A City Club Report on Reducing Excessive Partisanship in the Oregon Political System

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1-16-2009 Bridging the Partisan Divide: A City Club Report on Reducing Excessive Partisanship in the Oregon Political System

City Club of Portland (Portland, Or.)

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City Club of Portland Bulletin, Vol. 91, No. 25, January 16, 2009

City Club members will vote on this report on Friday, January 16, 2009. Until the membership votes, City Club of Portland does not have an official position on this report. The outcome of the vote will be reported in the City Club Bulletin dated January 30 and online at www.pdxcityclub.org. The mission of City Club is to inform its members and the community in public matters and to arouse in them a realization of the obligations of citizenship.

Additional copies of this report are available online at www.pdxcityclub.org or by contacting the City Club office:

City Club of Portland 901 S.W. Washington St. Portland, OR 97205 503-228-7231 • 503-228-8840 fax [email protected] • www.pdxcityclub.org Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... i

INTRODUCTION ...... 1 The Meaning of Partisanship and Excessive Partisanship ...... 2 Is Excessive Partisanship on the Rise and Is It a Problem in Oregon? . . . . .5 Areas for Reform ...... 9

STATE PARTIES, LEGISLATIVE CAUCUSES AND INTEREST GROUPS . . . 10 State Parties ...... 11 Legislative Caucuses ...... 13 Interest Groups ...... 15

LEGISLATIVE RULES, LEADERSHIP AND NONPARTISAN STAFF . . . . . 19 Background ...... 20 Control of Committee Assignments ...... 23 Control of Legislation ...... 26 Nonpartisan Staff ...... 27

LEGISLATOR RELATIONSHIPS AND CIVILITY ...... 30 The Importance of Relationships and Civility in Legislative Deliberation . . .30 The Experiment with Term Limits ...... 31 Oregon’s Citizen Legislature ...... 32 The Deterioration of Relationships among Legislators ...... 32 An Analysis of Potential Solutions ...... 34 Longer Terms for Legislators ...... 34 Annual Legislative Sessions of Limited Length ...... 34 Change in Timing of Session ...... 35 Improved Training and Relationship-Building for Legislators ...... 35 Increased Salaries for Legislators ...... 36

EXCESSIVE PARTISANSHIP IN CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS ...... 38 The Electoral Process ...... 39 The Initiative and Referendum ...... 40 Redistricting ...... 41 The Present System ...... 41 Proposed Redistricting Reforms ...... 44 Campaigns and Campaign Finance ...... 46 How Rising Campaign Costs Have Fueled Excessive Partisanship . . . . .46 Analyzing Campaign Finance-Reform Options ...... 47 Bridging the Partisan Divide

Public Ownership and Financing of Elections ...... 47 Limits on Campaign Contributions and Spending ...... 48 Greater Campaign Finance Transparency ...... 48 Election Reforms ...... 49 Nonpartisan Elections / Nonpartisan Legislature ...... 50 Top-Two Primary ...... 51 Instant Run-Off / Ranked-Choice Voting ...... 52 Multi-Member Districts / Proportional Representation ...... 53 Fusion Voting ...... 53

HOW THE PUBLIC AND THE MEDIA FUEL EXCESSIVE PARTISANSHIP . . .55

CONCLUSIONS ...... 60

RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 62

CITATIONS ...... 64

APPENDIces A: COMMITTEE CHARGE, MEMBERSHIP AND PROCESS ...... 67 B: WITNESSES ...... 69 C: BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 71 D: SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC COMMISSION ON THE OREGON LEGISLATURE, 2006 ...... 76 E: OREGON GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATIVE LEADERS, 1953-2009 . . .80

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Party ideology, party affiliation and organized activity by political parties are insti- tutionalized elements of the political system in Oregon and throughout the nation. While most Oregonians would likely agree that our system dominated by two parties historically has served our state well, many Oregonians have voiced concerns about the nature and extent of partisan behavior and its effect on the functioning of state government.

City Club’s Research Board and Board of Governors charged your committee with determining if and when partisan behavior is an impediment to effective governance and, if so, what should be done about it. The primary objectives of the study were to (1) define partisanship and investigate its impact on Oregon’s political system and state government’s ability to effectively govern and resolve key issues and (2) recommend possible solutions for any negative impacts of partisanship, as well as ways to support elements of the political system that should be continued.

Although this report examines the problem of excessive partisanship in numerous spheres — within the electorate, within party organizations and within government — its main focus is within government, and more specifically within the Legislature.

Your committee readily accepted the inherent difficulties of trying to define a subjective concept such as “partisanship” and its corollary behaviors. Nevertheless, after interviewing numerous witnesses and conducting considerable research, your committee settled upon the following definitions of “partisanship” and “excessive partisanship”: “Partisanship” is the party allegiance that results from shared values, identities, and goals. When partisanship functions well, it serves to help develop competing visions of what is best for Oregon, produce meaningful deliberation, and focus the activities of voters and legislators from different parties. “Excessive partisanship,” by contrast, is the elevation of party allegiance to such a degree that it interferes with the ability of the Legislature to function well. Partisanship becomes excessive when

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state legislators base their decisions on building and maintaining party power rather than on promoting the interests of the public at large.

Your committee found that experts disagree as to whether the nature of partisanship in Oregon has changed significantly in recent years. In fact, partisan behavior has waxed and waned over the years, for many reasons, and your committee suspects this pattern will continue. Nonetheless, your committee also concluded that it is reasonable for citizens to try to moderate behaviors and practices that inhibit effective lawmaking before and when they occur.

Frequent reports of incessant bickering, mean-spirited attacks on fellow legislators and distortion of information came to mind far more quickly for too many people than did collegiality among lawmakers, reasonable compromise and fair and accurate use of information. Although members of Oregon’s legislative and executive branches are often capable and have demonstrated the ability to work together in a bipartisan manner, excessive partisanship occurs all too frequently and is especially disabling when the state confronts controversial issues that attract the public’s attention. In these cases, excessive partisanship represents a substantial obstacle to addressing some of the state’s most pressing problems, leads to voter disaffection with the political process and discourages qualified individuals from seeking public office.

As previously mentioned, much of this report identifies and discusses the factors that contribute to excessive partisanship in the Oregon Legislature. Some of these factors are readily apparent. Limited and poor media coverage of the political system and a public that is poorly informed about legislative processes and policy issues both contribute to excessive partisanship. Strong interest groups aligned with either the Democrats or the Republicans also reinforce excessive partisanship by pressuring legislators to commit to uncompromising agendas.

Other factors contributing to excessive partisanship, however, are less readily apparent. Surprisingly, your committee found that the greatest concentrations of partisan- based power are not where it expected to find them. Oregon’s Republican and Demo- cratic state parties are grass roots organizations that serve the valuable function of involving citizens in the political process, but they have little direct involvement in the state Legislature. Rather, legislative party caucuses, caucus leaders and presiding officers wield the greatest amount of partisan power and influence in Oregon. Legisla- tive caucus leaders and the presiding officers possess more power than the state parties when it comes to pressuring legislators to support the partisan agendas.

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Because of the structure of Oregon’s Legislature, which is characterized by a strong- leader system, leaders have tremendous discretion for establishing the degree of partisanship. As most of Oregon’s legislative rules are subject to revision by simple-majority vote, they can be — and have been — easily manipulated to satisfy the immediate demands of the majority party in a particular house. Oregon’s legislative rules currently give undue authority to its presiding officers, who can easily use these rules to control both committee assignments and the movement of legislation in a way that demands loyalty from majority party members and that excludes members of the minority party from a meaningful role in the legislative process. While committees remain important in the Legislature, their power has somewhat diminished because of the increasing power of the caucuses. Ostensibly nonpartisan administrative staff officers are also subject to the imperatives of the party in control of a particular house.

This report considers various electoral reforms that have been proposed, including nonpartisan elections, the top-two primary, instant run-off voting, multi-member districts and fusion voting; campaign finance reforms such as public ownership and financing of elections, campaign spending limits and contribution limits; and redistricting reform. For most of these proposed reforms, your committee concluded that there was not sufficient information to recommend for or against any proposed reform. Your committee concluded, however, that alternative elections systems are worth exploring and that the process of redistricting can be influenced by partisan considerations, giving the party in power at the time of redistricting a tool to increase its power in a way that does not accurately represent the wishes of the voters.

Your committee also concluded that a deterioration of legislators’ relationships with one another and an increased lack of civility have occurred in recent years. These in turn have adversely impacted the deliberative process of the Legislature.

Your committee believes that the following recommendations will mitigate the problem of excessive partisanship and make Oregon’s political system function more effectively:

Administration of the Legislature

2. The Legislature should continue to build upon its efforts to conduct legislative business in communities throughout the state and to publish information and proceedings online. ii iii City Club of Portland Bridging the Partisan Divide

Legislative Rules and Procedure

4. The House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that require the vice- chair of each committee to be a member of the minority party, and committee chairs should consult with vice-chairs in developing committee agendas.

5. While the House’s Teamwork Bill is a step in the right direction, the House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that allow each member of the Legislature to require a committee hearing on a predetermined number of bills during each legislative session.

6. The House should maintain and the Senate should adopt rules permitting a majority of each of their members to require a committee or floor hearing on a bill and, in addition, permitting a substantial minority of each of their members to require a committee or floor hearing on a bill that has already been passed by the other chamber.

7. The House should maintain and the Senate should adopt rules ensuring that the Secretary of the Senate and the Chief Clerk of the House are nonpartisan and serve members of both parties, not at the sole discretion of the presiding officers. In addition, the House and Senate should employ permanent staff with knowledge of substantive policy areas to support the work of committees.

8. Once the above rules are adopted, the House and Senate should require a supermajority to change these and other rules that protect each member’s right to participate in the legislative process.

Constitutional Amendments

9. The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment establishing a nonpartisan redistricting commission.

10. The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would establish annual legislative sessions of limited length, commencing in March, shortly after the state Office of Economic Analysis releases its first revenue projections for the year.

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11. The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would establish four-year terms for members of the House of Representatives and six-year terms for members of the Senate.

Further Study and Advocacy

12. City Club of Portland should establish a research committee to study alternative election systems.

13. City Club of Portland should establish a research committee to prepare a detailed recommendation for a nonpartisan redistricting commission.

14. City Club should support efforts to increase substantive and objective policy news reporting in the media.

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INTRODUCTION

During election seasons, personal seen a sharp increase in partisanship attacks between candidates seem to and disregard of other views as a major overshadow substantive communication source of decline in Oregon’s legislative with the electorate. While the Legisla- process and performance, leading the ture is in session, legislative division Legislature to make faulty decisions or and stalemate appear to make better preventing any decision at all.” headlines than stories of compromise and achievement. It is certainly true In March 2007 your committee asked that there has been a lot of discussion the opinion research firm Davis, of the negative effects of partisanship in Hibbitts & Midghall, Inc., to poll five the past few years. In late 2005 Gover- hundred Oregon citizens in order to nor Ted Kulongoski and the Legislature determine their response to the follow- established the Public Commission on ing question: “Does the role of political the Legislature (PCOL) to examine the parties have a positive or negative effect effectiveness of the Legislature. One on state government?” Of those who of the issues that immediately came to responded, 31 percent believed that the attention of the PCOL was political political parties have a positive effect, partisanship. Several prominent Oregon while 51 percent believed that political politicians led the charge to examine parties have a negative effect. Those partisanship and how it has affected the who thought political parties had a posi- Legislature. tive effect expressed two top reasons for their view: parties “give people a choice” On September 13, 2005, former Attor- and parties “identify issues and have ney General David Frohnmayer, a mem- different stands on them.” Those who ber of the PCOL, set out “seven aspects thought political parties had a negative of a ‘problem statement’ that an agenda effect listed two top reasons for their of legislative reform might address.” position: parties pursue their own in- Among those seven aspects was “politi- terests rather than the state’s interests, cal partisanship.” “Observers as well as and parties make it hard to reach agree- participants,” noted Frohnmayer, “have ment so nothing gets solved. Younger vi 1 City Club of Portland Bridging the Partisan Divide

Percentage of Oregonians Who Believe Political Parties Have a Positive or Negative Effect on State Government

10% “Strong Positive” 18% “Don’t Know/No Answer”

21% “Mild Positive”

28% “Strong Negative”

23% “Mild Negative”

Source: “City Club of Portland Partisanship Study Poll,” Davis, Hibbitts, & Midghall Inc., March 2007

voters tended to view political parties “blind, prejudiced and unreasoning al- more negatively than older voters. legiance,” while the term “partisanship” has been described as “an attitude that During the course of this study, your always favors one way of feeling or act- committee confronted the challenge of defining partisanship, considering the ing especially without considering any 1 positive and negative consequences of other possibilities.” Your committee in- partisanship and identifying ways to terviewed three local political scientists, alleviate the negative effects of excessive Professors Richard Clucas of Portland partisanship on the state. (See Appendix State University, Robert Eisinger of A for the committee’s charge.) Lewis & Clark College, and Paul Gronke of Reed College, who generally rejected The Meaning of Partisanship these pejorative associations, instead and Excessive Partisanship defining the terms neutrally:

Some definitions of the words “partisan” Partisans are individuals who share and “partisanship” have negative conno- certain values, identify with a particular tations. For example, the word “parti- political party, and possess a commit- san” can mean someone who exhibits ment to party goals.

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Partisanship is the party allegiance remains reasonably constrained, conflict that results from those shared values, between the parties can be informative identities, and goals. and productive.

Your committee chose to adopt the Despite the value of partisanship, neutral definitions favored by these partisan behavior can become excessive, academics because such definitions fa- thereby undermining effective lawmak- cilitate analysis of both the valuable and ing. While running as an Independent destructive effects of political allegiance. for governor in 2006, then-Senator Ben Westlund commented that partisanship Your committee also concluded early in was not inherently bad, but “like air and its research that partisanship and the water, too much can kill.” Similarly, the two-party system PCOL recognized serve valuable func- that “partisan cam- tions by developing “For the purposes paigns, elections competing visions of this study, your and organizations of what is best for committee defined play a critical and Oregon. Academic ‘excessive partisanship’ constructive role witnesses generally as the elevation of party in the formation stated that partisan- allegiance to such a level of public policy,” ship had worked that it interferes with the but the commis- fairly well as a way ability of the Legislature sion nevertheless to focus and orga- to function well.” concluded that “an nize the activities of effective Legisla- the Legislature here ture encourages and elsewhere. Tim Hibbitts, an inde- partisanship to be set aside for the best 2 pendent political analyst who appeared interests of the state.” before your committee several months For the purposes of this study, your before his firm did the survey discussed committee definedexcessive partisan- above, was of the opinion that having ship as the elevation of party allegiance two strong parties reduces political frag- to such a level that it interferes with mentation when compared to multi-par- the ability of the Legislature to func- ty democracies in other countries. Even tion well. Your committee identified without official political parties, conflicts five characteristics of a well-functioning between competing visions would natu- electoral and legislative system: rally occur in our electoral and legislative processes. Party labels serve as useful 1. Ease of recruitment of well-qual- guides to persons of similar back- ified candidates for legislative grounds, values and interests who wish office. to work together to accomplish common goals. When electoral and legislative 2. High electoral participation and processes work well and partisanship the election of legislators who

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serve all voters, not just those their own individual judgment of what affiliated with major parties or is best for the state. They also neglect strong special interests. good legislation that might otherwise 3. Good relationships and civility have broad public support. Further- more, excessive partisanship degrades among legislators. the abilities of legislators to deliberate 4. Deliberation and resolution of and collaborate — abilities that are policy issues with input from the essential to our legislative process. In majority and minority. an excessively partisan Legislature, the 5. Public respect for and confidence majority uses its control to consolidate in the Legislature. power and advance its agenda, while the minority uses its limited rights to This report focuses on excessive parti- stall and disrupt the majority’s agenda. sanship as it specifically affects the -Or Either the majority successfully silences egon Legislature. None of the witnesses the minority and advances its agenda your committee interviewed raised without real debate, or the minority suc- concerns about partisanship affecting cessfully resists the majority’s agenda, any part of the government other than resulting in legislative gridlock. In the the Legislature, with the sole exception meantime, both the majority and the of the office of the secretary minority posture for the next election. of state with respect to reditrict- Finally, excessive partisanship corrodes ing, as discussed later in this report. public trust in political institutions and Many county and city elected offices are discourages otherwise promising candi- nonpartisan, with candidates’ political dates from running for legislative office. affiliations not listed on the ballot. The same is true of judicial elections. The Distinguishing between partisanship governor and other statewide executive and excessive partisanship can some- officials are elected on a partisan basis, times be difficult. As he left Wash- but they have a great deal of indepen- ington, D.C., Tom DeLay, the former dence once in office. The Legislature is U.S. House Majority Leader, defended particularly affected by partisanship intensely partisan politics, noting that because members of both parties are “partisanship properly understood, is elected to the Legislature, and, once not a symptom of democracy’s weak- there, they must compete for control at ness, but of its health and strength....” some times and work together at other While DeLay recognized that “politics times. demands compromise,” he stated that compromise and bipartisanship are Excessive partisanship in the Legislature means and not ends and that “[i]t is not produces unwelcome outcomes. Exces- the principled partisan, however ob- sively partisan legislators support their noxious he may seem to his opponents, party’s agenda even when it contradicts who degrades the public debate, but the

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preening, self-styled statesman who el- increase in that metric may not be a sign evates compromise to a first principle.”3 of unhealthy partisanship. It could instead indicate changes in the issues that The PCOL viewed matters differently matter to voters, or it could result from when it called attention to “[e]xcessive demographic shifts. Researchers have partisanship at the expense of collabora- not tabulated how frequently votes in tion and creative problem solving.” In its the Legislature have divided along party final report, the PCOL stated that the lines in Oregon. Even if that data were “public perception is that non-construc- available, the data would be difficult to tive partisanship erodes public faith in interpret. An increase in divided votes the Legislature and its ability to find would not necessarily indicate greater reasonable compromise.” partisanship, as presiding officers As noted at the beginning of this control whether controversial bills even chapter, partisanship is an essential and receive a hearing. Your committee was positive feature of the legislative pro- unable to identify any empirical basis cess. Partisanship helps political actors for determining whether excessive par- develop and more precisely articulate tisanship — as your committee defines their values and goals. It helps forge it — has risen in Oregon a sense of common identity among Your committee heard many witnesses otherwise isolated voters. Furthermore, express their opinions about excessive partisanship serves to focus political partisanship. The perception of most activities of people with common values was that excessive partisanship has and identities towards realization of those shared goals. When partisanship been rising and has sometimes bitterly functions effectively in the Legisla- divided the Legislature to the point of ture, it results in a productive tension dysfunction, but a strong and persuasive between legislators from different minority disagreed. parties. That tension manifests itself in Leading the opinion that partisanship meaningful deliberation, a willingness is not on the rise were the academic to set aside dogmatism and personal witnesses, joined by several former or acrimony, and an openness to pragmatic current political insiders. They felt that consensus-building and lawmaking. the Legislature functions reasonably well and that partisanship as the public Is Excessive Partisanship on knows it today is no more “excessive” the Rise and Is It a Problem in than it has been in the past. Professors Oregon? Clucas, Eisinger and Gronke acknowledged that political tactics and rhetoric Partisanship is difficult to measure. -Po have changed in recent years, but they litical scientists have tracked how often generally agreed that partisanship voters registered with a political party has been an historic part of American vote for that party’s candidates, but an politics. They observed peaks and valleys

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of partisan behavior in this nation’s and background check on their partisan cre- this state’s history, and they challenged dentials. Then-Senate Majority Leader the notion that partisan behavior has Kate Brown concurred that party labels been especially problematic in recent matter more now than they did in the years. Former Governor Barbara Rob- past. erts also cautioned against undue nos- talgia for the “good old days.” She cited Charles Beggs, a retired journalist who the example of her late husband Frank covered the state capitol with the As- Robert’s service in the Oregon House sociated Press for forty years, main- in the late 1960s while in the minority tained that partisanship has been much party. After challenging the Speaker more intense during the last three or on an issue, he was penalized by not four legislative sessions, with the more getting appointed to a single interim extreme members of each party exerting committee. greater control and overshadowing the centrists. Lobbyists Pat McCormick and Dave Barrows also believed that partisanship has become a greater problem in recent sessions, adding that moderates who cooperate with the opposing party risk falling out of favor with their own leadership. McCormick, a lobbyist with Conkling, Fiskum & McCormick, Inc., noted that moderates from both major parties reached across the aisle more in the Witnesses in the opposing camp felt past, but now they would be ostracized that politics in Oregon has become more by the other members of their party for ideologically and rigidly divided in re- doing so. Barrows, a lobbyist with Dave cent years, and they provided some tell- Barrows & Associates, and regarded by ing examples. Jeff Merkley, a Democrat some as the “dean of the lobbying corps and the House minority leader in the in Oregon,” also recalled a time when 2005 session and Speaker of the House legislative leaders from both parties in the 2007 session, noted that when he worked together on major legislation, worked as an intern in Republican Sena- including Oregon’s famed 1967 beach tor Mark Hatfield’s office, he was never bill, which he thought could not happen asked his party affiliation. He doubted in today’s political climate. Some of the anyone would be hired today without a committee’s witnesses maintained that

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candidates like Mark Hatfield, Wayne crats can be expected to present starkly Morse and Al Ullman could not be different visions for Oregon and to elected in the current climate. compete vigorously for control of state government. Not all of the witnesses who believe that partisanship has increased in Oregon has experienced major socio- Oregon think that the increase is a sign economic changes since the early 1970s of dysfunction. Instead, they point to that have reinforced these ideological changes in society and argue that a more differences. Oregon was once more polarized public will naturally result in a homogenous, economically and socially, more polarized legislature. Tim Hibbitts and until the late 1950s Republicans asserted that politics is more partisan were the majority in the Legislature. than it was thirty years ago. Hibbitts (See Appendix E.) Through the 1970s offered the opinion that the Democratic and 80s, Republicans and Democrats Party had become more liberal and the were both elected from all parts of the Republican Party more conservative, not state. With the decline of the timber as a result of the organized efforts of po- industry in rural areas and the rise of litical parties, but because the public has high-technology businesses in the Port- been drawn more and more to uncom- land metropolitan area, Oregon today promising ideologies. Governor Victor is culturally and economically more Atiyeh added that “the main cause of divided, with dramatic differences from the problem [of excessive partisan- region to region.5 These local develop- ship] is not the elected people, but the ments, some of which reflect national people who elect them.” In short, a more trends, have exacerbated ideological dif- partisan legislature is a natural result of ferences between urban and rural areas. a more partisan electorate. Political analyst Bob Moore pointed to this growing political segregation along Professor Clucas has described the two geographical lines as one of the most major ideologies of the role of govern- dangerous trends in the nation — no ment in Oregon as progressivism and different than religious or racial segrega- conservative populism. In recent years tion — and not healthy for the country. progressives have tended to cluster in urban areas and vote for Democrats. Several witnesses also pointed to na- Conservative populists, by contrast, are tional influences on the partisan climate generally located in rural areas and vote in Oregon. In her 2006 book, Fight Club for Republicans. “[M]uch of Oregon’s Politics: How Partisanship is Poisoning the political conflict,” writes Clucas, “reflects House of Representatives, Juliet Eilperin the collision of the progressives’ strong provides evidence of institutional- support for an active government and ized incivility at the federal level on the conservative populists’ general both sides of the aisle, including public desire to limit government.”4 In this insults directed at both the opposing environment, Republicans and Demo- side and non-conforming members of

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the same party. Barrows and Merkley lawmaking.Your committee’s witnesses both attribute some of the excessive unanimously expressed the view that partisanship witnessed in recent legisla- genuine deliberation and compromise is tive sessions in Oregon to the strident an essential ingredient in the governing ideological views and aggressive political process. Your committee could not agree tactics of former Congressmen Newt more. There are certainly times when Gingrich and Tom DeLay. Tony Van fidelity to one’s principles is honorable Vliet, a Republican state representa- and socially valuable. However, given tive from Corvallis from 1974 to 1994 that Oregon’s legislators represent di- concurred, as did former Republican verse economic and geographic regions, U.S. Senator Robert Packwood. Van Vliet thoughtful and respectful deliberation traced the change to the late 1980s and is necessary to address the unique needs early 1990s, when GOPAC, a national of each district while compromising to political action committee led by then- deliver what is best for the state as a Congressman Gingrich, embarked on whole. a nationwide campaign to build a Re- publican political infrastructure capable Your committee believes that when of winning and maintaining control the Legislature is perceived as an of state and local governments across acrimonious and dysfunctional body, the United States. Through campaign well-qualified potential candidates are seminars, workbooks, audiotapes and discouraged from running and serv- grassroots organizing, GOPAC became ing, which in turn further erodes the the Republican Party’s education and public’s respect for government. If the training center. In particular, train- public perceives that its elected officials ing tapes produced and distributed by are motivated by partisanship at the GOPAC galvanized Republican candi- expense of the public’s best interests, dates and activists. GOPAC material the resultant loss of confidence in state made clear that no member should co- government may encourage apathy or operate with a Democrat. In Van Vliet’s circumvention of the legal process. words, “If you talked to a Democrat, you were a traitor.” Your committee also agreed with the conclusion of the PCOL that excessive While degrees of partisanship elude partisanship comes at “the expense of precise measurement, the dominant collaboration and creative problem solv- perception among the witnesses in- ing,” “erodes public faith in the Legis- terviewed by your committee was that excessive partisanship has increased lature and its ability to find reasonable in Oregon over the past several de- compromise,” and “discourages many cades. Your committee concluded that qualified candidates from running for 6 excessive partisanship is a problem legislative office.” Excessive partisan- in Oregon that has inhibited effective ship is a problem that warrants attention from all Oregonians.

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Areas for Reform Chapter Conclusions

Based on the testimony of witnesses, ➤➤ Partisanship serves to help develop your committee identified two major and clarify competing visions of areas for reform: (1) legislative admin- what is best for Oregon, and it istration, rules and procedure, and helps focus the activities of voters (2) the design of our election system. and legislators from different par- In addition, because many witnesses ties. emphasized the importance of strong ➤ relationships among legislators as a ➤ Excessive partisanship is widely counterbalance to partisanship, your perceived as having increased over committee analyzes several ideas for the past several decades in Oregon. how to promote good working relation- ➤➤ Excessive partisanship is a problem ships in the Legislature. Finally, many in Oregon that should be addressed witnesses also mentioned the influence because it impairs legislators’ abil- of the public and the media on partisan ity to deliberate and collaborate behavior in the Legislature, so your on legislation, results in legislative committee discusses that issue in the gridlock, discourages qualified can- final chapter and considers whether any didates from running for office and reforms are possible. leads to voter disaffection. Before launching into a discussion of the first major area for reform — legislative administration, rules and procedure — it is first necessary to lay a foundation by describing the partisan power structure. The following chapter will explain the roles of state political parties, legislative caucuses and interest groups in developing partisan allegiance among legislators.

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STATE PARTIES, LEGISLATIVE CAUCUSES AND INTEREST GROUPS

Although Oregon’s Republican and The Speaker of the House of Represen- Democratic state parties work to ad- tatives and the Senate President are vance partisan interests, these parties the presiding officers of the House and are not the most powerful political Senate respectively. They are elected at organizations in the state. Rather, the the beginning of the legislative ses- legislative party caucuses, often highly sion by the members of their assembly. reliant upon special interest groups, The Speaker of the House and Senate wield the greatest amount of partisan President control the operations of the power and influence in Oregon. The Legislature by appointing members to picture that emerges is not so much of committees and selecting committee a unified hierarchical structure as of chairs, assigning bills to committees and a coalition of groups that attempt to setting agendas for legislative sessions. coordinate with each other in the name The presiding officers also typically play of the state party. In short, legislative an important role in fundraising for caucuses and interest groups frequently their party members. fuel excessive partisanship in Oregon more than do the parties themselves. The members of the two major parties in the House and the Senate are organized Before continuing, some definitions are into legislative caucuses: House and in order: Senate Democrats and House and Sen- ate Republicans. The majority and mi- State parties are membership organiza- nority caucuses in each house elect their tions that engage the public by register- caucus leaders: House Majority Leader, ing voters, organizing volunteer efforts Senate Majority Leader, House Minor- in support of the party’s candidates in ity Leader and Senate Minority Leader. general elections, and developing party Caucus leaders advance common goals platforms. of party members in the Legislature and strive to maintain or win majority con-

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trol by leading caucus meetings during ported by a small number of full-time legislative sessions, recruiting legislative staff members. These administrative candidates, and raising and distributing organizations are so small that much campaign funds. of the parties’ work is done through volunteer efforts. In comparison to their Partisan interest groups are groups counterparts in other states, Oregon’s that align with one party to promote major state parties are relatively small favored legislation and prevent passage administrative organizations with of disfavored legislation. They do so limited influence. According to Amy by funding like-minded candidates in Langdon, past executive director of the primary and general elections, mobi- Oregon Republican Party, other similar- lizing volunteers, appealing to voters sized states, such as Nevada, have party during campaigns, and calling on party offices with two-to-three times the staff. members to adhere to the group’s policy positions during legislative sessions. The two major state parties are relatively independent of the county parties and the national parties. Senator Peter State Parties Courtney, President of the Senate since 2003, noted that some of the county As nearly all legislators in recent legisla- parties are even more active than the tive sessions have belonged either to state parties. The county party is con- the Republican or Democratic parties, trolled by representatives elected from your committee has chosen to focus this precincts. The county parties choose del- section of its report on the role that the egates to serve as their representatives two major state parties play in promot- in the state party; the state parties, in ing partisanship in the Oregon Legisla- turn, choose delegates to serve as their ture. Your committee learned that the representatives in the national party. major state parties are basically small The national parties do not control administrative organizations with little the state parties, and the state parties power and influence. They help register do not control the county parties. The voters, develop party platforms, and national parties may, however, exercise organize volunteer efforts in support of influence over the state parties through the party’s candidates for national and distribution of funds. executive-branch state office, but they play little to no role in setting partisan Each of the major state parties is legislative agendas. Your committee has responsible for the development of concluded that their role in promoting the party platform, but legislators are excessive partisanship in the Legislature in no way bound by these platforms. is negligible. Party platforms are debated and decided upon by delegates. The state parties use Both major state parties are led by their platforms as a way of providing executive directors, who are in turn sup- information to the public about their

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positions on issues. But once adopted, Despite their significant, but limited, the platforms have little effect on candi- role in running candidates for state- dates or legislators. Candidates running wide executive office and national office, on a state party’s ticket are not required the state parties play negligible roles in to agree with the party platform. In fact, races for the Oregon Legislature. The according to former Democratic House limited role of Oregon’s state parties in Speaker Jeff Merkley, many legisla- legislative elections is further high- tors have never even read their state lighted by the fact that state parties in parties’ platforms. Therefore, although most other states wield considerable platform discussions often attract the authority when it comes to recruiting most devoted party members who may candidates and supporting campaigns put strong planks in the platform, those for state legislative office. When it party faithful are not likely to influence comes to races for the Legislature, the the legislators through the platform state parties in Oregon defer to partisan itself. legislative caucuses. Neel Pender, former executive director of the Democratic The state’s major parties — often with Party of Oregon, told your committee the financial assistance of the national that there existed a “healthy division of parties — recruit candidates for state- labor” between the state party and the wide executive-branch and national partisan legislative caucus as to recruit- offices and support these candidates in ment of candidates. Amy Langdon, who the general election by getting informa- was the executive director of the Repub- tion to voters, providing volunteers and lican Party of Oregon at the time of her mailings for candidates, and registering interview, noted that her party has been and mobilizing voters. But they do not in a period of restructuring so that the actually choose the parties’ candidates legislative caucuses have taken on more for the general election. Rather, each power, including recruitment. party’s candidates are determined in the primary election, and anyone regis- Your committee concluded that the tered as a party member may vote in Republican and Democratic state parties the primary. Each state party generally in Oregon are grassroots organizations supports its incumbents in the primary, that serve the valuable function of although county parties have been recruiting candidates for office and -in known to endorse candidates other than volving citizens in the political process, incumbents. If there is no incumbent but that these state parties have little and there is more than one candidate direct influence over the Legislature. for the party’s nomination, the state Your committee also concluded that party does not typically endorse one none of the minority parties had at- candidate; but party members, even leg- tained sufficient impact to be considered islators themselves, can and do support as contributing to or against excessive challengers in the primary. partisanship in the Legislature. Finally,

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none of the witnesses your committee As discussed below, the President of interviewed put any blame for excessive the Senate and the House Speaker have partisanship in the Legislature on the substantial power over legislative pro- state parties, and your committee did ceedings and over the appointment of not find it necessary to consider any legislators to committees. They appoint reforms directed at the state parties. committee chairs, who in turn have considerable influence on committee proceedings. The Speaker of the Oregon Legislative Caucuses House of Representatives in particular has been identified as the fifth most Legislative caucuses play a far greater powerful state house speaker in the role in promoting partisanship than the country.7 This high ranking is primarily state parties. Indeed, Senate President due to the Oregon Speaker’s generous Peter Courtney power to appoint noted that the state “Legislative caucuses play a party leaders and parties fall into the far greater role in promoting the chairs of stand- background when partisanship than the state ing committees, to legislative sessions parties.… [T]he state parties make committee begin, at which fall into the background assignments, to re- time the caucuses when legislative sessions structure the com- begin, at which time the become very active mittee system, to caucuses become very active and exert substan- provide campaign tial power over and exert substantial power over party members.” assistance and ad- party members. ditional staff, and The party cau- to control the legis- cuses consist of the lative calendar and members of a political party within the procedures, in addition to the unlimited Legislature. Political affiliation provides number of years he or she may serve as 8 the organizing principle of legislative Speaker. The next chapter of this report activity, including the election of presid- will discuss the powers of the presiding ing officers. In Oregon, the members officers in more detail. At this point, it is of the party having the most seats in a enough to note that the powers associ- particular house coordinate their votes ated with these positions create strong to select their presiding officers: the incentives for the legislative caucuses to President of the Senate and the Speaker strive for majority status and for legisla- of the House of Representatives. Shortly tors in the majority party to be loyal to thereafter, the four caucuses then elect their presiding officer. their caucus leaders: the House Majority The roles of party caucus leaders are Leader, the House Minority Leader, the not formally defined, but caucus leaders Senate Majority Leader and the Senate nevertheless exert tremendous influ- Minority Leader. ence within the Legislature. According

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to Professor Clucas, “The main job of the also serve as liaisons to state and federal caucus leaders is to promote their par- agencies to assist constituents.10 ty’s political and policy goals. Although they are not the top leaders in the The strong pressure on individual state parties, the caucus leaders in the legislators to conform to legislative majority party often play a more direct priorities of their caucus is well recog- role in planning strategy and champion- nized. Shortly after his 2006 election, ing party goals than the speaker or the then-freshman Democrat Ben Cannon president.”9 One important role of a was advised by a more senior legislator that he should support decisions of the caucus leader is building and maintain- Democratic caucus.11 Senator Charlie ing majority control through the recruit- Ringo, a Democrat from Beaverton, ment of candidates and fund-raising. also commented on the power of the During legislative sessions, the caucus Democratic caucus leaders to dictate a leaders convene frequent meetings of legislative agenda for its members. their members, in which they share information, develop policy goals and Legislators will naturally be sensi- plan strategy. Caucus meetings have tra- tive to how their legislative decisions ditionally been conducted behind closed may be judged by their constituents in doors, with some short-lived exceptions. the next election. Caucus leaders can During caucus meetings, members often use the specter of defeat in the next educate their colleagues about bills primary election to bring their members pending before their committees. into consensus on key issues for the party. Dave Barrows described how an Several witnesses noted that members outside campaign consultant managed of the Legislature find caucus meetings the agenda of the Republican caucus useful because they can discuss candidly during the 2005 session, insisting that why their constituents are opposed to members “sing from this hymnal,” which party-backed measures. Legislators was perceived by some as coercive and are free to ask questions they would be excessively partisan. Several witnesses reluctant to ask on the floor. Legisla- also pointed to the example of House tive staff may also be present to provide members Cheryl Walker and Vic Back- fiscal or legal background or to lay out lund, both Republicans, being targeted parliamentary options, but caucus in the primary because of disagreements members typically dismiss nonpartisan with their caucuses on budget and tax staff when discussing political strategy. issues. In addition to the political aspects of the caucuses, the caucus offices also provide In the 2007 session, the House Re- support services to the members of the publican leadership effectively used Legislature, such as conducting re- caucus meetings to “lock down” votes search, writing speeches and preparing against revenue bills that enjoyed, at press releases. The caucus offices may least initially, bipartisan support. House

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Republicans assembled the necessary and the fact that the leadership can use votes to block passage of bills to raise the PAC, virtually unfettered, to ensure the corporate minimum tax, to create continued leadership and to reward a dedicated tax for affordable housing, loyal party members and punish disloyal and to raise the cigarette tax to fund party members. children’s health coverage. All of these bills initially appeared to have enough Interest Groups Republican support to pass, but after a caucus meeting, the support disap- While interest groups are an essential peared. component of a robust democracy, they nonetheless play a significant role in The principal power exerted by presiding fueling excessive partisanship. They officers and caucus leaders comes from do so in a number of ways. Interest their control over the distribution of groups serve as a campaign money. principal source of Special interests “The principal power funds for leadership contribute money exerted by presiding PACs, they provide to leadership PACs officers and caucus leaders funds to candidates that are largely comes from their control who support their controlled by the over the distribution of causes, and they caucus leaders or campaign money.… The hire lobbyists to in- presiding officers. leaders can reward loyal fluence legislators. Those officers then party members with greater have the power to contributions and refuse to Before discussing divide the funds assist candidates who are in more detail how perceived not to be toeing among their par- interest groups the party line.” ties’ candidates. often serve to The leaders can promote excessive reward loyal party partisanship, a few definitions relating members with greater contributions to interest groups are in order. An inter- and refuse to assist candidates who are est group itself is an organized group of perceived not to be toeing the party people with common interest in some line. The considerable financial power particular political issue. There are at of legislative leaders over potential least two different types of interest campaign funds is a tool that can be groups. An interest group may represent used in excessively partisan ways to constituencies of people organized by secure loyalty from party members in occupation, like teachers or building the Legislature. Your committee agreed owners. An interest group may repre- with the concern expressed by Governor sent people who share a similar value, Barbara Roberts over the current power like environmentalists or tax reformers. of the caucuses and the leadership PACs, Both types of interest groups may be

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involved in advocating for or against themselves have neither the time nor issues that are particularly divisive or staff to research every policy issue that controversial and in ways that are not comes before them. The most effective susceptible to compromise. The more lobbyists are those who have developed interest there is among public mem- a reputation for honesty, and lobbyists bers in the issues advanced by interest who are not candid with legislators lose groups, the more likely the group will be the trust of those legislators.13 Interest able to accumulate the funds and influ- groups often do more than just talk to ence that it may use to advance its goals legislators — they also make campaign with legislators. These are fundamental contributions and mobilize voters in elements of democracy: constituents elections. telling their representatives what they want through the medium of organized This report focuses on interest groups interest groups. that are aligned with one or the other major political party, and your commit- Many interest groups hire lobbyists to tee calls them “partisan interest groups.” serve this function. More than 300 hun- Your committee distinguishes those dred groups have registered lobbyists at groups from interest groups that donate the state capitol. Oregon ranks twenty- money to both Republican and Demo- second in the nation for the number of cratic candidates even-handedly in order entities that use lobbyists. The number to gain access to whichever candidate of lobbyists working in the state capitol is elected. Partisan interest groups that also seems to be growing. The associa- consistently support only Democratic tion of Oregon lobbyists, known as the candidates or only Republican candi- Capitol Club, listed 385 members in dates function essentially as extensions 2001 — a considerable increase from of the parties. They may provide support 300 in 1991.12 Many political watchers not just through campaign donations are uncomfortable with this apparent but also by mobilizing their members increase in the number of lobbyists to vote for the party’s candidate and, in working on behalf of interest groups in some cases, even campaigning directly the state capitol. At the same time, as for the candidate. one observer said, one cannot bemoan the rise of interest groups if one favors Partisan interest groups generally greater civic engagement on the part of include those with large, or very well- the public. funded, constituencies and those with an ideological focus. Some examples on Interest groups and their lobbyists the Democratic side are public employee play a number of different roles with and other labor unions, environmental- regard to the Legislature. Lobbyists ists and pro-choice supporters. On the often make a positive contribution Republican side are social conservatives, to the Legislature because they study some business interests, anti-tax groups policy issues and inform legislators who and pro-life supporters. This does not

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mean, for example, that there are no ceive that the incumbent has not been Democrats who are pro-life and no Re- faithful to the special interest group’s publicans who are pro-choice. However, needs. Two of Oregon’s larger labor Republican and Democratic legislators unions — the SEIU and the Oregon tend to align with particular groups, Education Association — together gave which in turn support them with money over $350,000 to Representative Greg and volunteers. MacPherson’s opponent, John Kroger, in the 2008 Democratic primary race for Partisan interest groups have significant Oregon’s attorney general. This dollar influence and impact. Almost half of figure amounted to almost half of the those interviewed expressed the view total funds that now-Attorney General that partisan interest groups controlled Kroger raised for the primary campaign. party agendas and that interest groups Many political observers speculated were more powerful than state par- that these unions gave this significant ties. Interest groups, they argued, play amount of money to Mr. Kroger as “pay- a strong role in promoting excessive back” for Representative MacPherson’s partisanship in the Legislature. The con- role in drafting and promoting legisla- cern that contributions from interested tion in 2003 that changed the public parties may taint a legislator’s judgment employees’ retirement system and cut is reflected in the fact that there are public employee benefits. The unions stringent reporting requirements for had adamantly opposed this legislative all legislators who receive contributions effort. during the legislative session.14 Second, partisan interest groups tend to Your committee concluded that partisan characterize issues in a black-and-white, interest groups interfere with delibera- good-versus-evil manner, thus encour- tion and compromise between legisla- aging ideological rigidity and making tors of opposite parties in two principal it difficult for legislators of opposing ways: parties to talk about controversial issues First, as will be discussed in more productively. When partisan interests detail in the chapter on campaigns and demand a specific legislative result, elections, since aspiring legislators which they often do, they may toler- must run for election first in a partisan ate no compromise by their allies in primary, they are hard put to suggest the Legislature. The resulting legisla- compromises that displease their party’s tive discussion focuses not on finding base. Interest groups play a key role in a reasonable solution but on achieving primary elections, potentially providing a specific and pre-approved result. For both financial and volunteer resources. a legislator to participate in an open In addition, interest groups can recruit or exploratory dialogue regarding the and support challengers to incumbents issues affecting partisan interests sug- in the primary where the groups per- gests that compromise is possible and

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thus sends a worrisome signal to the ➤➤ Legislative caucus leaders and pre- concerned partisan interests. Political siding officers possess more power discourse in these situations is therefore than state parties when it comes to reduced to well-worn sound bites, with pressuring legislators to support the goal of pushing a partisan agenda partisan agendas. rather than engaging in the process of ➤ finding a solution. The result is a situa- ➤ Strong interest groups aligned with tion in which each side sees the legisla- either the Democrats or the Re- tive process as an “all-or-nothing” effort, publicans often reinforce excessive with victory possible only through the partisanship by pressuring legisla- absolute defeat of one’s opponents. The tors to commit to uncompromising polarization can then extend to less agendas. controversial issues, as legislators who see each other as “the enemy” lose the ability or interest to work together.

Your committee concluded that partisan interest groups often reinforce excessive partisanship. The legislative process attracts partisan interest groups that push their individual and sometimes uncompromising agendas. Industry groups, labor unions, religious conservatives and other interest groups use their issues to energize their constituents and apply pressure on individual legislative members. These interest groups can sway legislators because there may be a high political cost for rejecting their uncompromising positions.

Chapter Conclusions

➤➤ Oregon’s Republican and Demo- cratic state parties are grassroots organizations that serve the valuable function of involving citizens in the political process, but they have little involvement in the Legis- lature.

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LEGISLATIVE RULES, LEADERSHIP AND NONPARTISAN STAFF

Anyone can be tempted to abuse power movement of legislation. This form of for partisan advantage, and many wit- excessive partisanship rewards the con- nesses explained that Oregon’s legisla- solidation of party power rather than tive leaders have frequently succumbed meaningful deliberative processes. to this temptation. The temptation stems primarily from the nature of Your committee concluded that two the legislative rules that govern the particularly clear manifestations of legislative process. In contrast to some excessive partisanship are apparent in other states, where the Legislature. legislative rules are “Leaders of both parties First, the majority defined in statutes, – while they enjoy their has the power to most rules that majority status – have use the rules to re- regulate Oregon’s regularly chosen to interpret duce the minority’s legislative process legislative rules in their own involvement in the can be modified by favor or to modify them legislative process. simple-majority through simple-majority This is excessive vote of the House or vote in order to consolidate partisanship in the Senate. Lead- power and to exert partisan its clearest form. ers of both par- control over committee Second, the powers ties — while they assignments and the that come with the enjoy their major- movement of legislation.” leadership offices ity status — have in the Legislature regularly chosen to reinforce the incen- interpret legislative rules in their own tive for each party to seek and main- favor or to modify them through simple- tain majority status. Your committee majority vote in order to consolidate examined these two manifestations of power and to exert partisan control partisanship and considered legislative over committee assignments and the rule changes that might at least dispel

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the temptation for the majority to abuse determines the number of committees, its power at the expense of the minority. selects the committee chairs, appoints members to committees and assigns Background bills to committees for consideration. As Oregon’s Legislature has a strong As stated earlier in this report, in Or- committee system compared to other egon, the members of a particular house legislatures, this system ensures that choose the presiding officer of that presiding officers will have extraor- house: the President of the Senate and dinary authority over the legislative the Speaker of the House of Representa- process. tives. The majority and minority party The bulk of legislative work occurs in members meet in caucus to coordinate committees. In either the House or their votes for the leaders. The majority the Senate, the committee chair may party members can also change their schedule meetings on bills, and a major- leaders if they are displeased with their ity of committee members may make performance. For example, at the begin- a formal request for a work session or ning of the 1999 session, the Republican hearing on a bill to the committee chair. caucus removed the sitting Speaker, Bills may be reported out of committee Lynn Lundquist, because he had been either with or without minority reports, too supportive of Democratic legisla- and the rules provide a means for 15 tion. amendments to be made. Bills reported out of committee ultimately go to the The President and the Speaker enjoy floor for a vote. tremendous discretionary power and typically demand that their party Powers granted by the rules and options members support them 100 percent of for the presiding officers to use these the time on procedural votes. Therefore, these leaders have considerable discretion to change the rules to strengthen their control. As mentioned above, changing the rules of the legislative bodies requires only a simple- majority vote.

The most important powers of the presiding officers relate to committees. The presiding officer

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powers can vary between the House Other witnesses, however, argued that and the Senate. Many witnesses were a strong presiding officer system makes of the opinion that the Speaker wielded it too easy to exclude the minority from too much power over the agenda in the any meaningful participation, and noted House in 2005, particularly in regard to that there will always be partisan pres- committee appointments and the rout- sures to do exactly that. ing of bills to those committees. How- Members of the minority have some ever, according to Representative Sal limited rights even in the face of the Esquivel, then-Speaker Minnis’ efforts majority’s determination to exclude mi- to incorporate members of the minority nority participation. Minority members were not appreciated in her first session have the right to debate any measure as Speaker of the House; when she tried on the floor. They also have the power to appoint Democrats to subcommittee to propose amendments in committee. chairs, the Democratic leadership would In addition, if they do not support a bill not cooperate. Some witnesses also that has been approved by the com- acknowledged that more control might mittee and sent to the floor for a vote, be appropriate in the House because they may file a minority report to be of important differences between the considered on the floor along with the House and Senate. Judy Hall, Secretary approved bill. Often minority reports of the Senate, quoted Senate President are filed to make a political statement or Peter Courtney’s characterization of to force the majority party members to the House as a “barroom brawl” and the take a position on an issue, but some- Senate as a “church.” Because it is twice times minority reports gain serious con- as large, the House is more difficult to sideration and even pass. However, these organize; greater efforts are required to minority rights, which are conferred move the agenda forward. Since Sena- only through legislative rules, can be tors serve longer terms, and many have changed by a simple-majority vote of the had experience as representatives in the legislative house. For example, at the be- House, the Senate requires less organi- ginning of the 2008 special session, the zation because of the greater experience Democratic majority adopted rules on a of its members and stronger relation- party-line vote that prohibited the filing ships among them. of minority reports unless a majority of House members signed on to the report. Some witnesses spoke in favor of strong Republican lawmakers argued that such leader control in both houses, arguing a rule essentially eliminated their right that it is inefficient to do everything to have alternative legislation considered by committee in a citizen legislature. on the House floor. Those witnesses placed great reliance on the character and leadership skills The minority generally does not possess of the presiding officers and reasoned the right to force consideration of a bill, that poor leaders would be voted out. either in committee or on the floor. This

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right belongs exclusively to the major- sessions, when party control was split ity. The Legislature traditionally has between the two houses, House and maintained rules allowing a majority of Senate leaders were forced to work legislators, from either party, to call for together in order to pass a budget and a vote on a bill without the agreement of other priority legislation. On the other the presiding officer. In the House this hand, some witnesses reported that the rule is called the “Rule of 31,” because 31 presiding officers at times would refuse votes constitute a majority. At the very to consider legislation passed by the end of the 2005 legislative session, how- other assembly — even bills that would ever, this rule was changed so that only have been supported by a majority of the presiding officer could bring a bill members — a practice that will be dis- to the floor for a vote. The Democratic cussed in more detail below. members of the Your committee House, who were in “Rules that guarantee concluded that the minority at the meaningful participation for time, opposed the members of the minority legislative rules measure and argued party should be in place.” and procedures that the purpose have been misused for the rule change by leadership of was to prevent the House from debating both parties for excessively partisan and voting on the Senate-passed civil purposes, that the powers of majority unions bill. Then-Speaker Minnis dis- control are so great that party leaders agreed, stating that the reason for the become overly focused on maintaining change was to prevent House members or achieving power in the next election, from wasting time by bringing bills to and that this focus interferes with the the floor that had little or no chance of cooperation and compromise often nec- passage simply for political purposes. essary for good public policy. Rules that At the beginning of the 2007 session, guarantee meaningful participation for the House voted to restore the Rule of members of the minority party should 31. Six bills were pulled from commit- be in place. Your committee found the tee and considered on the House floor most partisan legislative maneuvering pursuant to this rule during the 2007 in two areas: committee assignments session. and the assignment of particular bills to committees. Rules that restore more The power of the leadership to control rationality and less gamesmanship to the agenda is complicated when differ- committee assignments and that limit ent parties control the Senate and the some of leadership’s power over assign- House. This situation can lead either ment of bills to committees could help to bipartisan cooperation or partisan to alleviate the excessively partisan stalemate, with each house rejecting atmosphere. Your committee also found, bills passed by the other house. Several as discussed further below, that having witnesses noted that during recent professional nonpartisan staff serving

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the legislative body contributes to an incorporating all rules into statutes. The environment where greater collabora- concern was that if rules were made into tion is likely to occur. statutes, the Governor could veto subsequent legislation designed to change The PCOL noted many of the same a rule, raising legitimate questions of concerns, concluding that “some rules separation of powers. and practices of the Legislature promote excessive partisanship and prevent Your committee thus reached a compro- problems from being addressed effi- mise recommendation: the Legislature ciently and effectively.” The PCOL urged should incorporate into statute certain that the rules of the House and Senate language relating to how rules would not be used to prevent consideration of be created, changed (e.g. by simple or significant policy issues and exhorted presiding officers to represent the body super-majority vote) or superseded. as a whole and not to use their authority Your committee also decided that rules to prevent debate on policy matters. It protecting the minority’s rights of also encouraged majority and minority participation should require a super- leaders to develop a more collaborative majority to change. environment for discussing legislative priorities and establish collaborative Control of Committee processes that include the minority in Assignments session management. (See Appendix D.)

Your committee considered the best As has been noted, Oregon’s legislative manner to implement legislative rules presiding officers have discretionary that might in turn foster such a col- power over all committee assignments. laborative environment and process. The A key assignment is the position of current manner of legislative rule-mak- committee chair. Committee chairs ing is clearly flawed, as it is possible for have considerable authority to adopt the Legislature to make changes to the procedural rules and decide which rules with very little deliberation and by proposed bills will be considered by the mere simple-majority vote. committee. In Oregon’s strong committee system, the chairs direct much One alternative — transforming all of the legislative process. Although rules into statutes — also has its drawbacks. While there are numer- the House Speaker and Senate Presi- ous legislative processes incorporated dent do not directly control committee into statute,* your committee and process, committee chairs serve at the witnesses were resistant to the idea of pleasure of the presiding officers. Also, the presiding officers decide which bills * For example, ORS 171.555 creates the to assign to which committees, giving Joint Ways and Means Committee, sets out the means for establishing the committee’s mem- them considerable influence over the bership, and identifies many of the procedures for the committee. flow of legislation.

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Oregon’s committee assignment process seven House Republicans and only three differs from the process in the U.S. Con- House Democrats to the Joint Ways and gress in a way that gives presiding of- Means Committee and six House Repub- ficers in the state Legislature far greater licans and only two House Democrats to power. In the U.S. Congress all legisla- the Emergency Board.16 tors, including members of the minority, once appointed to a particular standing Besides resulting in a loss of propor- committee, have a proprietary right to tional party equity on committees, such their committee positions and can move arbitrary committee assignments fre- up the ranks through seniority. No such quently rob committees, and ultimately right exists in the Oregon Legislature, the Legislature itself, of considerable where presiding officers have near expertise. Several witnesses complained complete author- that when the ity over committee presiding officers “[I]n the Oregon Legislature, assignments. As a assign minority where presiding officers have result, the Oregon committee mem- near complete authority over system can lead to committee assignments. As bers, legislators a loss of expertise a result, the Oregon system with special expe- on committees can lead to a loss of expertise rience, education, if someone or on committees if someone or professional some party falls or some party falls out of training are not as- out of favor and favor and the experienced signed to commit- the experienced members of the committee tees in which their members of the are reassigned.” knowledge would committee are be valuable. Then- reassigned. In the Senator Westlund 2005 session in the House, the Speaker noted, for example, that Representative made all committee assignments, usu- Alan Bates, a Democrat from Ashland ally without conferring with minority and a physician with the expertise and leadership. A more equitable state of the desire to work on health policy, was affairs existed in the Senate, where the not assigned to the committee that President consulted the minority leader- dealt with health matters while he was ship about committee appointments in the minority party. and ensured that all appointments, including those to the important Ways The House Speaker has not always made and Means Committee and the Emer- committee appointments unilaterally. gency Board, were proportional. In the Sal Esquivel noted that when Hardy House, by contrast, committee com- Myers served as Speaker of the House position was not always proportional. from 1979 to 1983, he established rules For example, during the 2005 session, that committee membership would when the House had 34 Republicans be proportional and that the party and 26 Democrats, the Speaker assigned members would select the specific com-

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mittee members so that the Speaker Your committee concluded that com- would have no role in choosing minority mittee assignments have increasingly members of committees. In the past, become political tools that both parties the minority party also had the right to have used to their advantage. Because name vice-chairs of committees. Former the committee structure is so critical to Speaker Vera Katz, however, altered the legislative process, the manipula- the committee assignment process in a tion of the rules surrounding commit- way that exhibited excessive partisanship. When she presided as Speaker, she tee assignments for political purposes personally made all committee assign- has heightened the sense of excessive ments, even for the minority party. The partisanship in the Legislature and change benefited the Democrats for the discouraged bipartisan cooperation. two sessions Katz served as Speaker, Restoring the prior rules on committee but then gave Republicans the same assignments could help alleviate these advantage when they took majority problems. Members of the minority control of the House. This example illus- should be given the opportunity to trates how the manipulation of power contribute in a meaningful way to delib- by the majority party often leads to the same manipulation when the minority erating legislation. The House in 2007 becomes the majority. took a significant step in this direction by restoring the rule that all committee As legislative processes are inherently appointments must be made propor- partisan, finding a way to meld partisan tionally. Your committee recommends maneuvering with the obligations of ef- that legislative rules in both houses be fective lawmaking will always be a chal- amended to require proportional repre- lenge. A minority party, for example, may be best served politically by being sentation of party members on commit- perceived as having little say in legisla- tees, as the rules of the House presently tion that the minority does not support require. Your committee also agrees and believes is not in its best political with the PCOL’s specific recommenda- interests. By contrast, a process that tion that the Legislature adopt rules to allows the minority party to have some “empower leadership of the minority influence creates real opportunities for party to select minority representa- meaningful contribution to legislation. tives on legislative committees” and to Your committee believes that active and “require that Vice-Chairs of legislative constructive participation is a respon- committees be from minority parties.” sibility of elected office. In the balance between political posturing and effec- (See Appendix D.) Finally, your com- tive legislative process, your committee mittee recommends that the legislative found value in having majority and mi- leadership take into account experience, nority members constructively engaged interest, and seniority in determining in the work of committees. committee assignments.

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Control of Legislation been a shift of power from committees to caucuses. At one time, “you would Besides deciding the number, member- go before a committee and feel that if ship and leadership of committees, the convinced, the committee could get the presiding officers also have considerable bill through, thus it was worth spending power over the movement of bills into time testifying and educating them.” and out of committee. First, the presid- Troy Nichols, chief of staff to Speaker ing officer appoints the members of the Minnis during the 2005 session, linked committees as well as the chairs and the rise in caucus activity to the period vice-chairs. Second, although the rules of term limits. Recently, the unspo- of each legislative body require that the ken rule has been that a bill must have presiding officer refer each bill or mea- the support of the majority of the ma- sure to a committee within seven days jority caucus before “[T]he authority of presiding of its first read- it can come to the officers can be used in floor. Wyse cited ing, the presiding excessively partisan ways officers are free to his own experience to prevent bills sponsored with the sunset decide to which by members of the minority renewal of the committee the bills party from being passed or or measures will even debated.” Oregon Progress be assigned. Third, Board, which passed subject to a major- out of committee ity of the committee’s request that a bill unanimously but did not get to the floor or measure be acted upon, the presiding because it did not have the support of officers can pressure committee chairs the majority of the Republican caucus. to give hearings to, or bring to the floor, He noted that the effect of caucus deci- the bills favored by the leadership. sion on bills meant that a minority of Finally, the President of the Senate is the body — a majority of the majority an ex-officio member of each commit- caucus, which could amount to only 26 tee with the right to vote. Clearly, the percent of the legislators — has dis- authority of presiding officers can be proportionate power. As noted above, used in excessively partisan ways to the reinstitution of the Rule of 31 in prevent bills sponsored by members of the House should alleviate some of the the minority party from being passed or problems noted by Wyse and others. even debated. The PCOL recommended that the Caucuses also have considerable sway Legislature adopt rules to allow mea- over the committee process. Duncan Wyse, who has worked with the Legisla- sures with demonstrable evidence of a ture as president of the Oregon Business majority of members of the chamber in Council since 1995, noted that, over support to move to the floor for debate the last ten to fifteen years, there has and vote. (See Appendix D.)

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Following the release of the PCOL re- on a bill. Third, the House and Senate port in 2006, Republican Representative should adopt and maintain rules per- Sal Esquivel and Democratic Represen- mitting a substantial minority of each of tative Peter Buckley drafted rules that their members to require a committee were adopted by the Oregon House of or floor hearing on a bill that has already Representatives as the “Teamwork Bill.” been passed by the other chamber. The new rules entitle each House member to have a hearing and work session Nonpartisan Staff for two bills so long as the member can obtain two chief co-sponsors from each Presiding officers, committee chairs party.17 Seven bills were designated as and majority caucuses also exert power teamwork bills during the 2007 session. over legislative processes through their Your committee control of staff “Staff have a duty to agreed with the resources. The serve all legislators, but analysis underly- most important committee staff report to ing the PCOL’s staff positions are the committee chair. As recommendation the Secretary of a result, minority party — that the strong the Senate and the members sometimes have control exercised Chief Clerk of the difficulties getting staff by leadership over House. They keep support and are hampered legislation prevents in their ability to craft official records, important policy legislation for committee advise the presiding issues from being consideration.” officers and mem- aired and obstructs bers on parliamen- passage of good tary procedure, and laws that would oversee a number of employees. Both of be widely supported. Your committee these positions are elected by a major- also applauds the House for passing ity of votes from each chamber. The two the Teamwork Bill. Your committee current officers have both been in place proposes additional specific recommen- for several sessions. While they each dations to provide a check on the leader- serve all the members of their chamber, ship’s power. First, the House and the they work most closely with the presid- Senate should adopt and maintain rules ing officers. allowing each member of the Legislature to require a committee hearing on a pre- In the 2005 Session Speaker Karen Min- determined and limited number of bills nis proposed a rule change that would each legislative session. Second, the Sen- have given the Speaker the sole power ate should follow the House’s lead and to hire and fire the Chief Clerk, but adopt and maintain rules, similar to the she faced resistance from the major- Rule of 31, which permit a majority of ity caucus. A modified rule change was members, regardless of party affiliation, adopted, giving the Speaker the power to require a committee or floor hearing

26 27 City Club of Portland Bridging the Partisan Divide to terminate the Chief Clerk but requir- Chapter Conclusions ing the full chamber to elect a successor. This event highlighted the tension be- ➤➤ Because of the structure of Oregon’s tween serving the entire legislative body Legislature, which is character- and serving the majority leadership. In ized by a strong-leader system, the 2007 the House restored the rule which leaders have tremendous discretion places the right to hire or terminate the and set the tone for partisanship or Chief Clerk with the membership of the collaboration. House and not just the Speaker. ➤➤ As most of Oregon’s legislative rules Committee members depend on the are subject to revision by simple- policy work of staff members who majority vote, they can be — and provide analysis for committees. Staff have been — easily manipulated to have a duty to serve all legislators, but satisfy the immediate demands of committee staff report to the committee the majority party in a particular chair. As a result, minority party mem- house. bers sometimes have difficulties getting ➤➤ Oregon’s legislative rules grant its staff support and are hampered in their presiding officers generous powers ability to craft legislation for committee that they can easily use to control consideration. The PCOL recommended both committee assignments and that the Legislature professionalize the movement of legislation in a issue-area staff to make them more ac- way that demands loyalty from cessible to all members. (See Appendix majority party members and that D.) excludes members of the minority party from a meaningful role in the Your committee found that staff re- legislative process. sources are unreasonably and unevenly distributed between the majority and ➤➤ The strong leader system fosters minority parties and, therefore, their excessive partisanship by reward- ability to analyze and propose meaning- ing a winner-take-all approach to ful legislation varies accordingly. Your controlling the Senate and House of committee agrees with the PCOL and Representatives. recommends that administrative officers and committee staff in the Legislature ➤➤ Ostensibly nonpartisan administra- be nonpartisan professionals serving tive staff officers are subject to the members of both parties; they should imperatives of the party in control not serve at the sole discretion of the of a particular house. majority party. ➤➤ While committees remain important in the Legislature, their power has somewhat diminished because of the increasing power of the caucuses.

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Chapter that has already been passed by the Recommendations other chamber.

➤➤ The House and Senate should adopt ➤➤ The House should maintain and the and maintain rules that establish Senate should adopt rules ensuring proportional representation of that the Secretary of the Senate party members on committees and and the Chief Clerk of the House permit the leaders of each caucus to are nonpartisan and serve members determine which of its members to of both parties, and not serve at appoint to committees. When mak- the sole discretion of the presiding ing committee assignments, caucus officers. In addition, the House and leaders should take into account Senate should employ permanent the experience, interest and senior- staff with knowledge of substantive ity of legislators. policy areas to support the work of committees. ➤➤ The House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that require the ➤➤ Once the above rules are adopted, vice-chair of each committee to be a the House and Senate should member of the minority party, and require a supermajority to change committee chairs should consult these and other rules that protect with vice-chairs in developing com- each member’s right to participate mittee agendas. in the legislative process.

➤➤ While the House’s Teamwork Bill is a step in the right direction, the House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that allow each member of the Legislature to require a committee hearing on a predetermined number of bills during each legislative session.

➤➤ The House should maintain and the Senate should adopt rules permitting a majority of each of their members to require a committee or floor hearing on a bill. In addition, the House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules permitting a substantial minority of each of their members to require a committee or floor hearing on a bill

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LEGISLATOR RELATIONSHIPS AND CIVILITY

The Importance of the Senate. In addition, senators are less Relationships and Civility in likely to be excessively partisan than Legislative Deliberation representatives because senators are elected from larger districts and must The Oregon Legislature works best when therefore appeal to a greater variety of individual legislators have personal people. and respectful relationships with each There are instructive examples of how other. A number of witnesses testified legislators, particularly those from the that they believe those legislators who same geographic area, have been able to know each other well and who respect put aside partisan concerns to work for one another are more likely to work the common good of constituents. Rep- together courteously and effectively. resentative Sal Esquivel, a self-described Similarly, witnesses expressed the “moderate Republican,” commented that opinion, and your committee concurred, he and Representative Peter Buckley, a that courtesy and good relationships be- Democrat, were able to develop strate- tween legislators contribute to positive gies for working together to promote deliberation. common interests. Esquivel and Buck- ley, for example, drafted rules that were Witnesses suggested that the Senate later adopted to ensure that each House generally fosters better relationships member is able to bring forth at least between individual legislators than the two bills and have those bills debated House for the reasons also discussed in in committee, regardless which party the previous chapter. Because the Sen- is in power, so long as each bill has two ate is smaller and senators serve longer sponsors from each party, as discussed terms, they tend to get to know each previously. other better. Senators also typically possess more experience, as many of them A number of witnesses commented that served in the House before coming to the governor has an important part to

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play in alleviating excessive partisan- his list of priorities, as well as played a ship. Witnesses commented on the key role in brokering compromises when styles of recent governors and noted needed.” that some styles may be more effective than others in mitigating the negative The Experiment with Term consequences of partisanship. Lobby- Limits ist Dave Barrows pointed to Governor Neil Goldschmidt as an example of a Witnesses pointed to the imposition of governor who played a useful role in term limits in 1992 as a factor that has combating excessive partisanship. Al- prevented many legislators from devel- though he lacked legislative experience oping lasting and positive relationships. prior to becoming governor, he quickly Oregon voters approved legislative term learned the importance of consulting limits in 1992. The Oregon Supreme the legislative leadership soon after call- Court later ruled in 2002 that the ballot ing a special session without having had measure establishing term limits was such a consultation. After that experi- unconstitutional in the way it was draft- 18 ence, Governor Goldschmidt made a ed. Although term limits have been abolished now for several years, many practice of casually visiting legislators witnesses felt that their negative effects in their offices, regardless of their party carried over into recent sessions. affiliation, in order to get to know them personally. His close relationships with Without exception, all witnesses who these legislators eventually worked to commented on term limits agreed that help facilitate passage of legislation that the period of term limits contributed to he supported. excessive partisanship. The imposition of limits meant that the most experi- Former legislative staffer and current enced legislators in the House served a member of the lobby, Pat McCormick, mere four years. Sal Esquivel, a Republi- considered Republican Governor Victor can member of the House who repre- Atiyeh the best governor with whom he sents the Medford area, pointed out had ever worked, in large part because that term limits led to a dramatic loss of the governor met weekly with the ma- institutional memory among legislators. jority and minority leadership of both This loss of institutional memory meant houses and maintained an open door that inevitably inexperienced legisla- to any legislator who wished to discuss tors were forced to rely heavily on party matters with him. caucuses and lobbyists for information about policy matters and legislative Several observers noted favorably that process. As a result, legislators were less Governor Kulongoski made a greater able to develop well-founded and inde- effort to build relationships across party pendent proposals on various subjects. lines during the 2007 session than in the 2005 session. One lobby newsletter Furthermore, because legislators were noted that he “weighed in judiciously on less familiar with legislative processes,

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they often tried to force proposals as opposed to a professional legislature, through the Legislature in a way that can cope with the intricacies and growth merely produced gridlock. Mark Sim- of the state budget and with the increas- mons, the Republican Speaker of the ing length of the sessions. House in 2001, concurred with Esquivel. Although he said he voted for the limits The Deterioration of in 1992, he was glad when Oregon Relationships among courts ruled them unconstitutional a Legislators decade later: “I saw that term limits take power from the elected legislators and Many witnesses voiced the opinion that give it to the lobby and the bureaucrats there has been an unraveling of personal — the people in the building with all the relationships in the Legislature, which 19 experience.” Simmons added that term has affected the Legislature’s ability to limits also prevented legislators from deliberate on major issues. Witnesses gaining the experience often required identified a number of contributing fac- for genuine leadership. “Under term tors in addition to term limits, some of limits,” noted Simmons, “nobody can be which were discussed in the first part of really ready to be Speaker.” this report: uncompromising ideologies that have become more widespread both Oregon’s Citizen Legislature in the public and among politicians; the influence of a national political culture Some witnesses pointed to the very ex- that brands members of the oppos- istence of Oregon’s “citizen legislature” ing party as enemies; and sociological itself as an engine of excessive partisan- changes in Oregon that have created a ship. In a “citizen legislature,” legislators divide between urban and rural popula- convene for a few months every year tions. Additional societal factors were or two and are expected to keep their also mentioned, including a general outside jobs and support themselves decline in civility and greater diversity primarily from outside income. By in the people who serve as legislators. contrast, in a professional legislature, legislators are paid a salary to work Some witnesses pointed to the chang- year-round and are expected to give up ing lifestyles of legislators, with more outside jobs when elected. Even setting of them interested in being at home aside the effects of term limits, many with their families than socializing witnesses claimed that there are too with fellow legislators. Former Senator many “amateurs” in Oregon’s Legisla- Mike Thorne noted: “I can recall getting ture who are overly reliant on lobbyists together in the evening with people I and special interests. Pointing out the had gone head-to-head with that day. enormous and expanding responsibili- The next day we might be together on ties of the Legislature, they questioned another subject.” Since legislators tend whether the state’s citizen Legislature, to socialize less during the session now,

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understand each other and their dif- fering points of view.” Eilperin quotes U.S. Representative Barney Frank as commenting that even the tables in the lunchroom are divided by party.20

Numerous witnesses argued that negative campaigns make it hard for legislators to form relationships with members of the opposite party once they get into office. Other witnesses noted that normal tensions arising from campaigning are exacerbated by the intensity, fre- quency and duration of campaigns. One witness pointed out that members of the House are almost always campaigning because they have only two-year terms, thereby constantly stoking the fires of excessive partisanship. they rarely develop the same level of respect and understanding that members There were also examples of caucus shared in the past. Several witnesses leaders discouraging efforts to build even pointed to changes in the physical relationships between Democrats and structure of the Capitol in Salem as hav- Republicans in the Oregon Legislature. ing adversely impacted the development A few years ago, a number of fresh- of strong personal relationships among man legislators developed a bipartisan legislators. Before the addition of the freshman caucus after attending a pre- Capitol wings, legislators did not have session conference together. Their inten- separate offices, but worked from their tion was to work together to develop desks on the House and Senate floors positive relationships and gain valuable where they constantly interacted. In the expertise. The legislative leadership, new wings, legislators are isolated in however, strongly disapproved of this their own offices and much less interac- caucus. When the staff tried to repeat tion occurs across party lines. Political the conference for freshman legislators writer Juliet Eilperin notes the same before the next session, the leadership trend in Congress where fewer House quashed the idea. members move their families to Wash- ington, D.C., instead spending as short a week as possible in the capitol and returning home for extended weekends, a trend which she suggests has “made it more difficult for House members to

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Your committee concluded that poor are not “good personnel policy and not working relationships have contributed a good investment.” “It takes time,” he to the Legislature’s inability to ad- added, “to figure out how government dress critical and pressing issues facing works.” In other words, legislators Oregon. In addition, many witnesses re- would benefit from greater expertise inforced the conclusion that Oregonians and institutional knowledge. Longtime tend to believe that legislators cannot professional staff in the Oregon House work well together, which may have the of Representatives agreed, noting effect of causing the public to become that in each session, they work with a disengaged from politics. For all of these different body of members, making it difficult to establish long-term working reasons, your committee concluded that relationships: “You get to know them potential solutions should be considered and then they go home.” Exacerbating to remedy this lack the problem is the of civility in the “Representatives seeking two-year election Legislature. reelection every two years cycle for the House are forced to campaign of Representatives. An Analysis of perpetually to enhance the Representatives Potential likelihood of reelection. seeking reelection Solutions This constant campaigning every two years are increases their dependence forced to campaign Your commit- on interest groups, perpetually to en- tee considered a decreases time spent on hance the likelihood number of reforms legislative work, and of reelection. This that might reduce diminishes cooperation constant campaign- the excesses of often necessary to achieve ing increases their partisanship and results.” dependence on strengthen positive interest groups, decreases time spent working relationships within the Leg- on legislative work, and diminishes islature. These potential solutions are cooperation often necessary to achieve described below. results.

Longer Terms for Legislators Your committee therefore recommends extending legislative terms in the House Several witnesses supported longer to four years and extending legislative terms for legislators. Former Oregon terms in the Senate to six years. Supreme Court Judge Hans Linde, also a member of PCOL, noted the advantages Annual Legislative Sessions of of six-year terms in the U.S. Senate, Limited Length which gives senators time to build relationships and accept the obligations Several witnesses, including former of statesmanship. Short terms, he said, state legislators Eileen Qutub and Max

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Williams, both Republicans, suggested recommended a March date because that meeting every year — as opposed the state Office of Economic Analysis to every other year — would allow releases revenue projections on March legislators to develop policy and insti- 1.* Much of the Legislature’s important tutional expertise and would promote business awaits that information. better working relationships. While some witnesses thought annual sessions The PCOL recommended that the would eliminate too many potential Legislature establish a new date for the legislative candidates from the process beginning of the legislative session. (See because of the increased time demands, Appendix D.) Your committee specifi- this concern could be ameliorated by cally recommends that the session begin limiting session length. Under such a in March. proposal, the Legislature would have a regular session during odd years and a Improved Training and short budget session in even years. The Relationship-Building for PCOL recommended that the Legisla- Legislators ture experiment with annual sessions by convening both in 2007 and 2008, then Many of your committee’s witnesses deciding whether to institute annual recommended pre-session conferences sessions permanently. (See Appendix D.) and retreats as a way for legislators to The Legislature has acted on this recom- get to know one another better. In the mendation and held a limited session in past, they noted, such gatherings helped February 2008. build collegiality and trust. Professional legislative staff, including Chief Clerk Your committee recommends amending of the House Ramona Kenady and Sec- the Oregon Constitution to allow for an- retary of the Senate Judy Hall, were the nual sessions of prescribed length. strongest advocates for such pre-session conferences and retreats. They argued that better orientation and socialization Change in Timing of Session before the session helped legislators Ramona Kenady, who has served as gain a deeper understanding of each Chief Clerk of the House since 1985, other and each other’s issues. Those suggested shifting the start date of witnesses pointed out that a pre-session the session from January to March. conference would also allow the two The extra time would give legislators a houses to facilitate the upcoming ses- cooling-off period after inherently par- sion by electing their leaders, appoint- tisan campaigns, as well as more time to ing committees and educating members prepare for the session. This additional * The Legislature also receives information period would also permit legislators to throughout the session about the fiscal impact of proposed legislation from staff members in receive more training and get to know the Legislative Fiscal Office and the Legislative each other better. Witnesses specifically Revenue Office.

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on both the legislative process and the independent commission at a level that key issues. The PCOL similarly recom- attracts well-qualified candidates. (See mended that the Legislature enhance Appendix D.) legislator orientation curriculum to include more training in subject matter Your committee considered the argu- and procedural areas. (See Appendix ment that low salaries might discour- D.) A pre-session conference would also age otherwise competent people from provide an opportunity for the Ways running for office and that increased sal- and Means Committee to examine the aries would broaden the pool of people budget and the economic forecast care- willing and interested in becoming fully before the session begins. legislators. Furthermore, your committee also considered the argument that a Your committee recommends that both significant increase in salary might send legislative houses organize annual pre- the message that the public expects the session conference retreats to promote Legislature to act in a more professional positive legislative relationships and to manner. Nevertheless, your committee prepare for the subsequent legislative concluded that it could neither make session. nor rule out a connection between salary and excessive partisanship. Increased Salaries for Legislators

A wide cross-section of your committee’s witnesses supported increased salaries for legislators. Judy Hall, Secre- tary of the Senate, said that legislators should earn a decent salary, and noted they make far less than they should considering the work they do and the hours they work. Members of the Legislature are compensated $19,884 per year, plus $109 per day they are in session.21 Since the average odd-year regular session lasts about six months and even-year special sessions appear to last about 20 days, each member receives approxi- mately $34,000 during odd years and $22,000 during even years. This aver- ages out to $28,000 per year.

The PCOL specifically recommended that salaries for state elected officials, including legislators, be set by an

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Chapter Conclusions

➤➤ Courteous and extensive working relationships among experienced legislators contribute to good deliberation.

➤➤ The Legislature has experienced an unraveling of relationships, which has inhibited its ability to function well as a deliberative body.

Chapter Recommendations

➤➤ The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would establish four-year terms for members of the House of Representatives and six-year terms for members of the Senate.

➤➤ The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would establish annual legislative sessions of limited length, commencing in March, shortly after the state Office of Economic Analysis releases its first revenue projections for the year.

➤➤ The Legislature should hold pre- session conference retreats to provide more training and more opportunities for legislators to forge productive professional relationships across party lines.

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EXCESSIVE PARTISANSHIP IN CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS

Your committee recognized that politi- who want to run as independents and cal campaigns are inherently partisan. who may be less beholden to partisan Competition between parties highlights interest groups also face an uphill battle major issues, excites public interest, and because of the risk that voters will con- provides voters with clear policy alterna- sider them “spoilers.” Voters who would tives. No election system is perfect and ideally prefer to support such candi- each involves trade offs. While your dates frequently choose not to do so for committee heard numerous criticisms fear of tipping the election toward the about how the current system frequent- major-party candidate they like least. ly contributes to excessive partisanship, your committee did not have sufficient In addition, in districts where one party evidence to conclude that any alternative has a “safe” majority, elections are election system is clearly preferable. essentially decided in the primary, leav- Nonetheless, several aspects of elections ing members of the other major party contribute to excessive partisanship and and independents (about 21 percent ought to be considered. of Oregon voters) without a meaningful vote.22 During the redistricting The current system of holding “closed” process, competitive districts can be partisan primary elections before the transformed into safe districts for the general election gives voters who regis- benefit of incumbents and the party in ter with the two major parties greater power. When the state is divided into influence than voters who choose to many safe districts, winning candidates remain independent. As independent tend to be more partisan, as successful voters are not allowed to participate candidates appeal to partisan voters in in the major partisan primaries, those the primary election rather than appeal- voters receive the implicit message that ing to a mix of partisan, independent, they must be on one of the two major and cross-over voters in the general “teams” to be real “players.” Candidates election. As a result, staunch conser-

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vatives and liberals are more likely to your committee evaluated whether our win election than centrist or moderate electoral process makes it difficult for members of each party, not to mention candidates to succeed if they do not independents. Voters who have a less engage in excessively partisan behavior. ideological orientation — even when Your committee concluded that it does. they comprise a significant portion of a This is not meant to assert any prefer- district’s population — feel under-repre- ence for centrists as opposed to staunch sented and often view the Legislature as conservative or liberal office-holders, overly polarized and partisan. but rather for an electoral system that does not systematically disadvantage Finally, the high cost and lengthy dura- any one part of the political spectrum. tion of campaigns make candidates dependent on Election observers interest groups and “Your committee…does… often note that party leaders, which [n]ot assert any preference candidates posi- reinforces excessive for centrists as opposed tion themselves as partisanship. Each to staunch conservative staunch conserva- of these factors, or liberal office-holders, tives or liberals to along with a number but rather for an electoral win the primary of potential reforms, system that does not and then swing will be addressed in systematically disadvantage back to the center this chapter. any one part of the political to win the general spectrum.” election. While the The Electoral apparent duplicity Process of such posturing may be troublesome in itself, it reveals a more fundamental Your committee is of the opinion problem. Candidates often must make that the Legislature benefits from the commitments to gain the support of presence of members of both parties party faithful in the primary. Once who are willing to consider supporting elected, such commitments tie their legislation proposed by members of the hands when the Legislature confronts opposing party and who can serve to difficult and controversial policy issues broker compromises on contentious is- that cannot be resolved without some sues. Your committee is convinced that compromise. In addition, legislators the presence of such members often who strive to serve their entire districts makes the difference between a truly and support legislative compromises deliberative body and one in which the can be forced out of office by a majority majority party forces through as much of the voters in their party’s primary, as it can while the minority party blocks even if a majority of their constituents as much as it can. For that reason, would re-elect them.

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Most of the remainder of this chapter Oregonians established the initiative will be devoted to examining reforms and referendum systems early in the of the redistricting process, campaign twentieth century, when public distrust finance, and the election system to of politicians was at an all-time high, in decide whether they would likely help an effort to return a degree of political to redress the tendency of the current authority to the citizenry. Unfortu- systems to exclude those in the middle nately, the initiative and referendum and to help mitigate excessive partisan- have not proven to be a good means of ship. Before analyzing those reforms, developing creative solutions to complex and difficult problems. With the initia- however, your committee briefly com- tive process, voters are presented with ments on the initiative and referendum a simple yes or no choice on issues pro- system, which a number of witnesses posed by an individual or group interest- tied to excessive partisanship. ed enough to fund a successful petition signature-gathering effort. Conversely, The Initiative and when a legislator knows that hard work Referendum and compromise on controversial issues might not please politically active A number of witnesses, including for- voters and can be overturned through mer Senator Ben Westlund and former the initiative or referendum process, Representative Max Williams, pointed and when that legislator knows that the to the frequent use of the initiative, ref- voters may use the ballot to punish the erendum and legislative referral systems legislator for addressing those issues, as supporting excessive partisanship few legislators are willing to take risks. in that the process provides legislators The initiative and referendum processes with little incentive to compromise have contributed to excessive partisan- on tough issues. Williams suggested ship by casting issues in black and white that initiatives, referenda and refer- and inhibiting nuanced understanding rals transfer legislative responsibilities and compromise on important issues. directly to voters and allow legislators The PCOL recommended that the initia- themselves to avoid engaging in mean- tive be reformed to “[e]stablish a regular ingful deliberation. He asked, “How do process for considering and possibly you position yourself around an issue taking legislative action on initiative that you can’t control?” Similarly, Eileen proposals.” The PCOL also recom- Qutub, a Republican who served as both mended several reforms to address the a representative and a senator, noted problem of the sponsorship and financ- that the availability of the referendum ing of initiatives by out-of-state interest often means that legislators themselves groups. (See Appendix D.) More re- do not have to vote on complex or con- cently, City Club of Portland specifically troversial issues. recommended the implementation of

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an indirect initiative system* to improve ORS 188.010 also establishes nonparti- legislative governance in Oregon.23 Your san criteria for redistricting: committee believes that such a system would mitigate excessive partisanship 1. Each district, as nearly as practi- by creating opportunities for delibera- cable, shall: tion and compromise in the Legislature a. Be contiguous; before an issue is put to the voters. b. Be of equal population; c. Utilize existing geographic or political boundaries; Redistricting d. Not divide communities of common interest; and The Present System e. Be connected by transporta- tion links. The Oregon Constitution requires the 2. No district shall be drawn for the Legislature to re-draw districts for Sena- purpose of favoring any political tors and Representatives according to party, incumbent legislator or population in the first session after each other person. U.S. census. The Constitution also speci- fies that the Supreme Court has original 3. No district shall be drawn for jurisdiction to review any reapportion- the purpose of diluting the vot- ment enacted by the Legislature. If the ing strength of any language or Legislature fails to complete the task by ethnic minority group. the close of the legislative session, or if 4. Two state House of Represen- the Supreme Court rejects the proposed tative districts shall be wholly reapportionment plan, the responsibil- included within a single state ity defaults to the secretary of state senatorial district.25 who has forty-five days to propose new districts.24 Although ORS 188.010 specifically prohibits redistricting to favor any party or person, your committee concluded * The specific recommendation for imple- menting an indirect initiative system is as that it was probably impossible to avoid follows: “In order to enhance public debate, consideration and study prior to a vote of the at least the perception that redistrict- people, require legislative deliberation with at- ing is used for partisan purposes as tendant public hearings for all citizen initiatives after they have qualified for the ballot. If the redistricting in Oregon is in the hands Legislature accepts a statutory initiative as pro- of party-affiliated elected officials. The posed, the Legislature enacts it into law. If the Legislature accepts a constitutional initiative party controlling redistricting can gain as proposed, the constitutional change must political advantage by drawing the dis- still be referred to the voters for adoption. Any initiative the Legislature rejects (regardless of trict lines so as to favor that party’s can- subject) would be submitted to the voters in the didates. That party may do so in three next election. In that case, the Legislature could take no further action, could enact its own principal ways: (1) packing voters of law on the subject, or could refer a competing alternative to the voters.” the minority party into as few districts

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as possible, leaving a larger number of districting plan that was promptly other districts favorable to the major- vetoed by Democratic Governor John ity party; (2) redrawing districts so that Kitzhaber. As the Republican majority two minority party incumbents are in in the Legislature failed to overturn the same district where no more than the governor’s veto, the redistricting one can be elected at the next election; task fell to then-Secretary of State Bill and (3) redrawing the borders so that Bradbury, a Democrat. Ted Ferrioli, the incumbent from the majority party Senate Republican Leader, claimed that has a “safe” margin of victory in future Secretary of State Bradbury’s redistrict- elections. Such tactics allow the major- ing plan exhibited a greater degree of ity to obtain an electoral advantage out partisanship than the prior plan by for- of proportion to the majority’s level of mer Democratic Secretary of State Phil support among voters statewide. Keisling, because borders were allegedly moved very small distances for no clear reason other than the Republicans’ resultant loss of control of the Senate. An editorial in The Oregonian echoed Ferrioli’s claim: “Republicans have been fu- rious at [Secretary of State Bill] Bradbury ever since he sketched an overtly partisan redistricting map that helped Democrats reclaim the state Senate.”28

The Oregon Legislature has repeat- Bradbury proposed a reapportionment edly failed to redistrict. In fact, “[t]he that fourteen separate groups challenged. battle over redistricting is so conten- In Hartung v. Bradbury, the Oregon tious,” writes Professor Clucas, “that the Supreme Court rejected all the chal- Legislature has not actually completed lenges but one relatively minor one.29 In redistricting since 1911.”26 For example, particular, the Supreme Court rejected a in 1971 and 1991, the Legislature failed challenge that the secretary of state vio- to complete its redistricting plan on lated the Oregon statute discussed above time because in each of these years the that prohibits drawing districts to benefit two legislative houses were controlled any particular political party. by different parties. In 1961 and 1981, legal challenges tied up the plan.27 Examples of redistricting abuse from other states abound. The highly con- In 2001, the Republican-controlled tentious 2003 Republican-controlled Legislature in Oregon passed a re- redistricting process in Texas enabled

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Republicans to gain 6 additional seats such a conclusion makes sense. Take for in the U.S. House of Representatives. example a region with equal numbers of In 2002, Maryland’s Democrats redrew Democrats and Republicans that must the district lines and picked up two U.S. be divided into two electoral districts. If House seats. In 2001, Virginia’s Repub- the lines are drawn so that both districts licans took control of the redistricting have equal numbers of Democrats and process and increased their control of Republicans, then it seems likely that the state house from just over one-half their elections will result in contests to two-thirds, even though a Democrat between a moderate Democrat and a 30 won the statewide race for Governor. moderate Republican, and the winner Your committee concluded that it will will be someone who can appeal to inde- always be impossible to determine the pendents and moderate members of the motivations of legislators in passing other party. On the other hand, if the or not passing a plan for redistricting, region is split so that one district has all of the governor in the Democrats and vetoing or not veto- “[A]s long as the one district has all ing a plan passed redistricting process is the Republicans, by the Legislature, controlled by partisan then the real con- or of the secretary elected officials, the test in each district of state if the work perception — if not the will take place reality — that the process is should fall to that during the primary. characterized by excessive office. But as long partisanship will be a The winner in one as the redistricting perennial problem.” district will be the process is con- Democrat who has trolled by partisan the most support elected officials, the among Democrats, perception — if not the reality — that while the winner in the other district the process is characterized by excessive will be the Republican who has the most partisanship will be a perennial prob- support among Republicans. lem. The perception alone can give rise to unnecessary animosity between the Although some scholars contend that no parties and prompt even more exces- causal relationship exists between less sively partisan behavior. competitive districts and polarization, most authorities agree that competitive In addition to examining whether exces- districts make it easier for moderate sive partisanship characterizes the redistricting process, your committee also candidates to win elections. In their considered whether non-competitive article on electoral competitiveness, districts resulting from partisan redis- Professors Mark Kayser of the Univer- tricting reduce the likelihood of the elec- sity of Rochester and Drew Linzer of tion of moderates. As a matter of logic, Emory University cite research finding

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that politicians elected from com- voters usually select candidates petitive districts are more responsive to similarly close to their parties’ their median constituents.31 Similarly, ideological extremes. This leaves legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin writes that fewer members of Congress in scholarly research supports the con- the political center, or with any clusion that partisan gerrymandering incentive to work toward bipar- leads to the election of more ideological tisan solutions. Conversely, in candidates who appeal to their party’s competitive districts, it’s the base. Toobin observes that redistrict- general election that matters, ing has transformed American politics, when candidates must appeal to making the U.S. House of Representa- independents and cross-overs tives in particular more entrenched: to win. Candidates who can “Members of the House now effectively build such bridges with the elec- answer only to primary voters, who torate are more likely to do the represent the extreme partisan edge of same with colleagues from the both parties. As a result, collaboration ‘other side’ once in office.”33 and compromise between the parties have almost disappeared.”32 Your committee concludes that there exists — at minimum — a widespread A 2005 conference hosted by The perception that excessive partisanship Council for Excellence in Government characterizes the redistricting process. and The Campaign Legal Center reached Your committee also concludes that similar conclusions about polarization excessively partisan redistricting, when which results from excessively partisan it does occur, generally results in the redistricting. The argument might be creation of “safe districts” where candi- applied to the impact of excessively dates who are less partisan face greater partisan redistricting in Oregon: obstacles to winning elections. “A clear connection exists between the geopolitics of redis- Proposed Redistricting Reforms tricting for partisan safety and the growing partisanship in the Although the House and the PCOL House of Representatives and have both made proposals to minimize in many state legislatures. In partisan abuse of redistricting, neither safe districts, the party primary proposal has been implemented. In the is the key election and even that 2005 session of the Oregon Legislature, often is not very competitive. In Representative Debi Farr, Democrat safe districts, the small primary from Eugene, introduced a Joint Resolu- turnout of a party’s most ardent tion (HJR 39) to establish an indepen- partisans determines who goes dent redistricting commission. Had to Washington (or the state- it been enacted, the resolution would house), and these core partisan have created a five-member redistrict-

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ing commission of state and federal Your committee recommends the estab- judges. The bill passed the House but lishment of a nonpartisan redistricting died in the Senate Rules Committee. In commission in Oregon because such a 2006 the PCOL recommended creat- commission would not only be more ing a nonpartisan State Controller to effective than the current system, which manage, administer, and oversee state has not worked since 1911, but would elections, election policy, campaign also reduce the abuses of excessive par- finance administration, and investiga- tisanship. While not a perfect solution, tions including elections and ethics a nonpartisan redistricting commission, issues. Management, administration, made up of members with a cross- and oversight responsibilities would section of political beliefs, would be the also include legislative redistricting. best way to prevent excessively partisan The State Controller would appoint a redistricting and address the perception five-member redistricting commission, that redistricting decisions are moti- consisting of individuals who have not vated by partisan concerns. held public office or political party office If Oregon establishes a redistricting within two years of their appointment. commission, many details will need The State Controller would have at least to be addressed, such as the number a six-year term and be prohibited from of members and their qualifications, seeking statewide elective office for two the appointment process, and proce- years afterward. (See Appendix D.) dural rules and timelines. An important subject that must also be addressed is Given the pervasive abuse of partisan what roles the legislative, executive and redistricting across the nation, twenty judicial branches will play if there is a states have established commissions commission with primary responsibil- to help in the redistricting process. In ity for redistricting. The twelve states twelve of these states, the commissions with nonpartisan redistricting commis- have primary authority for redistricting. sions have set up their commissions in Three state commissions are advisory different ways, and there is extensive and develop plans that are submitted to literature comparing and analyzing the Legislature for approval. Five state them. Because of the complexity of commissions prepare redistricting plans the subject, your committee recom- if the legislatures are unable to agree on mends that City Club establish another plans within the allotted time. The com- research committee to prepare a more missions in these various states have be- detailed recommendation on the form tween three and fifteen members. In all and function of a nonpartisan redistrict- these states active politicians and party ing commission. leaders play a part in selecting commission members. Otherwise, existing state redistricting commissions vary widely in make-up and responsibilities.

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Campaigns and Campaign Finance

How Rising Campaign Costs Have Fueled Excessive Partisanship

Many witnesses identified the increasing cost of elections, with the resultant need to raise more funds from interest groups, as a reason for excessive partisanship. House campaigns now cost between $300,000 to $400,000 and Sen- ate campaigns cost between $750,000 to $1,000,000.34 On a per capita basis, this cost ranges between $5.50 to $8.00 per district resident. Hotly contested debate. As noted earlier in this report, campaigns can be much higher. The high much of the money for campaigns cost of campaigns has meant that leg- comes from the lobby and interest islators are constantly concerned with groups, which support candidates in raising money. Besides distracting them order to obtain access to the candidate from the deliberative process, such reli- once elected. Once a candidate becomes ance on campaign funds also threatens dependent on these funds, he or she to make legislators less likely to assert then has a difficult time taking a posi- their independence when it comes to tion or making a statement at odds making legislative policy choices. with that group’s particular agenda. Candidates receiving large sums of such The cost of campaigns has risen money are often expected to make very dramatically for a variety of reasons. specific and uncompromising state- Vote-by-mail, an Oregon innovation, ments in support of the interest group’s has increased costs because candidates positions. While such absolute and cer- need to keep their message in front of tain statements can be helpful to voters voters for an extended period of time trying to identify a particular candi- as opposed to concentrating it in the days immediately before election day. date’s stance on issues, they can also Another reason for the increased cost lead to excessive partisanship. When a of campaigns is that campaigns have candidate takes an uncompromising po- become more professional, with paid sition during a campaign, opponents of consultants shaping the message and that position have very little hope to be content. able to work with that candidate should he or she get elected. Such rigidity raises Reliance on money from partisan inter- the stakes of the election for these est groups can polarize the campaign individuals and fosters a win-at-all-

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costs mentality. A much more divisive, paign-finance transparency. The PCOL personal and bitterly fought campaign did not make specific recommendations usually results, making reconciliation on any of these topics. Rather, it recom- with one’s opponents extremely difficult mended that a commission be formed after the election. to examine the role of campaign finance in legislative decision-making, that the In addition to the growing costs of cam- Legislature reform the use of campaign paigning and the increasing dependence funds by candidates and elected offi- of candidates on their financial contrib- cials, and that consideration be given to utors, witnesses also reported increased moving the primary election date later caucus control over campaign funding. to shorten the campaign season. (See If a legislator crosses the party line, Appendix D.) or insufficiently supports the party’s agenda, that legislator may not receive Public Ownership and Financing of adequate financial support from his or Elections her caucus in the next election. Former representative Tony Van Vliet of Corval- While the proposal for public financing lis observed that the challenge is getting of elections met with general support people “who will really level and work from journalists, lobbyists and other toward solutions” and that the main witnesses, these witnesses invariably barrier to making this happen is caucus pointed out that the proposal lacks control over campaign funding. public support and that a very vocal minority opposes it. In 1976 two of Your committee concluded that the your committee’s witnesses, Attor- financial imperatives of legislative ney General and former Speaker of electoral campaigns lead to reliance on the House Hardy Myers and former money from partisan interest groups Oregon Supreme Court Judge Hans and the caucus leadership, which in turn Linde, were instrumental in qualifying leads to excessive partisanship, and that a ballot measure — Measure 7 — for a a number of potential campaign finance constitutional amendment to provide reforms should be considered. partial public financing of elections, but voters defeated this measure 659,327 to Analyzing Campaign 263,738. Finance-Reform Options Your committee concluded that public Your committee focused on three op- financing of elections might potentially tions for addressing the negative impact minimize excessive partisanship, but of campaign costs on partisanship: (1) your committee did not obtain enough public ownership and financing of elec- evidence or conduct sufficient research tions, (2) campaign contribution and to conclude that adopting such a system spending limits and (3) greater cam- would successfully reduce the influence

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of those who have substantial money Some witnesses, including opinion re- to spend on elections. Furthermore, searchers Tim Hibbitts and Bob Moore, your committee doubted that sufficient maintained that campaign finance political will and public support existed legislation would actually contribute to to institute such a system state-wide. polarization. When direct contributions However, if the City of Portland’s to campaigns are limited, more money “voter-owned elections” system proves flows to political action committees that to work well, that success might make are not responsible to any candidate it worthwhile to consider adopting a and that frequently engage in malicious similar system for state elections. campaign advertising. The journalists Jeff Mapes ofThe Oregonian, Charles Beggs of the Associated Press, and Limits on Campaign Contributions Peter Wong of The Statesman Journal and Spending also pointed out that campaign finance Various provisions for campaign con- limitations have not reduced excessive tribution or spending limits in Oregon partisanship in Congress. have been proposed over time. In 1997, Your committee agreed that plac- the Oregon Supreme Court struck down ing limits on campaign contributions limits on campaign contributions and would not alleviate excessive partisan- expenditures as violating the right to ship as money would likely be used in engage in political speech protected in other ways by groups less accountable 35 the Oregon Constitution. The follow- than candidates. Your committee was ing year proponents of campaign finance also concerned about the questionable reform passed Measure 62, which sought constitutionality of restricting people’s to amend the Constitution, but the rights to support candidates or issues. Oregon Supreme Court invalidated that measure because it unconstitutionally Greater Campaign Finance violated the separate vote requirement Transparency of the Constitution.36 More recently, in 2006, proponents of campaign finance In 2005 the Legislature passed HB reform succeeded in placing Measures 46 3458, directing the secretary of state and 47 on the ballot. Ballot Measure 46, to develop an electronic filing system which did not pass, proposed amend- where campaign committees would be ing the Constitution to allow campaign required to file contribution and expen- contribution and expenditure limita- diture information. The system, called tions. Ballot Measure 47, which did pass, ORESTAR, became fully functional on proposed the specific limitations. Since January 1, 2007. The law creating ORE- Ballot Measure 47 was dependent upon STAR required that: the passage of Measure 46, these limita- • Candidates and political tions have not become law. action committees file

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campaign finance information explained in more detail below. Your electronically with the secretary of committee attempted to determine state’s office. whether these potential reforms might • Candidates and committees con- reduce or increase partisanship by ex- tinuously report campaign finance amining each reform against features of information, with most reports due good electoral and legislative processes within thirty days of the transac- hurt by excessive partisanship. tion; in the six weeks prior to As stated previously, these positive the election the filing deadline is features include: ease of recruitment of reduced to within seven days of the well-qualified candidates for legislative transaction; and certain candidates office; high electoral participation, and and committees must report contri- the election of legislators who serve butions during a legislative session all voters, not just those affiliated with within two days. major parties or strong special interests; • Contributor and payee aggregates good relationships and civility among must be reported once specified legislators; deliberation and resolution thresholds have been reached. of policy issues with input from the majority and minority; and public respect In the words of Troy Nichols, chief of for and confidence in the Legislature. staff to former House Speaker Karen Minnis during the 2005 legislative ses- All of the reforms your committee sion, the system would offer “real-time, considered have advantages over our prompt, frequent reporting that people current system and have the potential can see and understand.” It would make to mitigate excessive partisanship. This candidates “think twice,” he added, report provides your committee’s analy- “about taking that large contribution.” sis below but does not make a recommendation for any single one of them. The new web-based contribution report- Minimizing partisanship is not the sole ing system certainly has provided in- criterion for a good election system, creased transparency, but it is too early and a more comprehensive analysis to tell if this greater transparency has should inform any decision to overhaul diminished excessive partisanship. Oregon’s elections system.

Election Reforms

Your committee also examined a number of other potential election system reforms, including nonpartisan elections, the top-two primary, instant run-off voting, multi-member districts, and fusion voting, all of which will be

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Election Key Characteristic Status Reform Nonpartisan Ballot does not identify Nebraska possesses the only nonpartisan Elections party affiliation of candi- state legislature. Many county and city dates. elections in Oregon and across the U.S. are nonpartisan. PCOL recommended consideration of this reform. Top-Two All candidates participate Used in several states, including Wash- Primary in one primary, and the top ington. Recommended by PCOL in 2006. two candidates advance to Ballot measure defeated in 2008. the general election. Instant Voters rank all candidates Used by a few local jurisdictions in the Run-Off / on the ballot. Votes for the U.S., but none in Oregon. Advocates have Ranked- last-place candidate are introduced instant-run-off bills several Choice Voting reallocated to voters’ next times in the Oregon Legislature. preferences. This process repeats until one candidate has a majority of the votes. Multi- Legislative districts are U.S. Senate districts have two members. Member made larger so that two or The Oregon Legislature had multi-mem- Districts / more candidates are elected ber districts prior to the 1970s. Proportional from each district. Representa- tion Fusion Voting A minor party can endorse Legal in seven states, but only actively the same candidate as a used in New York and Connecticut. The major party, and voters Working Families Party, which is active in can select which party they New York, is advocating for fusion voting prefer when they cast their in Oregon. votes for that candidate.

Nonpartisan Elections / and voters, and simply serves to narrow Nonpartisan Legislature the field to two candidates for the general election. Only one state, Nebraska, In a nonpartisan election, the ballot lists holds nonpartisan elections for its candidates without identifying their Legislature and organizes its Legislature party affiliation. If a “primary” election along nonpartisan lines. Nebraska’s Leg- exists at all, it is open to all candidates islature has no majority or minority cau-

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cuses. During the 2005 Oregon Legisla- Top-Two Primary tive session, Democratic Senator Charlie Ringo sponsored legislation that would In a top-two primary, all registered have made the Oregon Legislature voters, regardless of party affiliation or nonpartisan, but the bill did not make non-affiliation, would receive the same it out of the Senate’s Rules Committee. primary ballot and would be free to vote In 2006, the PCOL recommended that for any candidate seeking to advance to each house of the Legislature should be the general election. The two candidates free to determine whether its members receiving the most votes would then will be elected with partisan labels. (See advance to the general election. Those Appendix D.) two candidates might be from the same political party, from different parties, or Your committee is of the opinion that report no party affiliation at all. a nonpartisan legislature might result in better deliberation and resolution In 2006, the PCOL recommended the creation of what it referred to as an of policy issues because agendas and “open” primary, but which in the politi- debates would not be controlled by cal science literature is more commonly party leadership — a type of control understood as a top-two primary. (See that your committee concluded had led Appendix D.) Washington state held its to excessive partisanship in the past. first top-two primary in 2008. In addition, your committee believes that a nonpartisan legislature would In 2008, supporters of the top-two pri- result in improved civility and better mary in Oregon succeeded in gathering relationships between legislators of dif- enough signatures to place a top-two ferent political ideologies. But although primary proposal on the ballot. A sepa- independent voters and voters in the rate City Club committee recommended political minority would have a greater against supporting that ballot initiative. chance to participate, voters in general That committee expressed concerns that would have to make more of an effort to a top-two primary might decrease voter learn about policy issues and legislators’ participation in the general election, as positions, as voters would not have the limiting the general election to two can- parties to define the issues for them. didates might exclude some of Oregon’s Your committee was concerned, there- qualified political parties from the gen- fore, that less motivated voters might eral election, making some voters affili- pay insufficient attention to issues ated with those unrepresented parties without some partisan guidance, giving less likely to participate. The committee activist voters and partisan interest also expressed concern that moderate groups greater influence, a factor that voters might run the risk of diluting your committee concluded had led to their influence by spreading their votes excessive partisanship under the pres- among numerous moderate candidates, ent system. thereby allowing a minoity

50 51 City Club of Portland Bridging the Partisan Divide of diehard supporters of extreme can- Instant Run-Off / Ranked-Choice didates to advance their candidates to Voting the general election. That committee also observed that national and societal In an instant run-off election, voters influences contribute to excessive rank all the candidates on the ballot. partisanship in Oregon and questioned Voters’ first choices are tallied first. Then the candidate with the least votes whether electoral changes at the state is eliminated. The votes for that candi- level could ameliorate the problem.37 date are reallocated to other candidates The top-two primary initiative ultimate- based on voters’ second choices. That ly was defeated at the polls. process continues until two candidates Although the 2008 City Club ballot mea- remain. The candidate with more than sure report expressed concerns about 50 percent of the vote wins. the potentially negative unintended As an illustration, in an election with consequences of the top-two primary, three candidates and one hundred vot- the Washington top-two primary ers, the initial tally might look like this: system, which has only been in place since 2008, provides a valuable oppor- • Candidate A (conservative) 40 votes tunity for Oregonians to observe how • Candidate B (moderate) 35 votes such a system would operate in practice • Candidate C (liberal) 25 votes over time. Your committee encourages observers to pay close attention in Candidate C is the first to be eliminated, particular to the following: (1) whether and the 25 votes for that candidate are voter participation increases or decreas- redistributed. If 20 of the voters who es in the primary election and in the preferred Candidate C listed Candidate general election, particularly in districts B as their second choice and the other that are predominantly Democratic or 5 listed Candidate A as their second choice, Candidate B would be elected Republican, (2) whether vote dilution and the final tally would look like this: affects moderate candidates more than extreme candidates in the primary, (3) • Candidate B (moderate) 55 votes whether the general election winners in • Candidate A (conservative) 45 votes predominantly Democratic or Republi- can districts tend to be more moderate In an instant run-off system, there than in the past due to the influence of may be only a general election, with minority-party voters in the primary no primary election. Another possible and (4) whether elected legislators variation involves using the instant who compromise with opposing party run-off method in the party primaries, members on major policy issues are able as well as in the general election. A few to win reelection with the support of local jurisdictions in the United States cross-over voters. have adopted instant run-off voting, including San Francisco and Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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Your committee believes that an instant fill seats from their candidates, typi- run-off system would promote better cally according to a ranked candidate dialogue during campaigns, as minor list. parties would more likely be involved and candidates would also likely need Your committee saw some potential for to reach out to a broader spectrum of proportional representation to improve voters in order to win “second choice” voter participation and for the Legis- votes. Your committee also thought that lature to become more representative the need to appeal to a broad spectrum of the population. Otherwise, your committee was divided on the potential of voters would make the Legislature impact of multi-member districts on more representative of the state as a excessive partisanship. whole. Your committee also thought that instant run-off elections had good potential to increase voter participa- Fusion Voting tion because all voters would be able In fusion voting, a candidate can seek to express their strongest preferences the nomination of both a major and a while also having a say about other minor party. Voters supporting that candidates, potentially drawing in more candidate have the choice of casting supporters of minority candidates. their votes either on the major party ticket or on the minor party ticket. Multi-Member Districts / Therefore, voters can express their sup- Proportional Representation port of a minor party’s platform without “throwing away” their votes on a candi- Proportional representation uses date who has no real chance of winning. larger districts from which two or In this way, fusion voting shares one of more members are elected, rather the main advantages of instant run-off than one member of the Legislature voting. Fusion voting has been adopted being elected from each district. The in a few places in the United States, U.S. Senate is organized along these including New York State. lines, with two senators represent- ing each state. In the past, Oregon Your committee thought fusion voting legislators represented multi-member would allow more viewpoints to be ex- districts. The Legislature abolished pressed during campaigns, but some of multi-member districts in a special those views could be fringe or extreme, session in 1971.38 Nineteen states cur- causing more division than dialogue. rently have multi-member districts for Your committee also thought that their Legislatures, including Alaska, fusion voting could motivate more sup- Nevada and Washington. Europe also porters of minor parties to participate has a form of proportional represen- in elections. tation, where voters vote for parties rather than candidates, and the parties

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In summary, your committee concluded Chapter that all of the above alternative voting Recommendations systems had the potential to minimize partisanship, but your committee also ➤➤ The Legislature should refer to concluded that it did not currently have voters a constitutional amendment the tools to recommend for or against establishing a nonpartisan redis- any of the specific alternatives. Your tricting commission. committee, however, believes that all of ➤➤ City Club of Portland should these alternatives are worthy of further establish a research committee to study. prepare a detailed recommendation for a nonpartisan redistricting Chapter Conclusions commission.

➤➤ Oregon’s current election sys- ➤➤ City Club should establish a re- tem contributes to excessive search committee to study alterna- partisanship by disadvantaging tive election systems. independent candidates, centrist candidates, and candidates who are willing to compromise with members of the opposing party on major policy issues.

➤➤ Excessively partisan considerations frequently influence the redistricting process, giving the party in power at the time of redistricting a tool to increase its power in a way that does not accurately represent the political make-up of the voters.

➤➤ The need to raise campaign funds leads to excessive partisanship because legislators are dependent on party leadership and interest groups aligned with the parties.

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HOW THE PUBLIC AND THE MEDIA FUEL EXCESSIVE PARTISANSHIP

This report has focused primarily on Studies by the National Conference features of our electoral system and Leg- of State Legislatures suggest that the islature that contribute to partisanship. public neither understands how govern- For the most part, these features can be ment works nor feels connected to those modified through changes in law, proce- who get elected.39 Therefore, excessively dure or administration. Many witnesses partisan pressure on the Legislature also commented on how the public and may, to some extent, result from the the media contribute to partisanship fact that the public does not fully ap- in the Legislature. preciate the difficul- Your committee “[E]xcessive partisanship ties of governance. concluded that ex- can result in part from the When the public cessive partisanship public’s lack of knowledge does not appre- can result in part regarding legislative ciate the costs, from the public’s processes and … this lack consequences or lack of knowledge of knowledge in turn tradeoffs that come regarding legisla- stems from the relatively from adopting poli- tive processes and limited and poor quality cies, the public can that this lack of of media coverage of the put enormous pres- knowledge in turn Legislature.” sure on legislators stems from the rela- to adopt uncompro- tively limited and mising and exces- poor quality of media coverage of the sively partisan agendas that may not Legislature. While public attitudes and be entirely good for the state. Were the media coverage are generally beyond the public to gain a deeper understanding reach of policy reforms, your committee of the workings of the Legislature and provides here an analysis of how the me- the issues the Legislature considers, the dia and public attitudes drive excessive public might not insist on such partisan partisanship. agendas or be so quick to punish those

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who compromise. This better under- The PCOL also recommended that the standing would give legislators more Legislature improve public access to the room to develop creative and effective legislative process by providing bet- solutions to policy and budget problems. ter notice of meetings and bills under consideration, and that the Legislature Former Senate Majority Leader Kate contribute to funding a public broad- Brown, a Democrat from Portland, casting television channel for the 2007 thought the Legislature might educate session on a trial basis. (See Appendix the public and help mitigate exces- D.) In response, the Oregon Legislature, sive partisanship by holding more Oregon Public Broadcasting, Southern public hearings and meetings outside Oregon Public Television, the Oregon of Salem. Indeed, the Legislature has University System and the Oregon recently endeavored to do so. During Public Affairs Network joined together the 2005 session, the Legislature held to form the Oregon Channel pilot proj- hearings in twenty-two counties where ect, which broadcasted gavel-to-gavel it heard testimony from more than a coverage of the 2007 Oregon Legislative thousand Oregonians. The Legislature session and other state government and also changed the requirement for public public affairs events. Your committee notice before hearings from 24 to 48 hours, giving the public more time to concluded that the Legislature should prepare and respond. continue its efforts to increase public knowledge of the legislative process and that the Legislature should continue to hold hearings around the state in order to expand opportunities for public participation in policy making.

Your committee also concluded that the amount and quality of media coverage of the Oregon political system must also be improved to help mitigate excessive partisanship. The number of reporters in Salem covering the Legislature and governmental issues has declined over the last several decades, leaving the public without sufficiently balanced and -in formative coverage of legislative policy issues and processes.40 Several witnesses expressed the view that this media phenomenon is a part of the coarsening of society. Analyst Tim Hibbits tied it to increasing attention on ratings: “You

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don’t generate high ratings by saying, As traditional media have sought to re- ‘Let’s have a rational discussion.’” main profitable by decreasing state and local government news coverage, news- The Center for Media and Public Af- letters, talk radio commentators and fairs (CMPA) conducted an analysis of blogs have sought to fill some of that political advertising and political news vacuum. These alternate news sources coverage in the Chicago, Milwaukee and tend to have different missions than Portland markets, based on the month traditional media. Some are providers before the 2004 November election. of entertainment, such as talk radio, During that month, of all the televi- which mixes news and reaction. Others, sion news aired in the Portland market, like blogs, provide venues for discussion only 4.9 percent of airtime was devoted and opinion. These sources of “infotain- to coverage of political campaigns and ment” and discussion do not have the elections. Seventy-eight percent of this degree of objectivity that the public very limited coverage was devoted to expects from traditional media. In es- the presidential race. Conversely, only sence, a “buyer-beware” marketplace of 1 percent focused on state legislative opinions and ideas has been created. The or local candidate races. In fact, races multiplicity of sources may also make in Washington state and other states it harder and more time consuming garnered more coverage in the Portland television market than Oregon state and to judge the credibility of a particular local races.41 source of information. Moreover, excessive partisanship can be exacerbated by This limited political coverage also these information sources to the extent lacked substantive content. CMPA that people rely on others’ strong opin- found that over 60 percent of the local ions as news. television election coverage focused on campaign strategy or the “horse race” Although several witnesses expressed aspect of campaigns. Only 24 percent of hope that the Internet and expanded these stories focused on the underlying use of blogs will increase information issues at stake in the election.42 These available to the public and improve the numbers suggest that the media is much quality of political coverage, Profes- more inclined to cover the tactics and sors Russ Dondero of Pacific University poll-results of campaigns than they are and William Lunch of Oregon State to inform the public about the policy University, and political analyst Jim implications of their votes. One legisla- Moore, suggest that such optimistic tive veteran refused to blame the media, claims may underestimate the public’s however, because “the public is hooked desire to filter information sources to on the thirty-second sound-bite and is suit personal or ideological biases. Some not very tolerant of much detail.” Media newer forms of electronic media, such as outlets are simply not rewarded for in- blogs and list-serves, allow the public to depth coverage. seek information and then immediately

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react to that information with their own conflict and ignores nuanced delibera- thoughts and analysis.43 As a result, tion, the public loses confidence in the news forums are experiencing increased Legislature and legislative processes. editorializing. Like the consumers of Balanced and thorough coverage of is- political talk radio, readers of blogs and sues and policy positions, accompanied newer forms of electronic media must by accurate information about legisla- be more politically aware to understand tors themselves, is essential to the the difference between these forums development of an informed citizenry and mainstream news media. that understands the complex deliberative processes that are essential to good Nevertheless, your committee recog- lawmaking. nized that this tendency for non-traditional media to exacerbate excessive partisanship may be offset to some degree by astute use of blogs. These resources allow readers to explore, weigh and compare numerous available opinions and discussions on a particular subject. The problem, of course, is that this approach depends entirely on the willingness of readers to seek out balanced perspectives and their ability to find credible material.

Your committee concluded that the multiplicity of non-traditional media might allow for the dissemination of a greater variety of views, but that this opportunity must be balanced by individual responsibility to use these resources wisely. The Legislature itself also has the opportunity, which many members have been using, to provide significant information through its web pages.

As explained above, a citizenry that ap- preciates the complexities of governance is less likely to insist on excessively partisan agendas and to punish legislators who make pragmatic compromises. The media clearly plays a crucial role in this regard. When media coverage focuses on

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Chapter Conclusions

➤➤ Limited and poor media coverage of Oregon’s political system contributes to excessive partisanship.

➤➤ A public that is poorly informed about legislative processes and policy issues contributes to political polarization.

Chapter Recommendations

➤➤ The Legislature should continue to build upon its efforts to conduct legislative business in communities throughout the state and to publish information and proceedings online.

➤➤ City Club should support efforts to increase substantive and objective policy news reporting in the media.

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CONCLUSIONS

1. Partisanship serves to help develop and clarify competing visions of what is best for Oregon and it helps focus the activities of voters and legislators from different parties. 2. Excessive partisanship is widely perceived as having increased over the past several decades in Oregon. 3. Excessive partisanship is a problem in Oregon that should be addressed because it impairs legislators’ ability to deliberate and collaborate on legislation, results in legislative gridlock, discourages qualified candidates from running for office and leads to voter disaffection. 4. Limited and poor media coverage of the political system in Oregon has contributed to excessive partisanship. 5. A public that is poorly informed about legislative processes and policy issues contributes to political polarization. 6. Oregon’s Republican and Democratic state parties are grassroots organizations that serve the valuable function of involving citizens in the political process, but they have little direct involvement in the state Legislature. 7. Legislative caucus leaders and presiding officers possess more power than the state parties when it comes to pressuring legislators to support partisan agendas. 8. Strong interest groups aligned with either the Democrats or the Republicans often reinforce excessive partisanship by pressuring legislators to commit to uncompromising agendas. 9. Oregon’s current election system contributes to excessive partisanship by disadvantaging independent candidates, centrist candidates, and candidates who are willing to compromise with members of the opposing party on major policy issues. 10. Excessively partisan considerations frequently influence the redistricting process, giving the party in power at the time of redistricting a tool to increase its power in a way that does not accurately represent the political make-up of the voters. 11. Legislators become dependent on party leadership and interest groups aligned with the parties because of the need to raise campaign funds. 12. Because of the structure of Oregon’s Legislature, which is characterized by a strong-leader system, the leaders have tremendous discretion and set the tone for partisanship or collaboration.

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13. As most of Oregon’s legislative rules are subject to revision by simple-majority vote, they can be — and have been — easily manipulated to satisfy the immediate demands of the majority party in a particular house. 14. Oregon’s legislative rules currently give undue authority to its presiding officers, who can easily use these rules to control both committee assignments and the movement of legislation in a way that demands loyalty from majority party members and that excludes members of the minority party from a meaningful role in the legislative process. 15. The strong leader system fosters excessive partisanship by rewarding a winner- takes-all approach to controlling the Senate and House of Representatives. 16. Ostensibly nonpartisan administrative staff officers are subject to the imperatives of the party in control of a particular house. 17. While committees remain important in the Legislature, their power has somewhat diminished because of the increasing power of the caucuses. 18. Courteous and extensive working relationships among experienced legislators contribute to good deliberation. 19. The Legislature has experienced an unraveling of relationships, which has inhibited its ability to function well as a deliberative body.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Administration of the Legislature

1. The Legislature should hold pre-session conference retreats to provide more training and more opportunities for legislators to forge lasting and productive professional relationships across party lines. 2. The Legislature should continue to build upon its efforts to conduct legislative business in communities throughout the state and to publish information and proceedings online.

Legislative Rules and Procedures

3. The House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that establish proportional representation of party members on committees and permit the leaders of each caucus to determine which of its members to appoint to committees. When making committee assignments, caucus leaders should take into account the experience, interest and seniority of legislators. 4. The House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that require the vice- chair of each committee to be a member of the minority party, and committee chairs should consult with vice-chairs in developing committee agendas. 5. While the House’s Teamwork Bill is a step in the right direction, the House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules that allow each member of the Legislature to require a committee hearing on a predetermined number of bills during each legislative session. 6. The House should maintain and the Senate should adopt rules permitting a majority of each of their members to require a committee or floor hearing on a bill. In addition, the House and Senate should adopt and maintain rules permitting a substantial minority of each of their members to require a committee or floor hearing on a bill that has already been passed by the other chamber. 7. The House should maintain and the Senate should adopt rules ensuring that the Secretary of the Senate and the Chief Clerk of the House are nonpartisan and serve members of both parties, not at the sole discretion of the presiding officers. In addition, the House and Senate should employ permanent staff with knowledge of substantive policy areas to support the work of committees. 8. Once the above rules are adopted, the House and Senate should require a supermajority to change these and other rules that protect each member’s right to participate in the legislative process.

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Constitutional Amendments

9. The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment establishing a nonpartisan redistricting commission. 10. The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would establish annual legislative sessions of limited length, commencing in March, shortly after the state Office of Economic Analysis releases its first revenue projections for the year. 11. The Legislature should refer to voters a constitutional amendment that would establish four-year terms for members of the House of Representatives and six-year terms for members of the Senate.

Further Study and Advocacy

12. City Club of Portland should establish a research committee to study alternative election systems. 13. City Club of Portland should establish a research committee to prepare a detailed recommendation for a nonpartisan redistricting commission. 14. City Club should support efforts to increase substantive and objective policy news reporting in the media.

Respectfully submitted,

Kori Allen Tony Iaccarino, research & policy director Alan Brickley Morgan O’Toole-Smith, research adviser Carolyn Bullard Sue Thomas, research adviser Mary Ellen Page Farr Kerry Forrell Andrew Käser Barbara Mahoney, vice-chair Scott Maxwell Rick Nitti Bill Savage Roger Smith Scott Warnick Bonnie Gee Yosick Caroline Harris Crowne, chair

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CITATIONS

1 Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com; Merriam-Webster’s Online Thesaurus, http://www.m-w.com.

2 “Executive Summary,” Public Commission on the Oregon Legislature Final Report, November 13, 2006.

3 Maura Reynolds, “DeLay Takes Parting Shot at Liberals as He Exits House,” The Oregonian, June 9, 2006.

4 Richard A. Clucas and Mark Henkels, “A State Divided,” in Richard A. Clucas , Mark Henkels and Brent S. Steel eds., Oregon Politics and Government: Progressives versus Conservative Populists (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), p. 4.

5 Jeff Mapes, Alex Pulaski and Gail Kinsey Hill, “The Nine States of Oregon,”The Oregonian, November 2, 2003.

6 “Executive Summary,” PCOL Final Report, November 13, 2006.

7 Clucas, “The Legislature,” inOregon Politics, p. 125.

8 Clucas, “Principal-Agent Theory and the Power of State House Speakers,”Legislative Studies Quarterly 26 (May 2001), pp. 319-38.

9 Clucas, “The Legislature,” inOregon Politics, p. 124.

10 Oregon Blue Book.

11 “New Lawmaker Earns Praise as He Learns Job,” The Oregonian, June 21, 2007.

12 Russ Dondero and William Lunch, “Interest Groups,” in Oregon Politics, p. 86.

13 Ibid., p. 89

14 ORS 260.076.

15 Clucas, “The Legislature,” inOregon Politics, p. 125.

16 Oregon Blue Book, p. 145-149.

17 “Buckley’s Enthusiasm Catches on in Salem,” Ashland Daily Tidings, March 31, 2007.

18 Lehman v. Bradbury, 334 Or. 579 (2002).

19 “Oregon’s Wild Ride with Term Limits,” The Oregonian, November 3, 2006.

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20 Juliet Eilperin, Fight Club Politics: How Partisanship is Poisoning the House of Repre- sentatives (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006), pp. 6, 31.

21 http://www.leg.state.or.us/faq/faqinfo.htm#pay.

22 Secretary of State’s Office.

23 “Making the Initiative Work for Oregon: A City Club Report on Reforming the Ini- tiative, Referendum and Referral Systems in Oregon,” City Club of Portland Bulletin, vol. 90, no. 32 (January 11, 2008).

24 Oregon Constitution, Article IV, Section 6.

25 ORS 188.010.

26 Clucas, “The Legislature,” inOregon Politics, p. 122.

27 Oregon Legislative Policy & Research Office, “Basics about Redistricting,” October 1999, http://www.leg.state.or.us/comm/commsrvs/redistbasics. pdf#search=%22Oregon%20redistricting%202001%22; National Committee for an Effective Congress, Redistricting Resource Center, Oregon, http://www.ncec.org/ redistricting/state4266.html?stateselect=OR.

28 The Oregonian, August 26, 2006.

29 Hartung v. Bradbury, 332 Or. 570 (2001).

30 Steven Hill and Rob Richie, “Rigging Elections, the Hidden Scandal of Redistrict- ing,” San Diego Union Tribune, May 23, 2004.

31 N. McCarty, K.I. Poole and H. Rosenthal, “Does Gerrymandering Cause Polariza- tion?” December, 20, 2006, p. 1, http://www.princeton.edu/~nmccarty/papers. htm; Justin Buchler, “Competition, Representation and Redistricting,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vo. 17, No. 4, pp. 431-65 (2005); Mark A. Kayser and Drew A. Linzer, “Electoral Competitiveness: Toward a Universal Measure,” April 2007, http://mail.rochester.edu/~mksr/.

32 Jeffrey Toobin, “The Great Election Grab: When Does Gerrymandering Become a Threat to Democracy?”The New Yorker, December 8, 2003.

33 The Council for Excellence in Government and The Campaign Legal Center, “The Shape of Representative Democracy,” June 2005, p. 3.

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34 Interview with Troy Nichols, chief of staff to Speaker Karen Minnis, January 30, 2006.

35 Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or. 514 (1997).

36 Swett v. Bradbury, 333 Or. 597 (2002).

37 “A City Club Report on Ballot Measure 65,” City Club of Portland Bulletin, vol. 91, no. 13 (October 17, 2008).

38 E.D. Dover, “Parties and Elections,” in Oregon Politics, p. 48.

39 Alan Rosenthal, et al., The Case for Representative Democracy: What Americans Should Know about Their Legislatures, National Conference of State Legislatures (2001).

40 James Sinks, “Media Have Retreated from Political Coverage,” The Bend Bulletin, September 27, 2006.

41 “2004 Campaign News Study in Chicago, Milwaukee and Portland Markets,” Center for Media and Public Affairs, August 10, 2005.

42 Ibid.

43 Russ Dondero, William Lunch and Jim Moore, “Media,” in Oregon Politics, p. 113.

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APPENDIX A: COMMITTEE CHARGE, MEMBERSHIP AND PROCESS

After interviewing four leading Oregon political figures to understand better how partisan behavior influences the Oregon political system, City Club’s Research Board and Board of Governors charged your committee with determining if and when partisan behavior is an impediment to effective governance and, if so, what should be done about it. The primary objectives of the study were to “(1) define partisanship and investigate its impact on Oregon’s political system and state government’s ability to effectively govern and resolve key issues and (2) recommend possible solutions for any negative impacts of partisanship, as well as ways to support elements of the political system that should be continued.”

Your committee, which convened in October 2005, includes fourteen City Club members who applied for membership on the committee and were screened for conflicts of interest. Your committee includes members of both major political parties and nonaffiliated voters — registered voters who are not members of any political party. At the outset of this study, your committee acknowledged the difficulties inherent in analyzing partisanship without reference to individual beliefs or biases. Nevertheless, the members of your committee endeavored to conduct its inquiry in a fair and objective manner. Every effort was made to ensure that your committee’s research and deliberations reflected an open, honest and rigorous analysis of this complex issue. Your committee gave time and attention to understanding the perspectives of both major political parties, as well as the points of view of people from urban, suburban and rural Oregon.

Your committee met weekly to conduct its research and prepare this report. Your committee interviewed 41 witnesses including political scientists, lobbyists, pollsters, members of the Senate and House of Representatives, legislative staff, directors of political parties, members of the media, and former officeholders (Appendix B). Mem- bers of your committee participated in or observed meetings of different political groups. In addition, committee members considered relevant scholarly material and monitored media statewide for contemporary information related to the study topic (Appendix C).

Your committee also closely monitored the proceedings of the Public Commission on the Oregon Legislature. The Commission was created by the 73rd Legislature in Sen- ate Bill 1084, which passed both houses and was signed by the governor in July 2005. All 30 members of the Commission were approved by both the Democratic President

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of the Senate and by the Republican Speaker of the House. The work of the Commis- sion was the first review of its kind since 1974. It was given the broad charge of seeking ways to improve the Legislature’s “administration, procedures, facilities, staffing and overall capacity” to ensure “that the Legislature can meet the increasing demands of legislative work and perform its functions as an equal and coordinate branch of state government.” The Commission adopted its final report on November 13, 2006. Many of the subjects considered by the Commission were beyond the scope of your committee’s study of partisanship. This report highlights those recommendations of the Commission that relate to the subject of partisanship. (See Appendix D.)

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APPENDIX B: WITNESSES

Titles listed below are those held at time of interview:

Vic Atiyeh Former Governor, State of Oregon Vic Backlund Former Representative, State of Oregon Dave Barrows Lobbyist, Dave Barrows & Associates Charles Beggs Former journalist, Associated Press Bill Bradbury Secretary of State, State of Oregon Kate Brown Senate Majority Leader, State of Oregon Richard Clucas Political scientist, Portland State University Peter Courtney President of the Senate, State of Oregon Robert Eisinger Political scientist, Lewis & Clark College Sal Esquivel Representative, State of Oregon Ted Ferrioli Senate Minority Leader, State of Oregon Mike Greenfield Former legislative administrator, State of Oregon Paul Gronke Political scientist, Reed College Judy Hall Secretary of the Senate, State of Oregon Tim Hibbitts Opinion researcher, Davis, Hibbitts & Midghall, Inc. Phil Keisling Former Secretary of State, State of Oregon Ramona Kenady Chief Clerk of the House, State of Oregon Amy Langdon Former Executive Director, Oregon Republican Party Hans Linde Former Supreme Court Justice, State of Oregon Bill Lunch Political scientist, Oregon State University Jeff Mapes Journalist, The Oregonian Pat McCormick Lobbyist, Conkling, Fiskum & McCormick, Inc. Jeff Merkley Speaker of the House, State of Oregon Bob Moore Opinion researcher, Moore Information, Inc. Hardy Myers Attorney General, State of Oregon Troy Nichols Staff, Oregon House of Representatives Robert Packwood Former state legislator and U.S. Senator Norma Paulus Former Secretary of State, State of Oregon Neel Pender Former Executive Director, Oregon Democratic Party Eileen Qutub Former Representative and Senator, State of Oregon Charles Ringo Former Senator, State of Oregon Barbara Roberts Former Governor, State of Oregon Jim Scherzinger Former member, Legislative Revenue Committee Wayne Scott Representative, State of Oregon Lane Shetterly Former Representative; Director, Land Conservation and Development Commission, State of Oregon

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Mike Thorne Former Senator, State of Oregon Tony Van Vliet Former Representative, State of Oregon Ben Westlund Senator, State of Oregon Max Williams Former Representative; Director, Department of Corrections, State of Oregon Peter Wong Journalist, Statesman Journal Duncan Wyse President, Oregon Business Council

In addition, members of your committee attended the 2006 Dorchester Conference in Seaside, Oregon, where your committee hosted an open discussion of partisanship in the Legislature, and other members of your committee attended the 2006 Money In Politics Research Action Forum (MiPRAP) and the Oregon Alliance to Reform Media Conference, “Our Media Our Democracy Action Forum.”

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APPENDIX C: BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abramowitz, Alan and Kyle Saunders. “Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? The Reality of a Polarized America.” The Forum. Vol. 3, No. 2 (2005).

Amy, Douglas J. “How Promotional Representation Elections Work.” PR Library. www. mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damny/prlib.htm.

Anderson, R. Bruce. “All Is Not Fair: The Effects of Changing Committee Representa- tion on Partisan Conflict in Transforming Legislatures.”American Politics Quar- terly. Vol. 28, No. 3 (2000).

Baer, April. “Crossing Over.” Oregon Public Broadcasting, May 15, 2006.

Bartels, Larry M. “Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996.” American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 44, No. 1 (2000).

Brooks, Oakley. “What’s the Open Primary Payoff?”Oregon Business, April 2006.

Buchler, Justin. “Competition, Representation and Redistricting,” Journal of Theoreti- cal Politics. Vol. 17, No. 4 (2005): 431-63.

The Campaign Legal Center, Council for Excellence in Government, and League of Women Voters. “Building a National Redistricting Reform Movement,” April 2006.

The Center for Media and Public Affairs. “2004 Campaign News Study in Chicago, Milwaukee and Portland Markets.” Presented to The Media Policy Program of the Campaign Legal Center, August 10, 2005.

“A City Club Report on Ballot Measure 65.” City Club of Portland Bulletin. Vol. 91, No. 13 (October 17, 2008).

The Council for Excellence in Government and The Campaign Legal Center. “The Shape of Representative Democracy,” June 2005.

Clucas, Richard A., Mark Henkels, and Brent S. Steel, eds. Oregon Politics and Govern- ment: Progressive Versus Conservative Populists. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005.

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Comer, John C. and James B. Johnson, eds. Nonpartisanship in the Legislative Process: Essays on the Nebraska Legislature. Washington, D.C.: University Press of Ameri- ca, 1983.

Drake, Peter. “Instant Runoff Voting: The Time Has Come,” 2005. www.blueoregon.com/2005/03/instant_runoff_.html.

Editorial Board. The Oregonian. “At Long Last, A Warrior for Tax Reform,” March 5, 2006. “It’s Not Just a Matter of Time in Salem,” November 13, 2005. “Oregon’s Wild Ride with Term Limits: Mark Simmons’ Experience as Oregon House Speaker Holds Lessons for Voters Reconsidering Legislative Limits,” November 2, 2006. “Political Parties May Howl, But Voters Would Cheer,” November 14, 2005.

Eilperin, Juliet, Fight Club Politics: How Partisanship is Poisoning the House of Represen- tatives. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006.

Federal Communications Commission. “Do Local Owners Deliver More Localism? Some Evidence from Local Broadcast News.” June 17, 2004.

Fiorina, Morris P. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. New York: Longman Press, 2004.

Gross, Terri. “A Political Warning Shot: ‘American Theocracy.’” NPR Online, April 19, 2006.

Har, Janie. “Beaverton Senator Won’t Run for Re-Election.” The Oregonian, January 19, 2006.

Hill, Gail Kinsey. “A Deepening Divide: Central Oregon.” The Oregonian, November 9, 2003. “Seeing Beyond the Trees.” The Oregonian, November 11, 2003. “A Way of Life in Flux.” The Oregonian, November 10, 2003.

Hirsch, Sam and Thomas E. Mann. “For Election Reform, a Heartening Defeat.”The New York Times, November 11, 2005.

Howland, G., and N. Shapiro. “Moderate Landslide.” Seattle Weekly, September 15, 2004.

Kayser, Mark A., and Drew A. Linzer. “Electoral Competitiveness: Toward a Universal Measure.” April 2007.

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Kitzhaber, John. Civic Engagement—Revival or Decline? Paper presented April 12, 2005.

Kremer, Rob. “Party Favors.” BrainstormNW, March 2006.

League of Women Voters of Lane County. “Oregon Primary Election May 16, 2006.” Vol. 3, No. 1 (2006).

League of Women Voters of Portland. “Nonpartisan Voters’ Guide: May 16, 2006 Primary Election Candidates.” Vol. 36, No. 1 (2006).

Linde, Hans. “Email to Wade Fickler,” July 7, 2005. “Portland City Club Committee: Items for Study of ‘Partisanship,’” December, 15, 2005.

Macpherson, Greg. “One Ballot Plan Worth Support.” Lake Oswego Review, March 3, 2006.

“Making the Initiative Work for Oregon: A City Club Report on Reforming the Initia- tive, Referendum and Referral Systems in Oregon.” City Club of Portland Bulletin. Vol. 90, No. 32 (January 11, 2008).

Mapes, Jeff. “Backers Start Push for Open Primary.” The Oregonian, November 9, 2005. “Growing Its Own Way: Southern Oregon.” The Oregonian, November 3, 2003. “Leaning Left, Portlandia Looks to Right Itself.” The Oregonian, November 2, 2003. “Wise to its Future.” The Oregonian, November 18, 2003.

Mapes, Jeff, Alex Pulaski and Gail Kinsey Hill. “The Nine States of Oregon,”The Orego- nian, November 2, 2003.

McCarty, N., K.I. Poole and H. Rosenthal. “Does Gerrymandering Cause Polariza- tion?” December, 20, 2006. http://www.princeton.edu/~nmccarty/papers.htm.

Merkley, Jeff. “Letter to the Public Commission on the Oregon Legislature,” May 9, 2006.

Morse, Frank. “Re: Partisanship.” Email sent to the Process Committee, Public Com- mission on the Legislature, May 9, 2006.

National Conference of State Legislatures. Changes in Sizes of State Legislatures (2003).

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National Public Radio. “Departing Congressman Wary of Bipartisan Trend.” All Things Considered, May 22, 2006.

O’Donnell, Patrick J. “A Unicameral Legislature.” Journal of the American Society of Legislative Clerks and Secretaries (1996).

Oregon State Legislature. “How An Idea Becomes A Law.” www.leg.state.or.us/bills_ laws.htm.

Pildes, Richard H., “The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics.”Harvard Law Review. 28 (2004).

Public Commission on the Oregon Legislature. “A Blueprint for a 21st Century Legis- lature,” November 13, 2006.

Pulaski, Alex. “An Area Ripe for Change.” The Oregonian, November 17, 2003. “Plying an Idle Economy.” The Oregonian, November 16, 2003. “A Region on the Ropes.” The Oregonian, November 4, 2003.

Rosenthal, Alan, et al. The Case for Representative Democracy: What Americans Should Know about Their Legislatures. National Conference of State Legislatures (2001).

Reynolds, Maura. “DeLay Takes Parting Shot at Liberals as He Exits House.” The Oregonian, June 9, 2006.

Shields, Mark. “The People Have Spoken.” National Public Radio Online: This I Believe, March 3, 2006. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyId=5256345 .

Sinks, James. “Media Have Retreated from Political Coverage.” The Bend Bulletin, September 27, 2006.

“Structure and Process of the Oregon Legislature.” City Club of Portland Bulletin. Vol. 78, No. 36 (January 31, 1997).

Toobin, Jeffrey, “The Great Election Grab: When Does Gerrymandering Become a Threat to Democracy?”The New Yorker, December 8, 2003.

United States Elections Project. “Enhancing Competitiveness in Redistricting.” www. elections.gmu.edu/enhancing.htm.

Walsh, Edward. “Commission of Lawmakers Discuss Their Jobs’ Barriers.”The Orego- nian, November 8, 2005.

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Wiggins, C., K. Hamm, and C. Bell. “Interest-Group and Party Influence Agents in the Legislative Process: A Comparative State Analysis.” The Journal of Politics. Vol. 54, No. 1 (1992).

Williams, Christina. “Leadership Version 2.0: A New Oregon Requires a New Way of Doing Business.” Oregon Business, January 2006.

Wong, Peter. “Man Behind Familiar Byline Ends Career Today.” Statesman Journal, October 31, 2005. “Women Who Blazed Trails in Politics to be Honored.” Statesman Journal, Octo- ber 24, 2005.

Wright, G. and B. Schaffner. “The Influence of Party: Evidence From The Legislatures.” The American Political Science Review. Vol. 96 (2002).

Wrzenski, Rhonda. “Nebraska’s Asterisk: Vote Structuring in the ‘Non-Existent’ Leg- islature.” B.A. Thesis. Hastings College, May 2003.

Wyse, Duncan. “Before Public Commission on the Oregon Legislature,” May 22, 2006.

Zakaria, Fareed. “Too Much of a Good Thing,”The Future of Freedom. New York: Nor- ton Press, 2004.

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APPENDIX D: SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC COMMISSION ON THE OREGON LEGISLATURE, 2006

The Public Commission on the Oregon Legislature made twenty-four recommendations. They are grouped into four main categories: Recommendations for Funda- mental Reform, Recommendations for Institutional Reform, Recommendations for Reforming Legislative Operations, and Recommendations for Improving Facilities and Technology. The following are the recommendations relating to issues discussed in this report. The full list of recommendations made by the Public Commission is available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/pcol/home.htm.

Recommendations for Fundamental Reform

Open Primary* • Oregon should adopt an “open” primary, allowing all Oregon voters to nominate two candidates to appear on the general election ballot regardless of political party affiliation, or lack of party affiliation, of the elector or candidate.

Nonpartisan Legislature • Members of each house should determine whether they want to be elected with partisan labels. One house may choose to be nonpartisan and the other not. However, both houses and the Governor would need to approve legislation to modify the definition of “nonpartisan” office.

Nonpartisan State Controller • Create a nonpartisan statewide State Controller, to be selected in a manner determined by law, to manage, administer and oversee state elections and elections policy, campaign finance administration, investigations including elections and ethics issues, and legislative redistricting. . . . Redistricting will be managed by the State Controller consistent with the recommendations made in a separate proposal for a five-member redistricting commission. . . . The State Controller’s

* The PCOL used the term “open primary” loosely. In essence, the PCOL called for what is more commonly understood, in the political science literature, as a “top-two primary”.

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term of office should be no fewer than six years. The office holder will be barred from seeking statewide elected office until two years after the expiration of the six-year term.

Redistricting Commission • Establish a redistricting commission responsible for drafting legislative and congressional district plans under administration of the State Controller, a new position.

Initiative Reform • Require citizen initiative or referendum chief petitioner(s) to be registered voters in Oregon. . . . • Require a notarized statement indicating the identities and physical addresses of the top five contributors to a ballot measure signature-gathering effort to be disclosed in the Voters’ Pamphlet. . . . • Establish a regular process for considering and possibly taking legislative action on initiative proposals. . . .

Campaign Finance • Appoint a Commission on Campaign Finance Reform to examine the role of campaign finance in legislative decision-making. Reform the use of campaign funds by candidates and elected officials. Improve legislator compensation in conjunc- tion with reforms related to use of campaign funds by candidates and elected officials. Consider moving the primary election date to the first Tuesday in June or August.

Legislator Compensation • The Public Officials Compensation Commission (POCC) should be given responsibility for establishing salaries for state elected officials, removing political consideration from that process. The commission will set salaries for: the Governor; Secretary of State; State Treasurer; Attorney General; Superintendent of Public Instruction; Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries; Judges of the Supreme Court; Judges of the Court of Appeals; Circuit Court Judges; Tax Court Judges; District Attorneys and Legislators. Salaries of elected officials should be based on the duties of the office and at a level that will attract citizens of the highest quality to public service.

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Recommendations for Institutional Reform

Annual Sessions and Session Structure • The Legislative Assembly should establish a new meeting time for the 2007 legislative session and hold a legislative session in 2008. The Legislature must determine how and whether it is desirable to have annual sessions beginning with the 2009 session.

Partisanship • Presiding officers should, in practice, represent the body as a whole, and not use authority to prevent debate. Develop a more collaborative environment for discussions by majority and minority leadership regarding legislative priorities. Establish collaborative processes that include the minority in session management. Allow measures, with demonstrable evidence of a majority of members in support, to move to the floor for debate and vote. House and Senate Rules should not be used for the purpose of foreclosing access to significant policy issues. Require Vice-Chairs to be from minority parties.

Staffing Legislative Offices • Separate issue-area staff and committee staff in an effort to professionalize issue- area staff, make them more accessible to all members, and acknowledge relationships between chairs and committee staff.

Public Access • The Legislative Assembly should take steps to improve public access to the legislative process, including providing more notice about committee meetings and consideration of legislation.

Recommendations for Reforming Legislative Operations

Committees • Enhance legislator orientation curriculum to include more training in subject matter and procedural areas. Require comprehensive work plans for interim committees that prepare members for upcoming sessions. Increase continuity of both members and staff from session to interim committees. Maximize use of work groups and emphasize breadth of membership to reflect as many viewpoints in a policy discussion as possible. Require minority parties to select their

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committee members in proportion to membership of the body. Require presiding officers and members of each body to “institutionalize” the appointment of one or more members of a minority party to chair one or more significant committees or subcommittees. Keep the ability to open or reopen committees when needed during session to ensure that legislators experienced in particular subject areas are working on related bills. Establish and adhere to deadlines for committee actions including bill introductions, hearing deadlines, work session deadlines and chamber cross-over dates. Make investments in the above items.

Recommendations for Improving Facilities and Technology

Oregon Channel • The Legislature should assist in funding the Oregon Channel Pilot Program during the 2007 legislative session to determine the utility of unedited coverage of legislative meetings and other public affairs events, such as agency meetings or Supreme Court arguments on a dedicated Public Broadcasting television channel.

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APPENDIX E: OREGON GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATIVE LEADERS, 1953-2009

Length of Leg. Senate Session # Year Governor President House Speaker (Days) 47 1953 Paul Patterson (R) Eugene Marsh, Rudie Wilhelm, 100 McMinnville (R) Portland (R) 48 1955 Paul Patterson (R) Elmo Smith, Edward Geary, 115 John Day, (R) Klamath Falls (R) 49 1957 Robert Holmes (D) Boyd Overhulse, Pat Dooley, Port- 128 Madras (D) land (D) 50 1959 Mark Hatfield (R) Walter Pearson, Robert Duncan, 115 Portland (D) Medford (D) 51 1961 Mark Hatfield (R) Jean Lewis, Robert Duncan, 124 Portland (D) Medford (D) & Ben Musa, The Dalles (D) 52 1963 Mark Hatfield (R) Ben Musa, Clarence Barton, 143 The Dalles (D) Coquille (D) 53 1965 Mark Hatfield (R) Harry Boivin, Kla- F. F. Montgomery, 127 math Falls (D) Eugene (R) 54 1967 Tom McCall (R) E.D. Potts, F. F. Montgomery, 157 Grants Pass (D) Eugene (R) 55 1969 Tom McCall (R) E.D. Potts, Roger F. Smith, 131 Grants Pass (D) Burns (R) 56 1971 Tom McCall (R) John D. Burns, Roger F. Smith, 151 Portland (D) Burns (R) 57 1973 Tom McCall (R) Jason Boe, Richard Eymann, 180 Reedsport (D) Springfield (D) 58 1975 Bob Straub (D) Jason Boe, Phil Lang, 153 Reedsport (D) Portland (D) 59 1977 Bob Straub (D) Jason Boe, Phil Lang, 177 Reedsport (D) Portland (D) 60 1979 Vic Atiyeh (R) Jason Boe, Hardy Meyers, 178 Reedsport (D) Portland (D)

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Length of Leg. Senate Session # Year Governor President House Speaker (Days) 61 1981 Vic Atiyeh (R) Fred W. Heard, Vern Meyers, 202 Klamath Falls (D) Springfield (R) 62 1983 Vic Atiyeh (R) Ed Fadeley, Grattan Kerans, 187 Eugene (D) Eugene (D) 63 1985 Vic Atiyeh (R) John Kitzhaber, Vera Katz, 159 Roseburg (D) Portland (D) 64 1987 Neil Goldschmidt John Kitzhaber, Vera Katz, 168 (D) Roseburg (D) Portland (D) 65 1989 Neil Goldschmidt John Kitzhaber, Vera Katz, 177 (D) Roseburg (D) Portland (D) 66 1991 Barbara Roberts (D) John Kitzhaber, Larry Campbell, 168 Roseburg (D) Eugene (R) 67 1993 Barbara Roberts (D) Bill Bradbury, Larry Campbell, 207 Bandon (D) Eugene (R) 68 1995 John Kitzhaber (D) Gordon Smith, Bev Clarno, 153 Pendleton (R) Bend (R) 69 1997 John Kitzhaber (D) Brady Adams, Lynn Lundquist, 174 Salem (R) Powell Butte (R) 70 1999 John Kitzhaber (D) Brady Adams, Lynn Snodgrass, 195 Salem (R) Clackamas (R) 71 2001 John Kitzhaber (D) Gene Derfler, Mark Simmons, 181 Salem (R) Elgin (R) 72 2003 Ted Kulongoski (D) Peter Courtney, Karen Minnis, 227 Salem (D) Fairview (R) 73 2005 Ted Kulongoski (D) Peter Courtney, Karen Minnis, 204 Salem (D) Fairview (R) 74 2007 Ted Kulongoski (D) Peter Courtney, Jeff Merkley, 172 Salem (D) Portland (D) 75 2009 Ted Kulongoski (D) Peter Courtney, Dave Hunt, Salem (D) Clackamas (D)

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NOTES

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NOTES

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NOTES

84 City Club of Portland

Photos of the Oregon State Capitol: Legislative Administration, Oregon State Legislature All other photos by iStockphoto.com All photos used with permission 84 Report design by Susan K. Shepperd The City Club of Portland is grateful to the following sponsors for their financial support to underwrite the expense of printing and distributing research reports during the 2008–2009 Club year. Sponsors have agreed that their gifts are given and accepted without regard to selection of research topics, study methodology, or report analyses, conclusions, recommendations or other content, and without effect on decisions made by the Club to approve reports or to advocate for their recommendations.

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