Scientism and Pseudoscience: a Philosophical Commentary
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Bioethical Inquiry DOI 10.1007/s11673-015-9665-1 SYMPOSIUM Scientism and Pseudoscience: A Philosophical Commentary Massimo Pigliucci Received: 6 January 2015 /Accepted: 2 June 2015 # Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Pty Ltd. 2015 Abstract The term Bscientism^ is used in a variety of campuses, and Snow famously chastised his colleagues ways with both negative and positive connotations. I in English departments for being proudly ignorant of the suggest that some of these uses are inappropriate, as second principle of thermodynamics, at the same time they aim simply at dismissing without argument an that they were ridiculing their counterparts in the sci- approach that a particular author does not like. However, ences for not being sufficiently acquainted with the there are legitimate negative uses of the term, which I works of Shakespeare. Nowadays, the situation is explore by way of an analogy with the term Bpseudo- completely reversed, with the sciences riding high and science.^ I discuss these issues by way of a recent pushing increasingly STEM-centred curricula while the specific example provided by a controversy in the field humanities are constantly put in the uncomfortable sit- of bioethics concerning the value, or lack thereof, of uation of having to explain their worth to students, homeopathy. I then frame the debate about scientism administrators, and the public at large (e.g., Nussbaum within the broader context of C.P. Snow’sfamousessay 2010). on the Btwo cultures.^ The term Bscientism^ began as a denigratory label, used to point out instances of unwarranted aping of the Keywords Scientism . Pseudoscience . Two cultures . natural sciences by the humanities (Sorell 1994)orof Homeopathy scientists attempting territorial advances into fields where they do not belong (e.g., Harris criticized in Blackford 2010) or else unfairly dismissing the contri- There has been much talk about scientism of late, and I butions of humanistic fields to human understanding expect there to be quite a bit more in the foreseeable (e.g., Weinberg criticized in Pigliucci 2008). More re- — future.1 This talk is generated and sustained by an cently, however, a number of authors including sever- — ongoing phenomenon that C.P. Snow (1959)famously al philosophers have attempted to reclaim the label of labelled Bthe two cultures,^ i.e., the mutual incompre- scientism in a positive fashion, using it to flaunt their hension, and sometimes overt hostility, between the tight allegiance with the natural sciences, which they see natural sciences and the humanities. Back in 1959, of as the only legitimate, all-encompassing source of course, the humanities held sway on university worthwhile knowledge (e.g., Ladyman and Ross 2007; Rosenberg 2011). It is not surprising, then, that scientism—both as a term of ridicule and as a badge of honour—also has M. Pigliucci (*) Department of Philosophy, The City College of New York, 160 begun appearing in the bioethical literature. Indeed, a Convent Avenue, New York, NY 10031, USA recent classification of the Bvarieties of scientism,^ so to e-mail: [email protected] speak, identified the following one: B[the idea that] no Bioethical Inquiry virtue, moral norm, or ethical principle has serious le- of scientism that can actually be useful for further gitimacy unless it has been confirmed by, or derived discussion.3 from, scientific knowledge about humanity and reality^ At one end of the spectrum, then, there is the idea that (Shook 2014, 28). In the following, I will attempt to any forays by natural scientists into the subject matters parse the contrasting claims being made by different of the humanities constitute an unwarranted example of parties when they invoke the dreaded term Bscientism^; scientism, a form of gross cultural imperialism based on I will then proceed to provide a brief example of dis- a naïvely reductionist conception of the world and of cussions of scientism in bioethics; and I will conclude human nature. This, I hope is clear, will not do. Philos- with some more general points about the ongoing war ophers since David Hume (1748), and more recently of between the two cultures. course Quine (Hylton 2014), have convincingly advo- cated a role in philosophical discussions for the sort of empirical knowledge about the world that science pro- vides us with. Similarly, using Bscientism^ so broadly as What Is Scientism, Approximately? a negative term would mean that there would be, for instance, no place in historical research for statistical Scientism means (very) different things to different peo- analyses of large data sets (Turchin and Nefedov 2009) ple, so much so that some of my colleagues have sug- and there would be no talk of the Bdigital humanities,^ gested abandoning the term altogether. That, I think, either.4 I do not think, like Quine did, that epistemology would be a mistake. Since scientism does pick out an can be reduced to a branch of psychology, nor do I interesting range of epistemic and cultural attitudes, entertain for a moment the notion that history and phasing out the word would simply make room for an literature will cease to be independent disciplines and alternative one to emerge and fill the gap. Much better to be absorbed into biology departments (Pigliucci 2012a). try to be as clear as possible on what scientism is and is But it seems odd to assert that quantitative data analysis not. and the deployment of methods and concepts from the Let us first examine the opposite extremes along the natural sciences have no place at all within humanistic range of definitions of scientism—both of which I take scholarship. to be indefensible in any serious intellectual fashion. Moving to the opposite end of the range of attitudes After that, we should be able to arrive at a sensible about scientism, we find a number of authors who 2 Wittgenstein (1953) Bfamily resemblance^ conception simply do not think that there is any problem at all with B ^ 2 what they often characterize as alleged scientism. From §67 of the Investigations on the fuzziness of the concept of These typically include scholars who have themselves game: BI can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family resemblances’; for the various resem- been accused of acting scientistically, such as physicist blances between members of a family: build, features, colour of Lawrence Krauss (Pigliucci 2012b) and biologist Jerry eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the Coyne, but also colleagues who think the term is useless ‘ ’ ^ same way. And I shall say: games form a family. Wittgenstein because it is deployed only as a derogatory and dismis- here is rejecting the Platonic, essentialist approach to definitions of concepts, in favour of a more nuanced, organically construed one. sive label for whatever the user dislikes about science. It is the latter approach that I am using in analysing the idea of While there certainly is some truth to the latter point, to scientism. 3 outright deny that there is a substantive issue sur- A recent paper by Loughlin, Lewith, and Falkenberg attempts to roundingscientismseemstometodenyanimportant define scientism more precisely as Bthe view that science, and only science, reveals the truth, such that all true claims are part of a true and fairly plain fact of modern academic and public scientific theory, or are reducible to claims of this sort^ (2013, intellectual life: there really are plenty of questions, 131). The authors point out that such a view is historically asso- issues, and problems where science plays a marginal ciated with logical positivism and interestingly argue that it comes role at best. with an (implicit) ontology: BThis epistemological thesis is closely associated with an ontological thesis, about reality or ‘what really Indeed, my collaborator, Maarten Boudry, and I have exists’, to the effect that science reveals the true nature or essence drawn a parallel between scientism (both the concept of the world^ (2013, 132). There is much that I agree with in this and its usage) and another loaded term commonly used paper, but I still think a less sharp, Wittgensteinian approach comes closer to do justice to the bewildering variety of not only epistemic and ontological claims surrounding scientism but also its 4 See, for instance, Digital Humanities Now, http:// broader psychological and sociological dimensions. digitalhumanitiesnow.org (accessed December 22, 2014). Bioethical Inquiry by both scientists and philosophers: pseudoscience 2015). It cannot be dismissed simply, as it is often done (Pigliucci and Boudry 2013). The parallel is enlighten- in philosophical circles, by invoking Hume’sfamous ing, we think: on the one hand, some scientists and self- distinction between is and ought as if it were a universal professed Bsceptics^ truly seem to apply the Bpseudo- trump card. For one thing, Hume’s principle needs to be science^ label to anything they do not like, quite regard- defended in turn, on penalty of simply making an argu- less of whether there may be good reasons to suspend ment from authority. But also it is somewhat ironic, judgement or to await further investigations. Dislike the given the context, to call on precisely one of the philos- sort of claims about gender differences made by evolu- ophers who has done the most to move morality into the tionary psychologists or neurobiologists? Just dismiss realm of psychology. At the same time, however, one them as pseudoscience, no need for additional analyses. reads books like the ones cited above, compares them Think the search for extraterrestrial intelligence is a with equivalent treatments written by moral philoso- waste of taxpayers’ money? Ditto. However, there are phers (e.g., Sandel 2009, 2012), and cannot help but also philosophers like Larry Laudan (1983) who simply find the former ones obviously wanting: while Sandel is think that the whole project of demarcating (as Popper recognizably doing the kind of moral philosophy that [1962] famously put it) science from pseudoscience is actually helps us think more clearly about ethical di- hopeless and misguided and should therefore be aban- lemmas, the reader will go through the whole of Harris’ doned.