Tracing Varieties of Peace

A case study on three approaches to peace in a frozen conflict

Johanna Kolli

Master’s thesis, 30 credit Master’s Program in Crisis Management and Peacebuilding, 120 credit Spring semester 2020

Abstract Scholars in the peace and conflict field oftentimes argue that peace is somewhat under- conceptualised. The Varieties of Peace network has made a substantial effort in furthering the conceptualisation of peace by creating a comprehensive framework, theorising peace as three different approaches: situational, relational and ideational. In this thesis, I explored how this framework can be applied in an empirical context and how the approaches relate to each other; testing the internal validity and assumptions of the framework. By shifting the common focus of peace from stability to a dynamic process of change, I studied how peace changes in an empirical context that is typically understood as static: frozen conflicts. In a case study on Abkhazia from 1994-2008, I used process-tracing to study how the three approaches relate to each other, either harmoniously or with dissonance, and to describe the changes of peace in a frozen conflict. I conclude that the Varieties of Peace framework has proven to be useful when studying the dynamics of peace and how it changes in a post-conflict setting. It has been especially useful in capturing the cyclical dynamic of change in a frozen conflict. The framework has comparative and comprehensive advantages in studying the peace as a complex, dynamic process, but inhibits some issues regarding the trade-off between complexity and parsimony and concerning the internal validity. Further research is needed in order to utilise its full potential as a framework that can be used to systematically study the varieties of peace in the world.

Key words: Varieties of Peace, three approaches to studying peace, frozen conflicts, Abkhazia

Table of content List of abbreviations ...... i 1. Introduction ...... 1 1.1. Purpose and research questions ...... 3 2. Theoretical framework ...... 4 2.1. Three approaches to studying varieties of peace ...... 4 2.2. Peace as a situation ...... 4 2.3. Peace as a relation ...... 5 2.4. Peace as an idea ...... 7 2.5. The problem of ontology and epistemology when studying peace ...... 9 2.6. Operationalisation ...... 10 2.6.1. Situational peace ...... 11 2.6.2. Relational peace ...... 12 2.6.3. Ideational peace ...... 13 3. Methodology and material ...... 14 3.1. Qualitative research and case studies ...... 14 3.2. Case selection ...... 15 3.3. Studying change: process-tracing ...... 17 3.4. Theoretical assumptions: how do the three approaches relate to each other? ...... 17 3.5. Analysing ideas ...... 19 3.6. Material ...... 20 4. Results and analysis ...... 21 4.1. Contextual background ...... 21 4.2. The first period: 1994-1999 ...... 22 4.2.1. Situational peace ...... 23 4.2.2. Relational peace ...... 26 4.2.3. Ideational peace ...... 29 4.3. The second period: 1999-2003 ...... 31 4.3.1. Situational peace ...... 31 4.3.2. Relational peace ...... 35 4.3.3. Ideational peace ...... 37 4.4. The third period: 2004-2008 ...... 39 4.4.1. Situational peace ...... 40 4.4.2. Relational peace ...... 44 4.4.3. Ideational peace ...... 46 4.5. Harmonious and dissonant changes in the Abkhaz frozen conflict ...... 48 5. Lessons learned from studying three approaches to peace ...... 51 6. Conclusions ...... 54 7. References ...... 56 Annex 1 ...... i Annex 2 ...... ii Annex 3 ...... v

Figure 1: GGCT model of ideal types of peace by Sahovic (2007; 2018) ...... 9

Table 1: the two dimensions of situational peace (Jarstad et al. 2019, 8)...... 5 Table 2: relational peace approach, summarising table (Söderström et al. 2019, 21)...... 7 Table 3: operationalisation of the ideal types of peace based on Sahovic (2007)...... 14 Table 4: summarising table of the three approaches to peace in 1994-2008...... 51

List of abbreviations CBM – Confidence-building measures CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States CPKF – CIS Peacekeeping Forces CSO – Civil society organisation IA – International Alert ICU – University of California, Irving NGO – Non-governmental organisation OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe SSR – Soviet Socialist Republic UN – United Nations UNOMIG – United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

1. Introduction Peace and conflict scholars have argued that peace in general is somewhat under- conceptualised. In contrast to research about conflict, there is far less comprehensive and systematic work on understanding of what peace actually is and how it should be studied (Jarstad et al. 2019; Davenport et al. 2018; Diehl 2016). The most commonly used conceptualisation of peace in the discipline is Galtung’s (1969) positive and negative peace dichotomy. The critics of Galtung’s work argue that such a binary and ideal-based understanding cannot capture diversity of peace in versatile empirical contexts (Diehl 2016; Jarstad et al. 2019). There are, also, different conceptualisations of peace as stand-alone concepts, often termed peace with adjectives, such as the democratic or everyday peace (see for example Richmond 2006; Mac Ginty 2014; Everyday Peace Indicators, n.d.). Yet another group of peace and conflict scholars have developed quantitative peace scales, attempting to develop frameworks to measure the degree of peace (see for example GPI database project, Davenport et al. 2018; Goertz et al. 2016). And finally, there are conceptualisations of peace through different typological frameworks, studying different types of peace in empirical contexts (see for example Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs 2010). These efforts have merit in furthering the understanding of how peace can be studied, but as Jarstad et al. (2019, 4) argue: “[…] they are not adequate for a systematic and stringent understanding of the variety of ways in which peace manifests itself in the aftermath of armed conflict”.

Jarstad et al. (2019) have, within the Varieties of Peace Network1, made a substantial effort in developing a framework in which varieties of peace can be studied in comprehensive and comparative terms. They have theorised peace through three different approaches: situational, relational and ideational and argue that: “[…] combining the approaches can provide a fuller understanding of the nature of peace and reveal patterns from which theoretical insights can be generated” (Jarstad et al. 2019, 5). When studying peace as a dynamic process, it is further argued that it opens up for the: “possibility to trace how situational, relational and ideational aspects of peace shape, reinforce, or contradict each other and how these dynamics may drive changes in the nature of peace over time”. It is thus assumed that change in one approach will

1 For more information about the Varieties of Peace Research Network, see: https://www.varietiesofpeace.net/

drive change in the other two; creating an interactive process of change (Jarstad et al. 2019, 4). There has, however, been little systematic and comprehensive empirical application of the framework in a post-conflict process and the ambitious promises and assumptions of the framework have thus not been tested.

The theoretical discussion on peace is oftentimes centred on stability. Likewise, stability is at the forefront of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, which is argued to impede the long-term development of a just and sustainable peace in post-conflict settings (Jarstad et al. 2019). As Aggestam and Björkdahl notes (2011) the transition from war to peace is a highly complex and risky process, with challenges of continued tension and resumption of violence. A failure to provide a transition is often attributed to so-called unending peace processes and frozen conflicts, where there is no shared vision or understanding of what peace is and what the outcome of the peace process should include. Frozen conflicts have gained increased attention from policy makers because of its unstable character, with an impending risk of escalating into violence and transcending boundaries. However, as Smetana and Ludvik (2019) notes, the academic community has not agreed on a common conceptualisation of what a frozen conflict is and how it should be studied. The term frozen implies a static character and is often described as neither peace nor war, but others disagree and call for a conceptualisation that includes the dynamic character of a frozen conflict (see for example Broers 2015, Pokalova 2014; Lynch 2004). Aggestam and Björkdahl (2011) and Smetana and Ludvik (2019), among others, acknowledges a cyclical dynamic, in which it is argued that frozen conflicts have phases of progress, deadlocks and impasses and that they thaw, either violently or peacefully, but fail to reach transformation and thus re-freezes. They further note that the knowledge about these complex dynamics is limited and that more systematic studies are needed. Moreover, research on frozen conflicts in peace and conflict studies are often centred on relational aspects, focused on different conceptualisations of rivalries and failure to create peaceful relations (see for example Diehl & Goertz 2000; Goertz et al. 2016; Klein et al. 2006; Smetana & Ludvik 2019). By shifting the focus from stability to change when studying peace, it is possible to gain insight in how it changes dynamically in a context characterised as frozen, typically described as static with no peace or war. Moreover, applying the three approaches to peace can generate new knowledge about the empirical realities of peace in a frozen conflict, going beyond a purely relational analysis. As Jarstad et al. (2019, 18) suggest: “The balance between stability and change is likely to shift over time and considering changes and continuities in situational, relational and ideational peace can provide insight into this equilibrium”.

In summary, the Varieties of Peace Network has developed a promising, comprehensive theoretical framework detangling the difficult task of studying peace. It is necessary to explore how this framework can be applied in an empirical context in order to further the understanding of how peace can be studied; going beyond contra-productive concepts of stability and shifting the focus to peace as dynamic processes of change. In this undertaking, it is also necessary to test the internal validity of the framework by studying how the three approaches to peace relate to each other; if change in one approach facilitates change in the other as is assumed.2 By applying the theoretical framework on frozen conflicts, it is possible to gain a multidimensional insights in the dynamic changes of peace in a post-conflict setting that is typically described as static, with no peace or war. Systematic studies on the dynamics of frozen conflicts are necessary for policy makers and academia, as it would further the understanding of how a frozen conflict can reach a peaceful transformation and mitigate the risk of military conflict.3

1.1. Purpose and research questions The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of what peace is and how it can be studied by applying the Varieties of Peace comprehensive framework on an empirical context. By shifting the focus of peace from stability to a dynamic process, the aim is further to trace how peace changes in a frozen conflict and how the three approaches to peace relate to each other in this process; testing the internal validity of the theoretical framework. The purpose of the thesis is thus threefold: (1) to explore how the three approaches to peace can be studied in an empirical context; (2) to describe the changing dynamics of peace in a frozen conflict; (3) and to test how the three approaches relate to each other in such a dynamic process of change.

This is done by tracing how the three approaches to peace changed in the Abkhaz4 case of a frozen conflict from 1994-20085. The thesis answers the following questions: 1. How has peace as a situation, relation and idea changed from 1994-2008 in Abkhazia? 2. How did the three approaches to peace change in relation to each other in Abkhazia from 1994-2008?

2 This thesis adopts a theory testing approach. It does not aim to falsify the theoretical framework, rather, it is better described as an exploration of how the three approaches of peace can be studied and of the assumptions on how the approaches relate and create change. 3 The purpose of this thesis is to study the dynamics of peace in a frozen conflict, not to engage in the conceptual debate of what constitutes a frozen conflict. For a review on this debate, see for example Smetana and Ludvik (2019) and Aggestam and Björkdahl (2011). 4 In this thesis, Abkhazia is referred to as a de facto state, as it has de facto control over the territory, but has not received international recognition (Caspersen 2009). 5 The choice of time period under study is outlined in the methodology chapter, under case selection.

a. Did change in one approach facilitate similar changes in the others? If so, how? If not, why? 3. What are the lessons learned from studying the three approaches to peace in an empirical context? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical framework?

2. Theoretical framework This chapter outlines the three approaches to studying peace as found within the Varieties of Peace framework by Jarstad et al. (2019). The chapter describes the three approaches separately, followed by an operationalisation of the approaches. The chapter ends with a broader discussion on how the three approaches correspond to analytical strategies in political science and what that implies with regard to ontology and epistemology.

2.1. Three approaches to studying varieties of peace The Varieties of Peace framework conceptualises how peace can be studied on different units of analysis: situational, looking at peace as a locality in a geographical area; relational, referring to the quality of peace in a web of relationships; and ideational, studying discourses and ideas about the peace as it is and expectations of what it should be. Jarstad et al. (2019, 2) argue that: “[…] together they [the three approaches] provide a fuller picture of what peace is, how it is manifested, experienced, understood and by consequence, how it can be analysed”. Jarstad et al. (2019) notes that studies about peace are often centred around peace as a situation in an empirical context, as peaceful relations between warring parties or groups in a society, or as an idea of what a quality peace is. Thus, the three approaches are in themselves not new, but Jarstad et al. (2019) are breaking new ground when separating and theorising peace as a situation, relation and idea in one comprehensive framework.

2.2. Peace as a situation Jarstad et al. (2019, 6) define situational peace as: “a condition in a given locality where people enjoy security and where there are institutions and norms for managing conflicts without resorting to violence that allows people to participate on an equal and just basis and exert influence in decision-making.”. This definition implies a structuralist approach to peace as a situation, as it is based on norms, structures and institutions for conflict management. Jarstad et al. (2019) identify two dimensions that constitute peace as a situation: security and political order. The dimension of security is based on arguably the most common definition of peace,

that is the absence of direct violence and fear of violence. Jarstad et al. (2019) have furthered the concept of security to include freedom of movement, meaning that people in a locality are able to travel without fear of harassment and violence against them. Additionally, security also includes an element of predictability, based the notion that in a quality peace, people must be able to expect that peace will endure.

The dimension of political order includes legitimate forms of governance and freedom and openness; if there is civil engagement, allowing different voices to be heard and for people to participate in and influence decisions that affect their lives. It also includes institutions for conflict management, for instance if there are formal power sharing agreements, such as federalist, autonomous or decentralised solutions to a state structure. Such institutions provide non-violent resolution to political disputes and conflicts and are thus a key to peace. Jarstad et al. (2019) further argue that studies about situational peace must take into consideration how the effects and benefits of peace are distributed across the population in the locality being studied. The question to ask is, according to Jarstad et al. (2019, 8): “Who can participate in the peace and how?”. The two dimensions are summarised in table 1. Dimensions Features of situational peace Security Absence of violence and fear of violence. Freedom of movement. Predictability.

Political order Institutions and norms for non-violent conflict management. Freedom, openness. Legitimate political order, forms of government. Table 1: the two dimensions of situational peace (Jarstad et al. 2019, 8).

2.3. Peace as a relation Söderström et al. (2019) have conceptualised the second approach to studying peace: peace as a relation. While situational peace is based on institutions and structures, relational peace is concerned with agency. It is based on the notion that both peace and conflict is a way of actors to relate to each other, either violently or peacefully. They argue that a relationship can be studied as a dyad of entities, consisting of either individuals, communities or even nations. The most crucial aspect of a relationship is that the parties of a dyad have some influence over each other. If they are independent and have no interaction, there is no relationship manifest. Based on previous research about peace as a relation, Söderström et al. (2019) have defined a peaceful relation as: “[…] non-domination, deliberation and cooperation between the actors in the dyad,

the actors involved recognize and trust each other and believe that the relationship is one between legitimate actors and ultimately an expression of friendship.”. Thus, three important characteristics of a relationship is identified: behavioural interaction between the parties of a dyad, the subjective attitudes that the parties have towards each other, and the parties’ idea of the relationship.

Söderström et al. (2019) identify three kinds of behavioural interactions: non-domination, deliberation and cooperation. First, non-domination address the power asymmetry that is often present in a dyadic relationship, where the asymmetry does not lead to one party being dominated by another. It also entails that a party does not limit or censor their behaviour because of the dominating capabilities of the other party. Second, deliberation entails the: “[…] the exchange of views combined with the actors involved giving reasons for their positions.” (Söderström et al. 2019, 12). Deliberation does not include a need for consensus, rather the interaction is based on a recognition of differences between the parties in a dyad. It opens up for dialogue and mutual understanding as an alternative to violence. Third, cooperation is when the actors in a dyad: “work and act together on shared issues instead of competing” (Söderström et al. 2019, 13).

Regarding subjective attitudes, Söderström et al. (2019) identify two core features: mutual recognition and mutual trust. Recognition is about confirming the other party’s self-image. Doing so can transform the relationship to become more peaceful, while the lack of recognition can result in further violence, as the basic existence or identity of the other party is not accepted. Söderström et al. (2019, 16) define it as: “[…] a way of extending respect to the other actor. This can be done through symbolic or material concessions that seek to demonstrate peaceful intentions and attitudes held towards the other for the purpose of confirming the other’s self- image.”. Trust is defined as: “[…] a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another.” (Söderström et al. 2019, 16-17). Thus, mutual trust is cemented in a trust of the other party’s good intentions.

Lastly, relational peace concerns the parties’ understanding of the relationship. As Söderström et al. (2019) describe, they can perceive the relationship to be either one of friendship or legitimate co-existence. The idea of the relationship is closely connected to the other characteristics of relational peace: it affects how the parties perceive the other’s interaction and

how they respond to it. A friendship means that the parties in a dyad perceive each other as friends and that the relationship is thoroughly peaceful. This corresponds to mutual trust and cooperation between the parties. Legitimate co-existence, on the other hand, is closer connected to mutual recognition, non-domination and deliberation. Söderström et al. (2019, 18) define it as: “an acceptance of the existence of the other and should one so wish the other is deemed to be a legitimate other with which one can interact (deliberate or cooperate)”.

Söderström et al. (2019) argue that the relational peace can be divided into higher and lower order. In the lower order, the parties engage in non-domination, deliberation, mutual recognition and have an idea of each other as parties of legitimate co-existence. In a higher order relational peace, the parties engage in cooperation, mutual trust and perceive each other as friends. The relational peace framework is summarised in table 2. Söderström et al. (2019) also argue that it is highly unlikely for a relationship to become one with higher order relational peace without going through a stage of lower order peace.

Table 2: relational peace approach, summarising table (Söderström et al. 2019, 21)

2.4. Peace as an idea The third approach to studying peace refers to peace as an idea. Jarstad et al. (2019, 15) suggests that Sahovic’s (2007; 2018) model of ideal types of peace is a viable option to study ideational peace: “The model enables a systematic mapping of perceptions of peace and peace discourses, and can provide new insights about how varying conceptions of peace shape peace processes and outcomes […]”.

Sahovic (2007; 2018) develops an ideal-type model of peace based on the Grid-Group Cultural Theory (GGCT) (see Thompson et al. 1990). According to the GGCT, people are influenced by different social solidarities, concerning people’s beliefs and values, their preferred solution to social problems and how they organise socially in order to solve these problems. The GGCT consists of two dimensions: grid and group. Grid refers to the extent to which people accept

control and constraints on their freedom of choice and group concerns the level of cooperation with others; if they prefer to solve problems collectively or individually. When crossed, these two dimensions create a model where four mutually exclusive types of social solidarities emerge: individualistic, egalitarian, hierarchical and fatalistic. Sahovic (2018) has translated the GGCT model to four ideal types of peace in a post-conflict society. The grid dimension concerns ownership of the peace process; if it should be controlled from above or from within. The group dimension translates to inter-group cooperation between the conflict parties on joint problems. When crossed, the two dimensions create ideal types of peace: controlled, negotiated, just or forced (see Figure 1).

Just peace corresponds to the egalitarian social solidarity. The group dimension is high, meaning that there is a belief that problems should be solved by working collectively, with high-intergroup cooperation. The grid dimension is low, meaning that the peace process should be driven from within, with a highly inclusive participation. Just peace entails a perception that war is caused by inequalities and injustices, thus peace is created by reconciliation, justice and equality.

Negotiated peace corresponds to a individualistic social solidarity. The group dimension is low, with minimal inter-group cooperation bound by a clear set of rules. The grid dimension is similarly low, meaning that the peace should be driven from within. The belief is that war is caused by corrupt institution and thus the path to peace is through democracy, freedom and economic development.

Controlled peace corresponds to the hierarchical social solidarity. This entails a high group and high grid dimension, where there is a belief that the conflict groups should engage in inter- group cooperation to solve joint problems and accept control from above. The belief is that war is caused by a lack of control over evil actors, thus peace is created through building a strong system, through state-building and institution-building, which can control actors and ensure security and stability. The strong control over deviants and extremes allows for a system with integral inequalities and injustices.

Forced peace corresponds to a fatalistic social solidarity with a high grid dimension and low group dimension, believing that the peace is driven from above and that inter-group cooperation should be minimum. It is believed that peace is non-lasting and that the resumption of war is

inevitable. Thus, the focus is preparation of war and day-to-day survival, excluding themselves from social life and politics. A strong rule, through authoritarianism, protectorate and occupation, is believed to be the only way to force peace as a pause in-between wars.

Figure 1: GGCT model of ideal types of peace by Sahovic (2007; 2018)

2.5. The problem of ontology and epistemology when studying peace There are different schools of thought in political science and international relations that all have different ontological and epistemological implications. Hay (2002, 7-8. 13-14, 24-25) outline the main analytical strategies in political science, centred on structures, actors and ideas. The common controversy is what analytical focus is of most importance. Rationalist scholars argue that political actors are rational, self-serving, utility maximising and possesses perfect information of the world in which they act. Institutionalist, on the other hand, argue that actors are influenced by the institutions and structures in which they act. The role of ideas are addressed by constructivist scholars, who emphasise that the political reality is socially constructed and that ideas are similarly analytically significant as material factors. It could be argued that the three approaches to peace include all the mainstream analytical strategies observed in the political science sphere, where situational peace refers to the structure and institutions of peace in a given context; relational peace concerns peace between former conflict actors; and ideational peace refers to the ideas of peace that are dominant in the post-conflict setting under study. This is a seemingly oversimplified account of the three approaches to peace, as the analytical strategies are more or less incorporated into all of the approaches respectively. Nonetheless, Hay argues (2002, 164): while structures, actors and ideas are ontologically interwoven, they can be analysed separately by identifying distinctive situational, agential and ideational factors. For the sake of parsimony and internal validity, I chose to study the three approaches to peace as ontologically separate.

When regarding situational peace, I only studied the observed structures of peace and not the ideas of the structures as such. This means that I excluded fear of violence and predictability in the situational approach, as these features regard the ideas about security. This demarcation was done because the ideas of security overlap with aspects within the ideal types of ideational peace. If included, it would have affected the internal validity of the thesis, making it difficult to assert if a harmonious relationship between situational and ideational peace was because they affected each other as theoretically assumed, or because they shared the same features and indicators. Ideas about security and peace as a whole was thus only included in the ideational peace framework. When regarding relational peace, actors are the centre of analysis. Here, I subscribed to the notion that actors are not completely rational, but that they are influenced by their subjective perception of the world (Hay 2002, 53). Thus, actors’ behaviour and attitudes are formed by their perception of the relationship, creating a context in which they act in relation to each other. Therefore, the ideas of a relationship was a central factor in the relational peace approach and in understanding the relationship between the parties. In the ideational approach, I studied the dominant discourses about peace. While discourses cannot be completely separated from actors and structures, I assumed that they are objectively real and can be studied by analysing accounts of peace given by actors in a specific context.

When studying how peace changes, it was assumed that the three approaches affect each other interactively, where situations, relations and ideas are equally important and can similarly be the driver of change (Jarstad et al. 2019). The role of theory in such an approach was to: “[…] inform and sensitise analysis to the complexity of the process of change.” (Hay 2002, 29) and further to piece together a theoretically informed narrative on the complex process of change and examine the interplay between structures, actors and ideas (Hay 2002, 47).

2.6. Operationalisation The operationalisation in this thesis was based on context-specific indicators and previous applications of the framework. This is not the definite way to operationalise the three approaches to peace, but a suggestion of how it can be done and what it implies for the results and for future research. A summary of the operationalisation of the three approaches can be found in Annex 2, Table 1.

2.6.1. Situational peace In situational peace, the unit of analysis was Abkhazia as a whole, as the entire de facto state was affected by the security and political order pertaining the conflict (Petersen 2008). Thus, the structures under study was on national level.

Jarstad et al. (2019) breaks down the security dimension into three features: absence of violence and fear of violence, freedom of movement, and predictability. Predictability and fear of violence was not included in this study, as it concerns the idea of security and not the structures in themselves. When referring to the absence of violence, it concerns the absence of direct violence, as is possibly the most common definition of negative peace (Jarstad et al. 2019). While direct violence is often measured in the number of war-related deaths (see for example Galtung & Höivik 1971; and Uppsala University n.d. for a definition), I expanded the scope in this thesis to be able to illustrate a more accurate picture of security in a frozen conflict, which does not have enough casualties in a year to be defined as a war. The indicators used to study the absence of violence was based on the material reported by the UNOMIG, which was mandated to monitor the ceasefire and to report on security on the ground in the established security zones, restricted weapons zone and ceasefire line (see Annex 1, Figure 1 for a map over UNOMIG’s operative area). They reported ceasefire violations, level of crime, presence of armed groups and eruption of hostilities (UN 2006). I also used the UN Secretary General’s reports on the situation in Abkhazia, which cover events and developments of concern to the peace process, including violent events in other parts of Abkhazia that the UNOMIG did not cover. The indicator for freedom of movement was if there were any obstructions for the Abkhaz population to travel safely within Abkhazia, or to enter or leave Abkhazia.

The political order dimension is divided into non-violent institutions for conflict management, freedom and openness and the possibility to have a voice and contribute to change in society, and legitimate political forms of governance. I studied institutions for conflict management by looking if there were institutions that Abkhazia, Georgia and other armed groups engaged in armed violence in Abkhazia could utilise to peacefully ease tensions and avoid an eruption of violence, and if the utilisation of the institutions resulted in a peaceful solution to the tension. Jarstad et al. (2019) note that institutions for conflict management include power sharing agreements between the conflict parties. However, in Abkhazia, the lack of such power sharing agreements is what created the frozen conflict to begin with (Haindrava 2011; Khintba 2011). Thus, operationalisation was focused on other mechanisms for conflict management than power

sharing. The features regarding freedom, openness and legitimate forms of governance were studied by using Freedom House’s Freedom in the World reports. Freedom in the World reports the: “[…]real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals […]”, by assessing civil liberties and political rights, determining if a country is free, partly free or not free. Freedom in the World is set to measure freedom, but also includes criteria of democracy. Thus, the reports were also used as an indicator of legitimate form of governance; making it possible to trace the political and democratic development in Abkhazia. Freedom in the World is the only annual report on democracy and freedom that includes territories that are not internationally recognised (Kopecek et al. 2016; Freedom House n.d.). The political order also included initiatives that facilitated the inclusion of civil society in the peace process, making it possible for the population to have a voice and be heard.

2.6.2. Relational peace In the relational peace framework, it is important to specify what dyad is under study and who the actors are (Söderström et al. 2019). This thesis adopted a state-centric approach, where the actors in the dyad were Abkhaz de facto state authorities and Georgian state authorities. This choice was made because the 1992-1993 conflict was fought between the two state(-like) entities of Georgia and Abkhazia, where the latter fought for independence from the former. Thus, adopting a state-centric approach allowed for a study on how the relationship between two former warring parties evolved after a war.

Behavioural interaction is broken down into non-domination, deliberation and cooperation (Söderström et al. 2019). As for non-domination, I adopted Berlin’s (1969) concept of non- interference; that an individual, group or other form of entity is free to do what they want or should without interference by others. It should be noted that this is a rather scaled-down version of non-domination, which only included the actual interference from a party and not the uncontrolled ability to interfere, or arbitrary power, which many scholars argue is what constitutes domination in addition to the interference condition (see for example Pettit 2010; Lovett 2016). However, what arbitrary power entails is rather ambiguous (Lovett 2016). Thus, for the sake of parsimony, I chose to only use actual interference between the parties as an indicator for non-domination. As Lovett (2016, 6) outlines: “We have learned that both interference and domination can similarly be analyzed as reductions in a person’s conjunctively exercisable opportunities.”, noting that non-interference and non-domination share central aspects and can be analysed similarly. Indicators used was if Georgia or Abkhazia,

at state-level, used military, political or economic means to interfere with the choices of the other party. The indicator for deliberation was if Abkhazia and Georgia engaged in state-level political dialogue, either bi- or multilaterally. The indicator for cooperation was if Georgia and Abkhazia signed or intended to sign any agreement outlining them working together on shared issues on a national level and if these agreements were implemented fully.

The subjective attitude towards the other is based on mutual recognition and mutual trust between Abkhazia and Georgia. Mutual recognition entails, according to Söderström et al. (2019) the recognition of the other’s self-image. Recognition was operationalised by studying if Abkhazia and Georgia recognised the other’s national identity. Abkhazia’s national identity was strongly connected to self-determination (Clogg 2008), thus a recognition of identity could be done by recognising an Abkhaz right to self-determination, sovereignty or independence from Georgia. Conversely, Georgia’s identity was strongly connected to the unity of the country and recognition would be if Abkhazia recognised that they were Georgian or a part of Georgia (Clogg 2008). The recognition could be expressed either through speech or through political symbols and concessions. The indicator for mutual trust was based on Abkhaz and Georgian expressions of vulnerability and their readiness to make political concessions based on the expectations of good intentions from the other party. Another indicator was if Georgia or Abkhazia explicitly expressed trust (or distrust) towards the other.

The idea of the relationship is divided into friendship and legitimate co-existence. These are closely interlinked with the other components of relational peace. Indicators were if Abkhazia and Georgia talked about their relationship as friendship, being friends, or having friendly relations. Legitimate co-existence regarded if the parties expressed that they co-existed, were peaceful neighbours or partners in cooperation. It should be noted though, that the parties were not necessarily friends just because they said so: a friendship also entails that there are non- domination, cooperation, mutual recognition and mutual trust. Similarly, a legitimate co- existence includes non-domination, deliberation and mutual recognition.

2.6.3. Ideational peace Ideational peace concerns discourses of peace. Here, Sahovic’s (2007; 2018) operationalisation of the ideal types was used. First, according to Sahovic (2018), a high grid dimension entails top-down control, with political elites, powerful neighbours and the international community being in charge over the peace. In the Abkhaz case, the political elite was the Abkhaz de facto

authorities on national level; the international community was international organisations engaged in Abkhazia and Georgia, such as the UN, CIS, OSCE and EU; and powerful neighbours were expanded to include not only geographical neighbours, but other countries with interests and influence over Georgia and Abkhazia without necessarily sharing a border. A low grid dimension entails control from within, which included engagement from the civil society in Abkhazia, with CSOs, NGOs, grassroot organisations, activists and the population as a whole. In the group dimension, I only studied discourses about inter-group cooperation between Georgians and Abkhaz as they constituted the main conflict groups. The operationalisation of Sahovic’s (2007; 2018) ideal types can be found in Table 3.

Ideal type Grid dimension Group dimension Idea of peace Just peace Peace from within Cooperation to solve Justice, equality and conflict issues reconciliation, broad definition Negotiated peace Peace from within Cooperation to a limited Democracy, economic degree with clear set of development, freedom rules Controlled peace Peace from above Cooperation to solve Security and stability conflict issues through strong institutions and control over deviants, injustice and inequalities accepted Forced peace Peace from above No cooperation War will resume, peace forced through protectorate or occupation as a pause in- between wars Table 3: operationalisation of the ideal types of peace based on Sahovic (2007).

3. Methodology and material This thesis is a qualitative case study, which used process-tracing to study how peace changed in a frozen conflict. This chapter outlines the research design and motivation of choices, including case selection, materials and source criticism.

3.1. Qualitative research and case studies Yin (2018, 15) defines a case study as an empirical method aiming at investigating a phenomenon in its real-world context. This method is described to be best suitable for giving in-depth descriptions and explanations to a case and is best used when studying a phenomenon that cannot be separated from its context without losing valuable information. This thesis studied the dynamic process of peace. By using a case study, it was possible to gain a complex understanding of peace as a phenomenon while maintaining a high contextual sensitivity to frozen conflicts as an empirical context.

Richie and Ormston (2014, 37-39) argue that qualitative research as the sole method in social science is useful in a number of circumstances: when the phenomena being studied is ill defined and not very well understood, where qualitative research can help define the phenomenon and create a deeper understanding; when it is complex and conceptually difficult to understand; or when the phenomena is delicate or intangible and the issue that is being studied is ethereal or highly subjective. These aspects corresponds to studying peace, as peace researchers often argue that it is complex and under-conceptualised. Jarstad et al. (2019, 4) also underline that the three approaches for studying varieties of peace are designed for qualitative methods, arguing that: “a more qualitative approach is needed to capture local, case-specific dynamics and complexities of different varieties of peace.”.

3.2. Case selection A common pitfall in case study research is selection bias. A study with the aim to test theories or generalise to a broader population must carefully select a case based on the representative character of the case and of the useful variation of the dimensions that are of theoretical concern (Seawright & Gerring 2008). This thesis studied varieties of peace in frozen conflicts, in which Abkhazia was chosen as a case. Smetana and Ludvik (2019) outline three criteria of what constitutes a frozen conflict: it must be a post-war situation where the core conflict issues are left unresolved; international between states or state-like entities; and they must lack a stable peace, meaning that both sides consider war a possibility, even though there have been no violent incidents for a relative long period of time. Abkhazia fulfils these criteria and are often classified as a prototypical case of a frozen conflict, together with South Ossetia, Nagorno- Karabakh and Transdniestria (Smetana & Ludvik 2019). Additionally, what made Abkhazia an interesting case for this thesis is that it is the only case of frozen conflict that has deteriorated into military conflict while also having a relative democratic development. Nagorno-Karabakh and South-Ossetia share the same military deterioration, but did not see a similar, peaceful progress in government (Kopecek et al. 2016). Thus, Abkhazia is a typical case of frozen conflict, which allowed for a generalisation of the results of this study, and it has a useful variation in the dimensions that were of theoretical interest, which other cases of frozen conflicts do not share. Moreover, Höglund (2011, 117) argues that in order to improve knowledge about driving forces of peace it is imperative to study cases where peace has not been achieved and cases that have been given little scholarly attention. Abkhazia is such a case: scholars note (see for example Petersen 2008) that the Georgian-Abkhaz war is a forgotten

conflict and research is often centred on the geopolitical rivalries in the South Caucasus, ethnic conflicts, failure of the peace process or state-building, and to a lesser extent the empirical realities of peace (see for example Nygren 2008; Antonenko 2005; Petersen 2008; Cheterian 2009; Francis 2011). Thus, by studying Abkhazia, it was possible to generalise to the broader population of frozen conflicts, while also gaining new empirical and theoretical insights in peace and how it changes in general and in Abkhazia in particular.

Abkhazia is a representative case of frozen conflict, which increased the external validity of this thesis. In order to have increased the possibility for generalisability further, it would have been preferable to have a cross-case comparison between two or more cases. To study two or more post-conflict processes of change in similar comprehensive manners would nonetheless go beyond the scope of a master’s thesis and was thus not possible, especially regarding the time-consuming character of process-tracing as a method. A comparative advantage did, however, come from studying a case across time, making it comparative within a case, rather than cross-case (Gerring 2006).

This thesis studied the time period from 1994-2008. I chose 1994 as a starting point of because this is when the final ceasefire agreement and agreement on a peaceful settlement of the conflict were signed, resulting in a final cessation of hostilities and creation of the peace process that followed. Similar agreements had been signed in 1993, but was violated by a military operation and ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia shortly after (Petersen 2008). The end point was set at the Russo-Georgian war in 2008. I argue that the Russo-Georgian war and the period that followed entailed a considerate change in the dynamics between Abkhazia, Georgia and Russia and in the post-conflict setting in Caucasus as a whole, including a new peace process and structures for negotiation (Francis 2011, 23). These aspects merit a separate study. The limitation of 1994-2008 allowed for an in-depth analysis of how peace changed from the start to the finish of a decade-long peace process. The time period does not, however, mark the start and end point of peace; as peace and conflict can co-exist, it is plausible that characteristics of peace as a situation, relation and idea can be found in Abkhazia both before and after 1994- 2008.

For comparative advantages, I divided the 1994-2008 period into three sub-periods to create cases within the case. The division is based on key events in Abkhazia that are typically described by scholars to have had a major effect on the Abkhaz-Georgian peace process: the

1999 Act of Independence, the 2004/2005 presidential elections and the 2006 Kodori crisis (see for example Haindrava 2011; Khintba 2011; Coppieters 2004; Nygren 2008). They are not the only events of importance in the peace process, but are typically described to be crucial for how it developed. The division was also done to facilitate the collection and analysis of the broad variation of material that was necessary for this thesis.

3.3. Studying change: process-tracing Jarstad et al. (2019) argue that studying peace over time will give insight in the peace as a dynamic process and how the three approaches to peace can relate to each other. I argue that a diachronic method, more specifically process tracing, was most suitable for the purpose of this study, as it is used to trace the process of change in social and political systems (Hay 2002, 144). An alternative to studying change would have been a synchronic analysis, which is an easy-to-use comparative static method (Hay 2002, 144-145). However, such a method would only give information about the direction of change between two or more static time periods and not the process of change in between and would thus not have been sufficient to fulfil the purpose of this thesis.

George and Bennett (2005, 147) describe process tracing as: “one means of attempting to get closer to the mechanisms or microfoundations behind observed phenomena”. It is a useful tool for theory testing and development because it does not only study a probabilistic explanation to a specific outcome, but also the complex causal process leading up to this outcome. This thesis adopted an analytically informed process-tracing method, making it possible to trace the process of peace without necessarily including a detailed narration of each step of the way, but rather being deliberatively selective in tracing analytical features belonging to a theoretical framework (George and Bennett 2005, 207-211). This type of process-tracing allows for a: “detailed examination of the causal mechanism and explains how specific variables interact” (Vennesson 2008, 236). Thus, using process tracing in this thesis made it possible to explore how peace changes and how the specific variables, or approaches, of peace interact as causal mechanisms of change.

3.4. Theoretical assumptions: how do the three approaches relate to each other? George and Bennett (2005, 217) state that: “If a theory is sufficiently developed that it generates or implies prediction about causal processes that lead to outcomes, then process-tracing can assess the predictions of the theory”. When applied in this way, process-tracing can be used to

assess whether the variables in a case undergo observed processes that conform to those implied by a theory. In this thesis, I used process-tracing to study how peace changes and if the three approaches relate to each other as is assumed. In other words, I tested if an observed change in either peace as a situation, relation or idea created changes in the other approaches that conform to what is implied by the theoretical framework. I address the relations as either harmonious or dissonant. In order to fulfil this purpose, I first detangled what causal processes are implied by the theoretical framework and, thus, what harmonious and dissonant relations between the three approaches entail.

The implications when studying the three approaches to peace are based on the notion that situations, relations and ideas affect each other (Jarstad et al. 2019). This means that a change in one approach should create a causal mechanism that drives similar changes in the other approaches as well. This notion of how the approaches facilitate change in each other have different implications regarding their harmonious and dissonant relations. First of all, it should be noted that harmony and dissonance are not equal to stability and change. Arguably, a harmonious relationship occurs if all approaches are subject to stability on an equally high or low level of peace. Dissonance occurs when one approach changes and the others do not follow in a similar way. Conversely, a dissonant relationship can also occur if all three approaches are subject to stability, but on unequal levels of peace. Harmony then occurs when the approaches changes back to be on a similar level as the other approaches. Similarly, harmony and dissonance are not equal to progress and deterioration. Harmony can occur when the approaches develop in both positive and negative ways. For example, a harmonious relationship occurs if a deteriorated situational peace results in worsened relations between the conflict parties and less peaceful ideas about peace. Similarly, dissonance can also involve positive development, where one approach can deteriorate and the others either remain stable or be subject to peaceful progress.

In short, harmony occurs when the three approaches to studying peace change in the same direction; an increase or deterioration of features in one approach should result in an increase or deterioration of the features in the other approaches as well. Dissonance occurs when change is observed in one approach, but the other(s) change in a different direction, or if the change in the first approach is persistent without the other two following. The reason for dissonance was subject for discussion and analysis. Likewise, how the approaches changed harmoniously was

also discussed and analysed. It was assumed that the approaches related interactively and that any approach could have facilitated change in the others.

It should be noted that the ideational approach differs from the situational and relational peace in comparative terms. The ideational approach is based on ideal types, rather than dimensions that can be classified as higher and lower, as is the case of peace as a situation (security and political order can decrease or increase) and as a relation (the relationship can be of a higher or lower order of peace). I do however argue that the ideal types can be classified as more or less peaceful: forced ideas of peace is least peaceful as they involve the perception that war will resume, while just peace is most peaceful because it includes all levels in a society and is based on justice, equality and reconciliation. Similarly, a negotiated peace is more peaceful than a controlled peace, as this idea involves democracy and freedom, while controlled peace regards less democratic and inclusive ideas of peace. Thus, if peace as a situation or relation increase or decrease, the idea of peace should follow and become more or less peaceful.

3.5. Analysing ideas Vennesson (2008, 237) points to the significance of using diverse empirical sources and analytical techniques in process-tracing. To uncover dominant discourses about peace, I used a descriptive ideational analysis. Vedung (2018) outlines ideational analysis as a methodological tool to study political ideas. In a descriptive analysis, the material is collected and classified by an analytical schema in order to make it possible to interpret the meaning and ideas behind documents and statements. According to Vedung (2018) a descriptive ideational analysis is divided into a number of practical moments: to define a research issue, to formulate research questions pertaining the research issue, to outline an analytical schema based on the research questions, and to collect material and classify it based on the analytical schema. In this thesis, the research issue, questions and analytical schema was already outlined before conducting the analysis: I collected and classied statements, speeches, documents and interviews made in Abkhazia and analysed it based on the ideational peace framework outlined by Sahovic (2007; 2018). The analytical schema was thus based on four ideal types of peace and the purpose with the ideational analysis was to uncover and describe what ideas of peace were dominant. The operationalisation of the ideal types have already been outlined (see Table 3). The purpose was to uncover dominant ideas of peace in Abkhazia and the material used was therefore collected from political elites. Previous research on discourses in Abkhazia was also used to describe the

dominant ideas about peace. Moreover, I used ideational analysis to uncover ideas about the relationship within the relational peace approach. Here, the analytical schema was based on the operationalisation of friendship and legitimate co-existence. For the sake of reflexivity, I conducted the ideational analysis, having an iterative process between the research questions, analytical schema and material used. Doing so gave me the opportunity to uncover my own biases and gain deep knowledge about the analytical schema and material in question.

It should be noted that only statements, interviews, documents and speeches made in English or translated into English were used in this thesis, which restricted the access to material. It could be argued that the only material that was accessible in English had a purpose to reach out to a broader, international audience. Thus, the ideas that were communicated could have been affected by the international character of the material in itself and its audience. I do not rule out that an ideational analysis based on material in Russian, Abkhaz or Georgian would yield a different result. However, due to the state-centric analysis conducted in this thesis it was nonetheless interesting to analyse the ideas about peace that were communicated internationally, as the peace process and frozen conflict included international actors.

3.6. Material This thesis is a desktop study that used a multitude of different historical material of both primary and secondary character. Primary sources used in this thesis were formal agreements between Georgia and Abkhazia, minutes and statements from meetings and official statements from political elites in Abkhazia. Secondary sources were previous research, reports from international organisations and NGOs, news articles and records of interviews with Abkhaz political elite. Most sources were found online, which meant that it oftentimes was difficult to prove the authenticity and validity of the material. This is why all material was handled with care, regardless of its secondary or primary character (Dulic 2011, 36-37). Regarding primary sources, I looked for photo copies of the original document and for signatures or stamps that could validate the authenticity. I searched for documents on official websites, such as the UN document library and the official governmental website of Abkhazia. When the authenticity of the document could not be proven, I treated the accessible sources as a secondary source. Regarding secondary sources, I questioned who wrote the material, what the target audience was, when it was written, in what context it was written and if the material was translated. I used triangulation with all materials by comparing the information with three independent sources to avoid bias and increase reliability (Dulic 2011, 45). If it was not possible to find

three independent sources, I addressed this problem and was transparent in my interpretation of the material. I was particularly careful when reviewing material written by Abkhaz and Georgian individuals, scholars, organisations and news outlets. While such material offered a great insight in Abkhazia as a study subject, there was an equal risk of biased reporting when using materials from conflict groups (Dulic 2011, 38).

4. Results and analysis This chapter includes a short contextual background on the 1992-1993 war between Georgia and Abkhazia, followed by a separate application of the three approaches to studying peace on each period of the frozen conflict from 1994-2008. The chapter ends with a discussion and analysis of the possible harmonious and dissonant relations between the three approaches and what it implies for the theoretical framework.

4.1. Contextual background Abkhazia is a de facto state in the northernmost region of Georgia, bordering to Russia and the Black Sea. Prior to the 1992-1993 Georgian-Abkhaz war, Abkhazia had population of around 500-600 000 people, consisting of a high ethnic diversity. The war led to a drastic change in demographics, as around 250 000 Georgians living in Abkhazia became victims of ethnic cleansing and forced to leave their homes in 1993 (Petersen 2008).

Abkhazia has historically been a region with diverse local, regional and international connections. Being a part of the Ottoman empire, the Russian empire and later on the Soviet Union, Abkhazia has been affected by diverse influences and have had many different types of political statuses and structures over the years. In the formation of the Soviet Union, Abkhazia enjoyed status as a sovereign SSR. In 1931, this status was abolished and they were instead included as an autonomous region within the Georgian SSR. The ethno-federal policies of Soviet led to a process of Georgianisation, with restrictions on Abkhaz language and education, and where Georgians as a group were privileged above the Abkhaz population. Abkhazia frequently turned to Moscow for support, with which they felt a closer historical connection to compared to Tbilisi. Wanting to protect a united Georgia, this led to a mutual distrust between the groups where Georgians were afraid of Russofication; a fear that deepened and developed grievances between the groups throughout the Soviet rule (Auch 2005; Saparov 2015; Coppieters 2004). When Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev launched the democratisation efforts

of Glasnost and Perestroika in the 1980s, it opened up for ethno-nationalist mobilisation and radicalisation in Georgia and Abkhazia. Georgia began a process of secessionism from the Supreme Soviet and stated that Abkhazia would continue to be an autonomous region in Georgia. Abkhazia, on the other hand, had begun a similar process of secessionism from Georgia and claimed that they had a right to secede from both Georgia and Soviet as a whole. The nationalist movements that emerged led to multiple violent clashes and outright massacres, which served as important catalysators to the following years of conflict (Petersen 2008).

The war broke out in August 1992 as Georgian troops entered Sukhumi. The belligerents consisted of Abkhaz and Georgian troops, Georgian paramilitary supporting the former Georgian president who had been removed from the presidential post in a coup d’état in 1991- 1992, irregular Chechnyan forced an Russia, who ambiguously support both sides in the conflict. A ceasefire was signed in July 1993, but later violated by a Abkhaz military operation to reinstate control over Sukhumi and subsequent ethnic cleansing and mass expulsion, resulting in approximately 250 000 Georgians leaving Abkhazia. New agreements were signed in the following year, including a ceasefire called the Moscow agreement. The main conflict issues concerned the political status of Abkhazia and the safe return of displaced persons and refugees to the region. These issues have been immensely difficult to reconcile, leading to a freezing of the peace process (Petersen 2008). A map over Georgia, with its secessionist de facto republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia can be found in Annex 3, Figure 1.

4.2. The first period: 1994-1999 The Moscow Agreement on the Ceasefire and Military Disengagement/Separation of Forces was signed in May 1994 against the backdrop of an established peace process under UN auspice, called the Geneva process. The Geneva process had resulted in a number of important documents being signed shortly before the Moscow agreement, such as the Statement on Measures for Political Resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict and the Quadripartite Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons. These agreements were the foundation of the Abkhaz peace process and were all brokered by Russia as facilitators (Khintba 2011; Haindrava 2011).

4.2.1. Situational peace Security Shortly after the signing of the Moscow ceasefire agreement, UNOMIG reported the situation on the ground to be relatively calm as a result of the deployment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force (CPKF), consisting mainly of Russian troops. It was reported that the situation in the Kodori valley and Gali district remained tense, while the situation in Sukhumi was relatively calm. Reports also verified that Georgia and Abkhazia had fulfilled the Moscow agreement by withdrawing troops and military equipment from the security zone and restricted weapons zone. However, looting, ambushes, destruction of property and mines had destabilising effects on the security throughout the whole period, with an increase of terrorist activity in the latter half of the period. The mine problem was a continuous threat towards the civilian population, the CPKF and the UNOMIG throughout the period, but was limited in the last year due to increased efforts in mine removal (UNSC 1994a; 1995a; 1999a).

The situation remained tense in the Gali district in 1995, with continuous shootings, ambushes and criminal activities. An operation from the Abkhaz militia (Abkhaz law enforcement) in the Gali district in spring 1995 left 13 people tortured and dead, and 200 civilians detained. This operation created a high degree of distrust towards Abkhaz authorities among the Gali population (UNSC 1995b). The situation in Gali remained unstable and tense until an escalation in May 1998, in connection to local Abkhazian elections and the raising of a Georgian flag by the Abkhazian government-in-exile6. The escalation led to a complete deterioration of security in the Gali district, with hostilities from Abkhaz militia and newly deployed Georgian military troops. The hostilities ended with a ceasefire agreement later in May the same year, but the looting and destruction of homes had led to 40 000 people fleeing the district, destroying much of the reconstruction work that had been conducted since the conflict ended in 1993. Increased efforts to separate the Georgian and Abkhaz forces led to a reduction of hostilities and ceasefire violations and a general improvement of the security conditions. However, as looting, ambushes, mines and terrorist activities were still common, the situation remained unstable throughout the whole period (UNSC 1998a; 1998b; 1999a; 1999b).

6 The Abkhaz government-in-exile was the de jure government in Abkhazia, elected by the Georgian parliament. Due to Georgia’s limited control in Abkhazia, the government-in-exile had little influence over the situation compared to the de facto Abkhaz leadership in Sukhumi (Francis 2011).

In 1995, the situation in Kodori valley was tense and affected by a general lawlessness. The situation improved when a Georgian police unit was deployed to the valley the same year and remained relatively calmed throughout the period. In addition to violence in the former conflict zones, there was also an increase of small arms-firing between Russian and Abkhaz troops in the port of Sukhumi in 1996 (UNSC 1995ac; 1996a; 1996b; 1999b). Moreover, as many as 400-500 people had been killed by clan violence in the Gagra district, according to Freedom House (1998), but it is unclear which period this concerns.

The freedom of movement for the Abkhaz population was severely affected by the high prevalence of crime and mines throughout the whole period. Until March 1995, it was not possible to cross the Inguri river due the security conditions and freedom of movement over the Abkhaz-Georgian border was affected by militia, police and non-governmental armed groups throughout the whole period. Moreover, displaced persons were obstructed from returning to their homes by Abkhaz policies hindering citizens with Georgian residence from entering the region after 1998 (UNSC 1994b; 1995a; 1996a; 1997; 1998b). Abkhaz passports were not internationally recognised, which restricted Abkhaz citizens from leaving the region other than to Russia. Abkhaz citizens could access Russian passports to a limited degree, which increased their freedom of movement outside of the Russian federation (Sandidzan 2011).

Political order The Geneva process was active throughout the whole period in negotiating a settlement to the conflict and in facilitating meetings to ease tensions between the parties. The UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Georgia (hereafter called Special Representative) conveyed multiple meetings to ease the tension between Georgia and Abkhazia, especially after the 1998 events in Gali. Georgia and Abkhazia could agree to a ceasefire agreement after the Gali events within the frameworks of the Geneva process, reducing the risk of resumption of conflict. In these meetings, Abkhazia agreed to security guarantees and exercise restraint in the militia’s use of violence, but due to a lack of control over the militia, especially in the Gali district, such promises could not always be fulfilled. In short, there were mechanisms for conflict management on state level through the UN, but they proved to be more or less effective throughout the period, partly because the Abkhaz authorities lacked full control over militia in the Gali district. The mechanisms could nonetheless mitigate the violent escalation and

negotiate a ceasefire between the parties in the end (UNSC 1994a; 1995a; 1996a; 1997; 1998a; 1999a).

The Abkhaz constitution was adopted in 1994 and established a presidential political system. It stated that all Abkhaz citizens could become a member of the parliament, but only people with Abkhaz nationality could be elected president (Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia 1994, Article 38 & 49). The president holds almost complete control over Abkhazia and over the parliament, reducing the influence from other political instances and ethnic groups (Freedom House 2001, 612). Moreover, Freedom House (1998; 1999; 2000) classified Abkhazia as not free throughout the period of 1997-1999 (data is missing for 1994-1996). A parliament election held in 1996 was highly problematic due to the 200 000 displaced Georgians not being able to participate. It was also reported that polling stations in the Gali district, where a majority of Georgians in Abkhazia live, were missing. The election was deemed free and fair by Russian observers, but called illegitimate by the international community. The media in Abkhazia was in general controlled by the government and reflected governmental positions. Corruption was a wide-spread problem during the period and a majority of the economy was controlled by criminal groups. Freedom of religion was also restricted as Abkhaz president Ardzinba issued a decree banning Jehovas Witnesses in 1995. Additionally, Christian Georgians and Armenians continuously faced harassment and persecution throughout the period (Freedom House 1998; 2000).

Civil society in Abkhazia was weak and small. Until 1995 it was mostly focused around humanitarian issues in the region rather than engagement in conflict settlement. In 1997, the University of California, Irvine (ICU) initiated a dialogue process with civil society actors with the aim to prevent resumption of violence (Hoch 2016; Garb 2012). While president Ardzinba and Abkhaz authorities did not support the civil society and the informal dialogues, they neither threatened nor limited their participation (Francis 2011, 212). In connection to the events in Gali 1998, multiple civil society leaders wrote to political leaders and called for restraint in military means, which contributed to a de-escalation of the violence. However, the leaders also acknowledged that the informal dialogue process within the framework of ICU rarely reached outside their own small circle of civil society leaders and academia. Participation in the dialogue process was often met with criticism from the Abkhaz community and leadership, noting that dialogue with Georgian civil society would signal a false readiness for cooperation and diminish the goals of independence (Garb 2012).

In summary, the period of 1994-1999 had a low degree of security and political order. The period saw continuous violence and crime from Abkhaz militia, Georgian police and armed, criminal groups, especially in and around the Gali district, Kodori valley and Gagra district. The period was characterised by a general lawlessness in parts of Abkhazia, and even though some parts of the region was relatively calm, other parts were affected by a highly tense and unstable situation, culminating into the Gali events in 1998. Freedom of movement was restricted by the general unwillingness to host a safe return of displaced persons by Abkhaz authorities and because of the bad security conditions, with restricted the population’s access to labour and their homes. The political order was low because of the limitations in civil liberties and political rights, especially for the displaced Georgian population. Moreover, Abkhazia was classified as not free by Freedom House. However, civil society engagement developed during this period and informal dialogue projects were established, but as the civil society was small and weak, it had limited influence. While there were institutions for conflict management, these efforts were insufficient in preventing the Gali events in 1998 because of inefficient state-level dialogues between the conflict party and limited state control over the militia and police on the ground.

4.2.2. Relational peace Behavioural interaction The negotiation process was at its most active state in connection to the signing of the Moscow agreement. Deliberations between Abkhazia and Georgia were present throughout the period. In the first years after the Moscow ceasefire, from 1994-1997. Georgia and Abkhazia met either under the UN or Russian auspice to discuss the protocols on a settlement of the conflict in 1995 and 1997. Both Georgia and Abkhazia initialled the protocol from 1995, which declared Abkhazia as a part of Georgian territory, but Abkhazia withdrew their signature shortly after. This led to a deadlock in the Geneva process and to Russia taking over the negotiation process. Georgia refused to sign the next protocol in 1997, drafted by Russia (UNSC 1994; UNSC 1995c; Francis 2011, 136; Haindrava 2011). Georgia and Abkhazia continued the deliberations nonetheless, with unprecedent bilateral meetings between the Abkhaz and Georgian presidents in Tbilisi in 1997. Moreover, the Geneva process resumed in 1997 with the establishment of the UN Group of Friends of Georgia (hereafter called Group of Friends), which met to discuss the peaceful settlement of the conflict. A Coordinating Council was also established under UN auspice, with the aim to discuss issues regarding security and stability, return of refugees and

displaced persons, and social and economic development (Khintba 2011; Haindrava 2011; Francis 2011, 138-142). The coordinating council held its first meeting in December 1997 and held eight subsequent sessions until April 1999 (Protocol of the first session of the coordinating council of the Georgian and Abkhaz side 1997; Protocol of the eighth session of the coordinating council of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides 1999). The Gali events in 1998 affected the negotiation process negatively, but the sides continued to meet in the coordinating council and in summits on confidence-building measures (CBMs) held in Athens in October 1998 and in Istanbul in June 1999 (Haindrava 2011; Khintba 2011).

A few agreements on cooperation between Georgia and Abkhazia were signed during this period. The Quadripartite agreement established the cooperation in a safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and established that (1994, §1): “The Parties agree to cooperate and to interact in […] the return of people who have fled from areas of the conflict zone [emphasis added]”. However, Abkhazia was consistently reluctant in facilitating a safe return of the displaced population, which received sharp criticism from the international community and Georgia (Gegeshidze 2008, 68; UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1036). Thus, the agreement was not implemented. Additional cooperation in CBMs was agreed upon in the Athens meeting in 1998 and Istanbul summit in 1999. During the meetings, the parties agreed to establish a joint fact-finding mechanism investigating violations of the 1994 Moscow ceasefire agreement, cooperative action with Abkhaz and Georgian law enforcement against the criminal activities in the Gali district, and local level economic cooperation (Istanbul Statement of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides on Confidence-Building Measures 1999; Athens Meeting of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides on Confidence-Building Measures 1998). Implementation of these agreements began in following periods.

Abkhazia was under heavy economic and political pressure during this period. The international community, with UN Security Council, OSCE, CIS and Russia, recognised Georgia’s territorial integrity and avoided any move that could be perceived as a recognition of Abkhaz sovereignty. After advocacy from Georgia and Russia, the CIS adopted sanctions against Abkhazia in 1996, which practically isolated the region from the outside world and deeply affected the socio- economic development in Abkhazia (Francis 2011, 135-137). With the international community and, first and foremost, Russia on its side, Georgia had the power to interfere with the Abkhaz economic, political and even military development. Khintba (2011) even suggests that it was only because of political pressure exerted from Russia, on Georgian behalf, that the

Abkhaz side initialled the 1995 protocol on a settlement of the conflict, which recognised Abkhazia as a integral part of Georgia. This is, however, disputed (see for example Haindrava 2011; and Francis 2011, 140). Georgia nonetheless interfered with Abkhazia’s choices throughout the period.

Subjective attitudes There was a widespread distrust throughout the whole period. The negotiation process was a zero-sum game, where the parties were unwilling to compromise or make concessions for the sake of a sustainable and mutually benefitting solution. According to Sergei Shamba, a senior Abkhaz politician, there was a deep distrust from Abkhazia towards Georgia. The distrust towards Georgia’s intentions even deepened after the Gali events in 1998 (Khintba 2011, 22). The lack of security guarantees between the parties led to the lack of any formal CBMs as well, and Abkhazia was reluctant to sign any protocol for a settlement because of this (Haindrava 2011; Khintba 2011).

There was only a short window of recognition in 1995, when Abkhazia initialled the draft protocol on a settlement that recognised Abkhazia as a part of Georgian territory. When the signature was withdrawn, any sign of recognition between the parties disappeared. The bottom line for Abkhazia during the negotiations was that a solution to the conflict had to include a recognition of Abkhaz sovereignty (Khintba 2011; Haindrava 2011). Georgia expressed a readiness to grant Abkhazia right to their own national symbols, such as a flag and anthem, together with their own constitution and some judicial and executive bodies. However, they did not accept Abkhaz right to secede from Georgia nor them being a subject in the international community (Francis 2011, 137-138). Thus, Georgia recognised Abkhazia as a national entity with its own national symbols and power, but they did not recognise Abkhaz sovereignty and their right to secede from Georgia, which was perceived by Abkhazia as the only guarantor for survival of the Abkhaz state and identity. Conversely, with the exception of a brief period in 1995, Abkhazia did not recognise Georgian unity, which was the foundation of Georgian national identity (Francis 2011, 138; Khintba 2011; Haindrava 2011).

Idea of relationship Georgia and Abkhazia signed multiple agreements in which they committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and restoration of good state relations. For example, in a joint statement after a unprecedent bilateral meeting between the Georgian and Abkhaz presidents

in 1997, the parties declared their: “[…] determination to put an end to the conflict that has divided them and restore relations of peace and mutual respect [emphasis added]”. The parties also stated that they are: “convinced that the time has come to embark on a course leading to peace and prosperity, and, with a sense of dignity and mutual tolerance, to act jointly in a spirit of compromise and reconciliation [emphasis added]” (Statement on the Meeting between the Georgian and Abkhaz Side 1997). This statement is similar to legitimate co-existence and a friendship, as the parties committed to establishing peaceful relations, with cooperation, mutual respect and tolerance. However, this statement was released in conjunction with continued deadlock in the negotiations, with dominating behaviour towards Abkhazia, lack of mutual recognition and with a deep distrust between the parties. Thus, while there was an expressed will to engage in peaceful relations, the parties refused to compromise in reaching a settlement that would facilitate a foundation to this very idea.

In summary, the 1994-1999 period included deliberations between Georgia and Abkhazia on issues regarding the political status of Abkhazia, return of displaced persons, security and economic and social problems. Cooperation between the parties was outlined in the Quadripartite agreement on the return of displaced persons, but Abkhazia did little to facilitate a safe return and implementation of the agreement was unsatisfactory. Cooperation increased later in the period, when frameworks for cooperation within CBMs were agreed upon in 1998- 1999. The parties expressed a will to have a relationship of legitimate co-existence, but little effort was made to facilitate this idea. Instead, the relationship was characterised by deep distrust, dominating behaviour and lack of mutual recognition. This created a deadlock in the negotiation, as both parties refused to compromise and trust the good intentions of the other. Arguably, there was a lack of relational peace between the parties during this period, with deliberation and cooperation being the only observable features of a peaceful relation.

4.2.3. Ideational peace Coppieters (2001) has studied the discourses in Abkhaz leadership concerning ethnic and civic state building. His research concludes that the discourses in Abkhaz leadership were focused around the survival of the Abkhaz nation, where unity and preservation of Abkhazia as an ethnic majority group were crucial elements. Kopecek et al. (2016) have the same assessment of the first post-war years in Abkhazia: political and ethnic plurality was seen as a threat to Abkhaz survival and political development aimed at national unity and building a state for the Abkhaz people. Clogg (2008) argues that this is because of the close interlinkage between state,

nationality and people, suggesting that when Abkhaz political elites talk about a state, they refer to ethnos rather than demos. Thus, the survival and creation of an Abkhaz nation does not merely refer to sovereign state institutions for people living in the geographical area of Abkhazia; it refers to the survival of the Abkhaz ethnic group and the building a sovereign state to ensure their self-determination. This is arguably also why the return of the displaced Georgian population in Abkhazia was perceived as a major threat by the Abkhaz leadership. It was highly believed that a return to pre-war demographics, where Georgians constituted a majority of the population, would threaten the sovereignty and existence of Abkhazia as a nation, because it would make the Abkhaz ethnic group a minority and re-establish Georgians as a majority in the region. The only way for the Abkhaz leadership to accept a return of displaced Georgians was through political guarantees from Georgia and the international community, such as a federative or confederative agreement where Georgia and Abkhazia enjoyed equal status as sovereign states (Coppieters 2001). Coppieters (2001) also suggests that the promulgation of the 1994 Abkhaz constitution before the return of the Georgian displaced population was a clear signal of Abkhaz leadership’s will to exclude them from having an influence over the fate of Abkhazia. The constitution reserved the presidential post to someone of Abkhaz nationality, which excluded any other ethnic group from having the most influential role in Abkhaz politics. In 1998, Abkhaz president Ardzinba stated that the Georgian- Mingrealians living the Gali district were ethnically Abkhaz, but had been: “forcibly assimilated by the Stalinist regime”. He further described Abkhazia as a multi-national country with Georgians being a part of it (Coppieters 2001, 81).

In her description of the Abkhaz perspective on the peace process, the civil society leader Liana Kvarchelia shared a similar assessment of what was necessary to create an enduring peace in Abkhazia: “The history of relations with Georgia suggests that only statehood, underpinned by international guarantees, will achieve conditions of security and the preservation not only of the identity of the Abkhaz nation, but of its physical survival [emphasis added]”, and that: “Being within Georgia does not provide such guarantees.” (Kvarchelia 1999, 33). Kvarchelia (1999, 34) also criticised the international community’s use of economic incentives to pressure Abkhazia into a reintegration with Georgia and stated that Abkhazia would rather be isolated with limited trade and travel through Russia, than be introduced into the international world through Tbilisi. This is consistent with Abkhaz president Ardzinba’s criticism against the international community expressed already in 1996: “The main problem is the one sided

support of Georgia by the international community and by Russia. We are not a country that has been conquered; we are looking for an agreement after a war [emphasis added]”.

These discourses about statehood, security and survival of the Abkhaz nation suggests a controlled peace. The group dimension was low because of the separation from Georgia, but higher when referring to the internal structure of Abkhazia, in which Georgian and Abkhaz groups could live together. However, the structure of Abkhazia would be based on institutions that controlled the influence of ethnic groups, making sure that the Abkhaz wielded the most power and limited the influence of Georgians. The non-repatriation regime of the Abkhaz leadership suggests the same thing: the Abkhaz political system had to control the number of Georgians in Abkhazia, to make sure that the Abkhaz group was in majority. Thus, the idea of peace was based on an unequal power distribution between the ethnic groups. The hierarchical and authoritarian structure of Abkhazia suggests a high grid dimension. The perception that international guarantees were important to ensure security further strengthens this argument. However, Abkhazia did not accept top-down control from Georgia or in economic incentives and pressure from the international community.

4.3. The second period: 1999-2004 Abkhazia declared their independence through a referendum and adoption of the Act of State Independence in October 1999, in the backdrop of increased frustration over the deadlock in negotiations over their political status. The international community and Russia declared the referendum illegal and continued to express their undivided support of Georgia’s territorial integrity. The event resulted in a deeper deadlock in negotiations, as Abkhazia became even more uncompromising in their position on sovereignty from Georgia (UNSC 2000a; 2001a; 2004a).

4.3.1. Situational peace Security The security situation was described as calm, but unstable in the Gali district from 2000-2004, with some increase in insecurity due to protests in connection to the Rose Revolution in Georgia 2004. A general lawlessness and increase of criminal activities was described to be the biggest threat against security and stability in the security zone. The criminal activities also threatened the spontaneous resettlement of displaced persons in the Gali district: tens of thousands of displaced persons returned in 2000, especially in connection to the harvest period, but without

any security guarantees from Abkhazia or Georgia. The formal repatriation under the Quadripartite agreement was stalled because of the inadequate security conditions and lack of political will to cooperate between Georgia and Abkhazia (UNSC 2000ab; 2001ab; 2002b; 2003a; 2004a).

A deterioration of the security situation in the Kodori valley began in April 2001 with sporadic kidnappings of Abkhaz militia and UNOMIG personnel. It deteriorated completely in August 2001, when armed irregular groups clashed with Abkhaz security forces in the Kodori valley. Later the same month, the Abkhaz prime minister reported 700 armed irregulars preparing to invade the Kodori valley from the Georgian side of the ceasefire line. The UNOMIG chief military observer organised a meeting with the Abkhaz prime minister and Georgian president, in which they agreed to exercise restraint and not conduct any military operation on either side. New signs of a major crisis emerged in the beginning of October, when armed irregulars attacked a Abkhaz checkpoint in the Kodori valley. Abkhaz responded with counter attacks to drive the irregulars out of the valley. A new low point in the security situation was reached a few days afterwards, when a UN helicopter was shot down over the Kodori valley, despite security guarantees from both Georgia and Abkhazia, killing 9 people. After this, heavy fighting continued with artillery and bombings from aircrafts until the 18th October. Georgia expressed suspicion of Russian involvement, based on the observation of unidentified aircraft that was not a part of Abkhaz military possession (UNSC 2001b). However, Georgian troops still present in the Kodori valley in violation of the Moscow ceasefire agreement were a major source of distrust and tension in Abkhazia in 2001 and 2002 subsequently. The tension de-escalated again in August 2002 and remained calm without major incidents in the Kodori valley throughout the rest of the period (UNSC 2002c; 2003a; 2004a).

Tensions heightened between Georgia and Abkhazia when foreign fishing vessels were seized and inspected by Georgian authorities outside the coastal waters near Sukhumi in spring 2004. Georgia stated that the vessels were illegally operating on Georgian territorial waters and Abkhazia warned that they would use force to prevent any further intrusion by Georgia into Abkhaz “sovereign territory” (UNSC 2004b, §13). The Special Representative initiated meetings between the parties to defuse the tension, but later in July 2004 the tension increased again when Georgia fired on foreign cargo vessels outside the coast of Sukhumi to regain control over their territorial waters. Abkhazia accused Georgia of violating the ceasefire

agreement and announced the suspension of their participation in the negotiation process and joint fact-finding operations (UNSC 2004a).

The freedom of movement in Abkhazia was affected by flooding in the Kodori valley in 2004 and by the unstable security conditions in general, where criminal activities remained high and a major concern for human rights and return of displaced persons throughout the whole period. It especially hindered the safety for people returning in connection to the harvest period, where the spontaneous return of displaced persons increased dramatically in the Gali district (UNSC 2000a; 2001a; 2002a; 2003a; 2004ac; Freedom House 2005, 734). However, the freedom of movement outside of Abkhazia increased as Russian and Abkhaz relations developed during the period, where Russia introduced a Visa-free travel regime for Abkhaz citizens and Abkhazia appealed for Russian citizenships and passports for the Abkhaz population. By June 2002, about 150 000 Abkhazians had received Russian passports and citizenships. Georgian foreign ministry stated that this was an illegal campaign and other Georgian officials called it a Russian annexation of Georgian territory (UNSC 2003b; 2004c; Khashig 2002).

Political order There were conflict management mechanisms active during this period. In connection to increased tension in the Kodori valley, the UNOMIG chief military observer and Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Georgia facilitated multiple meetings between Georgia and Abkhazia in order to de-escalate the situation. The meetings were, however, not always successful, especially in regard to the crisis in the Kodori valley in 2001, when multiple meetings between the sides did not manage to mitigate the military crisis that was prevailing. The meetings also proved ineffective in resolving the conflict created by foreign vessels in the coastal water outside of Sukhumi, and rather resulted in Abkahzia suspending their participation in the negotiation process (UNSC 2001b; 2004a).

Freedom House classified Abkhazia as not free throughout the whole period from 1999-2004. In the presidential election in 1999, president Ardzinba was the only candidate running for office. The displaced population of approximately 200 000 ethnic Georgians was not able to vote in the 1999 president election, the 1999 referendum on independence, the 2001 local election and in the 2002 parliamentary elections. The opposition candidates boycotted the 2002 parliamentary election in 2002 in protest against the election campaign, which resulted in a parliament consisting only of deputies loyal to the president. A opposition force, called the

Amtsakhara, gained political ground in 2003 when they could pressure the sitting prime minister Gennady Gagulia into resignation (Freedom House 2004).

Civil liberties and political rights remained restricted throughout the whole period. In 2002, the Abkhaz education ministry prohibited the use of Georgian language in Abkhaz schools, which hindered the Georgian population in the Gali district from accessing education in their mother tongue. Other aspects, such as freedom of religion and freedom of media, remained unchanged since the last period: Christian Georgians and Armenians were continuously harassed and persecuted and the media was largely controlled by the government. In addition, the judicial system in Abkhazia could not guarantee fair trials (Freedom House 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005).

Civil society engagement increased during this period. NGOs were active in humanitarian assistance, but informal discussion formats between Abkhaz and Georgians were established in the period, such as the Schlaining process and the continuation of the ICU dialogue initiative. The Schlaining process was an informal dialogue initiative facilitating its first meeting in the Austrian town Schlaining in 2000 between Georgian and Abkhaz governmental officials, civil society activists and NGO representatives. The process was designed to bring people from the two sides together and to create a constructive environment for problem solving and for addressing the specific vulnerabilities and insecurities of both parties. 57 people from the Abkhaz side participated in the process, which met three to five times a year from 2000-2003 and only once in 2004 due to domestic instabilities in both Georgia and Abkhazia (Cohen 2012, 63-70; Gurgulia 2012, 102; Garb 2012). However, participation in the meetings was seen as controversial. Abkhaz representatives often had to legitimise their participation by acting as envoys for the Abkhaz government, informing the Georgian side about the government’s view on the conflict (Hoch et al. 2016). As mentioned in the previous period, the Abkhaz authorities under Ardzinba were sceptical to engagement from NGOs and the civil society, believing that it could hurt the Abkhaz road to independence. Offensive articles about NGOs in Abkhazia were published in 2002 and 2004 by a government-controlled newspaper, likely reflecting president Ardzinba’s negative view of NGO and civil society engagement. There was a general unwillingness to include any other group than Abkhazians from the Abkhaz side and thus there was no representation from ethnic Georgians residing in Abkhazia in the dialogue processes (Francis 2011; 204, 212, 215).

In summary, the period from 1999-2004 saw low security and a low political order. The security in Abkhazia was lower this period compared to 1994-1999. This is because of a general lawlessness in the Gali district, the high-level tension with military clashes and bombings in the Kodori valley in 2001 and the firing against foreign vessels outside the coast of Sukhumi in 2004. Conflict management mechanisms were inefficient in easing these tensions and it ultimately resulted in Abkhazia suspending their participation in the negotiation process. Political order did not see any noticeable change compared to the previous period, with the exception of a growing civil society engagement in informal dialogue processes, facilitating discussions between the conflict sides.

4.3.2. Relational peace Behavioural interaction There was an ongoing deliberation between the conflict parties during the period. However, since its unilateral declaration of independence in 1999, Abkhazia refused to discuss the issue of political status. Thus, Abkhazia rejected the Boden plan on basic division of competencies between Sukhumi and Tbilisi, a document prepared by the Special Representative Dieter Boden as a basis for discussion on a settlement of the conflict (UNSC 2000a; 2002d; 2004a). In connection to deteriorated security situation in April 2001, Abkhazia withdrew participation in the Coordinating Council. By this time, the contact between Georgia and Abkhazia was held at a minimum, with deliberation only being active regarding security issues within the framework of the Geneva process. The negotiation on a settlement was completely stalled (UNSC 2001c). The peace process and the deliberations got new momentum after Shevardnadze and Putin met in Sochi in 2003, resulting in the Sochi agreement, outlining economic cooperation and cooperation in return of displaces persons between Russia, Georgia and, in some instances, Abkhazia (UNSC 2003c). The period saw a higher degree of cooperation between the parties, with implementation of CBMs established in 1998 and 1999, together with a new agreement on CBMs signed in March 2001. Cooperation including establishment of a joint fact-finding mission and increased cooperation between the sides’ law enforcement in the Gali district. The Sochi meeting in 2003 also included an agreement to develop cooperation in energy projects between Georgia and Abkhazia, especially referring to the Inguri power plant (UNSC 2001d; 2003d). However, this deliberation and cooperation was halted in 2004, when Abkhazia suspended their participation in the negotiation process and in confidence-building measures (UNSC 2004a).

No non-domination was observed during this period. Georgia still exerted economic pressure towards Abkhazia through CIS sanctions adopted in 1996 and directed sharp criticism against Russia for violating these sanctions and developing political and economic ties with Abkhazia. Moreover, Georgian officials continuously stated that a military solution to the conflict was not ruled out, given the lack of progress in the discussions on Abkhaz political status (UNSC 2003b; 2004c). Abkhazia expressed similar military threats against Georgia (UNSC 2003b; 2004b), indicating that both parties attempted to threat with the use of violence to interfere with the choices of the other. Due to CIS sanctions, informal relations with Russia were the only option for Abkhazia to avoid complete isolation.

Subjective attitudes The distrust was high between the parties throughout the period, especially in connection to the deteriorating situation in the Kodori valley in 2001 and the incident outside of coast of Sukhumi in 2004 (UNSC 2002a; 2004a). The military threats from Georgia and Abkhazia deepened this distrust, as the parties could not trust that the other would refrain from the use of violence, especially in connection to increased support from the US to Georgia in 2002 and the general development of Russian-Abkhaz relations (UNSC 2003b; 2004c; Shamba 2002). This perception increased after the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2004, when the new president Saakashvili expressed that a reintegration of Georgia’s separatist regions was a top priority. Georgia had earlier in 2003 and 2004 regained control over Adjara, an autonomous region de facto controlled by a warlord and the new leadership gained momentum in the unification of Georgia. When Georgia shortly after launched a police operation to regain control over the separatist region South Ossetia it resulted in a deeper distrust against Georgia’s intentions to solve the conflict with peaceful means. Saakashvili reiterated Georgia’s peaceful intentions, but it did not consolidate the parties (UNSC 2004d). In his address to the nation in May 2004, Saakashvili recognised Abkhazia as a nation and promised that they would enjoy the highest federal status as a part of Georgian territory (UNSC 2004d). This was too little too late in the Abkhaz view, as they were uncompromising in their declaration of independence and would not accept anything less. In summary, there was no mutual trust or recognition between the parties throughout the period.

Idea of relationship No change in the ideas of the relationship could be observed from 2000-2004. In the Act of Independence (1999), Abkhazia outlined their intention to build: “good-neighbourly relations”,

indicating legitimate co-existence. However, Georgia was not specifically mentioned and other features of such a relationship was not fulfilled. In contrast, the parties were suspicious about the other’s intentions and expressed that there was a lack of good will in the negotiation process. Moreover, after his inauguration, Saakashvili addressed his intentions to regain control over Abkhazia and called the Abkhaz presidency “evil” (Nygren 2008, 141), indicating that he did not perceive the current Abkhaz authorities as a legitimate partner for co-existence or as a friend (UNSC 2001d; 2000b; 2002b; 2004c).

In conclusion, the period from 2000-2004 saw a change in fewer issues being deliberated and cooperation in implementation of the CBMs, until the negotiation process was suspended later in 2004. Regarding mutual trust and recognition, there was no significant change compared to the previous period, with the exception of Abkhazia refusing anything less than recognition of their independence. The idea of the relationship was still characterised by a deep distrust and additionally by threats of military use. The most considerable change came in July 2004, when deliberations and cooperation halted almost completely, resulting in a deterioration in Georgian-Abkhaz relations.

4.3.3. Ideational peace The Act of Independence adopted in 1999 stated that: “[…] the people of Abkhazia have reaffirmed their determination to proceed with building a sovereign, democratic State[…]”, emphasising both state-building and democracy. However, the prohibition of the use of the Georgian language in education in 2002 and the non-return of the displaced Georgian population continued to indicate that the Abkhaz state-building process was not intended to create democracy and equality for all Abkhaz citizens. Moreover, the Act of Independence states: “The Republic of Abkhazia intends to build up its relations with other States on the basis of equality, peace, good-neighbourly relations, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and other universally recognised principles of political, economic and cultural cooperation between States”, indicating that Abkhazia did not accept top-down control from other states, but rather strived to be incorporated into the international community on an equal basis. This was also emphasised when the Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba stated (2002) his unhappiness with the peace process: “[…] the position of the key participants in the peace-making process can hardly be called ‘equidistant’ […]”.

Some significant changes in peace discourses could be identified during the period. In the previous period, the dominant peace discourse was controlled. In this period, the discourse gradually turned to a more forced idea of peace. This is largely due to the increased military support from the US to Georgia. The foreign minister Shamba stated (2002): “Currently, the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is going through a stage when it is grading into a problem of an entirely different level. A new alignment of forces is being shaped in the Caucasus.” expressing that US interests in the Caucasus region were aimed at isolating Russian influence and ensuring the territorial integrity of Georgia. Shamba expressed serious concerns over the increased US- Georgian partnership and worried that Georgia would use a rhetoric of terrorism to legitimise a military campaign in Abkhazia, with support from the US.

Shamba (2002) also outlined the public opinion in Abkhazia: “Two conditions prompt the public opinion in Abkhazia to consider interests of potential players in the region: a general feeling of the threat that military action will be resumed; and an understanding acquired in the past decade that the West cannot be completely relied upon in the process of state building.”. This indicates that there was a growing distrust towards the West during this time, due to its increased military partnership with Georgia. In combination with this high scepticism against the West and US in particular, there was a growing belief that increased Russian influence and patronage would mitigate the risks of military aggression. President Ardzinba stated already in 2001 that: “it is Russia that plays the stabilizing role in the region” (RFE/RL 2001). After the Kodori crisis in 2001, the Abkhaz prime minister asked for Abkhazia to become an associated state with Russia, which Russia declined, reiterating their support for Georgia’s territorial integrity (UNSC 2001b).

The perceived threat of Georgian military offensive increased after the Rose Revolution in 2004, when Georgian president Saakashvili entered office. As the speaker of the Abkhaz parliament expressed: ''The idea of the new president of Georgia will lead to a new war” (Chivers 2004). Abkhaz authorities described that they were preparing for military aggression and was, if necessary, ready to attack first (Chivers 2004). Moreover, the Russian distribution of passports to Abkhaz citizens were seen as a security guarantee from Russia. Vice-president Valery Arshba explained why: “'The president of the Russian Federation is the guarantor of protection of the citizens of the Russian Federation, no matter where they live. Political protection implies military protection.” (Chivers 2004).

This idea of peace highly corresponds to forced peace. While Abkhaz sovereignty, with equal status as Georgia and recognition in the international community, was at the foundation of the peace discourse, the idea changed to become more fatalistic, especially after the increased US- Georgian support in 2001 and after the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2004. There was a perception that the conflict would resume and that Georgia would use Western support to regain control over Abkhazia. Because of this, Abkhazia turned to Russia to mitigate the perceived threats of military aggression and to ensure the survival of the Abkhaz nation. It was believed that Abkhazia would survive only with the help of Russian patronage, as they were seen as the main stabilising force in the Caucasus. The acceptance of top-down control from Russia and the general belief that war would resume are typical characteristics of forced peace. However, an independent Abkhaz state where the Abkhaz ethnic group enjoyed self-determination and political power was still seen as the main driver for peace, indicating similar discourses about a controlled peace as in the previous period. Thus, the peace discourses from 1999-2004 were a combination of forced and controlled peace; Russian patronage was deemed necessary to avoid war, but focus was still state-building and ensuring self-determination for the Abkhaz people.

4.4. The third period: 2004-2008 The 2004 presidential election created a political crisis in Abkhazia. President Ardzinba had not been publicly visible during his last years in office due to serious health issues and the pressure for his resignation from the newly established opposition increased. The election marked the first competitive presidential election in Abkhaz history and three leading opposition figures, all prominent political figures under Ardzinbas authority, became eligible presidential candidates. Raul Khajimba, the handpicked successor of Ardzinba, enjoyed support from Kremlin (Freedom House 2005, 733-734). The result of the election was highly contested. The Central Electoral Commission first declared Khadjimba victor with 53% over the opposition’s Bagapsh with 34%. When the commission later withdrew the result and declared that no candidate had received the necessary 50% to win, it sparked wide-spread protest from Khadjimba’s and Bagapsh’s supporters. One week later, the commission changed the result again and declared Bagapsh victor with merely 50.08% of the votes. Ardzinba called this result illegal and absurd and refused to step down from the presidential post. When the Abkhaz supreme court declared Bagapsh winner, it escalated the protests and resulted in a storming of the court building. The court later announced that a new election would be held in two months. The crisis was resolved after Russia mediated a solution where Bagapsh would run for president

in new elections and Khadjimba as vice-president in a joint ballot. Bagapsh won the subsequent elections in January 2005 (Nygren 2008, 139-140).

4.4.1. Situational peace Security The security situation in the end of 2004, beginning of 2005 was fragile. As a result of the ambiguous results from the presidential election, protestors took to the streets in Sukhumi. The protests escalated when official buildings were stormed in attempts to oust the sitting president Ardzinba and his successor Khadjimba. The protests calmed down when Bagapsh, Khadjimba, Ardzinba and Russia reached an agreement on how to proceed with new elections in January (Nygren 2008, 139-140).

There was a significant increase in criminal activity in the Gali district in 2005 continued instability outside of the coast of Sukhumi, as Georgian coastguards attempted to intercept foreign vessels (UNSC 2005ab). After gaining some stability in 2005, the security situation deteriorated further when multiple serious incidents targeting Abkhaz official were carried out by criminal groups and Georgian partisans. Georgia and Abkhazia signed a protocol agreeing to cooperate closer to combat the criminal activities in the Gali district. The situation became increasingly volatile as the tension increased between Abkhazia and Georgia in general, with spurs of violence and a number of serious incidents from 2006 to 2008. An image of the other as an enemy was increasingly persistent in local media in proximity to the ceasefire line, together with increased disinformation about the current security situation. In September 2007, there was an armed clash between the Georgian and Abkhaz side in Zugdidi, on the Georgian side of the ceasefire line. Another particularly serious incident took place in December 2007, where over 60 local Gali residents were detained by Abkhaz militia and the threat of a Georgian intervention increased. The violence increased dramatically in Summer 2008, when indiscriminate bombings of public places in Gagra, Sukhumi and Gali (2005c; 2006a; 2007b; 2007c; 2008b).

The security situation in Abkhazia deteriorated completely when a Georgian police operation was deployed to the Kodori valley in July 2006. According to Georgia, the goal of the police operation was to restore law in the Kodori area, but Georgian officials also stated publicly that the operation would establish control over an important base from which Sukhumi could be reached by air in a matter of minutes. The operation also resulted in the Abkhaz government-

in-exile, based in Tbilisi, being relocated to the Kodori valley and of Georgia regaining control over the district. Abkhazia called this a gross violation of the Moscow ceasefire agreement. They also stated their readiness to oppose the relocation of the government-in-exile with force if necessary (UNSC 2006abcd; 2007a). The tensions after the Kodori operation remained, with occasional aerial attacks and clashes between Georgian and Abkhaz forces. Georgia described their military build-up in Kodori as a way to protect their territorial integrity by “all necessary measures” and to forestall the recognition of Abkhazia in light of the forthcoming international recognition of Kosovo (UNSC 2007b; 2008a). It escalated further in August 2008, in connection to the outbreak of military hostilities in South Ossetia. As a result, Abkhazia introduced heavy weaponry in the security zone to meet the increased threat from Georgia. Russia subsequently deployed o aerial battalion to increase the CPKF to, as they described, protect Russian citizens. Russia also deployed a military railway unit to rehabilitate the railways south of Sukhumi, which Georgia described as acts of aggression. Abkhazia deployed a military operation to regain control over the Kodori valley and thus, the whole region of Abkhazia was under Abkhaz de facto control (UNSC 2008a; 2008b; 2008c).

As in the previous periods, the freedom of movement was restricted in the Gali district due to the high level of criminal activity. The increased tension between Georgia and Abkhazia did not help the situation, as the Abkhaz authorities and local Gali administration closed the crossing over the ceasefire line multiple times after 2006, which limited the possibility for residents on both sides of the line to access work and education. Moreover, the return of displaced persons was still a concern and the Abkhaz parliament adopted a resolution limiting the displaced population’s right to their own property (UNSC 2007c; 2008d). While the freedom of movement was limited to and from Georgia, it was increasing across the borders of Russia. As the Abkhaz-Russian ties deepened, the majority of the Abkhaz population gained access to Russian passport, making it possible for them to travel to and from other countries, through Russia. However, this freedom was limited to the Abkhaz population. The Georgian population in Abkhazia could only access Abkhaz passports, and subsequently Russian ones, if they renounced their Georgian citizenship (UNSC 2008b).

Political order Similar to the previous periods, the UNOMIG and Special Representative provided structures for conflict management for Georgia and Abkhazia. When the negotiation process within the framework of the Geneva process was halted after 2006, in connection to the Georgian police

operation in Kodori, the UNOMIG and Special Representative conveyed multiple meetings between Georgia and Abkhazia to ease the tensions. In some instances, the meetings succeeded in easing tensions and avoiding a direct escalation of military violence, but largely failed to make the parties refrain from the use of force at large. Formal documents were signed, such as the UN Security Council resolution 1716 (2006), which called on the parties to follow the Moscow agreement and to refrain from the use of force. The resolution was, however, sparsely implemented.

The most significant change in the civil society engagement in Abkhazia was the new leadership with president Bagapsh. Bagapsh had, in contrast to Ardzinba, a positive approach towards the civil society and political pluralism. The authorities would listen to CSOs and NGOs and the civil society had access to top-level decision-making. Bagapsh reiterated his positive stance towards the civil society in 2008 in an address to the parliament, when he stated that the Abkhaz civil society had potential to influence the international community and were topical for the development of a democratic state. In fact, local NGOs monitored the 2004-2005 presidential elections and the subsequent parliamentary election in 2007, contributing to transparent and fair election in Abkhazia. Although, the international community nonetheless noted the illegitimate character of the elections (Francis 2011, 209-213, 259).

CSOs, NGOs and political figures met multiple times within the framework of the Schlaining process, the ICU and IA (ending in 2007, 2008 and 2005 respectively) facilitating informal dialogues between the two sides (Garb 2012; Hoch et al. 2016; Cohen 2012, 80). Scholars involved in the dialogue processes note that they had an impact in facilitating dialogue on sensitive issues, such as the return of displaced persons, which was not possible in the formal negotiation process. However, the outcome of the informal dialogues did not succeed in reaching out to the grassroot level (Garb 2012; Hoch et al 2016). Garb (2012) described it as a failure in involving a sufficient number of participants in order to influence the leadership in the Abkhaz and Georgian communities to only seek peaceful solutions to the conflict and not resort to violence. Hoch et al. (2016) noted a radicalisation of the NGOs after 2005, in which they became even more uncompromising in their strive for Abkhaz independence than the de facto leadership. Furthermore, from 2008 and onward, there was no domestic funding for Abkhaz-Georgian cooperation and CSOs and NGOs turned to domestic and social issues rather than bi-communal dialogue. In summary, the support for the civil society increased from the top Abkhaz leadership from 2004-2008 and the role of civil society was seen as important for

democracy and strive for independence. At the same time, the support and progress in the informal dialogue processes between the Georgian and Abkhaz community during the same period decreased in connection to deteriorating Georgian-Abkhaz relations, especially after 2006. It ended completely in 2008, when the informal dialogues ceased and the domestic support for such Abkhaz-Georgian cooperation disappeared (Hoch et al. 2016).

Freedom House (2006, 826; 2007, 925; 2008, 811; 2009, 821) classified Abkhazia as partly free from 2005-2008. This is a significant increase compared to the previous periods, where Abkhazia was classified as not free. The change was due to increased public engagement in the political process, especially in connection to the 2005 re-run of the presidential election. The event was also the first openly contested presidential election in Abkhaz history. In 2007, a parliament election was held where a number of opposition parties participated and opposition candidates were elected. However, there was also criticism against alleged presidential interference in the election. The elections were characterised by the same issues as in the previous periods: the displaced Georgian population could not participate. In 2008, the parliament passed a law stating that only citizens with Abkhaz passports were eligible to vote. This restricted the Gali population to participate in the election, as they had to renounce their Georgian passports in order to gain Abkhaz citizenship. Moreover, residents in Abkhazia with Georgian passports were not allowed to study at the Sukhumi State University, and thus had to renounce their citizenship to gain a higher education in Abkhazia. Regarding freedom of media and press, a law prohibiting the private broadcasting of news had been lifted already in 2004, but due to broadcasting infrastructure being destroyed during the war, the number of private broadcasters were highly limited. In 2007, however, several news programs were given broadcasting rights and multiple independent newspapers criticising the government could be observed. Nevertheless, independent media outlets were often pressured by the Abkhaz authorities. In 2008, the Abkhaz government passed a law on freedom of expression, successfully lobbied by Abkhaz NGOs. Georgian Christians were limited in their freedom of religion in this period, similar as the periods before. The Georgian orthodox church claimed that they were unable to operate in Abkhazia and Jehovah Witnesses were still banned in the region (Freedom House (2006, 826-829; 2007, 925-928; 2008, 811-814; 2009, 821-824).

In summary, the security dimension from the presidential election in 2004 to the outbreak of the five day war in 2008 was significantly lower than in the previous period, due to large-scale militarisation of the Kodori valley and multiple violent incidents involving Georgian, Abkhaz

and Russian forces. However, as reported by Freedom House and as observed in the civil society sector, the political order increased. President Bagapsh introduced democratisation efforts and showed his support for civil society engagement, resulting in CSOs and NGOs gaining access to decision-making, going hand in hand with openly contested elections and in increased political pluralism, with growing opposition. The political order was still characterised by human rights violations and widespread inequality, especially directed at the Georgian population in Abkhazia. Nonetheless, the political order was significantly higher in 2004-2008 than before.

4.4.2. Relational peace Behavioural interaction The change of government in Abkhazia initiated some hopeful revitalisation of the peace process in the beginning of the period. Already in December 2004, Abkhazia resumed its participation in the weekly Quadripartite meetings and its cooperation in the joint fact-finding mission with Georgia. Moreover, Georgia and Abkhazia met together with the UN Group of Friends in April 2005, which sent clear signals of Abkhazia’s intentions to resume participation in the Geneva peace process after eight months of no contact. This continued with a resumption of the working groups under the Sochi agreement in June 2005, a high-level meeting on security guarantees in August the same year, and, ultimately, the first session in the Coordinating Council since January 2001, held in May 2006. These deliberations were accompanied by an agreement to cooperate in implementation of a rehabilitation programme to ensure necessary security conditions, as well as increased cooperation to fight crime in the Gali district. Both agreements were signed in 2006 (UNSC 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). However, after the Georgian operation in the Kodori valley, Abkhazia suspended their participation in the negotiation process and refused its resumption before the withdrawal of Georgian forces. This also affected cooperation in the Joint fact-finding mission. All negotiation on non-technical issues were suspended and Georgia and Abkhazia only met with the Group of Friends to discuss confidence-building measures and the implementation of Security Council resolution 1716 (2006), calling for measures to reduce the tension between the parties. Georgia continuously called for a new negotiation format and the withdrawal of the CPKF, which Abkhazia refused, saying that a withdrawal of CIS forces would lead to a resumption of violence (UNSC 2007b; 2007c; 2008b; 2008d). In July 2008, the German foreign minister proposed a 5-phase plan to end the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia. The parties were first positive towards the plan and a high-level meeting was planned in Berlin,

but the Russian-Georgian war in August escalated before the meeting could be convened (UNSC 2008c).

Efforts to dominate and coerce the other party was found from both sides throughout the whole period, but it increased after 2006. Both Georgia and Abkhazia engaged in militarisation; Abkhazia with help from Russia and Georgia with help from the US. When Russia declared their withdrawal from the CIS sanctions in March 2008, Georgia met it with broad criticism and accusations of annexation, clearly disappointed in the decreasing economic pressure on Abkhazia. The military exercises held by Abkhazia in proximity to the ceasefire line were arguably efforts to threaten Georgia into withdrawing their forces from the Kodori valley. Similarly, Georgia’s deployment of police and military units to Kodori were clear signs of domination; trying to establish control over Abkhaz territory (UNSC 2006a; 2007c; 2008a; 2008b). This increasingly hostile behaviour was arguably founded in a growing frustration in the lack of progress in finding a peaceful solution, which resulted in the parties resuming to the use of violence or threat of violence to interfere with the choices of the other party.

Subjective attitudes No mutual recognition was identified during the period. While president Saakashvili promised the broadest possible autonomy and anything short of independence to Abkhazia in efforts to reconcile, this was still not enough to recognise the Abkhaz national identity, founded in self- determination achieved only through an independent state, as proclaimed in their unilateral declaration of independence in 1999 and reiterated by president Bagapsh shortly after his inauguration in 2005. Moreover, Georgia expressed concerns over recognition of Abkhazia in light of Kosovo and stated their readiness to use all necessary means to protect their territorial integrity and hinder the recognition of Abkhazia (UNSC 2005a; 2006c; 2007; 2008a; 2008d). Thus, not only did Georgia not recognise Abkhaz self-determination and independence, they also used military force to ensure their non-recognition. In the same time, Abkhazia appealed to the Russian Duma that they would reconsider their position on Abkhaz independence, further distancing themselves from the Georgian quest for national unity (UNSC 2007a; 2008d).

The distrust increased significantly between the parties during this period. Abkhazia voiced concerns over Georgia’s military rhetoric, increased military expenditure and mobilisation. Simultaneously Georgia expressed their concerns over Abkhaz recourse to enemy stereotypes and large-scale military exercises. Georgia’s peaceful intents were questioned, as they increased

their military expenditure significantly. Georgia pointed at a similar threat, referring to Russian support to Abkhazia and South Ossetia (UNSC 2005a; 2005c; 2005d; 2006b). The distrust grew even more after the Kodori operation in 2006, when Abkhazia continuously voiced concern over Georgia’s military build-up in the Kodori valley and that the domestic political situation in Georgia would lead to military action in Abkhazia. The threat perception was also affected by Georgia’s refusal to sign documents on the non-use of force. Georgia simultaneously expressed deep concerns over Russia’s deployment of forces in Abkhazia in 2008 (UNSC 2006c; 2007c; 2007d; 2008a; 2008d).

Idea of relationship The idea of the relationship were subject to barely any change from 2004-2008 compared to the previous periods. Both Georgia and Abkhazia expressed their willingness to create a peaceful, neighbourly relations by reaching a peaceful solution to the conflict, for instance in connection to the 5-phase plan in 2008. Despite these good intentions, no solution was found and the Abkhaz-Georgian relations were at an all-time low. Neither Georgia nor Abkhazia perceived their relationship as one of legitimate, or friendly, co-existence. Rather, it deteriorated into yet another war (UNSC 2008c; Fuller 2006; 2008d).

In conclusion, the relational peace saw a relative progress from 2004-2006, when the Coordinating Council resumed and the parties met with the Group of Friends, suggesting some progress in deliberations and in cooperation. However, this progress was completely diminished in 2006, when the Georgian police operation resulted in a suspension of the Geneva process, highly limiting the options for deliberation and cooperation. This also increased the distrust between the parties and the militarisation, which led to an increase in the dominating behaviour. While both Abkhazia and Georgia expressed their willingness to have legitimate co- existence they did not manage to reach a resolution to the conflict that would provide the baseline for such a relationship. In short, the relational peace between Georgia and Abkhazia was lower than in the previous period, completely deteriorating from 2006 to the Russo- Georgian war in 2008, with the only characteristics observed being some deliberation and cooperation on highly specific and technical issues. 4.4.3. Ideational peace The 2004-2008 period saw a change in discourses about peace, initiated by the change of government the 2004/2005 elections and the subsequent 2007 parliament election. Kopecek et al. (2016, 95) describe this as a “democratisation for recognition-strategy” that was adopted

by the new political elite in 2004. First, it was believed that democratisation and liberalisation were natural continuations in strive to national independence, but the leadership quickly realised, in light of Kosovo, that democratisation was a necessary condition for international recognition of independence. Thus, the political elite in Abkhazia started comparing their level of democratisation with Kosovo. President Bagapsh stated in 2006 that if Kosovo is recognised, the international recognition of Abkhazia would shortly follow, and that state functions in Abkhazia were better than in Kosovo, which was controlled by a UN interim government. This idea of democracy as a facilitator for recognition was shared by the wider public in Abkhazia (Kopecek et al. 2016). The EU broad neighbourhood program was seen as a possible guarantor for good neighbour relations in the Black Sea region. As Popescu (2007) notes, the use of pro- European narrative in the political elite in Abkhazia was a part of the strive for international recognition. Moreover, integration with the EU was seen as a viable option for developing ties with the international community, expanding beyond Abkhaz-Russian relations in trade, economy and politics. As one Abkhaz official said: “[…] integration with Russia does not contradict integration with EU” (Popescu 2007, 19). Abkhaz officials also stated their readiness to have an EU protectorate (Popescu 2007). It should be noted, however, that integration with Russia was stated as the top priority for Bagapsh as he was inaugurated as president in 2005 (RFE/RL 2005). In short, outside support and control was seen as a guarantor for Abkhaz independence, with which Abkhazia could circumvent the isolation strategies from Georgia and CIS sanctions, developing international relations, trade and cooperation outside of Abkhazia (Popescu 2007; Kopecek et al. 2016).

In parallel with efforts of democratisation and development of international ties, the question of ethnic relations was still burning in Abkhazia. In 2005, Bagapsh stated that the return of displaced persons to Abkhazia was “impossible” and that economic development and infrastructure rehabilitation had to be solved in both Abkhazia and Georgia before the political issues could be addressed (UNPO 2005). Bagapsh reiterated this in a speech in 2008, stating that people in the Gali district are living in Abkhazia and should thus not vote in the Georgian election (UNPO 2008). Clogg (2008) has performed field-work in Abkhazia 2005, surveying inter-ethnic attitudes and relations in the region. She concludes that the Abkhaz population is concerned with maintaining a demographic balance and in preserving their ethnic identity, holding on to grievances and past persecutions on their strive for independence. While Abkhaz generally take pride in tolerance and acceptance towards ethnic diversity, the nationalist narrative and separation of ethnic communities, in particular Georgians and Abkhazians, in

combination with an increased military rhetoric from Sukhumi and Tbilisi, created an image of the other as the enemy.

In summary, this period saw a some changes in discourses about peace. The change concerned democratisation and the belief that democratisation and liberalisation would lead to international recognition. This suggests a negotiated peace, as democracy and economic development were prioritised. However, the democratisation was not on the basis of creating a good society with good institutions, but a path towards independence. Moreover, the idea of democracy was not inclusive, but rather centred on controlling the influence of Georgia and Georgians in Abkhazia, to facilitate self-determination for the Abkhaz group. This suggests a controlled peace: democracy was seen as a tool for recognition and the democratisation only concerned some groups of the population, particularly excluding the Georgian population. The high acceptance of external control and strive to be integrated with Russia and have an EU protectorate is characterising for a forced peace; similar to the previous periods. In conclusion, while the tools to gain international recognition changed, the discourses of peace largely remained the same: the only way to reach peace was through an independent Abkhazia, with self-determination for the Abkhaz group and with Russia and the EU as guarantors for Abkhaz survival.

4.5. Harmonious and dissonant changes in the Abkhaz frozen conflict A variation of changes in the peace was observed in Abkhazia from 1994-2008, all of which have different implications regarding harmonious and dissonant relations between the three approaches. A summary on how the approaches changed can be found in Table 4.

Firstly, the security dimension was generally low with lawlessness, spurs of violence and resumption of military hostilities in 1998, 2001, 2004 and, perhaps most notably, in 2006-2008. In connection to resumption of hostilities between Georgian and Abkhaz police and military, the peaceful behavioural interaction within relational peace decreased, as the parties engaged to a lesser amount in deliberation and cooperation. This suggests a harmonious relationship between situational and relational peace; when security deteriorated, it affected the possibility for peaceful relations and, thus, the relational peace changed to the worse. This also suggests that while peace and conflict can co-exist, it is more difficult for conflict parties to engage in both peaceful and violent interaction simultaneously.

Secondly, the ideational peace was first characterised by controlled discourses from 1994-1999, with the perception that peace would have to include self-determination for the Abkhaz nation and control over the Georgian influence in Abkhazia, both in political terms and when regarding demography. However, in connection to a growing US support to Georgian military and decrease of security in 2001, the discourses changed to include forced ideas of peace. The idea of Abkhaz self-determination and sovereignty still underpinned the discourses, but they changed to become more fatalistic, where prominently Russian support was seen as necessary to mitigate the risk of Georgian aggression. This constitutes a harmonious relationship between situational, relational and ideational peace: the idea that control over Georgian influence would create peace was challenged by a deteriorated security situation, limited peaceful interaction and growing distrust, especially after 2001, which changed the discourses to include the idea that war would resume. Moreover, according to Smetana and Ludvik (2019) the criteria for a frozen conflict includes that the parties prepare for continued warfare. Such ideas of continuation of war were not dominant in Abkhazia in the first period from 1994-1999, which suggests that the peace process did not freeze directly after the Georgian-Abkhaz war, but rather after the first rounds of failed negotiations in reaching a peaceful settlement. This has further implications for frozen conflicts as a broader category, as it suggests that a peace process can avoid being frozen if initial momentum in the peace process is utilised. This is in no way a new conclusion, but it illustrates the importance of progress and pragmatism in the beginning of a peace process and that the characteristic frozen is not inherited from historic features of a case. It also illustrates how the three approaches to peace were useful to capture the dynamic of change in which conflicts become frozen.

Thirdly, while the situational, relational and ideational peace decreased in peaceful features, the political order increased in connection to the 2004/2005 presidential elections. This suggests a dissonant relationship between the approaches. It does not necessarily mean that the internal validity of the theoretical framework is flawed, but rather that the processes of how peace changes are more complex and dynamic than suggested by harmonious and dissonant relations and that there might be an alternative explanation. For instance, when studying more closely what a controlled peace includes, it does not necessarily contradict the development of political order. As observed, the increase of political order, with democracy, political rights, civil liberties and civil society engagement did not include all groups in Abkhazia. The Georgian population, in particular, was excluded from many of these privileges and had a very limited influence in the Abkhaz society. Thus, the relative increase of political order was still adapted

to a controlled idea of peace; where it was perceived that the Georgian influence had to be mitigated and controlled, in order to create a democratic and sovereign state for the Abkhaz group. Moreover, it was believed that democratic development would increase the chances of international recognition, which resulted in Abkhazia adopting a democracy-for-recognition strategy. As a result, the increase of political order became an integral part of the Abkhaz state- building project, which went in parallel with the peace process. Arguably, the dissonant relations observed between the three approaches can be attributed to separate processes of peacebuilding and de facto state-building, where the former failed and the latter saw relative achievement.

Fourthly, in the introduction to this thesis, I noted that research about frozen conflicts is oftentimes centred on relational aspects and that the three approaches to peace could generate insights beyond concepts of rivalry. However, based on the result on this thesis, it could be argued much of what the three approaches captures is relational. The peace process was focused on mending the Georgian-Abkhaz relations and agreeing on a solution in which Georgia and Abkhazia could live peacefully with good relations within a single state, as a confederation or federation. When the relational peace saw no development despite extensive efforts in the peace process, the parties resorted to violent interaction on the ground instead of peaceful interactions within the Geneva framework. Similarly, the ideational peace includes inter-group cooperation and thus regards discourses on how conflict groups should interact, or not interact, to create peace. With this logic, it is not difficult to image why the three approaches related in harmonious ways: the relational peace approach showed a lack of development in peaceful relations between Georgia and Abkhazia; the deterioration of the security dimension was result of this lack of development, where Georgia and Abkhazia interacted violently on the ground instead of peacefully within the Geneva process; and the ideas of peace were forced and controlled, characterised by perceived need to control the other and fear of aggression, which were both a result and expression of the bad relations. Furthermore, this implies that the increased political order is not a dissonant development in relation to the situational, relational and ideational peace; it is the only feature in which the problem of Georgian-Abkhaz relations could be ignored by focusing solely on the Abkhaz state-building and excluding the Georgian population from having any influence and agency in the process.

Moreover, this implies that not only a change in one approach can facilitate a change in other approaches; it is also possible for a lack of change to create a general deterioration. In the

Abkhaz case, the lack of progress and deadlock in the relational peace approach generated frustration and led to a resumption of hostilities, which decreased the security dimension and further limited the peaceful interaction between the parties. In turn, it also affected the ideational peace to become more fatalistic, where it was believed that war would resume. Arguably, this is the epitome of a frozen conflict: the status-quo and lack of development between conflict parties create a hot spot for insecurity and risk of military escalation.

Lastly, the three approaches to peace have proven to be useful in capturing the changing dynamics of peace in a frozen conflict. It generated insights in the cyclical character of a frozen conflict, where the lack of development in relational aspects led to a thawing of the conflict with violent interaction on the ground and forced ideas of peace. The conflict managing mechanisms could de-escalate the tensions and re-freeze the conflict, but the peace process could not provide a transformation of the conflict with a peaceful settlement. It has already been noted that all three approaches include relational aspects, but a purely relational approach would not have capture the state-building dynamics that went in parallel with the peace process; where the issue of rivalry relations could be ignored and relative democratic progress observed. In conclusion, for a systematic research on the changing dynamics of peace in frozen conflicts, the three approaches to peace provides a useful analytical framework. However, the trade-off between parsimony and complexity should be considered, which is further discussed in the chapter below. Approach/Features 1994-1999 1999-2004 2004-2008 Situational peace Low security, low Low security, low Low(er) security, political order political order high(er) political order Relational peace Deliberation, Deliberation*, Deliberation*, cooperation, mutual cooperation cooperation* recognition* Ideational peace Controlled Controlled/Forced Controlled/Forced *Feature was not observable in the whole period Table 4: summarising table of the three approaches to peace in 1994-2008. 5. Lessons learned from studying three approaches to peace The application of the three approaches to peace on an empirical context have generated lessons learned on the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical framework.

In this thesis, I chose to make an ontological separation between peace as a situation, relation and idea; where the structures, relations and discourses were analysed respectively. However,

the conclusions of how the three approaches interact suggest that all approaches inhibit relational factors that, unsurprisingly, related harmoniously in the deterioration of state relations in a frozen conflict. This implies that an analytical separation of the three approaches for the sake of parsimony is not possible or, at least, not desirable, as all approaches are ontologically interwoven. Jarstad et al. (2019) noted that the three approaches are not mutually exclusive and, arguably, this interwoven and eclectic character of the framework can be one of its greatest strengths as it allows for a flexible application with high contextual sensitivity. However, it also raises some questions about the internal validity of the framework when studying the cause and effects of peace; it is difficult to determine if a relation between the approaches can be attributed to causal mechanisms or because the approaches concern the same aspects of peace. Close attention must be given to the operationalisation of the approaches in order to clearly separate their features and further facilitate studies on how the approaches relate and interact in dynamic processes of peace. This would also increase the construct validity of the framework.

The interwoven character of the framework could also imply that a comprehensive application of all three approaches was not necessarily needed in order to capture the dynamics of change in this empirical context. In hindsight, if interpreted broadly and without demarcations, the situational peace approach could have been an adequate tool to capture how peace changed in a frozen conflict, as it would have included the situational, relational and ideational factors that merited closer empirical scrutiny in this particular case; it would have captured violent behavioural interaction on the ground, peaceful interaction within conflict managing mechanisms, democratic progress in the political order, and ideas about the longevity and sustainability of peace within predictability and fear of violence. This does not mean that the other approaches were redundant, conversely, is notable that all three approaches provided individual insights in the dynamics of peace. Rather, it illustrates how the Varieties of Peace network has created an eclectic analytical framework with broad application of the approaches both separately and combined. Nevertheless, the comprehensive application of all three approaches was time-consuming and complex. Future users of the framework should consider this trade-off with parsimony and if it is possible that one approach can capture the situational, relational and ideational dynamics of peace that are of empirical interest, even though it is not at a similarly complex level as the full application of all three approaches.

When studying the three approaches separately, it is possible to trace increases and decreases of features of peace. For example, it is possible to note a decrease of security, decrease of

relational peace and increase of political order. It is also possible to observe the discourses of peace going from more and less peaceful. However, when combining the three approaches to peace, it is possible to draw conclusions that are not based on the degree, but rather on the type of peace. The type of peace in Abkhazia, for example, was characterised by insecurity, fatalism and democratic development. It is difficult to assess whether this context is more or less peaceful than, for instance, a context with security, reconciliation and an authoritarian regime, with no freedom for the population. This implies that the three approaches to peace have very interesting comparative advantages in which not only the type of peace can be compared, but also the degree of peaceful features in and between different types. This should be further explored with a cross-case comparative study of the three approaches in different post-conflict settings.

More research is needed to explore how the three approaches can be operationalised an applied in a less intricate manner. Arguably, the flexibility of the framework is both a strength and a weakness: if it can be applied however and whenever, what is the explanatory power of a comprehensive use? And furthermore, is it possible to compare varieties of peace in different empirical contexts if the three approaches to peace is applied in different ways, both with regard to ontology and epistemology? In order to utilise the comparative and comprehensive advantages of this framework, future research must focus on how to operationalise and use the three approaches to peace in a way that allows for a clear application in various empirical contexts and not merely in context-specific instances.

Lastly, this thesis has illustrated the advantages of shifting the focus from stability to change by studying peace as a dynamic process; allowing for analysis of not merely what peace is, but how it develops in post-conflict contexts. Arguably, peace is not a chronological pattern of events, with a linear development of peaceful situations, relations and ideas. Conversely, peace is an intricate web of features, being subject to continuity and change, by progressing or deteriorating. I would argue that there is no single definition of what peace is, but rather that it has spatial and temporal variations that should be subject to closer empirical and systematic scrutiny. In so doing, it would further our understanding of the varieties of peace in the world and how peacebuilding and peace processes should be designed to best suit the prevailing circumstances. The three approaches to peace can contribute to this purpose.

6. Conclusions The purpose of this thesis was threefold. First, the purpose was to describe the dynamic changes of peace in a frozen conflict and, secondly, to test the internal validity of the framework by studying how the three approaches related to each other in such a process. This case study of Abkhazia from 1994-2008 has showed that peace in a frozen conflict change in both harmonious and dissonant ways. In conclusion, the deadlock in the negotiation process between Georgia and Abkhazia led to a growing frustration between the parties and use of violence to thaw the conflict. This increase of violent interaction on the ground limited the possibility for peaceful interaction within the Geneva process, decreasing aspects within the relational peace further. Moreover, the decrease of security and growing distrust between the parties resulted in controlled and forced ideas about peace in Abkhazia, in which it was believed that war would resume and that a Russian protectorate was necessary to mitigate the risk of Georgian aggression. These dynamics of change suggests a harmonious relationship between the approaches, attributed to the similar relational features that can be found in all three approaches. Moreover, a dissonant relation was observed as the political order increased while the security, relations and ideas became less peaceful. This dissonant change can be explained by the separate, but parallel, processes of state-building and peacebuilding in a frozen conflict, where political order could increase because it was the only feature that could disregard the deadlock in the negotiation process and subsequent bad relations between the conflict groups.

In summary, the three approaches to peace have provided a useful tool for capturing the dynamics of peace in a frozen conflict and how a peace process becomes frozen. The framework has provided insight in the cyclical character of a frozen conflict, which is advocated by Aggestam and Björkdahl (2011) and Smetana and Ludvik (2019). Furthermore, while the three approaches were largely influenced by relational aspects, they also provided a greater insight in the dynamics of peace, in which it was possible to observe and analyse the relative democratic progress as a process of state-building, beyond the concept of rival relations. The application also suggests that not only change in one approach can facilitate change in the other, but also that a lack of change, or stability, in one approach can lead to a general deterioration.

Thirdly, the purpose of the thesis was to explore how the three approaches to peace can be applied in an empirical context, reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical framework. This thesis has showed that the three approaches are ontologically interwoven and

difficult to separate, creating both strengths and weaknesses. A strength is its eclectic character, as it is possible to adapt the approaches based on empirical context and accessible resources, both when applying the approaches separately and as a comprehensive framework. However, a comprehensive application is both complex and time-consuming and the possibility to capture situational, relational and ideational dimensions with each approach separately raises some questions about the explanatory value of a comprehensive use, especially with regard to the trade-off between complexity and parsimony. Moreover, as the approaches are interwoven, it inhibits some issues regarding internal validity. The framework is undoubtedly useful in capturing different dynamics and dimensions of peace, but when studying how the approaches relate to each other, it is difficult to determine if the relationship can be attributed to causal mechanisms or to the fact that similar dimensions and features are studied in each approach. Future research should be focused on how the framework can be operationalised in a way that clearly separates the features, which would allow for research on how different dimensions of peace interact and create processes of change.

The most distinct strength of the framework is its comparative advantages, with which it is possible to compare not only the different types of peace, but also the degree of peaceful features within and between types. This has great implications for systematic studies on varieties of peace in an intricate world and should be further explored with cross-case comparative studies on peace in post-conflict settings. However, in order to facilitate this comparative potential, researchers must consider the eclectic character of the framework and use similar ontological and epistemological applications in each case study.

In conclusion, the Varieties of Peace framework has proven to be useful when studying the dynamics of peace and how it changes in a post-conflict setting, especially the cyclical dynamics of a frozen conflict. The framework has comparative and comprehensive advantages in studying the complexity of varieties of peace in the world, but further research is needed on the operationalisation and practical application of the framework in order to increase the internal validity and utilise its full potential in analysing what peace is and how it should be studied.

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Annex 1

Figure 1: map over Georgia showing the restricted weapons zone and security zones as established in the Moscow agreement in 1994, and the UNOMIG presence in Abkhazia (UN 2009).

Annex 2

Approach Unit of analysis Features Operationalisation Material Situational peace Abkhazia as a Security Absence of violence: Secretary General geographical Violation of letter to the region ceasefire, level of Security council on crime, resumption of the situation in hostilities, military Abkhazia, reports and other violent from NGOs, incidents. Freedom in the World, previous Freedom of research and news movement: articles Possibility to travel to, from and within Abkhazia for Abkhaz residents without obstructions. Political Order Institutions of Freedom in the conflict management World reports, to reduce tension and Secretary General risk of escalation letters to the between Georgia and Security Council on Abkhazia. situation in Georgia, reports Political rights and from ICU, IA and civil liberties the Schlaining (Freedom in the process and NGOs, World) previous research and news articles Legitimate forms of governance: democracy

Civil society engagement Relational peace Georgia and Behavioural Non domination: Policies or verbal Abkhazia as state interaction Georgia and threats about actors Abkhazia does not economic sanctions, interfere with the political pressure choices of the other and military party. operations/exercises from Abkhazia and Deliberation: Georgia Georgia; Reports and Abkhazia engage from the UN in state-level political Secretary General; dialogue. UN Security Council resolutions; Cooperation: Georgia Statements from and Abkhazia sign or Georgian and intend to sign Abkhaz state agreements to work leaders about the together on shared other; formal issues and implement agreements those agreements. between Georgia and Abkhazia; statements and minutes from meetings with

Georgia and Abkhazia; previous research; news articles Subjective attitudes Recognition: Georgia Statements from and Abkhazia political leaders recognises the other from Georgia and party’s self-image Abkhazia regarding regarding national the other, minutes identity. For Abkhaz and protocols from it entails recognition meetings between of sovereignty, the same; formal secession, or agreements; reports independence from from the UN Georgia. For Georgia Secretary General; it entails recognition previous research; of the unity of the news articles state and Abkhazia being within Georgian borders.

Trust: Georgia and Abkhazia make political concessions or express vulnerability based on the expectation that the other party’s good intention. The parties express trust or distrust towards the other. Idea of relationship Legitimate co- Statements from existence: Abkhazia political leaders and Georgia describe from Georgia and that they can co-exist Abkhazia regarding with each other while the other, minutes also engaging in non- and protocols from domination, meetings between deliberation and the same; previous mutual recognition. research

Friendship: Abkhazia and Georgia talks about the other as a friend while also engaging in non- domination, deliberation, cooperation, mutual trust and recognition. Ideational peace Abkhaz political Just peace Peace process Statements, elites controlled from interviews, within (civil society); speeches, minutes Abkhaz and from meetings and Georgians should interviews with cooperate to resolve Abkhaz political conflict issues. Broad elite engaged in the definition of peace, peace process with reconciliation, (discourse

iii

justice and equality at analysis), previous its centre. research about Negotiated peace Peace process discourses in controlled from Abkhazia within; minimum inter-group cooperation between Georgia and Abkhazia with clear rules; peace through democracy, freedom and economic development. Controlled peace Peace processes controlled from above (de facto authorities, international community and powerful neighbours); Abkhazia and Georgia should cooperate to resolve conflict issues; peace through strong institutions, fostering security and stability. Inequalities and injustices integral. Forced peace Peace process controlled from above; cooperation between Abkhazia and Georgia is unnecessary, war is inevitable; peace only attained through authoritarian rule, occupation or protectorate, but will not sustain. Focus on preparation for war. Table 1: overviewing table with the three approaches to studying peace, with operationalisation and material used-

Annex 3

Figure 1: map over Georgia (Clogg et al. 2016)