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A New Fleet Architecture for the U.S. Navy to Develop by the 2030S to Address the Most Important Missions for Naval Forces

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A New Fleet Architecture for the U.S. Navy to Develop by the 2030S to Address the Most Important Missions for Naval Forces RESTORING AMERICAN SEAPOWER A NEW FLEET ARCHITECTURE FOR THE UNITED STATES NAVY BRYAN CLARK PETER HAYNES BRYAN MCGRATH CRAIG HOOPER JESSE SLOMAN TIMOTHY A. WALTON RESTORING AMERICAN SEAPOWER A NEW FLEET ARCHITECTURE FOR THE UNITED STATES NAVY BRYAN CLARK PETER HAYNES BRYAN MCGRATH CRAIG HOOPER JESSE SLOMAN TIMOTHY A. WALTON 2017 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2017 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Bryan Clark is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Prior to joining CSBA in 2013, Bryan Clark was Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and Director of his Commander’s Action Group, where he led development of Navy strategy and implemented new initiatives in electromagnetic spectrum operations, undersea warfare, expeditionary operations and personnel and readiness management. Mr. Clark served in the Navy headquarters staff from 2004 to 2011, leading studies in the Assessment Division and participating in the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. He is the recipient of the Department of the Navy Superior Service Medal and the Legion of Merit. Peter Haynes is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments specializing in grand strategy, maritime and naval strategy, the development of strategy and operational concepts, naval and air warfare, the future of conflict, special operations, and irregular warfare. Prior to retiring from the U.S. Navy in 2016 as a captain, he served as the Deputy Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J5) at U.S. Special Operations Command. He is the recipient of the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Air Medal with Combat “V,” and the Navy/ Marine Corps Commendation Medal with Combat “V,” as well as the 2009–2010 Naval History and Heritage Command’s Samuel Eliot Morison Naval History Scholarship. Bryan McGrath is the Assistant Director of Hudson Institute’s Center for American Seapower and the Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group LLC. An active duty naval officer from 1987 to 2008, he served in cruisers and destroyers, commanding USS BULKELEY (DDG 84) from 2004– 2006, during which time the ship earned the Battle “E” Award and the USS ARIZONA Memorial Trophy, signifying its status as the most combat-ready ship in the Fleet. Craig Hooper is an author and commentator on naval affairs at www.NextNavy.com. After earning a Ph.D. in Immunology and Infectious Diseases at Harvard University, he lectured at the Naval Postgraduate School. In 2011, Dr. Hooper was recruited to serve as a Vice President at Austal USA, builder of the Littoral Combat Ship and Expeditionary Fast Transport. He now works for Maryland-based Gryphon Scientific as a Senior Analyst, focusing on national security solutions. Jesse Sloman is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Prior to joining CSBA, Mr. Sloman worked for the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as an intelligence officer in the Marine Corps from 2009 to 2013 and a civil affairs officer in the Marine Corps Reserve from 2013 to 2016. He is the recipient of the 2012 Major General Michael E. Ennis Award for Literary Excellence. Timothy A. Walton is a Senior Analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Mr. Walton focuses his research and analysis on trends in future warfare and Asia-Pacific security dynamics. Prior to joining CSBA, Mr. Walton was a Principal of Alios Consulting Group and an Associate of Delex Consulting, Studies, and Analysis, both defense and business strategy firms. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The opinions and analysis in this study are those of the authors, but draw from the results of an integrated series of workshops, wargames, and exercises. Any shortcomings, however, are solely the responsibility of the authors. This study benefited greatly from the independent reviews of Karl Hasslinger, Dr. Frank Hoffman, and Steven Anderson. The authors would like to thank Maureen Smolskis, Michelle Shevin-Coetzee, and Ryan Boone for their terrific work on the graphics for this report, without which the concepts would be much more difficult to explain. We also want to thank CDR Robert Wells, LCDR April Bakken, Dr. Renee Fye, William Hardy, James Goodheart, and Patrick Nagel for their assistance on the logistics analysis. Most importantly, the authors would like to thank Kamilla Gunzinger for her infinite patience and expert editing and production to get this report completed on time. CSBA receives funding from a broad and diverse group of funders, including private foundations, government agencies, and corporations. A complete list of these organizations can be found on our web site at http://csbaonline.org/about/contributors. Cover Photo: America-class LHA 6 courtesy of Huntington Ingalls Industries. This is the revised version of the original study published in January 2017. Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . I A New Strategic Approach .................................................i New Operating Concepts ..................................................ii Changing the Deployed Fleet ..............................................iii A Revised Naval Posture. iv New Force Packages, Platforms, and Unmanned Systems ...........................v Changes to Readiness and Training Cycles .................................... vi Composition and Costs of the Proposed Fleet . .vii Implementing the Proposed Fleet Architecture .................................. ix Conclusion ........................................................... ix CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION . 1 A Changing Strategic Environment. 1 Shifting from Efficiency to Effectiveness ...................................... 3 Developing a New Fleet Architecture ......................................... 5 Sustaining American Competitive Advantage ................................... 8 CHAPTER 2: THE EMERGING GREAT POWER COMPETITION . .. 9 The Imperative to Deter Great Power Conflict ................................. 12 Conventional Deterrence in the 21st Century. 14 The Role of Naval Forces in Deterrence. 16 CHAPTER 3: OPERATING CONCEPTS AND WARFIGHTING APPROACHES OF THE FUTURE FLEET. 17 Implications for Missions and Concepts ..................................... 18 Air and Missile Defense ................................................. 19 Electromagnetic Spectrum Warfare ......................................... 23 Anti-Submarine Warfare ................................................. 27 Undersea Warfare ..................................................... 31 Surface and Strike Warfare ............................................... 33 Mine Warfare ......................................................... 34 Amphibious Operations ................................................. 36 Implications for Fleet Architecture .......................................... 41 CHAPTER 4: THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPLOYED FLEET—DETERRENCE FORCES AND THE MANEUVER FORCE . 43 The Fleet of Today ..................................................... 43 A New Structure for the Fleet ............................................. 46 The Deterrence Force .................................................. 48 The Maneuver Force ................................................... 50 CHAPTER 5: NAVAL POSTURE . 51 North and South America Deterrence Force. 52 Northern Europe Deterrence Force ......................................... 53 Mediterranean Sea and West Africa Deterrence Force ........................... 56 Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Deterrence Force ......................... 60 Indian Ocean Deterrence Force ............................................ 62 East China Sea and South China Sea Deterrence Force .......................... 62 Western Pacific and Philippine Sea Deterrence Force ............................ 64 Arctic Deterrence Force ................................................. 66 Maneuver Force ....................................................... 67 Logistics and Support Forces ............................................. 69 CHAPTER 6: NEW SHIPS, UNMANNED VEHICLES, WEAPONS, SENSORS, AND MISSION SYSTEMS . 73 Aircraft Carriers ....................................................... 74 Submarines ......................................................... 76 Unmanned Underwater Vehicles ........................................... 76 Surface Combatants ................................................... 79 Unmanned Surface Vehicles .............................................. 82 Amphibious Vessels .................................................... 83 CLF Vessels ......................................................... 84 Unmanned Vehicle Support Vessels/Tenders .................................. 85 Salvage Ships ........................................................ 87 Weapons, Sensors, and Mission Systems. 87 CHAPTER 7: IMPLICATIONS FOR NAVAL AVIATION . .. 93 Maneuver Force CVW Missions ............................................ 93 CVW Organization ..................................................... 98 Composition of Maneuver Force CVWs .....................................
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