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Home , Consilience, Homeopathy, Maarten Boudry, Massimo Pigliucci, Pseudoscience, Scientism

Bioethical DOI 10.1007/s11673-015-9665-1

SYMPOSIUM

Scientism and : A Philosophical Commentary

Massimo Pigliucci

Received: 6 January 2015 /Accepted: 2 June 2015 # Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Pty Ltd. 2015

Abstract The term Bscientism^ is used in a variety of campuses, and Snow famously chastised his colleagues ways with both negative and positive connotations. I in English departments for proudly ignorant of the suggest that some of these uses are inappropriate, as second principle of thermodynamics, at the same time they aim simply at dismissing without argument an that they were ridiculing their counterparts in the sci- approach that a particular author does not like. However, ences for not being sufficiently acquainted with the there are legitimate negative uses of the term, which I works of Shakespeare. Nowadays, the situation is explore by way of an analogy with the term Bpseudo- completely reversed, with the riding high and .^ I discuss these issues by way of a recent pushing increasingly STEM-centred curricula while the specific example provided by a controversy in the field are constantly put in the uncomfortable sit- of bioethics concerning the value, or lack thereof, of uation of having to explain their worth to students, . I then frame the debate about administrators, and the public at large (e.g., Nussbaum within the broader context of C.P. Snow’sfamousessay 2010). on the Btwo .^ The term Bscientism^ began as a denigratory label, used to point out instances of unwarranted aping of the Keywords Scientism . Pseudoscience . Two cultures . natural sciences by the humanities (Sorell 1994)orof Homeopathy attempting territorial advances into fields where they do not belong (e.g., Harris criticized in Blackford 2010) or else unfairly dismissing the contri- There has been much talk about scientism of late, and I butions of humanistic fields to understanding expect there to be quite a bit more in the foreseeable (e.g., Weinberg criticized in Pigliucci 2008). More re- — .1 This talk is generated and sustained by an cently, however, a of authors including sever- — ongoing that C.P. Snow (1959)famously al have attempted to reclaim the label of labelled Bthe two cultures,^ i.e., the mutual incompre- scientism in a positive fashion, using it to flaunt their hension, and sometimes overt hostility, between the tight allegiance with the natural sciences, which they see natural sciences and the humanities. Back in 1959, of as the only legitimate, all-encompassing source of course, the humanities held sway on university worthwhile (e.g., Ladyman and Ross 2007; Rosenberg 2011). It is not surprising, then, that scientism—both as a term of ridicule and as a badge of honour—also has M. Pigliucci (*) Department of , The City College of , 160 begun appearing in the bioethical literature. Indeed, a Convent Avenue, New York, NY 10031, USA recent classification of the Bvarieties of scientism,^ so to e-mail: [email protected] speak, identified the following one: B[the idea that] no Bioethical Inquiry , moral norm, or ethical principle has serious le- of scientism that can actually be useful for further gitimacy unless it has been confirmed by, or derived discussion.3 from, scientific knowledge about humanity and ^ At one end of the spectrum, then, there is the idea that (Shook 2014, 28). In the following, I attempt to any forays by natural scientists into the subject matters parse the contrasting claims being made by different of the humanities constitute an unwarranted example of parties when they invoke the dreaded term Bscientism^; scientism, a form of gross cultural imperialism based on I will then proceed to provide a brief example of dis- a naïvely reductionist conception of the world and of cussions of scientism in bioethics; and I will conclude human . This, I hope is clear, will not do. Philos- with some more general points about the ongoing war ophers since (1748), and more recently of between . course Quine (Hylton 2014), have convincingly advo- cated a role in philosophical discussions for the sort of empirical knowledge about the world that science pro- vides us with. Similarly, using Bscientism^ so broadly as What Is Scientism, Approximately? a negative term would mean that there would be, for instance, no place in historical for statistical Scientism means (very) different things to different peo- analyses of large data sets (Turchin and Nefedov 2009) ple, so much so that some of my colleagues have sug- and there would be no talk of the Bdigital humanities,^ gested abandoning the term altogether. That, I think, either.4 I do not think, like Quine did, that would be a mistake. Since scientism does pick out an can be reduced to a branch of , nor do I interesting range of epistemic and cultural attitudes, entertain for a moment the notion that and phasing out the word would simply make room for an literature will cease to be independent disciplines and alternative one to emerge and fill the gap. Much better to be absorbed into departments (Pigliucci 2012a). try to be as clear as possible on what scientism is and is But it seems odd to assert that quantitative data analysis not. and the deployment of methods and concepts from the Let us first examine the opposite extremes along the natural sciences have no place at all within humanistic range of definitions of scientism—both of which I take scholarship. to be indefensible in any serious intellectual fashion. Moving to the opposite end of the range of attitudes After that, we should be able to arrive at a sensible about scientism, we find a number of authors who 2 Wittgenstein (1953) Bfamily resemblance^ conception simply do not think that there is any problem at all with B ^ 2 what they often characterize as alleged scientism. From §67 of the Investigations on the fuzziness of the concept of These typically include scholars who have themselves game: BI can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family resemblances’; for the various resem- been accused of acting scientistically, such as physicist blances between members of a family: build, features, colour of (Pigliucci 2012b) and biologist Jerry eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the Coyne, but also colleagues who think the term is useless ‘ ’ ^ same way. And I shall say: games form a family. Wittgenstein because it is deployed only as a derogatory and dismis- here is rejecting the Platonic, essentialist approach to definitions of concepts, in favour of a more nuanced, organically construed one. sive label for whatever the user dislikes about science. It is the latter approach that I am using in analysing the idea of While there certainly is some to the latter point, to scientism. 3 outright deny that there is a substantive issue sur- A recent paper by Loughlin, Lewith, and Falkenberg attempts to roundingscientismseemstometodenyanimportant define scientism more precisely as Bthe view that science, and only science, reveals the truth, such that all true claims are part of a true and fairly plain of modern academic and public scientific , or are reducible to claims of this sort^ (2013, intellectual : there really are plenty of questions, 131). The authors point out that such a view is historically asso- issues, and problems where science plays a marginal ciated with logical and interestingly argue that it comes role at best. with an (implicit) : BThis epistemological thesis is closely associated with an ontological thesis, about reality or ‘what really Indeed, my collaborator, , and I have exists’, to the effect that science reveals the true nature or essence drawn a parallel between scientism (both the concept of the world^ (2013, 132). There is much that I agree with in this and its usage) and another loaded term commonly used paper, but I still think a less sharp, Wittgensteinian approach comes closer to do to the bewildering variety of not only epistemic and ontological claims surrounding scientism but also its 4 See, for instance, Digital Humanities Now, http:// broader psychological and sociological dimensions. digitalhumanitiesnow.org (accessed December 22, 2014). Bioethical Inquiry by both scientists and philosophers: pseudoscience 2015). It cannot be dismissed simply, as it is often done (Pigliucci and Boudry 2013). The parallel is enlighten- in philosophical circles, by invoking Hume’sfamous ing, we think: on the one hand, some scientists and self- distinction between is and ought as if it were a universal professed Bsceptics^ truly seem to apply the Bpseudo- trump card. For one thing, Hume’s principle needs to be science^ label to anything they do not like, quite regard- defended in turn, on penalty of simply making an argu- less of whether there may be good to suspend ment from authority. But also it is somewhat ironic, judgement or to await further investigations. Dislike the given the context, to call on precisely one of the philos- sort of claims about gender differences made by evolu- ophers who has done the most to move into the tionary psychologists or neurobiologists? Just dismiss realm of psychology. At the same time, however, one them as pseudoscience, no need for additional analyses. reads books like the ones cited above, compares them Think the search for extraterrestrial intelligence is a with equivalent treatments written by moral philoso- waste of taxpayers’ money? Ditto. However, there are phers (e.g., Sandel 2009, 2012), and cannot help but also philosophers like (1983) who simply find the former ones obviously wanting: while Sandel is think that the whole project of demarcating (as Popper recognizably doing the kind of moral philosophy that [1962] famously put it) science from pseudoscience is actually helps us think more clearly about ethical di- hopeless and misguided and should therefore be aban- lemmas, the reader will go through the whole of Harris’ doned. The truth, I think, somewhere in the middle: and Shermer’s books without finding a single actual some claims made by evolutionary psychologists and example of how (by itself) science solves moral prob- neurobiologists may be questionable, and if so they need lems. Not one. If so, then authors like Harris and to be scrutinized and may end up being rejected, without Shermer are engaging in scientism not because what this necessarily leading to impugning the whole disci- they are proposing is impossible a priori (few things pline as pseudoscientific. But, contra Laudan, there are are) but simply because they are making extraordinary actual, well-identifiable out there in- claims on behalf of science and delivering little or cluding, but not limited to, , homeopathy (see nothing to support them. Scientism is like pseudosci- below), , , and the like. To reject ence, then, for similar reasons: it is not that parapsychol- the whole idea of a would fail to ogy is wrong a priori, it is just that parapsychologists make important distinctions that are both of theoretical insist on making extraordinary claims backed up by interest (to epistemologists and philosophers of science) proportionally little or no . In other words, just and of sometimes great practical import (e.g., in public like in the case of pseudoscience, there may be some discussions about , climate change, so- notions that are clearly scientistic, as well as cases of called Balternative^ , and many others). unwarranted use of the label Bscientism^ to dismiss Since the situation is, I maintain, analogous for the undesirable notions without argument; but the interest- idea of scientism, what might a reasonable solution look ing cases will find themselves located in a complex, and like in the latter case? The answer is not going to be far from clear-cut, middle territory. clear-cut and certainly not uncontroversial, which is typical of the kind of Wittgensteinian fuzzy concepts I think both pseudoscience and scientism are. Again Scientism and Bioethics building on the analogy with pseudoscience: the latter can be thought of as an aping of actual science (i.e., In order to crystallize the ideas sketched above, let deploying the trappings of conferences, dedicated me briefly comment on a series of articles pub- journals, experts, etc.) without its substance or well past lished in 2012 in the journal Bioethics,whichwill the point where the alleged substance has been investi- allow me to bring together my parallel talks of gated and found wanting (e.g., parapsychology, but also, scientism and pseudoscience into a single paradig- for example, cold fusion). Analogously, we can think of matic example—though this will turn out to be an scientism not simply as any injection of the natural (or instance of actual pseudoscience and therefore un- social) sciences into the humanities but as the unwar- substantiated labelling of Bscientism.^ ranted (or as yet unwarranted) subset of such injections. The debate got started with a paper by Smith (2012a) Take, for instance, the oft-repeated claim that science applying a utilitarian perspective to the issue of home- can answer moral questions (e.g., Harris 2010; Shermer opathy and whether it should be practised in a medical Bioethical Inquiry setting. Smith presents a systematic argument that be- utilitarian account, homeopathy ought to be dep- gins with an explanation of the theoretical implausibility recated. … [H]omeopathy ought not to be of homeopathy and, in particular, of the two fundamen- regarded as a mere tool [in the same guise of tal principles of the practice—the Blaw of similars^ and approved drugs or dialysis machines]. Because it the Blaw of infinitesimals.^ He then engages the empir- is inherently ineffective, homeopathy cannot be ical literature on homeopathy, finding it woefully insuf- ethically neutral (Smith 2012a,408). ficient to establish any of the claims on which the approach is based. So far, nothing really new, as home- All of the above seemed to me— both as a biologist opathy is regarded as one of the clearest examples of and as a of science—entirely uncontrover- pseudoscience by both scientists and philosophers of sial, and I thought it a bit surprising that a major bioeth- science (Goldacre 2009; Pigliucci and Boudry 2013). ical journal would go into this trite territory to begin Smith then moves to build his ethical argument on with. Then I read the four responses that Bioethics utilitarian grounds (though I suspect something very published as a reaction to Smith’s article (Moskowitz similar could easily be done on deontological as well 2012; Milgrom and Chatfield 2012; Sebastian 2012; as on a virtue ethical basis, too). Bellavite 2012; see also Smith’s response [2012b]). Smith’s argument assumes—correctly, as far as I can That’s where things got interesting—both in terms of tell—that there is no evidence or to believe in any pseudoscience and of scientism. direct biomedical or physiological effect of homeopathic A few things to note before we get into the details: ministrations on the body. At best, homeopathy can First, three out of the four responders are medical prac- Bwork,^ inaverylimitedfashion,onlybywayofplacebo titioners, not researchers affiliated with any university effects. Smith then very carefully examines the possible research centre (the exception is Bellavite). Second, benefits of homeopathy, including non-invasiveness and none of the four responders actually engages Smith’s cost-effectiveness; its holistic approach; the possibility, ethical argument, preferring to focus on the (alleged) range, and strength of effects; and its fostering of scientific bases of homeopathy—despite the fact that the patients’ autonomy regarding healthcare decisions. He exchange was published in a bioethical journal and that concludes, again very reasonably, that Bthe benefits of one of the four responses (Sebastian’s) carries reference homeopathy are rather minimal^ (2012a, 405). to Smith’s utilitarian argument in the title. Lastly, one of Next, Smith goes on to equally systematically analyse the responses (Milgrom and Chatfield’s) explicitly uses the possible disutilities of homeopathy: the risk of failing the word Bscientism,^ accusing Smith of that particular to seek conventional healthcare; the waste of resources kind of (epistemic) malpractice. that results from supporting homeopathic practice (since Idonothavetimetogointoeachofthefourresponses it is known not to work, outside of ); the problem in detail, their full-fledged arguments, and Smith’s raised by unwarranted credence, i.e., the credibility that (devastating) counterarguments, but let me give you a homeopathy gains when it is endorsed by medical prac- few highlights, especially where the issue of scientism is titioners or healthcare agencies; the simultaneous weak- either explicitly brought up or very strongly implied. ening of support for evidence-based medicine and the Moskowitz begins with the strange assertion that Bif weakening of support for types of Balternative^ therapies homeopathy is based on a mystery, that does not prove that actually do work (e.g., some forms of meditation, it to be a fake^ (2012, 499), a type of reasoning that could , etc.). His conclusions are that Binvestment in just as well be used (and in fact has been used!) to defend homeopathy by public healthcare providers is unethical the practice of astrology. He then goes on, boldly and as it entails a waste of resources … the effect [of such strangely, to turn the criticism that homeopathy works by investment] is important and amounts to a serious net placebo and via the natural self-healing of the human disutility^ (Smith 2012a, 407). body into a positive: Bcan a higher compliment be paid Smith’s general judgement, after additionally consid- to a medicine than that its action cannot be distinguished ering the question of whether clinical trials of homeop- from a gentle, spontaneous, and long-lasting cure requir- athy should be conducted, is that ing no further treatment?^ (Moskowitz 2012, 500). Well, if a medicine does not do anything beyond the spontane- it appears indubitable that the quanta of disutilities ous healing of the body, is it still medicine? And why do clearly exceeds the quanta of benefits. Thus, on a we charge patients for it? Bioethical Inquiry

Sebastian (2012), with a fallacious argument correctly—dispenses of Bellavite’s (and Sebastian’s) from authority, cites winner Luc defence of the principle of similitude: Montagnier’s (a virologist) support for homeopathy as somehow relevant to the discussion, in lieu of [T]he principle of homeopathic similitude is sim- actual evidence originating from properly con- ply a category mistake: it cannot be applied to trolled, large, and well-statistically analysed exper- modern medicine. The principle was conceived iments. She characterizes Ballopathic^ medicine as 200 years ago when it was unknown that disease based on a deductive-nomothetic model (thus exists in fundamentally different forms, each displaying only a superficial understanding of the caused by a specific malfunction of a tissue or an [Ladyman 2002]), claiming organ. In light of this knowledge, we now know that that is not the Bmodel^ adoptedbyhomeopa- that diseases cannot be treated according to a B ^ thy, for which somehow uncontrolled and anecdot- common rule such as similitude. The only cor- al evidence is supposed to be sufficient. She then rect therapy for an illness is according to its very goes on to accuse Smith of thinking that Mahatma specific etiology and pathogenesis (Smith 2012b, 510). Gandhi was unethical (because he was a proponent of homeopathy), which is an example of a colossal Exactly. non sequitur (as well as yet another recourse to Finally, let me turn to Milgrom and Chatfield (2012), irrelevant authorities—Gandhi was not a medical the authors who explicitly invoke scientism in the con- researcher). Finally, and without any irony what- text of the exchange. To begin with, as Smith (2012b) soever, she concludes: BIf Dr. Smith’s argument himself notes, their response is self-contradictory: on the were simply an exercise in ivory tower philoso- one hand, they wish to defend homeopathy on the phizing, it would be of little concern—but know- ground of ; on the other hand, they ing that the health and in fact the of others accuse Smith of being scientistic precisely because he may be affected by such thinking is very demands such scientific evidence. It is either one or the disturbing^ (Sebastian 2012, 505). Indeed, it is other; they cannot have it both ways. Milgrom and precisely because the health and lives of people Chatfield complain that Smith avoids utilitarian scrutiny are at stake that Smith judges the practice of of conventional medicine, which of course not only was homeopathy to have ethical import! not the scope of the original article but also would help Bellavite (2012), rather idiosyncratically, prefers to homeopathy not at all. (Should it turn out that some or focus only on a defence of the homeopathic principle of even many of the practices of conventional medicine similitude—the idea that diseases causing certain symp- were ethically difficult to defend that would obviously toms are to be cured by the ministration of substances imply precisely nothing about the of homeopa- that produce similar effects on the body. He engages in a thy.) Similarly, they attempt to deflect criticism of the manifest example of mumbo jumbo, i.e., talk that ap- concerning homeopathy by stating pears to be technical but in fact says nothing of sub- that a lot of regular clinical trials have problems, too. stance whatsoever: Maybe so, but how does that make the evidence for homeopathy any stronger? [H]omeopathic could interact with sen- We then come to the crux of the issue with the sitive (primed) regulation systems through com- following extended quote: plex information, which simulates the disorders of natural disease. Reorganization of regulation sys- ’ tems, through a coherent response to the medicine, More perplexing is Dr Smith s claim that home- could pave the way to the healing of the cellular, opathy could weaken support for science-based tissue and neuro-immuno-endocrine medicine. Such fear is rooted not in science but homeodynamics (Bellavite 2012,506). in scientism,i.e.theunscientific that com- pared to other forms of knowledge, science is the Talk of reorganizing regulation systems and of neuro- absolute and only justifiable access to truth. Taken immuno-endocrine Bhomeodynamics^ is an artful mix to the extreme, scientism defaults to Internet- of vacuities and obfuscatory language, as Smith (2012b) fueled inquisitorial intolerance which, supported clearly saw in his rebuttal. Here is how Smith— by certain academics, sections of the media, and Bioethical Inquiry

(usually anonymous) blog sites, systematically Scientism and the Two Cultures vilifies anything considered Bunscientific,^ e.g. the campaign to undemocratically rid Britain’s I have argued that there are compelling similarities NHS of its homeopathy/CAM facilities. Fortu- between the concepts of pseudoscience and of scien- nately, not all share such fundamentalist views, tism: they both point to real problematic epistemic atti- especially at the frontline (Milgrom and Chatfield tudes—the first one comprises examples of discredited 2012,502,emphasis original). or untenable notions being passed for scientifically valid To begin with, notice that Smith has never claimed ones; the second one characterizes instances of over- that science is the Bonly justifiable access to truth,^ reach by the natural or social sciences into areas or much less that scientific knowledge is Babsolute,^ questions for which their methods are either unsuited claims that truly would qualify as scientistic. He has or can be seen as complementary at best. In both cases, simply treated medical research as a science, from which the term can be used properly or abused in the service of it follows that any claim about the medical efficacy or a specific agenda. It is tempting to label as Bpseudo- lack thereof of any treatment ought to be substantiated scientific^ notions that may actually be worthy of fur- with the best scientific evidence available. I don’tknow ther investigation, and it is equally tempting to deploy about you, but I quite like the medical advice I receive to the Bscientistic^ trump card to make sure that importune be science-based. Notice also the semi-paranoid refer- scientists are not going to question one’ssacredcows. ence to undemocratic conspiracies to undermine home- Indeed, in a sense, pseudoscience and scientism are opathy. As Smith himself explains in his rebuttal, public symmetrical notions: the first tends to be deployed mostly information campaigns about the lack of substantive by scientists (and a number of philosophers of science), evidence in favour of a particular practice, and calls while the second is often used by humanists (and a number for it not to be funded with taxpayers’ money, are—on of philosophers whose area of expertise lies further from the contrary—eminently democratic. Finally, also notice the sciences). Which means that the study of the use and the use of the pejorative term Bfundamentalism,^ accom- misuse of the two terms is a microcosm of the general panied in the paper by a reference to an article by unfortunate state of relations between the sciences and the Holmes et al. (2006) where the word Bfascism^ is re- humanities, i.e., Snow’s Btwo cultures.^ If we are to make peatedly used5 when writing about demands for scien- substantive in that respect, i.e., in reconciling the tific approaches to medical research. This sort of highly two cultures and letting them proceed to do what they do emotive talk—accompanied by precious little substan- while benefiting from each other, we will have to foster tive evidence to back up one’s extraordinary claims—is more dialogue, mutual understanding, and especially re- one of the hallmarks of pseudoscience and in this case spect across the divide. I suggest that bioethics may turn also represents an egregious, ideologically motivated out to be one of those fields that naturally lends itself to this misuse of the term Bscientism.^ sort of crosstalk: by its very nature it is frequented by scientists (medical researchers) and humanists (ethicists) who have very consciously decided to engage in a multi- disciplinary fashion to reciprocal advantage. Perhaps this is one of the loci where we can systematically parse the 5 It is true that Holmes et al. (2006) qualify their usage by the legitimate and illegitimate uses of the Bscientistic^ and B ^ prefix micro, as in microfascism. But here is what they say right Bpseudoscientific^ labels, thereby facilitating that much- at the beginning of their paper (which, incidentally, is entitled BDeconstructing the Evidence-Based Discourse in Health Sci- needed and beneficial rapprochement invoked by Snow. ences: Truth, Power and ,^ with no Bmicro^ modifier): BAlthough it is associated with specific political systems, this fascism of the masses, as was practised by Hitler and Mussolini, References has today been replaced by a system of microfascisms—polymor- phous intolerances that are revealed in more subtle ways. Conse- quently, although the majority of the current manifestations of Bellavite, P. 2012. On the plausibility of homeopathic Bsimili- fascism are less brutal, they are nevertheless more pernicious^ tude.^ Bioethics 26(9): 506–507. (Holmes et al. 2006, 180). So, according to Holmes et al. (2006), Blackford, R. 2010. Book review: ’ The Moral there is a definite link between the original fascism of Hitler and Landscape. Journal of & 21(2): 53– Mussolini and the Bmicro^ variety practised by some within the 62. healthcare community. Which, of course, is nonsense on stilts. Goldacre, B. 2009. Bad science. London: Fourth Estate. Bioethical Inquiry

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