The Failed Emergence of an Anglo-Soviet Cooperation Against Germany: 1930S British Perception of Soviet and German Threats

The Failed Emergence of an Anglo-Soviet Cooperation Against Germany: 1930s British Perception of Soviet and German Threats

Makiko Miyazaki

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Prerequisite for Honors In Political Science under the advisement of Professor Stacie E. Goddard

May 2020

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………....iii

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………...iv

People ……………………………………………………………………………………………..v

Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………………1

Chapter 2: History of the Soviet Threat, 1922-38………………………………………………..24

Chapter 3: Chamberlain and the Parliament……………………………………………………..55

Chapter 4: Diplomatic Corps…………………………………………………………………….85

Chapter 5: Conclusions…………………………………………………………………...…….110

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………...... 117

iii

Acknowledgements

To my advisor, Professor Stacie Goddard –

I would like to express my deepest gratitude for your constant encouragement, insightful advice, and generous time. I could not have done this without you. From this thesis to the Rise and Fall of Great Powers seminar and the Albright Institute, you were part of some of my most memorable experiences at Wellesley. It has been an honor to work with you!

To my professors –

Thank you so much to Professors Paul MacDonald, Katharine Moon, and Kim McLeod for serving on my defense committee: I truly appreciate your input and your time.

Professors Goddard, MacDonald, Moon, McLeod, Jennifer Chudy, Jay Turner, 赵老师, 陈老师, 汤老师, and James Battat – I have learned so much from you over the past four years, and I am blessed to have had you as professors. Many of you have written me countless recommendation letters as well. Thank you so much for your constant support and kindness.

Thank you also to Dr. Paul Hansbury and Adam Brodie at the University of Oxford for giving me the knowledge essential to write this thesis.

To my family –

Mami, Papi, and Saki, thank you so much for everything. Your unconditional love, support, and encouragement carried me forward: I could not have done this without you.

Special fondness to バーバ、ジージ、and やっくん as well.

To my friends –

You have given me so much inspiration, kindness, and strength to keep going. I am blessed to be surrounded by people as amazing as you. Special shoutout to Leila B., Irene B., Sabrina C., Nathaniel C., Emily D., Lauren E., Sofia G., Ayla H.*, Lisa H., Sophia L., Olivia L., Huihan L., Maya M.*, Daria O., Zoe O., Andrew P., Shirin P., Polina P., Dwi R., Diane S., Lucy S., Cheryn S., Meghan S., Lisa S., and Sanjana T.* Thank you also to the countless others at Wellesley, the Albright Institute, Oxford, MIT-Wellesley Toons, and JASC. *Go Sev 212!!

Special thank you to Rachel Besancon and Maya Nandakumar for your invaluable guidance throughout the whole thesis process. From writing the proposal to finishing the thesis and preparing for my defense, you have helped me every step of the way. I feel so lucky to have gotten to know both of you – I just wish I had met you in person before you graduated!

Finally, thank you to Wellesley College, the Department of Political Science, and the Knapp Social Science Fellowship for your generous support.

Abstract

Between 1933 and 1938, Nazi Germany’s recrudescent power threatened to plunge Europe into another world war. To mitigate the German threat of aggression, Britain had two choices: to mollify Germany through appeasement or to challenge it through an Anglo-Soviet cooperation. Britain ultimately chose appeasement, resulting in the 1938 Munich Agreement, and the conventional wisdom alleges the reason to be because the British perceived the Soviet Union to be a greater threat than Germany. This thesis critically examines this argument. Between 1933 and 1938, how much consensus was there among the British policymaking elites that the Soviet Union was a greater threat than Germany and that an Anglo-Soviet cooperation was ill-advised? Through an examination of Prime Minster Neville Chamberlain, the Parliament, and the diplomatic corps using materials that include speeches, private letters, government documents, and internal memos, I find that the conventional wisdom has limited explanatory power. Instead, I argue that there was, in fact, overwhelming consensus that Germany was the greater threat, and dissensus lay in what was the best strategy for Britain to address the German threat. Although fervent arguments for an Anglo-Soviet cooperation persisted until the eve of the Munich Agreement, supporters of appeasement were ultimately greater in number and authority, and the case for British overtures to the Soviets was lost.

People

PARLIAMENT NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN DIPLOMATIC CORPS

Chancellor of the Exchequer, ANTI-APPEASERS, 1931-37 Foreign Secretary led by Winston Prime Minister, 1937-40 John Simon, 1931-5 Churchill Samuel Hoare, 1935 Anthony Eden, 1935-8 Lord Halifax, 1938-40

Permanent Under- Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (PUS) Robert Vansittart, 1930-37 Alexander Cadogan, 1938

Foreign Office

Department Heads Northern Department

(Soviet Affairs) Laurence Collier,

1932-41

Central Department (German Affairs)

Orme Sargent,* 1926-33

Ralph Wigram, 1933-36

William Strang, 1936-39

*from 1934, Assistant

Undersecretary who supervised the Central

Department

Far Eastern Department (Japanese

Affairs) Charles Orde, 1929-38

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

On September 30, 1938, Great Britain, alongside France and Italy, signed the Munich

Agreement that sanctioned Nazi Germany to annex the Czechoslovak territory of Sudetenland.

Although intended to curtail Germany’s revisionist ambitions, the Munich Agreement came to be regarded, by contemporaries and historians alike, as an act of appeasement that emboldened

Germany’s aggressions and helped lead to World War II. Consequently, the Munich Agreement has become an infamous symbol of Western impotence in the interwar collective memory.

One curious aspect surrounding the Munich Agreement is why Britain did not choose instead to cooperate with the Soviet Union against Germany. Aware of Germany’s intense enmity towards the Soviet Union and visions of expansion into the Soviets’ backyard, the Soviet

Union in the 1930s had clearly considered Germany a threat and launched repeated initiatives towards Britain to improve their relations and guard against Germany together. Given the Soviet

Union’s geographic location to the east of Germany, one could argue that an Anglo-Soviet cooperation would yield an encirclement of Germany, force Germany to negotiate with the West, or deter German aggression all together. Moreover, Britain considered the worst-case scenario to be a German-Soviet rapprochement against Britain: yet, rejecting Soviet overtures could help drive the Soviets, desperate for territorial security in Eastern Europe, into Germany’s arms.1 If an

Anglo-Soviet cooperation offered all these benefits, Britain’s ultimate rejection of it in favor of appeasement seems counterintuitive.

The conventional wisdom behind this puzzle invokes the British perception of the Soviet

Union: Britain considered the Soviet Union to be a greater threat than Germany, and Britain

1 This is what exactly happened through the 1939 German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. 2 deemed it better to engage with the lesser threat than to cooperate with the greater threat.2 But despite the narrative’s pervasiveness in the scholarship of the interwar period, assessment of this narrative’s validity remains rather lacking in the literature.

This thesis aims to fill this gap by examining the following question: between 1933 and

1938 (Hitler’s accession to power to the Munich Agreement), to what extent was there consensus among the British policymaking elites that the Soviet Union was a greater threat to Britain than

Germany and that an Anglo-Soviet cooperation was ill-advised? To investigate the puzzle, I undertake a qualitative analysis of primary sources (public and private) and secondary sources to trace the elites’ perspectives, debates, and conclusions over both the threat and the remedial strategy over time. For these elites, I will particularly focus on Neville Chamberlain, the

Parliament, and the diplomatic corps,3 as will be discussed later on. Through this analysis, I find no evidence of a consensus stating that the Soviet Union was the greater threat and that an

Anglo-Soviet cooperation was imprudent. In fact, there was an overwhelming consensus that

Germany was the greater threat. However, there was great dissensus over the desirability of an

Anglo-Soviet cooperation as a strategy against Germany. While there was vocal support for an

Anglo-Soviet cooperation, this strategy ultimately did not materialize because its proponents were smaller in number and lesser in authority than the supporters of appeasement. Chamberlain, some of his closest advisors, and the majority of Parliament were all determined to pursue appeasement, and the Munich Agreement consequently ensued.

2 For examples of this view, see Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); W.P. Coates and Zelda K. Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1945); Margaret George, The Warped Vision: British Foreign Policy, 1933–1939 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965); Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963). 3 See the Methodology section for the definition. 3

Despite being a particular historical case study, this thesis has significant implications for both appeasement studies and International Relations theories. The studies on appeasement have tended to focus disproportionately on the German threat vis-à-vis Britain. Although it is true that

Britain had relatively limited formal interactions with the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s,4 if we consider the aforementioned relevance of the Soviet Union in addressing the ‘German problem,’ disregarding the Soviet Union in scholarly analysis offers only an incomplete understanding of the Munich Agreement. Theoretically, this thesis contributes to a fuller understanding of grand strategy formulation. First, many scholars have focused on systemic conditions, but they cannot explain a state’s grand strategy on its own. An analysis of the policymakers’ decision-making process is warranted, and the extent to which they reached a consensus and what that consensus entailed offer a crucial component in explaining why a particular grand strategy was formulated. Second, some scholars examining grand strategy have stipulated that a particular strategy follows a particular threat, but this is not always the case in reality: separating the ‘ends’ and the ‘means’ in a grand strategy analysis would thus bring new insights into the scholarship. These will be elaborated further in the later parts of this chapter.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, I define key terms in my inquiry, introduce the greater appeasement literature, and delineate where this thesis is placed in the historiography. The second section will expand upon the theoretical implications of this work. It will illustrate why systemic considerations are insufficient for explaining the lack of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation, why the analysis of policymakers through the consensus/dissensus approach provides a better alternative, and why this thesis’ distinction

4 Britain had no formal relations with the Soviet Union in 1918-1924 and 1927-1929. In the 1930s, Britain was severely lacking intelligence on the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union was not the focal point of British diplomacy per se. Keith Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 24. 4 between the ‘ends’ and the ‘means’ of grand strategy is useful. The third section will be a literature review, presenting the existing literature and highlighting its shortcomings. The fourth and final section will present my methodology.

DEFINITIONS AND CONTEXT

Definitions

My use of the term “British policymaking elites” refers to those who oversaw the foreign policymaking processes, represented by Chamberlain, the Parliament, and the diplomatic corps in this thesis. This framework might plausibly exclude other figures who may have had an influence, such as those from the Treasury and the War Office, but as they did not have the ultimate say in actual foreign policymaking, they are outside the scope of this thesis.

I will at times use the word ‘appeasement’ to refer to the Munich Agreement. Although appeasement as a theoretical term can be defined broadly as a policy of accommodating the grievances of revisionist actors to attain at least a temporary peace,5 thereby including several of

Britain’s foreign policies in the 1930s,6 this thesis’ approach reflects the scholarly tradition that regards appeasement as synonymous with the Munich Agreement in this period.7

I acknowledge that many of the direct quotations that I invoke refer to the Soviet Union as ‘Soviet Russia.’ The use of this term is prevalent across sources of the time period. However, I refrain from using this term because ‘Soviet Russia’ is also an unofficial name for the Russian

Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, which was in existence during the civil war of 1917-22.

5 Peace here would be defined as negative peace, or absence of conflict. 6 To distinguish the Munich Agreement from other policies to accommodate Germany, I categorize the latter under the terms ‘direct engagement,’ or when appropriate, ‘Anglo-German rapprochement.’ 7 Daniel Hucker’s elucidation of this tradition may be useful. Daniel Hucker, Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 3. 5

1922 marked the birth of the Soviet Union, so the state in question for this thesis, having the period range from 1933 to 1938, would be the Soviet Union.8 While I respect the use of the term

‘Soviet Russia’ in direct quotations, my avoidance of the term in my own writing is to avoid confusion given the historical context.

I define ‘threat’ as the general belief that a state harbors malign intent and has the capabilities – economic, military, and discursive resources, close relationships with other states, and/or geographic location – to achieve its intent to the observer state. While this definition is similar to one of the most influential conceptualizations of threat in International Relations –

Stephen Walt’s notion of the adversary state’s “geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived [aggressive] intentions”9 – my modifications of the geographic proximity and offensive capabilities factors arguably render my definition more appropriate when studying foreign policy, especially in the interwar years. Geographic proximity does not necessarily equate to threat: in the case of the Soviet Union, which was situated quite far from the British homeland, one could plausibly see the British threat perception coming from the Soviet Union’s location – holding the key to whether it can force Germany to fight a two-front war, in addition to being near British interests in India and China – rather than its proximity per se. The concept of offensive capabilities reflects the neorealist definition of power as the economic and military capabilities that allow a state to achieve its objectives and compel/coerce other states into non- resistance.10 Although economic and military capabilities are undoubtedly important, Chapter 2 reveals that the British perceived a Soviet threat in other ways – such as the exportation of

8 For further context, see Peter Kenez, A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 9 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 5. 10 E.g. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 31; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001), 55. 6 communism through the Communist International (Comintern) and the ability to join hands with

Germany – that do not fit neatly into such a neorealist framework. My definition of threat takes these considerations into account.

Granted, any theoretical framework that includes malign intent/aggressive intentions can have limitations: most notably, scholars could question why states can and do perceive other states as having such intentions in the first place.11 There would be scholarly merit in examining this contention: however, such an endeavor is outside the scope of this thesis, since the British elites generally assumed that they understood the adversary state’s intentions, as the following chapters will reveal. Because this thesis explores the debates that the elites engaged in at the time, not retrospectively critique if these elites’ assumption was correct, the incorporation of perceived intentions in the definition of threat seems justified for this purpose.

Finally, the term ‘consensus’ concerns the extent to which the British policymaking elites agreed on a threat and the means to address it. Arguably, examining the opinions of the policymaking elites would yield a dissensus, or lack of consensus, in any circumstances because it is implausible that every single individual concerned would agree on a threat and a solution: such a pure case of ‘groupthink’ is rather unthinkable in even the most repressive of regimes, let alone a democracy such as Britain. However, there is a spectrum of dissensus that renders some types of dissensus a ‘consensus’ in practical terms – for example, if the dissenters are insignificant in number given the size of the policymaking group and/or have little visibility or voice to have a substantial effect on the foreign policy formulated. In cases like these, I will label

11 Stacie E. Goddard and Ronald R. Krebs, “Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 24, no. 1 (2015): 10. 7 them as consensus for the practical purpose of distinguishing them from more clear types of dissensus that display clear factions in opinions.

Context

As this thesis concerns itself with appeasement, a brief summary of appeasement historiography and this work’s place in it seems warranted. Appeasement studies have evolved over time and are divided into three schools: orthodox, revisionist, and counter-revisionist. The orthodox school emerged in the 1940s. Also called the “guilty men thesis,” the orthodox school argued that appeasement was a conscious choice made by policymakers and admonished the

‘men of Munich’ – Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his government – for accommodating Germany.12 Directly challenging the orthodox school is the revisionist school, which gained ground in the 1960s. Rather than individual agency, the revisionist school explained appeasement in terms of ‘structural constraints,’ such as Britain’s military and economic weaknesses, that made appeasement the only logical, if not the only possible, response.13 In this view, the appeasement of Germany was “massively overdetermined,”14 and the British policymaking elites were pawns driven by forces beyond their control.15 Finally, since the 1990s, the counter-revisionist school has taken root. While the counter-revisionist school

12 For examples of this school, see Frank Owen, Michael Foot, and Peter Howard, Guilty Men (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1940); Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948); Lewis Namier, Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-1939 (London: Duckworth, 1948); John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1948). 13 E.g. see Mark R. Brawley, “Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Calculations: Explaining Divergent British, French, and Soviet Strategies toward Germany between the World Wars (1919–1939),” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 92. 14 Paul W. Schroeder, “Munich and the British Tradition,” Historical Journal 19, no. 1 (1976): 242. 15 For examples of this school, see A.J.P Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamilton, 1961); Keith Eubank, Munich (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963); Keith Robbins, Munich (London: Cassell, 1968); Laurence V. Thompson, The Greatest Treason: The Untold Story of Munich (New York: Morrow, 1968). 8 acknowledges the systemic constraints, it still ultimately holds individual policymakers accountable for bringing about the British decision to appease.16

This thesis is in the counter-revisionist school because it analyzes appeasement at the unit level of policymaking elites. While the thesis takes note of the greater systemic context, such as the clash of differing ideologies and shifts in the balance of power, it nevertheless places agency on the elites themselves by focusing on their consensus/dissensus regarding their external threats.

The approach that this thesis undertakes – examining appeasement from the specific lens of the absence of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation, as well as assessing British perceptions of the Soviet and German threats side by side – has hardly been taken by the existing appeasement scholarship. Thus, this thesis would make a meaningful contribution to the expansion of the debates in which the counter revisionist school has been engaging.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Why is examining the degree of consensus among the British policymaking elites necessary to understand why an Anglo-Soviet cooperation against Germany did not materialize before 1938? After all, in such a case of great power politics, does a systemic/structural analysis not hold more explanatory power than a unit-level, ‘reductionist’ analysis? At the beginning of this chapter, I made the statement that a systemic/structural analysis cannot explain grand

16 For examples of this school, see R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War (The Making of the Twentieth Century) (London: Macmillan, 1993); R.J.Q. Adams, British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 1935-39 (London: Macmillan, 1993); Michael Jabara Carley, 1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 1999); Sidney Aster, “Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 19, no. 3 (2008): 453 ; Ralph B. A. Dimuccio, “The Study of Appeasement in International Relations: Polemics, Paradigms, and Problems,” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 2 (1998): 246-7. 9 strategy on its own: this section elaborates on this contention and why a consensus/dissensus model is useful.

Kenneth Waltz’s balance of power theory is arguably the most prominent systemic level theory in International Relations. Operating under the assumption that the international order is anarchical and that any state can resort to force to achieve its objectives, impose compliance on other states, and possibly even eliminate them, this theory predicts that states consider any concentration of power to be a threat to their security. Thus, as a state amasses power, the other states will restrain the rising power by building up their own capabilities (‘internal balancing’) and/or forming alliances to aggregate their capabilities (‘external balancing’). The key point is that only the raw consideration of power matters in threat perception and resultant measures: in

Waltz’s words, “[s]tates, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them.”17 There should not be handicaps in forming a counter-balancing alliance because states’ shared interest in checking a rising power trumps any other consideration.

Between 1933 and 1938, few could dispute that Germany was amassing power. Its aggressive rhetoric and military buildup rendered Germany firmly as a rising power, while it was difficult to argue the same for the Soviet Union given its display of fear towards the Germans and its calls for peace. Meanwhile, “the fighting strength of the British Empire was weaker in relation to its potential enemies than at any time since 1779:” British navy was weak, land force almost nonexistent, and air force in need of a buildup, but there were insufficient financial resources to mobilize such internal balancing.18 Given Britain’s military weakness and difficulty

17 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 127. 18 Paul M. Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), 99-100. Also see Zara Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933-1939, 431. 10 in pursuing internal balancing, theory dictates that Britain should have formed an alliance with the Soviet Union, the weaker side, to counter Germany, the stronger side. However, this alliance did not form: in fact, not even cooperation – a form of external balancing lesser than an alliance

– emerged. This indicates a presence of a “handicap”19 between Britain and the Soviet Union, which renders the balance of power theory unsatisfactory as an explanatory device.

Some scholars have nevertheless tried to frame the British policy before the Munich

Agreement as consistent with the balance of power theory or at least explainable from a systemic standpoint. Norrin Ripsman and Jack Levy, for example, famously argued that Britain appeased

Germany “as a means of buying time for rearmament,” delaying the seemingly inevitable confrontation until Britain could correct the military imbalance: in this way, British policy was

“driven by strategic balance-of-power calculations.”20 While this analysis may appear valid, it is remarkable that Ripsman and Levy completely omit the possibility of external balancing in their work. If, as they describe, British policymaking elites were deeply troubled by Germany’s military superiority in the face of British decline, feared Germany’s future offensives, and devised policies based on “a bleak assessment of relative power,”21 then one would expect

Britain to contemplate an alliance, or at least cooperation, with other states to mitigate its insecurity. Otherwise, Britain was highly vulnerable in the time that it bought, since it would be relying solely on German goodwill to not confront Britain while it was still rearming. If British policymaking elites were so concerned about its security, why would they not provide any safeguards in case Germany did not have such goodwill? Thus, contrary to their intentions,

19 Randall L. Schweller, “The Balance of Power in World Politics,” in Oxford Research Encyclopedia, Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 7. 20 Ripsman and Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s,” 151. 21 Ripsman and Levy, 175. 11

Ripsman and Levy actually undermine the explanatory power of the balance of power theory by calling into question its fundamental assumption that states seek to protect their security at all costs.

For an example of other systemic explanations, Randall Schweller introduces the idea that from 1936 to 1940, Europe was a tripolar system consisting of “Nazi Germany, the Soviet

Union, and an Anglo-French combination,” all of which had “roughly equal strength.”22 In a system with three poles of relatively equal strength, “because any combination of actors yields the same strength, assuming that the purpose of allying is power aggregation, no coalition is more likely to form than another.”23 This explains “why the balance of power system did not function properly during the interwar period” and why an Anglo-Soviet alliance – and for that matter Anglo-German alliance – did not form, but the explanation for British foreign policy would still lie at the systemic level.24

Schweller’s contention that Germany and the Soviet Union were roughly equal in strength might be controversial among the scholarly community. However, even if that was indeed the case, his argument would remain unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, one should not treat Britain and France as a singular unit because their policy aims and economic and military resources were not always synchronized. Schweller himself acknowledges that “it is incorrect to treat France and Britain as a single pole” but justifies it by contending that “some of the contemporary actors (most importantly, Stalin) conceptualized the system as tripolar with an

22 Randall L. Schweller, “The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-39: Why a Concert Didn’t Arise,” in Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 208. For a detailed argument, see Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 23 Schweller, “The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-39: Why a Concert Didn’t Arise,” 206. 24 Schweller, “The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-39: Why a Concert Didn’t Arise,” 206. 12

Anglo-French pole:”25 yet, he offers no evidence that British policymaking elites conceptualized the system this way, weakening his own stance. Second, even if one accepts the assumption that there was an Anglo-French pole of equal strength to the Soviet Union and Germany, it still fails to explain why Britain alongside France decided to engage with Germany and not the Soviet

Union. While not an alliance, Britain and France’s appeasement of Germany indicates their preference of one pole over the other pole, something Schweller’s tripolar system does not address. If systemic explanations do not explain this, then one must examine individual policymakers to discover why no Anglo-Soviet alliance, let alone cooperation, formed and why

Britain appeased Germany instead.

For others, the lack of British overtures to the Soviet Union could be explained systemically using Walt’s balance of threat theory, which is a modification of the balance of power theory. In Walt’s model, states “balance against threats rather than against power alone:”26 in other words, “[s]tates, if they are free to choose and have credible allies, flock to what they perceive as the less threatening side, whether it is the stronger or weaker of two sides.”27 As aforementioned, Walt defines threat in terms of “geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived [aggressive] intentions.”28 While a more nuanced model, the balance of threat theory still leaves questions. If scholars of the interwar period are correct, Germany was considered to have more offensive capabilities – economic and military – than the Soviet Union, and Germany was closer to Britain than the Soviet Union when one only considers the homeland.

As for aggressive intentions, insofar as territory was concerned, Germany was far more openly

25 Schweller, “The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-39: Why a Concert Didn’t Arise,” 208. 26 Walt, 5. 27 Schweller, “The Balance of Power in World Politics,” 6. 28 Walt, 5. 13 revisionist than the Soviet Union, which was at least nominally signaling its desire for collective security to preserve the status quo.29 Thus, in two if not all three of Walt’s categories, scholars would argue that Germany was a greater threat to Britain than the Soviet Union. The fact that

Britain did not cooperate with the Soviet Union against Germany is puzzling and suggests that

Britain may have perceived threats differently than what Waltz’s model predicts. If this is the case, systemic explanations are yet again unsatisfactory in explaining the lack of an Anglo-

Soviet cooperation.

What makes systemic explanations insufficient is that they take agency away from the actual people who are governing the state. The state in terms of institutions or territory is inanimate, and it is the policymaking elites who observe the international environment and shape the state’s behavior in response. As scholars increasingly acknowledge, these policymaking elites “are rarely, if ever, compelled by structural imperatives to adopt certain policies rather than others:”30 they “are not objects of history…[but] are responsible subjects.”31 If policymakers shape foreign policy, failing to analyze the debates that they engaged in before formulating policy leaves us with only a limited understanding. As Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton

Sapin eloquently put it:

“[I]f one wishes to probe the ‘why’ questions underlying the events, conditions, and interaction patterns which rests upon state action, then decision-making analysis is certainly necessary. We would go so far as to say that the ‘why’ questions cannot be answered without analysis of decision-making.”32

29 For instance, by joining the League of Nations. 30 Schweller, “The Balance of Power in World Politics,” 3. 31 Eugen Weber, The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1994), 6. 32 Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, “Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics,” in Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited), ed. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2002), 34. See also Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). Emphasis original. 14

In examining such decision-making, one must emphasize the policymaking elites’ threat perception because it facilitates the mobilization of resources to formulate countermeasures and thereby serves as the primary driver of state reaction to external stimuli.33 Because individuals must act collectively to take tangible action, especially in a democracy, the degree of consensus among the policymaking elites on (a) their perception of threat and (b) its remedies becomes “the most proximate cause”34 behind why a particular foreign policy was formulated.

When examining the elites’ consensus, I consider it crucial that one distinguishes between the consensus over who is posing the threat and the consensus over what strategies should be taken to remedy that threat. This is because the distinction is closely related to the conceptualization of grand strategy. This is the subject to which we will now turn.

Grand strategy is the process by which a state marshals its resources, military and non- military, to achieve a particular goal. In most instances, this goal is to ensure security from particular entities of concern.35 Grand strategy is said to have four essential components. First, there must be a national interest, which is often the said attainment of security. Second, grand strategy “identifies the key threats to the state and prioritizes among them.” These threats are the recipients, or the ‘ends,’ of the state’s attention. Third, grand strategy must devise feasible means

– ‘strategy’ without the ‘grand’ – to redress those threats. Fourth, the state must execute this said strategy through a mobilization of domestic resources and the conducting of appropriate diplomacy.36 The second and the third components are the most critical, since it is they that

33 Raymond Cohen, “Threat Perception in International Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly 93, no. 1 (1978): 93. 34 Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” 170. 35 Paul Kennedy, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition,” in Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) ; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). 36 Goddard and Krebs, 8. 15 determine the state’s particular course of action. Thus, any examination of grand strategy must consider these two components.

The problem, however, is that some scholars have considered the two components as one: they have suggested that once the state identifies the source of threat, one could predict the strategy that would follow. For instance, Waltz’ balance of power theory contends that if State A is stronger than State B, State A is the threat, and one will ally with State B. Similarly, Walt’s balance of threat theory maintains that if State A is more threatening than State B, one will ally with State B. Even Schweller, who has analyzed consensus in some of his work, binds the ends and the means. He defines consensus as “the degree of shared perception about some facts in the world as being problems (vs not) of a particular nature (vs some other nature) requiring certain remedies (vs others),” a concept that “takes into account…the process of problem construction.”37 Thus, his view of consensus focuses on what state poses a threat (the ‘problem construction’), not on what these “certain remedies” specifically are.

However, this combinatory approach has its limitations. After all, strategy is crucial on its own: according to Paul Kennedy, it is even “[t]he crux of grand strategy,” as strategy spells out the actual actions that the state would undertake.38 But if we were to give importance to strategy, we must also recognize that strategy is not always predictable. As individuals, policymaking elites have different priorities, concerns, and perspectives, so they may devise different strategies to address the same threat. Until these strategy proposals are vetted, assessed, and prioritized, the state could hardly take concrete action.

37 Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 170. 38 Kennedy, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition,” 5. 16

Thus, considering the identification of threat and the determination of strategy separately allows us to better understand why a state follows a particular grand strategy. If the strategy a state undertakes is unsurprising, this framework will complement other explanations that might be at play. But if the said strategy is surprising, as is the case for this thesis, the framework will help fill the gap that the other explanations, especially those using the aforementioned combinatory approach, struggle to address. Thus, this thesis contributes to the general scholarship around grand strategy by providing a case study for the usefulness of this framework.

As for more specific contributions, I note that while much has been written about interwar

Britain’s grand strategy, this approach has seldom been taken in that field. By utilizing this framework, this thesis will help introduce a more nuanced and comprehensive analysis of British grand strategy into the existing literature.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Finally, it is helpful to introduce the existing literature on interwar Britain’s threat perception, so as to provide context for the narrative I will forward. Little has been written on the specific subject of British elites’ consensus regarding the primacy of the Soviet threat and the undesirability of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation. However, the existing literature gives us a useful glimpse.

Those who imply that there was such consensus tend to be scholars of ideological politics. For instance, Michael J. Carley argues that “many… regarded Nazism as a merely disagreeable but effective antidote to communism and popular unrest” and that this “ideological anti-communism impeded Anglo-French efforts to conclude a war-fighting alliance with the 17

Soviet Union against Nazi Germany.”39 In a more qualified analysis, Mark Haas maintains that

“most members of the British and French right considered the Soviet Union to be a greater ideological danger than Nazi Germany,” leading them to “inflate the perceived threat posed by the USSR” and “deflate [the one] posed by Germany,” even “frequently refer[ring] to Hitler with admiration as a ‘bulwark against communism.’”40 Haas seems to be basing his argument on an assumption common among scholars of ideological politics that since the conservatives dominated the British government in the late 1930s, such ideologically-based consensus among the conservatives had the most direct influence on British foreign policy. While that assumption is not unreasonable, further analysis of non-conservatives and dissidents within the Conservative

Party is needed for a more comprehensive assessment of consensus. Moreover, some scholars – such as Geoffrey Roberts, Donald Cameron Watt, Keith Feiling, and Donald Lammers – disagree that British elites placed ideology as their primary lens for assessing threats.41 Thus, because scholars of ideology fail to examine Soviet threat perception outside ideology, their suggestion that most elites considered the Soviet Union to be the greater threat and an Anglo-

Soviet cooperation to be imprudent is not sufficiently substantiated.

On the other side of the spectrum, some scholars lead us to believe that there was consensus on the other scenario, namely that Germany posed the greater threat to Britain.

Ripsman and Levy provide a pure example of this view, even completely omitting the Soviet

Union from Britain’s perceived sources of threat.42 Other scholars – such as Mark Brawley –

39 Carley, 1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II, xix, xviii. 40 Haas, 122, 126. Emphasis added. 41 Geoffrey K. Roberts, The Unholy Alliance: Stalin’s Pact with Hitler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 225-226; Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came (London: Pimlico, 2001), 120, 338, 452; Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London: Macmillan & Co, 1946); Donald Lammers, “Fascism, Communism, and the Foreign Office, 1937-39,” Journal of Contemporary History 6, no. 3 (1971): 67, 85. 42 Ripsman and Levy. 18 acknowledge British concern regarding the Soviet Union but illustrate how Germany’s open display of revisionism and growing capabilities made it appear a greater threat for most British policymaking elites.43 But while their arguments have validity, these works do not adequately examine the debates surrounding whether the Soviet Union posed any threat, nor do they explain why an Anglo-Soviet cooperation did not materialize if most agreed that Germany was the primary threat.

Most scholars suggest a dissensus among the British elites on which of the two states posed a greater threat to Britain. For instance, scholars such as Keith Neilson, Zara Steiner,

Donald Lammers, and Peter Jackson argue that figures including Stanley Baldwin, Anthony

Eden, Orme Sargent, Samuel Hoare, and Francis D’Arcy Godolphin Osborne believed the Soviet

Union to be the greater threat; figures such as Neville Chamberlain, Laurence Collier, Winston

Churchill, and Lord Beaverbrook argued that Germany was the greater threat; and Robert

Vansittart was mostly ambivalent.44 These scholars reveal the viscous debate within the Foreign

Office, both in general and among its Northern, Central, and Southern Departments.45 Louise

Grace Shaw and Mark Haas add to this picture by highlighting the tension between

Chamberlain’s supporters and opponents from the Conservative and Labour parties.46

However, these works remain incomplete for two reasons. First, these scholars’ categorization of those who saw Germany as the greater threat and those who saw the Soviet

43 Brawley, 93-4. 44 For examples of this view, see Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919- 1939; Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933-1939; Lammers, “Fascism, Communism, and the Foreign Office, 1937-39”; Peter Jackson, “Europe: The Failure of Diplomacy, 1933-1940,” in The Cambridge History of the Second World War Volume II: Politics and Ideology, ed. Richard J.B. Bosworth and Joseph A. Maiolo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 45 Neilson and Lammers offer an especially detailed of these debates. Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939; Lammers, “Fascism, Communism, and the Foreign Office, 1937-39.” 46 Louise Grace Shaw, The British Political Elite and the Soviet Union 1937-1939 (Oxford: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003); Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989. 19

Union as the greater threat can be called into question. Take the aforementioned contention that

Collier and Churchill viewed Germany as the greater threat and that Osborne, Hoare, Sargent, and Eden took the opposite position. Evidence suggests that the first two may have been equally distrustful and antipathetic of the Soviet Union as the latter four.47 How could it possibly be that these elites were equally suspicious of the Soviet Union but reached such different conclusions regarding the Soviet threat vis-à-vis Germany? The current literature is rather silent on such a question.

This leads me to the second critique: the existing literature does not sufficiently explain why the elites perceived the Soviet Union or Germany to be the greater threat: instead, they often compel the readers to assume that there was a rather homogeneous standard that elites used to assess which was the greater threat, such as ideology or balance of power. But in reality, there was no such standard: elites could rely on many standards to measure a threat, and these standards could be contradictory, in which case they must rectify the contradictions according to their own beliefs and biases.

Given this narrative landscape, the story I tell through this thesis has some novel elements. By arguing that there was consensus over the primacy of the German threat but dissensus over the means to address it, I hope that this thesis will help diversify the interpretations and stimulate further debates.

47 E.g. Steiner, 431, 438. 20

METHODOLOGY

Approach

As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, I utilize a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources to trace the elites’ perspectives, debates, and conclusions over both the threat and the remedial strategy over time. My particular focus is on Neville Chamberlain, the most prominent architect of the Munich Agreement; the Parliament, where politicians from both the Conservative and Labour Parties demonstrated serious opposition to the rejection of an

Anglo-Soviet cooperation; and the diplomatic corps, consisting of the Foreign Secretary,

Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (PUS), and the Foreign Office, all experts on Britain’s foreign policy.48 While Chamberlain and those in Parliament were elected officials, the diplomatic corps were mostly career bureaucrats. Examining both elected and unelected officials would acknowledge the composition of the British policymaking elites and allow for a more comprehensive analysis.

For Chamberlain and the diplomatic corps, I divide the analysis into two sections: the periods 1933-35 and 1936-1938.49 This is because the two time periods represent a shift in

European affairs and the British elites’ understanding of them: thus, these periods offer a critical context to bear in mind when tracing the elites’ debates.

The overview of the two periods is as follows. Between 1933 and 1935, the German threat was not yet preponderant. Of course, the British elites recognized that Germany had aggressive intentions: Hitler had come to power promising to revise the post-Versailles international order, and Germany’s departure from both the Disarmament Conference and the

48 See People and Terms for further details. 49 The reason why I do not do so for the Parliament is discussed in the next chapter. 21

League of Nations in 1933 signaled the seriousness of their intentions.50 However, it was still unclear whether Germany possessed enough material and military resources to pursue their aims successfully, so the general British attitude to Germany was that of caution. Meanwhile, the

Soviet Union was persistently signaling their desire to join international efforts to counter the

German threat. But the British remained distrustful and vigilant of the Soviet Union, due largely to the history of Soviet efforts at ideological subversion.51 The developments at the end of 1935 sparked a shift in British perceptions. Germany had begun openly pursing military rearmament, demonstrated by the introduction of the German air force Luftwaffe and the reestablishment of conscriptions. Meanwhile, there were few changes regarding the Soviet Union. Thus, 1935 marks a turning point in which the elites began to view Germany with more alarm.

In 1936, Germany remilitarized the Rhineland in flagrant violation of the Treaty of

Versailles. The boldness of this move and the inability of the international community to have a significantly forceful response sobered many British elites into believing that Germany could be seriously considering war. Nevertheless, the Soviet threat was not completely forgotten: the ostensibly ideological Spanish Civil War that began in 1936 and the open involvement of the

Soviet Union in it raised concerns in Britain about the possibility of Soviet-backed ideological revolution in the West. However, 1937 and 1938 witnessed the Stalinist purges that debilitated the Soviet Union, not least its military; meanwhile, Germany had intensified its pursuit of aggression through Anschluss and the Sudetenland crisis. By September 1938, the Soviet Union appeared to be in disarray while Germany’s aggression was effectively unchecked. In this context, Britain signed the Munich Agreement.

50 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939. 51 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939. 22

Thus, the two periods offered very different landscapes in which the elites had to operate.

The division of analysis into these two periods would help account for these landscapes and facilitate our analysis.

Sources

This thesis examines a wide range of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include Neville Chamberlain’s private letters to his sisters Hilda and Ida; his official speeches; cabinet papers; Foreign Office documents; internal memos; parliamentary debates; autobiographies; diaries; and newspaper articles from The Times and the Manchester Guardian, long associated with the Conservative and Labour parties respectively. For secondary sources, works by Keith Neilson, Louise Grace Shaw, Zara Steiner, and Donald Lammers were especially helpful. Nevertheless, I have relied on these works and other secondary sources more for the primary sources they introduce than for their arguments. To assist in my analysis, I used Atlas.ti, software for qualitative data analysis and research. I used this as an organizational device, tracking all the sources based on the particular actors concerned and themes they revealed.

In these sources, I specifically looked for language that painted Germany or the Soviet

Union as a greater threat than the other, as well as the ways in which the elites deliberated on, justified their support for, and when appropriate, rejected certain strategies for addressing the threat. I complied and compared these indications to reveal and assess how much of a consensus the elites were in at the time.

One might be struck by the extent to which I utilize private sources such as letters and diaries in this thesis, especially with regards to Chamberlain. This is not to dismiss the importance of public sources: rather, it is to acknowledge that private sources do much, if not 23 sometimes more, to reveal the elites’ perceptions of threat and preferences of strategies. As the examination of the Parliament would especially reveal, there were important perspectives that the elites were reluctant to voice in public: if one had only relied on public sources, those perspectives may not have come to light so clearly. By paying much attention to private sources in conjunction with public sources and secondary sources, this thesis has sought to analyze the

British elites in a holistic light.

LOOKING FORWARD

The thesis will proceed in the following manner. In the next chapter, I delineate what threat the British elites perceived the Soviet Union to pose to Britain between 1922 and 1938, the establishment of the Soviet Union and the Munich Agreement respectively. This background is necessary since one cannot analyze the level of consensus among the British policymaking elites regarding the Soviet threat – and how that threat compared to the threat from Nazi Germany – without understanding what they perceived the threat to be. Chapters 3 and 4 reconstruct the elites’ debates regarding the Soviet Union and Germany to illuminate the extent to which they reached a consensus over which state was the greater threat and what strategy Britain should adopt for that threat. Chapter 3 focuses on Chamberlain and the Parliament, and Chapter 4 discusses the diplomatic corps. In the final chapter, I conclude with a brief summary of my findings, revisiting of the theoretical implications, and observations regarding some of the possible driving factors behind the narrative I reveal.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORY OF THE SOVIET THREAT, 1922-1938

When examining the advent of World War II in continental Europe, the claim that the

Soviet Union had posed a threat to Britain seems to be a widely accepted interpretation. In this explanation, the Soviet Union was a revisionist power that was “unwilling to participate in (and a threat to) the existing order”52 in the interwar years. This motivated Britain to exclude the Soviet

Union in various important agreements, not least the 1938 Munich Agreement with which this thesis concerns itself. But this literature often bypasses analyzing precisely what kind of threat

Britain thought the Soviet Union to be in this period. In attempting to fill this gap, this chapter asks the following question: what threat did the British policymaking elites perceive the Soviet

Union to pose to Britain between 1922 and 1938, the establishment of the Soviet Union and the

Munich Agreement respectively?

Although the term ‘the Soviet threat’ utilizes the singular form, it consisted of many threats in different categories, and understanding these various categories would shed greater insight into how the policymakers viewed the Soviet Union at the time. Similar to the remainder of this thesis, I deliberately leave out the analysis of whether the Soviet Union was a threat to

Britain in the first place, since analyzing British threat perception warrants the understanding of how the British elites viewed the Soviets at the time, not the retrospective analysis of if they were correct.

52 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 6. 25

LITERATURE REVIEW

It might be useful to organize the existing literature through Walt’s conceptualization of threat – a combination of “geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived

[aggressive] intentions”53 – as introduced in the previous chapter. The literature on the British perception of the Soviet threat tends to center around the Soviet intentions to export its ideology.

Jackson recounts how the Comintern was “charged with promoting revolutionary subversion abroad” according to the Soviet state’s “ideological commitment to overthrowing the liberal- capitalist order.”54 Neilson calls the Soviet threat the “Red threat,”55 and Haas paints the primary preoccupation of British elites towards the Soviet Union as that of ideological subversion in

Britain and Europe.56 The ideological threat spilled over to the threat over British imperial holdings as well: the Soviet efforts at subversion in British colonies such as India – manifested not least in its support for anti-colonial movements – posed the risk of destabilizing British control over the periphery.57 However, the fact that some scholars disagree that ideology constituted a large share of the perception of Soviet threat58 warrants further assessment of the

Soviet threat in realms outside ideology.

There is less literature on the British perception of Soviet geographical threat, or what we might also term the strategic threat. Scholars have written about this type of threat regarding the

British Empire. For instance, Calder Walton argues that the threat of Soviet expansion in the late

53 Walt, 5. 54 Jackson, 223, 225. 55 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 44. 56 Haas, 122-3. 57 E.g. Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 89. 58 See Introduction, page 18. 26

1920s was “a strategic threat along the traditional lines of the ‘Great Game’ with Russia,”59 and

Neilson highlights the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence in East Asia, in which Britain had significant economic interests, especially in China. 60 However, one has difficulty finding a similar level of coverage on the Soviet geographical threat to the British homeland. That may be because there was no significant threat – Britain was positioned far from the Soviet Union, and some argue that the Soviet navy was concentrated in the Baltic61 – but assessment of this contention is lacking. The offensive capabilities literature reflects the classic definition of power as the economic and military capabilities that allow a state to achieve its objectives and compel/coerce other states into non-resistance.62 S.G. Wheatcroft, R.W. Davies, and J.M. Cooper attest to how the Soviet Union was “a great industrial power” by the end of the 1930s due to its

“rapid” and vast-scale internal development such as the Five Year Plans, as well as the economic growth helped by measures such as the New Economic Policy.63 As for military buildup, the

Soviet Union had developed a navy64 and an air force65 in catching up to the West. Despite these findings, recounting of the British perception of the Soviet Union’s economic and military capabilities remains rather wanting, at least in the secondary literature.

59 Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, The Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire (New York: Overlook Press, 2013). 60 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 53, 90. 61 Gunnar Åselius, “The Naval Theaters in Soviet Grand Strategy during the Interwar Period,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 13, no. 1 (2000): 68. 62 E.g. Gilpin, 31; Mearsheimer, 55. 63 S.G. Wheatcroft, R.W. Davies, and J.M Cooper, “Soviet Industrialization Reconsidered: Some Preliminary Conclusions about Economic Development between 1926 and 1941,” The Economic History Review 39, no. 2 (1986): 264. 64 Åselius, 68. 65 Von Hardesty, “Roles and Missions: Soviet Tactical Air Power in the Second Period of the Great Patriotic War,” in Transformation in Russian and Soviet Military History: Proceedings of the Twelfth Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 1-3 October 1986, ed. Carl W. Reddel (Washington, D.C: United States Air Force Academy, Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1990), 172. 27

This chapter aims to redress these gaps by offering a comprehensive review of the British perception of the Soviet threat between 1922 and 1938. In particular, I will examine four of the ways in which the British elites believed the Soviet Union to be a threat: ideological subversion, material and military buildup, undermining of the British Empire, and potential to forge a

German-Soviet rapprochement. While the chapter would utilize relevant secondary literature, it would base the bulk of its evidence on primary materials. In delineating Soviet foreign policy aims and the specific ways in which these aims were implemented as policy, I will examine materials including Stalin’s speeches, letters, and/or records of private utterances, as well as

Comintern documents. For British interpretations of the threats in the aforementioned four ways,

I will utilize materials and the approach outlined in the Introduction. Through this combination of primary and secondary sources, the chapter hopes to provide as comprehensive and revealing examination as possible over this historically salient question regarding British views of the

Soviet Union.

THEORY

The dependent variable is the British elites’ perception of Soviet threat, and the categories of ideological subversion, material and military buildup, undermining of the British

Empire, and possible German-Soviet rapprochement constitute the independent variables. The explanatory mechanisms of the independent variables are as follows. The Soviet efforts at ideological subversion would help empower communist forces in Britain and jeopardize the

British elites’ legitimacy and maintenance of power, generating a Soviet threat to Britain’s domestic stability. The Soviet material and military buildup would shift the balance of power in the Soviet Union’s favor and even increase the chance of the Soviet Union exercising force on 28

Britain and its interests, bringing about a Soviet threat to Britain’s international security. The undermining of the British Empire – through the possibility of military-led expansions and spreading of anti-British propaganda – would engender a Soviet threat to Britain’s power and prestige. Finally, the possibility of a German-Soviet rapprochement would hamper Britain’s efforts to bring Germany into the comity of nations and facilitate Germany’s war against the

West, eliciting a Soviet threat to Britain’s international security, albeit a more indirect one compared to the threat posed by the Soviet material and military buildup.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The chapter will proceed as follows. In the first section, I will briefly introduce the Soviet aims in interwar foreign policy. In the second section, I will examine the four ways in which the

British elites believed the Soviet Union to be a threat. While all four ways were salient in shaping the Soviet threat in this period, research suggests that ideological subversion in the

British homeland and Empire and the potential for a German-Soviet cooperation were the most significant in driving British perception of the Soviet threat.

SOVIET AIMS IN INTERWAR FOREIGN POLICY

From 1922 to 1938, Soviet foreign policy was characterized by an uneasy balance between ensuring state survival and promoting world revolution. The need for such balance stemmed from the fact that the Soviet Union (as well as its predecessor Soviet Russia) was the sole Marxist state in existence at the time. This was a “situation that had not been anticipated by

Marxist theory;” after all, Marxist theory predicted that classes would coalesce worldwide to 29 topple the state framework as an instrument of oppression.66 Instead, the Soviet Union found itself surrounded by capitalist states hostile to the communist cause. Thus, the Soviet Union faced a dilemma: the state needed to survive among the capitalist states to be able to promote world revolution, but promoting world revolution was necessary to legitimize the Bolsheviks’ power and allow state survival in the first place. Thus, the Soviet Union adopted a Janus-faced approach to its foreign policy, characterized “on the one side the face of appeasement67 and statecraft, the policy of accommodation to the capitalist world …[and] on the other the contrasting face of violence and revolution to uproot and supplant capitalism in its entirety.”68

Before 1922, Soviet Russia (the Soviet Union’s predecessor) arguably placed similar levels of emphasis on both accommodating the capitalist powers and promoting world revolution. While Soviet Russia signed the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the 1921 Anglo-

Soviet trade agreement to help minimize the antagonism of the Central Powers and Britain,69 for instance, the Communist International (Comintern) was established in 1919 as a “global party of the proletariat,” became an important arm of Soviet foreign policy, and “gave active support” to

66 David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 135. 67 This is not in reference to the Munich Agreement: it rather points to the notion of accommodation. 68 Jonathan Haslam, “Comintern and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1919-1941,” in Cambridge History of Russia Volume III: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 638. 69 Of course, these agreements also spoke to Soviet self-interest. The 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers would help the Bolsheviks concentrate its efforts and resources on “consolidating the Russian Revolution against the attempts to overthrow it from within,” thus ensuring the Bolsheviks to hold power after the civil war. Through the 1921 Anglo-Soviet trade agreement, the Soviet government hoped to stimulate its war-torn economy with capitalist goods and investment. However, the costs to making these agreements were arguably very high, from the humiliating territorial concessions to Germany at Brest-Litovsk to the unappealing optics of an anti-capitalist state relying on capitalist goods. Thus, self-interest could not be the only motivations for such agreements, and the agreements’ implications on establishing non-belligerent, somewhat courteous relationships with the capitalist powers should be taken into account. For descriptions of Soviet benefits from Brest-Litovsk and the trade agreement, see Michael Jabara Carley, “Behind Stalin’s Moustache: Pragmatism in Early Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-41,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 12, no. 3 (2001): 162. 30 communist parties preparing insurgencies in places such as Germany, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states.70

But after 1922, the now-Soviet Union prioritized accommodation with the capitalist states over the promotion of world revolution. In part due to the complete failure of the German

Communists’ attempts at revolution in 1921, Soviet Union had recognized that “a structural shift was under way outside Russia, reversing the tide accelerated by war from revolution to the

‘stabili[z]ation of capitalism’…[a]nd if the Soviet regime was to survive, it had to take careful note and adjust tactics accordingly.”71 Now, “Soviet policy was motivated by the desire to be on acceptable terms with at least one of the Western powers (apart from Germany), so that they would not form an anti-Soviet bloc.’”72 Thus, the Soviet Union strengthened the diplomatic apparatus for foreign policy, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel), and

Lenin oversaw a “transfer of talent” from the Comintern to the Narkomindel.73 During the 1920s, the Soviet Union continued to call for trade with the Western powers and in 1926-27 offered

France “what were probably the most extensive concessions on the tsarist foreign debt that it ever made during the interwar years.”74 In the 1930s, especially with the rise of Nazi Germany that openly espoused enmity towards the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union became more rigorous in making overtures to the West, as evidenced not least by the 1932 Franco-Soviet nonaggression pact, the 1934 entrance into the League of Nations, the 1934 new Anglo-Soviet trade agreement, and the 1935 Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact. Granted, the 1930s still saw Stalin

70 Alexander Vatlin and Stephen A. Smith, “The Comintern,” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism, ed. Stephen A. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 188-9. 71 Haslam, 639. 72 Carley, “Behind Stalin’s Moustache: Pragmatism in Early Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-41,” 164. 73 Haslam, 639. 74 Carley, “Behind Stalin’s Moustache: Pragmatism in Early Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-41,” 164. 31 supporting a global alliance of “proletarians” and “colonial peoples,”75 and the Comintern continued to call for world revolution, promote communist propaganda, and support revolutionary attempts abroad.76 However, “the Comintern no longer remained the centre of

Soviet foreign policy-making:”77 the Comintern “was now pushed far to the right with the preoccupation of Stalin to find allies to ‘defend the Soviet Union from attack,’”78 as demonstrated not least by Stalin’s instructions to communists in Germany and China to desist extravagant and risky attempts at revolution.79 Thus, in the 1930s, the Comintern’s continued activities and Stalin’s language may have been driven partly if not notably by the need to legitimize the Soviet state to communists at home and abroad given its doctrinally blasphemous accommodation with the capitalist states.

In such light, Soviet foreign policy between 1922 and 1938 were more consistent with the pragmatic approach of ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the capitalist powers than blatant efforts to upend the liberal-capitalist international order through world revolution. Nevertheless, that did not dissuade the British elites from suspecting the Soviet Union of malign design. It is to such perceptions of the Soviet threat to which we now turn.

75 Joseph V. Stalin, “October, Lenin and the Prospects of Our Development (7 Nov. 1925),” in J.V. Stalin Archive Works by Decade, vol. 7 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), https://www.marxists.org. 76 Carley, “Behind Stalin’s Moustache: Pragmatism in Early Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-41,”164. 77 Haslam, 645. 78 Ted Grant, “The Rise and Fall of the Communist International,” Workers’ International News 5, no. 11 (1943). 79 E.H. Carr, Twilight of the Comintern (New York: Pantheon, 1982). 32

IDEOLOGICAL SUBVERSION AS A SOVIET THREAT

Regardless of Soviet leanings towards peaceful coexistence, the West “saw international revolution as Russia’s objective,”80 and Britain was no exception. What Haas calls the

‘demonstration-effects mechanism’ was at play: elites believed that the success of states governed by rival legitimating ideals “increase[s] the legitimacy of other leaders’ ideological enemies at home, thereby threatening these decision makers’ domestic power,” and that “others dedicated to opposing legitimating principles will target their state for ideological conversion.”81

The British elites knew that the British Communist Party (BCP) existed and that the Comintern consistently publicized its support for the Party. The elites also believed, with certain degrees of truth, that the Comintern openly directed the BCP’s activities, spread communist propaganda, and funded if not fueled domestic discontent.82 Given the crippling economic malaise, growing unemployment, and restlessness of the workers and trade unions, stemming first from World

War I and later the Great Depression,83 British elites commonly believed that communism could hold much domestic appeal and that they could lose their power. In such light, the perception of the Soviet ideological threat remained persistent between 1922 and 1938, manifested most commonly in strong protestations over Comintern propaganda.84

The period between 1922 and 1924 saw three short-lived governments, the first two led by Conservatives Andrew Bonar Law and Stanley Baldwin, the last led by Labour’s James

80 Haslam, 645. 81 Haas, 8. 82 E.g. “Instructions from the ECCI to the CPGB on the Conduct of the CPGB in the British General Election of October 1924,” in The Communist International 1919-1943 Documents: Volume II 1923-1928, ed. Jane Degras (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1959), 170–71. 83 E.g. see Nicholas Crafts, “Walking Wounded: The British Economy in the Aftermath of World War I,” Vox, 2014, https://voxeu.org. 84 These attitudes ultimately hampered policy including Anglo-Soviet trade, granting of a loan to the Soviet Union, and the Anglo-Soviet cooperation after Hitler’s accession to power. 33

Ramsay MacDonald. The Conservative governments believed deeply in the Soviet ideological threat, issuing confrontational policies such as the 1923 ‘Curzon ultimatum’ that demanded that the Soviet Union cease its revolutionary propaganda targeting Britain; however, the 1924 Labour government was equally weary of the “Red menace.”85 MacDonald denounced the Soviet propaganda in Britain as “not legitimate,”86 echoing opposition leaders such as the Liberal Lord

Emmott in characterizing such propaganda as a “disease” that cannot be ignored.87 But despite such attitudes, the Labour government met its demise in significant part to the Conservative and

Liberal accusations of its sympathy for communism. For instance, when J.R. Campbell, assistant editor of the communist paper Workers’ Weekly, was arrested and charged with incitement to mutiny, the Labour government released Campbell because his influence as assistant editor was deemed to be low. This led the Conservative and Liberal Parties to pass a motion of no confidence in the Labour government, and MacDonald resigned. Furthermore, shortly before the election, the right-leaning newspaper Daily Mail published a letter allegedly from Grigory

Zinoviev, head of the Comintern. This ‘Zinoviev letter’ was reported to unveil “a great

Bolshevik plot to paralyse the British Army and Navy and to plunge the country into civil war,” and to portray the Communist Party as “masters of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's Government.”

While the letter was later confirmed as a forgery, it all but ensured Labour’s defeat in the 1924 election.88 While political considerations undoubtedly helped motivate such accusations, the ease

85 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 47. 86 MacDonald’s sentiments in 1924, quoted in HL Deb 17 June 1926 vol 64 c463. 87 HL Deb 26 Mar. 1924 vol 56 c1050-1. 88 Brian Brivati and Richard Heffernan, The Labour Party: A Centenary History (London: Macmillan, 2000), 58 ; “Russia and the British Voter: The ‘Zinoviev Letter’, ‘Red Scare’ and 1924 General Election,” Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick, 2019, https://warwick.ac.uk. 34 with which such accusations were accepted and unseated the Labour government arguably reveals a deep-seated fear of ideological subversion pervading among the British elites.

Such anti-communist sentiments only intensified under the new Conservative government, led by Baldwin who displayed “a visceral dislike of communism.”89 1926 saw the

General Strike, which was the “largest industrial dispute in British history,”90 and records emerged of subsequent Soviet financial assistance to the strikers: one telegram stated, “‘t[he

Soviet trade unions are sending you to-day two million roubles….Fraternal greeting.’” These impressed upon the British elites, especially the Conservatives who dominated the government, that “revolution was just around the corner.”91 With this belief, the Foreign Office memoranda displayed opinions such as the Soviet Union being “to all intents and purposes – short of direct armed conflict – at war” with Britain,92 and many elites shared the Conservative MP Commander

Oliver Locker-Lampson’s declaration that “[w]e regard the subject of the Russian menace as second to none in importance and in peril.”93 Such paranoia led the government to renounce formal diplomatic relations between 1927 and 1929.94

It might strike one as notable why both Labour and Conservative politicians in the 1920s were generally antipathetic to communism. While the right-wing mistrust of left-wing ideologies is understandable, one might assume Labour to be more open to another, albeit more intense, left-wing ideology. Although Labour did indeed initially view the Soviet Union with some open

89 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 145. 90 “The General Strike,” National Archives, 2019, https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk. 91 Keith Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear’: British Estimates of Soviet Military Strength and Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1922-1939,” Canadian Journal of History 28, no. 2 (1993): 194. 92 “Russia: Memorandum by Mr. Gregory,’ 10 Dec 1926, FO 371/11787/N5670/387/38, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 53. 93 HC Deb 25 June 1926 vol 197 c699. 94 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 24. 35 mind, that they were ultimately antipathetic in the 1920s likely stemmed from the fact that the

Comintern targeted both parties equally vigorously, leading elites on both sides to believe that they might lose power. For instance, in 1926-7, The Times reported how the Comintern called on the BCP and British workers to use the slogan of “Baldwin’s defeat is the victory of the British people:”95 around the same time, Stalin stated how the British working class must “get rid of its present leaders…[such] as the Thomases and MacDonalds,”96 referring to the prominent Labour leader J.H. Thomas and MacDonald respectively. Even beyond the possibility of forced overthrow, Labour politicians would have worried that they might be disadvantaged in elections since its opponents so frequently associated it with communism, fanning the public’s fear: as

Labour politician John Clynes put it, “[t]he party which suffer[ed] most from that Communistic propaganda [was] the Labour party.”97 Thus, the 1920s saw a permeation of the fear of ideological subversion and the elites’ subsequent loss of power.

Although by late 1929 the Labour party had reestablished formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, British elites continued to regard the Soviet Union as an ideological threat and to protest the Comintern’s propaganda within Britain well until 1938. This was perhaps unsurprising. MacDonald’s 1931 national government came to lean “strongly towards the

Conservative Party,” and the Labour party continued to display “great suspicion” towards the

Soviet Union. 98 Meanwhile, despite being coalition governments on paper, Baldwin’s government of 1935-7 and Neville Chamberlain’s government of 1937 onwards were

95 “The Comintern And Great Britain,” Times, 7 June 1927, The Times Digital Archive. 96 Joseph V. Stalin, “The British Strike and the Events in Poland (8 June 1926),” in J.V. Stalin Archive Works by Decade, vol. 8 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), https://www.marxists.org. 97 HC Deb 26 May 1927 vol 206 c2196. 98 Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 206. 36

“effectively Conservative governments.”99 Although the Soviet Union increasingly sent previously described costly signals that indicated its desire for collective security and improved

Anglo-Soviet relations, such signals seem to have been largely overlooked or misinterpreted, revealing some consistency with political psychologists’ theory that political elites color their perceptions of other states with individual heuristics and biases to maintain cognitive consonance.100

In terms of ideological antipathy, the early to mid-1930s were relatively similar to the late 1920s. There were certainly events that fueled the elites’ anger towards the Soviet Union: for instance, the Soviets dumped goods at cheap prices in the British market and arrested British engineers on dubious grounds in the 1933 Metro-Vickers incident. However, these had little effect on the British ideological image of the Soviet Union and only “reinforce[d] the existing low opinion of the Soviet Union held by many in the foreign office,” cabinet, and the

Parliament.101 Elites continued to denounce the Soviet Union for fueling “propaganda in this country…which would be harmful to the present social system or subversive of the present law and the Monarchy as we know it.”102 Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden displayed deep mistrust that any British dealings with the Soviet Union (such as a loan) “would be used to pay for

‘communist propaganda, here & elsewhere”103 and “emphasized that Soviet Russia must

‘rigorously abstain’ from interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries” to merit any

99 Edmund Wright, ed., “National Government,” in A Dictionary of World History, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 100 For examples of such theories, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Keren Yarhi-Milo, “In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries,” International Security 38, no. 1 (2013): 7–51. 101 Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 207. 102 HL Deb 2 May 1933 vol 87 c650-1. 103 Eden’s minute (21 Nov) on Remnant to Collier, 25 Oct 1935, FO 371/19448/N5566/1/38, minutes, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 156. 37

Anglo-Soviet friendship.104 When, in 1935, the Comintern suddenly endorsed an anti-fascist

Popular Front, most British elites, not least the Foreign Office’s Northern Department managing

Soviet affairs, concluded that the Soviet policy was “not a change of heart…but a change of tactics” and that ideological subversion remained a concern for Britain.105

It was arguably the Spanish Civil War that intensified British elites’ perception of ideological threat from the Soviet Union. While Britain had nominally pursued non- intervention,106 as the Soviet Union had backed the leftist Republicans to “help…the revolutionary masses of Spain,”107 British elites grew increasingly “disturbed” that such backing of communism was “gaining momentum not merely in Spain but throughout much of southern and western Europe as well” and might jeopardize the British elites’ hold on power.108 The editorial of the conservative-leaning Times aptly summarized such view:

“[The Soviet Union] has its fanatical supporters in most countries….It is therefore the first and paramount concern of every Government which cares for the civilization of Europe that the armed conflict should be confined to Spain….The [Soviet] action is to be condemned for the reason that it is without the slightest doubt provocative.”109

Such events invigorated the British elites’ fear of ideological subversion. Members of Parliament

(MPs) admonished the government for not effectively restraining the Soviet Union from

104 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 157. 105 Chilston to Hoare, 30 July 1935, and minutes by B.A.B. Burrows, 6 August 1935, and J.L. Dodds, 7 August 1935, N3894/54/38; Chilston to Hoare, 13 August 1935, N4118/54/38; Chilston to Hoare, 29 November 1935, and minutes by Dodds, 19 December 1935, and Laurence Collier, 20 December 1935, N6304/135/38, F0371 (General Political Correspondence of the Foreign Office, 1914-45), vols. 19457 and 19460, Public Record Office, quoted in Douglas Little, “Red Scare, 1936: Anti-Bolshevism and the Origins of British Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War,” Journal of Contemporary History 23, no. 2 (1988): 293. 106 New evidence demonstrate that M15 dispatched British volunteers to Spain. Tom Buchanan, “The Secret History of Britain’s Spanish Civil War Volunteers | Tom Buchanan,” The Guardian, 28 June 2011, https://www.theguardian.com. 107 Joseph V. Stalin, “Telegram from the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B)to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain,” in J.V. Stalin Archives Works by Decade, vol. 14 (London: Red Star Press, 1978). 108 Little, 296. 109 “No Intervention,” Times, 9 October 1936, The Times Digital Archive. 38

“fomenting revolution and disorder in Great Britain.”110 The Foreign Office, usually

“[deemphasizing] ideology as a determinant of policy,” engaged in a wide-ranging examination of the threats of communism and fascism, where there emerged views that communism was an

“ideological imperialism”111 and that such “‘communist danger’ [was] the foremost problem of

[British] policy.”112 By 1938, The Times was reporting that the Comintern “[was] being raised at

M. Stalin’s behest from a state of subsidiary importance” to intensify its “chief subversive activity…prescribed for the ‘democratic countries.’”113 Whether that was completely true is questionable, given the Soviet Union’s increasingly desperate efforts at Anglo-Soviet rapprochement in the 1930s, but such news at least reveal an almost paranoiac fear of communism in Britain by 1938.

Of course, there were voices among British elites that disputed the Soviet Union being an ideological threat. In 1930, for instance, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede stated that “[t]hose who know the facts about the [British] Communist Party…really cannot repress their laughter at the supposition that the propaganda of the Comintern and the Socialist International is going to have any effect whatsoever in this country” because the BCP had a considerable fall in membership and it was owing only to the Conservatives’ constant “advertising” of its presence that the BCP appeared a significant political challenger.114 Echoing his view, some MPs claimed that the BCP were “the mildest-mannered Socialists there are” and thus unlikely to usurp the elites’ power in

110 HC Deb 15 Feb. 1937 vol 320 c823-4. 111 As described in Lammers, 69. 112 Public Record Office (PRO), Torr to Collier, 20 April 1937, N 2109/272/38, in FO 37I/2II03. As described in Lammers, 68. 113 “Comintern,” Times, May 3, 1938, The Times Digital Archive. 114 HL Deb 20 Feb. 1930 vol 76 c671. 39 the forceful way that many elites, especially the Conservatives, imagined.115 Meanwhile, the

Manchester Guardian declared that “[s]tories of ‘Red’ terror…[gave] a wholly false perspective of what [was] happening” in the Spanish Civil War. Perhaps most revealingly, while Foreign

Office officials accepted the gravity of communism’s ideological threat, many treated fascism as the more pressing ideological threat because of its propensity for war in the short term.116

However, these viewpoints largely failed to persuade the elites who were paralyzed by fear and distrust of the Soviet Union.

MATERIAL AND MILITARY BUILDUP AS A SOVIET THREAT

The balance of power theory might posit that Britain considered the Soviet Union amassing power – defined as economic and military capabilities – as a threat since, under anarchy, increased power yields increased ability for a state to achieve its objectives at other states’ expense and to potentially even eliminate other states.117 However, it appears as though

Britain hardly saw the Soviet Union as a material/military threat: this section explores how the

British elites perceived the Soviet Union materially/militarily and the possible reasons why.

The Soviet Union achieved a remarkable economic growth between 1922 and 1938. In the wake of the Civil War’s conclusion, the Soviet economy was in ruins; however, by 1928, due not least to Lenin’s New Economic Policy, the Soviet economy had recovered back to near pre-

World-War-I level. While rapid industrial expansion had started in 1926, Stalin’s installation of the two Five Year Plans, 1928-32 and 1933-37 respectively, ensured further economic and industrial growth in the 1930s. In terms of GDP per capita, which is deemed one of the first, if

115 HC Deb 15 Feb. 1937 vol 320 c824. 116 Lammers, “Fascism, Communism, and the Foreign Office, 1937-39.” 117 Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 40 not “the first[,] indicator that economists usually use in assessing economic performance,”118 the

Soviet GDP per capita grew from around 600 international dollars in 1922 to around 1,400 in

1928 and around 1,800 in 1938.119 Given this rapid growth, the interwar Soviet economy was

“one of the most successful in the world,”120 and the Soviet Union was now a mighty economic and industrial power.

British elites knew that British interwar economy had significant losses from World War

I and the Great Depression.121 By 1930, the British elites believed that the Soviet Union

“maintained their high trade surplus by dumping goods on the British market,” leading to a slight perception of Soviet threat to the British economy’s health and position in the world.122

However, most elites believed that the Soviet economy was not a threat but rather an opportunity, if not a necessity, for Britain to retain said economic health and position. Requiring capitalist goods to rebuild its economy after its Civil War, the Soviet Union provided a large and much-needed market for British exports in the interwar years.123 Moreover, the increased trade was expected to alleviate Britain’s high unemployment, which would not only mollify domestic discontent but would also stimulate further economic growth. As Lord Parmoor remarked in the

House of Lords in 1930, Britain had good reason to depend on the Soviet Union as “one of the best markets” in the world that could “give [the British people] continuous employment.”124 This

118 Robert C. Allen, “The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy,” Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne D`Economique 34, no. 4 (November 2001): 860. 119 Mark Harrison and Andrei Markevich, “Russia’s National Income in War and Revolution, 1913 to 1928,” Vox, 2012, https://voxeu.org. Also see Wheatcroft, Davies, and Cooper. 120 Allen, 860. 121 E.g. Crafts, “Walking Wounded.” 122 Steiner, 425. 123 Carley, “Behind Stalin’s Moustache: Pragmatism in Early Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-41,”162. 124 HL Deb 20 Feb. 1930 vol 76 c661. 41 sentiment was consistently expressed among the elites in the 1930s and helped motivate efforts for Anglo-Soviet trade agreements.125

As for the military buildup, in the context of which the Soviet economic growth was also significant, British views of the Soviet Union must be analyzed in three periods: 1922-33, 1933-

37, and 1937-38. Between 1922 and 1933, the Soviet improvements in its military were not particularly noteworthy for the British elites, especially with regards to any threat to the British homeland (the discussion of the Empire would follow later in this chapter). The relative lack of concern over Soviet military capabilities can be seen in the 1927 assessment of the Red Army that appeared in The Times: “The great number of automatic weapons in use in the Red Army should be noted,” but “only a limited proportion [of the men] could be armed and equipped” at this stage, and the Red Army faced a “serious” problem in transportation.126 The 1928 Imperial

War College’s assessment of British and Soviet military strengths further suggested that Britain had not much to worry from Soviet military buildup:

“With Europe neutral, Britain would enjoy ‘overwhelming’ naval superiority; the British air force and the [Soviet] air force would have approximate numerical parity, with the British having the advantage of superior technology.” While the Soviet Union held advantage in its enormous man power and land mass, it “had no sea power, an ‘instability’ in government, ‘deficiency’ in manufacturing ability and a ‘shortage’ of modern technical equipment.”127

This view that the Soviet Union was still far behind in military capabilities generally remained a consensus until around 1933. The view might have been true: or, given the rapid industrializations before 1933, the military capabilities might have been greater than what the elites believed but were just never reported, not least because Britain had no military attachés in

125 For instance, see HC Deb 31 Jan. 1934 vol 285. 126 “The Soviet Army,” The Times, 28 November 1927, The Times Digital Archive. 127 “Imperial Defence College. Exercise No. 7 Russia.” Na, nd (but the exercise was carried out on 3-21 Oct. 1928), Cab 53/15. As described in Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 203. 42 the Soviet Union to provide complete information until 1934.128 Regardless, British elites did not perceive a great threat from Soviet military buildup between 1922 and 1933.

1933-37 marked the period in which British elites were the most aware of Soviet military strength. Owing not least to the rise of Nazi Germany with open enmity towards the Soviet

Union and the continued industrialization, the Soviet Union’s military capabilities rapidly improved, and, helped by the installation of military and air attachés, British elites had a fairly accurate grasp of this improvement. In 1934 and 1935, the attachés Colonel E.O. Skaife and

Wing Commander A.C. Collier assessed that while the improvement was notable, “neither the

Red Army nor the Red Air Force appear yet to be very efficient instruments for war.”129 In 1936, the elites were more impressed. After observing Soviet maneuvers, the Manchester Guardian reported Major General Archibald Wavell of the British military delegation telling Soviet leaders how “astonished” he was at the “quantity of tanks, aeroplanes, and other materials,” the amount that Britain would not be able to attain in the immediate future.130 His compliments were not superficial or meant to please: he privately reported back to the Foreign Office that “[t]he Red

Army would certainly be a very formidable opponent indeed in defence of its own territory...it would at present be clumsy and less formidable in attack but its size and the extent of its mechanical equipment would make it dangerous,”131 an assessment that echoed that of the War

128 Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 204. 129 Charles to Sir Samuel Hoare (foreign secretary), despatch 468, 22 Oct. 1935, FO 371/19455/N 5533/49. As described in Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 210. 130 “THE ‘RED ARMY IS READY’: Soviet Leader’s Speech at Manoeuvres,” Manchester Guardian, September 14, 1936. 131 “British Military Delegation to Red Army Manoeuvres” Wavell, secret, 10 Sept. 1936. FO 371/20352/N 5048/1298 and minutes. Quoted in Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 213. 43

Office made earlier that year.132 By early 1937, Chiefs of Staff (COS) were noting how “Red

Army and air force were the world’s largest and that the entire country had been placed on a war footing,” making it prime for defense but not yet offense given problems in organization and transportation.133 The widespread agreement that the Soviet Union was strong but not capable of offense against Britain dispelled any fear among the British elites: as head of the Foreign Office

Northern Department Laurence Collier put it:

“A Russian army strong enough to discourage adventures by Hitler or the Japanese...but not strong enough to indulge in adventures of its own, seems to me just what suits us!”

In that sense, the Soviet military buildup was almost an opportunity for Britain, not a threat.

However, any opportunity the British may have seen in the Soviets’ military resources soon dissipated. This was due to the advent of the Great Purge, Stalin’s brutal political campaign to eliminate domestic dissenters. The Great Purge changed British perception of Soviet military strength in 1937-38.134 As much as the Purge fanned the elites’ fear and disdain towards Stalin’s regime, the Purge greatly diminished the elites’ interest towards the Soviet military. Given the report of military attaché Lieutenant-Colonel R.C.W.G. Firebrace, British elites believed rather accurately that “the [Purge] had swept away about 65 per cent of the highest-ranking officers in the Red Army.”135 This undoubtedly introduced confusion and disorganization into the already inefficient Soviet military, crippling its strength. The air force and the navy were not exempt

132 “The Reliability, Efficiency, and Value for War of the Russian Army,” War Office, 20 Jan. 1936, FO 371/20348/N 751/287. Sent to Collier by Major Hayes (M.I. 2) on 6 Feb. Quoted in Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 211. 133 Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 215. 134 Although the Great Purge began in 1936, accounts of the effects on Soviet military capabilities begin from June 1937 onwards because it was only then that the purge of the army began. Shaw, 52. 135 Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 215. 44 from the Purge, 136 and, especially with regards to the navy, elites claimed that Britain still had

“overwhelming superiority” in quantity if not also quality.137 Although Firebrace, British ambassador to Moscow Lord Chilston, and majority of the Foreign Office still believed the

Soviet Union could be a “formidable opponent” on the defensive,138 the Purge led others, most notably Neville Chamberlain, to believe that it was no longer a great military power.139 This was not necessarily just a Conservative opinion: Manchester Guardian also ran articles claiming the post-Purge Soviet Union to be “weak.”140 With elites believing the Soviet Union to be at least not much different and at most significantly weaker than before, few believed the Soviet Union to be any military threat to Britain now.

UNDERMINING OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AS A SOVIET THREAT

While this chapter has so far mostly focused on the threat perception to the British homeland, analysis would not be complete without considering its imperial holdings and economic interests, particularly India and China. Since the late 19th century, having an empire had symbolic significance as a source of prestige for a great power. According to Gilpin and

Ralph Hawtrey, prestige was crucial for a state to maintain because it would give other states a strong impression of its power and incentivize them into non-resistance. If a state loses prestige,

“it is weakened in any future diplomatic conflict,” and defeat would mean “a diminution of

136 Jürgen Rohwer, Mikhail Monakov, and Mikhail S. Monakov, Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935-1953 (Psychology Press, 2001), 69-70. 137 HC Deb 11 Mar. 1937, vol 321 c1408. 138 Firebrace to Chilston (British ambassador, Moscow), despatch 7, secret, 18 Apr. 1938, contained in Chilston to Halifax (British foreign secretary), despatch 196, 18 Apr. 1938, FO 371/22298/N 1993/725 and minutes. As described in Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 215-6. 139 As Chamberlain was accused in HC Deb 22 Feb. 1938, vol 332 c307. 140 E.g. see “BRITISH DISLIKE OF THE PACT AGAINST COMMUNISM: Its Present Form Only a Beginning FASCIST EYES ON POLAND, PORTUGAL, AND HUNGARY,” Manchester Guardian, 10 November 1937. 45 material strength,” which would render the state more insecure under anarchy. Thus, “[a] decline of prestige [was]…an injury to be dreaded.”141 In more pragmatic terms, imperial holdings – whether formal political control or informal control through economic penetration – and economic interests provided enormous markets for British trade and capital investment, buoying

British power. In fact, “India took the greatest share of British export, China stood a close second.”142 Given that Britain was already suffering economically, Britain could hardly afford to lose these crucial markets. Thus, British elites had every reason to assess whether the Soviet

Union posed any military or ideological threat to its Empire as much as to its homeland.

Although British elites perceived a Soviet military threat to its Empire throughout the

1920s, the perception was mainly focused on India and became practically nonexistent after

1933/4. Given not least its geographic proximity, Russia had always been “Britain’s most persistent and formidable opponent” in India since the 19th century.143 As Tsarist Russia became the Soviet Union, British perception of Soviet threat to India increased since the Soviet Union’s desire to weaken British imperialism there was “identical with that adopted in the past by

Imperial Russia,” but the methods, namely the military, were “more dangerous than those employed by their predecessors.”144 The perceived threat was exacerbated by the elites’ belief that states integral to defending India – Persia and Afghanistan – were also prone to Soviet military intrigue. Persia, significant as a buffer against Soviet aggression and as a source of a quarter of Britain’s petroleum imports, was “weak.”145 The territorial integrity of Afghanistan

141 Gilpin, 31-2; Ralph George Hawtrey, Economic Aspects of Sovereignty (Longmans, Green and Company, 1930), 65. 142 Haslam, “Comintern and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1919-1941,” 642. 143 Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 190. 144 35th meeting of the C.O.S., 6 July 1926, Cab 53/1. Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 195. 145 “Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee,” Trenchard, Madden (First Sea Lord) and Milne, 11 Oct. 1928, Cab 53/16/COS 179. Quoted in Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 205. 46 was deemed “essential to India” as a prevention of Soviet invasion there,146 but despite Britain’s previously described general military superiority to the Soviet Union in the 1920s, the COS offered “bleak” conclusions on the British ability to maintain such integrity because the specific terrain circumstances were such that British naval, air, and land operations ineffective and costly.147 Granted, many in the COS and the Foreign Office pointed out that the Soviet Union “at the present time [did] not possess, and, indeed, [was] unlikely in the near future to possess, either aircraft or the organisation required to translate this threat” to the British Empire.148 However, in the 1920s, these views failed to stifle the more inflated narratives of the Soviet threat to India, championed by those such as Austen Chamberlain,149 that “the Soviet Government [had] sought to increase the unrest, and to create trouble” there.150

Once the 1930s began, however, the Soviet threat to India quickly retreated to the background. The most visible manifestation of this change was the 1934 Defence Requirements sub-Committee (DRC) report. In evaluating various threats facing Britain, such as the Far East and Germany, the report reduced the Soviet menace to India into a “tertiary threat,”151 perhaps because the Soviet Union was believed to prefer focusing its military resources in Europe in light of Germany’s rise. After the publication of this report, British concern over imperial defense practically “vanished…until the [very] end of the 1930s.”152 Consistent with the British elites’

146“Afghanistan,” Birkenhead, 17 June 1926, Cab 24/180/CP 246(26). Quoted in Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 194. 147 “Afghanistan. Second (Interim) Report,” Beatty (First Sea Lord), Milne (C.I.G.S.) and Trenchard (Chief of the Air Staff), 29 July 1926, Cab 53/12/COS 48. Described in Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 198. 148 “Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee,” Trenchard, Madden (First Sea Lord) and Milne, 11 Oct. 1928, Cab 53/16/COS 179. Quoted in Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear:’” 205. 149 Austen Chamberlain was Neville Chamberlain’s older half-brother and was the Foreign Secretary at the time. 150 E.g. HC Deb 26 May 1927 vol 206 c2208. 151 Steiner, 426. 152 Steiner. 426. 47 assessment of the Soviet military regarding its homeland in the previous section, British elites generally perceived limited threat from the Soviet Union in its Empire.

In contrast, British belief that the Soviet Union would ideologically undermine India and

China was consistent throughout the 1920s and 1930s, parallel to the elites’ fear of ideological subversion in their homeland. In terms of India and regions integral to its defense, the staunchly anti-communist Curzon expressed alarm in 1924 over the Soviet-backed “Indian extremists” who sought to “[break] down British rule” and the circulation of “a paper financed by the Soviets with the object of stirring up disorder and rebellion in the frontier districts of the Indian Empire.”153

Across the political aisle, MacDonald echoed a similar sentiment in 1927, claiming that Soviet propaganda was “giving us difficulties in India.”154 The problem was that the elites generally believed the Soviet propaganda to have notable appeal in the region: the Indian nationalist movements, the “sentiment of Islam…hostile to the British Empire” in Afghanistan,155 and the general lack of “plain common sense and intelligence” among the Indians and Afghans rendered these states “inflammable” to Soviet ideological influence.156 This belief led British elites to consistently denounce Soviet propaganda during the 1930s on the grounds that it would “[break]

Great Britain’s power.”157

What about China? As Austen Chamberlain pointed out, the British elites were aware of how “Bolshevist activity in China date[d] back at least as far as 1923,” and how the Comintern instructed the Chinese Communist Party to strike “a heavy and well-aimed blow” against British

153 HL Deb 26 Mar. 1924 vol 56 c1062. 154 HC Deb 3 Mar. 1927 vol 203 c621. 155 “Report of the Sub-Committee on Indian Military Requirements,” Chamberlain et al, 22 June 1922, Cab 4/125- D. Quoted in Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 196. 156 HL Deb 20 Feb. 1930 vol 76 c649. 157 “Red Propaganda,” Times, May 12, 1930, The Times Digital Archive. 48 imperialism.158 In the 1920s, revolution was imminent in China, and the Soviet government and the Comintern offered assistance. This both frightened and infuriated the British elites, so much that Austen Chamberlain’s “senior officials and clerks…were spoiling for a fight with the Soviet

Union.”159But the full communist revolution in China that many elites were fearing failed:160 among the many consequences, Chiang Kai-shek expelled Soviet ambassadors and purged left- wing sympathizers within the Kuomintang.161 This assured many British elites, especially

Labour but Conservatives as well, that “Soviet influence in the Far East was on a decline.”162 As the Conservative MP Robert Boothby declared, “[t]he collapse of Russia in China had completely altered the situation and robbed the Bolshevik world movement of its menace.”163

Additionally, elites increasingly considered Japan, not the Soviet Union, to be chief threat to

China:164 in this light, the Soviet Union further decreased in importance as far as China was concerned. Of course, many British elites, especially Conservatives, continued to claim of a

Soviet ideological threat to China as part of their general protest to Soviet propaganda worldwide.165 That being said, the invocation of the threat to China arguably appears less frequently than that for India and, though not a colony, Spain during the Civil War: then, the fear of the Soviet Union directly stripping British influence in China may not have been as urgent to

British elites and thus promoted a relatively limited perception of threat from the Soviet Union.

158 HC Deb 26 May 1927 vol 206 c2208. 159 Carley, “Behind Stalin’s Moustache: Pragmatism in Early Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-41,” 164. 160 Carley, “Behind Stalin’s Moustache: Pragmatism in Early Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-41,” 164. 161 Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 199. 162 Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear:’” 199. 163 “COMMONS’ DEBATE ON RUSSIA: Agreement Attacked by Mr. Baldwin FEAR OF REVOLUTION IN THE EAST Mr. LIoyd George’s Strong Support for Cabinet,” Manchester Guardian, November 6, 1929. 164 E.g. “The possibility of co-operation between Germany and Russia, and Germany and Japan and the effect of such combinations on British security,” secret, MI3B, 30 Oct 1935, WO 190/368, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 152. 165 HL Deb 2 May 1933 vol 87. 49

GERMAN-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT AS A SOVIET THREAT

Deeply resenting the dictat peace of the Treaty of Versailles, “Germany [had] nurtured revanchist aspirations” throughout the 1920s,166 and Germany after 1933 demonstrated increasing will and ability to realize these aspirations. Both before and after 1933, British elites had reasons to be weary of Soviet overtures to Germany because they exacerbated the ‘German problem’ from Britain’s perspectives.

During the 1920s, some British elites sought to bring Germany back into the comity of nations. They hoped that alleviating post-Versailles German isolation could not only benefit the

British economy, as Germany was Britain’s important trading partner before World War I,167 but also mitigate the possibility of future German aggression. One of the most significant efforts to reintegrate Germany was the 1925 Locarno Treaties; however, some elites believed that the

Soviet Union attempted to prevent Germany signing these treaties. As Austen Chamberlain remarked in 1927:

“Everybody knows that Soviet Russia did her best to prevent the Treaty of Locarno being signed, that Soviet Russia did her best to persuade the Germans not to come into the comity of Europe, not to resume friendly relations with their Western or Eastern neighbours, and that they did their utmost to persuade Germany not to come into the League of Nations, but to remain outside with Soviet Russia.”168

For these elites, Soviet overtures to Germany represented active efforts to hamper British pursuit of peace. Although others such as David Lloyd George provided an alternative explanation of such hampering – namely, that Soviet Union feared a Western coalition against the Soviet Union

166 Benjamin Miller, International and Regional Security: The Causes of War and Peace (Taylor & Francis, 2016), 153. 167 Catherine Ann Cline, “British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 20, no. 1 (1988): 43. 168 HC Deb 3 Mar. 1927 vol 203 c663. 50 and thus was not as hostile to Britain as was accused – Austen Chamberlain and those who agreed with his views continued to speak of a threat from the Soviet Union.

But the 1930s significantly elevated and almost universalized the threat of German-

Soviet rapprochement among the elites. After 1933, Britain viewed Germany with great alarm and urgency.169 If the Soviet Union forged cooperation with Germany and refused to encircle it, the War Office warned, Germany could more easily launch war against the West, and the two powers would “ultimately entirely dominate continental Europe.”170 Furthermore, Japan could join this alliance, “which would probably mean the end of the British Empire,” and the Soviet

Union could inspire communist revolutions as the war weakens the liberal powers.171 Thus, the

British elites came to fear German-Soviet rapprochement as the worst-case scenario for Britain’s international security, its share of global power, and perhaps even the international system. For instance, the Foreign Office’s Collier and Major Hayes from M12 expressed that they were

“gravely concerned” about the Soviet Union collaborating with Germany.172 Foreign Office

Deputy Under-Secretary Orme Sargent spoke of a sobering “danger,”173 and the Foreign Office

Permanent under-secretary Robert Vansittart repeatedly highlighted the disquieting nature of a

169 The 1934 DRC calling Germany Britain’s “most important long-range threat” is one example of this change of view. For this and other examples, see Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933- 1939; Lammers, “Fascism, Communism, and the Foreign Office, 1937-39”; Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939. 170 “The possibility of co-operation between Germany and Russia, and Germany and Japan and the effect of such combinations on British security,” secret, MI3B, 30 Oct 1935, WO 190/368, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 152. 171 “The possibility of co-operation between Germany and Russia, and Germany and Japan and the effect of such combinations on British security,” secret, MI3B, 30 Oct 1935, WO 190/368, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 152. 172 Maj. Hayes (M12, WO) to Collier, 3 Dec 1935, FO 371/19450/N6255/7/38, spawned the discussion; Collier’s minute (19 Dec), quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 154. 173 Sargent’s minute (17 Jan 1936) on Chilston to Collier, 10 Dec 1935, FO 371/19460/N6642/75/38, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 159. 51

German-Soviet rapprochement.174 That the Foreign Office in the 1930s engaged in impassioned debates on how best to reduce the possibility of such rapprochement, manifested not least in the

1935 debate on whether to give the Soviet Union loans or credits,175 implies the significance of the Soviet threat to many British elites.

It must be noted that few elites believed that German-Soviet rapprochement was inevitable and thus that the Soviet Union posed an insurmountable threat. For one, Hitler’s

“personal hatred” towards communism was well-known and was widely believed to impede most efforts at such rapprochement.176 However, the elites believed that this barrier was not eternal177 and that both Germany and the Soviet Union had a motivation to improve relations to oppose any

Western coalition against them.178 Moreover, the Soviet Union had some history of concluding agreements with Germany, such as the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo, and the 1926 German-Soviet Pact of “friendship and mutual assistance” that was renewed in

1931 and, as was pointed out by Viscount Cranborne, was still in force in 1937.179 As Collier argued, especially given the Soviet Union’s historical suspicion of the West and the

“great…moral and physical influence of Germany in Eastern Europe,” where Britain could never

174 “Note of a Meeting held in the Secretary of State’s room at the Foreign Office on February 3rd, 1936, to discuss Sir R. Vansittart’s memo on Britain, France and Germany,” ns, 3 Feb 1936, FO 371/19885/C979/4/18; “Germany,” CP 42(36), secret, Eden, 11 Feb 1936, Cab 24/260, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 162. 175 See Chapter 3. 176 “Note of a Meeting held in the Secretary of State’s room at the Foreign Office on February 3rd, 1936, to discuss Sir R. Vansittart’s memo on Britain, France and Germany,” ns, 3 Feb 1936, FO 371/19885/C979/4/18; “Germany,” CP 42(36), secret, Eden, 11 Feb 1936, Cab 24/260, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 162. 177 “Note of a Meeting held in the Secretary of State’s room at the Foreign Office on February 3rd, 1936, to discuss Sir R. Vansittart’s memo on Britain, France and Germany,” ns, 3 Feb 1936, FO 371/19885/C979/4/18; “Germany,” CP 42(36), secret, Eden, 11 Feb 1936, Cab 24/260, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 162. 178 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939,154, 160. E.g. see Sargent’s minute (17 Jan 1936) on Chilston to Collier, 10 Dec 1935, FO 371/19460/N6642/75/38. 179 HC Deb 12 Apr. 1937 vol 322 c601. 52 give the Soviets sufficient assurances against German expansion,180 German-Soviet rapprochement seemed quite possible and warranting urgent action in the eyes of the British elites.

CONCLUSION

While the Soviet Union’s foreign policy between 1922 and 1938 was generally of pragmatic accommodation of the West, British elites often viewed the Soviet Union with suspicion, fear, and hostility. This chapter explored four of the ways in which the British elites perceived a threat from the Soviet Union. Fear of ideological subversion and the resultant domestic instability constituted a significant threat for most British elites and was shared across time and party lines. The Soviet economic and military buildup was generally considered more of an opportunity than a threat until 1937, since the Soviet capabilities were large enough for

Britain to capitalize on but small enough that they would not be used against Britain. The Soviet potential to militarily and especially ideologically undermine the British Empire provided a source of threat perception for many elites, reflecting the aforementioned trend in the British homeland that saw ideological subversion as a threat but material/military buildup as less so.

Finally, the Soviet potential to forge German-Soviet cooperation was also perceived as a threat by many British elites. Although such rapprochement was a possibility in the future, not a confirmed affair such as the communist propaganda in the British homeland and Empire, the

German menace to peace and the territorial status quo and the British reliance on the Soviet

Union for the encirclement of Germany made the atmosphere conducive for a perception of that

180 Sargent’s minute (17 Jan 1936) on Chilston to Collier, 10 Dec 1935, FO 371/19460/N6642/75/38, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 160. 53 threat from the Soviet Union. These observations motivate my conclusion that the British perception of the Soviet threat centered mainly around ideological subversion in its homeland and imperial holdings as well as its potential for a German-Soviet rapproachement, followed by a militarily-led expansion into India, and then the Soviet economic and military buildup.

These findings offer significant implications for our understanding of the interwar period.

On the one hand, the British paranoiac preoccupation with ideological subversion would render suggestions for Anglo-Soviet cooperation extremely unpopular, since communism and the Soviet

Union were deemed two sides of the same coin. The ideological antipathy would constitute a significant ‘handicap,’181 in Randall Schweller’s words, and one must analyze whether the elites overcame or at least cast aside such ideological prejudice when explaining any efforts to improve

Anglo-Soviet relations. But on the other hand, the general agreement that the Soviet Union faced serious limitations in military capabilities raises the possibility that military considerations helped dissuade Britain from cooperating with the Soviet Union against Germany before 1938. If that was the case, the often-made claim that ideology was the chief reason for the lack of an

Anglo-Soviet cooperation must be reexamined and qualified. Similarly, the subordinated importance of the Soviet Union compared to Germany, evident in the perception of the Soviet threat in enhancing the German threat, is at times incongruent with its elevated status as Britain’s significant ideological threat. This warrants further analysis into the extent to which ideological considerations ultimately mattered to the British elites when faced with the German threat. In delineating the ways in which British elites perceived a threat from the Soviet Union and its implications, this chapter has set the groundwork for the following chapters, which would

181 See Introduction, p. 10. 54 analyze to what extent a consensus existed that the Soviet threat was greater than the German threat and that an Anglo-Soviet cooperation was ill-advised.

CHAPTER 3

CHAMBERLAIN AND THE PARLIAMENT

Between 1933 and 1938, both Neville Chamberlain and the Parliament contended that

Germany was a greater threat than the Soviet Union. However, they gave little support for the notion that an Anglo-Soviet cooperation would curtail the German threat. Chamberlain devised many potential solutions for ensuring security from Germany: while he had briefly yet seriously considered an Anglo-Soviet cooperation, he ultimately deemed that a direct engagement with

Germany (henceforth shortened as direct engagement) would be the most effective strategy.

Meanwhile, most of the Parliament threw their support behind Chamberlain. While the ‘anti- appeaser’ coalition led by Churchill protested heavily in favor of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation, they ultimately failed to change Britain’s course towards appeasement.

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN

Chamberlain is an indispensable figure in our narrative. As Prime Minister, it was he who argued for, decided on, and acted upon the notion of appeasing Germany in the Munich

Agreement. But even before becoming Prime Minister in 1937, Chamberlain held great influence over British policy. As Chancellor of the Exchequer who headed the Treasury, he was one of the most senior members of the Cabinet whose voice carried a heavy weight. Top politicians, even

Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, heeded Chamberlain’s advice, such that Chamberlain considered himself (with a fair amount of accuracy) “a sort of Acting P.M.” for much of the 56

1930s.182 Thus, Chamberlain’s views on who was Britain’s greatest threat and the best strategy to address that threat played a significant role in determining British policy towards Germany and the Soviet Union.

Between 1933 and 1938, Chamberlain resolutely believed that Germany was a greater threat than the Soviet Union. While he despised and distrusted the Soviet Union, Germany’s aggressive behavior towards Britain and the international community, combined with the impotence of the League of Nations in restraining Germany, convinced Chamberlain that

Germany was Britain’s primary threat. Chamberlain firmly believed that the best strategy to rectify this preponderant threat was diplomatic pressure through direct engagement with

Germany. By addressing Germany’s grievances, the strategy of engagement would bind

Germany to Britain and deprive it of justifications, if not also motivations, to start a conflict.

While Chamberlain had initially advocated binding Germany in a collective arrangement, he realized that its pursuit would be fruitless given Hitler’s aversion to the idea. As he opposed the option on the other side of the spectrum – alliances – he ultimately promoted the middle ground of exerting pressure on Germany diplomatically through direct engagement. Due to his belief that direct engagement was the solution, he was slow to consider an Anglo-Soviet cooperation against Germany as a viable solution. When he did consider the notion in 1938 to respond to the crisis over Czechoslovakia, he dismissed it on the grounds that the Soviet Union would be of little use in halting German advances and would only serve to exacerbate German antagonism.183

182 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 23 Mar. 1935, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, ed. Robert Self (London: Ashgate, 2005), 125. 183 Note: the primary evidence that I will present in this section reveals that Chamberlain was more pragmatically oriented than people have thought. However, certain scholars – such as Mark Haas and Louise Grace Shaw – have argued that Chamberlain excluded the Soviet Union on ideological grounds. There do seem to be some evidence of that: for instance, they often invoke how Chamberlain in 1937 told King George VI that he had “sketched out the prospect of Germany and England as the two pillars of European peace and buttresses against communism” (See Chapter 2). If that was the case, however, it does not explain why Chamberlain in a more private capacity – the diary 57

1933-35

During this period, the conventional wisdom among the elites was that Germany was a nuisance but not necessarily a threat. However, from the very beginning, Chamberlain embraced the notion that Germany could become a greater threat than any other state: this included the

Soviet Union, as much as he despised and distrusted the Soviets. As developments in Europe strengthened Chamberlain’s belief, he began to entertain multiple options to address the

German threat, such as an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement, collective security pacts, alliances, and direct engagement with Germany.

In 1933, Chamberlain’s antipathy towards the Soviet Union was still abundant.

Chamberlain despised the Soviet Union as “beyond the pale of European civilization:” the

Soviets’ propagation of communist propaganda across Britain and its global interests in the

1920s and the 1933 Metro-Vickers incident had convinced him that the Soviets were hostile towards Britain.184 But more than detestation was his “profound distrust of Russia.”185 He believed that the Soviet Union “[had] little in common with our ideas of liberty and [was] concerned only with getting everyone else by the ears."186 In other words, the Soviets might be attempting to pull Britain into a war with Germany, wait for them to weaken each other’s political, material, and military power, and fill the power vacuum to realize their doctrine of

letters chiefly – hardly mentions ideological reasonings. While Chamberlain may indeed have harbored and expressed ideological antipathy, it may very well be the case that he was changing his rhetoric based on his environment (public vs. private). See Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Shaw, The British Political Elite and the Soviet Union 1937-1939 (Oxford: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003). 184 Ovey’s testimony to ‘Committee on Anglo-Soviet Relations…’, SRC(33), ns, 3 Apr. 1933, Cab 27/550, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 69. 185 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 26 Mar. 1934, NC18/1/1091, quoted in G. Bruce Strang, “The Spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and British Appeasement in the 1930s,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 19, no. 3 (September 17, 2008): 510. 186 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 26 Mar. 1934, NC18/1/1091, quoted in Strang, 510. 58 overthrowing the liberal-capitalist order. Nevertheless, Chamberlain recognized that this Soviet menace was more hypothetical than real. Despite its history of hostility in the 1920s, the Soviet

Union was now signaling its desire to cooperate with Britain and the international community, as its desire to join the League of Nations revealed. In contrast, Germany appeared to be seeking a significant revision of the political and territorial status quo, demonstrated by its departure from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference. Given the discrepancy in the two states’ signals, Chamberlain recognized that as much as the Soviets may have been hostile in the past, Germany was more likely to become the chief aggressor. Therefore, Chamberlain reasoned,

Britain’s attention ought to be on Germany.

Chamberlain made this view clear as early as November 1933. At the time, the Chiefs of

Staff (COS) sub-Committee was examining Britain’s myriad external threats, and consensus was emerging that Japan was Britain’s primary threat, followed by Germany and the Soviet Union.

While Chamberlain agreed that the Soviet Union was the least threatening among the three, he argued that Germany “might become more significant than the Far East [Japan].”187 While his argument was largely rejected by his colleagues, Chamberlain did not abandon it, and his view was reconsidered in the Defence Requirements sub-Committee (DRC). While the DRC ultimately agreed with the COS sub-Committee’s ranking of threats, it did establish Germany as

Britain’s “ultimate [greatest] potential enemy,” offering some acknowledgement of

Chamberlain’s concerns.188

187 Based on Minutes, 261st meeting CID, 9 Nov. 1933, Cab 2/6. Recounted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 90. 188 “Committee of Imperial Defence. Defence Requirements Sub-Committee Report,” DRC14, Hankey, Chatfield, Ellington, Fisher, Montgomery-Massingberd and Vansittart, 28 Feb. 1934, Cab 16/109, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 98. 59

1934 strengthened Chamberlain’s belief in the potential primacy of the German threat.

For instance, Chamberlain was troubled by Germany’s unilateral imposition of a moratorium on long-term debts to Britain and the months-long disputes that ensued. Believing it a case of

Germany attempting to take advantage of Britain, Chamberlain warned that it was “most dangerous to allow ourselves to be bullied” by Germany.189 Later events such as the Nazi assassination of the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss caused Chamberlain to “hate Nazi- ism and all its works with a greater loathing than ever”190 and to become more convinced of

German ability to strong-arm the international community. While Chamberlain agreed with the

Foreign Office’s assessment that Germany was not as powerful as it was portraying itself to be, since it was “not ready” militarily and had “the most gloomy…economic condition,” he was more cautious than optimistic.191 He was aware that Germany was “arming and training as fast as [it] can,” while the Treasury’s budget allocated concerningly little money for defense.192 Thus,

Chamberlain believed that Germany had a high potential of becoming Britain’s greatest threat, and it was a matter of time for this potential to be fully realized.

In this light, Chamberlain began to seriously consider myriad options to counter the

German threat. He focused on three options: the first one was an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement against Germany, and the latter two were collective security measures that bound Germany to the

European order.

189 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 3 Feb. 1934, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 52. 190 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 July 1934, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 81. 191 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 July 1934 ; to Ida Chamberlain, 4 Aug. 1934 ; to Ida Chamberlain, 13 Oct. 1934, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 82, 85, 92. 192 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 4 Aug. 1934, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 85.

The Anglo-Japanese rapprochement was his first preference. He was aware that while

Germany was increasing in strength, Britain’s military preparations were insufficient and stretched between Europe and Asia. Moreover, he doubted that the U.S. would ever come to

Britain’s rescue if war broke out.193 Thus, Chamberlain believed that an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement would be the best solution, allowing Britain to move its resources from the East and focus on defending against Germany: “if we [were] to take the necessary measures of defence against [Germany]…we ought to be making eyes at Japan.”194 However, most of his colleagues denounced Chamberlain’s proposal because they believed that an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement would lend support to Japanese militarists and alienate the U.S.195 As powerful as he was as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he could not overcome such overwhelming opposition, and he was effectively forced to abandon this idea.

The second idea was called the ‘limited liability plan,’ consisting of a mutual guarantee of security by Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Under this plan, a breach by any state would trigger the other parties to put on a “limited specified force…to support the aggrieved party.”196 Chamberlain believed that by creating “an international police force” against territorial revision in Europe, this plan would effectively “maintain the peace & security of Europe” from Germany.197 However, this plan was again opposed by both the

193 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 July 1934, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 82. 194 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 July 1934, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 82. 195 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 21 Apr. 1934, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 67 ; Minutes, 26 Oct. and 1 Dec. 1933, on ‘Imperial Defence Policy. Annual Review (1933) by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee,’ FO 371/17338/W11987/11987/50, recounted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 90. 196 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 24 Mar. 1934, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 65. 197 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 24 Mar. 1934 and 21 Apr. 1934, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 65, 67. 61

Foreign Office and Chamberlain’s colleagues, in part because they believed Chamberlain was

“over cautious.”198 He therefore had to abandon this option as well.

The third idea was not his own but that of the Soviet Union and France, an ‘Eastern Pact’ that resembled the 1925 Locarno system of collective security. Under this plan, both Germany and the Soviet Union would be part of a mutual guarantee over the status quo in Eastern Europe and be effectively prevented from pursuing territorial revision.199 While Chamberlain doubted that Germany would agree to the Eastern Pact – Hitler’s anti-communism and aversion to associating with the Soviets were well known200 – Chamberlain nevertheless placed hope in the idea and was pleased when discussions over the Eastern Pact went well. 201

It is interesting to note that Chamberlain supported both the limited liability plan and the

Eastern Pact. After all, the former excluded the Soviet Union, while the latter included it as a central player. Given his history of distrust towards the Soviets, Chamberlain might indeed have preferred the Soviet Union to be excluded, as he made sure to do when he formulated the limited liability plan. However, his support for the Eastern Pact that included the Soviet Union suggests that Chamberlain cared about restraining Germany above anything else. His preparation to sacrifice his aversion to the Soviet Union sheds insight into how much threat Chamberlain was perceiving from Germany.

198 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 21 Apr. 1934, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 67. 199 See for example Lisanne Radice, “The Eastern Pact, 1933-1935: A Last Attempt at European Co-Operation,” The Slavonic and East European Review 55, no. 1 (1977): 45–64. 200 E.g. Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 30 Mar. 1935, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 125. 201 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 21 July 1934, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 79-80. 62

By 1935, Chamberlain had firmly established that Germany was a greater threat than the

Soviet Union. Germany was acting as the “bully of Europe,”202 and the rapid improvements in military capabilities – now made evident by the unveiling of the Luftwaffe and the reestablishment of conscriptions – put teeth to Germany’s aggressive signals. Partly because he doubted whether the Eastern Pact could ever be signed, he began to consider new options for what strategy Britain should adopt towards Germany. First, he placed much more importance on engaging directly with Germany: “I thought it would be necessary to speak very plainly to Hitler if [any] results were to be obtained.”203 Second, he determined that Britain should not provoke

Germany unnecessarily when its defense capabilities were insufficient. Thus, he began to entertain the notion that direct engagement might sometimes have to be conciliatory in nature.

He did not hesitate to take the initiative in this regard: for instance, when the Foreign Office published a White Paper that he believed would be particularly offensive to Germany,

Chamberlain quickly “toned down” the offensive passages.204 Third, he began to consider the option of alliances against Germany. Having long believed that the system of alliances caused

World War I and that Britain must avoid another war, Chamberlain maintained that he “very much preferred” collective security: however, if Germany would not agree to act within the

European order, he was willing, albeit reluctantly, to consider alliances.205

202 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 18 Mar. 1935, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 123. 203 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 16 Mar. 1935, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 122. 204 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 16 Mar. 1935, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 122. 205 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 16 Mar. 1935, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 122. As he later clarified, even if Britain were to form alliances, it would be with France and Belgium. He was strikingly averse to allying with the Soviet Union: “[I]f [Hitler] persists in refusing to make any contribution he may lose the sympathy of England & find that he has driven us into an alliance with Belgium & France.” 63

The death of the Eastern Pact in March 1935, when Hitler refused to sign it, effectively removed collective security as a viable option. While Chamberlain was not surprised by the outcome, he was nevertheless disappointed, since it represented a blow to his preferred strategy against Germany:

“I never for one moment expected that Hitler would sign the Eastern Pact… But seeing that the possible antagonists in the East are Germany & Russia and that they are divided by a band of small states...I should have thought it was worth while [for Germany] to have explored the possibility of Russia & Germany mutually guaranteeing the Western & Eastern frontiers of these states.” 206

As he became increasingly aware of international community’s impotence against aggressors, manifested so clearly in the Abyssinian Crisis,207 Chamberlain resigned himself to the fact that collective security against Germany would not be a successful strategy. However, he was not yet prepared to embrace the idea of alliances either, since that was an enormous responsibility and commitment to undertake. Therefore, he placed hope in the option of direct engagement, whose potential of effectiveness he saw in the successful conclusion of the Anglo-German Naval

Agreement in June.208 Diplomatic pressure was, it seemed, the best strategy to restrain dictators and prevent another great war. This belief would only be solidified in the coming years, and it would ultimately drive Chamberlain’s decision to forgo cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 28 Mar. 1936, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 182. 206 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 30 Mar. 1935, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 125. 207 The League of Nations did little to prevent Italy from invading Abyssinia (today’s Ethiopia). In fact, the League’s leading powers Britain and France made a secret (albeit failed) deal to facilitate Italy’s invasion, which was called the Hoare-Laval Pact. 208 The Anglo-German Naval Pact of 1935 sanctioned German naval rearmament. See D. C. Watt, “The Anglo- German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment,” The Journal of Modern History 28, no. 2 (1956): 155–75 ; Hines H. Hall, “The Foreign Policy-Making Process in Britain, 1934-1935, and the Origins of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement,” The Historical Journal 19, no. 2 (1976): 477–99. 64

1936-1938

The period between 1936 and 1938 crystallized Chamberlain’s beliefs about the primacy of the German threat. Developments such as the remilitarization of Rhineland, Anschluss, and the Czech crisis demonstrated Germany’s increasing resolve and success in its aggressive agenda, and the possibility that Germany might resort to war in pursuing its ends weighed heavily on Chamberlain. Although the notion of the Soviet threat reemerged with the Spanish

Civil War, the assessment of the Soviets’ military capabilities and the effects of the Stalinist purges convinced Chamberlain that the Soviet threat was lesser than that of Germany.

Reinvigorated in his belief that Germany was the greater threat, Chamberlain continued to pursue direct engagement and the avoidance of provoking Germany. While Chamberlain did consider an alliance with the Soviet Union and France in 1938, he ultimately dismissed it on the grounds of German strength and Soviet uselessness, and the Munich Agreement ensued.

The events of 1936 heightened Chamberlain’s perception of the German threat. After

Germany remilitarized the Rhineland on March 7, 1936 in blatant violation of the Treaties of

Versailles and Locarno, Chamberlain reported a “grim week” wherein Britain realized the implications of the events: while Germany had protested both agreements for years, this new violation in light of the recent increase in military capabilities added teeth to Germany’s aggressive intent. 209 As Chamberlain recognized the difficulty in convincing Germany to halt its

209 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 21 Mar. 1936, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 180. 65 aggression,210 he felt forced to consider direct engagement that placates German anger through concessions. For instance, he remarked in April:

“I don't believe myself that we could purchase peace and a lasting settlement by handing over Tanganyika [former German territory confiscated under the Treaty of Versailles211] to the Germans, but if I did I would not hesitate for a moment to do so.”212

In June, Chamberlain even supported the government’s plan for Britain to propose the abandonment of sanctions against Germany at the next League Council. While this policy met a ferocious opposition in Parliament, Chamberlain called the opposition “very noisy and rude” and maintained that it was useful to avoid antagonizing Germany to avert war.213

It is notable that Chamberlain would have jumped at committing Britain to a colonial offer and supported an abandonment of sanctions if it meant attaining peace in Europe. Since both would have undercut the political and territorial status quo under the Treaty of Versailles, which Britain had long championed, his position reveals the degree to which he was desperate to restrain Germany. Granted, Chamberlain was not merely focused on making concessions to

Germany: he recognized that Britain must improve its own military capabilities in the case that it had to defend against German aggression, and he therefore intensified his support for rearmament, especially in the air.214 But given his rearmament plans were slow to be accepted by

210 E.g. Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 28 Mar. 1936, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 182-3. 211 Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration: Report by Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the General Assembly of the United Nations for the Year 1959 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1960), 6. 212 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 13 Apr. 1936, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 186, emphasis added. 213 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 20 June 1936, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 196. 214 As he later aptly summarized, “[W]e must show our determination not to be bullied by announcing some increase or acceleration in rearmament.” Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 13 Mar. 1938, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 304. 66 his colleagues,215 the policies of direct engagement and avoidance of provoking Germany took on increasing importance.

Chamberlain’s attitude towards and solutions to address Germany in 1936 were complicated by the breakout of the Spanish Civil War in July. Germany’s open involvement on the side of Franco made Britain nervous. But he was nevertheless cautiously optimistic: he found

“some comfort to learn that Von Neurath [German Foreign Minister] gave Vansittart the most definite assurance that Germany would spring no new surprise on us between now and…October,” and once it reached November, Chamberlain found solace in the fact that

“Franco is making no progress” and Germany was consequently “a bit piano at the present.”216

Germany’s difficulty in Spain and the signing of the Anti-Comintern pact with Japan led

Chamberlain to believe that Germany was not as strong as it portrayed itself to be: it was, he thought, offering “an admission of nervousness” towards the Soviets.217 However, while a possibility of a reduced German threat was good news, Chamberlain did not rejoice. For one, he knew that Germany’s faltering might be temporary. For another, the Soviet Union had emerged again on Chamberlain’s radar through its role in the Spanish Civil War.

As described in the previous section, the Soviet Union had been reduced to a secondary concern in Chamberlain’s (as well as most elites’) mind for some years. While the Comintern remained active with communist propaganda, there were little novel developments that warranted further alarm. Furthermore, the British Communist Party remained weak and the

215 E.g. Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 25 July 1936, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 203. 216 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 2 Aug. 1936 ; to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 Nov. 1936, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 204, 224. 217 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 Nov. 1936, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 224. 67 conservatives held a stronghold: this meant that a visible shift towards the political left, such as one that happened in France, was unlikely in Britain.218 However, the Spanish Civil War as an ostensible conflict of ideologies raised concerns of the Soviet Union’s threat to both Britain and the international community. A large factor was the clear indication of the Soviet aid towards the

Republicans: it was evident that “the tanks and aeroplanes [did] come from Russia.”219 This was compounded by the understanding of increasing military capabilities on the part of the Soviets.

As Chamberlain noted, “[t]here [was] no doubt that Russia has made herself a formidable military power,” which meant that there was a possibility, however slight, that the Soviet-backed side might prevail and allow the Soviets to extend its political and ideological influence in

Europe.220 Concerns over what could ensue from this scenario – a change in the balance of power, conflict in Europe, the empowerment of the communist ideology, and the jeopardizing of

British elites’ domestic power through the delegitimization of liberalism and conservative rule – made the Spanish Civil War a “disquieting situation” for Chamberlain, causing him “acute anxiety and depression.”221

A point of consolation, however, was that neither Chamberlain nor the experts believed that the Soviet Union had enough military resources for offense. Chamberlain noted that the

Soviets would “inflict some very nasty wounds on any one who came within reach of her claws” but not be “foolish enough” to wage a war: these were also the conclusions reached by the War

218 E.g. Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 4 Apr. 1936, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 184. 219 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 22 Nov. 1936, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 223. 220 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 Nov. 1936, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 224. 221 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 Nov. 1936, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 224. 68

Office, Major General Archibald Wavell, and the Foreign Office.222 This widespread understanding of the Soviets’ lack of offensive power suggested to Chamberlain that it was a lesser threat than Germany.223

In 1937, Chamberlain became Prime Minister. While he had exerted influence in the past, his influence had only been so far as others would implement his ideas, but as Prime Minister, he now had the great authority and direct control over Britain’s foreign policy. As he said himself:

“as [the Chancellor of Exchequer] I could hardly have moved a pebble; now I have only to raise a finger & the whole face of Europe is changed!”224 The beginning of 1937 was not radically different from 1936 in terms of developments, however. The Soviet threat, perceived primarily in terms of the Spanish Civil War, continued to loom on Chamberlain. Meanwhile, although there were speculations that the internal situation of Germany was “precarious” and “imposing a certain restraining influence on Hitler,” he refrained from reaching premature conclusions and continued to exercise vigilance.225

It was June 1937 that confirmed to Chamberlain that Germany was still the greater threat: in fact, the Soviet threat had considerably decreased. As described in Chapter 2, in June 1937,

Chamberlain and the other elites were made aware of the debilitating effects of the Stalinist purge on Soviet power, especially when regarding the military. They were inundated with reports

222 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 Nov. 1936, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 224. For expert assessments, see Chapter 2. The assessments invoked here refer to “British Military Delegation to Red Army Manoeuvres” Wavell, secret, 10 Sept. 1936. FO 371/20352/N 5048/1298 and minutes. Quoted in Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 213. 223 Granted, Chamberlain’s understanding of the Soviet Union’s military capabilities for defense might have portrayed it a useful partner for cooperation: however, as was noted in Chapter 2, this was not to be, given the developments in 1937. 224 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 8 Aug. 1937, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 265. 225 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 16 Jan. 1937, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 231. 69 that the purge enfeebled the Soviet military, and the military attaché Lieutenant-Colonel

R.C.W.G. Firebrace observed that “the [purge] had swept away about 65 per cent of the highest- ranking officers in the Red Army.”226 Chamberlain now understood that the Soviet Union was

“in no condition to wage a war” and severely wounded in its ability to back up its foreign policies by force.227 In contrast, the Germany remained openly hostile and aggressive. The

Germans were “as exasperating as they [could] be,” professing to desire peace and friendship with Britain yet fanning antagonism within the country.228 Perceiving the impression that

Germany does not want to go to war, however, Chamberlain continued to strive to avoid antagonizing Germany. For instance, when German claims of a torpedo attack by Spanish

Republicans raised alarm in Britain, Chamberlain defended the Germans in Parliament, saying that German claims should be treated with sympathy and that the German government’s response

– withdrawing their ships and closing the question over the culpability – showed “a degree of restraint which we all ought to recognize.”229 Chamberlain later noted that this defense was an opportunity he took “to say a few kinds words to Germany [in a public setting] which may have a far reaching effect” in improving Anglo-German relations.230

For the remainder of 1937, therefore, Chamberlain operated on the renewed belief that

Germany was Britain’s greatest threat and that Britain must pursue “the double policy of rearmament & better relations with Germany… [to] carry us safely through the danger period” of

226 Described in Neilson, “‘Pursued by a Bear,’” 215. 227 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 9 Oct. 1937, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 274. 228 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 4 July 1937, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 259. 229 HC Deb 25 June 1937 vol 325 c1549. 230 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 26 June 1937, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 256. 70 growing German ambitions and capabilities.231 Therefore, when Germany invited Lord Halifax, who was serving on Chamberlain’s new Cabinet,232 for a visit to Berlin, Chamberlain jumped on the opportunity to forge a better understanding with Germany. Through Halifax, Chamberlain sought to “convince Hitler of our sincerity” in desiring an Anglo-German détente, ascertain

Hitler’s objectives, and create an atmosphere that would convince Germany that the two parties could discuss a European settlement.233 Being reported of Hitler’s repeated assertions that

Germany had neither the desire or intention of making war, Chamberlain declared the visit a

“great success.”234

For Chamberlain, Halifax’s visit confirmed the lessons of the Anglo-German Naval

Agreement that British overtures to Germany could reduce hostilities and lead Germany towards a settlement for peace.235 This perception of success encouraged Chamberlain that direct engagement could potentially prevent Germany from waging war over Eastern Europe. As he noted in November 1937:

“I [don’t] see why we shouldn't say to Germany Give us satisfactory assurances that you [won’t] use force to deal with the Austrians & Czecho-Slovakians & we will give you similar assurances that we [won’t] use force to prevent the changes you want if you can get them by peaceful means.”236

231 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 1 Aug. 1937, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 264. 232 Lord Halifax’s official title was Lord President of the Council. 233 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 26 Nov. 1937, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 286. 234 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 26 Nov. 1937, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 286. For more on Lord Halifax’s visit, see Lois G. Schwoerer, “Lord Halifax’s Visit To Germany: November 1937,” The Historian 32, no. 3 (1970): 353–75. 235 Schwoerer, 356. 236 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 26 Nov. 1937, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 287. 71

Thus, Chamberlain had conceived of the mentality behind the Munich Agreement as early as

November 1937. Understanding that Germany was the greatest threat, Chamberlain was driven by the belief that direct engagement was the best strategy forward and was determined to go to great lengths to ensure security. To do so, Chamberlain even removed Vansittart, whom he saw as strongly anti-German, from his PUS office: instead, he gave him the nominally higher but more marginal position of Chief Diplomatic Advisor. As Chamberlain noted:

“I am afraid [Vansittart's] instincts were all against my policy [of direct engagement]...he will be removed from active direction of F.O. policy & I suspect that in Rome & Berlin the rejoicings will be loud & deep.”237

Chamberlain’s removal of Vansittart was only the most blatant of his efforts to reduce opposition from the top layers of government. While his measure was forceful and not necessarily commendable, it nevertheless highlights his growing anxiety and desperation to curtail German aggression.

By early 1938, Chamberlain believed that the German threat had reached its greatest height. Having just annexed Austria through Anschluss, Chamberlain saw that Germany was

“flushed with triumph and all too conscious of her power,” and “the prospect [of preserving

European status quo] looked black indeed.”238 In this light, the need to restrain Germany was more urgent than ever before. Chamberlain reviewed his strategy options. Collective security was impossible because it was shown to be impotent time and time again. While direct engagement remained the ideal option, he had to recognize that the German situation might require the more forceful option of an alliance. After all:

237 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 12 Dec. 1937, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 292. 238 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 20 Mar. 1938, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 307. 72

“[F]orce [was] the only argument Germany understands… is it now obvious that such force and determination are most effectively mobilised by alliances which [don’t] require…resolutions by dozens of small nations who have no responsibilities [as in collective security]? Heaven knows I [don’t] want to get back to alliances but if Germany continues to behave as she has done lately she may drive us to it.”239

This was not just any alliance: it was an offensive-defensive alliance with France and the Soviet

Union, which Churchill termed the ‘Grand Alliance.’240 The Grand Alliance would encircle

Germany, impede its expansion into Eastern Europe, and force Germany to the negotiating table for peace.

Past scholars have suggested that Chamberlain hardly considered committing Britain to the Grand Alliance,241 but evidence suggests that he had in fact seriously entertained the notion in 1938. On May 20, six days after Churchill proposed the idea in the House of Commons,

Chamberlain expressed his interest privately to his sister Ida:

“As a matter of fact the plan of the ‘Grand Alliance’ as Winston calls it had occurred to me long before he had mentioned it. I was thinking about it all last week end -- I talked about it to Halifax and we submitted it to the Chiefs of the Staff and the F.O. experts. It is a very attractive idea.” 242

As committed as he had been to direct engagement with Germany and avoidance of alliances,

Chamberlain was willing to consider an alliance with the Soviets given the gravity of the

European situation with Anschluss and the new threats to Czechoslovakia. However,

Chamberlain was concerned over the idea’s “practicability:”

239 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 13 Mar. 1938, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 304. 240 Shaw, 77. 241 Shaw is among the most ardent proponent of this view. In fact, her argument is that “had it not been for Neville Chamberlain, an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance would have been concluded.” Shaw, 4. Other examples include Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961);Terrance L. Lewis, A Climate for Appeasement (New York: P. Lang, 1991); and Robert J. Caputi, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2000). 242 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 20 Mar. 1938, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 307, emphasis added. 73

“You have only to look at the map to see that nothing that France or we could do could possibly save Czecho-Slovakia from being over-run by the Germans if they wanted to do it. The Austrian frontier is practically open; the great Skoda munition works are within easy bombing distance of the German aerodomes, the railways all pass through German territory, Russia is 100 miles away. Therefore we could not help Czecho- Slovakia -- she would simply be a pretext for going to war with Germany. That we could not think of unless we had a reasonable prospect of being able to beat her to her knees in a reasonable time and of that I see no sign. I have therefore abandoned any idea of giving guarantees to Czecho-Slovakia or to France in connection with her obligations to that country.”243

Chamberlain’s words reveal that his primary motivation for rejecting the Grand Alliance was his pragmatic assessment of the German threat and the ability of Britain to curtail it through an Anglo-Soviet cooperation. Chamberlain understood that Germany had enough military might, control over territories, and necessary infrastructure to successfully actualize its aims over

Czechoslovakia if it really wanted to. If an alliance could hinder Germany’s ability in that regard, it would have been useful, but Chamberlain deemed that not to be the case. The Soviet

Union was geographically too removed from Czechoslovakia to come to its immediate defense, nor did Chamberlain believe that the Soviet Union now had sufficient military strength to partake in any offense against Germany if conflict arose. Meanwhile, the aforementioned difficulty in undertaking rearmament meant that Britain would certainly struggle to engage in conflict with

Germany, let alone achieve victory, if Germany were to retaliate against the Grand Alliance for its encirclement. In fact, as his colleagues recounted, Chamberlain believed that British plans

“both for offence and defence [were] not sufficiently advanced,” and Britain would be able to offer little more than the “economic pressure” of a blockade if Germany were to begin war.244

Thus, Chamberlain reasoned, an Anglo-Soviet cooperation in the form of a Grand Alliance

243 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 20 Mar. 1938, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 307, emphasis added. 244 Halifax to Phipps, 22 Mar. 1938, British Foreign Policy, third series i. No. 106, quoted in Taylor, 156. 74 would only serve to provoke Germany into war while Britain would have few capabilities to undertake such war successfully. Given that his aim was peace and security from Germany, an

Anglo-Soviet cooperation was far from the best strategy.

This seemingly quick rejection of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation may be striking to some.

They may doubt the trustworthiness of Chamberlain’s invocation of pragmatic reasonings and suspect that there were other motivations behind his unwillingness to work with the Soviets.

Shaw and A.J.P. Taylor, for instance, would argue that discussions of Soviet uselessness were merely a cover-up for Chamberlain’s inherent anti-Soviet attitudes and desire to exclude the

Soviet Union from Europe. As Taylor put it, “[t]he British and French governments acknowledged Soviet Russia only to emphasize her military weakness; and this view…represented…their desire. They wanted Soviet Russia to be excluded from Europe; and therefore readily assumed that she was so by circumstances.” 245

Such attitudes and desire may indeed have existed: nevertheless, it seems highly improbable that these were the dominant force behind Chamberlain’s rejection of the Grand

Alliance and the Anglo-Soviet cooperation in general. First, as even Taylor concedes, the belief in Soviet military uselessness in offense was not unique to Chamberlain: instead, it was a unanimous interpretation of the War Office and Britain’s military intelligence, and the view was consequently widely accepted among the British elites.246 Therefore, Chamberlain’s claims of

Soviet uselessness in an offensive-defensive alliance had its foundation. Second, his remarks in the letter to Ida were not some exception to the rule. Chamberlain consistently noted the preponderance of German power over issue of Czechoslovakia: “[i]f Germany did decide to

245 Taylor, 163 ; Shaw, The British Political Elite and the Soviet Union 1937-1939. 246 “[British perception of Soviet military weakness] rested no doubt on their information.” Taylor, 163. Also see Chapter 2. 75 destroy Czechoslovakia, I do not see how this can be prevented,” and war would ensue: thus,

“think[ing] first of the safety of this country,” Britain should undertake “whatever means might seem most appropriate, towards the solution of questions likely to cause difficulty between the

German and Czechoslovak Governments.”247 If Chamberlain was seeking the ‘most appropriate means’ to ensure Britain’s safety, which to him involved avoiding war, then it is understandable that Chamberlain ultimately refused an Anglo-Soviet cooperation through the Grand Alliance that, he feared, would precisely provoke the war that Britain so feared.

This left Chamberlain with little choice but to pursue direct engagement with Germany, and Germany’s belligerence convinced him of the need to placate its aggression through concessions. Chamberlain thought it best that Britain:

“again approach Hitler... & say something like this. ‘[W]hat we have to do now is to consider how we can restore the confidence you have shattered... The best thing you can do is to tell us exactly what you want for your Sudeten Deutsch. If it is reasonable we will urge the Czechs to accept it and if they do you must give assurances that you will let them alone in the future.’”248

Here, then, the idea behind appeasement at the Munich Agreement crystallized: a concession over Sudetenland negotiated directly with Hitler would satisfy Germany. By allowing Germany to achieve its territorial demands, such appeasement could “postpone a crisis & perhaps…avert it” all together, offering Chamberlain some promise of peace.249

Chamberlain’s expectations that appeasement would placate German aggression have often been criticized by scholars, given that it ultimately yielded the opposite effect of

247 Anglo-French Conversations, 28 and 29 Apr. 1938, British Foreign Policy, third series, i. No. 164, quoted in Taylor, 160 ; HC Deb 24 Mar. 1938 vol 333 c1407. 248 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 20 Mar. 1938, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 307-8, emphasis original. 249 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 20 Mar. 1938, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 308. 76 emboldening Germany and helping start World War II. For instance, scholars such as Yarhi-Milo have lambasted Chamberlain for being too self-confident and optimistic of Germany’s willingness to form and adhere to an agreement.250 But this does not necessarily seem a fair critique. Chamberlain knew “how utterly untrustworthy and dishonest the German Government

[was]” in forming an agreement: in fact, he often lamented over the difficulty of negotiating with the Germans.251 However, appeasement was the only choice he saw to ensure “the sterilization of

[a] danger spot” in Europe and to fulfill his duties as Prime Minister to protect the country.252

Resigned with this belief, Chamberlain resorted to pursue appeasement with a solemn sense of responsibility, resulting in the Munich Agreement on September 30.

All in all, Chamberlain believed from the very beginning that Germany was a greater threat than the Soviet Union. As much as he had despised and distrusted the Soviet Union,

Chamberlain focused his attention on Germany, and contemplated myriad potential solutions ranging from an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement and collective security to an alliance with the

Soviets and direct engagement. When Chamberlain had settled on direct engagement through concessions, especially at the cost of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation, it was after careful consideration of the capabilities of Germany, the Soviet Union, and Britain. From this analysis, one could argue that Chamberlain was not necessarily the weak or misguided Prime Minister as his critics have portrayed him to be. Rather, he might have been a Prime Minster who, facing the prospect of an impending world war, was committed to the belief that Germany was the greater

250 Yarhi-Milo, 40-1. 251 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 28 May 1938, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 325. 252 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 28 May 1938 and 20 Mar. 1938, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 308. 77 threat and was striving to prevent war with what he believed was the best strategy he had at hand.

PARLIAMENT

As Chapter 2 discussed, the Parliament throughout the 1930s conducted notable discussions on the Soviet Union and Germany, such as the importance of the Anglo-Soviet trade relationship, the threat of communist propaganda, and the options of collective security, disarmament, and rearmament against Germany. But compared to Chamberlain and the diplomatic corps, it was less frequent for the Parliament to focus its attention on assessing the

German and Soviet threats and the adequate strategy that Britain should take, since it also had obligations to debate domestic affairs as well.253 When the Parliament did engage in those foreign policy assessments, especially in the late 1930s, there was a general understanding that

Germany was the greater threat. But once again, there was dissensus regarding the optimal strategy against this German threat. Between 1933 and 1938, the anti-appeasers were the clearest example of the dissensus within Parliament regarding the strategy against Germany. This section therefore focuses its discussion on the anti-appeasers and how they fared in Parliament.

The anti-appeasers were a small minority group – around 35 members – that included

MPs across party lines. Believing that Germany was a greater threat than the Soviet Union, they argued that the best strategy to address the German threat was an Anglo-Soviet cooperation.

Specifically, they advocated for the adoption of the Grand Alliance, the offensive-defensive alliance that Churchill proposed in March 1938.

253 Leopold S. Amery, My Political Life, Vol III: The Unforgiving Years, 1929-1940 (London: Hutchinson, 1953); Shaw, 78. 78

While the anti-appeasers gained much of the British elites’ attention after Churchill’s announcement of the Grand Alliance, they had been expressing anti-appeasement sentiments for a long time. In February 1938, for instance, Herbert Morrison, a senior Labour MP, delivered a speech in the House of Commons denouncing the government’s refusal to cooperate with the

Soviet Union. He stated that while he “[did] not agree with the internal political system of the

Russian Government” or Stalin, all the facts demonstrated that “the Soviet Union is a genuine power for peace and a genuine friend nowadays of the League of Nations,”254 while Germany was threatening to plunge Europe into war. Morrison claimed that Britain had to cooperate with the Soviet Union: not only was it “in our own national interest” to strengthen the force of opposition so that it could curtail German aggression, it was also “our duty” to “promote peace with all the nations of the world, whatever the complexion of their Government might be.”255 He believed that the government’s refusal to cooperate with the Soviet Union was motivated by its inability to move past its anti-communist prejudices. As he noted, “[it] is difficult for us in the case of the Fascist Powers, but if we were the Government it would be our duty to [form an alliance with Germany]. It is difficult for hon. Members opposite in the case of Soviet Russia, but it is their duty to [do the same with the Soviet Union].”256 He accused Chamberlain’s claims that the Soviets were not militarily strong enough by arguing that “[i]t is a much greater military

Power in Europe than Italy,” with whom Chamberlain was much more inclined to cooperate.257

Morrison’s position as a Labour MP posed the risk of undermining his arguments as a partisan

254 HC Deb 22 Feb. 1938 vol 332 c308. 255 HC Deb 22 Feb. 1938 vol 332 c308, 307. 256 HC Deb 22 Feb. 1938 vol 332 c307. 257 HC Deb 22 Feb. 1938 vol 332 c307. 79 attack, but his position was an important indication of the discontent brewing within the

Parliament regarding the Chamberlain government’s policies.

When Churchill, member of Chamberlain’s own party, officially proposed the Grand

Alliance, the discontent was brought into greater light. Granted, Churchill had long been regarded as an eccentric MP, on the backbench for many years, and in a strained personal relationship with Chamberlain: however, the fact that this alliance involving the Soviets was not just a policy by the Labour Party granted Churchill some serious attention in 1938.

Churchill had firmly despised both the Soviet Union and Germany. This was not least for their ideologies: communism and Nazi tyranny were “the same things spelt in different ways”258 and “equally obnoxious to the principles of freedom.”259 But he noted that politicians had to look beyond ideology to work with those who opposed aggression: “[S]urely we must have an opinion between right and wrong? Surely we must have an opinion between aggressor and victim?”260 If the Soviet Union had been the aggressor, he would of course support allying with Germany to resist that aggression.261 However, since the Soviets were now clearly the victim of German aggression, Britain had to ally with the Soviet Union.262 If Britain were to accept the Grand

Alliance, then Britain might be able to “arrest this approaching war.”263

Churchill’s ideas attracted more Conservative mutineers. For instance, Robert Boothby declared that while he would rather see the three-power alliance that was defensive only, he

258 “The Defense of Freedom and Peace,” Churchill’s address to the people of the United States of America, 16 Oct. 1938, cited in Into Battle: Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, ed. Randolph S. Churchill (London: Cassell, 1941), 56. 259 Quoted in Into Battle: Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, 17. 260 Quoted in Into Battle: Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, 17. 261 Memorandum of Churchill’s interview with Herr Foster, 14 July 1938, cited in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Companion 1936-1939, Vol. V Part 3 (London: Heinemann, 1982), 1100-2. 262 “The Choice for Europe,” cited in Into Battle: Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, 19. 263 HC Deb 14 Mar. 1938 vol 333 c99-100, quoted in Shaw, 77. 80 agreed that “[nothing was] more likely to deter Herr Hitler from action...than the knowledge that staff talks were now taking place between Britain, France and Russia.”264 Future Prime Minister

Harold Macmillan agreed, perceiving “the most urgent need of Britain...to draw in as her allies in the cause of peace... Russia.”265

By September, even Chamberlain’s closest supporters and Sovietphobes had begun calling for a Grand Alliance. For instance, Henry Channon, a Conservative MP who was a fervent supporter of Chamberlain, contended that “Hitler is too canny to risk a war, so long as there is a chance of French and Russian participation.” The same was the case for Leopold

Amery. Amery, a Conservative MP who had been known as a leading isolationist and imperialist,266 had staunchly opposed Anglo-Soviet cooperation in the past. In 1936, for instance, he had declared that “an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance against Germany, Japan and Italy…would be the worst situation which I could imagine in foreign politics, and one which might well make war inevitable.”267 However, by September 1938, Amery believed that Chamberlain’s exclusion of the Soviet Union from efforts to address Germany was a “fundamental mistake.”268 In a private meeting held in Churchill’s flat on September 26, Amery discussed with politicians with whom he may never have agreed with in the past – such as David Lloyd George (Liberal MP),

Lord Robert Cecil (President of the League of Nations Union), and Archibald Sinclair (leader of the Liberal Party) – about the importance of “bringing Russia into the picture” and “pressing the

264 Letter to Daily Telegraph, 19 Mar. 1938, G/3/13/9, Lloyd George papers, quoted in Shaw, 81. 265 Harold Macmillan, Winds of Change 1914-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1966), 529, 549. 266 Neville Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers: Conservative Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930s (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 162. 267 HC Deb 31 July 1936 vol 315 c1939. 268 Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers: Conservative Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930s, 162 ; Harold Nicolson, Diaries and Letters, 1930-1939 (New York: Collins, 1943), 1178-9. 81 government privately” to do so.269 Channon and Amery represented cases of fervent resistance within the Conservative Party: that those who would traditionally be on Chamberlain’s side were challenging appeasement speaks to how much dissensus existed in reality.

Despite this dissensus, however, the anti-appeaser coalition failed to reverse

Chamberlain’s policy. After all, most elites within Parliament, not least most of the

Conservatives that made up the government, still continued to support, or at least allow, appeasement to address the German threat.270 It was to the extent that Hugh Dalton (L) lamented,

“it was amazing how some people, otherwise intelligent, had made a fixation about Russia and seemed almost to prefer that this country should be defeated in war without Russian aid rather than win with it.”271

There appear to be at least two related reasons for the anti-appeasers’ lack of influence.

First was the inability of the anti-appeasers to form a united coalition against Chamberlain and the majority of Parliament on his side. Second was that anti-appeasers who would have caused the greatest damage to Chamberlain’s cause – high-profile figures and Conservative mutineers who were not considered ‘eccentric’ like Churchill – were unwilling to make their opposition public. For instance, the change of opinion by Leopold Amery, who had garnered a reputation as an opponent of Anglo-Soviet cooperation, could have emphasized the seriousness of the need to form a Grand Alliance. However, he found it extremely difficult politically to openly rebel against the leader of his party. While he threw his support behind privately pressuring the

269 Amery, 278. 270 E.g. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” 192. 271 Diary entry, 17 Sept. 1938, 1/19/27, Dalton Papers, quoted in Shaw, 76. 82 government, he “strongly objected” to Churchill and other anti-appeasers’ wishes for “[a] public declaration by us, as Conservatives, that we stood for co-operation with Russia.”272

Eden was another case in point. No longer Foreign Secretary, he was now back in

Parliament. Agreeing with Churchill and other anti-appeasers on the need for Anglo-Soviet cooperation, Eden believed that the government had “no sufficient cause for seeking to organise

Europe on such a basis that excludes any great power, nor do I believe you can secure the lasting peace of Europe on such a basis.”273 However, Eden did not express this belief openly before the

Munich Conference. For instance, on September 29, there was to be a telegram sent to

Chamberlain to warn him against appeasing Germany and betraying the Czechs. While anti- appeasers such as Sinclair and Robert Cecil agreed to sign it, Eden refused to do so on the grounds that “it would be interpreted as a vendetta against Chamberlain.”274 Scholars such as

Shaw explain that Eden hoped to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing Chamberlain, given that Eden had resigned as Foreign Secretary in February and might have been hoping for a future Cabinet position.275 Regardless of whether this was the entirety of his reasoning, however, the fear of political repercussions expressed by Amery and Eden alike are important to note. By stifling voices of opposition, such fear most likely made the anti-appeasers appear weaker and less supported than then actually were, allowing Chamberlain to continue pursuing appeasement without anticipating much political backlash.

Thus, the examination of the anti-appeasers reveals that while there was consensus in

Parliament that Germany was the greater threat, there was much dissensus on the best strategy to

272 Leopold Amery, diary entry, 26 Sept. 1938, cited in Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Companion 1936-1939, Vol. V Part 3, 1179-80. 273 HC Deb 3 Oct. 1938 vol 339 c86, quoted in Shaw, 80. 274 According to Harold Nicolson, diary entry, 29 Sept. 1938, cited in Nicolson, 371-2. 275 Shaw, 79. 83 address the German threat. While the anti-appeasers advocated for an Anglo-Soviet cooperation through the Grand Alliance, they were small in number and faced additional challenges of having Conservative anti-appeasers unwilling to oppose Chamberlain outright. Ultimately, the anti-appeasers were unable to overcome the support to appeasement given by the majority of

Parliament and Chamberlain himself. The prospect of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation, discussed until the eve of the Munich Agreement, failed to become reality.

CONCLUSION

This chapter revealed that both Chamberlain and the Parliament, pro- and anti-appeases, adhered to the notion that Germany was a greater threat than the Soviet Union. It also unveiled the great deliberation and dissensus that existed over the elites’ preferred strategy of addressing the German threat. Between 1933 and 1938, Chamberlain had entertained the myriad strategy options of an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement, collective security arrangements, a Grand

Alliance, and direct engagement with Germany meant to avoid its provocation. He was forced to abandon the first two due to opposition from his colleagues and the Foreign Office. While he had seriously considered the Grand Alliance, he rejected it on the grounds that it would not shield

Britain from war, as Germany was too powerful and the Soviet Union too useless. He was left, then, with direct engagement, which he applied to the Eastern European context as the Munich

Agreement.

Meanwhile, most of the Parliament remained in favor, or at least allowed for,

Chamberlain’s policy of direct engagement through appeasement. The emergence of the small but vocal minority, the anti-appeasers, represented the clearest and most direct challenge to the trend of appeasement. However, they ultimately failed to counter this trend and bring Britain to 84 an Anglo-Soviet cooperation. The influence of Chamberlain and his supporters was too great for the anti-appeasers to seriously pose a challenge, and the Munich Agreement was signed accordingly.

CHAPTER 4

THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS

The diplomatic corps constitute another key element in the narrative, since they were the institution officially charged with conducting Britain’s foreign affairs. Although Chamberlain came to play an increasingly greater role in foreign affairs, even buying disapproval from the diplomatic corps of overriding their authority,276 the diplomatic corps were a key source of the knowledge, analysis, and perspectives regarding foreign affairs that the government had to recognize.

The diplomatic corps consist of three institutions: the Foreign Secretary, the Permanent

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (PUS), and the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office was separated into multiple departments, and this chapter focuses specifically on three of them: the Northern Department (in charge of Soviet affairs), the Central Department (in charge of

German affairs), and the Far Eastern Department (in charge of Japanese affairs). It is important to note that the Foreign Secretary, the PUS, and the Foreign Office did not necessarily act as a single cohesive actor. For one, there was a difference in the nature of their institutions. The

Foreign Secretary and the PUS were political appointments, while the Foreign Office was a body of lifelong bureaucrats. This meant that they had different levels of access to the Prime Minister, with the Foreign Secretary having the greatest access as a member of his Cabinet. For another, as this section will reveal, the three institutions were sometimes in disagreement over what Britain’s greatest threat was and what Britain should do in response. While the thesis recognizes the

276 As Chamberlain remembered in 1937, “it is natural that [the diplomatic corps] should be annoyed at press headlines about the ‘Chamberalin touch’ instead of ‘the Eden touch.’” Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 1 Aug. 1937, in The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, Vol. 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934–1940, 264. 86 significance of each institution’s agency, it nevertheless categorizes them together as diplomatic corps because they were ultimately charged with the same task of managing Britain’s foreign affairs.

Between 1933 and 1938, the diplomatic corps reached a general consensus that Germany was the greater threat. Although 1937 saw a noticeable group of those who labeled the Soviet

Union as the greater threat, these people were fewer in number and lacked the authority and influence that those who adhered to the consensus had. In contrast, there was great dissensus over whether Britain should pursue engagement with Germany or a cooperation with the Soviet

Union to curtail the German threat. While most of the diplomatic corps came to support the latter, they were ultimately unable to convince Chamberlain and his government to pursue their cause.

1933-35

While there was initially a dissensus on which state posed the greater threat to Britain, the diplomatic corps slowly came to accept that Germany was the greater threat. However, there remained a clear dissensus over whether Britain should cooperate with the Soviet Union to counter this German threat. Many elites were reluctant to acquiesce to Germany and recognized the potential usefulness of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation; however, the history of distrusting the

Soviets was hard to overcome, and the support for Anglo-Soviet cooperation was still lukewarm.

Thus, in this period, the diplomatic corps was ambivalent about both Anglo-German rapprochement and Anglo-Soviet cooperation, and a clear policy direction remained wanting.

In 1933, the diplomatic corps was engaged in a debate over what later became the 1934

DRC report’s subject: which among the three ‘danger areas’ – the Far East, Germany, and the

Soviet Union – demanded Britain’s greatest attention. At that time, the diplomatic corps had overwhelmingly agreed that the Far East was the most immediate threat, not least because Japan had demonstrated its commitment to aggression in the 1931 invasion of Manchuria, while

Germany’s commitment to aggression in 1933 was still relatively new and focused on rhetoric.277 In 1933, therefore, discussion over the menace of Germany and the Soviet Union usually was conducted in the context of the Far East.

This discussion saw noticeable dissensus, divided largely along departmental lines at the

Foreign Office. A handful believed that the Soviet Union was the greater threat. Charles William

Orde, the head of the Far Eastern Department, contended that the Soviet Union sought to spread communism in China, which would jeopardize the stability of Britain’s key economic interest.278

A.W.A. Leeper, the head of the League of Nations and Western Department, noted that the

Soviets’ potential menace loomed larger: however unlikely the Soviet-Japanese cooperation was in the Far East, “[any such] unholy alliance…might make our position in the Far East and India a very precarious one,”279 destabilizing Britain’s global influence.

Despite these voices, however, the more popular and louder view was that Germany was the greater threat. Orme Sargent, the head of the Central Department, was concerned about the possibility of a “hostile” German-Japanese cooperation against Britain, while he saw less

277 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 89. 278 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 89. 279 Minutes, 26 Oct and 1 Dec. 1933, on ‘Imperial Defence Policy. Annual Review (1933) by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee’, FO 371/17338/W11987/50, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 89. 88 likelihood of a Soviet-Japanese cooperation.280 Laurence Collier, the head of the Northern

Department, also argued that while Germany’s signals were clearly aggressive,281 the Soviet

Union had been signaling its desire to cooperate with the international community, viewed

Germany “as their greatest foe in Europe,” and was “bitterly opposed to Japanese ambitions.”282

In that light, the Soviet Union was not a threat: on the contrary, it was on Britain’s side, and the two could work together to fight the common enemy. The PUS Robert Vansittart agreed with

Sargent and Collier and went even further. His argument was the following:

“It seems to be generally agreed that Japan is unlikely to attack us, unless we are engaged elsewhere….And elsewhere is Europe and Germany. Furthermore, surely Japan is unlikely to provoke a war with us so long as she is not on better terms with Russia. Nothing points to such an improvement – on the contrary.”283

According to him, the most concerning developments were occurring in Europe due to Germany, and Japan was not as much of a primary threat as many believed it to be. Meanwhile, Vansittart saw the Soviet threat to have been inflated as well. For one, the Soviet Union was unlikely to ally with Japan and endanger the Far East. For another, Vansittart believed the Soviet Union

“suffered from internal chaos” and thus was unlikely to interfere with British interests such as

India.284 Furthermore, judging from the Soviet Union negotiating non-aggression pacts in

Europe, he believed that the Soviets were “likely to steer clear of European conflicts.”285 With

280 Minutes, 261st meeting CID, 9 Nov. 1933, Cab 2/6, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 90. 281 See Chapter 3. 282 Minutes, 26 Oct and 1 Dec. 1933, on ‘Imperial Defence Policy. Annual Review (1933) by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee’, FO 371/17338/W11987/50, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 89. 283 Minutes, 3rd meeting DRC, 4 Dec. 1933, Cab 16/109, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 91. 284 Minutes, 3rd meeting DRC, 4 Dec. 1933, Cab 16/109, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 92. 285 Minutes, 3rd meeting DRC, 4 Dec. 1933, Cab 16/109, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 92. 89 these conditions, the Soviet Union was unlikely to come into conflict with Britain, so Britain faced a much greater threat from Germany than from the Soviet Union. Having established that

Germany was the greater threat, Vansittart then advocated for the need to rearm: “I am not prepared...to rely on pure diplomacy, on other countries, or on economics so far as Germany is concerned.”286 While his views and proposed solutions were distinct from his colleagues, even

Sargent and Collier, the larger picture tells the important story. While beliefs that the Soviet

Union was the greater threat had its visibility through the head of the Far Eastern Department, it is notable that the heads of the two other Departments concerned and the PUS were inclined to believe the opposite.

1934 continued to reveal the schism between the departments. Led by its head, the Far

Eastern Department continued to argue that the Soviet Union was the greater threat because it could spread communism to British interests throughout Asia.287 Even the Foreign Secretary

John Simon joined this camp. He argued that the Soviets were committed to undermining British power globally. For instance, he noted that the Soviets might one day turn “southwards towards

Afghanistan & Persia” and thereby India, “a not very pleasant prospect for us.”288 Nothing, even engaging directly with the Soviet Union, would mitigate this ultimate threat:

“the fact that the [Soviet] Government leaders sit at the dining table will not deter the Comintern cooks from brewing potions in the kitchen which they will not hesitate to serve up to us at any suitable opportunity.”289

286 Vansittart’s minute, 30 Nov. 1933, FO 371/17338/W11987/11987/50, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 92. 287 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 100. 288 Cab 5(34), minutes, 14 Feb. 1934, Cab 23/78, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 102. See Chapter 2 for the history of this view. 289 DBFP, 2nd ser., Vol. VII, Nos. 576 and 582 (22 Feb. 1934 and 29 Mar. 1934), quoted in Steiner, 425. 90

The combination of the propagation of a hostile ideology and the willingness to backstab Britain convinced Simon that the Soviets were the greatest threat. The agreement by the high-profile

Foreign Secretary added to the strength of the Soviet camp.

On the other side, Collier and Vansittart continued to argue that Germany was the greater threat because its aims were clearly against Britain and the international community, while the aims of the Soviet Union were aligned with Britain’s. Ralph Wigram, who had just replaced

Sargent as the head of the Central Department, also resolutely supported Collier and Vansittart’s position, even noting that the Soviet Union “[could] again appear [in Europe] as a counter weight to Germany.”290 Granted, few who believed that Germany was the greater threat were sympathetic to the Soviet Union. In fact, most people continued to harbor suspicion: revealingly,

Collier denied having “any undue fondness for the Soviet Government,”291 and Vansittart called increased Soviet influence in the Far East “evil.”292 Instead, these men were motivated by “the facts as we [found] them,” and the facts clearly established that Germany was the aggressor while the Soviet Union was not.293 The agreement by both the Central and Northern

Departments, concerned directly with Germany and the Soviet Union, and the PUS that Germany was the greater threat lent strength to their claim. The notion that Germany was the greater threat began to gain acceptance in the diplomatic corps.

290 ‘Memorandum on Russo-Japanese Tension’, A.W.G. Randal (FED), 9 Feb. 1934, FO 371/18176/F823/36/23, and minutes, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 101. 291 ‘Memorandum on Russo-Japanese Tension’, A.W.G. Randal (FED), 9 Feb. 1934, FO 371/18176/F823/36/23, and minutes, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 101. 292 Vansittart’s minute (25 May) on Cadogan (ambassador, China) to FO, disp 27 TS, 23 Mar. 1934, FO 371/18147/F2899/2899/10; Mounsey to Cadogan, 31 May 1934, Cadogan Papers, FO 800/293, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 101. 293 ‘Memorandum on Russo-Japanese Tension’, A.W.G. Randal (FED), 9 Feb. 1934, FO 371/18176/F823/36/23, and minutes, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 101. 91

However, there was still much dissensus on how Britain should counter this German threat, and departmental lines mattered little in this debate. In May 1934, for instance, dissensus raged over whether Britain should participate in the Soviet-led collective security arrangement of the Eastern Pact. Some, such as Sargent (now Assistant Undersecretary who supervised the

Central Department) advocated for Britain participating in the pact because otherwise the

European order would shift from an Anglo-French hegemony to a Franco-German power politics, in which Britain would have lesser say.294 Meanwhile, others such as Collier, Wigram, and Simon argued that Britain must stay out of involving with the Soviets in the context of the

Eastern Pact. Collier did so on the grounds that the pact would only increase German aggressive intentions. The pact was so obviously anti-German, and states in Eastern Europe would not dare join such a grouping unless Germany were to agree to it: because Germany had few reasons to sign the pact, the pact would only invigorate German claims of international hostility and fuel its grievances.295 Meanwhile, Wigram and Simon maintained that while they did not discourage other states pursuing the pact, Britain should “avoid all unnecessary continental commitments” for now to facilitate “the building up of our own strength” and the strengthening of relations with its global interests and its European neighbors.296 Thus, schism emerged between Sargent who

294 Patterson (consul, Geneva) for Eden to FO, tel 19, FO 371/18298/N2973/2/38; Collier’s minute (22 May) and untitled memo by Allen Leeper (head, League of Nations and Western Department, FO), 23 May 1934, FO 371/18527/W5693/1/98; minutes, Collier (23 May), Craigie (24 May), Wigram (24 May), E.H. Carr (25 May), Sargent (29 May), Mounsey (6 Jun) and Simon (7 Jun), quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 106. 295 Patterson (consul, Geneva) for Eden to FO, tel 19, FO 371/18298/N2973/2/38; Collier’s minute (22 May) and untitled memo by Allen Leeper (head, League of Nations and Western Department, FO), 23 May 1934, FO 371/18527/W5693/1/98; minutes, Collier (23 May), Craigie (24 May), Wigram (24 May), E.H. Carr (25 May), Sargent (29 May), Mounsey (6 Jun) and Simon (7 Jun), quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 106. 296 By “unnecessary,” they were not dismissing Germany as a threat, but rather noting that there have not been acts of aggression so blatant enough to undertake such a commitment, especially one that posed the risk of provoking Germany. Patterson (consul, Geneva) for Eden to FO, tel 19, FO 371/18298/N2973/2/38; Collier’s minute (22 May) and untitled memo by Allen Leeper (head, L of N and Western Department, FO), 23 May 1934, FO 92 managed the Central Department and Wigram who headed the same department, the Northern

Department, and the Foreign Secretary.

The ambiguity continued into November 1934, when the Soviet Union appealed directly to Britain to improve the bilateral relationship. Some, such as diplomat J.L. Dodds, noted that

“the Russian fears of Japan and Germany can be worked to our advantage.”297 Others, such as

Victor Wellesley, the former head of the Far Eastern Department who was now Deputy

Undersecretary, expressed caution on the grounds that “Russia has always proved herself to be a very unreliable partner.”298 Collier erred towards the side of Wellesley: he worried that the

Soviets might assume that Britain needed the Soviets more than they needed Britain, thereby being unwilling to make concessions to the British.299 While both the optimistic and cautious views regarding working with the Soviets were respected, the latter was given relatively more weight given the authority of the people promoting it.

The diplomatic corps in 1935 remained in discord over the notion of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation. There was still vocal opposition towards the Eastern Pact as a recipe for “ fiasco:” even Sargent now rejected the cause, claiming that the pact might not benefit Britain after all as

371/18527/W5693/1/98; minutes, Collier (23 May), Craigie (24 May), Wigram (24 May), E.H. Carr (25 May), Sargent (29 May), Mounsey (6 June) and Simon (7 June), quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 106. 297 Boothby to Eden, 6 Nov. 1934, FO 371/18305/N6328/16/38, minutes by Speaight (12 Nov.), Dodd (13 Nov.), Collier (13 Nov.), and Wellesley (14 Nov.), quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 115. 298 Boothby to Eden, 6 Nov. 1934, FO 371/18305/N6328/16/38, minutes by Speaight (12 Nov.), Dodd (13 Nov.), Collier (13 Nov.), and Wellesley (14 Nov.), quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 115. 299 Boothby to Eden, 6 Nov. 1934, FO 371/18305/N6328/16/38, minutes by Speaight (12 Nov.), Dodd (13 Nov.), Collier (13 Nov.), and Wellesley (14 Nov.), quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 115. 93 the Soviets cared only about its own security.300 Bereft of committed proponents, the possibility of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation through the Eastern Pact effectively met its death. This did not mean, however, that elites felt any better about an alternative to the pact, which at that point was a Franco-Soviet alliance into which Britain could well be pulled. People such as Sargent rejected the Franco-Soviet alliance because of the concerns that the system of alliances could facilitate war. In his words, the Franco-Soviet alliance would lead to:

“an immediate re-grouping of the Powers under the pre-war system of the balances of power, organised on the basis of exclusive mutually antagonistic alliances. It would thus mean the final abandonment of the collective peace system, and all that it stands for.”301

This Chamberlain-like view was also held by Vansittart, who proposed that if “the Franco-

Russian alliance sh[oul]d come about, silence w[oul]d be best on our part.”302 Collier, however, had resigned himself to the fact that Britain’s options were limited. Collective security was hopeless: “we are really already back in the days of the balance of power,” and Britain could

300 Chilston to FO, disp 56, 25 Jan. 1935, FO 371/18824/C369/25/18, minutes, Creswell (CD) (5 Feb.), Collier (6 Feb.), Sargent (6 Feb.), and Vansittart (7 Feb.), quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 125. 301 Minutes, Sargent (28 Feb.) and Collier (28 Feb.) on Clerk to FO, tel 31, 26 Feb. 1935, FO 371/18827/C1558/55/18, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919- 1939, 130. 302 “The Proposed Eastern Pact,” Sargent, 28 Jan 1935, FO 371/18825/C962/55/18, minutes, Vansittart (28 Jan.) and Eden (29 Jan.); “Russia’s Probable Attitude towards a ‘General Settlement’ with Germany, and the Proposed Air Agreement,” Sargent, 7 Feb. 1935, FO371/18827/C1471/55/18, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 125. One might ask whether Vansittart and others who harbored similar views were primarily concerned about preserving collective security or avoiding entangling alliances. It seems that at that point, those two considerations were two sides of the same coin. As Chamberlain noted (see Chapter 3), Britain’s options for addressing external threats were often presented as a dichotomy between collective security and alliances: if one did not work, Britain would be forced into the other. Believing that it was alliances that caused World War I and that Britain must avoid another world war, Vansittart, Chamberlain, and Sargent sought to avoid alliances. In that case, they believed, they must place some hope in preserving collective security. The fact that people like Sargent were reluctant about the Eastern Pact did not mean that they opposed collective security. It seems that they were just unhappy with the particular form and timing of the Eastern Pact, being so obviously anti-German and Britain needing some more time before committing to it. 94 expect nothing less from dictators such as Hitler and Stalin.303 As opposed to the idea as Britain might be, it may well have to allow for necessary alliances to safeguard its interests. As much as the diplomatic corps engaged in the debates, however, it did little to yield any conclusion on whether Britain should pursue an Anglo-Soviet cooperation.

Although they could not agree on what to do with the Soviet Union, the diplomatic corps were becoming nervous about continuing to be ambivalent towards the Soviet Union for so long: if the Soviets believed that Britain was alienating them, then they might establish a German-

Soviet rapprochement, which was Britain’s worst fear but was “a possibility with which we must reckon.”304 Given that anxiety, some elites expressed the desire to assure the Soviet Union that

Britain was not rejecting Anglo-Soviet cooperation entirely. Most notably, Simon, and at his request Vansittart, requested that any trip to Berlin should be followed by a trip to Moscow.305

But ultimately, this request was denied by the Cabinet, and the diplomatic corps was unable to allay Soviet fears of alienation.

By mid-October of 1935, few challenged the notion that Germany was the greatest threat.

This had at least three reasons. First, there emerged a consensus that Japan was now a secondary threat: echoing Vansittart from earlier, elites now believed that a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement

303 Minutes, Sargent (28 Feb.) and Collier (28 Feb.) on Clerk to FO, tel 31, 26 Feb. 1935, FO 371/18827/C1558/55/18, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919- 1939, 130. 304 Charles to FO, disp 453, 17 Oct. 1935, FO 371/19460/N5520/76/38 minute; Collier’s minute (4 Dec.) on Phipps to FO, dis 1237/27 Nov. 1935, GO 371/19460/N6175/76/38, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 152. 305 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 129. Elites were also motivated by a similar thought process in concluding the Anglo-Soviet Trade agreement of 1934. See G. L. Owen, “The Metro-Vickers Crisis: Anglo-Soviet Relations between Trade Agreements, 1932-1934,” The Slavonic and East European Review 49, no. 114 (1971): 107. 95 was unlikely and that Japan would not attack British interests in the Far East so readily.306

Second, the Abyssinian crisis demonstrated that Italy had joined the aggressors’ camp, leaving

Britain searching for another state that could check Germany.307 Third, rumors emerged on an imminent improvement in German-Soviet relations: while these were ultimately dismissed, they highlighted the very possibility of the German-Soviet rapprochement that the British elites so feared.308

But the increased understanding that Germany was the greatest threat only intensified the dissensus over how Britain should address the German threat. There emerged three camps. On one side of the spectrum, an “influential sector” led by Sargent and Wigram advocated for an

Anglo-German rapprochement.309 While they were not sympathetic to the Germans, they believed that Germany’s aggression could only be mollified if its grievances were directly addressed. In their words, an Anglo-German rapprochement might enable Britain to “moderate the development of German aims in the Centre and the East [of Europe].”310 Furthermore, they believed that it was what the “British public will expect it to have been attempted.”311 An Anglo-

German rapprochement would mitigate the need for an intensive rearmament, prevent the signing of multiple defensive pacts, and take away the excuse for Germany to start a war on

306 Randall’s minute (11 Oct. 1935) on “Strategical Situation in the Far East with Particular Reference to Hong Kong,” COS 405, 10 Oct. 1935, FO 371/19343/F6416/717/61, Vansittart’s minute (12 Oct.), quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 151. 307 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 149. 308 See Chapter 2 for fear of German-Soviet rapprochement. 309 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 152. 310 “Britain, France, and Germany,” Sargent and Wigram, memo, 21 Nov. 1935, FO371/18851/C7752/55/18, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 152. 311 “Britain, France, and Germany,” Sargent and Wigram, memo, 21 Nov. 1935, FO371/18851/C7752/55/18, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 152. 96 claims of encirclement. 312 The Anglo-German rapprochement would therefore honor the public’s preference of peace over war313 and must be pursued as such.

On the other side of the spectrum, people led by Collier contended that an Anglo-Soviet cooperation was the solution. Collier very well understood that the Soviets were unreliable,

“refrain[ing] from aggression and preach[ing] peace so long as it pays her, and no longer.”314

However, the Soviets were not a threat at the moment: for instance, regarding the ideological threat which was usually the primary reason for anti-Soviet positions, Collier noted that “[t]he

Comintern is a nuisance but not a serious menace, and need be no ban to Anglo-Russian collaboration in matters of foreign policy towards third parties.”315 The Soviets shared a common interest with Britain in seeking to counter Germany, so Britain should take advantage of that opportunity to prevent the dreaded German-Soviet rapprochement. Meanwhile, Collier rejected the benefits and ethics of an Anglo-German rapprochement: “Germany’s aims in [E]astern

Europe were incompatible with British interests and could not be moderated:” moderating them

312 “Britain, France, and Germany,” Sargent and Wigram, memo, 21 Nov. 1935, FO371/18851/C7752/55/18, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 152. 313 Politicians’ perception of the public support for peace has been researched extensively by the scholarly community. Most invoke at least three evidence of this pacifist trend. First, there was a so-called ‘Peace Ballot’ in 1935, and among the 11.5 million participants in Britain (38% of Britain’s population), more than three-quarters demonstrated popular support for collective security and disarmament. Second, anti-war books were perceived to be popular. Third, the Oxford Union’s “King and Country Debate,” in which students overwhelmingly voted for the motion “This House will under no circumstances fight for its King and country,” had become a major news story in Britain and abroad. These all suggested that the public was largely opposed to war. However, there are retrospective criticisms that these anti-war sentiments were not as strong as politicians perceived them to be. For instance, the Peace Ballot voters have been shown to have limited understanding of the implications of collective security (such as also advocating for disinvolvement in Europe), and a systematic study of public opinion had not yet been established. J. A. Thompson, “The Peace Ballot and the Public,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 13, no. 4 (1981): 381–92 ; Martin Ceadel, “The ‘King and Country’ Debate, 1933: Student Politics, Pacifism and the Dictators,” The Historical Journal 22, no. 2 (1979): 397–422. 314 Collier’s minute (24 May) on Charles (chargé d’affaires, Moscow) to FO, disp 209, 21 May 1935, FO 371/19456/N2647/53/38, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919- 1939, 140. 315 Collier’s minute (14 Dec) on Cadogan to FO, disp 41, 20 Oct. 1935, FO 371/19308/F7572/427/10, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 151. 97 would only mean emboldening future aggression and acquiescing to the aggressor.316 Finally, he rejected that the British public wanted appeasement: the Government was basing that claim based on its recent electoral victory, not “any [real] qualification.”317 With all these factors,

Collier’s camp did not “believe that it is either possible or desirable...to attempt to reverse our present policy by coming to an understanding with Germany at the expense of Russia.”318

Vansittart took the middle position. He believed that Britain should chiefly cooperate with the Soviet Union but work with Germany enough to prevent it from striking rapprochement with the Soviet Union or to claim that it was a victim of encirclement.319 While he agreed with

Collier that Germany could not be appeased in Eastern Europe, he was willing to be more flexible, arguing that Germany could be mollified by being given some of Britain’s African possessions and having the League Covenant320 revised.321 That being said, Vansittart argued that Britain should not approach Germany prematurely. Additionally, while Britain had to engage with Germany to the extent that it prevented Germany from becoming too aggressive, the main part of Britain’s policy must be to counter the danger of a German-Soviet rapprochement

316 Untitled memo, Collier, 22 Nov. 1935, FO 371/18852/C8523/55/18, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 153. 317 Untitled memo, Collier, 22 Nov. 1935, FO 371/18852/C8523/55/18, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 153. 318 Phipps to Eden, disps 1344 and 1359, 16 and 19 Dec. 1935, both Phipps Papers, PHPP 1/15; “Comments on Berlin Telegrams Nos. 343, 344, 345 and 298 Saving,” Wigram, 16 Dec. 1935, FO 371/18852/C8329/55/18; Phipps to FO, 30 Dec. 1935, FO 371/19855/C1/1/17; Clerk to FO, tel 2, 3 Jan. 1936, FO 371/19855/C62/1/17, minutes, Wigram (6 Jan.), Collier (7 Jan.), Sargent (8 Jan.), Vansittart (9 Jan.), and Stanhope (15 Jan.), quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 157. 319 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 153. 320 Which was part of the Treaty of Versailles. 321 Untitled memo, Vansittart, 1 Dec. 1935, Vansittart papers, VNST 2/24; original in FO 371/18852/C8524/55/18, and Hoare’s minute (3 Dec.), quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 153. 98

“not by collaboration with Germany but by collaboration with Russia.”322 Therefore, Vansittart advocated a policy of Britain working chiefly with the Soviet Union while working with

Germany in the minimum capacity necessary.

While this notion of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation was gaining ground, however, the diplomatic corps remained reluctant to embrace this solution due to the history of distrust towards the Soviet Union. The debate over whether to provide loans or credits to the Soviet

Union in 1935 was a case in point. The Soviet Union had wanted loans: proponents of giving

Soviets the loans, which included Collier, Vansittart, and the now Foreign Secretary Samuel

Hoare, argued that the loans would assuage Soviet fears of alienation and prevent a German-

Soviet rapprochement. However, the elites were largely reluctant to grant the Soviets the loans, not least due to the fear that the “loans’ ‘proceeds’ would be used to pay for ‘communist propaganda, here & elsewhere.”323 The debate was eventually settled in favor of credits over loans. Although the loan-credit debate was not solely motivated by attitudes towards the Soviets

– Britain’s economic considerations were also pertinent324 – the debate highlighted how lukewarm the elites were towards working with the Soviet Union when they were also hesitant to acquiesce to Germany. The diplomatic’ corps ambivalence in policy direction did not bode well for Vansittart: as he lamented, “we shall -- as in other matters...miss a very large boat [working with the Soviet Union against Germany] if we cannot make up our minds even now.’”325

322 Maj. Hayes (M12, WO) to Collier, 3 Dec 1935, FO 371/19450/N6255/7/38, spawned the discussion; Collier’s minute (19 Dec.), quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 154. 323 Eden’s minute (21 Nov.) on Remnant to Collier, 25 Oct. 1935, FO 371/19448/N5566/1/38, minutes, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 156. 324 Robert Manne, “The Foreign Office and the Failure of Anglo-Soviet Rapprochement,” Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 4 (1981): 745-6. 325 Vansittart’s minute (21 Dec.), quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 156. 99

Thus, between 1933 and 1935, there slowly emerged a consensus that Germany was a greater threat than the Soviet Union. However, much dissensus remained over how Britain should address the German threat. There was a growing understanding that the Soviet Union provided opportunities, but a history of distrust was difficult to overcome. It would take more time for the diplomatic corps to advocate for Anglo-Soviet cooperation in earnest.

1936-38

The diplomatic corps remained in general consensus that Germany was the greater threat. While the views that the Soviet Union was a greater threat did regain visibility in 1937, the proponents were very much a minority and had less authority than those who maintained that

Germany was the greater threat. While dissensus over Britain’s strategy to curtail the German threat remained, most of the diplomatic corps ultimately came to support an Anglo-Soviet cooperation. However, they were ultimately unable to persuade the Chamberlain government of their cause, and the appeasement of Germany through the Munich Agreement ensued.

By 1936, the visible heightening of Germany’s military capabilities in the previous year rendered the German threat more urgent than ever. While this solidified the consensus that

Germany was the greater threat, it further aggravated the dissensus over what strategies Britain should use to address the German threat.

The influential sector under Sargent continued to argue for an Anglo-German rapprochement. Part of the argument came from the traditional mistrust of the Soviets. Lord

Stanhope, one of the permanent undersecretaries, noted that while he mistrusted Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, he “mistrust[ed] Russia most of the three,” and this view garnered 100 agreements from a handful of elites.326 However, most people promoting an Anglo-German rapprochement, namely Sargent, based their arguments on purely practical matters. Sargent believed that improvements in the Anglo-Soviet relationship would convince (or at least allow)

Germany to claim that it was being encircled and ostracized, which would push Hitler “to swallow his principles and to reverse his anti-Russian policy:” this would actualize the dreaded

German-Soviet rapprochement.327 Sargent was also skeptical of the value Britain could provide to the Soviets, since the Soviets were most concerned about Eastern Europe but the dominant influence over the region lay with Germany: “[s]o great is the moral and physical influence of

Germany in Eastern Europe that [British favors] would not weigh for a moment with Litvinov

[Soviet diplomat/commissar for foreign affairs] if Hitler were to offer him a German alliance.”328

Thus, cooperation with the Soviet Union might be counterproductive if the Soviets decide to ally with Germany, a German-Soviet rapprochement takes place, and Germany harbored new grievances that Britain had sought to challenge Germany through an Anglo-Soviet cooperation.

While Sargent did not completely renounce the prospect of collaborating with the Soviet Union, he believed that it should be a last resort, and that “we ought at any rate to make the effort, if only to test Hitler’s intentions and sincerity, before putting all our eggs in the Russian basket.”329

Meanwhile, the arguments for cooperating with the Soviet Union still had high-profile proponents, but its support was becoming unstable. Anthony Eden, who had become Foreign

326 FO 371/18338, N 479/20/38, minutes Cranborne and Stanhope, 14 Jan. 1936, quoted in Manne, 749. 327 Sargent’s minute (17 Jan. 1936) on Chilston to Collier, 10 Dec. 1935, FO 371/19460/N6642/75/38, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 160. 328 Sargent’s minute (17 Jan. 1936) on Chilston to Collier, 10 Dec. 1935, FO 371/19460/N6642/75/38, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 160. 329 Sargent’s minute (17 Jan. 1936) on Chilston to Collier, 10 Dec. 1935, FO 371/19460/N6642/75/38, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 160. 101

Secretary in December 1935 after the Hoare-Laval Pact scandal,330 was deeply skeptical of the

Soviet Union’s history of spreading communist propaganda in Britain and abroad. He recognized the value of working with the Soviets in light of the heightened German threat, but he was a reluctant supporter nevertheless. As he famously remarked, “I want good relations with the bear…[but] I don’t want to hug him too close. I don’t trust him, & am sure there is hatred in his heart for all we stand for.”331 Therefore, Eden would agree to an engagement with the Soviets

“only if it is worth our while.”332 Even while he was stating his position of support, however, he found Sargent’s arguments against preventing German claims of encirclement highly appealing.

Eden began suspecting that an engagement with the Soviets might only provoke Germany further rather than restraining it effectively.333 The wavering of the Foreign Secretary as the head of the diplomatic corps was a blow to the supports of Anglo-Soviet cooperation.

A further blow was the wavering of Vansittart, who had long been one of the most prominent supporters of engaging with the Soviets. In early January, he had advocated for

Anglo-Soviet cooperation as usual: no one could tell if Germany could be “brought back into the comity of nations” through direct engagement, and until Britain was sure it could, Britain “ought to be careful to discourage no one who is in the same boat.”334 He assured others that the

330 The Hoare-Laval Pact was a secret plan between the British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare and his French counterpart to grant a part of Abyssinia to Italy to mollify its demands. The news of the pact leaked to the press, however, leading to a scandal that forced Hoare’s resignation in December 1935. 331 Minutes and marginalia, untitled memo, Collier and Ashton-Gwatkin, nd (but 9 Jan. 1936), FO 371/20338/N479/20/38, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919- 1939, 159. 332 Minutes and marginalia, untitled memo, Collier and Ashton-Gwatkin, nd (but 9 Jan. 1936), FO 371/20338/N479/20/38, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919- 1939, 159. 333 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 159. 334 Minutes and marginalia, untitled memo, Collier and Ashton-Gwatkin, nd (but 9 Jan. 1936), FO 371/20338/N479/20/38, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919- 1939, 159. 102

German-Soviet rapprochement was not as great of a possibility as others believed it to be, since it would only come about if Britain “mismanage the situation” in Europe.335 But by February,

Vansittart had shifted to the more ‘Eden line’ of exploring the possibility of coming to terms with Germany. He now argued that Britain “would be well advised to resume the exploration of their former policy of coming to terms with Germany, provided always that this course proves possible, honourable and safe.”336

Scholars have found at least two reasons for this change. The more ‘practical’ reason, advocated by Neilson, was Berlin’s announcement on January 22 that Germany would grant credits to the Soviet Union.337 This appeared to be the possible first step to a German-Soviet rapprochement and convinced Vansittart to believe that an Anglo-Soviet cooperation that could be interpreted as German encirclement was not the appropriate solution. A more ‘personal’ reason, advocated by Steiner, was that Vansittart perceived the need to be seen favorably by

Eden. After his leading role in the Hoare-Laval scandal, he perceived that his position and influence were at stake and hoped Eden’s favors would grant him some job security.338

It seems most likely that Vansittart was motivated by both. Despising both Germany and the Soviet Union, Vansittart was beholden to neither and had based his policy recommendations largely on pragmatism.339 The announcement of overt German overtures to the Soviet Union could very well have provided him with a perception of a new reality. Meanwhile, it is also

335 Vansittart’ minute (17 Jan. 1936) on FO 371/19460/N6642/75/38, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 160. 336 “Note of a Meeting held in the Secretary of State’s room at the Foreign Office on 3 Feb. 1936, to discuss Sir R. Vansittart’s memo on Britain, France and Germany,” ns, 3 Feb. 1936, FO 371.19885/C979/4/18; Vansittart’s memo forms part of ‘Germany,’ CP 42(36), secret, Eden, 11 Feb. 1936, Cab 24/260, quoted in Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 162. 337 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 160. 338 Steiner, 433. 339 Steiner, 428. 103 likely true that Vansittart perceived danger to his job. After all, following the Hoare-Laval scandal, then-Prime Minister Baldwin and Eden were pressuring Vansittart to leave the PUS position: they sought to move him to the more marginal Paris Embassy instead, and he ultimately had to refuse it under the excuse of his wife’s health.340 Vansittart, therefore, would have been well aware of the precariousness of his political career and the potential benefits of ingratiation.

In any case, the drifting away of Eden and Vansittart very much weakened the arguments for cooperating with the Soviet Union.

A few months into 1937, the Foreign Office perceived a great need to reexamine its priorities and policies. This had several factors. Neville Chamberlain’s accession to the premiership represented an elevation of support for an Anglo-German rapprochement. This, combined with the destabilizing of support for an Anglo-Soviet cooperation, represented a change in the dynamic of the debates that the elites had engaged in for years now, and some recalibration under this new environment was deemed necessary. Meanwhile, the Spanish Civil

War was still raging, giving elites the constant reminder of the battle, however ostensible, between fascism and communism and where Britain should stand in it. Furthermore, reports of

Stalin’s Great Purge began pouring in in 1937, and this raised questions on what will become of the Soviet Union and its menace.341 The most notable example of this reexamination was the correspondence between Collier and his opponents between 1937 and 1938.

In part because the Great Purge revealed the horror of the Stalinist regime, voices that the

Soviet Union was a greater threat than Germany gained some volume in 1937. First, P. I. H.

Torr, a junior member of the British legation to the Holy See, named the “‘Communist danger’

340 Peter Neville, Hitler and Appeasement: The British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 140. 341 Lammers, 52. 104 as the foremost problem of policy.”342 Then joined Francis D’Arcy Godolphin Osborne, the more senior ranking official of the British legation to the Holy See. He argued that the Soviet Union was the greatest threat because it had a universalist ideology of overthrowing elites across the world in a class struggle.343 Meanwhile, Germany was a lesser threat because fascism was not a universalist ideology:

“[F]ascist states could perhaps be pacified if they were met in a spirit of sympathy, fairness, and generosity. These regimes, with their less-than-universalist ideologies, could be brought back into peaceful ways if their economic distress were alleviated and their prestige enhanced.”344

As one could see, Osborne held a stark and rather simple view regarding ideologies, but his ideas resonated with those who have historically distrusted the Soviet Union. The final prominent note of support came from Gladwyn Jebb, soon-to-be private secretary to the Permanent

Undersecretary, who emphasized that communism was “far more horrible” than Nazism.345 This revival of the Sovietphobe position garnered much attention in the Foreign Office.

Collier found himself defending his position with “little support from his colleagues,”346 which was understandable given the wavering of Eden and Vansittart. Collier’s main argument was that the Soviet Union, however despicable and threatening it was, was not the greatest threat to Britain at the moment. He rejected the opponents’ arguments regarding ideologies by arguing that fascism was more malignant than communism: fascism “most definitely put state power ahead of individual happiness [and] posited a continuing struggle for world domination,”347 but

342 Public Record Office (PRO), Torr to Collier, 20 Apr. 1937, N 2109/272/38, in FO 371/21103, quoted in Lammers, 68. 343 Osborne to Collier, 16 June 1937, N 2I09/272/38, in FO 371/21, quoted in in Lammers, 69-70. 344 Osborne to Collier, 16 June 1937, N 2109/272/38, in FO 371/21, quoted in Lammers, 70. 345 Minutes, variously dated, on letter from Collier to Osborne on 29 June 1937, quoted in Lammers, 73. 346 Shaw, 66. 347 Collier to Osborne, 29 July 1937, quoted in Lammers, 71. 105

“[c]ommunism theoretically at least -- aimed at the welfare of the individual.”348 Even outside of the theoretical realm, he argued, the Comintern was doing little more than protecting the Soviet

Union, so some elites’ fears regarding ideological subversion was inflated.349 This did not mean, however, that Collier was particularly sympathetic to the communist cause.350 Rather, his only concerns were the facts and Britain’s immediate future. The facts indicated that Germany was clearly committed to aggression in the immediate future while the Soviet Union was not. He argued that because “in foreign policy one cannot concern oneself with more than the immediate future,”351 Britain should regard Germany as the greater threat and take appropriate actions.

While Collier’s arguments that fascism was relatively better than communism found few supporters, many people were sympathetic to a middle position: maintaining that communism could be worse than fascism but identifying Germany as the greatest threat for pragmatic reasons. For instance, Paul Falla, a junior clerk in the Northern Department, noted that while the internal practices of communism were worse than those of fascism, the Foreign Office should be focused on identifying and resisting those whose external policies were most powerful and aggressive, regardless of their policies at home. In this case, the externally most powerful and aggressive state was Germany, so Germany was the greater threat. 352 Echoing this sentiment,

Reginald Leeper of the News Department, who was a staunch anti-communist, 353 dismissed using ideological conflicts to define threats as “bunkum [nonsense].”354 In a belief also adopted

348 Collier to Torr, 17 May 1937, N 2109/272/38, in FO 371/21, quoted in Lammers, 69. 349 Lammers, 69. 350 Lammers, 72. 351 Collier to Osborne, 29 July 1937, quoted in Lammers, 72. 352 Lammers, 72. 353 Steiner, 431. 354 Minutes, variously dated, on letter from Collier to Osborne on 29 June 1937, quoted in Lammers, 73. 106 by Churchill, Leeper argued that only national interests and ambitions were the sources of conflicts, and since Germany’s pursuit of these national interests and ambitions were threatening to bring Europe to war, Germany was clearly the greater threat.355

In 1937, therefore, there was a revival per se of arguments that the Soviet Union was a greater threat than Germany, while many continued to believe Germany to be the greater threat.

On both sides, there were those who invoked more ideological reasons and those who invoked more pragmatic reasons. Some were able to move beyond their ideological antipathies, and others found overlap between their ideological beliefs and their determination of what was

Britain’s greatest threat. Despite the differences in reasoning, however, those who argued that the

Germany was the primary threat were greater in number and authority. Often hailing from the

Northern Department, these elites were the experts on the Soviet Union: their perspectives were thus deemed to have more authority and weight to the issue at hand, something that those who believed in the primacy of the Soviet threat – not least the legation to the Holy See – struggled to possess.

The discussions over which state was the greater threat gained even more importance in

1938 in light of new developments. After all, Anschluss was completed to the dismay of many

British elites in March, Czechoslovakia was in danger of being overrun by Germany, and Eden, who resigned as Foreign Secretary in February, was replaced by Lord Halifax, who was much more aligned with Chamberlain in calling for an improvement of relations with Germany. In the

Foreign Office, as it became more apparent that most believed Germany to be the greater threat, attention increasingly turned to how Britain should engage with the Soviet Union in this new

European context. In July, Sir Lancelot Oliphant, Deputy Under-Secretary concerned with

355 Minutes, variously dated, on letter from Collier to Osborne on 29 June 1937, quoted in Lammers, 73. 107

European affairs, asked the Foreign Office to prepare a paper comparing the German and Soviet threats, and Collier completed a memorandum on the subject in August.356 In it, Collier argued that because a state’s action is more important in its doctrine, a state whose action is more friendly to Britain, regardless of its doctrine, was the lesser threat and one with which Britain should cooperate. Because the Soviets had consistently expressed their desire to work with

Britain while Germany had only been aggressive, Britain must choose to improve the Anglo-

Soviet relationship as the means to counter Germany.357 Collier’s memorandum found a large and receptive audience, not least from high-profile figures such as Oliphant and Vansittart.358

Anglo-Soviet cooperation was now widely accepted as a viable solution for Germany.

As the crisis over Czechoslovakia intensified, the diplomatic corps rigorously promoted

Anglo-Soviet cooperation to remedy the German threat.359 They expressed their anxiety regarding Chamberlain’s plan to deliberately exclude the Soviet Union in the negotiations with

Germany. For instance, William Strang, the head of the Central Department, emphasized to

Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador in Berlin friendly to Chamberlain’s cause, that

“keeping Russia out of Europe altogether [was] not an aspect of German policy which we wish to encourage.”360 Meanwhile, Vansittart wrote a fervent letter to Lord Halifax in September to oppose the Soviets’ exclusion in the proposed conference at Munich:

“I am strongly opposed to the idea of summoning a Four Power Conference in present circumstances….It would be the thin end of the wedge for driving Russia out of

356 Lammers, 73. 357 Shaw, 66. 358 Lammers, 73. 359 Interestingly, Collier is reported to have been ambivalent about an Anglo-Soviet cooperation over the specific case of Czechoslovakia: according to Shaw, he was suspicious of Soviet intentions over Czechoslovakia prevented him from embracing the idea fully. However, he was still a fervent supporter for including the Soviet Union in diplomatic circles and improving the Anglo-Soviet relationship. Minute by Collier, 22 June 1938, FO 371/22288, invoked in Shaw, 68. 360 Quoted in Gilbert and Gott, 136. 108

Europe….[Furthermore,] [i]t can be supported on no adequate ground…[T]here is far more ground for the presence of Russia than of Italy seeing that three-quarters of the population of Czechoslovakia are Slav.”361

Resolute in their belief that Britain must counter Germany with Anglo-Soviet cooperation, the diplomatic corps made a desperate effort to prevent the Munich Agreement.

Given the fervor with which the diplomatic corps appealed to the government to cooperate with the Soviet Union, why were their calls not needed? There appear to be at least two related reasons. First, Chamberlain’s closest advisors who had the most influence over

Chamberlain – which included Halifax and Henderson – were very closely aligned with his position. Halifax had been constantly praised by Chamberlain for being agreeable, and

Henderson had been known for expressing dovish interpretations of Germany and being the

“arch-appeaser among British diplomatists.”362 Although Chamberlain was aware that there was a strong opposition to his policy of appeasement, being surrounded by such pro-appeasers would have allowed Chamberlain to ignore such opposition and carry out his preferred policy without too many impediments.

Second, the people who were most vocal about the need to cooperate with the Soviet

Union did not have the same authority as did those to whom Chamberlain listened the most. The heads of departments certainly held less direct influence than the Foreign Secretary, for instance, so the latter’s opinions inevitably carried more weight. Vansittart’s letter could have yielded a notable effect on Chamberlain, but that was difficult since Vansittart was no longer PUS. As

Chief Diplomatic Advisor, Vansittart now had considerably less influence over Chamberlain, so his calls for Anglo-Soviet cooperation were likely diminished in significance. The combined

361 Quoted in Ian Colvin, Vansittart in Office (London: Gollancz, 1965), 248, and Shaw, 68. 362 Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 215. Also see Peter Neville, Appeasing Hitler: The Diplomacy of Sir Nevile Henderson, 1937-39 (New York: Palgrave, 2000). 109 factors of Chamberlain’s closest advisors supporting appeasement and the opponents not having a strong enough voice would have contributed to the ultimate inability by the diplomatic corps to convince Chamberlain to pursue an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement.

Thus, between 1936 and 1938, there was a general consensus that Germany was a greater threat than the Soviet Union, and those who argued that the Soviet Union was the greater threat were fewer in number and less authoritative than those who adhered to the consensus. The dissensus over Britain’s strategy towards the German threat continued, and while most of the diplomatic corps came to support an Anglo-Soviet cooperation, their views were ultimately disregarded by Chamberlain and his government.

CONCLUSION

Similar to Chamberlain and the Parliament, the dissensus in the diplomatic corps lay not in what state was the greater threat, but what strategy Britain must adopt to curtail the German threat. In general agreement that Germany was the greater threat, the diplomatic corps was nevertheless divided over whether Britain should engage with Germany in the form of an Anglo-

German rapprochement or an Anglo-Soviet cooperation. While the diplomatic corps was hampered in the dissensus for much of the period, they eventually came to call for an Anglo-

Soviet cooperation by the later years. The reason why such Anglo-Soviet cooperation did not occur, therefore, was a product of the diplomatic corps’ inability to have their say in

Chamberlain’s pursuit of appeasement. As much as the diplomatic corps yielded influence over

Britain’s foreign policy, the influence of Chamberlain and his closest advisors was a barrier they could not overcome.

110

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

This work has established that between 1933 and 1938, there was no consensus among the British policymaking elites that the Soviet Union was a greater threat than Germany and that an Anglo-Soviet cooperation was thus imprudent. On the contrary, I have found that there was an overwhelming consensus that Germany was the greater threat, but that there lay great dissensus over the desirability of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation.

While the elites were initially divided on which state posed the greater threat, the consensus emerged as the elites recognized Germany’s belligerent intentions to restructure the post-Versailles international order and rapid improvements in its military capabilities that concretized the threat. Although anti-Soviet sentiments were pervasive among the British elites, only a few of them considered the Soviet Union to be a greater threat than Germany, and they neither had enough numbers or influence to change the consensus. This was revealed through the three actors we have examined. While Chamberlain despised and distrusted the Soviet Union, he was quick to recognize that Germany was the aggressor and thus the greater threat. The diplomatic corps was divided from the start, but arguments that Germany was the greater threat eventually became dominant, albeit with some revisiting of the issue in 1937. In the Parliament, anti-appeasers and pro-appeasers alike recognized that Germany was the most pressing threat, and few argued otherwise.

The issue, then, was not which was the greater threat but what Britain must do with the

German threat. Some argued that an Anglo-Soviet cooperation would pressure Germany into curtailing its aggression. Others maintained that Germany was too aggressive and militarily 111 equipped to risk provocation: far from diminishing the German threat, an Anglo-Soviet cooperation would incite Germany to claim that it was a victim of encirclement and wage a war for ‘self-defense.’ Within the elites, Chamberlain, some senior members of the diplomatic corps

(including Halifax), and the majority of the Parliament supported the latter. Meanwhile, the other members of the diplomatic corps (including heads of departments) and anti-appeasers advocated for Anglo-Soviet cooperation, and in the anti-appeasers’ case, the specific form of a Grand

Alliance, to address the German threat. Both sides had fervent supporters, and the dissensus persisted until the very eve of the Munich Agreement. However, the proponents for an Anglo-

Soviet cooperation ultimately lacked the number and the authority needed to materialize this cause: instead, the most authoritative decisionmakers’ calculation that engaging with Germany was the best way to avoid another war carried the day.

In this light, the failed emergence of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation had little to do with a consensus regarding the primacy of the Soviet threat or the undesirability of the Anglo-Soviet cooperation. Instead, it was a story about the primacy of the German threat, festering dissensus over the best remedial strategy, and most of all, the effects of authority.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: A REVISITING

What does this story tell us about the theory of grand strategy? In the Introduction, I noted that this story seeks to address two theoretical matters: first, the usefulness of considering an individual level of analysis as opposed to utilizing systemic level analysis alone; and second, the need to consider the identification of threat (‘ends’) and the determination of strategy

(‘means’) in the examination of grand strategy. I argue that this story has brought insights into both matters, and it is my hope that readers would agree. 112

For the former, the examination of individual policymaking elites has allowed for a better understanding of what a systemic level analysis might struggle to understand: why Britain chose not to balance externally against Germany when it was militarily stronger and openly threatening than the Soviet Union. The individual level of analysis revealed that the choice to balance externally is not always obvious. Sometimes, external balancing could be too costly: if the elites of a state believe that the external threat is too strong, that they are unprepared if war results from alienating the threat, and/or that their partner for external balancing may not bring intended benefits, then external balancing may appear as suicidal. In that case, elites might contend that accommodation with the aggressor might grant the state the security it so desires. The case study of appeasement and the rejection of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation demonstrated that a state desperate for security might resort to a different, sometimes seemingly incomprehensible means to accomplish its goals.

For the latter, the distinction between the ends and the means of grand strategy was revealed to be a useful framework. In formulating grand strategy, elites must both identify a threat and a strategy. For a given threat, there is not necessarily a strategy that is automatically deemed the best: instead, there are often myriad strategies that are proposed, and these ideas are vetted, assessed, and prioritized before a state takes action. These are all decisions to be made, and one cannot assume that a consensus over the threat always translates to a consensus over the strategy. This thesis, then, has challenged the assumptions held by some of the notable works on grand strategy that the ends and means can be conflated – whether in terms of the theories363 or of specific case studies, such as the conventional wisdom behind Britain’s rejection of an Anglo-

Soviet cooperation. This thesis’ demonstration that consensus over the threat can be

363 See the Introduction. 113 accompanied by dissensus over the strategy, in which case the elites’ level of authority helps shape the decision over the final strategy, sheds new light into the grand strategy scholarship.

OBSERVATIONS

I leave this work with a brief discussion of my observations of the findings. One of the most notable surprises in undertaking this study was that ideological considerations ultimately played a much smaller role than expected in determining the degree of consensus over what state posed the greater threat and what Britain must do to address it. Of course, ideological considerations were important: however, the extent to which they were revealed in the primary sources was far short of the extent to which they have been emphasized in the secondary literature regarding Britain and the Soviet Union in the interwar period. This observation has illuminated how often scholarly works that retrospectively analyze the Soviet Union in the interwar period can use a chiefly ideological approach. Has the Cold War helped color the lens for scholarly analysis? While these ideological analyses are valid in their own right, it was notable to observe the discrepancy between the primary sources and the secondary sources, and I made sure to keep this observation in mind in trying to reconstruct the narrative.

What the primary sources unveiled instead was the extent to which the British elites – most of whom despised communism – focused on more pragmatic considerations when identifying the threat and determining the strategy. Over and over again, there were references to the material and military strengths of Germany, Britain, and the Soviet Union, and how the latter two cannot match the former. The language of the elites displayed that these considerations played a significant role in motivating the rejection of the Anglo-Soviet cooperation in favor of 114 appeasement – demonstrating that these pragmatic, power-based ways of thought do not always result in the realist notion of external balancing through alliances or cooperation.

The study has also shed light on how relatively small the roles of partisanship and individual biases might have been in interwar Britain’s grand strategy. At the beginning, I reasoned that partisanship would be a notable driving factor. I was persuaded by Haas’ argument that conservatives would be more likely to emphasize the Soviet threat and reject cooperation with the Soviets, and Labour would be the opposite, not least because those on the left would have less “ideological distance” (extent of differences in the ideology they stand for) from the

Soviets than do those on the right.364 While there was ultimately some evidence of this fault line, the effects of partisanship were more muted than I had imagined. Not only did the Conservative

Prime Minister Chamberlain emphasize the German threat, but many Conservative Party members supported the anti-appeasers’ cause. Relatedly, one might have expected individual biases to have yielded a strong influence on the elites. For instance, one might contend that those who were fearful and disdainful of the Soviet Union were more likely to consider the Soviet

Union as the greater threat and be averse to Anglo-Soviet cooperation.365 Although that was true to an extent, most notably in the case of the legation to the Holy See, most elites who harbored anti-Soviet sentiments – not least Chamberlain, Churchill, and Collier – cast their biases aside to focus on Germany. Such impresses upon one that individual biases may only have a limited role in explaining British attitudes and policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

364 Haas, 5. 365 E.g. Yarhi-Milo, 7-51. 115

Finally, the analysis of primary sources suggested that time horizons seemed to help explain the elites’ different opinions. David Edelstein defines short and long time horizons as the following:

“Leaders with short time horizons are focused on the immediate future in a general state of affairs that they do not expect to change dramatically. Leaders with long time horizons are more focused on a world that emerges after some predictable, but not necessarily certain, transformation of the underlying structure within which they operate.”366

Elites with short time horizons would have believed that in the immediate future, Germany could easily start a war with Britain. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union would have interest in being on

Britain’s side, and it would be too hampered by the lack of resources – not least military – to pose a noteworthy threat to Britain. In contrast, elites with long time horizons would have noted that the Soviet Union advocated the destruction of the liberal-capitalist international order in its doctrine. The Soviet Union would thus be a more fundamental menace to Britain than Germany, which would be seeking territorial revision within the current liberal-capitalist international order. For these elites, then, the Soviet Union would be the greater threat, and allying with it to defeat its enemy, Germany, might actually facilitate the Soviets’ ability to transform the world in their vision.

Some of the primary sources presented in this thesis already indicate the effects of time horizons. Collier noted it most clearly – “in foreign policy one cannot concern oneself with more than the immediate future”367 – but other elites who have underscored Germany’s propensity for aggression despite having long been suspicious of the Soviet Union were effectively following the same logic. Meanwhile, the minority who had argued that the Soviet Union was the greater

366 David M. Edelstein, Over the Horizon: Time, Uncertainty, and the Rise of the Great Powers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017), 5. 367 See Chapter 4. 116 threat tended to exhibit signs of long time horizons. Osborne’s suggestion that the Soviet Union would always be a threat based on its doctrine but Germany could be pacified is a case in point.368 Analyzing British policymaking elites from the perspective of time horizons, then, appears to be an underexplored but fruitful area for research.

LOOKING FORWARD

Overall, this thesis has drawn attention to how many more contributions could be made to the study of grand strategy. On a theoretical level, there is a need for scholars to devote more attention to the agency of individual policymaking elites in formulating grand strategy, as well as to the notion that an identification of threat and a determination of strategy are interconnected but distinct components. In this light, assessing the degree of consensus among the elites for both the identification of threat and the determination of strategy seems a promising approach that merits further investigation. On a more empirical level, the study has highlighted that while much has been studied about interwar Britain’s grand strategy, the field remains rife with possibilities for new analyses and interpretations. Whether it be continuing to study the intersection between appeasement and Anglo-Soviet relations, or exploring diverse factors that drove the elites’ decisions on the source of threat and the remedial strategy, future research on interwar Britain’s grand strategy seems a rewarding pursuit.

368 See Chapter 4. 117

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