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TIBET at a TURNING POINT | 47 CRF-2008-04-045-058.Qxd:HRIC-Report 1/14/09 2:52 PM Page 48 CRF-2008-04-045-058.qxd:HRIC-Report 1/14/09 2:52 PM Page 46 TIBET AT THE HUMAN RIGHTS A TURNING POINT Committee Against Torture SITUATION IN TIBET AND (CAT) at its 41 st session, during TIBET’S CHINA POLICY which the Committee reviewed Edited remarks from a presentation the PRC’s Fourth Periodic Re - Since March 10, 2008, the Interna- delivered at Promoting Human Rights port .3 tional Campaign for Tibet (ICT) in China: Post-Olympics Legacies and has documented over 125 protests. Opportunities, a conference co-orga - In Tibet, ICT has confirmed that The map on page 47 shows the nized by Human Rights in China (HRIC), new measures have been imple - location of Tibetan protests .1 International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), mented to purge monasteries of and the International Federation for monks and nuns and ban wor - With the exception of the March Human Rights (FIDH), on October 27, ship in the wake of the protests. 14 protests in Lhasa, the protests 2008, in Brussels. These include measures created were non-violent. Tibetans in specifically to cause public hu - Tibet have risked their lives and By Vincent Metten miliation or extreme mental an - safety throughout the past guish among the monastic months to express their fundamental discontent with community, revealing a systematic new attack on Ti - policies imposed by Beijing—with the clear message betan Buddhism led by Chinese Party Secretary and that their exiled leader, the Dalai Lama, and not the President Hu Jintao. In an edict reminiscent of the Cul - Chinese state, represents their interests. tural Revolution, an order from the People’s Govern - ment of Garze (also “Kardze”; in Chinese, Ganzi However, the Tibetan people’s non -violent expression [甘孜 ]) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture states that the of their situation was met by a violent crackdown by rooms of monks and nuns who refuse to be registered the Chinese authorities. ICT has learned from reliable or who do not conform to the demands of political ed - sources from the field that around 100 Tibetans were ucation will be demolished, and the monks and nuns killed in Lhasa, the capital city, and nearby areas during expelled. The above-mentioned measures as well as the crackdown from March 14 onwards. In other Ti - other information received from the ground totally betan areas, around 40 people were shot dead or have contradict the content of the newly released Chinese died as a result of the crackdown .2 The crackdown led White Paper on Protection and Development of Tibetan to a climate of intense fear and despair all over the Ti - Culture . betan Plateau. In addition, China has taken all possible measures to Sources in Tibet have also revealed that Chinese security impose an information blackout on the Tibetan forces took possession of the bodies of those who were plateau. In areas of Tibet where protests took place, au - killed, in order to destroy any eventual evidence of the thorities confiscated cell phones and computers, manner of death. ICT, while monitoring the aftermath turned off cellular transmission facilities, and inter - of protests, received several reports that large numbers fered with Internet access. of such bodies were disposed of in a new crematorium at Yabda (in Chinese, Yangda [ 羊达 ]) Township in the According to news reported on Tibet’s XZTV in Sep - Toelung (in Chinese, Duilong [ 堆龙 ]) Valley. tember 2008, the “Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) government will do anything to keep all border areas In order to verify the conditions of Tibetan people with under control , and border troops and the People ’s Armed the relevant authorities of the People’s Republic of China Police will be provided with special equipment , such as (hereafter the PRC) , ICT submitted a report to the UN tents and communications equipment , that works in ex - 46 | WHILE THE WORLD WATCHED CRF-2008-04-045-058.qxd:HRIC-Report 1/14/09 2:52 PM Page 47 CHINA RIGHTS FORUM | NO. 4, 2008 tremely cold environments.” This may indicate severe site confirmed that the region had received more than ongoing restrictions on Tibet’s border areas, which con - 160 tour groups. According to one Chinese source close tinue to remain sealed off from the outside world. Sim - to ICT who was in Lhasa recently , there are reports that ilarly, TAR Vice Party Secretary Hao Peng told security many Chinese tourists were distressed due to the repres - forces during his visit to the border region in September sive atmosphere and heavy military presence , and said that the objective was to “hold their ground at all border that they would never go back to Tibet .6 Today in Lhasa, passes.” He added, “The political stability in the TAR is streets are saturated with army personnel . A Taiwanese facing a new stage. We must continue to obey the American who was able to travel to Garze during the Party’s orders . and determinedly fight in order to de - Olympics said that the region was like a “war zone .” feat the Dalai clique’s political scheme. ”4 As for the foreigners, only a limited number of foreign It is unsurprising , therefore, that since March 2008 , only tourists, journalists, or official delegations are allowed— a very limited number of Tibetans could cross the Hi - under certain conditions and strict control—access to malaya and transit via the Reception Center in Kath - Lhasa and the rest of Tibet . But given the high restrictions mandu. In “normal times, ” according to ICT’s 2006 in Tibet, foreigners would be in a difficult position to see Refugee Report , between 200 and 300 Tibetans each the reality that Tibetans are experiencing every day . For month make the dangerous journey through the Hi - example, Norwegian Foreign Secretary Raymond Jo - malayas, in particular during the winter, when it is hansen was able to visit Tibet around the end of October more difficult for Chinese patrols to monitor high alti - 2008, but only when he agreed to travel without a Norwe- tude passes .5 gian press corps. He was not given a reason as to why re - porters were not allowed to accompany him into Tibet. However, the severe restrictions do not apply to domes - tic tour groups, which have been allowed into Tibet Tibetans are still unable to travel freely within Tibet since late April , followed by visitors from Hong Kong, and many are not ready to risk their lives to cross the Macau, and Taiwan. As of June 20, the CCTV.com web - Himalayas. Squares on the map indicate counties or cities (eg., Lhasa, Xining, Lanzhou, Hezuo) where protests have taken place. Within a county there may have been numerous protests in different villages or monasteries. Sites compiled from various sources where protests are reported to have taken place since March 10, 2008. Map credit: Tashi D. Lek and www.savetibet.org. TIBET AT A TURNING POINT | 47 CRF-2008-04-045-058.qxd:HRIC-Report 1/14/09 2:52 PM Page 48 In such an environment, have the protests on the Ti - ficial state media has acknowledged such a high figure. betan Plateau had any impact on China’s Tibet Policy? The policy to resettle nomads in towns and villages is a Chinese authorities have made a rare admission that serious threat to the way of life that is an integral part large-scale migration from China, particularly linked to of Tibetan identity , as well as the livelihoods of Tibetan the opening of the Qinghai-Tibet railway in 2006, may nomads. have been a factor in triggering the unrest in Lhasa in March .7 The official Xinhua News Agency has also announced the Chinese government’s intention to increase extrac - But so far, China’s overall Tibet policy has not been re - tion of natural resources, and that it will spend 3.1 bil - viewed or changed despite the fundamental discontent lion yuan (US $453 million) by 2013 on a series of of the Tibetan population with the policies imposed by industrial schemes, including ten mining projects and Beijing. five industrial zones . The Chinese government has also expressed its intention to build more than 750 hydro - In Tibet, there is increasing evidence of ethnic tension electric power stations across Tibet to boost the re - between Tibetan and Chinese people, partly because of gion’s electricity supply. Accordingly, Beijing is misinformation and propaganda by the Chinese au - determined to dam many of Tibet’s rivers and lakes de - thorities. An official notice seen in two different regions spite concerns about the local environment and about stated that every hotel and public bathhouse is required the effect the projects will have on neighbouring coun - to check on the “circumstances ” of all Tibetan and tries. In the past, Tibetans have opposed many of the Uyghur visitors, and that their presence should be re - projects, in particular, the project to dam the holy Yam - ported to local police. This official acknowledgement drok Yumtso (in Chinese, Yangzhuo Yongcuo that Tibetans and Uyghurs are under suspicion simply [羊卓雍錯 ]) , or Scorpion Lake, south of Lhasa. because of their ethnicity is supported by numerous an - ecdotal and eyewitness reports of new discrimination More information about the resettlements of nomads against Tibetans and a breakdown in communications and the exploitation of natural resources can be found between Chinese and Tibetan colleagues in different in ICT’s report Tracking the Steel Dragon .11 workplaces, including at government meetings .8 A two-month ultimatum ran out in mid-September for THE FUTURE OF THE TIBET QUESTION Tibetan Party and government workers who sent their children to study in schools run by the government in Special Meeting on November 17 –22, 2008 exile in India.
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