Case Studies on the Participation of Conflict Forced Migrants in Elections
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Case Studies on the Participation of Conflict Forced Migrants in Elections Participatory Elections Project (PEP) Desk Research Package: Backgrounder May 2003 List of Cases I) Bosnia and Herzegovina: The 1996 General Elections and the 1997 Municipal and RS Assembly Elections II) Burundi: 1993 Presidential Election and the Arusha Process 2000 – 2001 III) Chechnya: 1995, 1996, 1999, and 2000 Elections IV) East Timor: The 1999 Popular Consultation on Autonomy V) Eritrea: The 1993 Referendum on Independence from Ethiopia VI) Georgia: The 1999 Parliamentary and 2000 Presidential Election VII) Kosovo: The 2000 Municipal Assembly Elections VIII) Liberia: The 1997 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections IX) West Bank & Gaza Strip: The 1996 Palestinian National Authority Elections X) Western Sahara: The Proposed Referendum on Independence 1 Note The following case studies provide further information on recent elections that have either enfranchised or disenfranchised conflict forced migrants. The cases range from very short overviews to more exhaustive political and technical analyses. The purpose of these studies is not to provide a comprehensive overview of all elections in all countries with significant displaced populations. Instead, we aim to provide a general overview that serves as background to other PEP outputs, particularly Discussion Paper No. 2 of the Desk Research, “Refugee and IDP Voting: Issues, Standards, and Best Practices.”1 Much of the discussion of particular election technical issues in that study is based directly upon these cases. The cases differ in orientation. Some focus more on political dynamics while others are procedural in nature. At a minimum, they all include core background information, including the nature on the conflict and its’ settlement, the conditions of displacement in/from the country or territory, an overview of the electoral codes relevant to the election, and description of the actual voting, along with references to reports and analyses conducted by domestic and international media and observers. Some of the cases are substantially more detailed than others. These are typically the cases where significant displaced population participation occurred (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Eritrea, and East Timor). In these studies, the emphasis is on both technical implementation and political considerations. The other cases are often very brief descriptions of events. Case selection was based on trying to find an appropriate mix between successful and unsuccessful attempts at enfranchising conflict-forced migrants (or the lack of any attempt at all due to political considerations). Other criteria guiding case selection included: 1) global coverage, 2) availability of information and analyses, and 3) prioritizing countries/territories which may be conducting elections in the near future.2 As always in case selection, electoral events of particular interest to any individual reader may not have been included. Readers are encouraged to visit the PEP website, where a significantly larger group of cases have been identified, and links to reports by other agencies and individuals are provided. The cases were prepared as part of the first stage of research activities conducted by the Participatory Elections Project. They were researched by Jeremy Grace, research coordinator of PEP, with substantial assistance from a team of students at SUNY Geneseo. These include: Phil Weaver (Bosnia, Eritrea, West Bank), Erin Conklin (Liberia, Western Sahara), and Anna Borshchevskaya (Burundi, Chechnya, Georgia). 1 Available at www.iom.int/pep 2 A comprehensive case study was also completed on Angola, although this is not included here as the case was eventually incorporated into a separate PEP action plan: “Angolan Elections: Promoting Reconciliation through Participation of Conflict-Forced Migrants.” Available at www.iom.int/pep 2 Case I: Bosnia and Herzegovina The 1996 General Elections and the 1997 Municipal and RS Assembly Elections Introduction The post-war elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were the first ever that guaranteed enfranchisement of conflict forced migrants both by rule and by actual practice. As such, the case presents a number of intriguing lessons for those interested in the technical and political implications of refugee and IDP voting. With close to 60% of the eligible voting population in some form of displacement, the election organizers needed to design a workable system of absentee balloting that contributed to the peace and reconciliation process. This case study therefore differs from others prepared as part of the PEP project in the substantial attention to the political consequence of the external vote and the relationship between the procedures adopted and the larger goals expressed in the General Framework Agreement for Peace (Dayton) that ended the war. In addition, the fact that elections have occurred nearly every year since 1996 has allowed election organizers to respond to shortcomings and lessons learned almost immediately, particularly as they sought to close the loop-holes through which the nationalist political forces exploited the absentee vote. The case is also important in that many of the absentee voting systems developed by the OSCE and IOM were subsequently applied in elections in Kosovo in 2000 and 2001. It is recommended that the reader approach the BiH and Kosovo cases together in order to track the evolution of best-practices and procedures.3 Background The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina stemmed from the collapse of the federal state of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. By the end of 1991, Yugoslavia had unraveled largely along ethnic lines: Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia each had declared independence. BiH followed suit, initially declaring sovereignty in October of 1991 and, after a referendum boycotted by ethnic Serbs, independence in March 1992.4 The remaining two republics, Serbia and Montenegro, joined forces in April 1992, together forming the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, BiH had been the most ethnically integrated republic of Yugoslavia. The FRY and Bosnian Serbs, united by a BiH Today: Republika Srpska & Federation common ethnicity, pursued the goal of a Source: CIA World Factbook 2002 “Greater Serbia” by attempting to militarily annex non-FRY territories in which ethnic Serbs were residing – including areas of Croatia and BiH. Croatia pursued similar policies with respect to Bosnian Croats. The result was three warring parties – Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), ethnic Bosnian Serbs united with the FRY as the Republika Srpska (RS), and ethnic Bosnian Croats united with Croatia – and a fractured Bosnian 3 The case studies differ in their orientation. The Kosovo case focuses primarily on the procedural implementation of the external vote. The political imperatives at work were completely different given the differing demographics of the two and the fact that Serbs boycotted the 2000 Kosovo municipal elections.. 4 CIA, CIA World Factbook 2002 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bk.html 3 state. The subsequent scramble for political power and territory – both amongst and within the former republics - was based almost exclusively upon nationalist claims. According to Cousens and Cater, “As the Yugoslav state disintegrated, the status of Bosnian Serbs and Croatians within an independent Bosnia was put in doubt … [N]ationalist leaderships among both communities and their respective patrons in Belgrade and Zagreb effectively launched a civil war as a preemptive strike against the prospect of a Muslim Bosnia. Their goal was an ‘ethnic cleansing’ of territory that could later be incorporated in Serbia or Croatia, and the primary tactic was forced migration.”5 A 1994 agreement between Bosniaks and Croats tempered one dimension of the conflict by establishing the Bosniak/Croat Federation of BiH. However, conflict with ethnic Serbs continued until the signing of the Dayton Agreement in December 1995. In the end, fighting had claimed more than 200,000 lives (some 6% of the pre-war population), had produced an estimated 1.3 million refugees and 1.2 million internally-displaced persons (combined, nearly 60% of the pre- war population was displaced by late 1995).6 The remainder of this case study will focus on the mechanisms by which the displaced populations of BiH were enfranchised for the 1996 National and Cantonal Elections, the 1997 Municipal Elections, and the 1997 Republika Srpska National Assembly Elections. It will also focus on the political environment within BiH and how the international community re-shaped the implementation of the Dayton Accords. The intent is to distill the successes and failures of the external and IDP voting programs that were put into place for these election cycles. As such, most aspects of “normal” in-country balloting are not covered in any great detail. Size and location of displaced population Refugees The US Committee for Refugees (USCR) estimates that at the end of 1996, at least 1 million Bosnians remained as refugees: 600,000 in Europe, 425,000 in other republics of the former Yugoslavia, and the rest scattered around Asia, the Middle East, Oceania and North America. The conditions facing refugees varied widely. 7 In Germany, the vast majority of Bosnians were not granted asylum and were instead given “temporary protection status.” Their care and protection fell to the state governments (Laender), which provided varying