APROPOS OF CONFLICTS, FROZEN AND OTHERWISE Prof. Alla YAZKOVA, Dr. Sc. (History) his article was fi rst written before the armed clash between Russia and Geor- gia and sought to explore new arguments to support the case for settling T frozen confl icts in the territories of the South Caucasus republics, Azerbaijan and Georgia, whose people have been maintaining close cultural, economic, humanitarian and everyday personal relations with Russia over the centuries. It seemed essential at the time to identify a common reference point (the op- posing sides did not necessarily have the same points of reference) and track down, step by step, those positions and actions that fuelled the confl ict and, last but not least, to try and identify those interested in “defrosting” the situa- tion and stabilizing positions on both sides of the confrontation. To all intents and purposes analysts and experts from South Caucasus, Russia and the West seemed to have built a strong case for that at the time, based on a broad range of facts and arguments. But after everything that happened during what policy makers and politi- cal journalists rushed to brand as a “Five-Day War”, Russo-Georgian relations have sunk to an all-time low so that a way out of the prevailing situation will now have to be explored from scratch, this time in a totally different direc- tion. What is going to the recycle bin now is not only the CIS, following the Georgian Parliament’s decision to quit it, and not only the USSR — a source of nostalgia for certain people on both sides of the border — but the 1783 Treaty of Georgievsk itself. The political and military crisis in Russo-Georgian relations is so severe that its effects will be hard to mitigate even with good will on both sides. It will be far from easy to erase from our shared memory the TV coverage of destruc- tion by bombers and salvo rocket launchers, refugees streaming into Russia and Georgia, Russian army units appearing in Georgian cities along with “volun- teers” — fewer than expected, however — some of whom were caught looting. The military outcome of the “peace enforcement operation” proved to be far from spectacular; in Lieutenant General Yuri Netkachev’s estimation, “it was by no means a walk-over; the Russian military leaders had failed to learn the lessons of the Chechen war”. EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 42 herald of europe 5/6 2009 43 By contrast, he made an objective assessment of “the fi ghting effi ciency and Their territorial integrity was confi rmed more than mentioned, in particular, by Armenian President Serge Sark- combat activity that Georgian troops have demonstrated today” (Nezavisimaya once at the time of their international recognition and isian, when he claimed during his May 2008 visit to Moscow Gazeta, 11 August 2008). As to the Russian army’s actions in Georgian territory, a UN admission, and also sealed by the CIS Charter as set that Azerbaijan could restart hostilities “overnight”. Yet an number of Western observers have said that Georgian forces deliberately offered out in its interrelated and equipollent principles, viz. “the armed confl ict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has been no resistance as they sought to avoid any more damage to Georgia’s Western inviolability of state borders, recognition of the existing held in check by both countries’ interest in developing rela- areas. borders and renunciation of unlawful territorial acquisition; tions with Russia. The political outcomes of the August campaign are not quite clear but the the territorial integrity of states and renunciation of any The shaky stability in the Georgian-Abkhazian and leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, who have received extensive support from actions directed towards the dismemberment of foreign Georgian-Ossetian confl ict zones was shaped by a much Moscow, albeit only verbal at this point, are wasting no time before reaping their territories” (Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent more complicated environment marked by a sharp dete- fi rst “fruits of victory”. This will doubtless be followed by negotiations to defi ne a States as adopted by the Council of Heads of State on 22 Janu- rioration of Russo-Georgian relations after October 2006, new status for both republics, with renewed references to the Kosovo precedent ary 1993). on the one hand, and Georgia’s proactive drive toward Later on a number of multi- and bilateral documents integration with NATO and recurrent tension along the and more clearly defi ned interests of various social and political as well as ethnic governing the legal aspects of relations among the CIS confrontation line monitored by the Russian peacekeepers, groups both in the South Caucasus republics — Azerbaijan, Armenia and Geor- countries were adopted. From a legal viewpoint, secession on the other. gia — and in Russia. by ex-autonomous entities claiming independence is only In March 2008 the Russian State Duma held parlia- possible with the consent of the states within the frame- mentary hearings followed by a statement saying that in work of which they are recognized. Resolutions passed light of the unilateral proclamation of Kosovo’s independ- by a consensus of the Council of CIS Heads of State also ence Russia had to revise its policy vis-à-vis Abkhazia, South endorsed the content and nature of peacekeeping opera- Ossetia and Transnistria with due regard to the free will of tions in the zones of confl icts which emerged after the their resident populations. The document went on to say he root causes and subsequent evolution only for the states directly involved in the confl icts but for collapse of the USSR. Moreover, both the decisions of the that in the event of a possible Georgian armed assault on of confl icts in the territories of Georgia the total security system in Europe. CIS Heads of State and the multiple resolutions of the UN Abkhazia or South Ossetia or proactive Georgian steps to and Azerbaijan have, in fact, many common Each of the confl icts mentioned above — those Security Council reiterated the necessity of observing the join NATO it was necessary to consider the possibility of T features both between them and with the around Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia — territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Committing accelerated sovereignisation for Abkhazia and South Os- Kosovo confl ict. This is due to the common have developed their distinctive traits and dynamics in line Russian peacekeeping forces to the confrontation zone setia and their recognition. legacy of their authoritarian and totalitarian regimes and with the general parameters of the domestic and foreign may have stopped the armed clashes but did not create the It should be stressed that the radical proposals made the sharp political confrontation that emerged during the policies of their “lesser parent states”. These parameters necessary conditions for resolving confl icts on a mutually by members of the State Duma, with no legal repercussions phased disintegration of the USSR and the Socialist Federal have changed more than once over the last two decades. acceptable legal basis. in any case, were substantially modifi ed by Russian Foreign Republic of Yugoslavia. As to the post-Soviet space, Rus- As of today, however, the leaders of Georgia, weakened by In the context of mounting militarization of the South Minister Sergei Lavrov, who addressed the Duma on that sia’s politics were initially compounded by a quest for its the Russo-Georgian confl ict, and of Azerbaijan are adamant Caucasus countries and the emergence of a Kosovo prece- occasion. While he agreed that the recognition of Kosovo own Russian identity. Far from everybody in Russia was about restoring the territorial integrity of their respective dent their leaders came to believe that restoring their terri- constituted a precedent, he went on to explain that Rus- prepared to put up with the loss of Moscow’s former, es- states. They are building their case on the norms of inter- torial integrity by armed force was increasingly a more re- sia had a “consistent and unopportunistic commitment to sentially imperial positions. Many people, including policy- national law and refusing to accept the Kosovo case as a alistic prospect. In November 2007 the International Crisis the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, makers, struggled to acknowledge the objective contradic- precedent. Meanwhile their tactical decisions tended to be Group issued its third regular report (Nagorno-Karabakh: the rule of international law, its obligations under the UN tion between their desire and ability to retain their former inconsistent and sometimes even out of sync with one an- Risking War: Europe Report No. 187 — 14 November 2007), Charter, and a responsible attitude to its terms of refer- positions, on the one hand, and the need to build their other even before August 2008. discussing the high probability of renewed hostilities in the ence as a permanent member of the Security Council”. relations with the newly independent states in a new fash- In the opinion of prominent Russian legal scholars, Armenian-Azeri confrontation zone. International experts Moreover, Lavrov stated that “attempts [were] now being ion, on the other. although the proclamation of Kosovo’s independence is a stated, in a section of the report discussing the likelihood made to impose on us such rules of the game as would At the same time, in the early post-Soviet days the fait accompli the legal basis for this process is far from of the current military balance being upset, that by and undermine these principles” and made a plea for “avoiding elites in former Soviet republics failed to put their eth- being clear and perfect. The point in question now is not large the balance was still there while the ongoing buildup the temptation to disregard them”.