The Failed Emergence of an Anglo-Soviet Cooperation Against Germany: 1930S British Perception of Soviet and German Threats
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The Failed Emergence of an Anglo-Soviet Cooperation Against Germany: 1930s British Perception of Soviet and German Threats Makiko Miyazaki Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Prerequisite for Honors In Political Science under the advisement of Professor Stacie E. Goddard May 2020 © 2020 Makiko Miyazaki ii Table of Contents Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………....iii Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………...iv People ……………………………………………………………………………………………..v Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 2: History of the Soviet Threat, 1922-38………………………………………………..24 Chapter 3: Chamberlain and the Parliament……………………………………………………..55 Chapter 4: Diplomatic Corps…………………………………………………………………….85 Chapter 5: Conclusions…………………………………………………………………...…….110 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………........117 iii Acknowledgements To my advisor, Professor Stacie Goddard – I would like to express my deepest gratitude for your constant encouragement, insightful advice, and generous time. I could not have done this without you. From this thesis to the Rise and Fall of Great Powers seminar and the Albright Institute, you were part of some of my most memorable experiences at Wellesley. It has been an honor to work with you! To my professors – Thank you so much to Professors Paul MacDonald, Katharine Moon, and Kim McLeod for serving on my defense committee: I truly appreciate your input and your time. Professors Goddard, MacDonald, Moon, McLeod, Jennifer Chudy, Jay Turner, 赵老师, 陈老师, 汤老师, and James Battat – I have learned so much from you over the past four years, and I am blessed to have had you as professors. Many of you have written me countless recommendation letters as well. Thank you so much for your constant support and kindness. Thank you also to Dr. Paul Hansbury and Adam Brodie at the University of Oxford for giving me the knowledge essential to write this thesis. To my family – Mami, Papi, and Saki, thank you so much for everything. Your unconditional love, support, and encouragement carried me forward: I could not have done this without you. Special fondness to バーバ、ジージ、and やっくん as well. To my friends – You have given me so much inspiration, kindness, and strength to keep going. I am blessed to be surrounded by people as amazing as you. Special shoutout to Leila B., Irene B., Sabrina C., Nathaniel C., Emily D., Lauren E., Sofia G., Ayla H.*, Lisa H., Sophia L., Olivia L., Huihan L., Maya M.*, Daria O., Zoe O., Andrew P., Shirin P., Polina P., Dwi R., Diane S., Lucy S., Cheryn S., Meghan S., Lisa S., and Sanjana T.* Thank you also to the countless others at Wellesley, the Albright Institute, Oxford, MIT-Wellesley Toons, and JASC. *Go Sev 212!! Special thank you to Rachel Besancon and Maya Nandakumar for your invaluable guidance throughout the whole thesis process. From writing the proposal to finishing the thesis and preparing for my defense, you have helped me every step of the way. I feel so lucky to have gotten to know both of you – I just wish I had met you in person before you graduated! Finally, thank you to Wellesley College, the Department of Political Science, and the Knapp Social Science Fellowship for your generous support. iv Abstract Between 1933 and 1938, Nazi Germany’s recrudescent power threatened to plunge Europe into another world war. To mitigate the German threat of aggression, Britain had two choices: to mollify Germany through appeasement or to challenge it through an Anglo-Soviet cooperation. Britain ultimately chose appeasement, resulting in the 1938 Munich Agreement, and the conventional wisdom alleges the reason to be because the British perceived the Soviet Union to be a greater threat than Germany. This thesis critically examines this argument. Between 1933 and 1938, how much consensus was there among the British policymaking elites that the Soviet Union was a greater threat than Germany and that an Anglo-Soviet cooperation was ill-advised? Through an examination of Prime Minster Neville Chamberlain, the Parliament, and the diplomatic corps using materials that include speeches, private letters, government documents, and internal memos, I find that the conventional wisdom has limited explanatory power. Instead, I argue that there was, in fact, overwhelming consensus that Germany was the greater threat, and dissensus lay in what was the best strategy for Britain to address the German threat. Although fervent arguments for an Anglo-Soviet cooperation persisted until the eve of the Munich Agreement, supporters of appeasement were ultimately greater in number and authority, and the case for British overtures to the Soviets was lost. v People PARLIAMENT NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN DIPLOMATIC CORPS Chancellor of the Exchequer, ANTI-APPEASERS, 1931-37 Foreign Secretary led by Winston Prime Minister, 1937-40 John Simon, 1931-5 Churchill Samuel Hoare, 1935 Anthony Eden, 1935-8 Lord Halifax, 1938-40 Permanent Under- Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (PUS) Robert Vansittart, 1930-37 Alexander Cadogan, 1938 Foreign Office Department Heads Northern Department (Soviet Affairs) Laurence Collier, 1932-41 Central Department (German Affairs) Orme Sargent,* 1926-33 Ralph Wigram, 1933-36 William Strang, 1936-39 *from 1934, Assistant Undersecretary who supervised the Central Department Far Eastern Department (Japanese Affairs) Charles Orde, 1929-38 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION On September 30, 1938, Great Britain, alongside France and Italy, signed the Munich Agreement that sanctioneD Nazi Germany to annex the Czechoslovak territory of Sudetenland. Although intended to curtail Germany’s revisionist ambitions, the Munich Agreement came to be regarded, by contemporaries and historians alike, as an act of appeasement that emboldened Germany’s aggressions and helped lead to World War II. Consequently, the Munich Agreement has become an infamous symbol of Western impotence in the interwar collective memory. One curious aspect surrounding the Munich Agreement is why Britain did not choose instead to cooperate with the Soviet Union against Germany. Aware of Germany’s intense enmity towards the Soviet Union and visions of expansion into the Soviets’ backyard, the Soviet Union in the 1930s had clearly considered Germany a threat and launched repeated initiatives towards Britain to improve their relations and guard against Germany together. Given the Soviet Union’s geographic location to the east of Germany, one could argue that an Anglo-Soviet cooperation would yield an encirclement of Germany, force Germany to negotiate with the West, or deter German aggression all together. Moreover, Britain considered the worst-case scenario to be a German-Soviet rapprochement against Britain: yet, rejecting Soviet overtures could help drive the Soviets, desperate for territorial security in Eastern Europe, into Germany’s arms.1 If an Anglo-Soviet cooperation offered all these benefits, Britain’s ultimate rejection of it in favor of appeasement seems counterintuitive. The conventional wisdom behind this puzzle invokes the British perception of the Soviet Union: Britain considered the Soviet Union to be a greater threat than Germany, and Britain 1 This is what exactly happened through the 1939 German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. 2 deemed it better to engage with the lesser threat than to cooperate with the greater threat.2 But despite the narrative’s pervasiveness in the scholarship of the interwar period, assessment of this narrative’s validity remains rather lacking in the literature. This thesis aims to fill this gap by examining the following question: between 1933 and 1938 (Hitler’s accession to power to the Munich Agreement), to what extent was there consensus among the British policymaking elites that the Soviet Union was a greater threat to Britain than Germany and that an Anglo-Soviet cooperation was ill-advised? To investigate the puzzle, I undertake a qualitative analysis of primary sources (public and private) and secondary sources to trace the elites’ perspectives, debates, and conclusions over both the threat and the remedial strategy over time. For these elites, I will particularly focus on Neville Chamberlain, the Parliament, and the diplomatic corps,3 as will be discussed later on. Through this analysis, I find no evidence of a consensus stating that the Soviet Union was the greater threat and that an Anglo-Soviet cooperation was imprudent. In fact, there was an overwhelming consensus that Germany was the greater threat. However, there was great dissensus over the desirability of an Anglo-Soviet cooperation as a strategy against Germany. While there was vocal support for an Anglo-Soviet cooperation, this strategy ultimately did not materialize because its proponents were smaller in number and lesser in authority than the supporters of appeasement. Chamberlain, some of his closest advisors, and the majority of Parliament were all determined to pursue appeasement, and the Munich Agreement consequently ensued. 2 For examples of this view, see Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); W.P. Coates and Zelda K. Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1945); Margaret George, The Warped Vision: British Foreign Policy, 1933–1939 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965); Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963). 3 See the Methodology section for the definition. 3 Despite being a particular historical case study, this thesis has significant implications for both