TOPIC 7 foreign policy as part of the 2000 presi- dential election, the time is ripe for a reassessment of U.S.-Africa relations. Though the African mosaic is diverse, with 53 independent countries and a Africa: prospects for number of complex issues, one question stands out: Should the next U.S. Presi- dent draw upon America’s traditional the future role as aid-giver and play an activist role in the African renaissance, or will budgetary constraints and competing The renaissance in Africa presents its leaders with many interests in other regions reinforce what challenges. What are U.S. interests in Africa? What role is viewed by some as a policy of ne- should the U.S. play? glect, at best? Democratization Dozens of countries in Africa, Asia, by Peter J. Schraeder Latin America, and Eastern and South- ern Europe made transitions from authoritarian to more democratic forms of governance during the last quarter of the 20th century. This trend has prompted visions of a “third wave of de- mocratization” (the first began in the 1820s and the second in the 1940s). In AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS the case of Africa, this third wave coin- cided with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The collapse of single-party re- gimes throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union set powerful precedents for African pro-democracy activists who already had begun orga- nizing against human-rights abuses and political repression against the backdrop of severe economic stagnation in their respective countries. The most notable outcome, often referred to as “Africa’s second independence” or “Africa’s sec- ond liberation,” was the discrediting of more than 30 years of experimentation with single-party political systems in fa- U.S.-TRAINED MALIAN TROOPS listen to U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright as she tells them of the importance of peacekeeping, October 1999. The troops, part of the vor of more democratic forms of gover- African Crisis Response Initiative, will be deployed in Sierra Leone. nance based on multiparty politics and the protection of human rights. N “AFRICAN RENAISSANCE” of his- of a new generation of leaders commit- In the early 1980s, truly competitive toric proportions is under way. ted to multiracial and multiethnic societ- elections were held in only five African A The 1994 inauguration of ies based on tolerance, universal human countries: Botswana, Gambia, Mau- Nelson Mandela as ’s first rights and the rule of law. Policymakers, ritius, Senegal and Zimbabwe. But be- democratically elected president sym- technocrats and private entrepreneurs tween 1990 and 1994, more than 38 bolized the efforts of thousands of pro- are also at the forefront of restructuring countries held competitive elections. democracy groups to instill democratic once moribund economies to unleash Most important, 29 of the multiparty practices throughout the African conti- the African entrepreneurial spirit. This contests of this period constituted nent. Mandela’s willingness to embrace renaissance is perhaps best captured by “founding elections” in which the office his former captors embodied the vision the flourishing of the media and litera- of the head of government is openly ture as they enjoy the progressive de- contested following a period during PETER J. SCHRAEDER is associate professor cline of state censorship. A new genera- which multiparty political competition in the Department of Political Science at tion of journalists, writers and scholars was impossible. Loyola University Chicago, and author, remains firmly committed to strength- most recently, of African Politics and Optimism or pessimism? Society: A Mosaic in Transformation ening the democratic achievements of (Boston/New York: College Division of the last decade of the 20th century. The prospect of a new wave of democ- Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000). As Americans begin debating U.S. ratization has fostered both optimism

GREAT DECISIONS 2000 75 TOPIC 7 AFRICA the official opposition, the United Na- tional Independence party. Critics drew

DAVID LADA parallels between Kaunda’s use of states of emergency during the 1970s and the 1980s to silence political oppo- nents and Chiluba’s use of them to curb rising criticism of his regime’s inability to resolve economic problems. Chiluba’s predicament illustrates Africa’s new authoritarian-democratic paradox. As with the first generation of African leaders, who took office be- ginning in the 1950s, Chiluba and the other newly elected leaders of the 1990s are confronted with popular ex- pectations that higher wages and better living conditions will be widely and quickly shared following multiparty elections. When the weak Zambian state was saddled with even the mini- mal checks and balances of a demo- cratic system, economic progress was stymied, and weariness and disen- chantment grew. Although largely trained within an authoritarian tradition, Chiluba is now expected to abide by the “rules of the game” of ’s multiparty political system. When strict adherence to those rules threatened to seal his political fate in the 1996 presidential elections, how- ever, he put them aside, especially after and pessimism: optimism generated by breakdowns in this century—and the Kaunda accepted opposition backing a host of democratic successes that cul- difficulties of consolidating new democ- and entered the race. To fend off his op- minated in what numerous observers racies—must give serious pause to those ponents, Chiluba oversaw the ratifica- have referred to as the South African who would argue . . . for the inevitabil- tion of two constitutional amendments “miracle,” and pessimism based on the ity of global democracy,” explains Larry that harked back to the authoritarian ex- simple reality that several transitions Diamond, a senior research fellow at the cesses of his predecessor and under- resulted in “democratic decay,” often Hoover Institution. “As a result, those mined the very democratic political sys- ending in military coups d’état and a concerned about how countries can tem he had sought to create. The first return to authoritarianism. Colonel move ‘beyond authoritarianism and to- requires that the parents of any presi- Ibrahim Maïnassara Baré of Niger talitarianism’ must also ponder the con- dential candidate be Zambians by birth. achieved the dubious honor of leading ditions that permit such movement to The second limits presidential candi- the first successful coup d’état against a endure . . . . To rid a country of an au- dates to two terms of office. Since democratically elected government in thoritarian regime or dictator is not nec- Kaunda’s parents were born in neigh- francophone West Africa since the be- essarily to move it fundamentally be- boring , and he had ruled Zam- ginning of the third wave of democrati- yond authoritarianism.” bia for 27 years (1964–91), he was zation. In a throwback to an earlier reign, forced to withdraw from the race. Colonel Baré announced that there The authoritarian- Chiluba’s political maneuvering re- would be multiparty elections in 1996, democratic paradox moved the only serious challenge to his presented himself as the “civilian” can- In 1991 Zambia made a successful rule and ensured his reelection. didate of the ruling party and won what transition from a single-party system Some proponents of democratization international observers agreed was a headed by President to argue that the true test of Africa’s newly grossly flawed electoral contest. a multiparty system under the leader- established systems is their ability to Even when a successful transition to ship of President Frederick Chiluba of foster an “alternation of power” be- more democratic governance is made, the Movement for Multiparty Democ- tween rival political parties. Benin newly elected leaders are confronted racy. Eighteen months after achieving stands out as the best example of a with the long-term challenge of ensur- victory, Chiluba reinstated a “state of newly established, multiparty democ- ing the consolidation of democratic emergency” that had existed throughout racy that has successfully weathered an practices in still-fragile political sys- Kaunda’s rule, and arrested and de- alternation of power via the ballot box. tems. “The frequency of democratic tained without charges 14 members of Following a 1990 national conference,

76 GREAT DECISIONS 2000 TOPIC AFRICA 7 founding elections were held in 1991 in Botswana, Djibouti, Cape Verde, AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS which a technocrat, Nicéphore Soglo, Eritrea, Namibia and South Africa— was elected president. Mathieu Ké- have never faced armed challenges rékou, the former Marxist dictator, gra- from their military, police or other se- ciously accepted defeat and retired from curity personnel. Nonetheless, the com- politics only to return as the leading mon assumption in Africa is that civil- opposition candidate in the 1996 presi- ian-dominated systems constitute the dential elections. With Soglo’s reelec- norm. Even military leaders intent on tion campaign severely hampered by staying in power are forced to offer, at the poor performance of the economy minimum, rhetorical support for an and public perceptions of his disregard eventual “return” to civilian rule, usu- for the average citizen, Kérékou over- ally accompanied by some sort of time- came the odds, emerged victorious and table. The notion of “demilitarization,” now serves as a powerful example of sometimes referred to as promoting the the consolidation of democratic prac- “civilianization” of military regimes, tices on the African continent. became increasingly important in the Whether democratic consolidation post-1989 era as policymakers and citi- will overcome democratic decay largely zen movements sought firmer transi- depends on how the newly elected elites tions to democracy. respond to the authoritarian-democratic In contrast to the 1960s, when mili- paradox. Will they graciously accept tary coups reached their peak, the sec- defeat and join the ranks of the “loyal ond half of the 1980s and the 1990s opposition,” as was the case in Soglo’s have witnessed a sharp decline in mili- defeat in 1996, or will they increasingly tary intervention. This trend may sug- turn to a variety of authoritarian tactics gest a growing strength among demo- FORMER ZAMBIAN PRESIDENT Kenneth to keep themselves in power at any cost, cratic transitions in the post-cold-war Kaunda peers out of a police vehicle, De- as did Chiluba? era. At the same time, it is important to cember 1997, after he was arrested and or- note that the transition to civilian gov- dered detained for 28 days. Opposition Civilian militaries groups accused President Frederick Chiluba ernments during the 1950s ultimately of using the emergency declaration to crack African militaries emerged from the stalled, only to be followed by an explo- down on political enemies. shadows during the 1950s to become sion of coups that made the 1960s the some of the most important institutions “decade of the military.” Today’s civil- so-called khaki contagion—as a threat in politics and society. The main way ian leaders thus view the potential re- to the democratization process through- they achieved power was the coup emergence of African militaries—the out Africa. ■ d’état: the sudden and illegal overthrow of an existing government by a portion of the state’s armed forces. By the end of the 1960s, more than two dozen suc- cessful coups had ushered in a period The crisis of that soon left more than 50% of all Af- rican countries governed by military re- gimes. Even in cases where they led the African state their troops back to the barracks after HE 1950–70 period was marked by tory states” of the earlier independence turning over power to elected civilian Tthe creation of highly authoritarian era increasingly proved incapable of regimes, military leaders maintained— and centralized states seeking to co-opt maintaining control over their respec- and often enhanced—their newfound or silence the very elements of civil so- tive territories, and became known as levels of political influence. Once they ciety that had contributed to the inde- lame Leviathans and shadow states. enjoyed the fruits of power, these so- pendence struggle, most notably politi- The most noteworthy outcome was called leaders in khaki were prone to cal parties, labor unions and student the inability of African leaders to con- return to presidential mansions in sub- groups. These states were significantly tain domestic violence and conflict. As sequent coups, leading foreign observ- challenged during the 1970s and the explained by Christopher Clapham, a ers to characterize African militaries as 1980s by a series of economic, political noted British Africanist, an especially the primary forces for change through- and military developments often re- threatening trend was the rise of guer- out the continent. ferred to as the crisis of the African state. rilla insurgencies. First and foremost, Most African countries have expe- African leaders found their hold on liberation insurgencies were directed rienced at least one attempted or suc- power simultaneously threatened by the against colonial empires unwilling to cessful military coup, and several have demands of faltering national econo- cede power peacefully, as well as against experienced two or more. The record mies, the resurgence of civil society, and white minority regimes in Southern for the greatest number (six) is jointly in some cases civil unrest and conflict. Africa. Other guerrilla groups sought held by Benin, Burkina Faso and Ni- Hobbled by decades of corruption and greater rights for specific regions of geria. Only six African countries— economic mismanagement, the “preda- already independent nation-states. In the

GREAT DECISIONS 2000 77 TOPIC 7 AFRICA torial integrity of existing nation-states, renaissance? Skeptics point to Laurent- their leaders were nonetheless commit- Désiré Kabila, the former guerrilla leader ted to overthrowing existing regimes. A whose forces overthrew the dictator fourth group, warlord insurgencies, in the Democratic

AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS lacked a coherent vision beyond the Republic of the Congo (Congo-Kinshasa; immediate goal of overthrowing the re- formerly ), in 1997. Rather than gime in power. Such insurgencies usu- establish democratic practices and a time- ally were unable to reestablish central- table for national elections, Kabila cre- ized states after achieving victory, of- ated a new dictatorship. In a series of ten leading to the continuation of con- moves that harked back to the rise of flict among competing warlords and authoritarianism under Mobutu, he their respective armies. banned opposition parties, arrested sev- The crisis of the African state clearly eral leading opposition figures, outlawed demonstrated that highly authoritarian human rights organizations and arrested governments were ineffective managers. journalists who criticized the new regime. It also highlighted the rising importance In an ironic but unsurprising twist of fate, of African civil societies. Just prior to the Kabila regime in 1999 found itself their marginalization in the post- confronted with a guerrilla insurgency in independence era, civil societies had the eastern provinces funded by Kabila’s played important roles, and during the former military benefactors, Uganda and 1990s they expected to wield equal if not Rwanda. greater levels of influence in their newly There are, however, other more hope- restructured societies. The international ful situations. One group of victorious REBEL SOLDIERS in Kinshasa await pro- dimension had also changed with the cold guerrilla leaders, often referred to as the nouncement by Laurent Kabila about a new war’s end. African leaders could no “new bloc,” led disciplined and battle- government. Kabila proclaimed himself longer count on the diplomatic, finan- tested guerrilla armies to victory over president and changed the name of the country from Zaire to the Democratic Re- cial or even military support of foreign discredited states. Bloc members include public of the Congo. powers to compensate for an increased Issaias Afwerki of Eritrea, inability to manage internal affairs. of Ethiopia, of Uganda extreme, such separatist insurgencies and of Rwanda. All share sought secession and recognition of their Experiments in restructuring a commitment to a free-market economy, territories as independent nation-states. state-society relations the reduction of corruption at all levels Although another group of reform in- Can a new generation of leaders succeed of government, the rule of law and the surgencies sought to maintain the terri- in fostering an economic and political creation of responsible police and mili- SIGNE, CARTOONISTS & WRITERS SYNDICATE/cartoonweb.com

78 GREAT DECISIONS 2000 TOPIC AFRICA 7 AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

ETHIOPIAN CIVILIANS WALKING to a military camp at Adigrat to enroll in the militia, June 1998. Since Eritrean planes bombed civilian targets in Adigrat, enrollment in the militia has increased. tary forces. However, this new bloc also autonomous cities. Although critics have South Africa’s carefully crafted state- tends to view multiparty democracy as argued that such an arrangement will society balance is threatened by a dra- a luxury that must take a backseat to the further polarize politics as ethnic lead- matic rise in crime and the continued promotion of politico-military stability ers compete for federal resources, pro- poverty of a large portion of the popu- and socioeconomic development. In the ponents have countered that the move lation. Constitutional guarantees of po- case of Uganda, for example, Museveni’s quelled separatist tendencies. Meanwhile, litical freedoms may mean little to work- regime has instituted a “no-party” sys- Ethiopia’s experiment in federalism has ing parents who cannot safely walk about tem that does not allow candidates to been marred by the authoritarian prac- their townships or earn enough money campaign under the banner of opposi- tices of the Tigrean People’s Liberation to move their families out of poverty. tion parties. As a result, this bloc in- Front, the politico-military core of the Indeed, the suggestion that the new con- creasingly finds itself criticized by citi- EPRDF, which controls both the presi- stitution will eventually evolve into a zens as well as international observers dency and the vast majority of the seats living testament to the multiracial and who question the long-term wisdom of in the Council of People’s Representa- multiethnic ideals of the African National stifling political dissent. tives, the national legislature. Congress (ANC) misses the crucial ele- A second restructuring that attracted The most comprehensive example of ments in this political transition: the vast tremendous debate revolves around state-society restructuring revolves majority expects and demands immedi- Ethiopia’s ethnically based federal sys- around the ongoing transformation of ate rewards to make up for the past in- tem. In 1991, after nearly 30 years of South Africa’s former apartheid system justices of apartheid. civil war, the Ethiopian People’s Revo- into a multiracial and multiethnic democ- “However it evolves, it seems safe lutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) racy. Prior to 1994, South Africa had to conclude that the [South African] con- overthrew a highly authoritarian and been ruled by a white minority regime stitution provides a solid basis for rep- centralized state that had been ruled by that instituted racial and social segrega- resentative, transparent and accountable the U.S.-supported monarchy of Emperor tion. As part of democratization, South governance, with meaningful protection (1930–74) and then the Africans were challenged to confront and promotion of fundamental rights,” Soviet-supported Marxist regime of their collective past and to create a cul- concluded a special report by the (1977–91). ture of forgiveness through public hear- Carnegie Foundation. “As such, it does EPRDF leaders firmly believed that both ings of the Truth and Reconciliation hold promise as an inspiration for other the Selassie and Mengistu regimes in- Commission. Subsequent negotiations countries in transition, particularly those tensified ethnic hatreds and polarized among the major political parties re- that are attempting to build viable state- the nation. They fielded a guerrilla army sulted in the adoption of a constitutional society coalitions under conditions of and led it to victory, one outcome of framework in 1997 that separated pow- diverse cultures, deep economic dispari- which was the determination of Eritrean ers between the executive, legislative and ties and limited political authority and guerrilla forces to demand independence judicial branches; created a three-tiered financial resources.” for their province. structure of municipal, provincial and In a 1993 referendum, 99.8% of vot- federal governments; and established a OAU and conflict resolution ers favored independence. bill of rights for individuals and civil The Organization of African Unity The EPRDF leadership believed that society. Although the constitution rec- (OAU) has the potential to play an im- the only way to “save” the remaining ognizes the importance of protecting the portant role in the resolution of con- portions of the multiethnic Ethiopian state “cultural rights” of individual racial and flicts emerging from such restructuring was to create a federal system compris- ethnic groups, the unified federal sys- experiments. However, the OAU’s two ing 12 ethnically based states and two tem is not based on race or ethnicity. bedrock principles—support for the ter-

GREAT DECISIONS 2000 79 TOPIC 7 AFRICA ritorial integrity of member states and nomic Community of West African leaders agreed in 1997 to create an Af- noninterference in internal affairs—his- States, which sponsored a series of rican Defense Force made up of mili- torically have impeded its ability to Nigerian-led military operations in tary units of OAU member states mediate both internal conflicts and those Liberia; foreign powers, most notably equipped by foreign powers, most nota- among member states. The 1967–70 the former Soviet Union, the U.S. and bly the U.S., France and Britain. The Nigerian civil war, for example, which France; and African powers, as demon- African Defense Force would remain yielded automatic support for the terri- strated by Nigeria’s 1997 dispatch of under the command of the OAU. Unre- torial integrity of Nigeria, seriously called troops to neighboring Sierra Leone to solved issues revolve around which coun- into doubt (at least from the view of the restore a civilian government to power. tries should be eligible to contribute secessionist Igbos) the OAU’s ability From the perspective of pan-Africanists, forces (e.g., should involvement be lim- to serve as an impartial negotiator. It is such interventions are ultimately unde- ited only to democratic countries?) and for this reason that the OAU Commis- sirable: rather than representing the con- what type of decisionmaking body should sion of Mediation, Conciliation and Ar- sensus of OAU member states, they ap- authorize interventions (e.g., should in- bitration was stillborn, and the major- pear driven by the self-interests of the tervention be the consensus of all OAU ity of African-initiated arbitration ef- intervenors. member states, or a smaller representa- forts have been carried out on an ad hoc In the wake of the cold war, African tive body?). ■ basis by African presidents. For ex- ample, former President Hassan Gouled Aptidon of Djibouti used his country’s stature as the headquarters for the In- tergovernmental Authority on Drought Response of and Development to mediate the con- flict between Ethiopia and Somalia. Ac- cording to I. William Zartman, a spe- the Clinton cialist in conflict resolution, such ef- forts historically have had a 33% suc- cess rate, and then only temporarily as Administration warring parties returned to the battle- field. RESIDENT Bill Clinton’s 11-day visit Africanists who criticized the chasm The ability to dispatch peacemaking Pto Africa in 1998 was intended to sig- between rhetoric and action. Despite his or peacekeeping forces is critical to con- nal a significant change in U.S. policy sharp attacks on European colonialism, flict resolution. The OAU founding fa- and a firm commitment to strengthen- Kennedy kept close military ties to Por- thers attempted to prepare for this by ing the African renaissance. “In com- tugal in order to protect access to Por- planning the creation of an African High ing to Africa,” Clinton explained in an tuguese-controlled military bases in the Command: a multinational military force address to the Great Hall of Parliament Azores. And Carter’s human-rights rheto- comprising military contingents from in Capetown, South Africa, “my motive ric notwithstanding, the U.S. continued OAU member states. The African High in part was to help the American people to align itself with authoritarian dicta- Command never made it beyond the see the new Africa with new eyes, and tors, including Zaire’s Mobutu. planning stage, however, leading once to focus our own efforts on new poli- again to a variety of ad hoc measures. In cies suited to the new reality.” Reassessing military force 1981 the OAU sponsored the creation Clinton Administration pronounce- In October 1993, dozens of U.S. soldiers of a short-term all-African military force ments are not unlike those of their Demo- were killed or wounded in a fierce battle designed to resolve an expanding civil cratic party predecessors, who also sought in Mogadishu, Somalia, during a humani- war in Chad. With approximately 4,800 to underscore their “fresh thinking” when tarian military mission launched by the troops from Congo-Kinshasa, Nigeria it came to Africa. In rhetoric that would previous president, George Bush. Me- and Senegal, the OAU force failed to resonate just as strongly with Africanists dia images of victorious Somali forces achieve any concrete solution due to during the late 1950s and early 1960s holding a U.S. helicopter pilot hostage financial, logistical and political diffi- as it did during the late 1990s, then and dragging the corpse of a U.S. sol- culties, and within a few months was Senator John F. Kennedy derided dier through the streets unleashed a forced to withdraw. Washington’s inability to come to grips firestorm of criticism and debate. What with the rising tide of African national- became known as America’s “debacle” Search for ism, and he underscored the need to in Somalia served as a crucial turning an interventionist solution embark on a “bold and imaginative new point in Clinton Administration foreign The OAU’s shortcomings have fostered program for the development of Africa.” policy toward Africa. intervention by four sets of actors: the President Jimmy Carter entered office The White House renounced a cam- United Nations, as demonstrated by the on a pledge to transcend his predeces- paign to significantly expand multilat- Security Council’s 1991 decision to spon- sors’ cold-war preoccupations in favor eral peacekeeping through the creation sor a series of U.S.-led military opera- of such positive goals as promoting hu- of a UN rapid deployment force. A for- tions in Somalia, usually referred to as man rights and basic human needs. mal Presidential Decision Directive, Operation Restore Hope; African re- The Kennedy and Carter Adminis- PDD-25, outlined fairly restrictive con- gional organizations, such as the Eco- trations nonetheless came under fire from ditions that had to be met before the U.S.

80 GREAT DECISIONS 2000 TOPIC AFRICA 7 would agree to any further UN-sponsored AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS military operations, regardless of whether American troops took part. Among the most important conditions was the con- sent of all warring parties prior to the deployment of military forces. The simple message was that the U.S. “cannot resolve the conflicts of the world but does not believe that the UN is capable of mak- ing and keeping peace, particularly when hostilities among parties still exist.” The most important outcome of the new directive, which in essence denied U.S. support for UN-sponsored military operations designed to impose peace, was an extremely cautious approach to other conflicts in Africa. In the case of Rwanda, for example, the Clinton Administration was clearly wary of being drawn into a civil conflict that, according to a UN report issued in 1994, had resulted in the execution of between 500,000 and PRESIDENT CLINTON GREETS OAU Secretary General Salim Salim during the opening session 1 million unarmed civilians. Fearful of of the Conference on U.S.-Africa Partnership for the 21st century, while Secretary of State being drawn into “another Somalia,” the Madeleine Albright (center left) and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Clinton Administration not only initially Rice, look on. blocked the dispatch of 5,500 troops requested by UN Secretary General dermine what is perceived as a radical volved early and doing it at a cheaper Boutros Boutros-Ghali, but instructed Islamic fundamentalist regime in the cost, or being forced to intervene in a Administration spokespersons to avoid Sudan. The Administration has em- massive, more costly way later.” labeling the unfolding ethnic conflict as braced the so-called new bloc—Afwerki With White House attention focused “genocide,” lest such a label further in- of Eritrea, Zenawi of Ethiopia, elsewhere, the African affairs bureaus flame American public sympathy and a Museveni of Uganda and Kagame of of the national security bureaucracies, demand for intervention, as had been the Rwanda—who control battle-hardened such as the State Department, the Pen- case in Somalia. guerrilla armies. Apart from the fact tagon and the Central Intelligence This unwillingness to support UN- that they hold the reins, these regimes Agency (CIA), grew in importance, sponsored peacekeeping missions has are believed able to maintain stability along with economic policy units, most led to de facto support for African mili- and create “responsible and account- notably within the Department of Com- tary solutions under the guise of “Af- able” governments. Paradoxically, a merce. The net result has been frag- rican solutions for African problems.” stress on stability may in fact run mented foreign policy. In the case of It is precisely for this reason, argue counter to the long-term goal of pro- Somalia, lack of high-level coordina- critics of U.S. foreign policy toward moting democracy. tion led to what many Somali special- Africa, that the Administration origi- ists considered an ill-conceived mili- nally proposed creation of an African U.S. involvement, tary operation from the start (i.e., fam- Crisis Response Force, subsequently re- for and against ine was merely the symptom of an un- formulated as the African Crisis Re- Entering office at a time when civil derlying political problem that could sponse Initiative. Africans, not Ameri- conflicts were multiplying across Af- not be resolved through military inter- cans, were to take the lead in resolv- rica, the Administration was expected vention). As separate bureaucracies pur- ing conflicts—a regional dynamic that to formulate a comprehensive policy sued different, often contradictory goals, stands in sharp contrast to extensive of conflict resolution. The new Admin- the emphasis on political reconstruc- White House attempts at resolving the istration was initially split. One school tion was at best contradicted by the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East felt African issues would unnecessar- military’s approach in the field, and at or the series of crises in the Balkans. ily distract the President and potentially worst mere rhetoric. One controversial implication is tacit plunge the White House into political The first high-level analysis of grow- support for military solutions imposed controversies at home. A second, more ing contradictions in policy toward So- by African regional powers. For ex- activist point of view, also inspired by malia nonetheless occurred only after ample, the Administration quietly sup- the U.S. experience in Somalia, asserted the deaths of U.S. soldiers—some eight ported Rwanda’s military efforts to in- that disaster could have been avoided months after Clinton assumed office. stall a pro-U.S. government in Congo- by preventive action. “The choice is To his credit, Clinton recognized the Kinshasa under Kabila, and at this writ- not between intervening or not inter- shortcomings of policy as it had evolved ing the U.S. is also supporting efforts vening,” explained one White House and quickly announced the impracti- by Rwanda, Eritrea and Ethiopia to un- policymaker. “It is between getting in- cality of a military solution imposed

GREAT DECISIONS 2000 81 TOPIC 7 AFRICA from abroad. However, the structural bilization of Zaire [Congo-Kinshasa]— to emphasize his commitment to de- problem inherent in the foreign policy which borders nine other African coun- mocratization: four of the six countries apparatus—the lack of high-level tries—could have a tremendously nega- visited—Botswana, Ghana, Senegal attention and coordination of U.S. poli- tive impact on regional stability.” With and South Africa—are among Africa’s cies toward Africa—is as much a prob- the experiences of Somalia and Rwanda leading democracies. Albright, how- lem today as ever. still etched in their minds, the Africa ever, visited seven countries, six of specialists of the national security which—Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Uneven approach to bureaucracies have successfully argued Congo-Kinshasa, Angola and Zimba- democratization for the need to tread softly as, according bwe—are ruled by leaders who seized Africanists have been understandably to another member of the State power with the barrel of the gun rather disappointed. “Democracy” was one of Department’s Africa bureau, the situa- than by democratic elections. The mes- the common threads in Clinton’s cam- tion in Congo-Kinshasa “could easily sage sent by the Albright visit was that paign speeches, during which he stated turn into a Somalia and a Rwanda rolled the Administration’s true priority is the that “we should encourage and nurture into one, although this time in one of cultivation of strategically located, pro- the stirring for democratic reform that is Africa’s largest and most populous na- U.S. regimes capable of maintaining surfacing all across Africa from the tions.” stability where civil wars and ethnic birth of an independent Namibia to the It is particularly striking to hear conflicts once raged. pressure for democratic reforms in members of the State Department’s Af- A final component of the Ad- Kenya.” Though U.S. support for South rica bureau argue that, like his prede- ministration’s approach has been to de- Africa’s transition to a democracy indi- cessor, Kabila is both “part of the prob- emphasize foreign aid in favor of trade cates rhetoric can be transformed into lem and part of the solution” to resolv- and investment. Foreign aid to Africa has viable policies, in Congo-Kinshasa the ing the crisis in the region. As is the steadily decreased from a peak of $1.8 cornerstone of Administration policy is case with U.S. support for other mem- billion in 1985 to approximately $800 a permutation of the same “Mobutu or bers of the new bloc of African leaders, million in 1999; meanwhile, a 1996 ini- chaos” thesis that dominated State De- a responsive and accountable govern- tiative, built around the proposed Africa partment, Pentagon and CIA thinking ment capable of restoring order, ensur- Growth and Opportunity Act, would from the 1960s through the 1980s. Un- ing territorial integrity and ending stimulate U.S. investments and sales der this bureaucratically inspired view, transborder threats will be viewed as a throughout Africa. Africans have sharply regional instability and, ultimately, success—even if it is at the expense of criticized the gradual decline in U.S. aid, Communist expansion into the heart of democracy. and some, most notably Mandela, have Africa was the only alternative to The Administration’s ambivalence denounced the political and economic Mobutu’s continued hold over power. can be nicely summed up by comparing conditionalities associated with the Af- “Regardless of the fact that we are no Clinton’s trip to Africa with one made rica Growth and Opportunity Act. Indeed, longer faced with a Communist threat,” by Secretary of State Madeleine K. although a version of the Africa Growth explained one member of the State Albright in December 1997. Clinton’s and Opportunity Act has passed both the Department’s Africa bureau, “the desta- itinerary was purposely whittled down House and the Senate, powerful domes- tic criticism, most notably within the Con- gressional Black Caucus and the textile industry, threatens the viability of any trial bill. The Administration’s aggressive trade policy has intensified economic AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS competition between the U.S. and other industrialized democracies with an eye on Africa. This has strained U.S.-French relations because stakes are so high in the lucrative petroleum, telecommunica- tions and transport industries in francophone Africa. In the eyes of French policymakers, the penetration of American and other Western companies constitutes at best an intrusion and at worst an aggression against France’s former colonies. The seriousness with which this issue is taken became clear when France’s minister of cooperation, Michel Roussin, said a series of meet- ings had been held at the beginning of YOUNG SIERRA LEONE men, who have had their ears, hands or fingers chopped off by the 1990s on how best to defend French rebels roaming the countryside after being ousted from power, wait outside a hospital operating room in Freetown, Sierra Leone, May 1998. economic and political interests against those of the U.S.

82 GREAT DECISIONS 2000 TOPIC AFRICA 7 REUTERS/ARCHIVE PHOTOS Options for the new millennium Grappling with ways to strengthen the African renaissance at the beginning of the new millennium, African lead- ers are confronted with the simple re- ality that even the best of intentions are often not enough, while American leaders are confronted by the knowl- edge that enlarging the renaissance will require enormous political will and greater understanding of an extremely diverse continent that has never been a U.S. priority. Even the best of Ameri- can intentions can be deemed contra- dictory or as even constituting an “Uncle Scrooge” approach devoid of either true interest or sincerity. But Clinton’s visit and other steps in the right direction mean the time is ripe to PRISONERS WITHIN GITARAMA PRISON, which holds some 6,500 inmates, look out from build on the successes thus far and to behind the bars of a dormitory window in April 1996. Some 68,000 prisoners reside in the promote debate about the future. Three overcrowded and grossly inadequate Rwandan jails. policy options stand out: ❑ 1. The U.S. should speak out tegrity of member states and noninter- ongoing military intervention in East- publicly and put pressure on all Af- ference in internal affairs—historically ern Congo-Kinshasa. rican governments—including those have impeded its ability to mediate in- ❑ 3. The U.S. should actively that have been freely elected—that ternal conflicts and those between two implement the Africa Growth and do not respect the political rights and or more member states. Ad hoc ar- Opportunity Act and make it the cen- civil liberties of their citizens, espe- rangements, such as Nigeria’s unilat- terpiece of U.S.-African economic re- cially when civilian democracies have eral intervention in Sierra Leone, raised lations. been overthrown by military coups questions as to the desirability of re- Pro: In an era of declining foreign d’état. gional, often undemocratic countries aid, the promotion of trade and invest- Pro: Making democracy the sine (Nigeria was under military rule at the ment serves as a solid indicator of U.S. qua non of enhanced U.S.-African ties time) taking matters into their own interest in Africa. Trade and invest- is consistent with U.S. values and an hands. African countries need external ment—the cornerstone of economic appropriate and constructive way to help in the creation and maintenance growth and development—are key to treat all foreign countries. In the ab- of a continent-wide force capable of strengthening fledgling African democ- sence of strong, national institutions, responding to internal crises and state racies and preventing the return of mili- this is the most effective way to foster collapse. U.S. training of national tary rule. Trade will ultimately benefit democratic norms. It also clearly con- armies, such as Senegal’s, has helped African and American producers and veys U.S. commitment to democratic improve peacekeeping and should be economies alike. practice. strengthened. Con: Trade and investment are not Con: U.S. policymakers should of Con: Ever wary of the consequences reliable substitutes for foreign aid be- course condemn military coups, but of direct U.S. military intervention, cause they gravitate to countries that are they have no business interfering in Washington supports ACRI as a way already economic leaders, to the poten- the internal affairs of other countries, to wash its hands of its military re- tial detriment of the most impoverished especially those with democratic elec- sponsibilities on the African continent. African countries. Several prominent tions. Democracies come in many va- The slogan “African solutions for Af- African leaders, including Nelson rieties, and the U.S. should be careful rican problems” in essence signals the Mandela, have sharply criticized the not to impose its own model on other lack of political will to put American Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and countries. Acting in such a way might soldiers in harm’s way. ACRI itself the political and economic conditions jeopardize other, more important issues remains flawed, because of such unre- that would accompany its extension to on the U.S. agenda for foreign policy solved issues as which countries should individual African countries. Congres- toward Africa. be eligible to contribute forces and what sional critics say increased trade and ❑ 2. The U.S. should make the type of decisionmaking body should investment in Africa would hurt certain African Crisis Response Initiative be capable of authorizing when and U.S. economic sectors, most notably the (ACRI) the thrust of its approach to where to intervene. In the extreme, U.S. textile industry in the U.S. South. ■ conflict resolution in Africa. support of local military forces will Pro: The guiding principles of the ultimately intensify regional military Opinion Ballots are on OAU—support for the territorial in- conflicts, as witnessed by Rwanda’s ✔ pages 85–86

GREAT DECISIONS 2000 83 TOPIC 7 AFRICA 4. What are the primary beliefs of the cluding Central America and the Carib- DISCUSSION so-called new bloc of African leaders bean), the Middle East, Russia and East- concerning the process of democratiza- ern Europe (the former Communist QUESTIONS tion? Do these beliefs ultimately facili- states), and Western Europe? tate or hinder the consolidation of Afri- can democracy in the long-term? 7. How involved should U.S. policy- 1. What are the problems and prospects makers be in attempting to facilitate and associated with the “third wave of de- 5. What actors and/or international or- strengthen the “African renaissance”? mocratization” in Africa? ganizations ultimately should be respon- sible for resolving African conflicts, in 8. What are some of the challenges and 2. What are the essential components for every way including the ultimate inter- pitfalls associated with U.S. foreign ensuring the successful “demilitariza- ventionist tool of direct military inter- policy efforts to promote democratiza- tion” or “civilianization” of African vention? tion and conflict resolution in Africa? military regimes? 6. How prominent should the African 9. What should be the relative 3. How should state-society relations be continent be in the global hierarchy of importance of the following U.S. foreign restructured so as to provide a firm ba- U.S. foreign policy in comparison to policy goals in Africa: democratization, sis for African economic growth and other regions, most notably Asia (includ- conflict resolution, and trade and invest- political development? ing Japan and China), Latin America (in- ment? foreign policy toward the Democratic Republic of Congo, READINGS AND Ethiopia, Somalia and South Africa. Smock, David R., and Crocker, Chester A., eds., African RESOURCES Conflict Resolution: The U.S. Role in Peacemaking. Wash- ington, DC, United States Institute of Peace, 1995. 176 pp. Bratton, Michael, and Van de Walle, Nicolas, Democratic $14.95 (paper). An overview of the challenges and pitfalls of Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Compara- U.S. involvement in peacemaking operations in Africa. tive Perspective. New York, Cambridge University Press, Villalón, Leonardo A., and Huxtable, Phillip A., eds., The 1997. 352 pp. $19.95 (paper). Comprehensive analysis of all African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegra- democratic transitions that took place in Africa 1989–94. tion and Reconfiguration. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Pub- Clough, Michael, Free at Last? : U.S. Policy Toward Af- lishers, 1997. 334 pp. $22.00 (paper). An extremely useful rica and the End of the Cold War. New York, Council on collection of case studies by noted Africanists on the nature Foreign Relations, 1992. 145 pp. $14.95 (paper). A noted and evolution of the “crisis of the African state.” observer of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa examines the political, economic and military trends. THE AFRICA FUND, 50 Broad St., Suite 711, New York, NY ■ Ottaway, Marina, Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy or 10004; (212) 785-1024; Fax (212) 785-1078. Since 1966, State Reconstruction? Washington, DC, Carnegie Endow- the Africa Fund has worked for an informed U.S. policy to- ment for International Peace, 1999. 120 pp. $10.95. A critical ward southern Africa, mobilizing community leaders through- analysis of the new bloc of African leaders and the implica- out America and providing guidance, information and con- tions of their rule for the future of democracy in Africa. tacts. www.prairienet.org/acas/afund.html Reno, William, Warlord Politics and African States. Boul- AFRICANEWS ONLINE, P.O. Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702; ■ der, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. 260 pp. $19.95 (919) 286-0747; Fax (919) 286-2614. Contains up-to-date (paper). An analysis of the implications of the enfeeblement news stories and features about a wide spectrum of issues and breakdown of African states during the 1990s. concerning Africa. www.africanews.org Rice, Susan E., United States Policy in Africa: Moving AFRICA POLICY INFORMATION CENTER (APIC), 110 Mary- Forward as Partners. An address before World Vision’s land Ave., NE, #509, Washington, DC 20002; (202) 546-7961; ■ Washington Forum, “Africa on the Eve of the New Millen- Fax (202) 546-1545. A nonprofit organization dedicated to nium.” Washington, DC, April 30, 1999.* disseminating information on African issues. The APIC of- fers maps, news, documents, publications and reports. Rothchild, Donald, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: www.africapolicy.org Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1997. 350 pp. $15.96 (paper). AFRICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION (ASA), Rutgers University, An extremely detailed examination of U.S. responses to Douglas Campus, 132 George St., New Brunswick, NJ 08901- ■ ethnic conflict in Africa by a leading authority. 1400; (732) 932-8173; Fax (732) 932-3394. A nonprofit orga- nization with a mission to bring together people with a schol- Schraeder, Peter J., United States Foreign Policy Toward arly and professional interest in Africa. www.sas.upenn.edu/ Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change. New York, African_Studies/ASA/ASA_Groups.html Cambridge University Press, 1994. 373 pp. $29.95 (paper). A theoretical analysis of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa during the cold-war era that focuses on the evolution of U.S. *You can find links to this document and additional 8readings on our website at www.fpa.org/program.html

84 GREAT DECISIONS 2000