Germany's Challenges to the Post-War Settlements, 1933–38

Home , Four Year Plan, Hossbach Memorandum, The Triumph of the Dark

CONTENTS

Contents Internal Assessment The historical debate: Did Hitler have a clear Your guide for Paper 1: The Move to Global War plan for achieving his foreign policy goals when he took power in 1933? Case study 1: Japanese expansionism in East Asia 2.3 Italian expansion, 1933–1940 1.1 The origins of nationalism and militarism What factors had an impact on Italy’s foreign in Japan policy in the 1930s? Japan after 1990 Italian foreign policy, 1935–39 Japan in the 1920s Why did Italy intervene in the Spanish Civil War 1.2 The actions of Japan, 1931–41 in 1936–39 Causes of expansion What was Italy’s roleole duringdu the Sudetenland crisis in Septembermber 1938?193 Events in Manchuria, 1931 Why did Italyly invade AlbaniaAlban in April 1939? What were the results of the Manchurian crisis? Italy andd the Second World WarW Years of turmoil: The descent into “the Dark Valley” Changingnging diplomatic alignments ini EuropeEurop after 193333 1.3 How did the international community respond to Japan’s actions? Germany’s challenges to the post-warpost-w settlements, 1933–381933 The League of Nations’ response to events in Manchuria 1931–36 2.5 German expansion,expa 1938–401938–4 The response of the League and Europe to Challengingllenging the post-war settlements after 1937 events after 1932 Beyond the TreatyTre of Versailles:V The liquidation The response of China to events after 193232 of CzechoslovakiaCzechoslovaki The USA’s response to Japanese actionsns 1931–3737 German expansion:expansio Poland The USA’s response to events 1937–387–38 Changing internationalinte alignments: The Pact of Steel,S May 1939 Why did the USA change its policyolicy towardstowar Japan after 1938? The outbreakout of war What was the reaction off the USA to the attackat 2.6 InternationalInte responses to Italian on Pearl Harbor? aggression,a 1935–40 What was the policy of appeasement and why Case study 2: Germanyany and Italiantalian expansionexpan was it pursued by Britain in the 1930s? 2.1 The origin off Fascism in Italy and its impact How was international response to aggression on foreignn policy in the 1930s affected by the weaknesses of the Background:ound: Long-term causes of expansionexpansi League of Nations? Mussolini’ssolini’s rise to power What was the impact of US foreign policy on the international response to the expansionist What was the impact of the First WorldWor War on powers? Italy, 1915–18?5–18? What was the impact of Soviet foreign policy on What is Fascism?sm? the international response to the expansionist Why did support for Fascism grow in Italy after powers? the First World War?r? DRAFTWhat was the international response to the How did Mussolini consolidate his power? Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935–36? What factors influenced Mussolini’s foreign The end of appeasement of Mussolini’s Italy policy? 2.7 The international response to German How successful was Mussolini’s foreign policy in aggression, 1933–40 the 1920s? The Second World War: The historical debate 2.2 The origins of Nazism in Germany and its impact of foreign policy Why did support for Nazism grow after the First World War? What factors allows Hitler to become a dictator?

3 2.4 German challenges to the post-war settlements, 1933–38

Conceptual understanding Key concepts ➔ Causation ➔ Consequence ➔ Continuity Key questions ➔ Examine the ways in which Hitler challenged the post-war settlement.nt. ➔ Analyse the consequences of Hitler’s actions for the internationalal situasituation.

Timeline

Hitler becomes German Chancellor 1933193 January

February Hitler introducesint a programme of Hitler leaves the Disarmament Conference rearmamentFTmam and announces the intention to withdraw October Germany from the League of Nations 1934 JanuaryJanu Germany signs a non-aggression pact with Poland Saar Plebiscite 1935 JanuarynuaryAFA MarchMarc Stresa Agreement

Anglo–German Naval Treaty June Italian invasionsion of Abyssinia RAR1936 March Germany remilitarizes the Rhineland Hitler sendss military support to Franco’Franco’s June nationalists in Spain August Hitler’s Four Year Plan is drafted Anti-Comintern Pact is made with Japan Rome–Berlin Axis DRD November 1937 Hossbach Memorandum

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As we have seen, Hitler’s main foreign policy aim after achieving power was to destroy the Versailles Peace Settlement, which had to be carried out alongside rearmament. This was achieved between 1933 and 1938 and, in the process, the stage was set for further territorial claims and the outbreak of global war in 1939.

Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe after 1933 The response of Britain and France to his actionstions after 1933 would be key for Hitler and his goal of overturninging the TreatyTrea of Versailles; Germany’s position in Europe was still vulnerablevulne and iti remained under the constraints of the Treaty of Versailles.ailles. FortunatelyFortu for Hitler, the international situation after 1933 worked to his advantage.ad Britain Britain was pre-occupieded not only with the economic crisis but also by events in the Far East,st,, where it was worriedworr about JapanJapanese expansion. Its resources were alreadyady overstretched,overstretche with its mainmai priority being the safety of the Britishritish Empire.re. Many BritishB politicianspoliticia also considered the Treaty of Versaillesrsailles to be unfair and supported somes redress of “legitimate grievances”.es”.”. Many right-wing politicianspoliticia in BritainB were also afraid of the communistunist dictator, Stalin, and had sympathysymsymp with Hitler, who they also saww as a bufferfer to the spread of communismcommu from the East.

The Little Entente France Francece was very concernedconce by the possible German threat but was too This was a series of weak to act on its own, especiallyesp after the failure of its 1923 intervention treaties between Romania,a, in the Ruhr. It was also ppolitically divided, following a series of weak Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia,slavia, governments, and hahad major economic problems. Lacking support from the which were concludedded from USA or Britain in tthe task of preserving the Versailles settlement, it built a 1920 to 1921, and aimed tot defensivedefe line oof fortresses along the Maginot Line between 1929 and 1938. prevent Austriastria and Hungary It also develoddeveloped alliances with countries on Germany’s eastern borders: from regainingaining territory lost Polandland aanand “The Little Entente” countries – Czechoslovakia, Romania and after thehe FirstFirs World War. YugoslYugoslavia.l TheT USA The economic depression meant that the USA was still focused on DRAFTDRdomestic concerns and was unlikely to change its isolationist stance. Other factors also worked in Hitler’s favour:

● The international economic situation was encouraging national insularity rather than collective security.

● The memories of the First World War were still acute, and the horror of this war made many determined to take any measures necessary to prevent another war.

● The need to avoid another war was reinforced by the military weakness of Britain and France at this time.

● Britain and France were unable to agree on a common policy for dealing with Hitler. 178 CHAPTER 2.4: GERMAN CHALLENGES TO THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENTS, 1933–38

● The League of Nation’s perceived Daring Lithuania N failure to deal effectively with Japanese East Prussia expansion in Manchuria was a blow to R. Ebe Polish both the Washington System and to the Holland Corridor R. Oder 0 100 League itself. Belgium Poland Germany km ● R. Seine The revision of the Treaty of Versailles France USSR had already begun; Britain and France evacuated the Rhineland in 1929–30 Czechoslovakia Austria and German reparation payments were Switzerland Hungary effectively cancelled at the Lausanne

Conference of 1932. R. Rhone Italy R.R Danube However, as the historian Zara Steiner Romania Maginot Line writes, “even allowing for the breakdown of YugosYugoslavia the international regime, Hitler moved with Germans living outside Germanyrmany Bulgaria a speed and ultimate purpose that clearly distinguished him from his predecessors” (Steiner, 2011: 95). T Germany’s challenges to the post-warwar settlements, 1933–38 Although the international situation favouredd Hitler’s aims, he still had to be careful to avoid an international backlash.klash. He thus followed a cautious policy. Publicly, Hitler claimedd that hee desired only peace, FT and he worked carefully to defuse anyny potential opposition. However, his actions over the next five yearss undermined collective security:s heh worked to withdraw Germany from multilateral commitmentscommit thattha might limit his action, he isolatedolated France by undermining existiexisting alliances, and, at the samee time, he negotiated alliances withwi Britain and Italy. Alongside these actions,ons, Hitler was able to effectively to challenge the Treaty of Versaillesles and too increase the prestige and power of his own dictatorship and off Germany within Europe.E Challengingging the Treaty of Versailles:Versailles WWithdrawal from the Disarmamentament Conference Article 8 of the Covenant of the LeagueLeaguLe of Nations had demanded that national armamentsrmaments be “reduce“redu“reduced to the lowest point consistent with national safety”ety” However, thtthe difficulties in implementing an international disarmamentmament policypo meant that it took until 1932 for an international conferenceceDRAFT to be organized. When the Disarmament Conference finally convened in Geneva in 1933, there was still little consensus on how disarmament could be achieved. France, in particular, was unwilling to disarm with the new threat of Nazism on its borders. The events unfolding at the same time in Manchuria were also not conducive to thinking about disarmament. Furthermore, it was clear that Britain and France did not agree about the way that Germany should be treated, with Britain indicating that it was prepared to make concessions to Germany. German governments prior to Hitler had requested parity of armaments, arguing that Germany would participate only if other countries reduced 179 2

their armaments to Germany’s level, or allowed Germany to rearm to theirs. When France refused this at the Disarmament Conference in 1933, Hitler pulled out of both the Conference and the League of Nations, claiming that these organizations were part of a French conspiracy to keep Germany weak and incapable of self-defence. In November 1933, a plebiscite gave Hitler 95% approval for his actions, with Germans rejoicing that Germany had at last stood up to the “victors”. Hitler’s withdrawal from the talks and the League gave him the freedom he needed to launch an assault on the rest of the Treaty of Versailles.

Source skills Source A in the month,nth, “the lack of an intention to A speech by Hitler, broadcast disarm on France’s part mustm be seen to be the on 14 October 1933 cause”.e”. “Germany cannot tolerate the deliberate In the end, Hitler effected his purposepu by degradation of the nation by the perpetuation using tactics that foreshadowed thoset he of a discrimination which consists in would employ in the Sudeten affair five years later: he madema demands Tat Geneva that he withholding the rights which are granted as a matter of course to other nations … The men was reasonablyreaso sure that the other powers who are at present the leaders of Germanyany woulduld not accept. He insisted that equality have nothing in common with the traitorsors of of statusus was not enough and that, since the November 1918. Like every decent Englishmanshma other powers werew reluctant to reduce their and every decent Frenchman, we all had our forces to Germany’sGer level, all controls must be duty to our Fatherland and placed our lives at liftedd so ththat it could seek actual equality in its service. We are not responsibleponsible for the war its own way. To this kind of intransigence the but we feel responsiblee for what every honest French, supported by the British government, man must do in the time of his countrcountry’s refused to yield, insisting on a waiting period distress and for whathat we have done. We have in which Germany could prove its good such infinite love forr our people that we faith and give some indication of what its desire wholeheartedlyeartedly an understandingunder with intentions were. This gave Hitler the excuse other nationstions … but, as men of honour,h it is he needed and, brushing aside an Italian impossiblessible for us to be members of institutionsi attempt to find a compromise, he announced undernder conditions which are only bearablebear to on 14 October 1933 that Germany was ending thosehose devoid of a sense of honour … both its participation in the conference and its membership of the League of Nations, an Sincee it has been made clearclea to us from the institution that he had always regarded as a declarationstions of certain GreatGrea Powers that they symbol of Germany’s second class status and were not prepared to considercon real equality of for whose members, including the German rights of Germanymany at present,p we have decided ones, he privately felt contempt.” that it is impossible,ibleDRAFT in view of the indignity of her position, for Germany to continue to force First question, part a – 3 marks her company upon other nations.” What key points are made in Source A with regards to Germany’s attitude towards Source B international cooperation? Craig, G. 1978. Germany 1866–1945, pages 678–688. Oxford University Press. New York, USA Third question – 6 marks Compare and contrast the actions of Hitler “It was necessary to avoid appearing the regarding the Disarmament Conference as villain of the piece. When the rupture came, expressed in Sources A and B. [Hitler’s] foreign minister told Nadolny later

180 CHAPTER 2.4: GERMAN CHALLENGES TO THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENTS, 1933–38

Examiner’s hint: Highlight the comparisons and in Source A, where the language “deliberate contrasts in the sources as shown below. Then write degradation”, “indignity”, “devoid of a sense of two full paragraphs showing clear linkage between the honour” shows Hitler’s feelings for Germany’s sources and giving brief quotes to support your points. treatment. Similarities Contrasts

● In Source A, Hitler talks about degradation and ● Source A blames “certain great powers” for the failure “perpetuation of a discrimination” and Source B of the Disarmament Conference, but Source B says refers to Germany seeing itself as a “second class” that Germany was doing this only so that it would not member of the League of Nations. appear to be “the villain of the piece”.

● Source A talks about “equality of rights” for ● Source A claims thatt GermanyGerm is the victim of other Germany. Source B also says that Germany was countries’ actions,s, whereaswherea Source B talks of the looking for “equality”. “intransigence”ce” of Germany and claims that Hitler was lookingng for an “excuse” to leave the League of ● Source A blames “certain great powers” for not Nations.s. allowing Germany to be on an equal footing and Source B speciﬁcally names France as a country that ● In Source A, Hitler says he wants “an understandingu “refused to yield”. with other nations”, whereas Source B implies that he did not want an understanding but was putting ● Source B talks of the “contempt” that Hitler had forward demandsdemand “that the other powers would not for the League of Nations and this tone is present accept”.pt”.

Undermining collective security: The Non-Aggression Pact with Poland Germany’s withdrawal from the Leagueeague was a setback for the conceptconcep of collective security. Poland, onn Germany’s eastern border,bord was particularly vulnerable and, alarmed at the West’s failure to stop Germany rearming, entereded into a 10-year Non-AggressionNon-Aggressio PactP with the German governmentnt in January, 1934. AFT The Non-Aggressionn Pact tookk the world by surprise. ThThe clauses of the Versailles Treaty that had given GermanGerma land to recrrecreate Poland were particularly resentedsented in Germany; at Locarno,Loca StrStresemann had been unwilling too guarantee the eastern borders ofo GGermany even though he had acceptedpted the western border with FrancFrance as part of the 1925 Locarno Treaty. Forr the moment, however, this papact suited Hitler. He was unable to take any action against Poland ata ththis stage and, by signing the pact, he was securingg his eastern frontierfrontiefrontier. It also weakened France’s security system in Eastern Europe. FrancFrance had signed an alliance with Poland in 1921 and had hoped that this would keep pressure on Germany’s eastern borders. Germany had nowDRAF broken out of the diplomatic encirclement that the French had attempted to impose on it. The pact also ended any chance of rapprochement between Czechoslovakia and Poland, thus further undermining the collective security system. Moreover, as this was an unpopular move in Germany, the Non-Aggression Pact looked to the Class discussion international community like an act of statesmanship; it could be used to What do Hitler’s actions in convince Britain and others that Germany was a peaceful nation. the years 1933–34 over Of course, Hitler had no intention of keeping to this agreement. Hitler disarmament and Poland reveal preferred bilateral agreements to collective security agreements, as about his tactics for achieving these could more easily be broken. He declared privately that “All our his foreign policy objectives in agreements with Poland have a temporary signiﬁcance”. these years?

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Changing diplomatic alignments: Mussolini and Austria In June 1934, Hitler and Mussolini met. However, the meeting was not a success; Mussolini was unimpressed by Hitler and would not agree to Hitler’s position on Austria. Anschluss, the unification of Germany and Austria, had always been an important part of Hitler’s foreign policy aims, and Hitler tried to persuade Mussolini that Austria should become a satellite of Germany. Mussolini rejected this, however, as he wanted to keep Austria as a buffer state between Germany and Italy. He was also aware that South Tyrol, which had been gained by Italy as part of the Versailles Settlement, had a substantialubstanubsta German minority. (See page XX for more detail on Mussolini’sMusso view on this.) Meanwhile, in Austria, Hitlerr was supportingsup the Austrian Nazi Party led by Alfred Eduardduard Frauenfeld.Frauenfe The AuAustrian Nazis organized a campaign of intimidation and terrorism,t wwhich culminated in the assassinationsassination of the AustrianAustria ChanceChancellor Englebert Dollfuss.s. This was intended to be the firstfi sstep of a coup d’etat that would force the union with GermaGermany. The attemptedptedd coup caused inteinternational concconcern. Mussolini immediatelyately mobilizedobilized 100,000100,0 troops and moved them to the Brennerner pass, Italy’s’s borderborde with GermanGermany, in a show of strength in July, 1934. Hitler was forcedforc to bacback down and disown thee actions of the Austrian NazNazis. TThe monarchist Kurt von Schuschnigguschnigg took over and stabistabilized the Austrian regime. At thisis point, therefore, HitlHitler was forced to play a waiting game regardinging unificationunific with Austria. He did not want to alienate Mussolini, whosew suppsupport he would need against the Western democracies, and he reassured Mussolini that Austria would not be annexed. ▲ Hitler and Mussolini meet inn Veniceenice in 1934 Thehe growinggrow strength of Germany: The Saar plebiscite,ple JaJanuary 1935 Inn accoaccordanceaccordan with the Treaty of Versailles, the Saar, a small coal-rich Coup d’etatetat territory,ritory held a plebiscite in 1935. This area of Germany had been This iss a suddensud and violent under French control since 1919 and was now given the opportunity take overer of government,gov to returnr to Germany. The result of the plebiscite was an overwhelming usually by a small group of agreement (90.9% of the vote) that the Saar should return to Germany. people. A putschch is ananother This was a triumph for Hitler. The voting was supervised by the League word for a coup (hencehence Hitler’s and so done fairly, and the result was not surprising given that the entire attempted Munich putschutsch in population of the territory was German. It was nevertheless a great 1923) DDRAFTDR opportunity for Nazi propaganda to reinforce the growing power and strength of Germany and the popularity of the Nazi regime. Historian Gordon Craig writes: This success, with which the other Powers made no attempt to interfere, marked the beginning of a new phase in his policy. He had survived the period of extreme vulnerability unscathed, and, thanks to the distractions and differences of the other Powers, his own tactical skill, and a good deal of luck, had been able in the course of two years to free himself from the restrains of the European security system. — Craig, 1978

182 CHAPTER 2.4: GERMAN CHALLENGES TO THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENTS, 1933–38

Source skills Communication skills ATL

Go to http://www.britishpathe.com/video/hitler-acclaimed-in-saar- news-in-a-nutshell. Watch the Pathé News clip showing Hitler’s arrival in the Saar. How does Hitler use this event to show his growing power?

ATL Thinking and self-managementent skillsski Look back at Craig’s assessmentnt of Hitler’sHitler’ situation by the end of 1935. He identifies several reasonsreasons forfor HitleHitler’s success: ● Hitler’s tactical skill ● luck ● the distractionstions and differences of the other powerspowers. Find exampleses from the period 191933–36 to supportT each of these factors. Whichhich of these factors do yoyou consider to be the most significant in explaining Hitler’s success? (You may want to review your answer to the question on page 8484, identifying the different tacticsctics that Hitler used.) ▲ A poster from 1934, in the lead up to the Saar plebiscite. The words at the foot read “To Germany”. First question, part b – 2 marksmark What is the message of this poster?po AFT

Challengingg the Treaty of Versailles:Versail RearRearmament Joachim von Ribbentrop As early as February 1933, Hitler told his genergegenerals that rearmament was Ribbentrop started off as the most pressing priority: “the next ﬁveRAF yeayears must be devoted to the Hitler’s adviser on foreign defence capacityapacity of the Germany people”ppeople”. In fact, Germany had always policy. In 1935 he negotiated ignored the rearmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. With the the Anglo–German Naval cooperation of the Soviet Union ununder the Rapallo Treaty (see page XXX), Agreement, and in August 1936 Germany had continuedntinued to build aircraft and to train and expand its he was appointed ambassador army. In this sense, Hitler was continuing what had already been started to Britain. He hoped to arrange by previous German governments.vernDR However, he now increased the pace an alliance with Britain but of rearmament dramatically. ultimately failed in this goal; he By 1935, the army had increased from 7 to 21 divisions. Conscription was not helped by his arrogant was introduced in the same year; the army increased to 36 divisions and behaviour. He became negative over half a million men. In March 1935, Hermann Göring, one of Hitler’s towards Britain after this, ministers, revealed the existence of the Luftwaffe, which by this time seeing it as weak. In 1938 he had around 2,500 planes. Hitler justiﬁed this level of rearmament on the became foreign minister, a post grounds that Britain and France had failed to disarm and that Germany he kept until 1945. needed to be able to protect itself against the growing Soviet Army.

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Challenging the Treaty of Versailles: The remilitarization of the Rhineland Early in 1936, Hitler turned his attention to the Rhineland. This area had been demilitarized under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. In order to provide security for France, no military installations or garrisons were permitted on the left bank or within 50 kilometres of the right NL Poland Germany bank of the River Rhine.Rh Belgium For Hitler, the remilitariremilremilitarization of the Rhineland would be an impimportant step in his Rhineland France Czechoslavakia plans forr strengtheningstrengthen Germany;Germa he would be ablelee to build fortificationsfortific therethe to prevent Saar an attack from France. Rhineland Austria Austria The timing of Hitler’s actions in 11936 was Hungary Sudetenland led both by domestic and interinternational Danzig – Free City Italy considerations.deratio In GermanyGermany, rising prices and ▲ Disputed territories around Germany, 1935–38 food shortagesshor were caucausing unrest among the populationpop and HHitler needed to distract attention fromom economic problems. InternationInternationally, the Abyssinian crisis providedd ann ideal opportunity to take aactionaction. Mussolini’s break with the Britishh and French over this crisis meant that he was now seeking closer tiess with Hitler,er, and so he agreed not tto oppose Hitler’s takeover of the Rhineland. Hitlertler also knew that he could take advantage of the fact that Britain and France werewer distractedistracted by both this crisis and the fallout from the Hoare–Laval Pact (see pagpage XXX). Hitler’sr’s excuse for movingmovAF troops back into the Rhineland was the Franco–Sovietanco–Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty (see page XXX), which was ratified on 4 March 1936. He argued that this violated the spirit of the LocarnoLo Pact and threatened Germany with encirclement.

Source skills Baynes,Ba N. 1969. Thehe Speeches ofo Adolf Hitler: will not be victorious … in France as well. April 1922–August 1939. H.H Fertig. New York, USA But should this happen … then … this new “To this [the Locarno] Pact Germany made Bolshevik state would be a section of the a contributiontion which reprepresented a great Bolshevik International, which means that a sacrifice becauseuse while France fortified decision as to aggression or non-aggression her frontier withhDDRAFTDR steelste and concrete and would not be taken in two different states armaments, and garrisoned it heavily, a … , but orders would be issued from one condition of complete defencelessness was headquarters, … not in Paris but in Moscow. imposed upon us on our Western Frontier. This gigantic mobilisation of the East against France had not concluded this Treaty with a Central Europe is opposed not only to the European power of no significance … Soviet letter but to the spirit of the Locarno Pact.” Russia is the exponent of a revolutionary First question, part a – 3 marks political and philosophical system … Its According to Hitler, how has France gone against political creed is … world revolution. the spirit of the Locarno Pact? It cannot be foreseen whether this philosophy

184 CHAPTER 2.4: GERMAN CHALLENGES TO THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENTS, 1933–38

Both Hitler’s generals and the German Foreign Ofﬁce were hesitant about marching into the Rhineland, viewing it as a dangerous action likely to provoke a response from Britain and France. However, Hitler decided to take a gamble, hoping that the diplomatic disarray caused by the Abyssinian crisis would prevent Britain and France from taking any effective action. However, he later said, the 48 hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-wracking of my life. If the French had marched into the Rhineland, we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs. German troops moved into the Rhineland on 7 March 1936. In fact, this was not a surprise to the British and the French, who had received intelligence warnings that this was about to happen. However, no action was taken by either the British or the French to stop the remilitarization, despite the fact that the Germans invaded with a relatively weak military force. The successful invasion was accompanied by a peace offer, which was again intended to make Hitler look as though he wass a manma of peace and to divert the attention of Britain and Francee away from his challenge to the post-war settlement. The offer includeduded demilitarizingemilitarizing the Rhineland, providing Britain and France createdated similar zonesones on their sides of the frontier as well. He also suggesteduggested that he was interested in negotiating new security pactss with his neighbours and returning to the League of Nations.

Source skills Examiner’s hint: How many marks would you give the following answer? The overall message here is that both the German troops and the occupants of the Rhineland were happy about the German action. This can be seen by the expressions on RAFTRA the faces of both the soldiers and the citizens who are also giving flowers to the troops. The Nazi flags that are flying from every building would also indicate support for the remilitarization.

First question, part b – 2 marks What is the message of this photograph?

185 2 186 his popularityamongthemasses…hadnever beenhigher.” the teethofForeign Officehesitancyandmilitaryanxiety.And to hisleadershipposition.Hehadbeenprovedrightagain, in his notabletriumphwasguaranteedtogiveamassiveboost of success.ButpreciselythemannerinwhichHitlerachieved it wasanissuewhichmorethanmoststoodalikelychance between BritainandFrance intheirstancetowardsGermany, Andgiventhewell-knowndivisions German government. Germany, itwouldhave beenontheagendaofanynationalist sovereignty overterritorywhichnoonedisputedwas about theNaziregime.Asre-establishmentofGerman distinctlycool the population–even incirclesotherwise elites; anditwashugelypopularamongthemassesof expectations ofthetraditionalconservative-nationalist the contextofrearmament;itmatchedrevisionist in remilitarisationoftheRhinelandwasimportant “The Source A make noteson: impact oftheremilitarizationRhineland.Identifyand Read theviewsofhistoriansKershawandCraigon by extent aretheirviewinfluenced given byeachhistorian.To what use of the previous page.Discussthe in SourceAandBon Review thehistoriansviews TOK Go to ● ● com/video/scraps-of-paper Germany atthistime? and thecommentarygiveabout impression doesthefootage of theRhineland.What showing Hitler’s invasion Watch thePathé Newsclip ATL ATL

skills Communication Thinking and communication skills expectation why itchangedtheinternationalsituation. Germany toHitler’s positionin why thissuccesswasimportant h thePa http://www.britishpathe. reason g Hitler’ neland. W o/scraps-of-paper oes thef ww.britishpathe. intheaccounts Hitler andhindsight? tary give about tary giveabout e? DDRAFDR , Ian Kershaw, Longman, 1991, page124 p r . s …hadnever beenhigher.” andmilitaryanxiety.And As interve Mussolini German involvement. contrast toMussolini(see pageXXX),Hitlerplacedlimitsontheextentof also attackedgovernment shipsintheMediterranean.Nevertheless, centres, mostnotoriously Guernica inApril1937.Germansubmarines German bombersoftheCondor Legioncausedhavocbyattackingcivilian Franco’s troopsfromMoroccotoSpainatthestartofconﬂict,and Germany didnotsendgroundtroopsbutplayedakey roleintransporting support fromBritain,FranceandtheSovietUnion. Germany andItaly, whiletherepublicangovernmenthopedtoget conﬂict. GeneralFrancoledthenationalistsandhe askedforhelpfrom Both sidesappealedtotheinternationalcommunity forhelpinthis republican Spanishgovernment. began in1936withanationalistrevoltledbythe army againstthe As youwillhavereadinthepreviouschapter, theSpanishCivilWar intervened intheSpanishCivilWar onthesideofFranco. Mussolini andHitlerwerepushedclosertogetherwhentheyboth Increasing theinfluenceofNazism:TheSpanishCivilinflu War ncreasing theinfl ussolin

RAFTother.other.o of communismandsocialismontheonehandforcesFascism of communism the became Spain becamethebattleﬁeldforaEuropean-widestrugglebetweenforces ve — Henig,1985H ly chance er achieved ve bo gain, man withguts!Godhelpshim.’ ” worldbelongstothe ‘The the disarrayofFrench fortunes, asheviewed All inall,theFührerhadgoodreasontoexult, ontoHitler’sweigh theadvantagesofgetting bandwagon. where politiciansw where politicianswithaneyetothemainchancebegan to Ententeaswell, neutrality. ThereweretremorsintheLitt neutrality. ThereweretremorsintheLittle Line intoBelgiumandhadsetacourseba Line intoBelgiumandhadsetacoursebacktowardsstrict had abandonedtheintentionofextendingMaginot by thetreatiesof1920and1925,hisgovernment Belgians wasseekingreleasefromtheobligations incurred France’s theKingof allies.Before theyearwasout, thinking, andthishaddevastating consequencesamong the exclusivelydefensivenatureofFrench strategical German prestige.Itspsychological effectwastoreveal was avictorynotmerelyinthesensethatitenhanced system. TheGermanremilitarisationoftheRhineland effectively destroyedthepost-First World War security the[invasionofRhineland]…Hitlerhad “With man withguts!God Source B Craig, G.Craig, 1978. eigh theadva abandoned theintentionofextendi all, theF reaties of1920and1925,an rray ofFr s seekingreleasefro . Beforetheyea Germany 1866–1945 had deva nsive na cholog University Press.University New York, USA , page691. Oxford CHAPTER 2.4: GERMAN CHALLENGES TO THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENTS, 1933–38

Hitler had several reasons for intervening in this civil war:

● He wanted a friendly government in Spain that would supply Spanish mineral resources and also provide military bases for German submarines.

● He would be able to test out his air force and see the effects of air

attacks on civilian populations. ATL Self-management Refer back to Chapter XX, ● He was able to pose as the defender of European civilization against page XX. Compare and contrast the Communist threat. the importancemp of involvement ● A pro-Fascist government in Spain would further undermine inn the SpSpanish Civil War for the French security. foreigforeign policies of Mussolini What were the results of this conflict for Hitler’s position and Hitler. in Europe? ● The war dragged on for three years, polarizing opinion in Europe.rope. Sourcerce skillssk The Origins of ● It reinforced suspicions between Britain and France on thehe one hand Henig R. 1985.1985 and the Soviet Union on the other, thereby preventingg a strong anti- the Second World War, page 30. Fascist alliance. TRoutledge. London, UK “In the process [of ● It distracted the West, and Britain’s failure to takeke any strongrong action the Four Year Plan], (see page XXX) led Hitler to believe that he would not face further Germany was to make opposition to expansion in Eastern Europe.e. every effort to become more self-supporting Changing diplomatic alignments:ts: The Rome–Berlin Axis FT by developing a wide and the Anti-Comintern Pact range of synthetic materials, by The most important result of thee Spanish Civil War on diplomaticdi stockpiling essential alignments was the improvedd relations between Hitler andan Mussolini.Mus raw materials, and by Hitler recognized King Victortor Emmanuel III of Italy as the “Emperor“Em concluding bilateral of Abyssinia” and workedkedd with Italy to prevent a British initiativein to trade agreements update the Locarno Treaties.. On the Italian side, opposiopposition to German with states in eastern inﬂuence in Austriariaa was now removed.removed In July 19361936, with Mussolini’s and south–eastern approval, Hitlerr signed an agreement withwi ChancellorChance Schuschnigg of Europe whereby food Austria, wherebyereby Schuschnigg promised to pursuepur a policy “based on and raw materials the principleiple that Austria acknowledges hersherherself to be a German state” in were supplied to return foror a German commitment to nonnon-intervention. Germany in exchange The new atmospheremosphere of cooperation bebetween Germany and Italy for manufactures and culminated in the signing of the RomRoRome–Berlin Axis between Hitler and armaments. Romania Mussolini in Octoberber 1936. It consistedcon of a series of secret protocols was a particular target setting out their mutualual intereinterests (see page XXX). This was followed up for German advances in November of the samemeDRAFT yeary with an agreement with Japan; the Anti- because she could Comintern Pact was directed against the Communist International and supply vitally needed stated that, in the case of an attack by the Soviet Union, the signatories supplies of oil.” would consult on measures to “safeguard their common interests”. The militant nature of this agreement indicated the beginning of the openly First question, part a – aggressive phase of Hitler’s foreign policy. 3 marks Hitler was delighted, as these agreements demonstrated that Germany According to Henig, in was no longer isolated but an important player on the world stage. what ways did Hitler plan to make Germany prepared for war?

187 2

Source skills The impact of the economy on Hitler’s foreign policy: First question, The Four Year Plan By 1936, rearmament was not progressing fast enough for Hitler. Indeed, part b – 2 marks the consumer economy was starting to struggle: there were shortages of Refer back to the Nazi butter and meat, as well as shortages of vital imports of raw materials postcard on page 83. and of foreign exchange. The economics minister, Dr Hjalmar Schacht, What is the message of favoured spending less on armaments in order to enable more exports to this postcard? be produced, thus encouraging foreign trade. However, Hitler believed that Germany’s economicomi problems could only be solved by the acquisition of more land and livingiving space.spacs He decided to go all Class discussion out for autarky, bringing the economy moreore closelyclo undunder party control, in order to prepare for war. This was to be done viavi a Four YearYe Plan, which To what extent had Hitler Hitler introduced in September 193636 under the leadershiplea of Göring. succeeded in removing the Believing that this would makee the pace of rearmamentrearmam too fast and that most important restrictions of it would cause an economic crisis, Schacht resigned. However,Ho tthere is the Treaty of Versailles by the no doubt that Hitler was now in a strong position. As the hishhistorian Ian end of 1936? Kershaw writes: By the end of the yearr [1936], with the German-ItalianGe axisaxi secured … the creation of the anti-Cominternintern pact withwi Japan, the SpanishSpa Civil War all providing renewedenewed evidencee of the passivityp and uncertaintyunce of the western democracies,acies, and the German economy committed full tilt to preparation for war, the contoursontoursours of growing international tensiontens and an escalating arms race in the latteratter 1930s0s were all set. And out of the varvarious interwoven crises of 1936, Hitler’s own powerr position had emerged buttressedbuttrebutt and reinforced. — Kershaw, [year] The impact of NazismNaz on Germany’s foreign policy: The Hossbach MemoraMeMemorandum The conference marks the point at which the expansion of the Third Reich ceased to be latent anda became explicit. — Wiliamson, 1995 On 5 November, Hitler called a special meeting that was attended by his top generalsg aand his war ministers: Hermann Göring (air), Werner von Fritsch (arm(army), Erich Raeder (navy), Werner von Blomberg (defence) and Foreigneign Minister Konstantin von Neurath. Hitler told the meeting that what he was to say was to be regarded as “his last will and testament”. WWe know about this meeting because the main points were compiled and written down ﬁve days later by Hitler’s military assistant, Colonel Hossbach, from notes that he made at the time. The document was ﬁled Communication, thinkingthinki without having been seen by Hitler.

ATL DDRAFT and social skills At the conference, Hitler gave an overview of Germany’s international Read the full text of the situation and proposed several actions that now needed to be taken. The Hossbach Memorandum at: following extracts are taken from Hossbach’s memorandum: avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/ The aim of German foreign policy was to make secure and to preserve the hossbach.asp. racial community and to enlarge it. It was therefore a question of space. The question for Germany was: where could she achieve the greatest gain at the Make bullet point notes on the lowest cost? German policy had to reckon with two hate inspired antagonists, key points made. Britain and France, to whom a German colossus in the centre of Europe was In pairs or small groups, discuss a thorn in the ﬂesh … Germany’s problem could only be solved by the use the significance of this meeting. of force. If the resort to force with its attendant risks is accepted … there then

188 CHAPTER 2.4: GERMAN CHALLENGES TO THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENTS, 1933–38

remains still to be answered the questions “When”? and “How”? In this matter there were three contingencies to be dealt with. Source skills Case 1: Period 1943–5 Second question – After that date only a change for the worse for our point of view could be 4 marks expected … Our relative strength would decrease in relation to the rearmament With reference to its origin, which would then have been carried out by the rest of the world. … If the purpose and content, how Führer was still living it was his unalterable determination to solve Germany’s useful is the Hossbach problem of space by 1943–5 at the latest … Memorandum as evidence of Hitler’s foreign policy Case 2 plansans aafter 1937? If internal strife in France should develop into such a domestic crisis as to absorb the French army completely and render it incapable of use for war against Germany, then the time for acting against the Czechs would have come.e. Case 3 If France should be so embroiled in war with another state that she could notn “proceed” against Germany. For the improvement of our political-militaryl-militaryl-milita position our first objective, in the event of our being embroiled in war, must be to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously inn order to remove the threat to our plan in any possible operation against the West. T If Germany made use of this war to settle the Czech and Austrian question,question it Class discussion was to be assumed that Britain – herself at war with Italy – would decide notno to act against Germany. Refer back to Hitler’s foreign policy ideas in Mein Kampf While none of the military leaders objectedted to thehe planned destructiondestructio F(see page XXX). What of Czechoslovakia, Blomberg and Fritschtsch were unhappynhappy about a policy continuities are there in his that could lead to war with Britainn and France before GermGermany was aims as set out in 1923 in Mein sufficiently prepared. However, all those who were hesitanthesita about Kampf and those as they appear Hitler’s aims – (Blomberg, Fritschitsch and Neurath) were ruthlesslyruth removed in the Hossbach Memorandum? from power in February 1938938 when Hitler appointed himselfhims Supreme What change in attitude do you Commander of the Germanman army. These changes were accompaniedacc by see concerning Britain? the retirement of 16 high-rankinganking generals and the trantransfer of 44 others, thus removing anyoneyoneone who might be lless than commcommitted to Hitler’s In pairs, review Italy’s position goals. As Kershawhaw writes, “Following the Reichstag FireF and the Rohm crisis on a potential naval war [Night of the Long Knives], the Blömberg-FritschBlömberg-Fritsc affairaffa was the third great with Britain. What would be milestone on the way to Führer absolutist power” (quoted in Darby, 2007). the Italian view of the cases discussed in this meeting? How significantificant is the Hossbach MemorandumMem as evidence of Hitler’s foreigngn policy objectives?objectives A copy of Hossbach’sch’s minutes of thistht meeting were used at the Nuremberg The Nuremberg Trials Trials as evidence of Hitler’s planningpla for war. However, AJP Taylor points A series of military tribunals, out that the memorandumum iis only a copy and indeed only a fragment of DRAFTheld by the Allied forces after a copy of the original, which has disappeared. Taylor also argues that the World War II. Key members purpose of the meeting was not actually to discuss foreign policy aims of the political, military, and but to convince conservative military and financial experts of the need to economic leadership of Nazi continue with the rearmament programme, and to isolate Schacht, who Germany were put on trial opposed it. Taylor states that “Hitler’s exposition was in large part day-dreaming charged with crimes against and unrelated to what followed in real life” (Taylor, 1969). peace and crimes against However, other historians would still argue that, while it cannot be used humanity as a road-map for war, the Hossbach Memorandum did clearly set out Hitler’s central goal: “to make secure and to preserve the racial community and enlarge it”. It also made clear Hitler’s war-like and expansionist intentions and Hitler’s sense of urgency; this was all taken seriously by those present. 189 2

TOK Think about what an historical fact actually is. Write a brief definition of what a fact in History is. Share your definition with a partner. How is this similar to or different from a fact in the natural sciences. Discuss as a class what could be considered the ‘historical facts’ in this chapter. Does your discussion suggest anything about the methods of, and challenges faced by, historians?

Full document feature: Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland Source A Source B A British report by the heads of the three A cartoon publishedished in Punch magazine on armed services on their ability to ﬁght a war 18 March 19366 against Germany in 1936 “We would at once emphasise … that any question of war with Germany while we were as at present heavily committed to the possibility of hostilities in the Mediterranean would be thoroughly dangerous. As T regards naval operation against Germany, our minimum requirements could onlyy be carried out by weakening naval forcesrces in the Mediterranean to an extent whichhich would jeopardise our position there vis-à-s-à- vis Italy … As regards the Army and the Air Force, the purely defensivensive provisions already made in the Mediterraneanediterranean have drawn upon the resourcesources of these twot Services to such ann extent that untilunti those reinforcements haveave returned to this country we should be quite incapable of dispatchingg a Field Force or providingp any proper defence in the air. To bringbri home thesee forces with their equipment … would takeake in the case of the army two monthsm … andnd even longer in the casecas of the Air Force. At thee moment our coast defencede artillery requires modernisation to a large extent, we have noo anti-submarineanti-submar defences for a Source C number of ourr most importanti ports, and Henig, R. 1985. The Origins of the Second World War, the number of ourDRAFur anti-aircraft guns and page 25. Routledge. London, UK searchlights is quite inadequate to deal with “On 7 March 1936, token German forces the air threat from Germany.” marched into the Rhineland and Hitler announced that the German government was remilitarizing it because of the threat to Germany posed by the Franco-Russian alliance which had just been ratiﬁed by the French Senate … The remilitarization was a further challenge to the Versailles settlement and to the British government’s wish to

190 CHAPTER 2.4: GERMAN CHALLENGES TO THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENTS, 1933–38

secure peaceful and orderly revision. For the In order, however, to avoid any misinterpretation British government had already gone out of its of its intentions and to establish beyond doubt way to indicate to Hitler that ministers were the purely defensive character of these measures, willing to agree to German remilitarization as well as to express its unalterable longing for of the Rhineland as part of a more general a real pacification of Europe between states in package of measures which might include equal rights and equally respected, the German an air pact. German return to the League of government declares itself ready to conclude Nations, some peaceful revision of Germany’s new agreements for the creation of a system of eastern frontiers and the return of former peaceful security for Europe … After three years, German colonies. Now Hitler had shown once I believe that today thee strustruggle for German again, in his rearmament policies that he equality of rights cann be ddeemed concluded … preferred to achieve his objectives by unilateral We have no territorialrritorial claims to make in military action rather than by participating Europe. Aboveove all, we are aware that all the in multilateral diplomatic discussions. … In tensions resulting either from erroneous retrospect, many politicians and commentators territorialrial provisions or from ththe disproportion claimed that this was the point at which Hitler betweenween the size of its population and should have been challenged, and that after Lebensraum can never be solved by wars.” March 1936 he could not be stopped from plunging Europe into war.” Firstrst question, partpar a – 3 marks Accordingrding to SourceSou A, why would it be difficult Source D for Britainain to resistre German aggression in 1936? A speech by Hitler to the Reichstag following the remilitarization of the First question, partpa b – 2 marks Rhineland, Saturday 7 March 1936 What is the message of Source B? “The German government has continuously Second questionquestio – 4 marks emphasised during the negotiationsiations of the last CompareCom and contrast the views expressed in years its readiness to observeve and fulfil all the SourceSo C and Source D regarding Hitler’s motives obligations arising from the Rhine Pact sos long for his actions in 1936. as the other contractinging parties were reaready on their side to maintainn the pact. This obvious ThirdThir question – 6 marks and essential condition can no longer be With reference to its origin, purpose and content, regarded as beingeing fulfilled by France.Fra France analyse the value and limitations of Source has repliedd to Germany’s repeated friendlyf C for a historian studying the reasons for the offers and assurances of peace by infringinginfrin remilitarization of the Rhineland. the Rhine Pact through a military allianalliance withh the Soviet Union directedirected exclusively Fourth question – 9 marks against Germany. In this mannmanner, however, Using these sources and your own knowledge, the Locarnono Rhine Pact has lolost its inner examine the reasons for Hitler’s remilitarization of meaning andd ceased to exist … the Rhineland in 1936. References DDRAFT Baynes, N. 1969. The Speeches of Adolf Hitler: April 1922–August 1939. H. Fertig. New York, USA Craig, G. 1978. Germany 1866–1945. Oxford University Press. New York, USA Darby, G. 2007. Hitler, Appeasement and the Road to War. Hodder, UK Henig, R. 1985. The Origins of the Second World War. Routledge. London, UK Kershaw, I. 1991. Hitler. Longman, UK. Steiner, Z. 2011. The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933–1999. Oxford University Press. New York, USA Wiliamson, DG. 1995. The Third Reich. Longman. London, UK 191