Was Dave Chappelle Morally Obliged to Leave Comedy?

Phillip Deen* WasDaveChappelle Morally Obliged to LeaveComedy? On the Limits of Consequentialism

Abstract: Dave Chappelle took an extended leave from comedy for moral reasons. Iargue that,while he had every right to leave comedybecause of his moral concerns, he was not obliged to do so. To make this case, Ipresent Chap- pelle’sargument that the potential negative consequences of his racialhumor obliged him to leave.Next,Iargueagainst Chappelle’sargument about avoidable harms as the harms are not his responsibility,hewas not being negligent, and the benefits of his humor outweigh the harms. Ialso argueinsupport of the intuition thatanother’sfailureofcomprehension or moralcharacter,even if that failurewill predictablyresultinharmstoothers, should not convert moral acts into immoral ones.

Keywords: Chappelle, humor,comedy, race,consequentialism

1Introduction

In 2014,DaveChappelle returned to comedyafter almost tenyears of near absence. He famouslyleft both stand-up and an astounding$50M contract for his eponymousshow on ComedyCentral because he faced amoral crisis. He worried that his humor, which mined racist stereotypes in order to critique them and to make wry observations about contemporary America,was actually perpetuatingthosestereotypes. It is not easy to imagine walking away from the wealth, fame, and fulfillment that Chappelle had receivedfrom his comedyca- reer.Todosobecause of deeplyheld moral beliefs is trulyadmirable. However, it wasnot required. Iargue that,while he had every right to leave comedybecause of his moral concerns, he was not obliged to do so. To make this case, Iwill present Chap- pelle’sargument for leaving comedy. Next,Iwill argueagainst Chappelle’sargument against avoidable harms as the harmsare not his responsibility,hewas not being negligent,and the benefitsofhis humor outweigh the harms. Ialso argue in support of the intuition thatanother’sfailureofcomprehension or moralchar-

* University of New Hampshire;[email protected] https://doi.org/10.1515/phhumyb-2020-0011 136 Phillip Deen acter,evenifthat failurewill predictablyresult in harms to others, should not convert moral acts into immoral ones. Beyond addressingChappelle’snarrowcase, this article has abroader goal. Ethical criticism of comedyhas often focused on the character of the people who laugh. Being amused by morallysuspect comedyissaid to reveal amorallysus- pect character.However,other critics assert that,irrespective of the comedian’s intent,itismorallywrong to tell certain jokes because of their consequences.By discussingthe limits of Chappelle’sargument for leaving standup, we can also see the limits of apurelyconsequentialist approach to the ethical criticism of comedy.¹

2Chappelle’sArgument forLeaving

Chappelle stated manyreasons for leaving comedy, but the main ones werees- sentiallymoral.² Iwill quickly state two before concentratingonathird. First,it was amatter of self-care. Having reached great heights in pop culture, he was under enormous stress.The more success he has had in television, the less happy he was. Forsomeonewho, since highschool, had dreamed of “doing a Bobby Fischer” and disappearingfrom public view,this stress could be damag- ing.Chappelle alsostated thatheneeded time to mourn his deceased father. When it became too much, he escaped to Africa to take a “sabbatical” where he was largely unknown and others werenot making such demands on him. Second, he believed he was being treated unjustlybythe entertainment industry.This concern traces to his past conflicts with it and his fear of exploitation and compromise. His conflicts with the “suits” extended back to his first television pilot for I’mthe Man when he waspressured to add an attractive,whitefe- male lead, but he refused, and the show was pulled soon after.But even on his wildlysuccessful Chappelle’sShow,hefelt thathewas being pressured into

 Aproviso:Chappelle’scomedyabout gender and sexuality is far less defensible,particularly in his five Netflix specials sincehis return to standup, TheAge of Spin, Deep in the Heart of Texas, Equanimity, TheBird Revelation, and Sticks and Stones. While certainlyworthy of ethical analysis,Ihave not done so herefor reasons of space. The very brief version: His treatment of these topics (particularlytrans-people) does not have the nuanceand moral purpose that his racial humor does,soitwould likelynot be protected by this argument.  Neal Brennan, co-creatorofChappelle’sShow and his former long-time writingpartner,sup- ports the moral arguments for leaving, but claimed that Chappelle also left for reasons of ego and control (TheJoe Rogan Experience #114, June 14,2011). Chappelle also statedthat he felt the show was coming at the expense of his standup, though he eventuallyleft both. Since the concern hereisethical,wecan set aside other motivations as outside our scope. WasDave Chappelle Morally Obliged to Leave Comedy? 137 doing thingshewould not otherwise do. During an interview with OprahWin- frey,hedrew attention to how others profited from his success, garnering their percentage. “Yougot your own personal problems thatget inflamed when this kind of money comes in. Igotta write the show and do the show and Iwas over- whelmed. Iwas like, Idon’tknow,itwas like all of this was happeningdeliber- ately” (Oprah 2006). While conceding that he has paranoidtendencies,hestill felt that there was apattern of exploitation. During an interview on Inside the Actor’sStudio before an audience of aspiringartists, Chappelle discussed the in- tersection of artand corporate interests, saying that it will inevitably break the heart of the artist.Heacknowledgedthat the entertainment industry is one of mutualadvantage, but the exchange “should be fair” (Inside the Actor’sStudio 2006).³ So, as amatterofjustice, he had to leave. However,itishis third argument that is most clearly ethical and richest for philosophical analysis,and the one Iwill be discussinghere. Chappelle left comedybecause, while filming asketch for the upcomingseason of his show,a stagehand waslaughingseemingly for the wrong reasons,indicating thatChap- pelle’shumor was perpetuatingthe very problems that he wasseeking to over- come.⁴ As he told Oprah Winfrey: “Iwas doing sketches that were funny, but so- ciallyirresponsible.” Thesketch that caused this epiphanywas one of aseries about “stereotypepixies.” Though ajoke explained is ajoke ruined, let’stakeamoment to explain and ruin this one. The sketch presents Chappelle on aplane afraid to order fried chicken because of how he, ablack man, would be perceivedbythe whitepassengers. Chappelle is the onlyAfrican-Americanpassenger on the planeand is surrounded by whitepeople. While it is clear that he prefers the chicken over the fish, he is very aware of alegacyofracist stereotypes about black people and fried chicken—acommon element in the Sambotrope of Southern blacks that has been used to ridicule African-Americans and to justify their further op- pression. Chappelle’sanxiety about how he will be perceivedisgiven form in his imagination as aSambostereotype pixie with blackface and ariverboat stew- ard’suniformwho shucks and jivestobanjo music and demands thatthe real Chappelle not fight his fate and just order the chicken. Chappelle is shown resist- ing the stereotypeand he makes apublic displayofhis preference for the fish to the whitepassengers. All the while, the pixie berateshim and begs him to live up

 He makes asimilar argument in the last tenminutes of his 2017 special, TheBird Revelation.  Rumor has it that the person was not astagehand but Bill Burr,acelebrated comedian and sometimes member of the Chappelle’sShow cast,but the rumor is unsubstantiated. Burr has refused to sayitwas him, but he has also refused to sayitwas not him. 138 PhillipDeen to the stereotype. In short,Chappelle is put in the unfair and awkwardposition of just wantingtoorder his preferred meal through the lens of racist perception.⁵ This sketch is itself basedonanearlier joke from his 2000 stand-up special Killin’ Them Softly in which he discussed his fear of eating chicken in front of whitepeople. In that bit,hediscusses confronting racism that is so explicit that,ironically, he misses it.Before he can even place his order in arestaurant in Mississippi, the racist waiter assumes that Chappelle wants the chicken. At first,hethinks that the waiter is just prescient,but he eventuallyrealizes what is actuallyhappening. To which he replies,

All these years, IthoughtIliked chicken because it was delicious. Turns out I’mgenetically predisposed to likingchicken! Igot no sayinthe matter.That guyruined chicken for me. Now I’mscaredtoeat it in public. Idon’twant someone to see me and saysomething. “Look at him. He loves it! Just like it said in the encyclopedia!Lookhow happy he looks!”

Giventhis, and the content of the Pixie sketch itself, it is clear thatChappelle is making anuanced, funnycomment about the waythat African-Americans have to negotiate their self-presentationinaworld in which even the simplest of thingscan reinforce stereotypes. This is aconcern that more privileged people do not have.While everyone has to worry about how they perform themselvesinfront of others, not everyone has to shoulder this particular burden. Admittedly, the black stereotype pixieis onlyone in aseries that includes awhite man whose country-club pixie advises him on how to behave in front of his black friends and restrains his desire for a beautifulblack woman, aHispanic man whose cocaine-using bullfighter pixie encourages him (with an assist from the Spanish-Americanactress and musician Charo) to getleopard pattern seat covers and aJesus air freshener for his car,and an Asian man whose pixiesports atraditional Chinese garb, afu-manchu mus- tache and buck teeth, eats rice, has L-Rconfusion, and commits seppuku upon dishonor.Curiously, all four pixies portrayed by Chappelle reflect the anxieties of men, as if women do not worry about self-performance. Further,while all address anxiety about how one is perceived, the white man’sanxiety is the only one in which the primary concern is how he will be perceivedifhedoes not act accordingtohis racial stereotype.

 The sketch was aired as part of the truncated thirdseason on Comedy Central without Chap- pelle’sconsent.Totheir credit,the sketch was framed by an explicit statement of its meaning and much of the episode was an open discussion with the audienceabout their reaction to it. http://www.cc.com/video-clips/s191yw/chappelle-s-show-stereotype-pixies—black-pixie—un- censored. WasDave Chappelle Morally Obliged to Leave Comedy? 139

While the black stereotype pixie sketch is acomplex and hilarious presentation of how African-American people face the burden of managingtheir racial representation to others, the stagehand that troubled Chappelle seemed to be laughingalong with the racist stereotype being taken seriously.Itisconceivable that someone could watch this sketch and miss all the nuance. Instead, their reaction would be to believethat Sambos are just funny, or that they reveal adeep- er truth about African-Americanpeople and that “it is funnybecause it’strue.” This concern was forefront in Chappelle’smind:

Blackfaceisavery difficultimage, but the reason Ichose blackfaceatthe time was because this was goingtobethe visual personification of the “n-word.” It was agood spirit or intention behind it.But,what Ididn’tconsider is how manypeople watchthis show and how the waypeople use television is subjective.Sothen when I’monthe set and we’re finally taping the sketch, somebodyonset that was white laughedinsuch away—Iknow the dif- ference between people laughing with me and people laughing at me, and it was the first time Ievergot alaugh that Iwas uncomfortable with. Not just uncomfortable, but like “Should Ifirethis person?”… Iknow that all these people who’re watchingTV, that there’s alot of people whowill understand exactlywhatI’mdoing and there’sanother group of people whoare just fans likethe kind of people whoscream “I’mRick James,bitch!” at my concerts. They’re goingtoget somethingcompletelydifferent.(Oprah 2006)

Chappelle’ssubversive comedy then runs the ongoingrisk of being misinterpreted and of perpetuating the oppressive Samboimagethathehad hoped to treat in afar more nuancedway.Inshort, “When he laughed, it made me uncomfortable. As amatteroffact,that was the last thing Ishot before Itold myself Igotta take a fucking time out after this. Because my head almostexploded” (Farley 2005). Chappelle felt responsible to the black community. “Idon’twant black people to be disappointed in me for putting thatout there” (Oprah 2006). Being from both Washington, DC and aliberal, whitecollegetown in Ohio, he has always negotiated the whiteand black communities,welcomed and shunnedbyboth. This is true of him both as aperson and as acomedian. Within the broader and whiter comedycommunity,hefelt obligated to represent the black community well—but he also felt the weight of expectations laid on him as ablack comedian, as when he regretted his performance on the notoriouslyraunchyDef ComedyJam, stating that the demand to be dirty was “limiting everyone” (Zino- man 2017,loc. 253).⁶ And his cross-culturalhumor, includinghaving awhitewrit- ing partnerand an earlytelevision show about his character’sfriendship with a whitebest friend, often did not playwell in the black community.Hewas ac- cused of selling out his people. His sketches about racial representation did

 See also chapters 2and 4. 140 PhillipDeen not begin or end with the stereotype pixie sketch, of course. Forexample, he mocked the thoroughly socially constructed nature of race in Chappelle’s Show’sfirst sketch ever.Itwas about Clayton Bigsby, the Ku Klux Klan grand wiz- ard who, being blind, was unaware that he was himself black.When introducing the sketch, he revealed that he had shown it to afriend who reacted as if Chap- pelle had “set black people back.” He then shruggedand playeditfor the studio audience. As Jason Zinoman notes,bythe third season featuring the stereotype pixie sketch, “Chappelle had stopped shrugging” (Zinoman 2017,loc. 375).At other times, Chappelle was criticized for representing ablack experience that he had not lived. MikeEpps accusedhim of such: “He don’tcome from no crack- heads on the streets and shit.You can’ttalk about black people like that and you don’tevenrepresent that” (Zinoman 2017,loc. 634– 35). In short,Chappelle has had to payparticularattentiontohow he is perceivedbymultiple communities, pulled between the demands of each. The issue of racialrepresentation thatwe find in the stereotypepixie sketch is then one very close to Chappelle’sown life.⁷ This concern mystified Neal Brennan, his long-time writing partner: “We’d shoot it,and then at some point he’dstart saying, ‘This sketch is racist,and I don’twant this on the air.’ And Iwas like, ‘Youlike this sketch. What do you mean?’ There was this confusingcontradictory thing:hewas calling his own writing racist” (Farley 2005).But Chappelle’sconcern did not regardthe intention, so it cannot be resolved by noting that he wrote the sketch. No matter the intent behind the sketch or who its sourcewas,the nature of its reception could render it immoral. Chappelle frames this all explicitlyasanethical deci- sion, one of his refusal to compromise his character and of the need to be socially responsible. The price wastoo high, and he felt an obligation to leave. Chappelle is not the onlycomedian to be concerned about how their comedy will be received. Forexample, Hari Kondabolu, an Indian-Americancomedian who has been very open about the moral responsibilities of comedians,wrote and starred in the documentary TheProblemwith Apu about TheSimpsons’ ster- eotypical portrayal of Indian-Americans and the ensuing harm done to thatcom- munity.Explicitlyreferencing Chappelle, he said:

Idon’tlike the idea that the laughjustifies everything. Idon’tbelievethat,because Ithink there’sdifferent kinds of laughs.That’sthe famous [comedian Dave]Chappelle quandary, right? Are you laughing at me or areyou laughing with me? Am Imaking things better or am I making things worse? Idon’tthink all laughs areequal, because if that is the case, youcould

 FormoreonChappelle’sconcernfor authenticity and the difficulty of negotiatingracial communities,see Lee2009 and Yates2009.For this issue in the contextofChappelle’sdisappear- ance, see Amarasingam 2009,particularly124– 26. WasDave Chappelle Morally Obliged to Leave Comedy? 141

probablyput the most racist stuff in the world constantlyinthings—likethe old days—and people would still laugh. (Saraiya 2017)⁸

Similarly,Sarah Silverman worries that her humor will appeal to people who think simple racism is funny(Silverman 2010,93–94). Even AnthonyJeselnik, who has mastered the art of walking the line of moralunacceptability in his humor, has heard laughs thathedid not want and cut jokes because of it (Zino- man 2019).⁹ Forany morallydecent comedian, the question of whether they are inadvertentlydoing harmissure to arise. To summarize Chappelle’sargument:Despite his intention and craft,humor that usesracial stereotypes in order to expose and subvert them maypromoteor reinforce bigotry among those who inevitablyfail to getthe joke. Out of adesire not to perpetuate racism and cause further harm, Chappelle then believed he had an obligation to leave comedy. Chappelle’sargument has merit.Laughter can express prejudice. Some have argued thatthe onlyway to enjoyracist or otherwise offensivehumor is to har- bor offensive attitudes and it is certainlypossiblethat that is preciselywhy the stagehand laughed, which would give Chappelle good reason to be outraged. But this position that finding offensivehumorfunnynecessitatesendorsing offensive attitudes is not asufficient account of offensivehumorgenerallyand of this sketch in particular.¹⁰ Findingoffensivehumor funnydoes not necessarilyentail that the laugher endorses offensiveattitudes,and certainlyChappelle was not endorsing them. However,though laughter does not necessarilyentail endorsement,itcan. Psychological studies of humor have shown that people find ag- gressive humor funnier whenittargets groups that they dislike. If people are laughingmore at his humor when it uses racial stereotypes, then it maydraw from an underlying racism. Second, while humor that uses racialstereotypes has been shown not to cause racist beliefs, it does seem to give people with pre-existing racist beliefs a “permission structure” within which to expressand to act upon them. Such humorreduces the barriers to the expression of negative emotions. Racists can saywith ajoke what it is not permissible to saydirectly, or the fact that others are laughing about race maylead racists to believethey mayexpress otherwise

 Foradeeper treatment of Kondabolu’shumor and his desiretoavoid “minstrelry,” see Kreft- ing 2014,196–230.  He also discusses the dangers of his ironicracism in his fourth standup special, Fireinthe Maternity Ward.  The best known and most discussed presentation of this “Attitudinal Endorsement Argu- ment” is De Sousa 1987. 142 PhillipDeen unacceptable beliefs. Racial humorhas historicallybeen used to reinforce existing racism and further marginalize groups,ashumor frequentlypolices social boundaries. People are informallyeducated about what is normaloracceptable and what is not by means of playful teasing or harsh ridicule.Inracist humor, marginal people are taught to keep in their social lane or suffer social exclusion (or worse) and members of the dominant group are taught that the ongoing exclusion of the ridiculedisjustified. So we maynot easilydismiss Chappelle’s concerns with abreezy, “Don’tworry;it’sjust ajoke,” as it maygiveracist people the impression that it is sociallyacceptable to act on racial stereotypes even if that wasneither the intention of the sketch nor even areasonable interpretation of it (Ferguson and Ford 2008;Ford et.al. 2015). Third, “Poe’sLaw” holds that no matter how extreme the ironyofastate- ment is, it will inevitably be taken as literal by someone. Studies of viewer’sre- actionstoAllinthe Family in the 1970sand TheColbert Report in the 2000s in- dicate that satire of bigotry will frequentlybemissed by bigots (Vidmar and Rokeach 1974;LaMarreetal. 2009).¹¹ Bizarrely, both prejudiced and non-prejudiced audiences will enjoy the humor to the same degree, but for very different reasons.Prejudiced audiencestend to laughnot because they correctlyidentify the satire of bigotry,but because they see someone sincerely “tellingitlike it is.”¹²

3Why Chappelle WasNot Obliged to Leave

Of course, all other thingsbeing equal, we have amoral obligation not to harm innocents,and racism is aclear social evil that we should not deepen. Chap- pelle’sargument then has an intuitiveappeal. However,Chappelle was not ob- ligedtoleave,eventhough reasonablypredictable harms might result from his racialcomedy. My objectionoriginates in an intuition: It seems odd to hold that anyone has an obligation to refrain from inoffensive or genuinelymoral actions because of the intellectual or moral failingsofothers. To what extent should one’svirtuous actions be rendered viciousbyanother’simmorality?

 Allinthe Family was based on the British program, Till Death Do Us Part,which reportedly misunderstood in much the same way.  Brian Gogan has argued that Chappelle’swork is particularlyvulnerable to this concern because sketcheslike “Stereotype Pixies” do not provide the clear markers of the author’sintent and this ambiguity can easilybeexploited (Gogan 2009). As Iarguelater,Ibelievethat thereare sufficient markers. WasDave Chappelle Morally Obliged to Leave Comedy? 143

But,before defending that intuition, Iwill address Chappelle’sargument from avoiding harms directly.

3.1 Uncaused Harms

It is widelyassumed that youare responsible onlyfor the harms youcause. You would rightlybesurprised to discover that youwerebeing blamed for harms that occurred before your birth, are on the other side of the world, or are otherwise not the resultofyour actions. In additiontoactuallycausing the harm, intent to cause harm is also generallyconsidered essential in assigningmoral blame. If youdid not mean to cause harm, wereunaware of what youweredoing,orif youreasonablybelieved thatwhat youweredoing was right,then youare not responsible—or at least youare less deserving of punishment.However,wicked intent is not always required. In the law, there is such athing as strict liability,in which aperson must compensate another person they have harmed if there was no malicious intent or even an awareness that what they have done is against the law(mens rea). If youare caught speeding,itdoes not matter whyyou weredriving toofast or if youwereaware of the speed limit.Sotoo for statutory rape, in which it does not matter if the offender was aware of the victim’sage or if they intended to do harm. In both cases, being the cause of the harmissufficientto make aperson legallyresponsible. Admittedly, legality and morality are not the same in aliberal society,but strict liability provides auseful analogy. We might imagine astrict moral liability, in which the intent simplydoes not matter when assigningmoral responsibility.¹³ All that matters is that aperson causedanother to be harmed. Chappelle’s argument that he had amoral responsibility to refrain from making the Black Pixie sketch (and other raciallychargedhumor)because of the harmful consequences,despite the absence of malicious intent,then seems to rely on strict moral liability.The strictest and simplest formulation of Chappelle’sargument is then: If your action causesharmtoothers—the reinforcement of racist beliefs and attitudes and promotion of racist acts, in this case— then youhaveanover- riding moral obligation not to do it. However,strictlyspeaking,Chappelle would not have caused the harms he feared. Let us imagine for the sake of argument that Chappelle’scomedywas a necessary condition for the eventual harm. In other words, if the racist audience

 Thereisnot an extensive literatureonstrict moral liability,unlikewith legal liability,but two exceptions are: Capes (forthcoming)and Rosen 2015. 144 PhillipDeen memberhad not seen it,they would not have acted immorally. But,evenifwe grant this assumption that his actions wereanecessary condition, it is not enough to establish responsibility.When thereisintervening agency by another person, that person has initiated anew causal chain, and they are responsible for what follows. Forexample, if youweretosell someone your car and then they crashed into someone else’shome as they weredriving away,you would not be responsible. Rather,the driveris, despite the fact that your providing the car was anecessary condition for the eventual harm. That others may crash cars does not imposeamoralobligation not to sell them. The analogytoChappelle’sjokes is obvious. By writing,performing,and air- ing the sketch, Chappelle would not directlyharmanyone, though it is certainly possiblethatpeople would be offended. Chappelle’sfear was that he was rein- forcingracist stereotypes among thosewho did not gethis morallyright intention, those who did not getthe joke. But for that harmtocome about,misunderstanding bigots had to intervene. They initiate anew causal chain and are responsible for the consequences. Even if one could arguethat Chappelle’s jokes provided apermission structure within which bigots felt freetoact upon their bigotry,the responsibility rests on them.

3.2 Chappelle’sPossibleNegligence

But perhaps direct causation is too narrow of astandard. People are sometimes morallyresponsible for the harms that,strictlyspeaking, they did not cause. We could accept that Chappelle wasnot strictlymorallyresponsible, but still believe that he is morallyresponsible for his jokes’ harm because he was being negligent.Aperson acts negligentlywhen they should have been aware of the sub- stantial and unjustifiable risk of their actions, as their failuretoperceive the risk grosslydeviatesfrom what areasonable person would see. They did not fore- see harm, but they should have.Thisisamurkier standard thansimplyasking whether Chappelle causedthe eventual harm. Again making an analogyto legal concepts, consider the classic case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,in which arailroad employee pushed asalesman to assist him onto atrain, unwit- tingly causing the salesman to drop asuitcase full of fireworks onto the tracks, causing them to explode, causing ascale on the platformtofall over,causing injury to poor Mrs. Palsgraf. The Court ruled thatLongIsland Railroad was not liable because the harm was not areasonablyforeseeable resultofthe orig- inal act.This has come to be known as the “zone of danger test,” which sets a limit to legal liability. WasDave Chappelle Morally Obliged to Leave Comedy? 145

Were innocent people within the “zone of danger” of Chappelle’sracial humor? Would he have been negligent if he had aired the Black Pixie sketch, leaving him responsible for future harmsand imposing amoral obligation to refrain from such comedy? While aperson is neither morallyresponsible nor liable if they sell their car to someonewho crashes it,they are arguably responsible if they instead sold their gunwithout conducting anysort of background check. This is especiallytrue if they have reason to believethatone of their customers will use it to cause harm, either because they werevocal about theirdesire to murder someone or simplybecause,ifsomeone sells enough guns, areasonable person knows thatone will be usedimmorally. To conclude that Chappelle was being negligent,wemust believethat the Black Pixie sketch is more like agun than acar.Itmust be the sort of thing that poses such asubstantial risk of harm that areasonable person would be negligent to leave it lyingaround. But jokes are not.Despite what anydwindlingnumber of pure adherents to the superiority theory of humor might believe, jokes are not free-floating tools of aggression.¹⁴ Forthe harm to result,the audience must completelymiss the joke, believethat the joke givesthem permission to be bigoted, and then act immorally. If anything,Chappelle’shumor was analogous to neither acar nor agun but an anti-violence educational doll thatwas used, against its intended and predictable purpose, to bludgeon someone. Further,evenagunseller is spared responsibility if they takereasonable precautions to ensure thatthe gunwill not be used to harminnocents.Analogously, acomedian who makes agood-faith effort to ensurethatthey do not harm others, directlyorindirectly, has then not been negligent.The sketch would have been aired in the context of acomedyshow on acomedynetwork by aracially progressive,African-American comedian. Jokes told by acomedian and set in the context of acomedyshow,acomedyclub, or acomedyalbum mayreasonablybe expectedtobetaken as humorous rather than serious, as ironic rather thanlit- eral. Giventhathis jokes wereclearlyset within aplay-frame,reasonable precautions weretaken and Chappelle did not displayrecklessness and disregard for others’ wellbeing.Thiswas not akin to selling guns withoutbackground checks or to firing bulletsinto the air without regard for wherethey would land. While a genuinelyracist joke maygrant bigots permission to be bigots, Chappelle’s humordoes not,whatever their misunderstanding might be. It is not an incite- ment to violence, or even avagueconspiracy mongering,which would be moral-

 The superiority theory of humor,which dominated the Western understanding of humor for millennia,holds that we laughwhen we suddenlybecome awareofour superiority to others (or ourselvesatanearlier time). Laughter is then mockery,ridicule, laughing at. 146 Phillip Deen ly culpable speech. And, if one claims that ajoke told even under these circum- stances makes the comedian morallyresponsible for anyharm, then far too manymorallypermissible acts will getcaughtinthe net.Such strict moralliabil- ity,which ignores all concern for intention or character,ignores ahost of our basic moral intuitions regardingwhat makes for moral blame.

3.3 Weighing the BenefitsToo

But let us concede that,despite the absenceofmalice, the loosenessofthe causation, and the presenceofreasonable precautions to prevent misuse of his comedy, Chappelle’shumor might resultinforeseeable harms. Forthe sake of argument,wecould claim that this is sufficient to impose aprima facie moral obligation on him not to tell raciallychargedjokes.All other thingsbeing equal, we have amoral obligation not to be complicit in systemic wrongslike racism,evenindirectlyand in an attenuated way—but does that obligation over- ride all other considerations?Specifically, while it is certainlyappropriate to consider the predictable harms of his racial humor when evaluatingits morality,no consequentialist ethics (of which Chappelle’santi-harm argument is one variety) should ignorethe benefits, and it is not clear to me that his racialcomedy does more harm thangood. The position thatacomedian has amoral obligation not to make jokes that might be taken—or inevitablywill be taken—the wrongway and thereforecause unintended harms ignores all of the good that comedycan do. The benefits of satire and humor as aform of racialcritique and resistanceare significant. While racialhumor has been used as ameans of social control by the powers that be, satire generally, and the tradition of African-American humor in particular,havelong served as aweapon in the hands of otherwise socially marginal people (Watkins 1994). Chappelle’searly jokes about how black men must fear getting shot by the police onlytohavecrack “sprinkled” on topofthem, how every black Americanisaregistered paralegal because of their history with the judicial system, and the waythatwhiteness protects people from both of these, are excellent examples of politically chargedhumor that lets his typically mixed-race audiences understand one aspect of race in contemporary America— all while showinggreat craft and making them laugh. And Chappelle is onlythe inheritorofalong tradition of resistant African-Americanhumor,bothcovert and overt,that appeals to bothsociallydominant audiencesand marginal ones. It is ameans to explore the legacyofracism and to develop solidarity among marginal groups and with their allies. At the sametime, predominantly whiteaudienceswaitingfor TheDaily Show were being educated by Chappelle WasDave Chappelle Morally Obliged to Leave Comedy? 147 an hour before. Ironic use of stereotypes is then ameans of resistance to those stereotypes themselves. Of course,one could object that it is possible to make humorthatdoes not take the risks Chappelle’sdoes. If acomedian wants to avoid misunderstanding and the possible harms thatcome with it,then they can unambiguouslyjoke in a waythat is bothfunnyand politically progressive.However,thatisvery unlikely. Comedyinvolvesadelicate negotiation between acomedianand audience that can always break down. Anyhumor that is so unambiguous as to be impossible or at least extremelyunlikelytomisinterpretwill be either bland or propaganda. When the moralorpolitical messagedominates over amusement,the humor will suffer.Laughter becomes “clapter,” aterminvented by Saturday NightLive head writers Seth Meyers and Tina Feytodescribewhat audiences do when they show agreementwith the messagerather thanamusement.This is not to saythat amusement must always be our overriding goal in life, but it is in comedy. As noted above, thereisnosatire, no racially-critical humor,nogender-critical humor,orotherwise resistant humor that will not be misinterpreted by someone, and frequentlybybigots. While TheColbert Report and AllInThe Fam- ily mayseem to be indisputablyobvious satires of right-wing bloviating,they have been proven to be vulnerable to completemisunderstanding by prejudiced audiences.Humor inevitablyinvolvesacomplex process of negotiation between acomedian and audience over whether to playbythe rules of comedic playframe or by those of everyday, serious communication, and it oftenbreaks down. Even in cases wherethe audience agrees to playalong,there is an inescapable ambiguity.Humorcan and will be misunderstood. No attempt at clarity of moral purpose is fool-proof,given the preponderance of fools in the world. Therefore, if the sheer fact that Chappelle’shumormay be misinterpreted as giving permission to be racist is sufficient reason to stop making thosejokes,then we should all start enjoying puns and knock-knock jokes much more thanwecurrentlydo. At the least,wewould have to conclude that it wasmorallywrongfor Mark Twain to write HuckleberryFinn or for Jonathan Swift to write AModest Proposal. Apply- ing a “foreseeable harms of humor” standard then resultsinsignificant moral, political,and aesthetic losses that must be factored in and that likelyoutweigh the harms.

3.4 When Bigotry Restricts Autonomy

But again, let us saythataperson has not been persuadedbythe previous arguments that Chappelle did not directlycause harm,thathewas not being negligent,orthat the benefits of his humor outweigh the harms. In that case, let us 148 PhillipDeen return to the earlier intuition that another’sintervening immorality and the harms that resultfrom it should not transformotherwise innocent or good actions into bad ones. Is the habit of saving money rendered immoral if those funds are then used by bad people for nefarious purposes?Itwouldn’tseem so, even if it is reasonable to assume that manybad people work in finance and some will inevitablyuse funds to enrich themselves, buy off politicians, or exploit mortgageholders. Sadly, this assumption is true even if yougoto great lengths to save in asocially responsible manner.Oraperson mayhave the habit of being kind and supportive of others, which maybemisunderstood as toyingwith people’saffections. Aperson mayhaveanhonest character,but that might lead others to think thatacruel frankness is acceptable because they didn’tunderstand or are morallyinsensitive.Wouldothers’ intellectual and moral failings convert the virtues of moderation, kindness, and honesty into vices? Defendingthis intuition involves afinal analogyfrom legal philosophy. In this case, the area is anti-discrimination law. Richard Mohr,afierce defender of gayrights, makes acase against well-meaning discrimination. While the matter at hand is not acase of unjustified discrimination against Chappelle and has nothing to do with LGBTrights, allow me to explain how Mohr’sanalysis helps. What Mohr has in mind are the supposedlygood faith arguments by those who would exclude LGBTpeople from servinginthe armed forces, denythem teachingpositions, or prevent them from having custodyoftheir children. The person imposing such discrimination makesitclear that they bear no ill will to- ward LGBT people, but that they must prevent aharm resulting from our prejudiced society.Ifgaysare allowed to serveopenlyinthe armed forces, unit cohe- sion and moral will weaken while those LGBT soldiers will be at risk of harm from their fellow soldiers.Anopenlygay teacher might encouragegay students to come out of the closet,exposing them to prejudice and abuse. If LGBTpeople are allowed to have custodyofchildren, then those children will be bullied.In each case, thosedenying equality before the laworinemployment arguethat there is apredictable harm that will come to innocents,sothe lawmust lamen- tablydiscriminate against people who are doing nothing wrong. Mohr has little time for such arguments, as none address the true sourceof the problem: the bigots who would do harm. It is the bigoted soldiers, parents, and bullieswho bear the moral responsibility.Supposedly kind acts of discrimination onlyperpetuate the harms that befall innocent LGBTpeople by codifying social prejudice in lawand policy.Instead, bigoted soldiers and parents should be punished. In response, Mohr proposes the Wilde Principle: “[S]implyciting the current existenceofprejudice, bigotry,ordiscrimination in asociety against some group or citing the obviousconsequences of such prejudice, bigotry,ordis- WasDave Chappelle Morally Obliged to Leave Comedy? 149 crimination can never constituteagood reason for trying to establish agood faith discrimination against that group” (Mohr 1988, 193).¹⁵ Inclusion in the armed forces, hiring decisions, and parental custodyshould be determined by bona fide occupational qualifications, not the risk thatbigoted people will lash out at the innocent. In Chappelle’scase, we mayappeal to amodified version of the Wilde Prin- ciple, but one that appeals to the sameintuition thatwehavemisplaced the responsibility. As ageneral principle, we should not cite others’ bigotry or the predictable harms of that bigotry as good reason to justify limiting the otherwise good acts of blameless people. As Mohr puts it in another context, “threats of the violent are allowed to morallyground restrictions on the liberty of the wholly innocent” (Mohr 1988, 194). While the moralcondemnation of acomedysketch pales in comparison to the injusticeofdenying employment or denying aparent custodyoftheirchild, the principle is the same. If not for the bigotry of certain members of his audience, Chappelle would have done nothing wrong. It is mo- rallywrongtoimposeobligations by appealing to explicit or implicit threats made by bigots.¹⁶ Of course, there are limits. It is possibletoimagine scenarios in which another’simmorality mayrequirethat Irefrain from doing an otherwise good action. While we might want to act as if we are in ideal world in which everyone else acts rightly, our worldisobviouslynot ideal and that places certain prudential —and possiblymoral—obligations on moral agents. Consider Bernard Williams’s famousthought-experiment from Against Utilitarianism of Jimand Pablo in the jungle(Williams 1973). Pablo, acruel man, is goingtoshoottwenty innocent in- digenous people, but he is willingtokill one and let the others go if Jimagrees to be the one who pulls the trigger. It would seem that,from utilitarian considerations, Jimhas an obligation to set aside his strongaversion to murder and do it so the others will be spared. As such, his otherwise virtuous action—not killing the innocent—might be rendered immoral by Pablo’scruelty.Similarly,Chap- pelle’shumorous and educative exploitation of racial stereotypes might be made immoral because bigots’ intellectual and moralvices would put innocents at risk of harm.

 See Chapter 5 passim. Foranearlier version of his argument,see Mohr 1982.  Chappelle himself does not consider another waythat his humor maycause harm. Amem- ber of the raciallystereotyped community mayfeel humiliated by the use of the Sambo (and other)stereotypes.The harm is then not mediatedbythe immoral character and/or actions of abigot.SinceIamevaluatingChappelle’sstatedarguments for leavingcomedy here,Ihave not addressed this possibility further. 150 PhillipDeen

But Williams used this example to draw out amorallyrelevant consideration that was missing from Utilitarian moral calculations: the fact thatitmatters who the author of an evil action is. Even if we concede that JimorChappelle has a moral obligation to refrain from doing the faciallygood thing,wemay stillobject that this imposition of this “duty” is itself immoral. It is to imposeaplan for someone’slife onto them by threat of greater harm. It constrains another’s moral autonomythrough violence. Thisisnot something thatcan easilybedis- missed, even if we come to the utilitarian conclusion thatthe overall right thing to do is to submit.Though we maybelievethatJim should have pulled the trigger to spare the othernineteen innocents,wewould likelyforgive him if he said that he simply could not bring himself to do it.Similarly,wewould likelyforgive Chappelle if he were to admit that,while he knows that his comedywill be misinterpreted by some and bring about some bad results, he would feel violated if he were forced to stop making comedywhich is otherwise morallyprogressive and so he has decided to keep doing it.This indicates that he wasnot under an obvious and overriding obligation to avoid racial humor. Further,muchofthe analysis of the ethics of humorfocuses on the ethical obligations of thosewho laugh, whether it is the comedian or the audience. How- ever,there are moral obligations on thosewho fail to getthe joke as well. While Chappelle’sstagehandmay have missed the humor,hewas under aprimafacie obligation to accept the invitation to see Chappelle’suse of racialstereotypes as ironic and humorous (in addition to their obvious, prior moral obligation not to have racist attitudes in the first place). There is ageneral obligation to accept the rules of communication proposed by those we are speakingwith, assuming we do not have acompellingreason not to. Refusing to be playful when we have been invited to,and when we have no compellingreason not to, is to be humor- less and unfriendly. Further,bynot accepting this invitation, the stagehandwas taking Chappelle’suse of the Sambo stereotype literally, which is to attribute mo- rallyoffensive beliefs to Chappelle and is itself prima facie wrong. His failureto live up to his obligations does not imposeanobligation on Chappelle who was otherwise acting morally. To argueotherwise entails that the least moral, least understanding person in the audience sets the standard of moral rightness for others. The most or least easilyoffended person does not set the standard for all. When determining whether an act is immoral, it is not appropriatetodepend on the judgmentof just anyone, but upon that of areasonable person of areasonable level of moral sensitivity.Ofcourse, what level is reasonable is open to debate. What strikes one person as aplayful commentary on race maystrike another as a grievous and insensitive put-down of an entire people. There is room for reasonable disagreement over whether ajoke was in poor taste or even profoundlyof- WasDave Chappelle Morally Obliged to Leave Comedy? 151 fensive.But certainly, whenmaking these determinations,weshould not rely upon the judgment of an objectively terrible bigot.Ifthe anonymous stagehand who playedthe central role in Chappelle’sdecision to take aleave from comedy was, in fact,aracist,then we should not value his judgment of what the joke was about or whether it wasfunny. Nor should we base our owndecisions of what is right or obligatory on how it will be receivedbythem. By shifting responsibility onto Chappelle, we have giventhe bigot aveto over what comedyismo- rallypermissible.

4Conclusion

Therefore, while the use of racial humor is risky because of the unintended but predictable consequences, that risk does not imposeamoral obligation on the comedian and did not requireDaveChappelle to leave stand-up. Of course, he had every legal and moral right to decide whether he wanted to continue making art thatmight inadvertentlyharm thosecauses he believes in—it mayevenbe admirable—but he wasnot obliged to do so. Nevertheless, had he stayed to com- plete the next season of his eponymous show,orcontinued to perform standup, he would not have violated acompellingmoral obligation. And, if this analysis is correct,then simplynoting that comedy can or willhavenegative consequences does not establish thatthe comedyisimmoral.

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