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Parysa Mostajir 5225 S Parysa Mostajir 5225 S. Blackstone Ave, Chicago, IL 60615 (+1)-312-860-4821 — [email protected] — voices.uchicago.edu/pmostajir PROFESSIONAL APPOINTMENTS University of Chicago 2020 – Postdoctoral Teaching Fellow History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Science and the College University of Chicago 2015-16 Preceptor History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Science EDUCATION University of Chicago 2020 Ph. D., Conceptual & Historical Studies of Science Dissertation: Volunteering Away Humanity: A Pragmatist Critique of Scientism Committee: Robert Richards (chair), Anubav Vasudevan, Michael Rossi, Philip Kitcher (external) Columbia University in the City of New York 2017 Ivy Plus Fellow, Philosophy Department King’s College London 2011 M.A., Philosophy Dissertation: Reconciling Biological and Social Scientific Explanations University of Chicago 2015 M.A., Sociology University of Cambridge 2009 B.A./M.A. (Hons.), Archaeology & Anthropology Dissertation: Constructions of Iranian Nationalism RESEARCH INTERESTS Specialization: History and philosophy of science; History and philosophy of social science; Science and values; American pragmatism. Competence: History of philosophy of science (19th/20th centuries); Feminist epistemology and philosophy of science. 1 AWARDS, HONOURS, AND FELLOWSHIPS Social Sciences Divisional Dissertation Fellowship, UChicago, 2019-20 Student Creativity Award, University of Chicago Arts, 2019 Graduate Fellowship, Stevanovich Institute on the Formation of Knowledge, UChicago, 2018-19 Graduate Fellowship, Morris Fishbein Center for the History of Science and Medicine, UChicago, 2017-18 Idealism and Philosophy of Mind Bursary, John Templeton Foundation, 2017 Ivy Plus Exchange Scholarship, Columbia University, 2016-17 Graduate Council Travel Grant, UChicago, 2016 Social Sciences Division Summer Research Grant, UChicago, 2015 Social Sciences Divisional Fellowship, UChicago, 2012-2017 Isaac Newton Trust Grant, University of Cambridge, 2007-2008 PUBLICATIONS Peer-Reviewed Articles “Reading Collingwood’s Idea of History through his Principles of Art,” Journal of the Philosophy of History 11, 3 (2017): 358-377. DOI: 10.1163/18722636-12341379 Contributions to Edited Volumes “Reconciling Objectivity and Accountability in Science: A Pragmatist Approach” in Science and Humanism (Ed. A. Chakravartty), forthcoming 2021 Manuscripts in Progress “Pragmatism as a Rival to Scientism” (expected publication 2021) Academic Blogging: “Jane Addams’ Pragmatist Theories of Democracy and Education,” Jane Addams Papers Project, 2020 TEACHING Instructor/Syllabus Designer Science, Culture, and Society III: History of the Social Sciences 2020-21 Core Civilization Sequence, University of Chicago 2 Feminist Perspectives on Science 2020-21 History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Science/Gender and Sexuality Studies/Anthropology/Sociology, University of Chicago American Pragmatism 2020-21 History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Science, University of Chicago History and Philosophy of Social Science 2018-19 History, Philosophy, & Social Studies of Science, University of Chicago Science, Art, and Democracy 2017-18 History, Philosophy, & Social Studies of Science, University of Chicago Teaching Assistant Science, Culture, and Society I, II, & III (Three-quarter sequence) 2014-15 Core Civilization Sequence, University of Chicago ACADEMIC SERVICE Coordinator Workshop on History of the Human Sciences Council on Advanced Studies, University of Chicago, 2014-15 Workshop on History and Philosophy of Science Council on Advanced Studies, University of Chicago, 2014-15 Pragmatism Reading Group University of Chicago, 2014-15 Philosophy of Science Reading Group University of Chicago, 2014-15 Seminar on Important Things Morris Fishbein Center, University of Chicago, 2013-14 Conference for the 50th Anniversary of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions University of Chicago, 2012 3 CIVIC ENGAGEMENT Woman is a Rational Animal Editor, Multi-author blog and syllabus aid for diversifying history of ideas Center for Progressive Strategy and Research Think Tank employing academics to educate and inform issue-based campaigns Core Team, June 2018 – June 2019 CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy “Conjoint Communicated Experience”: Art as an Instrument of Democracy Colorado University Denver, March 2021 Science and Humanism Reconciling Objectivity and Accountability in Science: A Pragmatist Approach University of Miami, November 2020 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association On the Role of Values in Science: A Pragmatist-Feminist Perspective University of Kent, July 2020 Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology Conference Power and Progress: The Scylla and Charybdis of Science Narratives University of Texas at Dallas, May 2020 (cancelled—COVID-19) Société canadienne d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences On the Role of Values in Science: A Pragmatist-Feminist Perspective University of Western Ontario, May 2020 (cancelled—COVID-19) International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science The Pragmatist’s Answer to Scientism, University of Groningen, July 2018 Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology A Pragmatist Reintegration of Science and Ethics, University of Texas at Dallas, May 2018 Scientism and Consciousness The Pragmatist’s Answer to Scientism, Keele University, June 2017 Progress in Science and Society Progress as Universalist and Pluralist: A Hidden Conflict Leibniz Universität Hannover, June 2017 4 Nordic Society for Aesthetics The Shared Ontology of Science and Aesthetics, University of Bergen, June 2017 Wassard Elea Annual Symposium Dewey’s Aesthetics, Ascea, May 2017 Dutch Association of Aesthetics Art and Science, University of Antwerp, May 2016. Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable Explanation in the Social Sciences, University of Santa Cruz, March 2013. WORKSHOP TALKS History of the Human Sciences, University of Chicago Scientism as Faulty Empiricism, April 2019 Stevanovich Institute on the Formation of Knowledge, University of Chicago Common Sense and Epistemic Justice, October 2018 History and Philosophy of Science, University of Chicago Marriage Counselling for Science and Ethics, January 2018 Literature and Philosophy, University of Chicago Experience and Literature, September 2017 Department of Philosophy, Columbia University Dewey’s Aesthetics, April 2017 History of the Human Sciences, University of Chicago The Role of Literature in Human Experience, March 2017 Department of Philosophy, Columbia University The Role of Literature in Human Experience, February 2017 History of the Human Sciences, University of Chicago Reading Collingwood’s Idea of History through his Principles of Art, May 2016 History and Philosophy of Science, University of Chicago The Metaphysics of Pragmatism and Discovery through Literature, January 2016 History of the Human Sciences, University of Chicago The Logic of Historical Interpretation: R. G. Collingwood on Action and Inference, May 2014 5 History of the Human Sciences, University of Chicago Explanation in the Social Sciences: Family Resemblances and Causal Properties, March 2013 LANGUAGES English Native French Advanced Proficiency Farsi Advanced Proficiency Spanish Intermediate Proficiency 6 REFERENCES Prof. Robert Richards Prof. Philip Kitcher Adviser (Chair) Adviser (External) Department of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Chicago Columbia University, New York 773-702-8391 212-854-4884 [email protected] [email protected] Prof. Anubav Vasudevan Prof. Michael Rossi Adviser Adviser Department of Philosophy Morris Fishbein Center for the History University of Chicago of Science and Medicine 773-702-4234 University of Chicago [email protected] 773-702-8391 [email protected] Prof. Adrian Johns Program Chair Department of History University of Chicago 773-702-2334 [email protected] 7 .
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