, even at the highest levels of government. A hearing on military posture in 1975 does use the prescribed “biological research program” wording in the main text of the hearing. However, some of the witnesses (the Assistant Secretary of the Army) revert to the “chemical-biological warfare” or “chemical-biological defense” terminology in their spoken testimony.

(Committee on Armed Services 1975)

Two other Congressional hearings also fail to use the prescribed terminology, instead reverting to terms associated with the chemical frame. A 1973 hearing on resolutions restricting the movement of chemical weapons without Congressional approval does not follow the guidance. It makes repeated references to

“chemical/biological” warfare and weapons. There is also an interesting section where the debates over the effectiveness of biological weapons held prior to President Nixon’s

1969 decision were used as a reference for the ongoing debates over a chemical weapons treaty. (Committee on Armed Services 1973) A subsequent hearing in 1974 on “U.S.

Chemical Warfare Policy” again is described in terms expected of a chemical frame making repeated references to “chemical/biological warfare.” (Subcommittee on National

Security 1974)

The quick reversion to the combined view, in spite of recent national debate and published guidance shows the strength of the chemical frame. It indicates that with a 214 high level of attention the frame can be broken, but as soon as the attention was diverted the frame re-asserted itself.

FRAMES IN HARDWARE

One of the expectations of or the organizational frames model is that while the program may appear balanced and sensible to those within the frame, the program will seem unbalanced to those outside the frame. One way to observe this imbalance is to examine the physical outputs of the program. Examination of two areas, specifically decontamination and detection, reveals the presence of a strong chemical frame.

The decontamination program is one which to this day demonstrates an extremely high degree of combined requirements. While there is an excellent logistical argument to combine defensive capabilities where possible, combining decontamination requirements forces researchers to develop a product that would be equally effective at decontaminating a hospital room and removing oil stains from a concrete floor. This approach greatly complicates the problem yet it is the stated goal for almost every decontamination program examined.

In 1971 a requirement for a new decontamination research program requests an

“An all-purpose decontaminant is required for use after CB agent accidents or hostile attacks.” The product is to be capable of “…neutralizing all known CB agents.” As if that requirement was not challenging enough, additional requirements include; “must not corrode aircraft surfaces or electrical equipment,” “no rinse required after use,” “non-

215 hazardous to personnel,” and “residue should be readily disposed of or safely absorbed in the environment.” (Tactical Air Command 1971)

Not surprisingly this requirement was not met, but the thought process lived on.

In 1980 A briefing to a symposium on decontamination titled Biological

Decontamination from the Army’s Point of View lists as the number one characteristic of a decontaminant as one “effective against both biological and chemical agents.” (Harstad

1980) A 1985 decontamination program based upon the C8 decontamination solution developed in Germany was required to “Decontaminate the exterior of all materials…against all probable threat chemical and biological agents to include toxins.”

(Gross 1985) Finally, in 1986 the Decontamination Systems Division lists

“Decontaminate all agents” as its top technology goal. (Decontamination Systems

Division 1986)

The military has had significant problems achieving any of these goals conducted at least one internal study in an attempt to understand why. The 1984 report from the

Army Science Board’s Ad Hoc Subgroup on Army Decontamination Program identifies several organizational issues that have impacted the program. While the report does not define any particular organizational theory, the concerns described in the report are similar to the behaviors associate with the chemical frame.

The Subgroup finds fault with the Army’s ability to use state of the art technology to advance decontamination ability. The report specifically cites a “lack of imagination” and states “no one seems to be thinking beyond the commonplace. There seems…to be no real support…to look at the whole problem in new ways.” Interestingly, while the 216 report identifies behaviors expected from a chemical frame, the report never separates the chemical threat from the biological threat, instead referring to the “CB” threat/challenge throughout the report. (Army Science Board 1984)

As with the requirements for decontamination, operational requirements for biological and chemical detection or sampling hardware from this period include many instances of combined requirements. As in other areas, documents produced immediately after the SECDEF’s guidance fail to follow the prescribed terminology. In 1971 the

Army’s testing agency refers to CBR tests and CBR agents. Again when nuclear weapons are broken out from the CBR reference, chemical and biological weapons remain combined, as in detection equipment to “provide notice of a CB agent attack,” or equipment to protect against “CB agents.” (U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command

1971)

Examination of subsequent development programs reveals repeated behavior predicted by the chemical frame. For example the Chemical/Biological Agent Sampling

Kit (CBASK) had a requirement to “safely collect and transport samples of suspended

CBW agent contamination.” (Swisher 1988a) The Chemical Biological Mass

Spectrometer was required to “Be capable of detecting nerve, blister and blood agents,” as well as being “capable of detecting biological agents as aerosols in the air and solid on the ground.” (Swisher 1990) The “BC detector” was a program initiated in 1896 with a planed fielding in 1999. It was designed to “incorporate maximum detection capability within one unit” to “reduce the number of fielded detectors.” (Palman, Memorandum

1989) Another briefing describes a high tech NBC system to provide “NBC 217 reconnaissance,” decontamination, and “smoke support.” While this is a “NBC” system the only threat described in the requirements section is Soviet use of chemical weapons.

(Floeck 1985)

Even when the systems are not explicitly designed to combine chemical and biological detection, the requirements for biological detectors are extremely similar to those for established chemical detectors. For example the Biological Detector and

Warning System (BDWS) had a required response time of 2 +/- 1 minute, in which it had to detect 75 +/- particles per liter of air.80 (Mangrum 1981) A similar the requirement existed for the chemical/biological mass spectrometer which had 90 seconds to identify and quantify both chemical agents and biological threat agents. (Swisher 1990)

This chemical frame is also present in requirements external to the DoD, perpetuating the frame within civilian research organizations. The detection section of a military briefing to industry contains requirements for several hardware systems which reflect the combined chemical and biological threat. This report contains requirements for; a “CB mini mass spectrometer,” a “CB Mini detector,” an aerosol sampler for

“chemical/biological agent detection,” the XM87 NBC recon system, and a mass spectrometer for acquisition and processing of CB agent from air. As would be expected, the decontamination section states the desire to develop a decontaminant able to

“decontaminate all agents.” (Dimmick and Hinkle 1986)

80 This requirement reflects the one size fits all approach for detectors and fails to take into account the vast differences in infectious doses which can range from 10-5,000 depending upon the organism. 218

The presence of the chemical frame within subordinate programs is not altogether unexpected when one can identify the presence of the frame in a so described capstone document which prescribes the vision for future NBC detection programs. Within this document nuclear, biological and chemical agents are generally addressed as a single threat, with some weapon specific variations noted. However, even when hardware requirements are broken out between weapons, they share the same operational characteristics. Some examples of combined desired capabilities or material objectives which make sense only under a frames model include; “monitor approaching NBC clouds,” “multipurpose integrated NBC detector,” and “detect surface NBC contamination.” Interestingly under the function of “monitor personnel NBC exposure” the only desired capabilities listed are radiation detection. (Swisher 1988a)

The combining of chemical and biologic defensive requirements within a single system would not necessarily be indicative of a frames model, except that over this time period there were many chemical specific systems produced. A 1974 Congressional

Research Service report on chemical and biological issues notes that the significant advances in defensive items included a chemical agent detector, liquid agent detector, and a chemical area scanning alarm. (Congressional Research Service 1974) A few years later a 1981 U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE) study on chemical warfare and aircraft operations lists 10 operational chemical detectors, 7 developmental systems expected to be operational in the short term, and 4 developmental systems expected in the long term.

(Quest Research Corporation 1981) Cross referencing with an Army laboratory report

219 from 1981 shows only one dedicated biological detection system and one combined NBC detector under development at that time. (Chemical Systsems Laboratory 1981)

FRAMES IN DOCTRINE

In addition to physical hardware, organizational outputs also include written reports and doctrine. The military often conducts strategic studies to establish a foundation for doctrine development. Looking at some studies conducted over this period it is possible to find examples where chemical and biological weapons are combined as one threat or examples where a chemical weapons approach drives the development of biological doctrine.

A 1971 Army study on defensive capabilities combines the weapons as its purpose was to “…examine CBR/N defensive doctrine, organization, and equipment as a system in order to insure that adequate CBR defense, with minimum degradation of combat effectiveness, is provided…” This study also defines the threat as the “enemy employment and exploitation of tactical CBR/N weapons.”81 (Combat Developments

Command 1971) Having all CBR defense encompassed within one “system” would lock in the frame for any subsequent doctrine or hardware developed based upon this study.

The chemical frame can also create a linkage where none should exist. For example a

1981 Air Force study characterizing the chemical environment focuses exclusively on chemical capabilities and training, but includes a discussion of the Soviet biological

81 The reference to tactical employment is significant in that most military planners recognize the slow action of biological weapons gives them minimal tactical (immediate battlefield effect) benefit. Chemical weapons act fast and have a much greater tactical utility, thus the terminology of the threat implies a chemical bias. 220 threat. (Quest Research Corporation 1981) Another Air Force study also includes chemical, nuclear, biological and conventional threats in the study objectives, but subsequently states that the study results were used to “upgrade simulation of sortie generation in chemical defense.” (Department of the Air Force 1986)

Studies are often conducted prior to development or revisions in doctrine, which is codified in military manuals and serves as the basis for actions taken by personnel.

Generally manuals published over this time period specific for one particular type of weapon are technically well written and generally free of frames. However, when combined “WMD” manuals, or manuals dealing with operations and combat intended for a more general audience are examined, a chemical frame is often apparent.

Army Technical Manual TM 3-216, Technical Aspects of Biological Defense, exhibits such behavior. The manual generally does an adequate job of describing the unique nature of the different weapons such as different effects, threat and ability to detect. However a chemical frame is also observable with such recommendations as

“The measures taken by troops while under biological attack are similar to those taken while under chemical attack.” The manual dedicates two pages to sampling and identification of biological weapons but only one paragraph to epidemiology, which given the lack of detectors at the time would be the most likely indication of a biological attack. In addition all detection/defense actions appear biased by including an

221 assumption that the individual will have immediate knowledge that a biological attack has occurred. 82 (Department of the Army 1971)

In Field Manual 101-40 Armed Forces Doctrine for Chemical Warfare and

Biological Defense the threat, environment and response are consistently described in reference to a “CB” environment or challenge. The chemical frame is evident in chapter titles such as “Chemical and Biological Munitions” as well as “Chemical and Biological

Defense.” There are also specific combined statements which lead to technical inaccuracies, such as “Most weapons systems can deliver CB agents.” (US Army Combat

Developments Command 1972)

Field Manual 100-5: Operations, published in 1976, provides insight into the

Army’s perception of chemical and biological weapons. One interesting observation is that the table of contents lists chapter eleven as “Chemical Operations,” while the chapter heading within the document is “Chemical Warfare and Nuclear, Biological and

Chemical (NBC) defense.” In spite of the title the chapter states forces, “must be organized, trained and equipped to survive and operate effectively in a chemical warfare environment.” The chapter makes minimal reference to any threat of a biological attack, but acknowledges Soviet forces were well trained for “nuclear and biological defense.” 83

Within this chapter the only specific references to biological weapons are that “chemical

82 This is realistic assumption in a chemical attack scenario where even if no detectors are present casualties will appear in minutes, unlike a biological attack which may go undetected for up to a week. 83 The wording of this threat paragraph is interesting. Soviet offensive and defensive chemical capabilities are specifically acknowledged. Yet the paragraph only calls out Soviet nuclear and biological defense training. It might be possible to argue that the reference to a defensive biological posture suggests a belief that the Soviets did not have an active biological program, but including nuclear defense in the same sentence confounds this theory, as the Soviets clearly had an offensive nuclear capability at this point in time. 222 protective clothing and equipment provides protection from biological attack,” and a discussion of immunization and hygiene as important defensive measures. (Department of the Army 1971)

Field Manual 90-14 published in 1985 addresses the rear battle, combat operations fought behind the traditional front lines. Forces stationed in the rear would include support forces or logistics centers. In the over 100 pages of text in this document the word biological is only used five times, and always in conjunction with chemical and nuclear weapons. In contrast there are eleven specific references to chemical weapons and seven references to chemical weapons combined with nuclear weapons. Specific references to chemical weapons include chemical attack, chemical defense, chemical detection and chemical experts. (Department of the Army 1985)

Field Manual 3-10 prescribes NBC Operations. Again the document shows the combined weapons frame referencing “NBC weapons,” “NBC doctrine,” and the “NBC battlefield.” While there are separate sections dedicated to each weapon type, the general sections refer to NBC weapons. When the NBC frame is broken, nuclear is identified as unique, while chemical weapons and biological weapons remain combined as one weapon type. The chemical frame is most telling in the section describing response to a chemical or biological attack. For instance the manual recommends “You must keep contamination from touching your skin because it can kill you.” 84 It also recommends immediate MOPP85 4 posture for either chemical or biological attack. The manual also

84 A true statement for chemical agents, but only true for biological weapons if the skin is broken. 85 MOPP stands for Mission Oriented Protective Posture. Protective equipment from the 1980’s was referred to as “MOPP Gear” 223 frames all attack responses in context of a chemical attack, such as when it cautions that liquid or solid contamination can “continuously generate vapors.” (Department of the

Army 1985)

Field Manual 91-12: Base Defense published in 1989 exhibits evidence of combining weapons classes. Again there are unique references to chemical attacks, but biological threat references are always part of the “NBC” threat. For example the manual combines chemical, biological and nuclear in one defensive category and addresses defensive measures by referencing suits, masks and detectors and alarms as “part of base

NBC defense” yet later states that biological field detectors are not “widely available.”

When biological weapons are addressed immunization is listed as the prime defense, and the threat scenario implied is mainly one of covert delivery through food or water.

(Department of the Army 1989) It is important to note that while this manual continues to exhibit a chemical frame, it does seem to have lost some of the heavy chemical references observed in some earlier manuals.

Field Manual 63-21: Main Support Battalion, published at the end of this period in 1990 provides guidance for units supporting combat units. Analysis of this manual continues to show behaviors predicted by the chemical frame model. One example is reference to “chemical” equipment, which includes supplies needed to address chemical or biological weapons. Addressing clearing stations, there is specific reference to chemical casualties, with no reference to biological casualties. Perhaps the most obvious example is the reference to enemy attacks utilizing “nuclear weapons or (emphasis added) chemical/biological agents.” As with previous documents, general threat 224 statements and defensive actions are in reference to combined chemical/biological attack scenarios. (Department of the Army 1990)

Significantly this document does take a step towards acknowledging some difference between chemical agents and biological agents. Referencing protection it states that adequate biological defense can be achieved through the use of the mask and hood, combined with the standard duty uniform. This is a departure from other documents which simply address the NBC threat by recommending full protective posture for all attack scenarios.

Of the documents examined one general document, FM 21-40 NBC Defense, stand out as it shows almost no evidence of a chemical frame (except for the title). This manual has separate sections for each weapon which are accurate and not tainted by another frame. This manual also acknowledges specific characteristics of biological weapons not often identified in other manuals. Some examples include; acknowledgement that weathering is an effective decontamination method, prescribing a mask only response to a biological attack, and addressing MOPP as chemical focused protective equipment. (Department of the Army 1977)

It is important to note the critical role these types of manuals have in framing how the military operates and perceives its environment. These manuals represent the primary, and possibly only, reference material for the vast majority of the operational forces. Unless the unit has a mission relative to chemical weapons or biological weapons there would be no reason to go beyond the general guidance as to how chemical weapons

225 and biological weapons behave. As the majority of the available manuals showed a chemical frame, it is not surprising the frame took such a strong hold in the military.

It is possible to make a counter argue that the behaviors observed in these documents reflect a realist argument that the biological threat was (relative to other threats) of minimal significance. While some elements of this theory might be true, there is evidence produced later in this chapter which indicates the biological weapons threat was greater than would be suggested by military doctrine, indicating the DoD was not responding to the biological threat as would be predicted by a realist model. It is also significant to note the continued reference to the combined chemical/biological weapon class is predicted by the chemical frame, and not indicative of a realist threat perception.

MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

The last area to be examined in this section is the development of medical countermeasures against biological weapons. The previous period showed that medical countermeasures were largely discounted as an effective defensive mechanism. It could be lack of technological capability, lack of funds, or a manifestation of the chemical frame that continues a similar attitude through this period. It is difficult to know for sure as there was little national interest over the role of medical countermeasures at this time.

Also of significance to this period was the move of medical countermeasures from Army

Material Command to the Army Medical Department in 1972.

A 1975 annual report from the Army Surgeon General reflects a general lack of interest in biological weapons defense making only three references to biological

226 weapons. Specifically referencing the USAMRIID mission to develop countermeasures it seems as the Army regards the mission as a means to have access to research facilities.

The report states, “Although the primary mission of USAMRIID encompasses defense against biological agents, the capabilities of the facility allow research on a wide range of hazardous organisms of importance of military operations.” (Oland 1979)

An Army report on biological defense continues the previous attitude that limits in detection would not allow effective distribution of antibiotics in time. The impracticality of vaccination without adequate intelligence is also stated as a major concern. However, the report does at acknowledge countermeasures play at least some role in defense as it notes the DoD maintained 10 grams of antibiotics for every military member, civilian employee and family member assigned overseas. One statement that may be most indicative of a chemical frame is relative to epidemiology noting, “The reporting procedures include no attempt to identify the possibly of the disease being a result of a biological attack.” (Parker, Galloway and Spendlove 1975)

A lack of interest is also reflected in the low amount of resources allocated to countermeasures. For example the Congressional Research Service notes that medical funding early in this period was averaging about $9 million per year. (Congressional

Research Service 1974) As a contrast, thirty years later (after the medical defense program received attention from Congress) this value would approach $600 million.

Hoyt also notes a general national malaise in vaccine production over this period.

Her data gathering methods note only six new vaccines were produced over this period versus eighteen for the previous period. Among the factors she cites are a changing 227 regulatory environment, and (more importantly) the erosion of the military/pharmaceutical/national pride combination that was established during World

War Two and which supported vaccine development through the 1950’s and 60’s (Hoyt

2012)

A similar assessment is found in a GAO report, which sheds light on the state of the program just prior to the Gulf War:

“For many years, DOD has maintained a medical research and development program for biological defense. However, at the time of the Gulf War, the United States had neither fielded equipment capable of detecting biological agents nor stocked adequate amounts of vaccine to protect the force. When the Gulf War started, DOD also had not established adequate policies and procedures for determining which vaccines needed to be administered, when they were to be given, and to whom.” (U.S. General Accounting Office 1996)

Regardless of the reasons, the best evidence as to the lack of interest and effort into the program is the firestorm of criticism the military received immediately following the Gulf War. While this period of time will be examined in the next period, the U.S. military, with a little help from Congress, finally decided that it was serious about developing medical countermeasures.

CONCLUSIONS - FRAMES

The evidence presented for this section shows how strongly the chemical frame was entrenched within the military and the federal government. While this time period started with several high level directives attempting to break the chemical frame, the frame did not disappear. 228

From these available data it is possible to observe a strong presence of the behaviors predicted by a chemical frame. Chemical agents and Biological agents are routinely combined within political and doctrinal discussions. Training for the two weapons is combined most of the time, and while there is a large amount of dedicated chemical defensive hardware, most of the biological defensive equipment was developed as combined hardware. The general doctrine written for the operational forces is generally written to defend against a chemical threat and as a result in some instances offers guidance that would be of minimal help in a biological environment.

The general confusion on appropriate defensive measures created by the chemical frame is of significant concern. Lacking a clear understanding of biological agents, national policy, doctrine and hardware all reflected inaccuracies or sub-optimal solutions for the biological threat. As a result, at the end of this period the U.S. entered the Gulf

War with biological defenses that would have failed our forces had the Iraqis employed such weapons.

Bureaucratic Politics and Biodefense, 1971-91

There is generally little evidence that imperialism influenced the biological program over this period. The bureaucratic environment early in this period was hostile to the program, as well as the entire military. While the 1973 war, Sverdlovsk and the

229 military buildup of the 1980’s did present some justification to expand the program what imperialistic behavior that is observed is heavily biased towards the chemical program. 86

In the paper “Imperialism” in Bureaucracy, Holden includes maintenance and retrenching as behaviors that can be observed after an imperialistic expansion by an organization. He identifies retrenchment as likely to occur when organizational leaders foresee no favorable balances or face an inflexible constituency. He also states that

“retrenching agencies may be forced to re-orient themselves merely to maintain the status quo.” (Holden 1966) Given the legislative environment in the 1970’s it would be expected to see these types of behaviors. It would be less likely to observe imperialism until the 1980’s when more money became available to the DoD

HEADWINDS

The bureaucratic environment for the first several years of this period was not especially conducive to imperialism. The decision by President Nixon to abandon the

U.S.’ offensive biological weapons program eliminated any opportunity for organizations to embrace the offensive use of biological weapons as an area of potential resources or power. At the same time the nation and the military were emerging from Vietnam War, and the overall environment was one of drawdown and negativity towards the military establishment.

86 A portion of the evidence presented in this section and the realism section includes testimony and policy based upon chemical weapons. This is a conscious decision, partly due to the lack of data and partly based upon the assumption that as the environment was extremely poor for imperialist behavior. As chemical weapons had fewer restrictions than biological weapons, any imperialistic behavior would likely be observed in the chemical program before the biological program. As already argued, the majority of the programs and polices of this period are presented in the joint chemical/biological frame of reference. 230

In the early 1970’s time period Congress took actions to reduce military funding.

Reduced funding combined with Nixon’s policy and negative public perception made imperialistic behavior almost impossible. Some actions even directed a reduction the mission, such as Executive order 11490 which moved the responsibility for defense against anti-crop agents (chemical and biological) to the Department of Agriculture.

Congress also severely restricted funds with specific language removing or severely restricting money for storage, testing and procurement of chemical or biological weapons. (Interdepartmental Political-Military Group 1970) As a result of reductions in funding the Army was forced to abandon real-estate resources such as Pine Bluff Arsenal, and cut biological defensive spending from $20 million down to $10 million. (Laird

1970)

These restrictions were identified by the Chemical Corps as causing “program delays” and making execution “more expensive.” For example Public laws 91-121 and

91-441 required the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Health, the President of the

Senate, and the Speaker of the House be involved in any transportation, open air testing or disposal of lethal chemical agents. The Corps also expected a 30% cut in funding for

FY 1974. Not only were these restrictions hampering imperialistic tendencies they were imperiling the future of the Corps as they hit at the same time it was trying to justify itself to the Army and avoid being disbanded.87 (Stoner 1973)

87 These notes actually come from a briefing by the Chief Chemical officer to the Chief of Staff of the Army. 231

One of the most significant challenges to the program was the move to disband the Chemical Corps. In 1973 by the Army took steps to eliminate the Corps, but the final decision to do so required Congressional approval. The Corps’ fate was debated within

Congress, the Department of Defense and the Army until 1975 when the Army reversed its position and began to re-build the Chemical Corps. This reversal in position was due in large part to a realist response to the 1973 Arab/Israeli war and the associated Soviet chemical equipment. While the proposed Army plan to disperse the chemical defense and biological defense missions among other unites would not have ended such research, having the Army advocate the dissolution of the Corps sent a strong signal to service members as to the relative importance placed on chemical and biological weapons at the time.

Another challenge facing the program was established when President Nixon issued NSSM 157, directing a review of U.S. position regarding chemical weapons relative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. (H. Kissinger

1972) Reminiscent of the 1969 debate, the military again found itself again having to review its position on chemical weapons, but did take the opportunity to make an imperialistic move.

Like the previous debate the military again found itself at odds with the State

Department. Notes from the NSC reflect that the DoD was the only agency in favor of the treaty option to “Limit (chemical) stocks to agreed retaliatory levels.” Mentioned in the advantages of this option was that the DoD could use this option to justify a

232 modernization of existing weapons stockpiles, specifically upgrading current weapons to new binary weapons. (National Security Council 1973)

Subsequent debate shows the financial benefits that would be associated with this position. The military estimated that upgrading to binary weapons would require four or five years of research which would be part of a ten year total acquisition plan. The cost to upgrade would require a doubling of the current $45 million budget for the ten year period. The military also identified that a retaliation policy would put U.S. forces at risk, noting current defense posture and training was “inadequate.” The cost to bring U.S. forces to an “adequate” defense posture was estimated at $72 million per year for eight years (expenditures at the time were $10 million). (National Security Council 1973a)

This attempt at imperialism was effectively halted when Congress eliminated funding for binary weapons in 1975. (Congressional Research Service 1974)

While the DoD showed an imperialistic streak, it did temper its expectations noting that “Political factors…including both public option and governmental attitude make it extremely difficult to introduce, relocate or disperse chemical weapons.” They were also aware that if they opted for a treaty which allowed modernization, and

Congress did not approve resources to modernize, they would actually put themselves further behind the Soviets if the Soviets exercised their option to modernize their weapons. Along these lines they noted that Congress had not allocated any money for offensive weapons since 1969, and the President had not requested any funds in the upcoming budget cycle. (National Security Council 1973a)

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While international chemical negations dragged on with little success, two other

Presidential directives further hindered the imperialistic environment. In 1975 President

Ford issued Executive Order 11850 renouncing the first use of herbicides and riot control agents. (Ford 1975) In 1977 President Carter issued Presidential Directive 15 which effectively froze the U.S. program stating “The President has also directed that US chemical warfare forces be maintained without force improvement” (Brzezinski 1977)

Although the Army was essentially in a retrenching mode the Army was able to keep its position as lead agency for the program. By maintaining its historical responsibly for the program the Army was at least able to maintain its autonomy in this area. This responsibility did come with some associated resources and allowed it to exert its influence over other services and joint defensive programs. In 1971 the Army and Air

Force (the Navy elected to retain its independence) entered a Memorandum of

Agreement, making the Army Material Command the focal point for the Joint Chemical and Biological Program. (Miley and Brown 1971) This agreement both supports at least a maintenance behavior within the Army, but also indicates the Air Force had little interest in claiming the chemical and biological defense research mission area for its own.

The Army’s position was further codified by DoD directive 5160.5 which defines the roles of all the services in chemical and biological defense. Specificity individual services were responsible for establishing service specific requirements, and were allowed to spend money on engineering development of individual service specific items.

However, the Army retained responsibility for “all research, exploratory development,

234 and advanced development” for all items, and the Army also retained lead responsibly for all phases of multi-service equipment. (Department of Defense 1976)

While most of the behavior is chemical centered or chemical/biological combined, there is at least one piece of evidence that the Army did use its biological knowledge to maintain resources. As President Nixon’s policy did allow defensive research the Army highlight the potential befits of defensive research to public health.

An Army historical report specifically notes that vaccine research was “no longer structured to meet the requirements for BW defense, but as directed toward the control of communicable disease in man.” Likewise general support for USAMRIID included the argument that its research objectives would “benefit the civilian community as well as fulfill a military objective.” (Department of the Army 1977)

OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPAND

As demonstrated above, for the early 1970’s there was little national resolve and no spare money in the budget and few imperialistic behaviors were observed. The 1973 war, the anthrax release at Sverdlovsk and the buildup of the military under President

Reagan all contributed to additional funding becoming available in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. With the availability of new money there are examples of imperialistic behavior, yet the observed imperialistic behavior is most often tempered by a chemical frame.

An excellent example is a brochure Chemical Warfare: Deterrence Through

Strength, Published by the Army in 1984. This publication highlights the weak position

235 of the U.S. relative to the Soviets and strongly advocates that this weakness be corrected by creating a retaliatory chemical capability. The brochure concludes by specifically advocating the development of new binary chemical weapons as the best method to address this weakness. 88 (Wickham 1984)

A similar theme is reflected in a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense’s testimony to Congress in 1985. He first cites the Soviet chemical threat, states the low level of U.S. defense and retaliatory capability, then request additional resources for defensive and offensive chemical capability. He also includes biological defense while describing some of the programs. Again this is evidence of imperialistic behavior, but focused mainly on the chemical threat in spite of intelligence assessments (presented in the next section) which by 1985 had identified a significant Soviet biological threat.

A desire to expand, but one focused on chemical weapons, is also found in the

Army’s Munitions and Chemical Command Long Range plan from 1984. The plan lists both chemical weapons and biological weapons as potential threats over the next 20 years. Yet, the planning assumptions which serve as the basis for future work include three specific chemical weapons programs (including two for new agent development/production), and eight combined chemical/biological programs, but include no dedicated biological programs. (Strategic Plans Branch 1984)

There are also examples of the defense program taking credit for biological defense on paper but with less emphasis in the development of actual hardware. This could be an example of frames behavior where biological defense is subsumed under the

88 Binary weapons represented a new weapons type of chemical weapon technology and were the source of significant debate in the government. Approval to develop these weapons would also include significant funding. 236 chemical defense cover, or it could be an attempt at imperialistic behavior where the organization is trying to get credit (and resources) for addressing a threat where it had marginal success at best. A system which shows this behavior is the XM87 NBC reconnaissance system known as the “Fox” vehicle. It is of interest in that in spite of the

“B” in its official name and advertised reconnaissance capability the vehicle had no biological capability beyond the ability to carry biological warning markers. This could be evidence of a chemical frame influence where biology is subsumed with chemical weapons, or it could be an attempt at expanding or claiming capability where none currently existed in hopes to retain responsibility for that mission area.

Also of interest from this time period are the data contained within the briefings to industry discussed in the organizational frames section. The combined chemical and biological equipment approach captures the essence of the imperialistic behaviors observed over this time period, and demonstrates the dominance of the chemical frame.

If imperialism was driving behavior in this time period one would expect such briefings to highlight the lack of biological capabilities, and highlight the need for new dedicated biological focused technologies. Instead the programs continue to address chemical weapons alone or focus on a combined chemical/biological approach.

CONCLUSIONS - IMPERIALISM

Based upon available data, there is little evidence of imperialistic behaviors relative to biological weapons. The budgetary and legislative environment facing the

DoD in the 1970’s made it unlikely to observe imperialistic behavior early in this period.

237

Focus on the Vietnam War, Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter’s directive’s on biological weapons and chemical weapons, and the reduction in funds made it unlikely that any organization responsible for lower priority programs of chemical and biological defense would be able to find the resources or justification to expand programs. The observed behaviors of organizations trying to maintain what they had, as well as emphasizing additional benefits of existing programs is indicative of behaviors predicted by Holden where organizations are struggling for existence.

Some imperialistic behavior did emerge in the 1980’s as observed in the public push for the development of binary chemical weapons, and a renewed interest in chemical and biological defense. However, while this is evidence of imperialistic behavior, this behavior is most focused on expanding offensive and defensive chemical programs. When biological weapons are addressed they are almost always part of a joint chemical/biological program. Therefore, it is possible to argue that while imperialism exerted a minimal degree of influence over this time period, the imperialistic behaviors that are observed were executed through a chemical frame.

Realism and Biodefense, 1971-91

For most of this period the Soviet Union and the Cold War was the prime concern and driving factor for the external threat facing for the U.S. From the realist standpoint the Soviet Union posed a mortal threat to the existence of the U.S. In the power balancing equations of realism, any perceived advantage can have significant implications for the state. As the U.S. grew more confident as to the existence of the 238

Soviet biological program, one would expect to see greater emphasis placed upon defense.

President Nixon’s decision to restrict all biological research to defensive measures also had an impact on threat assessment. From the perspective of understanding the capabilities and threat posed by biological weapons, this decision removed an important data point. While previous planners could look to the U.S. offensive program for an understanding of what a biological weapon could do, all assessment of the biological threat for this period would have to rely upon data from the defensive program and upon intelligence estimates of the Soviet program.

This is also the first time period where the U.S regarded chemical weapons and biological weapons as distinct weapons with different policies use. Both the U.S. and the

Soviets maintained offensive chemical warfare programs through most of this time period, and both were signatories to the BWC. Therefore it would not be surprising to see different threat levels associated with the two weapons.

The data available for this period does show difference in the relative threat between chemical and biological agents, consistent with an external threat perspective.

However, the combined chemical/biological threat model is readily observable in the data, indicating a chemical frame was also influencing U.S. actions over this time period.

THE THREAT

It is possible to get an understanding of how the U.S viewed the biological threat for this time period by looking at a chronologic history of intelligence documents. They

239 reflect that chemical weapons were always regarded as a threat to U.S. forces. Biological agents were never absent from the threat picture, but it is possible to argue they were regarded as less of a threat in the 1970’s but gained importance in the 1980’s.

Two National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) on Soviet biological weapons prior to this time period set the stage for the general attitude of the country entering this period.

The first NIE judges the Soviets were researching biological weapons, but that they had no dedicated production facilities or stockpiles. The report did state the Soviets could probably produce significant stockpiles within months of a decision to do so. (Director of

Central Intelligence 1964)

A 1969 NIE on Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities estimates that nuclear weapons had reduced the chemical role within Soviet doctrine but found

“continued stress on the importance of chemical munitions is evident in Soviet military

Writings, organization, training and armament, suggesting the Soviets will continue to retain a significant proportion of chemical warfare warheads in inventory.” Regarding biological weapons this NIE found evidence for an emerging biological weapons program that could no longer be explained by sanitation or defense work and that the

Soviets had capability “to develop, produce and stockpile military significant quantities” of biological weapons. (Director of Central Intelligence 1969)

This assessment is supported by a translated copy of a document outlining

Warsaw Pact military operations. This document showed a strong focus on conventional and nuclear operations. However, it also included distinct chemical operations, to include numbers of forces and employment concepts. The document makes little direct 240 reference to biological operations, but does include an expected 5% loss of forces to

“biological means” in the section discussing expected casualties.89 (CIA - Directorate of

Plans 1970)

An assessment of Soviet civilian chemical and biological defense in 1978 notes and “extensive” chemical and biological defense program, giving equal weight to chemical and biological weapons. The report notes the unusual precedence of the defensive program, given the existence of international treaties. Interestingly this report does not reach a judgment that the Soviet defensive plan was possibly the result of an existing (but secret) Soviet offensive capability. Rather the report judged the Soviets gave attention to biological weapons because of a combination of; holdover from previous Soviet doctrine, U.S. public debate over binary chemical weapons,90 other potential advisories, or as an internal propaganda tool. (National Foriegn Assesment

Center 1978)

In 1979 a significant event occurred in the Soviet Union when an apparent biological accident in the city of Sverdlovsk resulted in the deaths of civilians within the city. Today it is known that there was a biological production facility in the city which accidentally released weaponized Anthrax. In spite of Soviet denials intelligence assessments from the time period made a correct judgment that:

“The information accumulated on the accident constitutes strong evidence that a biological production or storage site is at the Sverdlovsk facility. All indications point to anthrax…indicating an extremely large number of

89 This is separate from casualties expected to be caused by disease. This is consistent with testimony from defectors who believed the U.S. had a secret biological program. 90 This finding in itself reflects a chemical frame on the part of the analyst 241

anthrax spores were released – effectively negating any assessment of peaceful or defensive research…This flies in the face of the Convention…Thus the evidence points strongly to illegal production or storage of biological agents and weapons.” (Defense Intelligence Agency 1980)

While having smoking gun evidence of Soviet biological capabilities, subsequent intelligence estimates were slow to definitively declare the existence of a Soviet biological weapons program. This attitude gradually changed over the 1980’s as intelligence estimates became more openly concerned with Soviet biological weapons capability.

At about the same time as the Sverdlovsk accident there was also concern that the

Soviets, through proxy governments, had employed not only chemical weapons but biological toxins in several counties. This gave rise to the “Yellow rain” controversy which has come to be viewed with general skepticism, but is not yet been resolved to everyone’s satisfaction. What is important to remember is the prevailing intelligence information at the time would be used to formulate national policy.

A 1982 CIA estimate on South East Asia, comes to a definitive conclusion that chemical weapons were used in Laos, chemical weapons and toxins were used in

Kampuchea and that chemical weapons, and possibly toxins had been used in

Afghanistan. Drawing from these conclusions, the CIA makes two implications of importance to the U.S. defensive program; “The Soviets had begun to weaponized toxins by at least the early 1960’s and have used these weapons in Laos and Kampuchea, and possibly Yemen and Afghanistan,” and “it means the Soviets have gained

242 considerable experience through operational use of biotoxins. If we are correct the

United States and its allies face a new threat not previously considered in intelligence estimates and defense planning.” (Director of Central Intelligence 1982)

A subsequent report in 1983 report on chemical weapon again makes claims of

Soviet use of chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan. While the report focused on chemical weapons it is significant in that it addresses toxins and raises the point of Soviet doctrine regarding toxins as chemical weapons but notes toxins were specifically covered under the Biological Weapons Convention. The report validates the threat, noting “large” sections of Soviet military manuals which address toxins. The report also notes a general lack in U.S. intelligence capability for both chemical and biological weapons as well as noting the inability of NATO to detect toxins. 91 (Director of Central Intelligence 1983)

The 1980’s saw advances in biotechnology, such as gene splicing which many argue have made the biological threat greater than ever. Intelligence estimates note that the Soviets were utilizing new technology to expand both their chemical and biological weapons programs. This report raised concerns that the Soviets were using advances in biotechnology to develop new weapons for which the U.S. had no defense, and to develop new capabilities for large scale production. 92 (Director of Central Intelligence

1984)

A report assessing Soviet biological weapons capability, published near the end of this period of analysis in 1986, was the first of the documents available to make definitive

91 The report also shows a potential chemical frame noting detection, protection and decontamination of toxins is similar to “traditional chemical agents.” 92 This report also has a chemical frame as the term “BCW” biological/chemical warfare is used in the title and the two weapons classes are combined throughout the document. 243 judgments of a Soviet biological program. This assessment found the Soviets maintained an “offensive biological warfare program and capability…in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.” It included key judgments regarding the program that the size and scope was beyond anything that could be justified by reasonable peaceful purposes, and that the Soviets were incorporating biotechnology developments “in their offensive BW program to improve agent utility on the battlefield.” (Defense Intelligence

Agency 1986)

By 1988 intelligence estimates were not only concerned with the Soviet Union but named Iran, Iraq and Libya (plus several redacted countries) as having biological weapons, and judged eleven other countries were attempting to develop biological weapons. Two other items are of note in this estimate. First, as with most other evidence from this period, the chemical frame is apparent in references to combined “CBW” materials, proliferation and facilities. Secondly, ominously setting the stage for the next period of analysis, the CIA assessed, “Iraq is now developing biological weapons and

(redacted) we expect it to initiate full scale production of botulinum toxin, anthrax and

(redacted) agent this year.” (Director of Intelligence 1988)

THE RESPONSE

While there was a continually growing concern over the presence and status of the

Soviet biological program the U.S. did not necessarily respond as would be predicted if the external biological threat was perceived as a dire threat driving decision making. The early 1970’s saw severe reductions in funds allocated to chemical and biological defense.

244

This may be an example of ideology overriding valid threat assessments. For example in spite of U.S. chemical defense capabilities described as “Marginal at best” the five year budget for chemical defense equipment was only $14.6 million vice a Joint Chiefs request of $1.137 billion. Likewise, in spite of having no biological detection capability the budget only provided for $2 million for this area per year. (Interdepartmental

Political-Military Group 1970)

Congressional testimony in 1970 was also indicative of the general atmosphere of the country regarding the threat. The questions are skeptical of the Soviet biological threat, and note the inability of the U.S. to identify clear evidence of a biological production facility. Subsequent testimony raises a thinly veiled accusation that the

“pentagon” had evidence of Soviet capabilities, was not willing to share the information with Congress. (Committe on Foriegn Affaris 1970)

The committee also provides a window into the strategic thinking of the nation in this time period. A large portion of the testimony is focused on either how to address treaties and President Nixon’s declarations, or how to address the use of tear gas and defoliants in Vietnam. There is also discussion that NBC defense could be obtained by maintaining a stated policy of nuclear or chemical retaliation in the event of an NBC attack. While this strategy may work on a global power politics scale, it does nothing to provide actual defensive capabilities to forces on the ground.

About this time the U.S. was also debating the benefits of the Biological Weapons convention. While Morgenthau cautions against bringing moral judgments into power calculations, the treaty would serve as another reason to be less concerned with biological 245 weapons. 93 There is evidence that the U.S. did put stock in the treaty as many intelligence estimates on Soviet biological capabilities seem to use the treaty as a default assumption that the Soviets did not have a biological program.

As an interesting aside, even the biological treaty was not immune from a chemical influence. The text of the convention mentions the use or stockpiling of chemical weapons three times in the nine sentences which compose the preamble. Draft language contained even more references, causing alarm within the U.S. delegation.

Some concerns expressed by the DoD include; “there are more references and a closer tie into chemical weapons,” and “The JCS consider that the addition of the words ‘chemical and’ in prembular paragraph 1 tend to change the entire thrust of the BW convention and may not be entirely consistent with NSDM 35’s statement that BW and CW are to be treated separately.” (Guhin 1971)

The 1973 war did serve to alert the nation as to the Soviet chemical threat.

Testimony to Congress by the Army sates “intelligence from the October war in the middle east highlighted the relative unpreparedness of US troops to engage in chemical warfare.” Specific reactions to this threat included accelerating developments of antidotes, decontamination capability, and scanning chemical detectors. (Committee on

Armed Services 1975) However, it is difficult to find extensive data showing that the

U.S. responded in a manner similar to the drastic responses observed after the 9/11 attacks and the anthrax letters. In fact the bureaucratic environment described in the

93 The BWC is generally regarded as un-verifiable. The U.S. has been critical of verification protocols and President Bush pulled out of verification discussions in 2001. This stance was then repeated by President Obama in 2010. 246 previous section imposed serious headwinds on the program. Likewise, the training environment described in the frames section is not reflective of an urgent national response.

By the Army’s own account, the extent of U.S. biological detection and warning research at the time was described simply as “exploratory in nature” with no urgency driving the program. (Department of the Army 1977) This thought process is also captured in an 1981 Air Force study on chemical warfare which notes that the U.S. had

“little commitment to chemical warfare,” noting the influence of the U.S.’ “humanitarian view” in its aversion. (Quest Research Corporation 1981) Another intelligence report acknowledges the Soviets probably had an accurate evaluation of U.S. “deficiencies” in this area, but does not take the step to assume the Soviets might wish to exploit those deficiencies with an offensive program. (National Foriegn Assesment Center 1978)

As already cited, Mauroni documents the increase in funds subsequent to the

Arab War and the Sverdlovsk incident which has been partially discussed in the frames section. I have argued that proportionally the response favors chemical weapons as would be expected from a chemical frame. However, it must be acknowledged that the timing of the two events and corresponding increases in funding levels are also indicative of a realist response to a changing external threat. However, the relative proportionality, especially in light of the fact that biological defense was so far behind chemical defense at this time argues, that the response was tempered by a chemical frame.

While it may be possible to argue that U.S. actions in the early 1970’s were realist in nature, based upon U.S. perception of a greater chemical threat, the argument does not 247 hold for the 1980’s. Available intelligence reports from the late 1980’s clearly identified a significant Soviet biological weapons program. A realist based response to this threat would be to try and address existing deficiencies to counter the program.

There is evidence that the threat was being taken more seriously by Congress, and there was concern the relevant treaties may not be working. A 1980 hearing on chemical and biological warfare reflects concern over reported use of Soviet chemical and toxic weapons and the implications on nonproliferation efforts. The committee raises specific concerns over the yellow rain incidents and the Sverdlovsk incident. Questions over this incident elicit a telling response from (retired) Admiral Davies (U.S. Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency). Asked his opinion of the threat posed by the evidence of an anthrax release he responds, “I think they represent a need for further investigation…But as to a threat…biological warfare, we concluded…that it was not a useful weapon.”

(Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs 1980)

In opening statements from a 1984 hearing on chemical warfare reflect a similar concern over emerging threat. The chairman states, “Until recently it was believed that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Bacteriological Weapons convention of 1972 were working effectively. So powerful was the revulsion with chemical and biological arms that no nation…would use them. Unfortunately, recent events have cast these assumptions into question.” (Committee on Foreign Relations 1984)

This committee hearing is interesting in several ways. First, although it is a hearing on “Chemical Warfare” biological weapons are repeatedly associated with chemical weapons. Second the committee places more emphasis on the yellow rain 248 accusations than the Sverdlovsk anthrax incident. Finally, this committee raises several questions over terrorist use of chemical weapons and biological weapons, a new theme not observed in previous periods.

There is also some evidence that chemical frame’s influence over the perception of biological weapons began to change in the later 1980’s. For example in a 1989

Congressional hearing on “Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation” there are two instances where biological weapons are discussed as a separate weapons class. There is specific reference to potential terrorist use of a biological agent. Also there is a section of the testimony which makes references to the unique aspects of biological weapons such as the challenges presented by the fact that unlike other “WMD” weapons biological weapons can be grown from a small, easily transported sample.94

However, as repeatedly observed, the trend is to address the problem as a combined chemical/biological threat. Except for the two sections referenced above almost every other statement referencing biological weapons combines them with chemical weapons as one category. Outside of these two specific sections, in the general testimony a combined chemical/biological reference is made 47 times, chemical weapons are uniquely mentioned over 400 times, while biological agents are mentioned only 22 times as a unique weapon. The testimony includes items such as the subcommittee’s

“Chemical and Biological Weapons Policy” and under the “U.S. Chemical Weapons

Control Proposals” section includes the statement “a number of bills have been

94 The ability to use a small (in theory single cell) sample of a biological agent to grow liters of agent for weaponization is unique in that a liter of a chemical weapon will not “grow” into any more agent. This makes covert trafficking of a biological agent much easier than attempting to transport a significant amount of chemical agent or a nuclear device. 249 introduced in both the House and Senate to further restrict the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.” (Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy

1989)

From these hearings it is possible to observe a general increase in concern over the Soviet threat. However, it is also possible to observe that in almost all of the instances the hearings reflect the joint chemical/biological perspective. In fact several of the hearings, which discuss chemical weapons and biological weapons, are titled exclusively as hearings on chemical weapons.

The intelligence estimates, and Congressional testimony for this period reflect a growing awareness of the threat posed by biological weapons. However, there are almost no organizational outputs that reflect this awareness. As documented in the organizational frames section; doctrine, hardware and training from this period are almost extensively reflective of a combined chemical weapon/biological weapon threat. Had external threat exerted a greater influence one would expect a greater emphasis on equipment dedicated to biological defense.

CONCLUSIONS - REALISM

Without recounting all of the evidence presented in the organizational frames section, the most that can be said for the influence of external threat over this time period is; the nation was becoming concerned with an emerging biological threat, but subsequent actions continue to be executed through a chemical frame. There is more emphasis placed upon chemical defense relative to biological defense, especially in the

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1970’s, as would be predicted by the theory. However, as later threat assessments become more definitive regarding the existence of a Soviet biological weapons threat, a corresponding increase in biological defense is not observed. What is observed is a drive to expand the chemical program, and a continued pattern of combining chemical and biological defensive programs.

Additionally, is possible to make two predictions relative to the threat, which would be indicative of an external threat influence, yet are not observed. First regardless of the threat level, chemical and biological weapons have vastly different characteristics worthy of their own programs. Yet it is possible to find numerous examples of a combined chemical/biological threat in all sources of data examined over this time period. Second, realism would predict that a low biological threat would result in a corresponding low incidence of references to biological weapons. However, biological weapons continue to receive significant attention, albeit as combined within references to

NBC or CB threats or programs. The continued linkage of chemical agents and biological agents, as well as a (relative) lack of priority adjustment for biological agents is more indicative of behaviors associated with organizational frames than realism.

Conclusions – 1971-1991

Over this period several significant historical events influenced the direction of the U.S biological program. This period starts with the program adjusting to President

Nixon’s unilateral renouncement of the use of biological weapons, which drastically altered the resources and prestige associated with the program. Other significant events

251 include the Arab-Israeli war, the Vietnam War, defense draw downs, Sverdlovsk and a subsequent defense buildup in the 1980’s.

Over this period it is possible to observe behaviors that are predicted by all three of the theories of interest. Retrenching and maintenance behaviors are observed in the

1970’s as the chemical program fought to remain relevant in spite of Army reorganization and budget cuts. Later, in the 1980’s, when more money is available, it is possible to observe imperialistic behavior, such as the public campaigning for binary chemical weapons.

It is possible to find evidence that supports the realist prediction that chemical defense would be favored based upon the perceived threat level. In the 1970’s the Soviet chemical threat was perceived as greater than the biological threat, and it is possible to observe a similar pattern in hardware development and financial expenditures. However, with the accident at Sverdlovsk and the increasing perceived Soviet biological threat in the 1980’s one does not observe a corresponding increase in the biological defense program. Rather most biological programs continue to be combined with chemical programs.

Finally there is ample evince to support of continued influence of the chemical frame which had dominated the program since the World War Two era. Behaviors such as combining weapons classes, unequal allocation of resources, and production of similar outputs are evident over the entire time period. Also, significantly, when evidence of imperialism or rational choice decisions are present the behaviors predicted by these theories still appear to be executed through a chemical frame. 252

Therefore when scoring this time period one must conclude a chemical frame exerted the greatest influence over the U.S. biological posture. While there are some observations that are best explained by the influence of imperialism or external threat they do not equal the number of observations in support of the chemical frame. From these available data organizational frames shows the most consistent pathway and has the greatest degree of observed behaviors.

As a result of the frame the U.S. entered the Gulf War with little capability to operate in a biological environment. What effort the U.S. had put into defense, detection and training was skewed towards the chemical threat or had treated the biological threat as an extension of the chemical threat. When the U.S. military found itself facing a potential biological threat in Iraq, the best it could do was implement an emergency vaccination program, and dust off a discarded biological detection system for emergency deployment to the theater.

While the U.S. did not face a biological attack in Iraq, the deficiencies were noted by military leadership and Congress. The resulting investigations and soul searching would result in significant changes in the program. Money, attention and a new assessment of the threat in the 2000 time frame might be the catalyst to break the chemical frame and help create a more effective biological defensive capability.

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Ch 7. 1991- Today, U.N. Sanctions, Terrorism, and Anthrax in the Mail

“The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States; therefore, the national emergency first declared on November 14, 1994, and extended in each subsequent year, must continue” –President Barack Obama (B. Obama 2010)

Historical Setting

The U.S. entered the present period in a bit of a panic, having just fought an enemy with known chemical and possible biological capabilities, while possessing less than ideal protective and detection capabilities. The military realized it had an inadequate supply of protective clothing, and was forced to pull equipment from other theaters to fill the gaps. Military members arrived in theater requiring crash courses in chemical and biological defense. By the time the U.S. initiated its ground action forces were judged as capable of operating in a contaminated environment, but serious concerns had been raised. The best biological detection the military could provide was to dust of a mothballed prototype system developed in the early 1980’s.

Biological weapons received significant attention in the news after the war as the

U.S. and the U.N. uncovered the extent of Iraq’s biological program. Biological weapons remained in the news for the next ten years as U.N. Inspectors, Iraq and the U.S. battled over attempts to execute the biological weapons inspection program within Iraq.

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President Clinton went as far as to initiate several bombing campaigns of Iraq due in part to continuing confrontations between U.N. inspectors and the Iraqi military, including strikes on a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant over fears of possible chemical weapons production.

Also influencing this period was the emergence of several defectors from the former Soviet Union who revealed extensive details on the Soviet biological weapons program. They provided evidence as to Soviet treaty violations, as well as evidence of a mature and operational state level biological program. From their accounts, the U.S. had drastically under estimated the Soviet threat which went as far as to include biological

ICBM’s capable of delivering weaponized anthrax and smallpox to any target within the

U.S.

As the U.S. was becoming aware of the extent of the Soviet biological weapons program, the Soviet Union collapsed. The collapse had immediate implications for nonproliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. For example, the Ukraine suddenly found itself to be the third largest nuclear power in the world. With the loss of

Soviet control and money, the U.S. was extremely concerned over the security of the weapons. Likewise many of the Soviet biological facilities were left with skeleton crews and security forces which were not paid for months at a time. For the U.S. the possibility that a foreign government or terrorist group would be able to buy or steal one of these weapons was a distinct possibility.

Adding to the fears of the rouge biological weapons threat has been the explosion in scientific advances in the biotechnology field. Cloning, genetic sequencing and 255 artificially constructed viruses, once viewed as science fiction have become commonplace within the scientific literature. Genetic techniques I learned in graduate school are now available as mail order kits for high school biology labs.

In 1995 the Japans cult Aum Shinrikyo, attacked the Tokyo subway with homemade nerve agent Sarin, killing 13 people. Subsequent investigation of the group found in addition to several nerve agent attacks, it had attempted to grow and release anthrax from its Tokyo headquarters. Luckily the group used the vaccine strain of anthrax for its attacks and the sarin it produced was of low purity or the group could have inflicted many more casualties. None the less these revelations served as watershed events for the nation. A terrorist group had crossed the chemical and biological line using weapons previously regarded as a threat only on the state level.

The Tokyo attack was followed a series of international terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities which culminated in the 9/11 attacks, drastically changed how the U.S. viewed the terrorist threat. These attacks demonstrated the capability of dedicated international terrorist groups using low tech unconventional means to cause horrific damage. Almost immediate following the 9/11 attacks, anthrax was delivered through the mail. Suddenly the idea of a terrorist release of a biological weapon within a U.S. city seemed a distinct possibility.

After the 9/11 attacks the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in an attempt to root out the al-Qaeda leadership. Soon there were reports of U.S. forces discovering evidence al-

Qaeda had conducted basic research in chemical weapons as well as biological weapons.

After the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, it invaded Iraq for the second time. One of the 256 reasons given was that Iraq was continuing to develop biological and other weapons, in violation of multiple U.N. resolutions. Secretary of State Powell went before the U.N. to provide evidence of alleged mobile Iraqi biological production facilities. While the subsequent failure to find biological weapons, and an understanding of the intelligence failure which led to the assessment has been the subject of many books and endless debate, the reality is that prior to the invasion the U.S. “knew” that the Iraqis possessed biological weapons, and that the Second Gulf War was likely to see their use.

Serving as backdrops across the entire time period were the presence of rouge states such as North Korea, Iran and Libya which were suspected of developing any combination of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Such states are still regarded as proliferation threats today and are the target of sanctions and non-proliferation initiatives designed to stall their efforts.

As the writing of this dissertation is being finished, the U.S. has just pulled its remaining forces from Iraq, and is expected to soon leave Afghanistan. At the moment the international community is concerned Iran will have a nuclear weapon within the next few years and North Korea again attempted to launch a ballistic missile. Domestically the U.S. biological defense program (and all counter proliferation programs) has grown to a massive scale, orders of magnitude larger than it was in the early 1970s. In addition to military programs the U.S. has initiated multiple federal and state biological defense programs as well.

This brief history of the last twenty years reflects and international environment conducive to policy decisions based upon an increasing external threat. For twenty years 257 the U.S. has been observing an increasingly sophisticated terrorist threat, an explosion in biotechnology, and a general realization that biological weapons were not contained by the 1975 treaty. It seems like every 3-5 years another significant event took place which made the likelihood of a biological event seem even greater. In fact the Graham/Talent commission, writing in 2008 stated, “It is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be use in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.”

(Graham and Talent 2008)

Likewise, and perhaps as a result of external threat, the bureaucratic environment is fertile for imperialism, especially after the 2001 time period. The U.S. has dumped massive amounts of money not only at biological defense, but at chemical and nuclear defense as well. While the U.S. was spending less than $10 million per year for medical countermeasures in the early 1970s that amount ballooned to $600 million in the mid

2000s. The massive amount of money and prestige associated with biological defense makes it a tempting colonization target for any organization with and advertised biodefense capability and an advocate in the correct position.

However, the U.S biological defense program is also burdened with the presence of a chemical frame which has been influencing its direction for the last 40 years.

Several generations of military officers, politicians and researchers have learned and worked under this frame. As seen in previous periods, direction from the top relative to a frame does not necessarily mean the frame will be broken. With such a long history it would be difficult to remove the frame entirely from the defense community.

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What the evidence will show is that for this period all three factors are exerting an influence over defense posture. The U.S. has clearly implemented a national policy based upon external threat. The money and resources available because of this response have resulted in an explosion of organizations claiming some responsibility for biological defense. These organizations are using the external threat as justification for their imperialistic behaviors. However, there is evidence that some of the organizational outputs reflect a chemical frame. This is troubling in that even thought nation may think it is taking appropriate action, if the outputs of the program are not effective against the biological threat the nation will have wasted a significant amount of resources. Even more troubling is that if the frame continues to influence the program future military forces may find themselves in the same situation encountered in the First Gulf War.

Organizational Frames and Biodefense, 1991 - Today

The conclusions from the previous two time periods were that a chemical frame played a significant role in the U.S biological posture from the end of World War Two through the Gulf War. Having been a major part of the decision making process for over

40 years there is reason to believe the chemical frame is so strongly entrenched it will continue to exert a significant influence this period as well.

The evidence will show that entering this period the chemical frame was exerting significant influence over U.S posture. However, later in this period the behaviors indicative of the frames model become less apparent. This apparent move away from a chemical frame is most evident in government policy, military doctrine and general

259 testimony, while the area of hardware development seems to be the slowest to emerge from the influence of the frame.95

FRAMES IN TRAINING

Historical events over this time period, such as the chemical and biological defensive scramble in the Gulf War, realization of Iraqi and Soviet biological programs, the 9/11 attacks and the anthrax attacks increased Congressional interest in chemical defense and biological defense. Based upon a perceived vulnerability to chemical agents and biological agents in the First Gulf War there was a push from Congress to increase capabilities, and in particular to increase training efforts. While the nation’s approach to biological training will also be addressed in the realism section, it is also important to highlight behaviors indicative of a chemical frame in this section as well.

An excellent example of how the DoD viewed chemical and biological weapons as one class is captured in the DoD response to a 2000 GAO report on training.

Acknowledging the GAO finding that current training was inadequate the DoD response states, “The Joint staff and CINCs will continue to develop a counter-CBW operational concept…This concept will serve as the basis for refining doctrine to reflect all aspects of counter-CBW operations.” (United States General Accounting Office 2000a) Not only does this position capture the combined chemical/biological threat behavior predicted by

95 While this period may be seeing the decline of a chemical frame, it may also be the rise of the combined “CBRN” frame. While these have been combined in the past (NBC, WMD) there seems to be a higher prevalence of a combined chemical/biological reference in the previous two periods. While the combined C/B category seems less apparent in this period, there seem to be more CBRN references. This may be a direct reflection of the increased congressional awareness (and resources) allocated to CBNR threats, indicating a shift in frames influenced by bureaucratic politics. 260 the model, but a directive from such a high organizational level instructing development of a combined chemical/biological operational concept could “lock in” that frame of reference for subordinate staffs responsible for developing the concept.

In a 2001 GAO report on medical readiness, the GAO found an overall lack of chemical or biological awareness in the military medical community but noted biological awareness was worse than chemical. If found the Army had finally incorporated chemical casualties into medical casualty/logistics estimates but had not incorporated biological warfare scenarios. The same report also showed that chemical scenarios had started to be included in medical unit training, but biological scenarios had only been

“piloted” at that point. The GAO also noted that no official direction had been issued to include biological scenarios in training “even thought biological warfare scenarios are different than those for chemical warfare.” (United States General Accounting Office

2001)

A subsequent 2005 GAO study found training was somewhat improved but still noted a general lack of NBC training at combat training centers. The report shows that when training did take place it was executed through a chemical frame. Examining several training events the authors noted that training included 3-7 chemical attacks per rotation, usually incorporated as an overt bomb, aerial spray or artillery attack. They also noted far fewer biological attacks, and when included the attack scenario was usually biological contamination of drinking water. The report did cite one area that showed an

261 increase in biological emphasis. A 2004 Marine NBC course allocated two of 17 classroom hours to biodefense.96 (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2005)

As late as 2007 Army training guidance continues to reflect a combined chemical/biological threat. The title of the document React to a Chemical or Biological

(C/B) hazard/attack reflects this bias which is evident throughout the training tasks. The document prescribes performance steps, and attack scenarios which are chemical centric.

For example soldiers are to identify a C/B hazard by “A Chemical Alarm,” or observe symptoms of “C/B” poisoning such as “difficulty breathing, coughing, wheezing, vomiting, or eye irritation.” (United States Army 2007) Such guidance is realistic for a chemical attack, but the training makes no reference to the fact that biological symptoms will not appear until days after the attack.

FRAMES IN SPEECH

In the previous historical periods many quotes have been drawn from

Congressional testimony demonstrating how closely chemical weapons and biological weapons were regarded by government officials. Generally biological weapons appeared to be included by default in discussions of chemical weapons, or as an afterthought of another possible route of attack, but were not regarded as a significant threat on their own.

The perception of biological agents captured over this period shows a striking contrast with previous testimony, indicating a weakening of the chemical frame. While

96 Interestingly this course inverts the previous chemical frame in that there is a distinct biological component, while all chemical components are combined with the biological threat. 262 there are still references to combined threats, and the WMD or CBRN terms are repeatedly used, the tight chemical/biological association seen in previous periods exhibits a gradual but steady weakening. Ironically, in the most recent testimony the roles of biological weapons and chemical weapons are almost reversed, as chemical agents now appear almost an afterthought to the biological threat.

In 1993 testimony regarding proliferation does not necessarily use the chemical/biological association, but refers to generic “WMD” threats when assessing the international threat environment. However, when the discussion is over specific countries or proliferation scenarios, references are unique to the type of weapon separate from the general WMD category. Interestingly one recommended course of action is to create one stop combined “WMD” threat center to collect and process intelligence.

(Woolsey 1993)

Over the subsequent years testimony reflects varying levels of influence from a chemical frame, with a general pattern of decreased influence. In 2001 testimony Dr.

Anna Johnson-Winegar does a good job of addressing biological specific challenges and solutions. However, the frame does creep in as witnessed by references such as “DoD’s chemical and biological detection equipment,” or referencing “operations in chemical and biological environments.” (Jonhson-Winegar 2001)

The frame is still exerting influence over testimony in 2003. In this testimony the chemical/biological association is stronger than previous testimony. Example statements include; “The Chemical Biological Defense Program’s initiatives over the last decade have significantly improved our ability to protect Service members from the effects of 263 chemical and biological weapons,” or “efforts have resulted in improvements in the whole family of chemical and biological defense systems,” and a reference to a

“Chemical and biological (CB) installation protection equipment suite.” (Klein 2003)

While the chemical frame is evident in this testimony there are some specific references to dedicated biological detection equipment. These statements reflect an attitude not previously observed in Congressional testimony. One telling statement reflects an appreciation of the difficultly in biological detection; “not only are there high levels of biological aerosols naturally present, but detection systems need to identify the various biological species and strains, the particle size, whether they are pathogenic, and whether they remain viable after being released into the atmosphere.”

Testimony in 2008 is interesting in that it represents a dual view of the chemical/biological relationship, and reflects a general pattern observed in other areas examined over this time period. The civilian component of the testimony shows distinction between weapons classes, and makes references to biological attacks, threats and technology with no reference to chemical agents. The military representative does make specific references to biological weapons by themselves in specific scenarios, but when discussing general threat the reference is much more likely to be chemical/biological combined. For example he references; “new chemical and biological detectors,” a “chemical and biological event,” “chemical and biological medical systems technologies,” and “all-hazards decontamination.” (Senate Committe on Armed Services

2008)

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Some of the most recent testimony continues to reflect the move away from a chemical frame. The title, National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats:

Diplomacy and International Programs, of the hearing in itself is significant in that biological threat is being identified as a unique and separate weapon.97 This theme is continued in the actual text of the testimony. Whereas most previous testimony contained some references to a combined chemical/biological threat, it appears witnesses in this hearing were acutely aware of the differences in weapons and made steps to identify issues with previous references.

Some examples of statements reflecting this awareness are, “I have often said that the use of the term WMD is misleading, because it lumps into one category mustard gas and hydrogen bombs along with all chemical, radiological, and biological and nuclear threats.” Or, “I want to stress a key point that informs the rest of our commissions’ analysis. That is that nuclear weapons and biological weapons are very different…If we apply some of the lessons that we have drawn from the nuclear area to the biological area, we will make some big mistakes.” (Committee on Foreign Affaris 2010)

Testimony in the hearing is biological specific, addressing concepts such as international disease surveillance, and addressing the significance of drugs and vaccination for biological agents noting “why weaponize pathogens to populations (that) can be effectively immunized or treated.” This testimony is also significant in that it addresses characteristics of biological agents not previously exploited in defense planning. Specifically it recognizes that the (relatively) slow action of biological agents

97 In 1970 the same committee was having hearings on “chemical-biological warfare” 265 provides a treatment option not available to other “WMD” class weapon.98 Speaking on behalf of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Proliferation and Terrorism, Rademaker states the position “That the United States needs to take advantage of that window to make sure that we have measures in place that will minimize the consequences of a bio attack.”

However, it is still possible to find references that indicate the chemical frame has some influence. A troubling quote (referencing the “underwear bomber”) reflects combination of the chemical/biological threat, and general confusion over what is a chemical weapon, vs. an explosive/kinetic weapon. A member of the committee states,

“Our most recent attack from a chemical/biological weapon shows the sophistication and change of tactics of terrorists…who would have thought that a mere mixing of a chemical in one’s under garments could blow a plane out of the sky?”

Records from two other 2010 sessions also reflect the significant weakening of the chemical frame. Testimony on government preparedness makes some references to a combined “WMD” threat. However, it makes many more reference biological specific threats and attack scenarios than was ever observed in previous periods. (Subcommittee on Terrorism 2010) A hearing on emerging threats is significant in that it almost completely reverses the chemical frame observed in the previous time periods. The transcript of this testimony reflects that while the combined chemical/biological/nuclear

“WMD” term is used, there are more references to specific biological attacks or

98 Designing a strategy based upon the “window of opportunity” unique to biological weapons is a strategy not observed in previous periods of analysis. While doctrine acknowledges the slower action of biological agents, the prevailing defensive strategies are, detect and mask up, or wait for casualties to show up, which I would argue are influenced by the chemical frame. 266 technology than chemical events. Even more importantly, not one biological reference is combined with a reference to a chemical agent.

The continuing change in focus is reflected in testimony from the director of the

Chemical Biological Defense Program to Congress regarding the 2011 budget. Some of the testimony supports imperialistic behavior and will be discussed in the next section.

Significantly for this section the main focus of the testimony was on countering the biological threat through drug development and disease surveillance. This testimony reflects a decoupling of the chemical/biological threat and recognizes the unique role of medical countermeasures in biological defense. The testimony also emphasizes the large number of collaborating agencies, something not observed in previous periods and is an indicator of increased imperialistic influence. (Scarbrough 2010)

WRITTEN FRAMES

When examining documents such as annual reports, charters, after action reports and modernization strategies it is possible to find behaviors predicted by the chemical frame model such as combining threats, subsuming threats and unequal attention. While there is evidence of the chemical frame, as in other areas is possible to detect a gradual shift away from the chemical frame.

Sources early in this period almost always combine the chemical and biological threat as one entity. The 1992 report summarizing U.S. performance in the Gulf War makes repeated reference to “CW/BW” defensive equipment, protection, and training.

(Department of Defense 1992) Also in 1992 a regulation was published creating a

267 committee to evaluate material for “nuclear survivability and NBC contamination survivability matters.” Although the committee was clearly charged with NBC survivability the official name of the committee was the “Nuclear and Chemical

Survivability Committee.” (Department of the Army 1992) The Army NBC

Modernization Plan published in 1992 combines threats and solutions when it states

“contamination avoidance is the cornerstone of NBC defense” in spite of an acknowledged lack of biological detection capability. The plan also states “Successful

NBC protection is founded in the chemical infrastructure and protective equipment located in all Army units.” (Department of the Army 1992a)

The 1997 science plan begins to show a crack in the chemical frame as it shows an interest in biological specific defense issues. The plan includes three specific biological technology demonstrations designed to improve defense against biological weapons. At the same time the plan also includes several combined experiments. It is not surprising that two of the areas which are combined, protective clothing and decontaminating, have shown some of the strongest historical evidence of the chemical frame. (Department of Defense 1997)

While the frame may have been weakening it was still present in significant strength. A 1998 NBC defense report to Congress continues the behavior of combining the chemical and biological weapons as one threat. In the threat section of the report there is a distinct nuclear section yet chemical and biological weapons are regarded as one threat for the purposes of issues such as national weapons programs, delivery systems and attack scenarios. (Depatrment of Defense 1998) In some cases there are actually 268 conscious efforts to combine the weapons classes. In 2002 the Counter Proliferation

Review Committee actually combines a unique “Bio Point Detection Roadmap” published in a previous report and re-designates it a “Chem-Bio Point Detection

Roadmap”. (Counter Proliferation Review Committee 2002)

The combined chemical/biological view continues to exist in recent government reports, significantly within “the” chemical/biological defense program. The 2005 CBDP annual report is based upon a combined threat as evidenced by statements such as; “the unique characteristics of the various CB weapons,” or “effectively mitigate the effects of a CB attack.” (Deparment of Defense 2005) This combined threat is still evident in 2010 as the CBDP annual report references acquisition of “CB defensive equipment,” “CB sensor components,” “CB point identification,” or repeated references to the encompassing “CBRN threat.” (Department of Defense 2010)

As in previous periods there are academic writings by military officers and

NCO’s which address issues relating to biological weapons. Looking at writings from the period there is a stronger prevalence of the chemical frame in these sources than observed in other written documents, perhaps reflective of a stronger frame within military leadership. This is also significant in that if the frame still exists within today’s emerging leaders it may continue to influence the military for the next 10-20 years.

Writing in 1991 Doesburg produced a thesis on the future of the Chemical Corps.

Reflected in his work is the familiar behavior of combining chemical and biological weapons as on threat. Specifically when addressing the “NBC” threat he identifies the unique nature of nuclear weapons, segregating them for separate discussions, while 269 referring to chemical and biological weapons as on combined class. Also in the thesis is the behavior of combining requirements for hardware when he discusses incorporating multiple detection missions and threats within combined “NBC” detection devices.

(Doesburg 1991)

A 2005 paper demonstrates an extreme example of where chemical weapons and biological weapons are viewed as one. A paper tilted Chemical and Biological Warfare:

A Moral Dilemma makes no reference to biological weapons in its thesis statement. It states the paper is about the Chemical Weapons Convention, retaliation, and elimination of chemical weapons. The paper then includes an almost obligatory paragraph on the basics of biological weapons, yet makes no reference to biological agents in any of its subsequent arguments. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the combined view is that it leads to the authors to make false statements. Thirty five years after President Nixon’s biological declarations do these military members still believe the U.S has biological weapons? These misperceptions are expressed in statements such as “Our nation’s leaders have decided the time has come to dispose of our nation’s vast stockpile of chemical and biological weapons…,” or “the U.S, unleashed 10,000 tons of chemical and biological agents on the North Vietnamese” and “how do we dispose of the remaining 91 percent of chemical and biological weapons by the 2007 deadline?” (Hodge, et al. 2005)

The combination of weapons is also observable in a 2007 thesis examining fixed site decontamination. This thesis continues to reflect the historic tendency to combine chemical and biological decontamination within the same frame of reference. In this case chemical and biological weapons are also combined with radiological and nuclear 270 weapons as one combined decontamination problem. An additional point highlighted in the thesis is that the other services rely upon the Army for heavy decontamination capabilities, in making the Army’s frame of reference the default frame of reference for all the services. (Ackley 2007)

As argued in previous sections the existence of contrarian views to a frame is expected, and serves as an indicator that others have issue with the status quo. At least one military paper advocates a non-frames view on consequence management. The author argues that “organizations are driving their actions based upon misperceptions gleaned from the 1996 sarin attack in Tokyo.” He makes several points that the combined category of weapons as observed with “WMD” policy results in universal doctrine and policy which are at best impractical and at worst physically impossible to implement because of the different physical realities of the different agents. For instance he argues that the quick action of chemical weapons make it unrealistic to assume a military unit would be able to respond in time to provide any protection to a local community. (Lee 2001)

While it is possible to identify many examples of the chemical frame there is also important evidence that the chemical frame has been challenged in recent years.

In 2005 the Air Force held a workshop in an attempt to identify the “85% solution” for defense against biological weapons. The workshop was needed to combat the perceived belief that the military is unwilling to accept any solution that is less than 100% effective.

The workshop produced over 50 suggestions on how to improve biological defense.

Among the “Tier-1” solutions was to “Develop C-BW CONOPS” where the report 271 explicitly sates “Doctrine for BW should be de-linked from other CBRNE doctrine since it is significantly different.” (Pravecek and Davis 2005) The Air Force has adopted this recommendation developing in implementing a biological specific concept of operations in 2008.99 The Air Force also adopted other recommendations such as developing biological specific decision tools, while other recommendations, such as increased training have not received substantial support.

There is also evidence that that the organizational culture of the Chemical Corps may be changing. In 2006 Brigadier General Spoehr, (Chief of the Chemical Corps) gave a briefing in which he stated “We lack a common lexicon in our Corps, are we exactly sure what we mean when we use terms like: WMD, NBC, CBRN, Full Spectrum

Hazards, SSE, HAZMAT, WMD Elimination, Technical Escort, and …?” Significantly in the same briefing he proposed changing position descriptions from NBC or chemical to reflect CBRN terminology. For instance a “Chemical Operations Specialist” was to become a “CBRN specialist.”100 (Spoehr 2006)

FRAMES IN HARDWARE

The data presented so far in this section indicate that the behaviors associated with a chemical frame were strongly present early in this period but have been fading over the last ten years. However, compared to the statements and reports, hardware and doctrine take much longer to develop and to change. Therefore, even if the frames model

99 The Air Force has effectively broken the doctrinal WMD frame, developing distinct operating plans for chemical, radiological and biological environments. 100 Such a change could be frames driven, or could be imperialistic as congress has generally added funding to counter CBRN programs. 272 is being broken in this period, it would take much longer to become evident in these areas.

The available evidence supports this conclusion, as it still possible to find numerous examples of hardware developed against joint threats or biological defensive hardware mirroring chemical hardware requirements. Specifically it is possible to observe the combining of chemical and biological agents/threats as one in the development of sensors, employment concepts, and decontamination capabilities. In instances where requirements are not explicitly combined it possible to observe operational requirements that are more similar that would be expected based upon the differences in the agents. This finding is important for the U.S. biodefense posture, in that if good policies are executed poorly, the U.S. will still be left with sub-standard defensive capabilities.

In the early 1990’s equipment is almost always referred to as NBC or C/B equipment. The DoD report assessing U.S. performance in the Gulf War makes almost exclusive use of the term “Chemical/Biological” when referencing defensive equipment, protection, and decontamination materials. (Department of Defense 1992) Likewise in the Army’s 1992 NBC Modernization Plan current capabilities, threat and operating environment are almost exclusively described relative to a “NBC” environment. When the WMD threat is broken out, there is still an overriding tendency to refer to use the combined “chemical/biological” references as when describing long range plans for

“individual CB detection,” and “Long range, real-time, detection, warning and identification system for Bio/Chem. hazards.” The hardware described in the vision 273 section (for FY03-08) show a chemical bias or a combined threat bias as the section has four chemical unique systems, five combined chemical/biological systems but only one biological unique program. (Department of the Army 1992a)

Even thought there is a preponderance of chemical or chemical/biological sensors, there have always been some programs specific to biological agents. However, as seen in previous periods the operational requirements for biological systems are similar to operational parameters for chemical sensors. The requirements for the Joint Biological

Point Detection System, written in 1996 reflect another biological point detector of a similar construct to chemical detectors. The specifications for the systems call for detection, warning, sample collection and identification capabilities within the same system. Specific performance parameters for the system call for detecting one agent particle per liter of air, and given a detection event, the system is to provide identification

(genus/species level) within 10 minutes.101 (Short 1996)

A concept study for the Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS) written in

1993 is somewhat unique in that the operational requirements for this system appear to be less influenced by the rapid alert/warning requirements seen in chemical and most biological sensors under development at this time. For this system the requirement is to provide “rapid warning,” specifically “At lease fast enough to warn of impending casualties” and “If possible proved advanced warning for some personnel, and warning to others to minimize their dose.” In this case the removal of specific time requirements

101 As already discussed a 10 min reaction time will still result in exposure of personnel ½ to over 1 mile downwind of the sensor. 274 allows developers flexibility in designing detection capabilities to meet faster requirements for toxins (act in min-hours) vs. bacteria or viruses (acting in days-weeks).

(Battelle 1993)

However by 1998, as the BIDS system was being developed, the flexible time requirements had been replaced by a near-real time detection requirement. Specifically the system was now required to; detect and identify 5-25 particles/l air in 15-30 min, simultaneously detect eight different agents, and now included a requirement to detect chemicals “at or below human response levels.” (Depatrment of Defense 1998) The point bears repeating that the 15-30 minute time warnings are of almost no used to a base commander. Warnings within seconds can prevent exposure among personnel. A warning provided 30 minutes after the cloud passes means most of the base has already been exposed.

In 1994 Congress mandated that biological (and chemical) programs previously dispersed among the services be consolidated under one joint DoD program, which is currently known as the Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP). Starting in 1995 the program issued annual reports to Congress which included a section listing all major existing and developmental programs.

The table below summarizes the total of major research programs reported each year to Congress from 1995-2007.102

102 The reports from 2008 – present are in a new format, and do not allow direct comparison of programs. Some of these programs are multiyear programs and are counted multiple times in the totals. 275

Table 4: Chemical and Biological RTDE Programs 1995-2007 Category Chemical Chemical Biological “Real- Standoff Biological time” Biological Biological Detection Detection All 50 100 66 33 22

CBDP 1 38 0 - - Decontamination CBDP 45 35 44 29 14 Hardware DARPA 0 10 11 1 0 DTO 4 17 11 3 8 Source: CBDP reports to Congress 1995-2007

In the table programs are scored as dedicated to chemical agents, dedicated to biological agents or designed to address both agents. The bulk of the programs are under control of the CBDP. Of those programs they were scored as either decontamination or as hardware. Biological detection was further broke out as; real-time, designed to detect in time to alert forces to don protective gear, or standoff, designed to detect biological agents at a distance from the location of the sensor. This breakout was included to show the relative lack of interest in a third possibility of biological detection, so called “detect to treat,” where identification takes hours and the goal is to facilitate medical treatment.

Two alternative programs the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Defense Technology Office (DTO) also produced similar equipment over this time period and their programs are included as examples of non-traditional military funded research.

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Looking at the various totals it is possible to draw several conclusions relative to the defense program.103 One significant observation is that the total number of biological projects is higher than chemical projects, reflecting a level of biological independence not observed in previous periods and possibly indicating a weakening of the chemical frame in some areas.

A second observation is the continued combined approach in the decontamination effort. The decontamination program has historical shown a strong chemical frame influence. Looking at the decontamination projects for this period these behaviors persist as the chart shows there is no dedicated biological decontamination program. Program descriptions from this period support this observation. A decontaminant effective

“against all probable threat chemical and biological agents, to include toxins” is requested in 1991. (Palman 1991) Similar requirements are reflected in the parameters for the Sensitive Equipment Decontamination System which is to “decontaminate chemical and biological warfare agents,” and the Sorbent Decontamination System which is required to “effectively decontaminate all CB warfare agents from contaminated surfaces.” (Depatrment of Defense 1998)

As with other areas there are some indicators that even in the decontamination arena the frame might be weakening as evidenced by two recent programs. Of the three currently listed by the Joint Program Manger –Decontamination one addresses the possibility of a multiple decontaminate solution. The “Family of Decontamination

Systems” program is to incorporate “a family of decontaminants and decontamination

103 The table does not include items listed as individual protection or collective protection 277 application systems under a single entity.” (Joint Program Manager - Decontamination

2010)

There is also evidence that the Air Force may be breaking chemical frame associated with the decontamination effort. Included in the survivability testing for the latest generation of fighter aircraft was a test dedicated to biological decontamination.

Writing about the tests, the authors recognize that “Biological threats and agents are living organisms that can be neutralized through a proven process such as VHP104. Unlike chemical threats, biological contamination does not have to be physically removed from the asset once an organism is killed.” However at the same time they continue to combine chemical and biological as one threat, therefore attributing capabilities to biological weapons which do not exist. Referencing material hardness they state materials must have the “ability to resist degradation by CB agents. Materials…must be capable of withstanding exposure to a contaminated environment.”105 (Stewart and

Griffis 2006)

The chart also captures programs outside of the traditional DoD research and acquisition programs. The two additional agencies, DARPA and the DTO were created to focus on forward looking, “high risk” research. These programs present an opportunity to break from legacy thinking, and explore “non-traditional” solutions.

Interestingly, in this case there is a large bias towards combined or biological unique programs, and relatively little effort directed towards chemical programs. Such a

104 Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide 105 Material degradation from chemical weapons is a concern to the Air Force as agents such as VX and Mustard can weaken metals, and degrade aircraft components. Biological weapons, however, pose no such material hazard. 278 contrast is consistent with organizational frames theory in that organizations outside of the frame would adopt strategies to address the problem as they perceive it, which very well might be different than strategies pursued by organizations within the frame. This may also reflect imperialist behavior by these agencies as they may be attempting to claim the biological mission space ignored by the traditional CBDP program.

A particular area of interest is the of biological detection programs. As already discussed detection parameters for chemical agents and biological agents continue to mirror each other. The chart also confirms that almost all of the traditional biological detection programs are based upon real time or standoff detection systems, continuing the established pattern of producing biological detectors with similar operational characteristics as chemical detectors. There is one more recent program

JBREWS/JBTDS which seems to break the pattern. This program (still in development today) is based upon a dispersed detection model rather than the traditional low density point sensor detection strategy. Also of note is that DARPA detection projects do not follow the same trend and seem to break from a chemical frame by examining alternative biological detection methods.

Over this period three additional biological detection systems were developed and are currently utilized by organizations outside of the CBDP. These systems; JBAIDS

(DoD Medical community), BASIS (NNSA/DOE) and BioWatch (DHS), were developed outside of the traditional CBDP and are all based upon technology utilizing a long sample/collection step followed by an a PCR identification step. Compared to the near- real time sensors developed by the CBDP these systems take hours to days to complete a 279 detection cycle. The long detection time is offset by a high degree of sensitivity and specificity not available in sensors developed by the CBDP. The fact that these three systems were developed and deployed outside of the traditional DoD program supports the contrasting internal/external behavior predicted by the organizational frame model.

The successful employment of alternative sensors by outside organizations also supports behaviors predicted by the bureaucratic politics model.

But, just when it is possible put forth an argument that the frame may be weakening, it continues to show its strength as evidenced in two current research programs. A recent Request For Information from the Transformational Medical

Technologies office published in 2012 looks for technology to “… identify and characterize biowarfare agents and infectious disease agents,” but also included is a

“secondary objective is to identify biological toxins and chemical agents.” (JPM-

Transfomational Medical Technoloigies 2012) The frame is also present in the Chemical

Biological Agent Resistance Test program. While including biological in the title, this program has nothing to do with biological agents but seeks to improve testing protocols for “chemical warfare agents, toxic chemicals and toxic industrial materials.” (JPM

Contamination Avoidance 2012) While biodefense hardware may be slowly emerging from the chemical frame, there is clear evidence that the chemical frame is still influencing perceptions within the biodefense program.

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THE CASE OF PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

A final area of hardware to examine is protective clothing. Combining data from each time period for one specific item allows a mini observation over the entire period of biological defense. The pattern observed with protective clothing mirrors the overall pattern of the defensive program. The initial development of protective biological clothing reflects the influence of external threat but subsequent development is dominated by a chemical frame. However, its history also reflects a battle of frames vs. non-frames thinking as the guidance regarding appropriate protection is schizophrenic, confusing and at times it directly contradicts itself.

There is a solid logistical and financial argument in favor of combined protective equipment. A single suit reduces development and acquisition costs, reduces logistical requirements, and does not rely on an accurate intelligence assessment of the enemy’s capabilities. However, a combined suit comes with its own set of costs. Many studies have documented the loss of mission effectiveness (tactile, heat stress, claustrophobia etc.) associated with protective equipment. The current materials used for chemical protection also come with a shelf life and service life. Therefore more combined suits are required to be available than would be needed for a biological threat only scenario.106

While there is no argument to the need for cutaneous protection against chemical weapons, it is questionable whether the same protection is needed against biological

106 Protective suits are based in part on a layer of activated charcoal which absorbs and sequesters chemical agents. Over time if the suit is removed from its packaging the charcoal will lose its ability to protect the individual. Biological protection does not rely upon the charcoal, so in theory a biological protective suit would have an infinite service or shelf life. 281 agents, especially when balanced against the loss of effectiveness and heat stress associated with the protective garments.

The need for biological protective clothing was identified in World War Two, and the initial efforts reflect a realist response to a new threat. Assuming the threat would be in the form of an aerosol or powder, physical filtering of agents was of prime concern to defensive planners. They looked at chemical protective equipment which was readily available, to see if it offered protection against biological agents. The results of these experiments were mixed. Assessment of issue chemical clothing showed it had no additional filtering capability over standard uniform fabrics. (E. Fred 1943) Assessments of gas masks 1944 indicated that hoods were needed to augment masks but were not available (Gantz 1944)

Other assessments did find some benefit in using chemical gear to obtain protection against biological agents. Assessment of available chemical masks indicated they provided two hours of protection. While chemical protective clothing did not filter biological agents it was found to possess a degree of bactericidal capability. While the overall finding of the report was that fully effective biological protection was not available, the availability of chemical clothing in theater combined with the bactericidal properties led research to “conclude that the chemically impregnated clothing should be worn in case BW breaks out.” (Gantz 1944) This is not to say that alternative protective methods were not explored. A 1943 report suggests that in an emergency “A surprisingly effective mask can be devised from a stocking filled with dried grass using crank case oil with rancid butter as a wetting agent.” (War Research Service 1943) 282

After the War development of protective clothing generally showed the influence of a chemical frame, although it was periodically challenged by contradictory assessments of the threat posed by biological agents. In 1949 the Air Force was concerned over the heat stress induced by chemical protective clothing and expressed interest in permeable fabrics for biological protection. (D. Miller 1952) In 1953 the Air

Surgeon went as far as to state that special protective clothing was not required for individuals handling biological munitions. He stated that ordinary over-clothes were all that were required. (D. Miller 1957) A similar recommendation is included in Chemical

Corps training documents with stated intact skin and normal clothing provided adequate biological detection. (US Army Chemical Corps School 1960)

This is contrary to the opinion expressed by the Chief of the Chemical Corps.

While he acknowledges intact skin is an adequate protection, he still recommends several layers of clothing, or an impermeable layer for biological protection. (Creasy 1950) This attitude is also reflected in a Chemical Corps program description which claims “Present items of clothing are unsatisfactory in one or more respects as protection for body surfaces against biological agents (Chemical Corps 1949)

As the chemical threat and biological threat began to be viewed as one, protective equipment followed the same pattern. The idea of combined chemical and biological protection within the same overgarment became the standard. A Chemical Corps annual summary from 1957 reflects the concern with new V chemical agents, and the need for increased protective value in the suits. (US Army Chemical Corps Historical Office

1957) By focusing on the chemical threat (a valid concern), biological protection 283 becomes over-engineered. While this approach might have had logistical advantages, it also resulted in over-protection against biological agents which has a negative impact on physical performance.

Yet in spite of contradictory policy directions regarding the amount of protection required for a biological agent, the military’s default course of action was continued development of combined protective gear, as observed in program descriptions. In 1971 protective garments were described as “preventing the entry of such agent into the respiratory system, decreasing the cutaneous and percutaneous hazards,” while making no distinction between the threat posed by chemical agents or biological agents. (U.S.

Army Test and Evaluation Command 1971)

Likewise in 1985 the Mission Requirements for Chemical and Biological

Protective Equipment Master Plan continues the combined approach. Threat references in this document make continued reference to “CW/BW” agents. It also states “Defense consists largely of preventing harmful agents from contacting personnel and material,” and describes the types of threats posed by chemical agent and biological agent identically as; “vapor,” “aerosol (droplet, solid particle, dust liquid suspension),” or “Re- aerosolization.” This plan also re-enforces the concern over an agent breaking through barrier material, which is primarily a concern for chemical agents. (U.S. Army Research and Development Center 1985)

The 1997 science plan addresses protective clothing, again utilizing a combined weapons view to define the threat environment. The report acknowledges the physical burden associated with protective clothing and recommends development of advanced 284 lightweight chemical protection but describes the actual plan as to “develop and demonstrate materials for a new generation of lightweight chemical/biological (CB) protective clothing ensembles.” (emphasis added) (Department of Defense 1997)

Such combined descriptions exist today, as the most recent protective clothing is still described relative to a combined threat scenario. Testimony describing the new Joint

Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JLIST) overgarment states it is to offer

“extended protection in a chemical or biological weapon environment.” (Klein 2003)

Likewise testimony describing future protective clothing calls for “embedding a level of chemical, biological and radiological protection into our forces standard combat uniform.” (Senate Committe on Armed Services 2008)

The testimony on the JLIST suit highlights another instance where the frame may have influenced development of protective equipment. As described in the 1998 report to

Congress, research on the JLIST suit describes a lightweight suit for chemical and biological protection combined with a second overgarment designed for chemical agents, with no biological protective requirement.107 (Depatrment of Defense 1998) This approach would have reflected an appreciation of unique biological and chemical protective requirements. However, by 2008 this approach was not mentioned in testimony, and today the suit is described as a single outer shell that provides protection against “chemical and biological agents, radioactive fallout particles, and battlefield contaminants.” As observed before the capabilities are described relative to a combined threat, such as; “24 hours of protection against CB agents” and “provides complete

107 Yet the JLIST testimony previously cited references a chemical/biological threat. 285 ocular, percutaneous and respiratory protection against CB agents when worn with CB protective gloves and masks.” (Joint Program Management Office 2012)

While the separate JLIST approach did not go forward, there is also some evidence that the military does appreciate the different protection required for the biological threat. The military has conducted experiments to determine the level of biological protection offered by commercially available protective masks, such as the

N95 and P100 filters. (Richardson, et al. 2006) Test results were encouraging but further study was recommended.

While the protective equipment program reflects a relatively consistent combined chemical/biological approach, written guidance on the appropriate response is less consistent is often contradictory. While full protective gear is generally recognized as the appropriate response to a biological attack, the military has never seemed develop a fully consistent doctrine. Some examples of contradictory statements have already been cited.

Similar contradictory guidance is also codified in published military doctrine.

For example FM 3-100 NBC Operations from 1985 says full protection is required for a biological attack, while Field Manual 3-4 NBC Protection also published in

1985, as well as FM 21-40 NBC Defense (1977) and FM 3-11.4 (2003) all state clothing and a respirator offered adequate protection. The confusion continues to today as Joint publication 3-11 published in 2000 actually argues regular clothing offers more protection against nuclear effects than biological weapons, stating “ordinary clothing can provide some protection against thermal effects of a nuclear detonation. More sophisticated protection is required against biological and chemical agents.” (Joint Chiefs 286 of Staff 2000) The existence of contradictory guidance is at least confusing and at the worst can be deadly if confusion results in personnel taking inappropriate action in the face of a threat.

FRAMES IN DOCTRINE

As observed in previous time periods, military doctrine for this period also exhibits many instances of combining chemical and biological (as well as radiological and nuclear) weapons within the same policy or doctrine. For this period, it is a general observation that over time the influence of the chemical frame seems to decrease, and there is greater awareness of the unique nature of biological agents.

Field Manual 3-7: NBC Field Handbook, published in 1994 is generally more consistent with a strong chemical frames influence. For example there are separate threat matrices for nuclear weapons, yet chemical and biological weapons are combined within the same table. The decontamination section uses a combined threat, and describes procedures geared towards chemical contamination. Finally there are 19 pages dedicated to nuclear weapons, 16 dedicated to chemical weapons while only are 8 dedicated to biological weapons. (Department of the Army 1994)

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.8; Counter Nuclear, Biological and Chemical

Operations Published in 2000, demonstrates examples of how combining weapons classes can result in statements which are physically impossible. For example there is

287 reference to NBC weapons delivered by “infected humans or animals,”108 or NCB weapons delivered by “helicopters equipped with sprayers that spread aerosol over a wide area.”109 (Secretary of the Air Force 2000)

Army FM 3-11.4: Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Nuclear,

Biological and Chemical (NBC) Protection, published in 2003, shows a chemical centric bias when discussing the fundamentals of NBC weapons. When discussing the physical impact of threat agents the references used are indicative of a chemical frame.

Specifically mentioned is time of exposure to an agent correlating to a relative level of incapacitation, and ability of the body to detoxify agents combined with exposure frequency.110 Specific vocabulary such as using “fallout” for radiological weapons, yet using the term “gas” for both chemical and biological agents, and making statements such as “a downwind vapor hazard of a non-persistent CB agent” reflects a chemical dominated vocabulary and results in statements that are false relative to biological agents.

The manual does acknowledge that the basic duty uniform can provide protection against biological agents (and some chemical agents). (Department of the Army 2003)

Field Manual 3-11.3 published in 2006 deals with CBRN contamination avoidance. This publication follows the trend of a reduced chemical frame observed in more recent publications. While the chemical frame is not as obvious, there is still

108 Infectious spread is a term only applicable to a sub-set of biological agents that are transmissible; one cannot utilize an “infected” individual as a delivery method for a chemical or nuclear weapon. 109 Aerosol delivery is a valid delivery method for chemical or biological agents, but makes no sense in reference to a nuclear weapon 110 Time and concentration of agent are a greater concern for Chemical weapons as there is a graduated physiological response to agent concentration (pinpoint pupils death), whereas biological weapons have more of a binary (sick/not sick) manifestation. The body can also detoxify/remove chemical agents over time. 288 evidence of a chemical (or CBRN frame) as in the general chapters the threat, procedures, policies and actions are all described in reference to a “CBRN” threat. In the general chapters when biological weapons are not addressed in the CBRN context they are always combined with chemical as a chemical/biological weapon. There are also specific examples of the chemical frame. It is observed in the formatting used for incident forms and messages. Nuclear incidents have unique forms, while chemical and biological incidents are combined within the same paperwork. There are also examples of a combined threat resulting in unrealistic scenarios. For example the manual describes

“CBRN” contamination effecting electronics. 111

Yet there are indications that the chemical frame is not exerting total influence over the document. Whereas documents in previous periods referred to defensive equipment as “chemical” equipment or gear, this publication refers to “protective gear.”

The manual also contains separate chapters for each weapon class, which do a good job of describing the unique nature of each weapon. While documents in previous periods also had distinct weapons chapters, the biological chapter in this manual shows less of the chemical centric wording or doctrine found in manuals from previous periods. (U.S.

Army Chemical School 2006)

Also published in 2006 was the field manual which prescribed how to conduct decontaminations operations. Of the most recent publications this one reflects the strongest legacy of the chemical frame as the background, threat, and hazards are all

111 While it is likely such damage could be expected from chemical and nuclear weapons biological agents are not usually associated with physical damage to equipment. 289 described in reference to “CBRN” contamination. Likewise, there is no differentiation between types of contamination or differentiation of decontaminating procedures. When the CBRN reference is broken, as in specific decontamination actions, it is broken as radiological or chemical/biological. (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 2006)

Two versions of Joint Publication 3-11 Joint Doctrine for Operation in Nuclear,

Biological and Chemical (NBC) Environments are available to review. Compared to the most recent 2008 version the 2000 publication is less detailed, and focuses more on planning and staff responsibilities. As observed in other documents, the 2000 version almost always references nuclear weapons, biological agents and chemical agents as one combined NBC threat. The document does acknowledge the U.S. had limited biological detection capability, yet many of the statements on maneuver and defense are written seemingly assuming biological agent will be detected and identified in time to allow commanders to factor biological contamination into decisions. (Joint Chiefs of Staff

2000)

The publication was re-written in 2008 and while this version generally shows less chemical frames influence, it still contains some statements which reflect the presence of a chemical frame. For example the use of a combined weapons view when discussing, detection requirements, protective clothing, onset of medical effects, and in some planning assumptions is indicative of a chemical frame. 112 (Joint Chiefs of Staff

2008)

112 In this document R and N are also often combined within the same CBRN weapon class, further complicating any attempt to understand the different actions of distinctly different weapons. 290

However, the publication improves upon the 2000 version as there are many instances where chemical and biological weapons are discussed as unique weapons classes. For example the weapons are split when addressing areas such as: decontamination, physical effects, and protective equipment. However in some cases statements influenced by a chemical frame contradict non-frame statements within the same section. One example is medical considerations where the “immediate impacts” section breaks out each weapon class and does a good job of describing the unique aspects of each weapon. Yet, the final part of the section combines all weapons into one

CBRN class which discusses mass casualties within hours of an event, an unlikely scenario for a biological weapon attack.

One of the most recent relevant publications is ATTP 3-11.16: Multi-Service

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

Aspects of Command and Control published in 2010. This publication continues to show the trend of a reduced chemical frame, but still contains some statements indicative of a chemical frame. For example there is still examples of combining weapons threats/effects (but this behavior has expanded to include nuclear and radiological) such as; reference to a covert release of a CBRN weapon, assuming the same infrastructure will be present for any “CBRN” weapon,113 describing liquid “CBRN” contamination as soaking through protective covers, and general statements about CBRN weapon impact on medical operations. Perhaps one of the strongest indicators is guidance to use the

113 Made in reference to the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission describing infrastructure such as weapon storage, transport, filling stations etc. 291 enemy’s possession of chemical defensive equipment as an indicator an enemy “trained and equipped to conduct BW operations.”

At the same time, the manual does break out aspects of biological agents/defense that had history of being combined in previous guidance. For example there is reference to distinct biological surveillance capabilities, operated by biological platoons with

CBRN specialist (v. chemical NCO’s). Instead of referencing biological detection or identification this document’s reference to biological surveillance indicates an acknowledgement that instantaneous biological detection is not presently possible. The distinct nature of biological protection is also acknowledged as there is guidance for biological protection based simply upon a duty uniform and mask. (Department of the

Army 2010)

A final piece of “doctrine” to be discussed is official guidance which reinforces the combined approach associated with the chemical frame. This approach was actually codified into law in 1993 by 50 U.S. Code Sect 1522, which directs the DoD to develop a combined “chemical and biological defense program” within one office under the

Secretary of Defense. The DoD continues to re-enforce this association whenever it issues guidance written relative to the chemical frame. For example, DoDI 3150.09 issued in 2008 addresses “The Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)

Survivability Policy.” (Young 2008). Also published in 2008 is DoD Directive 5160.05 which prescribes “Roles and Responsibilities Associated with the Chemical and

Biological (CBD) Program (CBDP).” (England 2008) As long as the terminology is prescribed by legislation and directives the frame may never be completely broken. 292

Contrasting the terminology used in DoD directives is House Resolution 5498,

The WMD Prevention and Preparedness act of 2010. The language of this legislation is important in highlighting the evolution on how biological weapons are perceived. While testimony and deliberations in previous periods showed a heavy bias towards unique chemical or chemical/biological references, this document contains 16 references to a

CBR threat, 75 references to a biological threat or weapon, and zero references to a chemical threat or weapon. It almost seems as if the frame had been reversed, with chemical agents now an afterthought and biological agents the threat of choice. (House of

Representatives 2010)

CONCLUSIONS - FRAMES

From the available evidence, it is possible to find many behaviors indicative of a chemical frame over this period of analysis. The tendency to combine hardware solutions, combine threats, develop combined doctrine, and to subsume biological agents as chemical agents is readily available in all areas examined.

However, there is also evidence that the influence of the chemical frame is waning over this time period. This trend is most evident in areas such as policy, perceptions and doctrine where biological agents continue to gain separation from chemical agents. In these sources of data, biological weapons are much more likely to be discussed by themselves and their unique nature vs. chemical agents highlighted and addressed. However, in areas such as hardware development this trend is less evident as

293 biological defense is still often combined with chemical defense, or is still based upon requirements tailored to address the chemical threat.

In areas where the frame still exits it seems strongest in the military dominated organizations, particularly in the areas of detection and decontamination. If the frame continues in these areas, while fading within the national leadership a serious disconnect may emerge. If the trend to separate biological agents continues in the areas of policy, doctrine and research the nation will be on course to significantly improve its biodefense posture. However, if the hardware does not change to reflect national policy, the military and the nation may find itself in a situation similar to the one faced in the First Gulf War.

Bureaucratic Politics and Biodefense, 1991 - Today

While the evidence above shows many behaviors associated with the chemical frame are present in this period, it also points out that in general these behaviors are not as strong as in previous time periods. It is also possible to identify instances where biological agents have totally broken from their association with chemical agents. With the weakening of the chemical frame and the large influx of resources this period it is possible to hypothesize that imperialism or external threat may be exerting a greater influence over this period.

The rapid ascent of the terrorist threat, combined with a renewed concern over biological weapons resulted in Congressional decisions to allocate greater resources to counter these threats. Under these conditions bureaucratic politics predicts organizations will exhibit imperialistic behavior, embracing the new threat as an avenue to greater

294 resources and power. The multitude of government agencies competing today for biological defense resources provides the strongest evidence that bureaucratic politics played a significant role in influencing U.S. biodefense posture over this time period. In fact, looking at the multiple government agencies claiming responsible in some way for biological defense today one would not believe that the biological mission was originally accepted somewhat reluctantly by the Chemical Corps, and actively avoided by other agencies.

While strong evidence for imperialism influencing this period will be presented it is also important to contrast the amount of imperialistic behavior observed this period with previous historical periods. The contrast in behavior serves to further support the significance of the imperialistic behaviors within this time period.

MULTIPLE AGENCIES

One of the behaviors predicted by the imperialistic model is that multiple agencies will attempt to claim responsibility for the “new” biological threat in order to receive the resources associated with the threat. As the agencies responding to the threat are government agencies, their ability to exhibit imperialistic behavior is somewhat limited by legislative restrictions on their areas of responsibility and financial resources. Yet in spite of these constraints it is possible to identify nearly 100 agencies claiming some responsibility for biological defense by the end of this period.114

114 Agencies claiming responsibility for NBC or CBRN defense are included as involved in biological defense. 295

After the Gulf War, Congress took several steps to addresses the state of the defensive program. In 1993 Congress established DOD’s Chemical Biological Defense

Program in an effort to coordinate and integrate all defense programs across the military from R&D through procurement. The DoD subsequently initiated an additional standalone R&D program in biological defense within the Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency (DARPA) in fiscal year 1997, and in October 1998 it designated the

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to administer the Chemical and Biological

Defense Program.

Reflected in a GAO report is the sense that by 1999 many other agencies had begun to claim roles in biological defense. This particular report shows three other government agencies, The Department of Energy (DOE), the Technical Support Working

Group (TSWG) and DARPA, involved in the same areas of defensive research covered by the CBDP.115 The GAO also projected that by 2001 the DOE and DARPA would be receiving as much funding for nonmedical basic research, applied research and prototype development as would the DoD. (United States General Accounting Office 1999)

Another organization to enter the biological mission area was the department of

Health and Human Services (HHS). Sensing an opportunity HHS strongly advocated for a role in the biodefense mission, placing the bioterrorism threat on par with AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. As a result of their efforts the 2002 HHS budget went from

$300 million to $3 billion in one year. This is in direct contrast to the DoD which actually returned money allocated in 2001 for biological detection work. (Smith 2011)

115 Of note is that every area of research within the DoD is replicated by at least one other agency. 296

Presently the number of agencies claiming some responsibility for biological weapons has exploded compared to the handful of agencies claiming responsibly in earlier periods. For an example the Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear

Defense Information Analysis Center has a web page which lists 85 organizations as having a role in CBRN defense. Removing international agencies, repeats and tangential organizations116 one is still left with over 20 large government organizations which claim some role in CBRN defense.117 (CBRNICAC n.d.)

IMPERIALISM IN MISSIONS

The development and employment of biological detection hardware over the last ten years also reflects the entrance of new organizations into the biological defense mission. Whereas in previous periods the majority of biological defense hardware development was done by the DoD, the BASIS sensors utilized in the Salt Lake City

Olympics and the Biowatch sensors employed in U.S cities were developed by the

DOE/DHS. Additionally, the JBAIDS system utilized within the DoD was developed by the medical community, rather than the traditional CBDP. Congress is even taking a role in expanding the number of organizations involved in biological detection. For example,

House Resolution 5498 directs the secretary of Health and Human Services to assess and possibly implement “screening capabilities for biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other infectious diseases.” (House of Representatives 2010)

116 Such as publishing offices or museums 117 This list is also incomplete, as the author has personal knowledge of several organizations not on the list. 297

In addition to hardware development, organizational claims of being “CBRN experts” have also been an area of growth. In his 2010 testimony to Congress the

Director of DTRA highlights the CBRN reach back capability118 (which he implies is unique) as an important service DTRA/STRATCOM provides to the DoD and federal government. (Committee on Armed Services 2010) However, as with most other mission areas in this period several other agencies have also created similar capabilities. Field

Manual 3-11.3 published four years prior lists nine other DoD agencies that also provided

CBRN reach back capabilities. (U.S. Army Chemical School 2006)

The counter-WMD mission is another area that provides evidence for imperialistic behavior. In the mid 2000’s the DoD established eight mission areas for combating weapons of mass destruction. When viewed together the mission areas form a continuum of possible actions, starting with security cooperation and ending with consequence management. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009) While it is good to have a comprehensive and integrated strategy, the wide range of missions has resulted in almost every combatant command and service claiming to have some responsibility for at least one C-WMD mission area be it; detecting, surveillance, destruction, interdiction, protection or cleaning up afterwards. This desire for military organizations to embrace the biological (C-CBRN) mission is not observed in previous periods of analysis. I it is important to note, however, that while these actions are imperialistic, the mission is still a

118 Reach back consists of experts on standby to provide advice to forces in the field which may encounter situations beyond their training 298 counter WMD mission and not a biological or chemical specific mission, reflecting a chemical frame influence. 119

In addition to new agencies claiming responsibility for biological defense, established agencies have also taken measures to expand existing missions, or create new capabilities in order to gather a greater portion of the increased funds. Several of these attempts reflect the interaction between external threat and imperialistic expansion.

In 1992 the Army was attempting to modernize its WMD plan while at the same time faced a potential chemical weapons treaty which would directly impact its operational mission. In the plan the Army hedges its bets, emphasizing the Army’s chemical expertise which would be able to directly contribute to treaty verification.

Specifically the Army lists six future technology developments and three programs that would allow the Army to expand its mission by contributing to future treaty compliance and verification missions. (Department of the Army 1992a)

This period also shows the military embracing the biological threat (free from a chemical reference) to justify biological detection systems. In the justification section, operational documents from the mid 1990’s cite the failure to create meaningful treaties and an increase in the number of nations (cited as 13) pursuing biological weapons, as justification for development of new systems. (Saunders 1995; Short 1996) At face value these arguments would support a realist behavior of a state responding to an external threat. However, as will be discussed in the next section, numerous audits found

119 The Air Force’s distinct counter BW concept of operations may be one of the only biological distinct strategies that could fall under this argument. 299 deficiencies in the military’s biological training and readiness over the same period.

Therefore these arguments may be more of an example of an agency embracing the threat for the associated resources, but failing to place enough validity to the threat to actually increase readiness.

A 1994 interview of retired General Ross, Army Material Command (AMC) reflects imperialistic actions his agency took relative to a rational choice input to consolidate AMC’s authority. Facing increased Congressional concern over the vulnerabilities exposed in the first Gulf War and a series of Base Realignment and

Closure Committee (BRAC)120 decisions, there was high level pressure within Congress to fix the problem. General Ross relates how AMC developed an “Alternative Azimuth to BRAC-91” which was briefed through the DoD and Congress, and resulted in the consolidation of the previously “fragmented” program under the new Chemical

Biological Defense Command. Also related in the interview is the effort to create Public

Law 103-160 designating the Army as the executive agent for chemical and biological programs within the Department of Defense. (Ross 1994)

The 1996 annual report from the Army’s Chemical and Biological Defense command provides strong evidence of attempts to colonize new areas. The report contains six strategic goals for the command. Only two goals, ranked 4 and 5, deal with

NBC technology or material development. Two goals, 1 and 3, deal with handling or remediating existing chemical sites. Goal two emphasizes a new domestic mission for the

120 A BRAC is a Congressional committee formed to evaluate existing military bases with the objective of recommending consolidations and closures of existing bases in order to reduce military expenditures. 300 organization to “become the DoD’s premiere response force – the Public’s Emergency

Response Center – for CB events.” The final goal is for the organization to implement quality management practices, such as ISO 9000/14000 standards. In this report the organization seems less concerned with technology/hardware development (in spite of documented deficiencies) and more concerned with staking out a claim to the remediation and public response missions. (USA Chemical and Biological Defense Command 1996)

The Command’s move to expand into public emergency response is also an excellent example of how an external threat scenario can be used by an organization to support a new mission. Taken from the 1996 report the Command references the

Domestic Preparedness mission as:

“An area driven by nation interest and public concern is domestic preparedness against terrorists using CB agents. CBDCOM was designated as the DoD program Director for Domestic Preparedness because of our expertise and experience in chemical and biological defense. We developed a strategy to execute this new mission, consistent with the language of the draft Nunn-Lugar II legislation.”121

The 2006 briefing by the Chief of the Chemical Corps, previously cited as moving away from the chemical frame, also includes imperialistic behaviors. For example he states, relative to the Army establishing protection as a wartime function, the Chemical

Corps is “well positioned for this change.” He also talks of the Corps including defense of the homeland in its mission, and of “the desire to move to full spectrum capabilities to

121 Note the CB reference implying a chemical frame influence over the proposed program 301 advise and protect against the complete range of hazards: peacetime/wartime/

CONUS/OCONUS.” (Spoehr 2006)

While the CBDP is legislated to have almost monopolistic responsibility for biological defense, it still makes overt efforts for more funding and greater responsibility.

The DTRA/CBDP budget testimony in 2010 provides many examples. While the emphasis on medical countermeasures and drug development/manufacturing/evaluation has already been discussed as a break from the organizational frame, it can also be considered an area of expansion not observed in previous time periods.122 Another area of expansion is in the inclusion of civilian/homeland defense as important consumers of equipment developed by the program for military users. (Scarbrough, Testimony to

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilites 2010)

In the same testimony the Director of DTRA/STRATCOM center for CWMD also made statements indicative of imperialistic behavior. In spite of being asked question regarding equipment survivability relative to chemical or biological weapons, he responded by highlighting DTRA’s work on Electro Magnetic Pulse. His testimony also focused extensively on the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review’s assessment of the spread of WMD and highlighted all the areas and potential areas that could be addressed by DTRA. Another strong indicator of the organizations mindset is the emphasis placed on the ability of the agency to spend money and meet obligation/expenditure goals,123

122 The program may also be attempting to defend against competition from outside organizations such as HHS, DARPA and CDC 123 Money budgeted by Congress is typically received as valid for two years, during which it must be utilized. There are defined metrics on how fast the money must be obligated and expended. Failure to meet the spending rate can result in additional scrutiny or possibly loss of current or future money. 302 highlighting the importance of bureaucratic policies in the function of the agency.

(Committee on Armed Services 2010)

CONFUSION IN THE PROGRAM

A possible outcome of strong (and successful) imperialistic behavior is the existence of many organizations claiming responsibility for the mission, with no evidence of an overarching authority responsible for shepherding the program. The interview with

General Ross cited above cites the “fragmented” state of the program in the early 1990’s, and the corresponding actions taken to consolidate the program under his authority. (Ross

1994) The fragmentation noted in the 1990’s continued through the 2000’s as the number of programs drastically increased.

Evidence of such a situation is noted in a 2000 GAO report on integration of the

DoD’s defensive programs. It contained findings such as, the “DOD’s organizational structure may be too diffused to facilitate efficient and effective management and integration of the Department’s counter proliferation effort.” The report also sates

“There is no one overarching joint counter proliferation doctrine document to provide a centralized picture of how DOD should respond in an NBC environment,” and the “DOD has not created a single, integrated master, or management, plan to guide, oversee, and integrate its department wide counter proliferation efforts.”124 (United States General

Accounting Office 2000)

124 Of note in this report the GAO takes issue with the fragmentation of the program, but calls for a frames based solution that calls for a strategy and written guidance to address the “WMD” threat. 303

Testimony in 2010 reflects that the co-ordination problem had yet to be fully fixed noting, “Some have noted that while there are many agencies in departments that have resources dedicated to prevention and mitigating damage and harm to the public, there is still a large gap in interagency and inter-governmental communications and co- ordinations.” (Committee on Foreign Affaris 2010) A similar sentiment is reflected in the 2009 National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats which states “efforts targeted to prevent such threats have received comparatively limited policy focus or substantive guidance at the national level.” (B. Obama 2009) One area in particular that has shown a significant amount of fragmentation and confusion is medical countermeasures.

MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

Evidence of confusion and multiple agencies is particularly evident in the current medical countermeasures program. Several reports have cited organizational and bureaucratic issues as having hampered U.S. efforts to develop medical countermeasures.

The medical countermeasures program received significant attention after the

First Gulf War. While evidence from previous periods showed a general lack of drive to develop countermeasures, the program went through significant organizational changes and received a large increase in funding following the war. By the mid 2000’s individual components of the program would be receiving hundreds of millions of dollars per year, and the total program budget would top a billion dollars.

304

The increased interest and allocation of resources are indicative of the nation making a rational choice response to the increase in perceived external threat posed by biological weapons. Examination of the program and its questionable success rate also reveals some behaviors associated with a chemical frame, but the majority of the issue appears to be a fragmented and complicated bureaucratic program, which would be associated with imperialism.

There was a change in attitude after the war regarding countermeasures. While previous periods tended to place a low priority on medical capabilities as a means of defense against a biological attack, this attitude changed after the Gulf War. The change is reflected in professional writings such as; “defense against biological warfare is almost exclusively a medical problem,” and that biological attacks were becoming regarded as

“similar to normal disease outbreaks,” save for the severity. Massive prophylaxis was now envisioned as a valid response to a biological attack. (Crozier 1996) Unlike the

1970’s, recent literature does not debate if medical countermeasures are appropriate, but debates how to optimize the employment of medical countermeasures. (DiGiovanni, et al.

2003; Wein, Craft and Kaplan 2003; Bravata, et al. 2006) In 2009 the President even issued an Executive Order directing the Post Office to develop procedures to distribute countermeasures in the event of a biological attack. (B. Obama 2009)

While the attitude towards medical countermeasures has changed, indicative of an external threat influence, the actual development of countermeasures has not kept pace with the changes in policy.

305

Organizationally significant changes were made in response to the issues identified in the Gulf War. In 1993 Congress centralized chemical defense and biological defense in one program. As part of this re-organization vaccine procurement was moved from USAMRIID to the Joint Development Office, which as Hoyt states was

“disastrous,” as it removed those who understood vaccine research from the program.

Subsequently operational capacities were moved to the Center for Health Promotion and

Preventative Medicine in Aberdeen MD, which resulted in the vaccine program competing with (and losing to) occupational health and environmental issues. (Hoyt

2012) Approximately ten years after the implementation of these changes a series of reports were issued showing the U.S. was still concerned over the pace of countermeasure development. This concern was further heightened in response to the second Gulf War and anthrax mail attacks

Written in 2000 the “Top Report” highlighted the lack of progress in the DoD vaccine acquisition program. The report reflects the belief that medical countermeasures are a valid form of defense, stating, “Vaccines are the lowest risk, most effective protection; they enable force projection and are superior to antibiotics or other treatments.” However, the report assesses the DoD’s program as “insufficient” and judges that “it will fail.” (Top 2000)

The report identifies many bureaucratic issues hindering the program. For example they note; eleven organizations had some responsibility for vaccine production, decision making authority was located in “organizations that lack the requisite level of medical and technical expertise,” and that the government acquisition program was not 306 flexible enough to take a candidate vaccine to market. While most of the observations are bureaucratic in nature, there is also a hint of a frame influence, as the lack of appropriate scientific knowledge among program officials is also noted.

Another report in 2004 reaches many of the same conclusions as the Top report.

Again the authors note the need for vaccines, contradicting some of the arguments made in the 1970’s stating, “The potential for new bioengineered pathogens does not eliminate the need for countermeasures against more familiar biological threats.” (Jollenbeck,

Durch and Benet 2004) As with the Top report this report also takes issue with the bureaucratic construct of the program noting “the DoD effort is in practice fragmented among multiple chains of command and burdened by organizational complexity.” They noted that research was directed by DTRA, advanced development/acquisition was run by the Joint Program Office, and that program requirements originate with the JCS. As with the Top report they also note issues with the qualifications of program managers noting, “ a lack of understanding of the level of experience, expertise and leadership…necessary to shepherd candidate vaccines and drugs through the long and difficult research, development and licensure process.”

In spite of reports critical of the organizational fragmentation, the situation has gotten worse. In addition to the DoD’s Chemical Biological Medical Systems, and

Transformational Medical Technologies Imitative medical programs; DARPA, the

National Institute of Health, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the

Centers for Disease Control are all involved in some aspect of medical countermeasures.

Additionally the DoD has lost the lead in vaccine development as in 2004 funding for 307 medical countermeasures development spent outside the DoD was five times the amount received by the DoD. (Jollenbeck, Durch and Benet 2004)

While bureaucratic factors are prevalent within the countermeasures program, it is still possible to find behavior influenced by frames. As already noted several reports took issue with the knowledge of program managers, possibly indicating the DoD regarded countermeasures as just another acquisition program. A medical systems briefing from 2007 also shows the chemical frame is still present as the program is presented from a combined chemical/biological standpoint.125 For example the briefing makes references to developing “Pre-treatments and therapeutics for protection against chemical and biological agents and radiological exposure,” and programs to “Develop, assess and validate diagnostic assays for Chemical and Biological Agents.” (Williams and Carpenter 2007)

In addition to organizational issues, financial issues have also hampered the program. The Jollenbeck report faults confusion in the DoD acquisition process as it notes that in the first ten years the DoD changed acquisition strategies three times. The initial plan was for a government owned - contractor operated facility. This strategy was replaced with plans for a contractor owned-contractor operated facility, which was subsequently changed to a prime systems contract acquisition strategy

In an attempt to address issues with countermeasure development Congress initiated another bureaucratic solution creating the BioShield program in 2004. However,

125 This briefing is presented by the CBDP, which has been shown in the frames section to have preserved the strongest chemical frame influence among government organizations. 308 as created, the program reflected a lack of understanding of the development process.

While the program provided initial research funding and established a guaranteed market for approved vaccines, the program failed to provide funding for the several intermediate years of testing and trials required to receive FDA approval, creating a “valley of death” in funding.

As Hoyt notes, by the 1990’s the major pharmaceutical companies had become less interested in developing vaccines for the DoD, and the BioShield program was not structured in a way that would entice them to devote resources to developing vaccines.

As a result the program saw little to no interest from the major pharmaceutical companies. The only companies that did participate in the program were small startup biotechnology companies which lacked the capabilities to bring candidate vaccines through licensure.

In 2006 a second program the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development

Authority was created in an attempt to provide incremental funding for vaccines under development in an attempt to help companies through the “valley.” Again this program failed to interest the large pharmaceutical companies and a subsequent series of bureaucratic decisions shifted money to other development programs, which undercut and underfunded the DoD effort.

Hoyt summarizes the current state of the vaccine program as, “The combination of push and pull programs currently in place will not bridge the valley of death because they reinforce the balkanized structure for research that grew in the 1980’s and 1990’s.

(Hoyt 2012) As a result a lack of understanding, a fragmented program and repeated re- 309 organization the U.S. finds itself essentially with the same countermeasures it possessed at the end of the First Gulf War.

CONCLUSIONS - IMPERIALISM

From the available data the substantial increase in organizations involved in the biological defense mission is perhaps the greatest evidence for the influence of imperialism in the current time period. The previous periods were marked by austerity in the defensive program and a general lack of interest by organizations. Today, however, not only has there been a significant increase in the number of military organizations participating in biological defense, many other federal and state organizations are also involved.

The emergence of imperialistic behaviors is not unexpected. The increased national concern with weapons of mass destruction combined with the rise of the international terrorist threat over this time period resulted in increased Congressional interest and resources dedicated to WMD, and biological weapons in particular. This increased interest and increased funding started after the first Gulf War, accelerated in the late 1990’s and exploded in the early 2000’s. While it is possible to trace the increases in funding to external threats, the fight over the resources has shaped the current program into a structure predicted by imperialism.

Therefore, based upon the prevalence of these behaviors, and the ability to define a logical process, it is possible to state that imperialism played a significant role in

310 guiding defensive strategy over this time period. The evidence also indicates that the influence of this behavior has been most evident over the later parts of this time period.

The emergence of a significant imperialistic influence within the program has several implications for the health of the U.S. defensive posture. Colonization of the mission area by new agencies can result in innovation which injects new ideas to compete with the existing program. This can also force legacy organizations to reassess their programs as they attempt to fend off the new competition. These behaviors can serve to break existing frames and inject new solutions into the defensive program. However, unchecked imperialistic behaviors can also result in tangled, inefficient and leaderless programs which are unable to effectively advance new defensive capabilities.

Realism and Biodefense, 1991-Present

External threat has previously played a dominant role in the development of U.S. posture as observed in actions taken by the U.S. in World War Two. Subsequent time periods did not reflect a similar level of influence, as the chemical frame dominated decision making. Observing U.S. actions in the present time period reveals the return of a strong rational actor response to the changing external threat environment. It is possible to find many actions taken by the U.S. over this period that are consistent with realist behavior. Significantly, this is the first period to have a national policy written exclusively to address the biological threat. This is significant evidence (in at least the rhetoric) that the chemical frame which influenced policy in previous periods is no longer present at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Instead the behavior observed over

311 this period reflects desire for action from the highest level of government (with the allocation of appropriate resources) specifically directed at biological agents. However, this behavior is not as clear within those organizations tasked to implement guidance, possibly indicating the influence of other behaviors beyond those focused exclusively on external threat.

As was observed with imperialism for this period, it is not only the behaviors observed over this period, but the contrast with previous periods which highlights the strong influence of external threat over this time period.

EVOLVING THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Over the last twenty years the United States faced a series of events relative to biological weapons that caused a significant adjustment as to how the U.S. viewed the threat. Revelations as to the degree and sophistication of the Soviet program, combined with the discovery of the Iraqi weapons program re-affirmed the threat posed by states armed with biological weapons. At the same time the U.S. was becoming increasingly concerned with terrorism. This fear, combined with the crumbling infrastructure and security within the Soviet Union made it possible to imaging a terrorist group stealing or buying material from the old Soviet program and using it against the U.S.

In 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo cult attacked the Tokyo subway with a chemical nerve agent, raising the specter of non-state WMD terrorism. This was followed by series of international terrorist attacks against the U.S., the 9/11 attacks on the homeland closely followed by the anthrax mail attacks. Two years later the U.S. was involved in

312 another war with Iraq, in part due to fears of the nation’s biological weapons program.

By the early 2000’s it could be argued that the combined terrorism/WMD threat was perceived as the top threat facing the state.

An interesting point raised by Bernstein is that these threats, first faced by

President Clinton, and then subsequent Presidents, were not amenable to diplomacy or treaty solutions. (Bernstein, Caves and Carus 2009) He notes three such challenges faced by President Clinton; lose nuclear weapons, rouge states with WMD and WMD terrorism. With no diplomatic solution, and a national self assessment that the state was vulnerable to these threats, the only viable option for the nation was to increase defensive capabilities, as predicted by a rational actor model.

The evolution in national policy in reference to biological weapons over this time period is consistent with a growing external threat. The trend observed in this period starts with the U.S. viewing the biological weapons threat as part of the general “WMD terrorism” threat. The perception of the biological threat evolves as subsequent policies begin to reference biological agents as significant and unique threats to the state, separate from references to “CB,” “WMD,” or “CBRN” weapons. This is a significant event as for the first time in over 50 years senior U.S. officials consistently referenced biological weapons without reference to chemical weapons, a significant blow to the existence of the chemical frame observed in earlier periods.

The rise of biological agents as an area of concern started with their inclusion in the “WMD” threat which began to gain more attention in the early 1990’s. Presidential

Decision Directive 39, published in June 1995 was a counterterrorism policy which 313 included WMD, declaring “the United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by terrorists.” And that “The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a terrorist group, through theft or manufacture, is unacceptable.”126 (Clinton 1995)

In 1999 President Clinton expanded the emphasis on biodefense, calling for increased training, and increased efforts to develop and stockpile medical countermeasures. President Clinton also took a significant step by recruiting the National

Institute of Health into the national biodefense effort. As quoted by the Secretary of

Health and Human Services at the time this was “the first time in American history where the public health system has be integrated into the national security system.” (Wright

2004)

This move is significant relative to the external threat in that it demonstrates the significance attributed to the emerging biological threat. It also represents a bureaucratic move by expanding the number of organizations involved in biodefense. Finally it also impacts the chemical frame in a negative manner, as the HHS was involved specifically to address the biological threat, representing a break in combined weapons view.

The national concern over WMD continued to grow. In 1997 the Secretary of

Defense stated “I believe the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents the greatest threat that the world has ever known. We are finding more and more countries

126 There were no Presidential Directives from President Clinton specifically addressing biological weapons (v. “WMD”) as later produced by Presidents Bush and Obama 314 who are acquiring technology…and are developing chemical weapons and biological weapons ... So I think that is perhaps the greatest threat that any of us will face in the coming years.” (United States General Accounting Office 2000a) The next year

Secretary Cohen would appear on national TV with a five pound bag of sugar, which he used as a prop to describe how many casualties an attack utilizing a similar amount of anthrax would cause.

In 2000 the Secretary of Defense describes the WMD threat as “…the greatest and most complex challenge facing the Department of Defense.” And the U.S. National

Military Strategy assesses, “the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological weapons, has made their use by an adversary increasingly likely in both a major theater war and smaller scale contingencies.” (United

States General Accounting Office 2000)

By 2004 top officials continued to worry about the “WMD” threat, but in a significant policy shift biological agents were now regarded as a unique threat, separate from chemical agents. In 2004 President Bush issued Biodefense for the 21st Century, a national strategy dedicated solely to the threat from biological agents. In this strategy the biological threat is regarded as a unique and significant threat to the security of the U.S. as a state. The strategy specifically states, “Biological weapons in the possession of hostile states or terrorists pose unique and grave threats to the safety and security of the

United States and our allies.” (G. Bush 2004)

Subsequent hearings and documents continue to reference biological agents as a distinct class of weapons, and put the threat from biological agents on the same scale as 315 the threat from nuclear weapons. The “Graham/Talent commission” formed to assess the

WMD threat facing the nation emphasizes this point, writing “While the mandate of the

Commission was to examine the full sweep of the challenges posed by…all forms of

WMD…we concluded early in our deliberations this report should focus solely on the two types of WMD categories which have the greatest potential to kill massive numbers: biological and nuclear weapons.” (Graham and Talent 2008)

The Graham/Talent commission’s findings were repeated in Congressional testimony, highlighting the threat assessment that, “their initial report found biological weapons are more likely to be acquired and used by terrorist groups than nuclear weapons…it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction would be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.” (Committee on Foreign

Affaris 2010) Also reflecting the elevated status of biological weapons is Congressional testimony where an Assistant Secretary of Defense sates the two things that keep him up at night are a nuclear device smuggled into an American city, or an anthrax attack.

(Committee on Armed Services 2010)

The recognition of the unique biological threat continues with the current administration. The most recent national biodefense policy, the National Strategy for

Countering Biological Threats published in 2009 again references a unique biological threat and states the threat of “Biological weapons and their use or proliferation by States or non-State actors present a significant challenge to our national security.” (B. Obama

2009)

316

PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSES

In addition to simple rhetoric highlighting the biological threat it is possible to identify actions taken by the state that reflect rational choice consistent with realism.

Presidential guidance over this period clearly directs a national response to the threat while at the same time following the pattern of moving from a combined biological/chemical/WMD frame to a biological only frame.

In 1995 the threat from “WMD” was acknowledged but addressed within a general counter terrorism strategy. Acknowledging the risk of “nuclear, biological or chemical materials,” the U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism directs action, stating “There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this capability or removing this capability from terrorist groups potentially opposed to the U.S.” (Clinton 1995)

The 2004 guidance issued by President Bush also prescribes actions to be taken in light of the biological threat. This document directs national action, prescribing four pillars for the biodefense program; “Threat Awareness, Prevention and Protection,

Surveillance and Detection, and Response and Recovery.” The guidance lists many specific hardware and policy advances put in place to protect the nation. It also specifically directs the DoD to “continue to ensure that United States military forces can operate effectively in the face of biological weapons attacks, and that our troops and our critical domestic and overseas installations are effectively protected against such threats.”

(G. Bush 2004)

Presently, while biological weapons are still viewed as distinct entities within

Presidential policy, it is possible to detect a shift in the perception of the threat and 317 directed actions. In 2009 President Obama published his strategy for biological defense.

While continuing to acknowledge a real threat from the weapons and retaining previous

Presidential directives, the 2009 guidance has a three pronged strategy to reduce biological threats.

“(1) Improving global access to the life sciences to combat infectious disease regardless of its cause (2) Establishing and reinforcing norms against the misuse of the life sciences (3) Instituting a suite of coordinated activities that collectively will help influence, identify, inhibit, and/or interdict those who seek to misuse the life sciences”

Within the Roles and Responsibilities of the Federal Government section there are six specific federal responsibilities. None of the responsibilities listed include a specific mandate to develop hardware or defensive capabilities. The directive most applicable to this area directs the federal government to “Conducing the full range of preparation ensure an effective response in the event of a biological incident.” (B. Obama 2009)

As Koblentz notes this latest Presidential guidance reflects a shift from pure biodefense to biosecurity. This policy reflects a move from a strategy based upon a defensive bunker mentality to a strategy that incorporates ideas ranging from third world medical improvements to increased laboratory security to achieve a comprehensive biosecurity environment. (Koblentz 2012) It also demonstrates how breaking the

318 chemical frame and addressing biological agents as unique weapons results in approaches that never would have been considered under the influence of a chemical frame. 127

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

In order to implement government directed actions, realism predicts the state will respond with additional resources to address the threat. Consistent with official statements regarding the biological threat, financial expenditures demonstrate an increase in allocation to biological defense over this time period. As predicted by realism the budget increases are most significant after the 9/11 and anthrax mail attacks. However, even before these events there were significant increases in funding, most likely a result of the post-Gulf War capabilities assessment.128

The highest level of funding observed in the previous historical period was $360 million for chemical and biological defense combined. Long range Army planning published in 1992 projected a similar value, predicting a relatively constant funding level of $300-400 million per year for FY94-08 time period.129 (Department of the Army

1992a)

The 1998 program report to Congress shows an upward bend in funding, reflecting an actual budget $100 million greater than predicted in 1992. It also shows a projected increase in future funding; predicting a total of nearly $800 million in 2003,

127 The current strategy does represent a shift in views with regards to international relations. I would argue that the policy does not fit within Waltz’s view of realism, but that is a topic for another debate. 128 Due to the multiple organizations and combined chemical/biological programs it is difficult to present a breakout of funds allocated to chemical vs. biological. The significance of this data is the relative amount of money spent this period in relation to other periods. 129 Excluding protective equipment and medical items 319 double projections from 1992. (Depatrment of Defense 1998) The program’s budget actually grew faster than predicted. The $800 million level was actually reached in 2000, three years early than expected and was budgeted to be $836 million for 2001. (United

States General Accounting Office 2000a)

The increasing rate of allocations was significantly accelerated in 2002 as the defense budget bends sharply up, a behavior predicted by realism as the state responded to the 2001 threats. In the 2002 report to Congress (reflecting the 2003 President’s budget) shows research funding alone in 2002 at $550 million with a projected increase to $932 million in 2003. Corresponding total program budgets for 2002 and 2003 were

$903 million and $1.3 billion. (Chemical and Biological Defense Program 2002) The trend in increased funding for defense continues through the present day as reflected in hearings on the 2011 defense budget. In the hearings DTRA/CBDP was expecting to receive an 18% increase over 2011 levels. The Chemical Biological Defense Program alone was requesting $370 million for procurement, $812 million for advanced research and development, and $396 million for Science and Technology efforts for a total budget of $1.6 billion. (Committee on Armed Services 2010)

THE DOD’S RESPONSE THROUGH TRAINING

While the nation can exhibit a rational actor response to a changing external threat by creating new polices and increasing budgets, these actions are meaningless if they do not produce effective defensive outputs. As already discussed the military has perhaps the strongest history of a chemical frame and the data presented in the frames section

320 provides evidence that a chemical frame is still exerting a level of influence over the biodefense program. While there is evidence that the frame is weakening, in areas such as decontamination, detection and protection the changes in outputs are not as swift or as definite as would be expected by a purely rational actor response. Another area that should change in response to external threat is training. While training deficiencies have been identified, and changes directed, the training program has yet to fully address the new threat environment.

After the Gulf War the DoD knew it had a problem with biological training. The

1992 report reviewing the conduct of the Armed Forces in the First Gulf War states that

U.S. “CW/BW defensive readiness at the outset of the crisis was quite low,” noting that

“after intensive preparation in theater” forces were at a level capable of conducting combat operations. The report also noted a need to pull protective clothing from worldwide reserves due to greater than planned usage. Specific to biological capacities the report found “BW defense should be emphasized more fully in DOD programs.

Inadequacies exist in detectors, vaccines, and protective equipment.” (Department of

Defense 1992)

Also In 1992 the Army addressed the growing importance of NBC defense relative to strategic changes imposed by treaties stating, “NBC defense will become a key element of NBC warfare deterrence as NBC retaliatory capabilities are reduced or eliminated to satisfy treaty requirements.”130 The report specifically cites proliferation in

130 The combined NBC shows the inaccuracies associated with a combined frame. The U.S. had not had a retaliatory biological capability since 1969. Taken at face value this statement implies such capabilities existed in 1992 321 the third world as a future source of NBC threat and among other responses recommends increased resources, training and integration of WMD into war games as keys to modernization. These suggestions are accompanied by a request of additional funds, demonstrating an imperialistic response to a changing external threat. (Department of the

Army 1992a)

In spite of highlighting training deficiencies the training issue persisted. A 1996

GAO report reflects a continued lack of priority given to biological training:

“Today, chemical and biological defense activities at all levels (from the Joint Staff to individual Army and Marine units) tend to continue to receive a lower level of emphasis than other high-priority activities, such as performing traditional operational mission tasks. This lower emphasis is seen in the funding, staffing, monitoring, and mission priority given to chemical and biological defense activities. Army officials contend that increased operational deployments coupled with reduced forces and budgetary constraints force commanders to make decisions regarding which aspects of operational preparedness to emphasize and those for which they are willing to accept increased risk. Thus, many commanders have accepted a level of chemical and biological defense unpreparedness and believe the resources currently devoted to this area are appropriate, given other threats and current budgetary constraints. Activities to equip, train, and otherwise prepare U.S. forces to operate in a contaminated environment have therefore received insufficient attention to resolve many continuing problems.” (U.S. General Accounting Office 1996)

Four years later the GAO again notes that the military was slow to implement biological training into normal operations. This is in spite of official planning guidance in 1998 and 1999 directed that “the NBC threat will be given a high priority in defense planning,” and directed that major exercises should “routinely include activities to assess

322 and enhance preparations for sustained operation in chemical and biological warfare environments.” (United States General Accounting Office 2000)

In a separate report from 2000 the GAO found “that Marine Corps, Army, and

Air Force commanders were not integrating chemical and biological defense into unit exercises and the training was not always realistic in terms of how units would operate in war.” And that “the Army’s combat training centers were restricting the simulated use of chemical weapons against the units being trained because the units were not proficient in chemical and biological defense.” (United States General Accounting Office 2000a) The same GAO report looked at personnel levels for “Chemical specialists” for a sample of units and found that only the Air Force had 100% manning for officer positions (1 of 1), while the Army and Marines were between 75-88% manned. For enlisted the Army had one unit manned at 100%, while the manning for other units and services was between

67-90%.

A follow up study on Army/Marine training in 2005 showed that while chemical and biological events were being incorporated in training centers, only 5% of soldiers were required to spend more than 18 hours in protective gear.131 The GAO also found a significant number of units were failing to perform required protective measures. (U.S.

Government Accountability Office 2005) In 2007 the DoD was required by Congress to report on NCB training and education. Some of the issues identified in the report include; a “lag” in doctrine and education, confusion over WMD mission areas, variation

131 Regulations allow commanders to tailor the nature of individual unit training and training conducted at training centers. As many of these units were preparing for combat deployments in areas with low chemical or biological threats commanders may have chosen to focus on more immediate threats facing their units. 323 of requirements between services, and issues with medical NBC training. (Disraelly, et al. 2007)

The GAO conducted another study of military training in 2007 and again identified issues. It noted, “Most Army units tasked with providing chemical and biological defense support are not adequately staffed, equipped or trained to perform their missions.” The report also notes “a misalignment between the high priority DOD places on chemical and biological defense and the current low level of preparedness characterizing Army chemical companies.” (U.S. Government Accountabiliy Office

2007) This last statement could not provide a better summary of the external threat/chemical frame dynamic at play over this time period. It also shows that in spite of high level emphasis, the operational level military forces have been slow to fully embrace the threat.

CONCLUSIONS - EXTERNAL THREAT

This historical period saw perhaps some of the most significant changes in external threat since the late 1940’s. Over this period the U.S. fought an enemy with a biological program, confirmed the existence of the Soviet biological program and suffered a series of terrorist attacks including one employing a biological agent. These events combined to elevate the threat from biological agents to a level previously reserved only for nuclear weapons.

Faced with such a change in threat, realism predicts that the state will take self- help actions to defend itself. The actions taken in the areas of national policy, national

324 response and the budget are all consistent with a rational actor’s reactions to an increase in perceived threat. The existence of these behaviors indicates that external threat exerted a significant influence over the nation’s biological defense doctrine over this period.

However, in the programs responsible for executing national policy the response has not been as swift or as definite. This lag in execution indicates that a chemical frame is still influencing the actually implementation of national policy.

However, the most important observation over this period is the emergence of an official national policy regarding biological defense, separate from any reference to a chemical threat. This change in the chemical agent /biological agent relationship is consistent with relationship proposed under the realism theory hypothesis. Therefore it is possible to state that external threat exerted a significant influence on biodefense doctrine over the later parts of this period of analysis. If this approach continues, and the program breaks from the remnants of the chemical frame, for the first time since the Second World

War the nation will be pursuing a defensive strategy tailored to the unique threats posed by biological agents, hopefully resulting in improved defensive capabilities.

Conclusions – 1991- Present

In every previous period it has been possible to identify one factor which was dominating the development of the U.S. biological posture. Since the end of World War

Two the chemical frame has had exerted the most influence over the program. While the frame is observable again in this period, the non-frame behaviors seem fundamentally different and more influential. Perhaps it is the national recognition that biological 325 weapons are a unique class of weapons with specific defensive requirements that is driving this perception.

As every time period has unique features, this time period is unique relative to the rise in technology, evolving state threats and the rise of international terrorism. Based upon these events it is possible to develop an explanation of this period where all three theories of interest play a significant role in influencing the development of U.S. biodefense policy.

For this period a rational actor based assessment of the evolving

WMD/biological/terrorist external threat initiated change in the U.S. program. As the state attempted to protect itself against this new threat it placed greater emphasis on biological defense, providing more prestige and resources for the mission area.

Associated with this heightened awareness of the biological threat was a significant increase in resources dedicated to biological defense. At the same time official statements and testimony break the chemical frame, referring to biodefense and biological weapons alone, were similar data from previous periods showed a strong chemical agent/biological agent association.

The influx of new resources provided fertile conditions for organizations to exhibit imperialistic behaviors. Sensing the new national emphasis on biological defense new agencies were created, and existing agencies expanded capabilities, in order to compete for the resources associated with developing new defensive capabilities.

A significant observation in the newer defensive organizations is that they are devoted to defense against biological agents, independent of chemical agents. This is not 326 unexpected as some of these new agencies had no prior exposure to the chemical frame, and would have no reason to associate chemical weapons with biological weapons. It can be argued the large number of new organizations entering the biodefense mission area has diluted the effect of the chemical frame, resulting in a new direction in biological defense over the last several years of this time period. However, as the nation takes significant steps to improve biological defense, such steps still must be taken with caution. Perhaps the best summary of the danger associated with the massive influx of resources is captured in 50 year old testimony, “If the country pours enough money into research it will inevitably support the trivial and the mediocre.” (V. Bush 1963)

In spite of the infusion of new agencies into biodefense, many of the individuals within the established defensive agencies have been involved in biological defense work for many years and have been shaped by the strong chemical frame present in previous periods. As many of these individuals are responsible for managing the execution of the defensive programs the legacy chemical frame still exhibits a strong influence over this period. It is still possible to find a strong chemical agent/biological agent relationship, particularly in the outputs from the traditional military centric defense organizations.

Unfortunately the frame is still the strongest in the organizations which are responsible for the production of hardware and doctrine. Therefore, in spite of national policy, the

U.S. has yet to fully execute a pure biodefense program.

Therefore it is possible to argue that for this time period all three theories are making a significant contribution to doctrine development. Whereas in the previous three periods of analysis it was possible to identify one theory as most influential, and 327 demonstrate one logical pathway, this period may be exhibiting equifinality. There is evidence that the historically close relationship between biological agent and chemical agent relationship is weakening, which is allowing external threat and imperialism to exert influence as predicted at their appropriate level. While there is still strong evidence for the close relationship within some organizations, the weakening of this relationship may foreshadow the demise of a chemical frame. As this frame is most evident in military centric organizations, such as the CBDP, it will be important to see if the frame continues to weaken or if a new event or change in policy allows it to re-establish itself.

If the frame continues to weaken the U.S. biodefense posture stands to see a marked increase in technologies and capabilities directed at the specifics of the biological threat.

328

Ch 8. Results

You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means – Inigo Montoya -- The Princess Bride.

The last four chapters analyzed the seventy year history of the U.S biological program for evidence that external factors were influencing the U.S. biodefense program.

The available evidence revealed the presence of behaviors associated with organizational frames, bureaucratic politics and realism. Analysis of these behaviors reveals a complex interaction between the behaviors themselves and their ultimate impact on the U.S. biological posture. While it appears a chemical frame played the most significant role in shaping U.S. posture, the story is not that simple.

Findings

From the available evidence I found each theory has contributed to the current

U.S biodefense posture, but that a chemical frame has exerted the greatest influence.

External threat was shown to have exerted a strong influence early in the program and in the last 20 years but played a substantially less significant role in the intermediate years.

Imperialistic behavior was consistently observed at a low level prior to the mid 1990’s at which point its influence significantly increased. The shift in the biological program’s

329 character after the Second World War indicates a chemical frame existed within the

Chemical Corps prior to it receiving prime responsibility for the biological mission. The chemical frame proved to be extremely strong and resilient as it was the dominant factor from the end of World War Two to the First Gulf War. While today external threat and imperialism are beginning to exert more influence over the program, it is still possible to observe behaviors associated with the chemical frame.

HOW THE CURRENT U.S. BIODEFENSE POSTURE WAS FORMED

It is not unexpected that external threat exerted significant influence over the initial formation of the U.S. biological program. The program was developed in direct response to the feared use of biological weapons by enemy states in a global war. For this period research on biological agents was conducted by organizations composed of civilian biological experts, created for the sole purpose of understanding the potential of biological agents. While the Chemical Corps was also involved in this research, the majority of the work was biological specific and separated from chemical weapons. This period is a classic example of a state perceiving a threat to its security and responding with appropriate dedication of interest and resources.

As the biological program grew in size and capabilities it was handed off to the military, where it was eventually placed under the U.S. Army’s Chemical Corps. As the war ended the Chemical Corps began to take full responsibility for the program. I argue that the biological weapons program became subject to a chemical frame when the military, and in particular the Chemical Corps, became the primary organization of

330 responsibility. I also argue that the chemical frame was in existence even before the

Corps was given responsibility for biological weapons. The frame was likely established in the inter-war period when the Corps focused solely on developing the offensive and defensive aspects of chemical warfare.

The chemical frame exerted a significant influence over the development of the

U.S. biological program from the late 1940’s’s through the 1990’s. During this period there is an overwhelming presence of behaviors predicted by the organizational frames model. Military doctrine over this period almost always refers to a combined chemical and biological threat when addressing enemy capabilities, attack scenarios and defensive measures. Significantly, when the combined threat is described it is almost always dominated by terms relative to how a chemical weapon would affect the battle, ignoring the unique aspects of the biological threat. Likewise official statements and reports also demonstrate a similar trend in combining chemical agents and biological agents as one threat or one weapon type. As a result most of the biological equipment and doctrine produced under this period is sub-optimal, failing to address the unique challenges and characteristics of a biological attack.

This is not to imply that the chemical frame dominated every aspect of those forty years. There are many events, such as President Nixon’s decision to end the program, the

Air Force’s area coverage weapons, the debate over the offensive use of the weapons, and the debate to eliminate the Chemical Corps which highlight the influence of alternative behaviors. However while the other theories exert temporary influence, the chemical frame is always present and always influencing the program. Whether it was offensive 331 weapons, defensive hardware, or doctrine the omnipresent combined view of the weapons shows the strength of the frame.

The end of the Cold War, the First Gulf War, the discovery of state biological weapons programs, the use of chemical agents and biological agents in terrorist attacks, and the rise of international terrorist groups caused a series of shocks to the United

States’ strategic outlook. Exhibiting behavior consistent with realism the U.S. assessed that as a nation it was facing an increased biological threat and that it was unprepared for that threat. The country responded by changing national policy and allocating significant resources to address the threat. Biological agents are currently the subject of dedicated

Presidential directives, separate from chemical agents and are viewed with a level of significance not observed since the Second World War.

As a result of this elevated threat level, a significant amount of national attention and resources have been allocated to biological defense. The resources and prestige currently associated with biological weapons present a prime target for organizations wishing to expand. Not unexpectedly a significant increase in imperialistic behavior is apparent in the last 20 years. It is present within the military as many organizations claim part of the mission space, and within the government as indicated by the increase in total number of organizations involved in the defensive program.

While external threat influenced the national response, which created an environment conducive for organizational imperialism, research and development programs are ultimately executed by individuals. Many of today’s leaders, especially within the DoD, entered the program many years ago and learned their trade under the 332 influence of the chemical frame. It is at this individual level where organizational frames can have the greatest impact. Even though the state and the organization may feel they are taking appropriate measures to a threat, it is the individual that interprets guidance and executes the response. So, even as the other factors grow in influence, if organizational frame behavior persists within the program it will blunt the influence of the other factors.

FINDINGS OF NOTE

This work examines seventy years of history in an attempt to understand the present state of the U.S program. Some of the observations put forth in this work, while significant, are not unexpected. For example the fact that external threat influenced U.S actions during a world war, or that new organizations flocked to expanding resources in

2001 is not surprising. The identification of these events confirms that the assumptions, theory selection and experimental design of this work are appropriate.

Of more interest to the reader are findings that were not readily predictable at the onset of this study. It is these findings of significant change, or inaction, which do not fit the predicted pattern that offer the best chance to understand why the U.S biological posture exists in the state we find it today.

One such finding is that twice senior civilian leadership broke the chemical frame.

Presidents Nixon and Bush both, albeit under different circumstances, came to view biological agents as separate from chemical agents. Their actions showed that the frame

333 is not inevitable, and when individuals outside the frame examine the issue they find the prevailing frame dominated view may not be the optimal approach.

It is also significant to note that the chemical frame seems weakest when the nation views itself in the greatest crisis, such as World War Two and after the anthrax attacks. This observation may indicate that when the nation is actually serious about making significant advances in the program, it appreciates that the combined weapon view is not the optimal approach. Yet, when the nation’s attention turns to other matters the influence of the chemical frame returns. This dynamic indicates that of the theories, realism and frames may be the least compatible. While they may be able to simultaneously exist at a lower level, when one set of behaviors reaches a critical level of influence, the other theory falls to the background.

Another unexpected finding is the current lack of concern with chemical agents in civilian agencies. While it may be expected that a non-military organizations (with less exposure to the frame) would have less interest in chemical agents it is not that simple.

As the evidence has shown it is possible to find the combined chemical/biological, or

WMD association present in almost all areas of the government at one point or another.

At the genesis of many of the current non-military biodefense programs the threat to the nation was still regarded predominantly as WMD or CBRN as it is today. Any government agency would have been repeatedly exposed to this frame of reference in testimony, guidance, reference material and exposure to personnel within the traditional program. Yet, today the civilian agencies involved with “WMD” defense are almost exclusively focused on biological agents. This may be an imperialistic stance to secure 334 resources, but also demonstrates that objective assessment of the weapons can result in programs dedicated specifically to one weapon type.

The resilience of the chemical frame is another significant surprise. At various points within the history of the program it was shown that some agencies were able to brake or resisted the frame. However that situation never seemed permanent and it always seems possible to find the frame somewhere within the traditional defense organizations. Even facing written guidance from the White House to the contrary, the chemical frame persisted. The frame emerged at the end of the Second World War and continues to influence the trajectory of the program to this day. While I argue that the frame shows signs of weakening and may have even disappeared in some areas of the program, it can still be found within the traditional defensive programs today.

The existence of the frame is concerning in that the defensive program seems to be banging its head against the wall trying to find solutions to problems it has made artificially difficult. Perhaps the most striking evidence of this is the decontamination program. The U.S. is still struggling today to develop the capability to decontaminate agents developed in the First World War.132 The requirements expressed in the previously cited Tactical Air Command decontamination requirements document from the 1970’s could just as easily be ascribed to today’s programs. In spite of years of effort it seems the frame has prevented anyone in authority from stepping back and assessing why the program has not produced the desired results.

132 A previous point bears repeating. Both chemical agents and biological agents can be and are routinely inactivated. It is the additional requirements to address all possible agents, while in a field environment without harming equipment which makes the problem much more challenging. 335

The detection area demonstrates the second strongest bastion of the chemical frame. Again, in spite of technical limitations, the program has insisted on a real time detection capability. In reality any detection system taking more than 10 minutes to alarm will do little to protect the vast majority of a military base. Yet the rapid response paradigm dominates the development program. This is in contrast to the three slower but more reliable biological detection systems deployed by agencies not associated with the traditional program.

The general lack of imperialistic behavior, while not a total surprise, is still somewhat unexpected. These data show that imperialism did not exert a significant level of influence over the program until the late 1990’s. It can be argued that compared to major weapon systems and the nuclear threat, biological agents did not represent a significant target for colonizing behavior. However, there are several periods where organizations were forced to defend their existence and only a token attempt is made to emphasize biological defense. Combined with the fact that biological defense was generally lacking in effectiveness it is surprising that the program was not subject to a hostile takeover attempt by another service.

It is also interesting to note the interaction of imperialism with other behaviors.

While I have argued that a frame and rational choice are not compatible, imperialism appears compatible with either other theory. There are many examples of imperialistic organizations using external threat to justify additional resources. Another interesting trend is that prior to the 1990’s most imperialistic behaviors were executed relative to the organizations inherent frame. For example when the Army sought new funds in the 336

1980’s it lobbied for binary chemical weapons. Something it was comfortable with and well within the chemical frame. This may indicate that as a general rule, imperialism is most likely to be observed in new organizations without an established frame, and when older organizations attempt imperialistic behavior any associated frames will overshadow the attempt.

One final data point of interest is the medical countermeasures program, particularly in the 1970’s. While this area has not been the major focus of this work, the available data from this period is of interest as it appears none of the behaviors associated with the three theories are exerting a significant influence over the program. There is no evidence that national leadership was directing significant levels of attention to this area, nor was there evidence that other agencies were attempting to take over the program. It would be possible to argue the lack of confidence in medical countermeasures grows from a chemical frame, but even this evidence is not as strong as observed in other areas of the defensive program. Withstanding a more extensive investigation into this area of defense, this particular data point may reflect a program showing a lack of influence by any of the three theories of interest and may be indicative of another organizational behavior.

These unexpected findings are important as they provide opportunities to reflect on how the program could have been changed. In particular the findings relative to the chemical frame highlight its strength, and how insidiously the chemical frame has impacted the program. The ability to find internal and external program assessments critical of the program in every time period indicates that the country was never truly 337 comfortable with the state of the biological program. However, investigators never appeared to question if it was the chemical/biological relationship which was causing the problem. Had this question been examined, it is quite possible the U.S. would be in a better defensive position today.

A PATTERN OF OBSERVED BEHAVIORS

From these findings it is possible to draw some conclusions as to when and where different behaviors are likely to exert the greatest influence.

Table 5: Predominant Behaviors by Threat and Organizational Age

Threat Low/Stable High/Changing

Age of Organization Old Organizational Realism or Frame Organizational (Cold War) Frames (Current, Nixon) New Bureaucratic Realism and Politics Bureaucratic Politics (Least likely) (WW II, Current)

The majority of the time covered in this analysis falls within the old/stable category. From the end of the Second World War to the 1990’s the U.S. faced the

Soviets in the Cold War. While there were occasional flare ups and proxy battles, the

Soviet Union was a known and relatively stable threat. The United States had an

338 established program and an established organization dedicated to the biological problem.

As far as the nation was concerned it was addressing the threat.

In this type of environment the nation will show little interest in established programs against what it perceives as lower level threats. Likewise without a major event, or major outside assessment the nation will assume the situation is under control.

In this situation exiting programs will receive little high level direction and the parent organizations will be relatively free to execute their programs as they see fit. It is easy to imagine that such an environment would result in existing frames dominating the direction of the program.

The environment least likely to be observed is the stable threat/new organization combination. This threat environment is reflective of the cold war, as just discussed and very few “new” biodefense organizations came into existence during this time period.133

A nation is unlikely to expend resources to create a new organization to address an existing low level threat, which is already being addressed by an established organization.

Given the stable threat environment, and lacking any gross negligence within the program, there is no compelling rational choice reason to add an additional program. Nor is it to likely that a chemical frame would influence the government to create a redundant organization. By default then, any new program would be created not due to lack of existing ability, but as the result of an arbitrary government decision. Such decisions are

133 Although the Army moved the mission from the Chemical Corps to Material Command this is a reorganization and does not represent the creation of a new organization competing with the original organization. 339 not usually made without some form of lobbying, either from existing organizations or outside constituencies.

The creation of a new organization in response to a significant change in threat is consistent with behavior predicted by realism theory. The civilian organizations created in World War Two, and the new governmental organizations entering the biodefense in the last ten years are such examples.

A national assessment that existing programs are misaligned with a rising threat will result in a rational choice to allocate more resources and possibly create new organizations in an attempt to alleviate the threat. It would be logical to expect an organization created directly in response to a new external threat, would focus on that threat. The newness of the organization, and severity of the threat would create an environment where the “old way” of doing things, associated with a frame, would not be acceptable or expected. It would be expected that the additional resources available in this type of environment would encourage imperialistic behavior as well as behaviors predicted by realism. It is possible to see these behaviors today in organization such as the HHS and DHS as they compete with the DoD to address the biodefense threat.

The final combination of an old organization in a rising threat environment reflects the Chinese curse, “May you live in interesting times.” In this scenario the national assessment of vulnerability has changed, and in the case of biodefense, the old organization addressed the threat through an inappropriate frame. The drastic changes imposed by President Nixon, or the realization that the U.S. was unprepared to face the

340

Iraqi threat in the Gulf War are two such examples where established organizations struggled to adapt to drastic changes in the threat environment.

In this scenario the nation realizes that existing measures are inadequate and something drastic must be done. One possible solution is to create new organizations which would likely be influenced by external threat and imperialism, as already discussed. Another possible solution is to rely upon existing organizations to address the changing threat. This creates some tension, as the existing organization may have failed to adequately anticipate the threat, and is quite possibly operating under the influence of a frame.

This scenario also highlights the tension between external threat and a frame.

Simply handing a frame dominated organization more money will just produce more of the same pre-event products which have been judged as inadequate. For the organization to break from the frame, and address the external threat as it truly exists, significant external pressure must be added. The historical analysis shows that it may require

Cabinet or Presidential involvement with the problem before is the frame broken. The record also shows that as national attention turns to other areas (and the program enters the old/stable environment), exiting frames tend to re-emerge as the dominant influence.

The evidence suggests that in their true forms, the behaviors associated with frames and realism are incompatible. While I have argued that both factors are influencing the program today, the influence is at different organizational levels. The highest levels of government are primarily concerned with the external threat and produce outputs reflecting this concern. However, the organizations executing the 341 program still reflect the influence of a chemical frame as evidenced in the hardware. If the influence of external threat reaches a tipping point within the executing organizations they will begin to address the biological threat based upon the true nature of biological weapons separate from chemical based assumptions. Such an environment is inhospitable to the chemical frame.

Criticisms – Alternative Explanations

This dissertation is based upon an observation that biological defenses are generally less developed and appear subservient to chemical defense. The arguments presented focus on the relationship between chemical agents and biological agents and the impact of the relationship on biological defense. I have considered three factors that could explain this observation. Based upon these available data, it appears that a chemical frame has played the most significant role in influencing the status of the current U.S. posture, with imperialistic behaviors and external threat exerting a lesser level influence. However, it is possible to put forth alternative arguments to account for the perceived inferiority of biodefense capabilities.

BIOLOGY WAS TOO HARD

It is possible to argue that the deficiencies in biological defense are a reflection of the significant scientific challenges associated with developing effective biological defense capabilities.

342

I acknowledge that scientific advances in the last 20-30 years have produced identification techniques and allowed hardware/software developments which represent a quantum leap over the capabilities available in earlier periods of analysis. It is obvious today that the researchers trying to develop real-time biological detection systems with

1950’s technology were facing an impossible task. Therefore, one could argue, it should be of no surprise that biological defenses have lagged chemical defenses over the years.

I counter that this is true, but provides even more support in favor of a chemical frame. It is not the technology, but the view of the threat and the development of requirements based upon that view which has been the focus of this analysis. The history of biological detection devices demonstrates a constant quest to achieve real-time detection, as would be expected if the threat is viewed through a chemical frame. Yet this standard is not an absolutely critical factor given the slower action of biological agents. What is not observed is any attempt to develop a detection strategy based upon technology that was available at the time.

I propose that detection and identification systems based upon separate collection and identification could have been developed and fielded many years prior to Portal

Shield. 134 However, such a system would not have provided fast detection. It would have required a dedicated laboratory capability, and would have taken hours to days to function. Such a system would have only worked in combination with a robust medical capability, either in vaccine or drug development to prevent significant casualties. These

134 While the DoD fielded a previously shelved detection system for Desert Storm, it was never standardized as an equipment item. Portal Shield, fielded in the mid 1990’s, was the first significant biological detection system employed on a large scale. It is a point/real time detection system based upon antibody detection technology. 343 operational characteristics are foreign to the detection of chemical agents, and I would argue this is one reason such a system was not proposed.

BIOLOGICAL AGENTS WERE NEVER REALLY A THREAT

It is also possible to argue that relative to massive Soviet conventional forces, nuclear armed enemies, and enemies with stated chemical capabilities, biological weapons were a relatively insignificant threat. It would be logical then, to combine biological defense within similar requirements imposed by chemical defense allowing a relatively low level threat to be addressed with minimal additional resources. Such an argument is valid and would reflect behavior reflective of a rational choice associated with realism. However, there are two factors that contradict this assumption, the nature of the threat, and the nature of the biological agent/chemical agent relationship.

Looking at the modern history of biological weapons are at most only twenty years where the U.S. or its allies did not have a biological weapons program, or where the

U.S. did not have concrete evidence it faced an adversary with biological weapons.

Entering World War Two the British had a biological program, and by the end of the war the U.S. did as well. The U.S. maintained an offensive program through 1969. From

1970-1990 the U.S. could not point to a “known” biological program. However by the mid 1980’s based upon intelligence estimates, and events such as Sverdlovsk it was becoming increasingly accepted as a fact that the Soviets did have a clandestine program.

By the end of the first Gulf War the U.S. had firsthand knowledge of two known state biological weapons programs. In 2001 the U.S. was subject to an actual attack, utilizing

344 weaponized anthrax. Taken together, it is possible to make the case that biological weapons were a tangible threat to the U.S. for a majority of the time since the early

1940’s.

Also, the relative level of the threat should not have influenced how the U.S. viewed biological agents relative to chemical agents. Just because the biological threat may have been lower than that from chemical agents that does not change the physical nature of the two weapons. In fact, if biological agents posed no significant threat then relatively easy and cheaper biological specific protective measures could have been developed to address the minimal threat which did exist. Yet, nearly all doctrine and policy produced by the U.S. prior to the 2000’s refers to a combined chemical/biological threat, un-necessarily complicating the issue if biological weapons were in fact not a threat.

INAPPROPRIATE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Another possible critique is that it is possible the three theories are not mutually exclusive and create an issue of equifinality, which is listed as a concern with the congruence/process tracing method as described in George and Bennett. At one level this is correct, external threat drives state action, imperialism can drive inter-departmental actions, while frames work within organizations.

However, it is the perception of biological weapons relative to chemical agents, and the resulting U.S. posture which is of most concern for this dissertation. Each theory predicts a unique and mutually exclusive view of biological agents and the corresponding

345 threat. Carried to their logical conclusion, each distinct view of the biological threat will produce a biological agent/chemical agent relationship specific to each theory.

A realist based approach will view the threat relative to all of the external threats facing the state. One could argue that compared to nuclear and conventional threats biological weapons were of minor concern. Realism predicts a posture based upon distinct threats tailored to address each threat with the appropriate level of resources. Yet we consistently see chemical agents, biological agents, and nuclear weapons given the same degree of prestige as they are often regarded as a single “WMD” threat or referred to as “NBC” weapons. Even when nuclear weapons are treated separately, the majority of the references are to combined chemical/biological agents.

An organization with imperialistic intentions would view disparate threats as an opportunity for organizations to expand into under developed areas. The theory also predicts organizations wishing to expand will highlight the different and unique aspects of biological weapons as a strategy to support their proposals for new programs. In fact imperialism predicts an overselling of the biological threat as means to support new programs. Yet again, as stated above, we see a consistent combination of the threat, either as chemical/biological or as nuclear/chemical/biological.

An organization under the influence of a frame views the threat as real and makes every effort to respond accordingly. However, it is the viewing of biological agents through the chemical lens that produces the output unique to this theory. In this case the weapons are seen as so similar that when attempts are made to address a biological threat,

346 the resulting effort is accomplished in a manner that would be more effective against a chemical agent.

INCORRECT THEORIES

It is possible to argue that the three theories included in this work are in fact not appropriate and an alternative theory would be better at predicting the behavior of U.S. biological defense doctrine. Posen addresses the same issue in his analysis. He acknowledges that it is difficult to select the most likely alternative theories, so he ultimately selected two of the most widely accepted theories to compete against each other.

To conduct this analysis three logically competing theories were chosen from the literature. While there is academic and historical precedence for the selection of these three theories they in no way compose a comprehensive list of international relations and organizational theories which could impact biodefense doctrine. In order to conduct this work in a realistic manner a limit needed to be placed on the number of theories examined. Therefore, I can only state my conclusions are valid relative to these three particular theories. There is the distinct possibility that an alternative theory may provide a better explanation than the three used in this work, but that argument will rely upon future work.

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WRONG DATA USED

A final argument is that I did not find the appropriate data, or did not examine enough data to draw my conclusions. I acknowledge there are at least two potential issues with data collection for this topic, classification and volume.

Classification of data in this area is a factor that cannot be circumvented. There is a valid security concern that detailed knowledge of weapons capabilities or vulnerabilities can result in harm to the country. While it is possible to request declassification or Freedom of Information access for specific documents, it is a tedious process and is not guaranteed to provide the data of interest. Therefore, the analysis is limited to data that is available to the public. Due to the nature of declassification the older the document, the more likely it is to be publically available. This also creates a bias where there is a greater amount of data from earlier historical periods.

A second issue is the sheer volume of possible data, the archives contain hundreds if not thousands of feet of documents. I have made every effort to utilize the most relevant data but do not claim to have examined every committee meeting, transcript or decision document.

However, I found that within the sources that were analyzed, the behaviors described were consistent regardless of volume or source. Given the omnipresent existence of the behaviors in the data I did examine, I find no reason to expect the same pattern would not be present in sources of data not included in this analysis.

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Conclusions

This analysis selected three prominent theories, which I argue logically could have impacted the development of the United States’ biological program. Based upon the presence of unique behaviors predicted by each of the theories it is possible to observe factors associated with each theory influencing the U.S. biological program at different points in the program’s history.

Examining the prevalence of the behaviors I propose that the U.S. biological program was created under the strong influence of an external threat. After the end of

World War Two, and through the first Gulf War a chemical frame was the dominant influence over doctrine development. In the post-Gulf War/international terrorist period it is possible to find a significant presence of behaviors associated with all three theories, each exerting the preponderance of their influence on separate areas of the program.

Yet is the presence of a chemical frame at the level of the executing organizations which has had the greatest historical influence over the U.S. biological posture. The majority of the hardware, doctrine, and training, as well as the general perception within the military, reflects the presence of a chemical frame. The repeated association of chemical weapons with biological weapons has unnecessarily complicated the issue and severely hampered the ability of the U.S. to achieve its true potential in biological defense. The repeated examples of the chemical frame being identified and partially broken, followed by the eventual return of the frame stand out as perhaps the most telling observation from this work.

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I acknowledge that there are limitations to these findings. While several challenges can be raised to my findings they are subject to debate and can be resolved with additional research. There are two challenges that I accept as unavoidable and place a limit on the conclusions which can be drawn from this work. The lack of access to classified data places an unavoidable bias into data selection. Due to the need to limit the problem, only three theories were examined. In the future additional theories or additional data may prove to contradict my findings.

Withstanding these challenges this work indicates that a chemical frame exerted a significant influence over a majority of the U.S. biological program’s existence. The implications of this dominance will expanded upon in the next section.

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Ch 9. Significance and Recommendations

Since leaving Moscow I have encountered an alarming level of ignorance about biological weapons. (Alibek 1999)

The results of this historical analysis show that behaviors associated with all theories contributed to the current state of the U.S. biodefense posture, but that a chemical frame exerted the greatest influence. Recognizing that external factors are influencing the program is the first step in understanding why the U.S. struggles in this area. Interpreting the impact and developing alternative strategies is the second step.

Significance – Impacts on the program

Assuming one accepts my findings of how these three factors influenced the development of the U.S. biological posture, why should one care? I have argued that the current U.S. biological defense posture is less than optimal, and that three factors have contributed in some way to this condition. I take the position that a chemical frame has had the greatest impact, but each factor has had some role in determining the current U.S. biodefense posture. However, due to the dominance of the chemical frame, it is not possible to observe the program as it would exist if under total control behaviors associated with either external threat or imperialism.

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IMPACTS OF IMPERIALISM

Is imperialism and issue? From some measures the presence of imperialistic behaviors within the U.S. program had a negative impact on the advancement of the program. The best example of a negative impact may be the current vaccine development program which has many participants but little success. The negative influence of imperialistic behavior is manifest when organizations let self interest exert a significant role in decision making. As a result doctrinal decisions may not be optimal based upon threat and cost, but are altered to include factors representing the best interest of organizations involved within the decision process. It would be reasonable to expect the fragmentation and cost of the overall program to increase as the influence of this theory increases.

However, especially in the presence of a frame, imperialistic behavior can have a positive effect on the program. One issue identified with the U.S. program is that under the influence of a chemical frame the program focused on established solutions with little innovation. Imperialism can serve as a counter to an organizational frame when outside organizations compete with established organizations for resources. This represents an opportunity for individuals outside the frame to address the program and bring unique solutions to the table while forcing established organizations to re-assess their polices in response to new competition.

The employment of the BioWatch, BASIS and JBAIDS biological detection systems provides evidence in support of this theory. These systems are based upon an extended filtration/collection step followed by a highly specific identification step. These 352 systems were not developed by the traditional DoD defense program, nor has the DoD historically dedicated significant resources to this type of detection strategy.135 Yet these systems were developed by organizations “new” to the biodefense program and are the ones currently employed within many U.S. cities, government facilities and even military bases.

For good or bad, a convenient characteristic of imperialism is that is relatively easy to identify. While bureaucratic behaviors may be joked about, or just chalked up to as “that’s how the government works” they can be fixed. Strong leadership involvement with a clear mandate can streamline and consolidate programs. Imperialistic organizations can resist for a period if they have a powerful enough constituency, but at some point if the nation wants it badly enough the bureaucratic structure can be changed.

IMPACT OF RATIONAL CHOICE

Is realism/rational choice an issue? Decisions based upon rational choice are not inherently good or bad. Ideally they are a logical response to a threat balanced against other threats and available resources. One would hope that there is some degree of rational choice behind every U.S. defensive decision. The nation cannot fund every possible defensive program so choices must be made. Ideally the rational choice is based upon external threat, and again can serve as a break on an organizational frame, by injecting the real world into programs and decisions.

135 BASIS and Biowatch were developed by the DOE/NNSA, and JBAIDS is based upon dry filter technology adapted to meet an urgent needs statement, combined with PCR detection systems developed by the DoD medical community. 353

The weakness of rational choice is that is based upon the accuracy of the perceived threat and human judgment. In some cases, such as Iraq, the U.S. had firsthand knowledge as to the extent of their program after the war and even maintained an inspection program. Even then the U.S. over estimated the threat in the following years, eventually going to war in part over the perceived Iraqi refusal to end its NBC programs.

Inversely, the Soviet Union ran a sophisticated and successful clandestine biological program for years which the U.S. never accurately characterized.

In addition to good intelligence, rational choice also relies upon a rational decision maker. Decisions to ignore a threat because of relative weight are OK.

Decisions to ignore a threat because your district has a technology to address a different threat are not. Likewise a decision to ignore a threat because one finds it personally immoral does not protect the nation from an amoral world.

A doctrine based upon realism should focus solely on the perceived threat to the state and should allocate resources to counter the most pressing threats. It is possible to argue that some behaviors, such as allocating greater resources to chemical weapons based upon Soviet threat are observed. However, what an external threat based program would not produce is the combination of threats or the constant submission of one threat relative to another.

While not always exerting influence over the biodefense program, when present rational actor behaviors serve as a rudder. They provide guidance and direction to the program. Realism based behaviors are most evident in historical periods showing the greatest flux in external threat, while relatively stable periods show less impact, and 354 greater influence of other behaviors. Rational choice serves as a check on organizational or bureaucratic forces. Un-checked these forces can produce a doctrine based upon politics or individual preference, and ultimately result in doctrine and hardware ill suited to address the threats encountered in the next conflict or attack.

Therefore a doctrine based upon external threat is not an issue with a degraded defensive capability. Working perfectly rational choice will fine tune the national defense to fit the threat facing the nation. It is the institutional weakness in knowledge and decision making which can result in a threat/defense mismatch. If deficiencies are identified, re-allocation of resources and effort can be implemented to correct the situation.

IMPACT OF A CHEMICAL FRAME

Is the chemical frame and issue? One can make a valid argument for treating biological and chemical weapons as a combined threat. In the area of collective and individual protection the U.S. has pursued a strategy of developing barrier materials and filters which offer protection against both chemical and biological agents. These combined programs offer a significant logistical advantage in reducing the amount of material needed in a theater of combat. Combined protection also simplifies the commander’s operational environment by reducing information requirements and simplifying decisions made in response to an unconventional attack.

Combined chemical/biological doctrine and training also offers advantages to military forces. Operational forces train for many different and evolving threats with a

355 limited amount of time and resources. Biological agents and chemical weapons are just two of many threats facing combat forces, and ones which are arguably much less likely to be encountered in today’s combat missions than snipers or IED’s. And as the method of employment (airborne) is likely to be similar for both weapons, many of the defensive actions have similar components. Combining training can allow commanders to maximize training opportunities while conserving resources.

Arguments can be made to combine weapons classes when designing defensive hardware. Large scale decontamination operations require significant amount of equipment, and require large amounts of water and decontaminant. Conducting a large scale decontamination operation imposes a significant logistical burden on the commander. As with protective equipment, development and employment of universal decontamination capabilities reduce logistical requirements, reduce the reliance upon detection technology and reduces reliance upon intelligence capabilities to identify the nature of the threat to be faced by combat forces.

Finally, nobody will argue that it is a good idea to expose anyone to a biological agent if it can be prevented. Faced with agents that are invisible and generally not detectible by human senses the ability to detect the presence of agents in time to allow effective protective measures is the ultimate goal of any detection system. To achieve this goal it is necessary to develop standoff detection systems or point detection with real time detect/alarm capabilities. Therefore, when the objective is to avoid exposure the operational requirements for chemical sensors and biological sensors will be essentially identical. 356

These are all arguments that can be made, and make perfect sense to an organization working under a chemical frame. If the frame inhibits the ability of one to appreciate the unique aspects of a new challenge/weapon then the organization will continue to utilize accepted solutions to the new problem. And as documented in the analysis section, there is ample evidence that the organizational chemical frame has exerted a significant impact on the development of U.S. biodefense doctrine.

In spite of these arguments, I argue that yes, the frame is a significant issue.

Looking at these arguments again, while focusing on the differences between biological agents vs. chemical agents (breaking the chemical frame), exposes significant shortcomings with the historic U.S. approach of a combined biological/chemical threat program. The key to this point of view is to appreciate the different physical behaviors of the weapons as discussed in chapter three. Persistent chemical agents are thickened; oily chemicals manufactured through an industrial process and are not normally found in the environment.136 Their physical composition results in their ability to penetrate and even degrade many materials over time.

Biological weapons,137 while lethal and intimidating, are ultimately only human manipulation and employment of bacteria or viruses which are ubiquitous in nature.

While agents may be delivered in wet or dry forms they are particulates. The agents themselves do not have the ability to penetrate non porous surfaces, nor degrade

136 Non-persistent agents evaporate quickly and exist mainly as a gas which moves with the airflow and dissipates relatively quickly over time. Respitory protection is the main line of defense against these agents, and they produce little to no residual hazard which would require long term protective equipment or extensive decontamination after the agent has dissipated. 137 Excluding toxins and (theoretical) engineered agents 357 materials. While the existence of the chemical frame influences all aspects of the program from the design of protective boots, to the wording of public law, it has had the most profound, and I argue the most detrimental impact on the hardware which serves as the cornerstones of biological defense.

FRAMES IMPACT ON PROTECTION

From outside the chemical frame the arguments to combined chemical and biological systems take on different implications. In the case of protective equipment, protective covers designed to protect against both types of agents must be able to withstand the penetration and degradation risks associated with chemical weapons. This results in bulky, expensive materials that usually have a shelf life imposed by their need to absorb chemical agents.

However, protective barriers for biological agents face a less significant physical challenge from the agent and can be constructed of materials which impose a far lesser physiological burden on the user. Intact skin is an effective barrier to biological agents and is easily augmented by impermeable barriers such as Tyvek ® suits and surgical gloves. The previously cited Air Force study on the efficiency of N95 masks against biological agents indicates there is an awareness of the different protective requirements.

While there is an excellent logistical argument for combined chemical/biological filters, most current filters effective against biological agents and chemical combine two distinct filtration techniques. In current filter systems protection against chemical agents is provided by absorbent materials which sequester chemical agents as the air passes over

358 the material. Filters need to be periodically replaced as the absorbent materials “fill up” with chemical agent and stop offering protection.

Even if there is no chemical agent present, these sorbent materials will react with normal chemicals in the air, slowly losing their ability to scrub the air of chemical agents.

This results in an operational life for opened filters after which they must be replaced, even if they were never exposed to chemical agents. Increased protection time and protection against additional agents is obtained by adding more or different mixes of absorbent materials into the filter.

Filtration against biological agents is based upon physical immobilization of the infectious particles on the filter material. Because biological filters work as physical barriers to the passage of particles they do not have a shelf life based upon the chemical properties of the sorbent material. The life of physical filters is determined by the amount of material caught within the filter. While this accumulation of material does not necessarily reduce the effectiveness of the filter, it does increase the resistance of air passing through the filter. At a certain point resistance will begin to impact the operation of ventilation systems, or reduce the ability of individuals to breath.

For protective equipment the military has incurred a cost as a result of the decision to develop material designed to face biological agents as well as chemical agents. Such equipment must be designed to meet protective standards dictated by the most extreme threat, resulting in over-protection against less demanding threats. A combined threat model also results in rigorous performance requirements, which can result in increased research costs, longer development periods and finally result in more 359 expensive material solutions.138 The need to address the chemical threat imposes shelf and service life constraints on filters and protective garments that are not applicable to a biological only threat scenario, imposing additional financial and logistical costs. Most importantly to the commander is the loss of mission effectiveness and heat stress placed upon individuals wearing protective over garments drastically over engineered relative to the biological threat.

FRAMES IMPACT ON DECONTAMINATION

A second mission area that has been significantly impacted by the chemical frame is decontamination. If decontamination were only a concern in a laboratory environment it would not be an issue. Many chemical and physical methods are routinely used to inactivate toxic materials or eliminate the ability of biological agents to cause infection.

However, these techniques are often harmful to sensitive equipment, or impractical for use in a field environment. Operating under the combined threat model imposed by the chemical frame the U.S. has yet to develop a universal, but equipment safe decontaminant.

To answer the decontamination challenge the United States has consistently pursued a decontamination strategy that focuses on developing a joint chemical/biological decontamination capability. While this strategy may seek to maximize logistical effectiveness it imposes significant physical challenges on any

138 Time, cost and materials will be greater when the material solution must counter all threats. Such requirements can exclude existing commercial capabilities acceptable to meet one threat but not meeting all of the requirements imposed by including all threats. 360 system. Re-examining this strategy relative to the distinctly different physical characteristics of the agents, a split decontamination strategy could offer significant advantages.

Liquid chemical agents (vs. vaporous agents) present the main challenge to chemical decontamination. One of the most significant challenges associated with chemical decontamination is the ability of chemical agents to penetrate surfaces such as paint. Once the agent has been absorbed into a surface it can remain a low level contact and vapor hazard for a significant amount of time. Therefore, a successful chemical decontaminant must be able to reach and de-toxify sequestered agent without damaging the structural integrity of the original equipment.

Compared with persistent liquid chemical agents, biological agents offer a stark contrast in decontamination requirements. As particles, biological agents do not penetrate surfaces. While they can settle into cracks and pores they are not physically absorbed into other materials as are chemical agents, presenting an easier decontamination target. Also, as a general rule, most biological agents are more “fragile” than chemical agents requiring less extreme decontamination capabilities. Hospitals and research laboratories routinely decontaminate equipment using heat, radiation or chemicals such as alcohol, peroxide or bleach.

The physical differences and decontamination requirements are recognized and addressed daily in the “regular” world. Every household has multiple cleaning products used to “decontaminate” surfaces in the home. There are commercial products that de- grease car engines, remove tar, clean toilet bowls and wash our dishes. Each product is 361 specifically designed to meet unique operational parameters such as the environment, cleaning challenge, the material to clean, and health considerations.

No commercial company would attempt to develop a product that addressed every cleaning requirement in a home, yet the military has consistently required its decontamination programs to address all agents in all environments.139 As with all other combined requirements, any all-encompassing solution will be significantly over- engineered for most of the threats in order to meet the most stringent requirements. By insisting on the 100% solution for every conceivable situation many 80% solutions have been rejected. Had several of these 80% solutions been combined within a larger program there is a real possibility the U.S. would possess an acceptable decontamination capability today.

FRAMES IMPACT ON DETECTION

Detection is the final area of hardware that will be discussed to show the impact of the chemical frame. The actual research programs, fielded sensors and detection capabilities have been discussed in previous sections. Looking at these capabilities from outside the chemical frame is it possible to argue that the chemical frame has hindered the development of effective biological detection capabilities.

Chemical agents by their nature necessitate an almost instantaneous detection capability to avoid casualties. Prior to the development of mechanical detection

139 As noted previously in this paper, one of the latest decontamination programs under development is taking a system of systems approach and may result in multiple solutions, each tailored to face a specific set of circumstances. 362 capabilities chemical detection was performed by observing soldiers or animals for the effects of chemical agents. Sentries watched for chemical effects on personnel and sounded “gas” alarms to alert troops downwind of the initial attack.

Technical solutions to chemical detection logically needed to respond faster than observable human physiological reactions if they were to be of any advantage in the battlefield. Therefore time to alarm, sensitivity, and standoff capability were significant considerations driving the development of chemical detectors. With the available technology, and the (relative) low level of background noise in the environment, current chemical detection capabilities are at least adequate to protect military forces.

As documented, the history of biological detection research shows a strong correlation to chemical detection. Requirements are similarly, if not identically worded, and in many cases the programs seek to combine biological detection within chemical detection. From a chemical frame these similarities make sense. The purpose of real time detection is to prevent personnel from being exposed to an agent, either through avoidance or by utilizing protective equipment. Further, nobody will argue that allowing exposure to a biological agent, if a detection capability existed, is acceptable. Nor would anyone argue against research to develop real time biological sensors. Yet, in the case of biological weapons instantaneous, low density, fixed sensors are not the only possible solution, especially given state of current detection technology.

What the chemical frame has done is blind the U.S. to a realistic appreciation of the differences between chemical agents and biological agents, and the resulting technical challenges these differences imply. Relative to chemical agents, biological detection 363 faces a much greater challenge with environmental noise. Some strategies to account for the noise are greater sensitivity, large samples or more data points, all of which result in slower detection responses. Yet, looking at the historical record the U.S. has consistently imposed time limits on biological detection ranging from 5-30 minutes.

These requirements have resulted in detectors which exist in a no man’s land of trying to produce useful warnings with low false alarm rates. Instead current sensors produce high false alarm rates while providing relatively little protective advantage to an installation. As time to detect/alarm becomes slower than “instantaneous” the usefulness of the detector decreases. A five minute response time could easily result in exposure of personnel ½ mile downwind from the detector and a 30 minute response time could result in a three mile downwind exposure.140 Put in perspective a three mile downwind exposure would essentially result in the exposure of the entire population of Kunsan Air

Base before an alarm sounded.

To meet even these relatively slow time requirements developers must use the most rapid detection technology suitable for a field environment. Currently the best fieldable rapid detection technology (antibody based detection) is relatively insensitive and is prone to cross reactions with normal environmental organisms. To combat this issue the developer can either rely upon a greater detection signal or accept a high false positive alarm rate. If the detector is fielded with a high false positive rate it may result in units ignoring alarms, or turning the sensors off. Steps taken to decrease the false

140 Assuming a wind speed of six mph. 364 alarm rate can negatively impact detector performance by increasing detection time, lowering sensitivity, or generating a greater false negative rate.

Given the lack of current technology capable of instantaneous biological detection in a highly complex environment, non chemical frame based solutions might offer increased capabilities. Given the slower action of biological agents, and the ability to counter some agents through medical countermeasures it is possible to conceive of alternative detection strategies such as long collection periods combined with highly sensitive (but slower) detectors, or networks of dispersed detectors.141 Such strategies may not be able to prevent exposure to an agent, but combined with a strong medical capacity they can offer a significant level of protection. Interestingly agencies which do not have a strong chemical frame, such as the medical community and civilian agencies have adopted such strategies.

WHY HAS THE FRAME PERSISTED

From these arguments it is realistic to claim that the chemical frame has had a negative impact on the U.S. biodefense posture. Yet, in spite of this impact on the program the frame has persisted. Even Presidential guidance aimed directly at separating chemical agents from biological agents at best only temporarily lessened the influence of this frame. Why has the chemical frame demonstrated such resilience within the biological program?

141 This is not to imply research into faster; more sensitive detection should not be pursued. However, until such technology is demonstrated to work in a field environment, with low false alarm rates and the capability to provide a benefit to a significant portion of the base, alternative detection strategies may be the most logical approach. 365

Perhaps it is structure of the military’s career path which makes it particularly susceptible to a frame. Most organizations can hire leaders from outside the organization. This provides an opportunity to inject new ideas into any level of the organization’s structure, which can be an effective management tool for organizations facing a crisis. However, military leadership is grown from within the organization.

Sufficient rank to hold a leadership position is only achieved after ten to twenty years of service. The training and education required to attain the higher ranks provides an excellent opportunity for the frame to perpetuate itself.

Reflecting upon the evidence presented relative to military training, it is possible to appreciate how the frame is perpetuated. During the Cold War, when there was relatively little concern with the biological threat, training was almost exclusively presented as combined chemical/biological training. In such a steady state environment there is little reason to expect that a significant challenge to the chemical frame to would emerge.

Of more interest is the training behaviors observed in the post Gulf War period.

Here, in spite of Presidential directives to address the biological threat and Congressional directives to address training deficiencies, the evidence documents a slow, frame dominated attempts to improve biological training. As long as the military trains its newest cadre of future leaders under a chemical frame, they will know no different when they reach a position to influence the direction of the program.

Closely associated with training is the background of those chosen to fill positions within the program. The reliance upon established educational quotas and arbitrary 366 entrance requirements can serve to perpetuate the frame within the organization. The available data shows a strong bias towards personnel with chemical backgrounds within the program. This bias can be perpetuated by leadership, which selects new personnel with similar backgrounds to their own. This bias can then be reinforced by the type of training and advanced education provided by the organization. While these behaviors can be a significant factor in how the frame is perpetuated, they can also be utilized to eradicate the frame. As entrance requirements and educational quotas can be (relatively) easily changed, this would be one tool a leader could use to slowly change the character of an organization by bringing in new educational outlooks to challenge the established frame.

One final reason the chemical frame may demonstrate such resilience is a lack of challenge from outside the organization. During the Cold War the U.S. nuclear strategy was subject to significant debate not only from within the military but from; national leadership, the academic community and the public. This debate served to generate new ideas which create a hostile environment for the perpetuation of a frame. Compared to nuclear weapons biological weapons posed less of a threat to the nation than nuclear weapons and predictably the U.S. biological defense program received significantly less attention from these outside sources. This lack of external challenge to conventional wisdom may have also been a significant factor in the perpetuation of the chemical frame.

Today the biological threat has been elevated to a status not seen since World War

Two, and concern over nuclear weapons has dropped from its Cold War levels. It is 367 possible to observe a corresponding increased interest in U.S. biodefense policy within the public and academic arenas. While there has already been a significant shift in how the national leadership views biological defense, the developing academic and public interest may emerge as another source of new ideas to challenge the remaining elements of the chemical frame.

CONCLUSIONS

Ultimately it is the perception that chemical agents and biological agents are the same which has created many of today’s deficiencies. This danger is epitomized by the military paper written in 2005 in which the authors still believe the U.S. possessed biological weapons. If any population should be aware of the status of the U.S. biological weapons program it is the military, as they are among the most likely to face the threat. Yet we have so intertwined chemical agents and biological agents, one is automatically included with the other, 35 years after the U.S destroyed its biological weapons.

If military leaders are still confused as to the nature of the U.S. biodefense program should we expect a better understanding from any other population? If we as the “WMD experts” create contradictory or even incorrect guidance how can we expect forces in the field to have confidence in their defensive equipment or training? While a chemical frame may have hamstrung our biodefense program, there are ways to fix the problem.

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Recommendations

Given that a chemical frame has had exerted influence over the U.S. biodefense posture, and that this influence has frame has negatively impacted U.S. defensive capabilities how should the program be improved?

The most straightforward solution is the most drastic and also the least likely to be adopted, simply split the responsibility for chemical defense and biological defense. A similar approach was tried once by the Chemical Corps in the 1950’s, and a separate agency has been recently recommended as a fix for the vaccination program. (Jollenbeck,

Durch and Benet 2004) A split program would have several benefits for biological defense. Having no competing model, the program would be able to view biological agents as unique entities. Such a move would emphasize the need for personnel educated about and dedicated solely to the biological threat. Finally, physically separating the chemical program from the biological program would allow equal advocacy for both programs, and would prevent cross-pollination of ideas or requirements.

Obviously such a change would face significant challenges. A new organization would impose a significant cost in personnel, infrastructure and resources. It would have to overcome a massive amount of bureaucratic inertia and then would run the risk of populating the new program with personnel educated under the influence of a chemical frame. Then even if the program was split unless a new Secretarial position was created within the Secretary of Defense at some point the two programs would be under the leadership of one person.

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A second sweeping but less contentious recommendation is to directly eliminate terms such as WMD, CB, or CBRN from the national lexicon. Every time these terms are used in an official capacity the implication is that these disparate weapons are somehow linked in threat, defense or mode of action. Reference to the actual weapon of concern removes confusion and allows directed solutions to be developed. It also makes individuals aware that there these weapons are not the same.

While this solution is not radical, and would be agreed upon by many, it faces decades of inertia. Carus has written an excellent examination of the WMD terminology in which he notes there are currently over 40 different definitions of WMD with official or semi-official standing. (Carus 2006) A recommendation to change terminology is neither original nor untested, as similar recommendations have noted in this work. Yet, even direction from the White House has not been able to remove these terms from the national vocabulary. Implementation of such a program would require continuous re- enforcement from senior leadership, which would probably require more effort than could be dedicated to the issue.

Given the massive bureaucratic inertia facing these two recommendations, there are other less dramatic actions that would still have a significant impact of breaking the frame. First the most important step is to recognize that any organization will be operating under some inherent bias or model of operation. It may be one of the three discussed in this work or one of the many other biases that can impact organizational behavior. Organizations should make efforts to honestly assess their own performance, or better yet invite outside experts to assess the state of the organization. 370

Organizations responsible for managing programs can easily maintain a bias if there is no outside audit of the programs. In my experience as a program manager, I have never had to justify my programs further than one level above my supervisor, meaning all program reviews have been conducted “in house” relative to the greater organization.

Inviting outside experts, to critically review program justification and requirements can help break an organizational frame by involving perspectives from outside the frame of reference. External reviews should not only involve true technical experts, but also involve the operational user. Both must see merit in the approach and see an operational benefit in the proposed program.

Just as program reviews are usually internal, doctrine and training manuals are also created internal to the military. Internal creation of these documents only serves to perpetuate any existing biases. As with research programs, it would be advantageous to have some sections of proposed doctrine reviewed by experts totally removed from the military culture.142 Such review would force the developers to validate why the military prescribes some actions over others and would expose recommendations based only upon historical precedent with not practical foundation.

Organizations must also recognize that education in one field does not necessarily make one an expert in all areas of a particular mission area. Yet, knowledge in one area of chemistry, biology, or nuclear physics often qualifies one as a total WMD expert.

While this approach makes sense in light of personnel limitations it exposes organizations

142 I do not suggest the entire document be written outside the military, but highly technical areas, or areas open to interpretation would benefit from an eternal assessment. 371 to the introduction or perpetuation of frames. Greater awareness of the existence of frames can allow better decision making when hiring personnel or modifying organizational structure to achieve a balance in educational background. Lacking the ability to cover all the educational bases, alternatives such as combining organizational resources with other organizations to create joint single threat centers of excellence dedicated only to one weapon type, or relying upon experts outside the organization may be acceptable alternatives.

Finally, decision makers must understand the positives and negatives of a program. Program managers do an excellent job of selling the benefits of their program.

However, we often do not understand, and are not even aware of, the negative impact of additional requirements placed upon the program. The presence of a frame can blind decision makers to the fact that not all threats are the same, and that over-engineering can actually harm readiness.

That said, there may be a valid case to justify combined biological and chemical requirements within some programs. Logistics, nature of threat, and likelihood of encountering the threat are all valid planning concerns which should be considered when developing program requirements. If the cost/benefit analysis favors one approach then acknowledge the cost in the program description and move forward. But if the added cost of additional protection does not justify a joint approach, look to separate the program. Either way, documentation of the decision process is of great importance.

Often in military development programs, the justification for one problem becomes gospel for future programs without understanding the original thought process. 372

Future Research

While completing this work I have made every effort to be as complete and thorough with my analysis as possible. However I acknowledge that with approximately

70 years of history involving multiple organizations there is an overwhelming amount of data available. I have made every effort to capture the most relevant data, but acknowledge I have not exhausted all possible sources.

Another complication to data collection is the classified nature of the biological and chemical defensive programs. Periodic declassification and freedom of information requests have provided a vast amount of previously classified information for analysis.

However, the more recent the datum the more likely it is to be classified. This creates an inherent bias in the availability of older data. In the future additional data relative to this dissertation will become available to the public which may support or refute my findings.

Finally, as some limit had to be placed on this analysis, only three theories were considered. While I believe these theories are the most relevant and were appropriate for this work they are not exclusive. As there are countless other organizational and behavior theories in the literature a similar analysis utilizing different theories could further support or refute my findings.

Last Thoughts

The significance of the impact of organizational frames is perhaps best observed in the failed (or sub-optimal) programs which litter the historical record. Program

373 requirements are typically written to address all threats and all conditions while ignoring the unique aspects of biological agents and chemical agents. As a result we routinely fail to utilize the available 80% solutions but seek the perfect 100% answer, which may often lie beyond physical or financial reality. Yet while we continue to strive for that mythical solution the U.S. remains vulnerable to threats which could be (at least partially) addressed today by existing technology.

The arguments presented in this dissertation point out some of the pros and cons of treating biological agents and chemical agents as one threat, as viewed through a chemical frame. I have attempted to point out that while some decisions may seem rational under a chemical frame, they do in fact carry costs that may or not be readily apparent when the programs are developed. I do not make the argument that the biological defensive program has been an abject failure, or that it was run with maliciousness or incompetence. What I do argue is that chemical frame imposes costs or constraints which may or may not be appreciated by program managers. All that I suggest is that the physical differences between the agents must be considered as part of the cost/benefit analysis process.

In Wilson’s Bureaucracy he makes several references to the unique nature of government organizations and how they perform. He raises that point that as there is no competition to the government these organizations lack the feedback that would be provided by the commercial marketplace. This removes one check on the proliferation of inefficiency and lack of understanding of customer need.

374

Lacking free market feedback, government organizations may only take an honest look at their organization and its operations when things go drastically wrong, when a

“visionary” leader is in place, or when they are scrutinized by an outside organization. I believe that the theories examined here did impact the biodefense program, and in a negative manner.143 Perhaps this work will serve to generate questions and create some scrutiny for the program. Whether or not I selected and advanced the correct theory may not ultimately be as important as any subsequent debate and assessment of the biodefense program which may follow this work.

143 By negative manner I mean that it is possible to conceive of a defense program which produced greater defensive capabilities that those currently available. 375

Appendix – Additional Information

List of military chemical detection equipment (National Research Council 1999)

Equipment Agent Sensitivity Time Cost Operations/ Notes Maintenance/Limits M-8 Paper Nerve-G 100-µ drops <30 sec $1 per Disposable/hand-held Chemical agent detector Liquids only Nerve-VX 100-µ drops book of Dry, undamaged paper paper; 25 sheets/book Mustard-H 100-µ drops 25 sheets has indefinite shelf life and 50 booklets/box; potential for false positives.

M-9 Paper Liquids only Nerve-G 100-µ drops <20 sec $5 per Disposable/hand-held Adhesive-backed dispenser Nerve-VX 100-µ drops 10-m roll 3-year shelf life roll or books. Mustard-H 100-µ drops Carcinogen

M-18A2 Detector Kit Liquid, vapor, Nerve-GB 0.1 mg/m3 2-3 min $360 Disposable tubes 25 tests per kit; aerosol Nerve-VX 0.1 mg/m3 Hand-held Detector tubes, detector Mustard-H, 0.5 mg/m3 tickets, and M-8. HN, HD, HT Lewisite-L, 10.0 mg/m3 ED, MD Phosgene- 12.0 mg/m3 CG Blood-AC 8.0 mg/m3

M-256A1 Detector Kit Vapor or Nerve-G and 0.005 mg/m3 15 min $140 Disposable Each kit contains liquid VX 12 Mustard-HD 0.02 mg/m3 Series is Hand-held disposable plastic sampler- Lewisite-L 2.0 mg/m3 longer 5-year shelf life detectors and M-8 paper. Phosgene 9.0 mg/m3 AC— oxime-CX Blood-AC, 3.0 mg/m3 25 min CK 8.0 mg/m3 376

M-272 Water Test Kit Nerve-G and 0.02 mg/1 7 min $189 Portable/lightweight Used to test raw or VX treated Mustard-HD 2.0 mg/1 7 min 5-year shelf life water; Type I and II detector Lewisite 2.0 mg/1 7 min USN, USMC tubes, eel enzyme detector Hydrogen 2.0 mg/1 6 min tickets; Kit cyanide conducts 25 tests for each agent. CAM - Chemical Agent Monitor Vapor only Nerve-GA, 0.03 mg/m3 30 sec $7,500 Hand-held/portable Radioactive GB, VX source. False Blister-HD 0.1 mg/m3 <1 min battery operated 6–8 alarms to perfume, and HN exhaust hours continuous use. paint, additives to diesel fuel. Maintenance required. ICAM - Improved Chemical Vapor only Nerve-G and 0.03 mg/m3 10 sec $7,500 4.5 pounds Alarm only; V Mustard-HD 0.1 mg/m3 10 sec Minimal training False positives common.

parallel. Alarm only.

M-8A1 Alarm - Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm Vapor only Nerve-GA, 0.2 mg/m3 <2 min $2,555 Vehicle battery Radioactive source GB, GD operated (license Nerve-VX 0.4 mg/m3 <2 min Maintenance required required); Mustard-HD 10 mg/m3 <2 min Automatic unattended operation; Remote placement. MM-1 - Mobile Mass Spectrometry Vapor 20–30 CWA ‹10 mg/m2 <45 sec $300,000 Heater volatizes German "Fuchs" (FOX of surface military surface contaminants. Recon System/Vehicle) area $100,000 civilian

RSCAAL M-21 Vapor Nerve-G 90 mg/m3 $110,000 Line-of-sight Passive infrared dependent energy Mustard-H 2,300 mg/m3 10 year shelf life detector 377

Lewisite-L 500 mg/m3 2-person portable 3 miles; tripod Visual/audible warning from 400 meters

SAW - Mini- CAD Vapor Nerve-GB 1.0 mg/m3 1 min $5,500 Minimal training Alarm only; Nerve-GD 0.12 mg/m3 1 min Field use False alarms from gasoline Mustard-HD 0.6 mg/m3 1 min 1 pound vapor, glass cleaner. No calibration

ACADA - (XM22) Vapor Nerve-G 0.1 mg/m3 30 sec $8,000 Vehicle mounted, Audible alarm; Mustard-HD 2 mg/m3 30 sec battery powered Bargraph display— Lewisite — — Radioactive source low, high, very high. (license required) Minimal training

Field Mini- CAMS Nerve-G, V ‹0.0001 ‹5 min $34,000 Designed for field Plug-in modules mg/m3 Mustard-H ‹0.003 ‹5 min industry monitoring increase mg/m3 versatility; Lewisite-L ‹0.003 ‹5 min (10 lb.) Threshold lower mg/m3 than AEL. 8 hours training 24 hour/7 day operations Viking Nerve-G, V ‹0.0001 ‹10 min $100,000 Field use, but Lab quality mg/m3 analysis; Spectratrak

Mustard-HD ‹0.003 ‹10 min 85 pounds Library of 62,000 mg/m3

GC/MS Many others Needs 120v AC, helium chemical signatures. 40 hours training

HP 6890 GC with flame photometric detector Nerve-G, V ‹0.0001 ‹10 min $50,000 Not designed for State-of-the-art mg/m3 gas Mustard-HD ‹0.0006 ‹10 min field use chromatograph; mg/m3 Many others Gas, air, 220v AC Used by CWC treaty lab. 40 hours training 378

Additional references of combined CW/BW documents

 1951 – DoD directive addressing chemical and biological warfare readiness. Ten references to chemical and biological weapons as a single entity when discussing topics such as logistics, employment, munitions, testing etc. This same document only once referred to chemical agents and biological agents weapons as separate weapons. (Lovett 1951)  1952 – Memo to the Secretary of Defense referencing chemical and biological warfare readiness. The memo directs services to “achieve both CW and BW readiness with at least one good weapon system in the hands of the operating forces.” (C. E. Hutchin 1952)  1955 – The Air Force identifies the need for facilities to test “BW-CW munitions” (Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1955a)  1958 – The Chief Chemical Officer discusses biological agents as “CBR capability” (US Army Chemcial Corps Historical Office 1959)  1953 – Air Force Memo from the “BW-CW” division referencing a plan to evaluate previous Army “BW-CW” work (Seller 1953)  1960 – U.S. Army report to Congress on CBR – (AD 3-2/ House report 815) (Department of the Army 1960) o The same report defines chemical, biological and radiological agents as CBR warfare together under the category of “toxic” warfare. o This report also presents a combined weapon frame to Congress, never once differentiating between the different weapons. Significantly this report shows combination of weapons at a strategic level “If CBR is to be considered a deterrent force in the US arsenal of weapons, the program of research and advocacy here will have to be accompanied by an adequate program of manufacture and deployment of CBR munitions.”  1962 Joint Chiefs of Staff combines chemical and biological as one subject when addressing offense plans, defensive capabilities, testing and service requirements. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1962)

379

Examples of 1950’s Chemical detection parameters

 A disposable G agent detector with the following requirements o instantaneous” detection via color change o Extremely light weight, small detection device o Simple instructions o (Office of the Adjutant General 1954)  Requirements for a standoff G-Agent detector o Automated, instantaneous detection of G agents o Scan path ½ - 5 miles o Small, transportable, low power, easy to operate o (Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1954)  Air Force 1954 requirements list for a chemical detector o Objective “to prove a means of rapid detection of hazardous concentration of toxic airborne chemical warfare agents o An ability to determine the identity of the agent at the time of detection is desirable o Be sufficiently rapid in detection ability to enable enactment of warning and protective measures prior to any marked increase in airborne CW hazard” o (Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1954)

Examples of 1950’s biological detection parameters

 A 1954 Air Force detector requests specifically states the need To provide sufficient warning of the appearance of toxic (CW and BW) agents to permit activation of protective measures before widespread exposure of personnel occurs” When listed the specific requirements for biological weapons detection are almost identical to requirements for chemical detector listed above (rapid identification, alert prior to exposure etc.) o “Rapid detection of hazardous concentrations of airborne anti- personnel biological warfare agents” o “Be sufficiently rapid in detection ability to enable enactment of warning and protective measures prior to any marked increase in the BW hazard” o The desire to identify the agent at the time of detection o (Chemical Corps Technical Committee 1954)

380

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Curriculum Vitae

Doug Lewis was born Norristown Pennsylvania in 1968. He has a Bachelors of Science Degree in Biology from the United States Air Force Academy as well as a Master of Science Degree in Genetics from The Pennsylvania State University. As of 2012 he has 21 years of commissioned service in the military. He spent 16 years in the Air Force and in 2005 transferred into the U.S. Army, where he still serves.

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