sign in sign up
<<
Home , Demarcation problem, Evidence, Science studies, Scientific method, Scientism

Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 249–267, 2000 Pergamon  2000 Elsevier Ltd. All reserved. Printed in Great Britain www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa 0039-3681/00 $ - see front matter

A Pragmatic Approach to the

David B. Resnik*

The question of how to distinguish between science and non-science, the so-called ‘demarcation problem’, is one of the most high-profile, perennial, and intractable issues in the of science. It is not merely a philosophical issue, however, since it has a significant bearing on practical questions and practical decisions. This essay develops a pragmatic approach to the demarcation problem: it argues that while there are some core principles (or criteria) that we can use in distinguishing between science and non-science, particular judgments and decisions about some- thing’s scientific status depend, in part, on practical goals and concerns.  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction The question of how to distinguish between science and non-science, the so- called ‘demarcation problem’, is one of the most high profile, perennial, and intrac- table issues in the . Writing in the of logical , (1963) offered the most famous solution to the problem when he argued that scientific and hypotheses must be testable. Subsequent writers, such as Kuhn (1962, 1970), Ziman (1968), Lakatos (1977), Feyerabend (1975), Thagard (1978, 1988), Kitcher (1983, 1993), Dupre´ (1993), Ruse (1982) and Lau- dan (1982) have criticized Popper’s definition of ‘science’ and have offered their own definitions. While there is no shortage of approaches to the demarcation prob- lem, it is not at all clear that philosophers of science have ‘solved’ it. Indeed, some writers have concluded that it is impossible to draw a clear and definite line between science and non-science; the best we can do is make a list of criteria that apply to most of those enterprises that we call scientific (Dupre´, 1993; Kitcher, 1993). The demarcation problem is not merely a philosophical issue, however, since it has a significant bearing on practical policy questions, such as public , the safety of foods and drugs, the use of scientific in the courtroom, and

* Department of Medical , East Carolina University, School of , Greenville, NC 27858-4354, U.S.A. (e-mail: [email protected]). Received 1 March 1999; in revised form 17 September 1999.

PII: S0039-3681(00)00004-2 249 250 Studies in and Philosophy of Science the funding of . Real people face this problem every they decide whether should be taught in public schools, whether recovered- memory testimony should be allowed in the courtroom, whether a health insurance company should pay for a visit to the chiropractor, whether the National Institutes of Health should fund research on , or whether a new bridge design hold its intended load. For better or worse, policy makers, politicians, attorneys, judges, physicians, engineers, educators, and lay people must distinguish between genuine science and non-science when making practical decisions. The world cannot wait for philosophers of science to solve the demarcation problem. Thus, there are actually two demarcation problems, the philosophical problem and the practical one. Recognizing that there are two problems raises some difficult questions about their relationship (if any): should philosophical solutions be shaped by practical concerns? Should the between science and non-science depend on who asks the question? Why do people care about separating science from non-science? This essay will address these issues by developing a pragmatic approach to the demarcation problem. It will argue that while there are some core principles (or criteria) that we can use in distinguishing between science and non- science, particular judgments and decisions about something’s scientific status depend, in part, on practical goals and concerns. Giving a satisfactory answer to the question ‘what is science?’ depends, in part, on knowing who asks the question and why. My defense of this view will proceed as follows. Section 2 contains some pre- liminary remarks about defining the words ‘science’ and ‘scientific’. Section 3 gives an overview of failed attempts to solve the philosophical demarcation prob- lem, Section 4 diagnoses these problems, and Section 5 discusses how demarcation issues can arise in practical settings. Section 6 synthesizes the discussion in Section 2 through Section 5 by developing a pragmatic approach to demarcation, and Sec- tion 7 addresses two objections to this approach.

2. Defining the Terms ‘Science’ and ‘Non-science’

2.1. Demarcation as a issue The demarcation problem is a classic definitional or ‘what is it?’ question in philosophy. In thinking about this aspect of the problem, we need to recognize that there are different types of definitions. Descriptive definitions attempt to capture (or accurately describe) common (or specialized) meanings and uses of words. A descriptive definition of ‘science’ is what one might find in a dictionary, lexicon, or glossary. Linguists, cultural anthropologists, and other social attempt to provide descriptive definitions. Prescriptive definitions, on the other hand, make recommendations for how we ought to use words. These definitions are based not on a description of usage but on deeper theories that explicate or analyze words. Analytic philosophers, for the most part, have concerned themselves with explicat- A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Problem 251 ing and analyzing terms, instead of merely describing common (or specialized) usage (Gorovitz et al., 1979). For example, philosophical definitions of ‘knowl- edge’ are usually based on epistemological theories, not on common usage. In this essay, I will understand philosophical and practical demarcation problems to be about how we ought to use words. Whether the question is raised in a court of or in a classroom, the question ‘what is science?’ is primarily an into how we ought to use the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’. If one views it this way, the demarcation problem has inherent normative dimensions. Indeed, the nor- mative aspects of the question can readily be seen when we apply the words ‘science’ and ‘scientific’. We often use the term ‘scientific’ to assert the value, merit, or worth of some thing. We often use the word ‘unscientific’ by contrast, to assert that something lacks worth or value. Thus, ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ are words we use in various kinds of appraisal, criticism, and (Kitcher, 1992). We use these terms in making both epistemic and practical value judgments. Epistemic value judgments pertain to the epistemic merit, legitimacy, or worth of theories, hypotheses, beliefs, methods, or concepts (Kitcher, 1992). To say that a is scientific, in this sense, is a way of saying that it has evidential support or . To say that a theory is unscientific is often a way of saying that it lacks evidential support or credibility. For example, the question concerning the scientific status of the claims of , one might argue, has a direct bearing on its epistemic legitimacy: if astrology is not a science, then it lacks epistemic legitimacy. By contrast, to claim that a discipline, such as , is a science, amounts to asserting that its theories, methods, and concepts have epistemic war- rant. Practical value judgments, on the other hand, pertain to the practical, e.g. moral, political, legal, social, legitimacy or worth of theories, hypotheses, beliefs, methods, or concepts. To say that a theory is scientific, in this sense, is a way of saying that it ought to be used or may be used in a particular context for a particular purpose. The terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ are often used to endow items with moral, legal, political, or social legitimacy, praise, or approval (Feyerabend, 1975; Long- ino, 1990). Thus, scientific medicine can be used to treat illnesses, but unscientific medicine should not be used (Angell and Kassirer, 1998); scientists can serve as scientific witnesses, but non-scientists or pseudoscientists should not be used in this fashion (Huber, 1991); and scientific theories about origins can be taught in public schools, but unscientific theories should not be taught (Laudan, 1982). These remarks should not be taken to imply, of course, that all and only scientific theories, hypotheses, beliefs, methods, or concepts should be believed or used for practical purposes. One might have good for refusing to believe some scientific statements, and one may have good reasons for believing some non- scientific statements. For example, science tells us that there is very little chance 252 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science that a person survives death, but a person may refuse to believe this statement in order to have hope or comfort in dying. A person may be justified in believing that he is a good poet, even if this claim has no scientific basis, since holding this may give him pleasure or enhance the meaningfulness of his life. It is also often appropriate to use some unscientific theories to achieve practical goals or refrain from using scientific ones. For example, in deciding whom to marry, it may be appropriate to use a non-scientific method, such as a ‘gut feeling’, and it may be inappropriate to use a scientific method, such as a blood test. One can recognize the epistemic and practical worth of scientific theories, concepts, methods, and hypotheses without succumbing to closed-mindedness and .

2.2. Sorting through the variety of terms and phrases Since people who discuss the demarcation problem use a variety of terms and phrases, it is important to sort through the various expressions that have been employed. Our first point should be to distinguish between the noun ‘science’ and the adjective ‘scientific’. It is important that we not lose track of this distinction, since something may be scientific without a science, just as something may be metallic without being a metal. For example, one might argue that M. C. Esch- er’s paintings are scientific without implying that they are science, just as a coating of paint may have a metallic sheen without being a metal. For the purposes of this essay, I will use the word ‘scientific’ to refer to (or characteristics) that we ascribe to those disciplines or human activities that we call ‘science’. Given the distinction, there are two different ways of phrasing the demarcation problem: ‘What is science?’ or ‘What makes something (e.g. a theory, concept, or method) scientific?’ Many writers, e.g. Thagard (1978, 1988), Ziman (1968) and Kuhn (1962), have sought to analyze the terms ‘scientific’ and ‘unscientific’ by giving an account of science. Something is scientific, on this approach, if it has some properties or features that we associate with science. However, one might go a slightly different route and analyze the terms ‘science’ and ‘non-science’ by providing an account of what makes something scientific (Feigl, 1949; Kosso, 1992). Although Popper (1963) articulated a theory of science, his original attempt to solve the demarcation problem was an effort to distinguish between scientific and unscientific theories and hypotheses. A science, on this approach, would be characterized as a scientific discipline. Although I think it is important to understand the difference between our use of the words ‘science’ and ‘scientific’, it makes little difference, for my purposes, whether one analyzes ‘science’ in terms of ‘what makes something scien- tific’ or vice versa. The points made in this essay will pertain to our use of the noun ‘science’ as well as our use of the adjective ‘scientific’. Our second point should be that there are many terms that we use to refer to activities that we call unscientific, such as ‘junk’ science, and , and simply poor or bad science. Just as bad or controversial A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Problem 253 might still be art, bad or fringe science might still be science. However, just as fake art is not art, fake (or pseudo) science is not science. ‘Pseudoscience’ should therefore refer to activities, such as astrology or fraud, which appear to be scientific but are not. Activities that are not scientific and do not purport to be scientific, such as law, painting or , I shall designate as ‘’. So, the paper will employ the following terminology in the discussion of science:

Science, viz. good science, poor science, weak science, , fringe science, , basic science, etc. Non-science, viz. pseudoscience (, fraud, etc.), arts (literature, philo- sophy, law, , music, etc.)

3. The Philosophical Demarcation Problem One way of thinking about the philosophical demarcation problem is that it began as a noble but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’. Armed with an explication based on some deeper of science, philosophers could use this definition to recommend changes in public and decisions (Reisch, 1998). For example, a definition of ‘science’ might be used to debunk Marxist or Freudian ideas or combat . The first attempts to solve the philosophical demarcation problem focused on features of human language that one might use to distinguish between science and non-science. This approach began with ’s heyday earlier in this century. Positivists, such as Ayer (1946) and Carnap (1928), viewed the demarcation problem as the central issue in philosophy. The verifiability criterion of meaning served as a vehicle for distinguishing between meaningful (i.e. verifiable) statements and meaningless (i.e. not verifiable) ones. Scientific statements, on this view, are verifiable and hence meaningful (Kitcher, 1992). Non-scientific statements are not verifiable and not meaningful. Popper’s famous solution to the demarcation problem is inspired by this view. According to Popper (1963), what matters most in deciding whether a theory is scientific is not that it has in its favor, but that the theory can be disproven (or falsified or tested). Subsequent writers have criticized the verifiability criterion of meaning, and it has gone through a variety of transformations and incarnations over the years (Hempel, 1950). I will not discuss these critiques here. Other writers have criticized Popper’s solution to the demarcation problem on the grounds that it provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for classifying statements as scientific. It does not provide sufficient conditions because it implies that many statements that should be viewed as unscientific, such as statements from astrology, are scien- tific because they can be disproven. The problem with a statement like ‘The planet Mars causes violent behavior’ is not that it is unfalsifiable; the problem is that it 254 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science is simply false. People who continue to accept this statement as true despite evi- dence to the contrary can be viewed as unscientific, of course, but the statement, divorced from its context, provides little guidance to its scientific status (Thagard, 1978). Popper’s solution does not provide sufficient conditions because it implies that many statements that we would consider scientific are not, because they cannot be disproven through direct tests. For example, evolutionary ’s principle of ‘survival of the fittest’ cannot be directly tested by means of a single test or experi- ment, but it can be tested indirectly in of the role it plays in structuring evolutionary (Brandon, 1990). General and statements of science often cannot be proven false through direct empirical tests, although they can be disconfirmed (or confirmed) in an indirect way in virtue of the explanatory or conceptual role they play in a system of belief (Quine and Ullian, 1978; Thagard, 1988; Lakatos, 1970; Kosso, 1992). We would consider these statements to be scientific even though they do not meet strict standards of . But then how can we distinguish between scientific statements that can only be indirectly tested and unscientific statements that can only be indirectly tested? After all, one might argue that claims about , the human soul, ESP, and the can be tested in so far as they play some role in a system of belief. In reply, one could assert that any system of belief that includes beliefs about ESP or the human soul is not a scientific system of belief. But how does one distinguish between scientific and unscientific systems of belief? In any case, the upshot of this critique of Popperian- ism is that one cannot determine the scientific status of a given statement apart from its context of usage. Other attempted solutions of the demarcation problem have sought to explore the context of usage in more depth by focusing on the historical, sociological, political, psychological, and epistemological aspects of science. These solutions have also moved beyond considering the scientific status of statements to address- ing the status of larger units of , such as disciplines or research traditions. Defenders of the historical approach include Kuhn (1962, 1970) and Thagard (1978). According to Thagard (1978), scientific disciplines exhibit progressiveness while non-scientific disciplines do not. Progressiveness, in this sense, refers to the discipline’s effort to gather more confirming for its theories, compare its theories to other theories, and address anomalies in its theories. A historical dimen- sion is a key part of this approach to the demarcation problem, since a given discipline can transform from pseudoscience to science over time.1

1Thagard no longer holds the view he defended in this famous paper. According to the account of science he defends in two more recent works, explanatory coherence provides us with a way of dis- tinguishing between good and bad science and between science and non-science (Thagard 1988, 1993). Briefly, a theory, such as creationism, can be judged to be unscientific insofar as it fails to cohere with previously accepted beliefs. Scientific theories, such as evolutionary theory, cohere with previously accepted beliefs. Explanatory coherence can be understood in terms of , , consist- A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Problem 255

Thagard’s approach, like Popper’s, also does not provide necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the words ‘science’ and ‘scientific’. It does not provide necessary conditions for defining science because there are some , such as basic human anatomy, that have made little substantial since the scientific revolution. Does this mean that anatomy is no longer a science? If we ever disco- vered all there is to know, would science cease to exist? The approach does not provide sufficient conditions for defining science because there could be disciplines that we would call non-scientific, such as the study of UFOs and , that have made a lot of progress in the last fifty years. Until we have a better grasp of the meaning of progress, this approach (and possibly other historical ones) will not solve the demarcation problem. Sociological approaches face similar difficulties. Ziman (1968) offers one of the clearest statements of this position when he argues that science is a type of social institution that aims at a rational consensus of . Ziman’s approach also fails to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for defining ‘science’. It does not provide necessary conditions for defining ‘science’ because there might be some scientific disciplines, such as or economics, which rarely achieve a consen- sus of rational opinion. One might still claim that these disciplines aim to achieve rational consensus, but this assertion would be an unrealistic and dishonest response to the phenomena of disagreement in science, since it makes little sense to describe a discipline as aiming at an unachievable goal. Ziman’s approach does not provide sufficient conditions for defining ‘science’ because there are some disciplines that we would call non-scientific, such as theology and , that do aim for a consensus of rational opinion. Many other writers, such as Merton (1973), Barnes (1974), Collins (1982) and Knorr-Cetina (1981), have defended sociological accounts of science. Rather than explore all of these approaches here I will suggest that they suffer from a common flaw. It is possible to provide a sociological definition of ‘science’ as simply ‘the community of people we call scientists’ or ‘what scientists do’, but these definitions are excessively vague because they do not tell us the features of a community that make it scientific or what it is that scientists ‘do’. In order to differentiate between scientific and non-scientific communities we need to list some characteristics (or features) of scientific communities. But when we do this, we once again face the problem of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for defining ‘science’, i.e. some communities that we would regard as scientific may not have these features, and some communities that we would regard as unscientific may possess these fea- tures. Instead of a sociological approach, one might attempt to develop a psychological approach to the demarcation problem. Giere (1988) analyzes science in terms of ency, and other epistemic . This new position is an epistemic approach to the demarcation prob- lem similar to the views defended by Dupre´ (1993) and Reisch (1998). 256 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science cognitive . He argues that scientists attempt to develop mental models of the world by interacting with it in various ways, such as sensation and exper- imentation. He attempts to explain how science works by looking at how individual scientists form beliefs about the world. In order to make this approach work one must distinguish between scientific and unscientific forms of , which Giere does. For example, Giere argues that scientists should be open-minded and rational. But by making this distinction he therefore faces the same kind of difficulty that plagues the other views, i.e. his approach may not provide necessary or sufficient conditions for applying the term ‘science’. There could be some people that we would call scientists, e.g. Kuhn’s normal scientists, who are not open-minded, and there could be some people who are open-minded, e.g. philosophers, that we would not call scientists. Gardner (1957) also takes a psychological approach to the problem by listing several criteria that characterize pseudoscientists. These psychological features include arrogance, stubbornness, paranoia, a lack of respect for auth- ority, and a tendency to use complex jargon. How many people that we would call scientists also fulfill these criteria? How many people that we would consider pseudoscientists do not fulfill these criteria? Gardner’s approach, like Giere’s, does not provide us with necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the terms ‘science’, ‘pseudoscience’, and so on.2 Although I will not explore all the other psychological approaches here (see Shadish and Fuller, 1994), I will suggest that they suffer from a difficulty that also hampers sociological approaches: as soon as we specify some psychological features of those people that we would call ‘scien- tists’ or ‘scientific’, we open ourselves to the possibility that some non-scientists may fit this stereotype and some scientists may not. Finally, many writers, such as Lakatos (1970), Laudan (1977), Glymour (1980), Shapere (1984), Howson and Urbach (1989), Thagard (1988, 1993) and Mayo (1996) have developed epistemological solutions to the problem of characterizing scientific inquiry. According to these accounts, scientific disciplines (or scientists) subscribe to various epistemological norms, rules, or procedures. Science, on this view, is equated with ‘the method’ of science, i.e. a system of rules or procedures designed to achieve the goal(s) or aim(s) of science (Laudan, 1984). There are several problems with this approach. First, there is very little agree- ment about what constitutes the goals or aims of science (Resnik, 1993). Does science aim to explain? To predict? To discover natural ? To describe natural phenomena? To solve practical problems? Second, there is also very little agree- ment about what constitutes ‘the method’ of science (Kitcher, 1993; Dupre´, 1993). Should scientists follow the hypothetico-deductive method? Bayesianism? Infer- ence to the best ? Bootstrapping? Error ? Third, even if we can

2Gardner’s approach is of course a tongue-in-cheek discussion of pseudoscience, but it still exemp- lifies the type of problem faced by psychological accounts of science. A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Problem 257 reach some general agreements about some common features of scientific method- ology, why should we think that an account of scientific would allow us to distinguish between science and non-science? It would still be possible for a discipline, such as medicine or , to adhere to scientific methods with- out being a science. It is even conceivable that a discipline, such as economics, could be considered to be a science even if its practitioners frequently fail to adhere to ‘the method of science’. In any case, the prospects for developing epistemologi- cally necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing between science and non-science appear to be bleak.3

4. Diagnosis and Prognosis To return to the point made earlier in this section, the preceding review of the philosophical demarcation problem provides us with strong evidence that the attempt to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ is misguided. Since the beginning of this century, scholars have developed a plethora of theories with implicit or explicit definitions of ‘science’. So far, no single theory has succeeded in completely explaining the human activity known as science, and no single definition has succeeded in explicating the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’. (Admittedly, not all science scholars who have defended theories of science have seen themselves as specifying neces- sary and sufficient conditions for applying the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’, but this does not affect my general point.) Given this dismal history, we have good reasons to expect that any solution to the demarcation problem that tries to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ is likely to fail because science cannot be defined in this way. It is possible that someone might come up with a definition that answers all objections and provides necessary and sufficient con- ditions for applying the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’. However, we should not hold our breath waiting for this definition to appear. Kitcher (1993) and Dupre´ (1993) take this one step further and claim that one cannot specify neces- sary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing between science and non-science. The best that one can hope to do is to provide a list of criteria that we associate with disciplines, theories, methods, concepts, or people that we call scientific. Scientific

3This is a very complex issue that I cannot explore in depth here. In some ways, the attempt to analyze and explicate the methods and goals of science parallels the effort to solve the demarcation problem. However, one might hold that we can develop an account of science’s goals and methods without thereby solving the demarcation problem, or that we can find a way of distinguishing between science and non-science without giving an account of the method and goals of science. Some philos- ophers, such as Popper, saw themselves as answering all these queries with one theory: Popperianism attempts to provide an account of the goals and methods of science as well as a solution to the demar- cation problem. For further discussion, see Laudan (1984) and Kitcher (1992, 1993). 258 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science disciplines will satisfy most but not necessarily all of these criteria, and many unscientific disciplines could satisfy some of these criteria. Assuming that the odds of specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ are exceedingly poor, how should we respond to the demarcation problem? Should we react with despair at the impossi- bility of distinguishing between and astrology, and meteor- ology? I don’t think so. Our reaction should be that one can distinguish between scientific and unscientific activities even though one cannot rely on a of neces- sary and sufficient conditions gleaned from an abstract theory of science to perform this task. Clearly, we need to rely on something else. But what might that be? In the remainder of the essay, I will argue that the distinction between science and non-science depends, in part, on specific practical concerns, not only on philosophi- cal theories or definitions of ‘science’. We distinguish between science and non- science in the context of making practical decisions and choices. To see this point, it will be useful to understand how the demarcation problem can arise in spe- cific situations.

5. Practical Demarcation Problems Demarcation issues arise at a practical level when our beliefs about the difference between science and non-science lead to specific actions or policies, such as adopt- ing a textbook, approving a drug for human use, reaching a decision in a legal proceeding, designing a rocket, allocating money to a research project, or adopting legislation. These actions and policies frequently have significant consequences for individuals and for society. The demarcation problem, in the words of Lakatos, ‘is not a pseudo-problem of armchair philosophers: it has grave ethical and political implications’ (Lakatos, 1977, p. 7). Some of the different areas of practical concern are as follows.

5.1. Public education is a cornerstone of public education in the United States (US). Since there are many different disciplines on the fringes of traditional science, as well as disciplines that are regarded as pseudoscientific, educators must tackle the question ‘what is science?’ when designing the science curriculum or when implementing various approaches to pedagogy. Although most discussions of the demarcation problem in public education have focused on the issue of teaching creation science in biology classes or refusing to teach (Kitcher, 1983; Dalton, 1999), the problem occurs (albeit less dramatically) when one decides whether to teach in biology and human health classes, Einste- in’s reflections on God and probability in a class, or the theory of cold fusion in a class. The problem also arises when one has to decide the scientific status of a particular theory of education, such as phonics or a whole- language approach to teach children to read (Pressley, 1998). A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Problem 259

Quite apart from issues of separation of church and state, education has important moral, political, and social consequences. The goal of public education is to develop citizens who have the , skills, virtues, and reasoning abilities to be productive members of society (National Commission on Excellence in Edu- cation, 1983). The skills students acquire (or fail to acquire), such as reading and writing, have significant impacts on their employability, self-esteem, and overall contributions to society. Specific scientific beliefs students learn (or fail to learn) have long-term impacts on their values, decisions, and actions. For instance, the student who grows up believing that evolution is false and the student who it is true are likely to have very different responses to the problem of antibiotic resistance. The student who knows nothing about ecology and the student who understands something about ecosystems are likely to have very different attitudes toward the conservation of natural resources. Knowledge about the fundamental tenets of science has an impact on how we deal with environmental, technological, and medical issues. Indeed, if science education did not have a significant impact on how we live, we would probably not regard it as such an important part of public education (National Research Council, 1996).

5.2. Medicine Science also serves as a foundation of modern medicine. Physicians employ scientific concepts, methods, and theories in diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment, and in understanding human health and disease. Although there has been consider- able debate about whether the practice of medicine is a science or an art, most clinicians and theorists agree that science plays an important role in medical prac- tice (Little, 1995). Those who practice medicine must also wrestle with the question ‘what is science?’ when they decide whether to use a particular diagnostic test, drug, or therapy. Many treatments are accepted as a part of standard medical prac- tice because they have been validated by scientific tests, such as controlled clinical trials. However, medical practices that have not been validated by scientific tests, i.e. ‘alternative medicine’, are usually not regarded as a part of standard medical practice. In medicine, the demarcation problem often boils down to finding a way to distinguish between ‘scientific medicine’ and ‘alternative medicine’ (Angell and Kassirer, 1998). Depending on how you view it, alternative medicine could be classified as ‘junk science’, ‘fringe science’, ‘weak science’, or ‘pseudo science’. It almost goes without saying that a great deal hinges on the distinction between scientific and unscientific medicine, since medical decisions have direct, immediate, and significant effects on human health and well being. ‘Good’ medicine can save lives, but ‘bad’ medicine can kill. ‘Good’ medicine can ease suffering and restore health; ‘bad’ medicine can increase suffering and destroy health.

5.3. Engineering Science also provides a foundation for the different engineering , such as mechanical, electrical, civil, chemical, biological, and aeronautical engineering. 260 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

Engineers employ scientific concepts, methods, and theories in solving engineering design problems. Although there is some debate about whether engineering is an art or a science—some would say it is an applied science—it is clear that science plays a key role in engineering practice (Schlossberger, 1993). While engineers do not have to confront a problem of ‘alternative engineering’ similar to the problem of ‘alternative medicine’, they still must assume that they have access to scientific knowledge. Engineering decisions, like medical decisions, can have direct, immedi- ate, and significant effects on human health and well-being. Engineering successes can improve our quality of life, but engineering mistakes can kill thousands people and destroy .

5.4. Funding of research In the US, the government spends billions of dollars a year to fund scientific research through various agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Environmental Protection (EPA), and the Department of (DOE). The demarcation problem can arise when peer reviewers and agency directors decide whether a specific research pro- posal merits funding, since these agencies have been appropriated public money in order to fund scientific research proposals but not unscientific proposals (Martino, 1992). Recently, a controversy arose when the NIH announced that it would establish the Office of Alternative Medicine to solicit proposals on non- standard medical therapies (Stix, 1996). Many physicians and scientists argued that the government should not waste public funds on the unscientific research proposals that this office would review. Since funding decisions have direct, immediate, and significant effects on the careers of individuals as well as the well-being of research institutions, these choices should not be made lightly.

5.5. Science in the courtroom Judges face a difficult demarcation problem when deciding whether to admit scientific testimony into the courtroom. Very often, important battles are fought over admitting scientific testimony in the courtroom, and judges must wrestle with the difference between scientific and non-scientific methods, theories, and hypoth- eses (Huber, 1991; Angell, 1996; Miller and Rein, 1998; Petroski, 1999). In a key legal ruling, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993), the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judiciary’s gate-keeping role in admitting expert testi- mony and scientific evidence into the courtroom. In the wake of this ruling, legal scholars, attorneys, and judges have wrestled with the issue of how judges should decide these matters. Two distinct approaches have emerged: a conservative approach, which seeks to keep junk science out of the courtroom; and a more liberal approach, which tolerates some junk science in order to take advantage of new developments in science (Black et al., 1994). Since the decision to admit scientific testimony can have a direct bearing on the decision a reaches, the distinction between science and non-science can have direct, immediate, and sig- A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Problem 261 nificant impacts on legal decisions. For example, although DNA profiling was at one time considered to be ‘a fringe science’ and inadmissible in court, it has now been used to exonerate wrongfully convicted murderers and rapists (McKusick et al., 1992; Kitcher, 1996; Kluger, 1999). On the other hand, the controversial ‘science’ of memory retrieval has been used to wrongfully convict people of similar (Loftus, 1995). Although some psychologists endorse this method, others have questioned its reliability. In order to deal with these complex issues, some judges have used panels of to help them evaluate expert testimony and scientific evidence (Petroski, 1999).4

5.6. Science and Finally, we should also mention that legislators and government officials face a demarcation problem when using scientific evidence in debates about public policy issues, such as global warming. Policy debates have normative (value-oriented) and descriptive (or factual) components. In order to decide these kinds of questions, one must balance competing values in of the available (Resnik, 1998). In the global-warming debate, the competing values include the goal of preserving the environment and the goal of promoting economic development. The facts include the effects of global warming, estimates of humankind’s contribution to global warming, current global temperatures, and projected climatological trends. Although debates about global warming involve questions about basic values, parti- cipants on both sides of the debate have also disputed the legitimacy of various models, assumptions, , and theories that have been used in the debate. The demarcation problem plays a key role in this debate, since both sides have accused each other of appealing to unscientific assumptions, measurements, theories, and hypotheses (Easterbrook, 1997; Mahlman, 1997; Kaiser, 1998).

6. Practical Solutions to Deep Problems The moral of the previous section is that we distinguish between science and non-science in various practical settings. The we need to make these distinc- tions is that they often have important consequences for health, safety, education, policy, and . Of course, abstract theories of science can have some bearing on these practical issues. For instance, the FDA requires that new medications have a good track record of safety and efficacy in clinical trials before it allows them to be marketed. The Daubert ruling allows judges to appeal to publication in peer- reviewed journals to decide whether to admit scientific testimony as evidence in court (Angell, 1996; Petroski, 1999). The notions ‘good track record’ and ‘’ are both based on some deeper understanding of scientific proof. Our theories and definitions of science are by no means irrelevant when it comes to

4The use of expert panels raises a problem concerning a possible ‘regress of experts’, but we will not explore that issue further here. 262 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science facing these kinds of practical issues. While the distinction between science and non-science is not purely a practical matter, solutions to the demarcation problem are strongly influenced by human values and goals. Thus, I propose that we consider a pragmatic account of the demarcation prob- lem. This approach should bear some resemblance to pragmatic accounts of expla- nation defended by Van Fraassen and other writers (Salmon, 1989). According to Van Fraassen (1980), an explanation is an appropriate answer to a why-question. Appropriateness is a function of the interests and background knowledge of the person(s) asking the question. In order to give a satisfactory explanation, we have to know who is seeking to have a question answered and why. Likewise, to distinguish between science and non-science, we must know who is seeking to make the dis- tinction and why. Practical interests and concerns should play an important role in answering the question ‘what is science?’ because they form an important part of the pragmatic features of this kind of question. We can understand these practical interests and concerns in terms of consequences: we want to promote some out- comes (such as health and justice) and avoid others (such as illness and injustice). Since different definitions of science may lead to different results, any particular definition of science may be evaluated in terms of the consequences of accepting that definition. We can reject some definitions because they do not do a good job of promoting our goals and interests, and accept other definitions because they do. To make sense of this view, it will be useful to observe that different definitions of science emphasize different criteria for distinguishing between science and non- science. Some emphasize testability or verifiability, others emphasize empirical support or reliability, and still others emphasize rational consensus, progress, prob- lem-solving ability, , and so on. When used to distinguish between science and non-science, these different criteria have different effects. Since these criteria can have different effects, the decision to emphasize some criteria and not others should depend on the goals and concerns we have in mind when we are seeking to distinguish between science and non-science. A few examples will help to illustrate this point. In medicine, the consequences of a mistaken judgment about the scientific status of theory, method, or concept can be very costly, immediate, irreversible and direct. Since the consequences of making a mistake are so grave, unless the patient is desperately ill, it may often be most useful to emphasize conservative and safe means of distinguishing between scientific and unscientific medicine, such as empirical support and rational consensus. This point should remind some readers of Rudner’s famous essay on value judgments in science. Rudner argued that stan- dards of scientific proof should depend on the consequences of making a mistake: the worse the consequences, the higher the standards should be. When your health and well being are at stake, it is better to stick with a conventional treatment with a good track record than to take a gamble (Rudner, 1953). In science education, on the other hand, the consequences of making a mistaken A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Problem 263 judgment about the scientific status of a theory may be less costly, less immediate, less direct, and more reversible. These kinds of mistakes concerning the content of the science curriculum often may have no practical effect beyond ignorance about science. Since some of the goals of science education are to explore and evaluate different points of view and to discuss new or controversial ideas, it may be useful to use a more liberal definition of science, perhaps even that of Feyerab- end (1975), for the purposes of designing the science curriculum. However, a more conservative definition of science may apply in other areas of education where the consequences of making a mistake are more costly, such as medical, engineering, or nursing education. Additionally, the consequences of making a mistaken judg- ment about the scientific status of a particular theory of human learning, such as the whole-language approach to teaching children to read, can be costly, since literacy is such a vital part of employability and full participation in society (Pressley, 1998). One might argue that the legal system, like medicine, should use a fairly con- servative and rigid definition of science, since mistakes in this realm can lead to dire consequences, such as wrongful convictions or civil liability (Angell, 1996; Huber, 1991). Justice is achieved when guilty people are convicted and innocent people are set free, and when civil liability decisions reflect causal responsibility. The best way to promote this goal is to use a definition of science that emphasizes reliability and rational consensus. Science used in the courtroom should have a well-proven track record. The conservative approach to the Daubert ruling reflects this viewpoint. On the other hand, relying on this definition of science may have an adverse impact on the legal system’s other goals, such as the protection of legal rights or due process. In order to protect legal rights, people who are accused of crimes should be able to use expert testimony that can prove their innocence. A rigid and conservative definition of ‘science’ might prevent an innocent person from gaining access to theories, concepts, and that could exonerate that person. For example, a rigid and conservative definition of ‘science’ might not have allowed DNA testi- mony to be used to exonerate innocent people when DNA profiling was still new and controversial. One might argue that the courts should use a definition of science that emphasizes problem-solving ability, testability, or other, less rigid criteria. The more liberal approach to Daubert reflects this viewpoint. However, opening the door to too much scientific testimony may increase the cost and of legal proceedings, and most people would agree that there should be reasonable limits on the costs and of trials (Angell, 1996; Miller and Rein, 1998). Both viewpoints, liberal and conservative, support my claim that solutions to the demar- cation problem should evaluate definitions of science in light of their probable effects on justice, due process, efficiency, and other goals of the legal system (Dworkin, 1986; Goldman, 1991; Loevinger, 1995; Resnik, 1998; Petroski, 1999). Although one might question the particular details of these three examples, they 264 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science all point to the same conclusion: the decision to draw a line between science and non-science should be made with an eye toward promoting our practical goals and concerns. Other things being equal, we should use a definition of science that does the best job of promoting these goals and concerns in a particular context.

7. Some Objections At this point of the discussion one might protest that my pragmatic account of the demarcation problem sounds an awful lot like . If what counts as science depends on our practical concerns, then anything might count as science, given the appropriate set of practical concerns. If we are fundamentalist Christians concerned about leading a life devoted to God, then we may count creationism as ‘science’. When it comes to science, anything goes. My response to this objection is that it misinterprets my emphasis on practical concerns. If the definition of ‘science’ depends entirely on one’s practical concerns, then relativism is unavoidable. But I am only claiming that the definition depends, in part, on practical concerns. There are some common themes that should run through these different definitions of science, even if any particular definition should be tailored to specific circumstances. These themes could include something like the list of criteria mentioned above, such as testability, empirical support, progressiveness, problem-solving ability, and so on. These common themes serve as guidelines for the distinguishing between science and non-science much in the way that prima facie moral rules, such as beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, justice, and utility, serve as guidelines for distinguishing between right and wrong actions. One can hold that there are some moral principles that apply universally, while admitting that particular judgments of right and wrong depend on the contex- tual features of a given situation (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994; Fox and DeMarco, 1990). Likewise, one can hold that there are some general criteria for distinguishing between science and non-science while holding that particular judg- ments of the scientific status of human activities depend on contextual features, such as practical goals and concerns. In making these practical choices, we compare and balance these different criteria for distinguishing between science and non- science, much in the way we compare and balance epistemic criteria in choosing among different theories (Kosso, 1992) or moral values in making moral decisions (Fox and DeMarco, 1990). One might also object that my ‘solution’ to the demarcation problem is not a genuine solution, since the line between science and non-science can be drawn on a case-by-case basis. Since our practical concerns vary from case to case, this pragmatic approach is pluralistic and unsystematic. If genuine solutions to the demarcation problem must explicate ‘science’ in terms of some of inquiry that unifies the various sciences, then I am guilty of proposing a pseudo-solution to the problem. However, my solution still allows for some type of unity among the sciences, because different scientific A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Problem 265 disciplines (or theories) may share some common features, such as testability or empirical support. Different disciplines (or theories) can also be evaluated in terms of their impact on a common set of values, such as utility, freedom, justice, and so on.

8. Conclusion: Some Final Thoughts The demarcation problem was originally motivated, in part, by a social and political agenda. In the early part of this century, philosophers of science under- stood the social implications of adopting specific theories of scientific inquiry and they viewed their discipline as having an important bearing on culture and politics (Reisch, 1998). During the middle part of this century, philosophers of science sought to make their discipline more politically neutral (Reisch, 1998). In their quest to build a politically neutral discipline, philosophers of science have developed apolitical theories of confirmation, explanation, theory structure, and concept formation. However, the movements initiated by Kuhn (1962) and other writers have shown the limitations of this approach to the philo- sophy of science (Kitcher, 1992). Contemporary accounts of inquiry have sought to make sense of the psychological, social, historical, and political aspects of science (Longino, 1990). Since the decision to call a human activity ‘science’ has important social, political, and practical implications, one should not expect that an apolitical theory or definition of science should be able to solve the demarcation problem. In order to understand how we should distinguish between science and non-science, we need an approach to the demarcation problem that explicitly addresses the social, political, and practical implications of this issue. A pragmatic approach to the demarcation problem is a step in this direction.

Acknowledgements—For helpful comments and criticism I would like to thank Ken de Ville, Michael Resnik and three anonymous reviewers. A previous version of this paper was also presented to the Department of Philosophy at Davidson College.

References Angell, M. (1996) Science on Trial (London: W. W. Norton). Angell, M. and Kassirer, J. (1998) ‘Alternative Medicine—the of Untested and Unregulated Remedies’, New Journal of Medicine 339(12), 839–841. Ayer, A. (1946) Language, , and (New York: Dover). Barnes, B. (1974) Scientific Knowledge and (London: ). Beauchamp, T. and Childress, J. (1994) Principles of Biomedical , 4th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Black, B., Ayala, F. and Saffran-Brinks, C. (1994) ‘Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: a New Search for Scientific Knowledge’, Texas Law Review 72(4), 715–802. Brandon, R. (1990) Adaptation and Environment (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Carnap, R. (1928) Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin: Welkreis). Dalton, R. (1999) ‘Kansas Kicks Evolution Out of the Classroom’, 400, 701. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) No. 92–102, 28 June (113 S Ct 2768 1993). 266 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

Collins, H. (1982) The of Scientific Knowledge (Bath: Bath University Press). Dupre´, J. (1993) The Disorder of Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Dworkin, R. (1986) Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Easterbrook, G. (1997) ‘Greenhouse ’, US News and World Report,1 December, 58–62. Feigl, H. (1949) ‘ and ’, American Quarterly 1, 135–148. Feyerabend, P. (1975) (London: Verso). Fox, R. and DeMarco, J. (1990) Moral Reasoning: a Philosophic Approach to Applied Ethics (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston). Gardner, M. (1957) Fads and in the Name of Science (New York: Dover). Giere, R. (1988) Explaining Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Glymour, C. (1980) Theory and Evidence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Goldman, A. (1991) ‘Epistemic : Communication Control in Law and Society’, Journal of Philosophy 88, 113–131. Gorovitz, S., Hintikka, M., Provence, D. and Williams, R. (1979) , 3rd edn. (New York: Random House). Hempel, C. (1950) ‘Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criteria of Meaning’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4(11), 41–63. Howson, C. and Urbach, P. (1989) Scientific Reasoning (La Salle, IL: Open Court). Huber, P. (1991) Galileo’s Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (New York: Basic Books). Kaiser, J. (1998) ‘Possibly Vast Greenhouse Gas Sponge Ignites Controversy’, Science 2, 386–387. Kitcher, P. (1983) Abusing Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Kitcher, P. (1992) ‘The Naturalists Return’, Philosophical Review 101(1), 53–114. Kitcher, P. (1993) The Advancement of Science (New York: Oxford University Press). Kitcher, P. (1996) The Lives to Come (New York: Simon and Schuster). Kluger, J. (1999) ‘DNA Detectives’, Time, 11 January, 62–63. Knorr-Cetina, K. (1981) The Manufacture of Knowledge (Oxford: Pergamon Press). Kosso, P. (1992) Reading the Book of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Kuhn, T. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Kuhn, T. (1970) ‘The Logic of or the Psychology of Research?’, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1–24. Lakatos, I. (1970) ‘Falsificationism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Pro- grammes’, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 91–196. Lakatos, I. (1977) ‘Science and Pseudoscience’, in Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1–7. Laudan, L. (1977) Progress and its Problems (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press). Laudan, L. (1982) ‘Science at the Bar—Causes for Concern’, Science, , and Human Values 7(41), 16–19. Laudan, L. (1984) Science and Values (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press). Little, M. (1995) Humane Medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Loevinger, L. (1995) ‘Science as Evidence’, Jurimetrics Journal 20, 153–190. Loftus, E. (1995) ‘Remembering Dangerously’, 19(2), 20–29. Longino, H. (1990) Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Mahlman, J. (1997) ‘ in Projections of Human-caused Global Warming’, Science 278, 1416–1417. Martino, J. (1992) Science Funding (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers). Mayo, D. (1996) Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). A Pragmatic Approach to the Demarcation Problem 267

McKusick, V. et al. (eds) (1992). DNA Technology in (Washington, DC: National Press). Merton, R. (1973) The Sociology of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Miller, P. and Rein, B. (1998) ‘Whither Daubert: Reliable Resolution of Scientifically-based Issues in Toxic Tort Cases’, Rutgers Law Review 50, 563–584. National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) A Nation at : The Imperative for Educational Reform (Washington, DC: National Commission on Excellence in Education). National Research Council (1996) National Science Education Standards (Washington, DC: National Academy Press). Petroski, H. (1999) ‘Daubert and Khumo’, American 87(5), 402–406. Popper, K. (1963) and Refutations (New York: Harper and Row). Pressley, M. (1998) Reading Instruction that Works: the Case for a Balanced Approach to Reading (New York: Guilford Press). Quine, W. and Ullian, J. (1978) The Web of Belief (New York: Random House). Reisch, G. (1998) ‘Pluralism, Logical , and the Problem of Pseudoscience’, Philosophy of Science 65(2), 333–348. Resnik, D. (1993) ‘Do Scientific Aims Justify Methodological Rules?’, Erkenntnis 38, 223–232. Resnik, D. (1998) The Ethics of Science: an Introduction (New York: Routledge). Rudner, R. (1953) ‘The Scientists Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments’, Philosophy of Science 20, 1–6. Ruse, M. (1982) ‘Pro Judice’, Science, Technology, and Human Values 7(41), 19–23. Salmon, W. (1989) Four Decades of Scientific Explanation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Schlossberger, E. (1993) The Ethical Engineer (: Temple University Press). Shadish, W. and Fuller, S. (eds) (1994) The of Science (New York: Guilford Press). Shapere, D. (1984) Reason and the Search for Knowledge (Dordrecht: Reidel). Stix, G. (1996) ‘Probing Medicine’s Outer Reaches’, Scientific American 275(40), 52–56. Thagard, P. (1978) ‘Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience’, in P. Asquith and I. Hacking (eds), Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol. 1 (East Lansing, MI: Philo- sophy of Science Association), pp. 223–224. Thagard, P. (1988) Computational Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Thagard, P. (1993) Conceptual Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Ziman, J. (1968) Public Knowledge (New York: Cambridge University Press).