Was it just poor tactics or some deeper problem that caused the failed Apache mission?

US Army photo by Sgt. Igor Paustovski Ambush at Najaf

By Richard J. Newman

URING Gulf War II, the copters in the raid retreated before A US Army AH-64 Apache in Iraq. issues facing defense planners as they 11th Aviation Regiment, and other tell them to prepare for a helicopter Army sent its Apache he- the mission could be accomplished. Critics view the failed March 24 attempt to fulfill Defense Secretary units participated in an exercise called raid. licopters to mount a “deep Despite this failed mission, the mission as the Apache’s “Little Big Donald H. Rumsfeld’s goal of mak- Victory Scrimmage at the Army’s train- As the Apache pilots flew toward Dattack” against an Iraqi unit. Small- Army insists the Apache was indis- ing the military more nimble and ing range in Grafenwoehr, Germany. their attack positions, the Iraqi power Horn.” arms and anti-aircraft fire downed pensable during the war, providing versatile. The exercise was a dress rehearsal for grid in the Najaf area went black for one Apache, and the other helicop- critical close air support for ground Whatever its limitations, few deny the war, with units practicing roles a few seconds—likely a signal to Iraqi ters retreated, some damaged so troops engaged in combat and armed that the Apache is a fearsome weapon they anticipated they would fulfill in gunners that the Apaches were ap- seriously they had to be grounded reconnaissance by helping to destroy system. The helicopter can carry 16 Iraq. Some went after artillery, for proaching. Then the sky filled with for weeks. That aborted mission Iraqi armor and other key equipment fire-and-forget Hellfire missiles, each example, while others attacked mecha- lead. The fire was so dense that when has become the subject of one of lurking on the edges of the battle- capable of taking out a tank. The newer nized units. Risky operations behind the Army tried to mount a search and the most controversial postwar de- field. “Our Apaches did great for and more advanced version—the AH- enemy lines were the focal point. “It rescue operation for the two-man crew bates. us,” said Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus, 64D Longbow—can track and pro- was typical use of the Apaches,” re- of the Apache that was shot down, the There’s little dispute about what commander of the 101st Airborne cess up to 256 different targets at once. called Lt. Col. Steve Smith, commander rescuers couldn’t get through. Iraqi happened. On March 24, Lt. Gen. Division, during a briefing after the It also carries a millimeter-wave radar of the 2nd Battalion, 101st Aviation forces captured the two pilots. William S. Wallace, the Army’s V war. “We were flexible and adapt- for improved performance during bad Regiment. “We thought we’d be do- Two days later, the Army again Corps commander, ordered 32 AH- able in the way that we used them.” weather and other poor-visibility situ- ing night and deep attacks.” used Apaches to carry out another 64 Apaches from the 11th Aviation ations. At combat altitudes of less than nighttime deep attack. But the Army Regiment to mount an attack behind “Little Big Horn”? a hundred feet, Apaches can often sneak The Mission used different tactics this time. enemy lines against the Iraqi Repub- But critics of the multimillion dol- below an enemy’s radar coverage, Then came the mission against the First, it preceded the Apache raid lican Guard Medina Division. The lar chopper view the Najaf retreat as which made them the weapon of choice Medina Division on March 24, four with a four-minute artillery bom- corridor near Najaf that the Apaches the Apache’s “Little Big Horn”— in the opening phase of the 1991 Per- days into the war. bardment to make sure Iraqi gunners planned to fly through was modestly proof that it is too vulnerable to sur- sian Gulf War. Before any Air Force Army officials now believe that wouldn’t catch the helicopter crews populated, so commanders decided vive modern combat. They argue that or Navy aircraft had dropped their the aviation assembly areas the Army by surprise. As the Apaches ap- against the usual suppression fire— the Apache is a relic of Cold War bombs, a fleet of Apaches had slipped established in the Iraqi desert had proached the city of Karbala, where mainly artillery—used to silence planning that failed at its primary into Iraq and attacked key nodes of the been under surveillance by enemy the Army expected to find Iraqi ar- enemy forces that could threaten the mission—deep attack. air defense system—the opening shots observers, who noticed battle prepa- mor, the lights once again went out, helicopters. That opening gave the “The Army,” wrote former Air Force of the war. rations on the night of the 24th. After just as they had when the 11th had Iraqis one of their few battlefield Chief of Staff Merrill A. McPeak after Army commanders expected the the war, Wallace, the V Corps com- been ambushed. “That put a little victories of the war. the war, “should restrict the Apache to Apaches to play a similar role in mander, told reporters that an Iraqi lump in my throat,” said Smith, who A fusillade of small-arms and anti- close air support—or, if it must go Gulf War II. two-star general in Najaf had used a was flying one of the choppers. aircraft fire downed one Apache and deep, hand it over for joint tasking.” In January and February 2003, “cellular telephone to speed-dial a Initially, the Apaches took little its two-man crew. The other heli- Those are precisely the kinds of Apaches from the 101st Airborne, the number of Iraqi air defenders” and fire. However, south of the city, they Was it just poor tactics or some deeper problem that caused the failed Apache mission?

US Army photo by Sgt. Igor Paustovski Ambush at Najaf

By Richard J. Newman

URING Gulf War II, the copters in the raid retreated before A US Army AH-64 Apache in Iraq. issues facing defense planners as they 11th Aviation Regiment, and other tell them to prepare for a helicopter Army sent its Apache he- the mission could be accomplished. Critics view the failed March 24 attempt to fulfill Defense Secretary units participated in an exercise called raid. licopters to mount a “deep Despite this failed mission, the mission as the Apache’s “Little Big Donald H. Rumsfeld’s goal of mak- Victory Scrimmage at the Army’s train- As the Apache pilots flew toward Dattack” against an Iraqi unit. Small- Army insists the Apache was indis- ing the military more nimble and ing range in Grafenwoehr, Germany. their attack positions, the Iraqi power Horn.” arms and anti-aircraft fire downed pensable during the war, providing versatile. The exercise was a dress rehearsal for grid in the Najaf area went black for one Apache, and the other helicop- critical close air support for ground Whatever its limitations, few deny the war, with units practicing roles a few seconds—likely a signal to Iraqi ters retreated, some damaged so troops engaged in combat and armed that the Apache is a fearsome weapon they anticipated they would fulfill in gunners that the Apaches were ap- seriously they had to be grounded reconnaissance by helping to destroy system. The helicopter can carry 16 Iraq. Some went after artillery, for proaching. Then the sky filled with for weeks. That aborted mission Iraqi armor and other key equipment fire-and-forget Hellfire missiles, each example, while others attacked mecha- lead. The fire was so dense that when has become the subject of one of lurking on the edges of the battle- capable of taking out a tank. The newer nized units. Risky operations behind the Army tried to mount a search and the most controversial postwar de- field. “Our Apaches did great for and more advanced version—the AH- enemy lines were the focal point. “It rescue operation for the two-man crew bates. us,” said Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus, 64D Longbow—can track and pro- was typical use of the Apaches,” re- of the Apache that was shot down, the There’s little dispute about what commander of the 101st Airborne cess up to 256 different targets at once. called Lt. Col. Steve Smith, commander rescuers couldn’t get through. Iraqi happened. On March 24, Lt. Gen. Division, during a briefing after the It also carries a millimeter-wave radar of the 2nd Battalion, 101st Aviation forces captured the two pilots. William S. Wallace, the Army’s V war. “We were flexible and adapt- for improved performance during bad Regiment. “We thought we’d be do- Two days later, the Army again Corps commander, ordered 32 AH- able in the way that we used them.” weather and other poor-visibility situ- ing night and deep attacks.” used Apaches to carry out another 64 Apaches from the 11th Aviation ations. At combat altitudes of less than nighttime deep attack. But the Army Regiment to mount an attack behind “Little Big Horn”? a hundred feet, Apaches can often sneak The Mission used different tactics this time. enemy lines against the Iraqi Repub- But critics of the multimillion dol- below an enemy’s radar coverage, Then came the mission against the First, it preceded the Apache raid lican Guard Medina Division. The lar chopper view the Najaf retreat as which made them the weapon of choice Medina Division on March 24, four with a four-minute artillery bom- corridor near Najaf that the Apaches the Apache’s “Little Big Horn”— in the opening phase of the 1991 Per- days into the war. bardment to make sure Iraqi gunners planned to fly through was modestly proof that it is too vulnerable to sur- sian Gulf War. Before any Air Force Army officials now believe that wouldn’t catch the helicopter crews populated, so commanders decided vive modern combat. They argue that or Navy aircraft had dropped their the aviation assembly areas the Army by surprise. As the Apaches ap- against the usual suppression fire— the Apache is a relic of Cold War bombs, a fleet of Apaches had slipped established in the Iraqi desert had proached the city of Karbala, where mainly artillery—used to silence planning that failed at its primary into Iraq and attacked key nodes of the been under surveillance by enemy the Army expected to find Iraqi ar- enemy forces that could threaten the mission—deep attack. air defense system—the opening shots observers, who noticed battle prepa- mor, the lights once again went out, helicopters. That opening gave the “The Army,” wrote former Air Force of the war. rations on the night of the 24th. After just as they had when the 11th had Iraqis one of their few battlefield Chief of Staff Merrill A. McPeak after Army commanders expected the the war, Wallace, the V Corps com- been ambushed. “That put a little victories of the war. the war, “should restrict the Apache to Apaches to play a similar role in mander, told reporters that an Iraqi lump in my throat,” said Smith, who A fusillade of small-arms and anti- close air support—or, if it must go Gulf War II. two-star general in Najaf had used a was flying one of the choppers. aircraft fire downed one Apache and deep, hand it over for joint tasking.” In January and February 2003, “cellular telephone to speed-dial a Initially, the Apaches took little its two-man crew. The other heli- Those are precisely the kinds of Apaches from the 101st Airborne, the number of Iraqi air defenders” and fire. However, south of the city, they found the Iraqi units they were seek- ing and quickly came under attack from anti-aircraft artillery. The Apaches fired back on the move— rather than using the Army’s typical tactic of hovering over the battle- field. That made them harder to hit from the ground but reduced their accuracy. The Army choppers also

USAF photo by SSgt. Cherie A. Thurlby coordinated the attack with several F/A-18s and other fixed-wing fight- ers. The fighters guarded the chop- pers’ flanks, enabling the Apaches to get in close and quickly pass the precise locations of the Iraqi mili- tary vehicles and anti-aircraft guns to the fighters overhead. The results of the attack were re- spectable, if not spectacular: seven Iraqi air defense guns destroyed, along with three artillery systems, five ra- After the March 24 retreat, Apaches coordinated attacks with fighters such as dars, and 25 vehicles or other weap- these F-16CJs, flying over Iraq. Some say the failed attack was poorly planned. ons systems. Not one Apache was Others say the Apache is inadequate for its deep-attack mission. shot down. Shortly afterward, the 3rd Infantry Division slashed through the Critics like McPeak argue that the Apache mission changed signifi- Medina on its way toward Baghdad. Apache simply lacks the stealth and cantly during the course of the war. The contrast between those two the range to penetrate enemy lines Military officials have pointed out missions has fueled the debate. Did without being detected. Others have that fighting conditions in Iraq weren’t the Army merely need to tweak its speculated, less publicly, that the well-suited to the Apache’s classic, attack aviation tactics as it adapted March 24 raid was simply poorly deep-attack mission. For instance, to the battlefield in Iraq or was a planned, with a predictable flight instead of massing in formation—an broader revamping of the entire path and a breach of operational se- ideal posture for an Apache raid— Apache mission required? “One key curity. Cordesman pointed out that Iraqi units dispersed and moved away question,” wrote Anthony H. Cordes- the “critical mission limitations” from the American lines, making man of the Center for Strategic and placed on Apache units after March themselves less vulnerable to the kind International Studies, “is whether the 24 “may have occurred because it of concentrated firepower that at- loss of tactical surprise [on the 24th] was already clear that the US could tack helicopters bring to bear. The was a freak incident or more typical win this particular war without tak- fine dust of the Iraqi desert also in- of what can be expected of an alert ing major losses.” hibited flight operations, fouling enemy in the future.” One thing is certain, though: The engines and power units and making visibility treacherous. At least one crash was largely caused by such poor environmental conditions. Still, the March 24 setback clearly alarmed senior commanders and forced rapid changes. “Everybody in this country has a weapon,” observed Wallace in a USA Today interview, “and if they all shoot them up in the air at the same time at every helicop- US Army photo by Sgt. Igor Paustovski ter that flies over, it becomes a very lethal environment for low-flying aircraft. He later told reporters, “Our attack aviation performed a signifi- cant role during the fight, but I must admit it didn’t perform the same role that I had envisioned.”

Revised Tactics Instead of conducting raids, Apaches ended up spending most of their time This AH-64 crashed during landing in Iraq on March 30. The Apaches suffered executing other missions from the from mechanical problems and poor visibility caused by the fine dust of the Army aviation playbook: armed re- Iraqi desert. connaissance and close support of

62 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2003 ground troops. Armed reconnaissance missions often resembled deep attacks, since many took place behind enemy lines. Some covered distances of nearly 100 miles. But there were important differences. Many of the reconnais- sance flights were during daylight. They were often packaged with other

air assets, such as USAF’s E-8 Joint US Army photo by Sgt. Igor Paustovski STARS radar, E-3 AWACS command and control aircraft, and F-16s with High speed Anti-Radiation Missiles, and Navy EA-6B electronic jamming aircraft. The Apaches would gather intelligence on how Iraqi forces were arrayed and scout for targets—but hus- band their own ordnance. If they came across hot targets, they’d call for strikes from Army artillery or from fixed- wing fighters overhead. Only when the Apaches were running low on fuel As part of its revised tactics, the Army shifted the Apaches to new missions: and were near the end of their time on armed reconnaissance, close air support, and urban warfare. They proved station would they fire their own mis- highly effective in supporting ground forces in the urban setting. siles, if targets were handy. There was more shooting during mission, filling the security vacuum ons hadn’t neutralized Iraqi air de- close air support missions, when created as the lead Army battalions fenses and friendly ground troops ground troops from the 101st and the briskly bypassed cities such as an hadn’t secured the territory beneath 3rd Infantry Division were battling Najaf and Karbala. When the 101st them. There’s also an important de- Iraqi units. As those troops punched moved into some of those areas to gree of symbiosis between the Apaches through areas such as the Ramadi begin peace enforcement operations, and their enablers. Attack helicop- Gap, al Hillah, and Karbala, Apaches Apache helicopters turned out to be ters helped identify and destroy many often hovered “over the shoulder” of invaluable: Hovering over buildings air defense weapons, and they served ground units, guarding their flanks, gave them an ideal perch for intelli- as aerial protectors for the very troops protecting supply lines, and conduct- gence gathering and taking direct whose presence on the ground made ing standoff attacks of enemy troops action. They were far more effec- it safer to fly. up to five miles ahead. At al Hillah, tive than artillery when US ground That may argue in favor of new for instance, an Apache company forces needed offensive fire. When procedures for Apache units and for from the 101st “fought very, very Iraqi irregulars belonging to the greater integration with other air- hard,” according to Petraeus, and Fedayeen Saddam militia fired on a craft. The kinds of “pop-up” tactics was a key factor in the defeat of a US brigade commander’s convoy in and earth-hugging flight profiles that Republican Guard battalion. Eight Najaf, for instance, an Apache air- are effective at the Army’s National helicopters took fire. crew had the mobility—and the le- Training Center—where tactical sur- In a half-dozen such battles dur- thality—to track the attackers and prise is often assumed and where ing the first two weeks of April, destroy their vehicles. By the time few civilians roam the terrain—may attack aviation units from the 101st US forces reached the Iraqi capital, turn out to be inappropriate for com- destroyed more than 200 Iraqi air Apache crews found themselves in bat on many of the world’s potential defense guns, 100 artillery pieces, an unprecedented role, essentially battlefields, where concerns about nearly 35 radars, and hundreds of flying air combat patrols for troops collateral damage trump standard other weapons. The Apaches found engaged in urban combat. “I never operating procedures. Greater coor- some of the equipment abandoned, thought I’d be flying an Apache dination with fixed-wing aircraft— beneath trees or in the open desert, over the rooftops of southern Bagh- as was apparently the case during but, at other times, Iraqi defenders dad,” recalled Smith. “But there I the battle of Karbala—may enhance put up a fight. Overall, the 101st was.” the survivability and effectiveness Apaches and Kiowa Warrior scout Was that a new role for the Apache? of the Apache. helicopters fired more than 40,000 Or an anomaly? The question may Cordesman suggested that long- rounds of ammunition, along with not be answered until the next war, range helicopter raids might be more nearly 1,000 2.75-inch rockets and but Apache pilots know they never successful if the helicopters attack Hellfire missiles. could have flown over Iraqi cities if armor while overhead fighters sup- To the Apaches fell another new fixed-wing fighters and other weap- press air defense weapons. If the Apache is indeed more ef- Richard J. Newman is a former Washington, D.C.-based defense correspon- fective in the next war, then the March dent and senior editor for US News & World Report. He is now based in the 24 retreat at Najaf might turn out to New York office of US News. His most recent article for Air Force Magazine, have been one of the most produc- “War From Afar,” appeared in the August issue. tive defeats in modern warfare. ■

AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2003 63