Managing Ethnicity under Authoritarian Rule: Transborder Nationalisms in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan Natsuko OKA Research Fellow, Area Studies Center Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO Chiba, Japan [email protected] November 2007 Table of Contents Abstract i Acknowledgements ii Chapter 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Aims of the Study 1 1.2 Why Conflict Did Not Occur: Explanations in the Extant Literature 3 1.2.1 Imperfect Kazakhisation? 3 1.2.2 Identity 6 1.2.3 Frame Analysis 8 1.3 Theoretical Framework of the Study 10 1.3.1 Consociation 11 1.3.2 Control 14 1.3.3 Applying the Control Model to Kazakhstan 17 1.4 Transborder Ethnic Community: A Source of Conflict? 20 1.5 Methodology, Delimitations, and Definitions of the Study 26 1.6 The Structure of the Study 31 Chapter 2 Formation of A Multiethnic Population in Soviet-Kazakhstan 34 2.1 Historical Background 34 2.1.1 Russians: An Ill-Defined Identity 38 2.1.2 Uzbeks: A Strong Sense of Rootedness 42 2.1.3 Uighurs: Multiple Migrations and Contested Indigenousness 46 2.1.4 Koreans: A Deported People 52 2.2 Ethnic Movements under Perestroika 58 2.2.1 Emerging Kazakh Nationalism 58 2.2.2 Language and Sovereignty Debates 62 2.2.3 Non-titular Ethnic Movements 65 2.3 Conclusion 69 Chapter 3 ‘Nationalising’ Policies in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan 72 3.1 Kazakhstan as a Kazakh Native Land 74 3.2 Demography 78 3.2.1 Changing Ethnic Composition 78 3.2.2 Demographic Manipulation 81 3.3 Language Issue 91 3.3.1 Language Policy 91 3.3.2 Non-Russian Minority Languages 97 3.4 Ethnic Control over the State’s Personnel Policy 103 3.5 Conclusion 106 Chapter 4 Control of Ethnic Movements 108 4.1 Strengthening Authoritarianism in Kazakhstan 109 4.1.1 Political Change Processes since Independence 111 4.1.2 Constitutional and Legal Control 115 4.2 Case Studies 118 4.2.1 Russians 119 4.2.2 Uzbeks 126 4.2.3 Uighurs 129 4.3 Conclusion 134 Chapter 5 Co-opting Ethnic Elites 137 5.1 An Authoritarian Cross-ethnic Coalition: The Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan 137 5.1.1 Functions of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan 138 5.1.2 Russians: Unification from Above 142 5.1.3 Non-Russian Minorities: Seeking ‘Cooperation’ with the Authorities 147 5.2 Controlling Elections 154 5.2.1 Ethnicity and Parliamentary Elections 154 5.2.2 Minority Mobilisation for Elections 161 5.3 Conclusion 165 Chapter 6 Relationship between Host and Kin States 167 6.1 Russians: To Remain or ‘Return’? 169 6.1.1 Developments in Russia’s Compatriot Policy 169 6.1.2 The Citizenship Law and the Dual Citizenship Issue 176 6.1.3 Border Issues 183 6.2 Uzbeks: ‘Ignored’ by the Kin State? 186 6.2.1 The Absence of Compatriot Policy 187 6.2.2 Border Issues 191 6.3 Uighurs: Labelled as ‘Terrorists’ 196 6.3.1. Post-Soviet Border Delimitation between Kazakhstan and China 196 6.3.2 Renewed Links between Xinjiang and Kazakhstani Uighurs: Transnational Movement for Independence? 199 6.4 Koreans: A Minority with Two Kin States 204 6.4.1 South-North Rivalry over the Koreans in the Soviet Union 205 6.4.2 South Korea: Adored Homeland? 208 6.5 Conclusion 210 Chapter 7 Conclusion 214 7.1 Control as an Effective Strategy for Managing Ethnicity 214 7.2 Triadic Nexuses in Kazakhstan: The Limits of Primordial Ethnic Ties 218 7.3 Diversity among the Four Transnational Communities 221 7.4 Constitutional Reforms in 2007 224 7.5 Future Prospects: Is Ethnic Stability Sustainable in Kazakhstan? 227 Bibliography 231 Key to Abbreviations 246 Glossary of Frequently Used Terms 247 Note on Transliteration 247 List of Tables 1.1 Comparison between Consociation and Control Models 15 1.2 Ethnic Composition of Kazakhstan, 1979, 1989 and 1999 23 2.1 Regional Distribution of Russians, 1959-1989 39 2.2 Regional Distribution of Uzbeks, 1959-1989 43 2.3 Regional Distribution of Uighurs, 1959-1989 46 2.4 Regional Distribution of Koreans, 1959-1989 53 3.1 Migration between Kazakhstan and Russia, 1980-1999 79 3.2 Ethnic Kazakhs Arriving to Kazakhstan from Foreign States, 1991-2003 84 3.3 Changes in the Regional Distribution of Russians, 1989 and 1999 88 3.4 Changes in the Regional Distribution of Uzbeks, 1989 and 1999 88 3.5 Changes in the Regional Distribution of Uighurs, 1989 and 1999 89 3.6 Changes in the Regional Distribution of Koreans, 1989 and 1999 89 3.7 Ethnic Composition of Kazakhstan, by Oblast, 1989 and 1999 90 3.8 Russians’ Knowledge of the Russian and Kazakh Languages, 1989 and 1999 94 3.9 Uzbeks’ Knowledge of the Uzbek, Russian, and Kazakh Languages, 1989 and 1999 95 3.10 Uighurs’ Knowledge of the Uighur, Russian, and Kazakh Languages, 1989 and 1999 95 3.11 Koreans’ Knowledge of the Korean, Russian, and Kazakh Languages, 1989 and 1999 96 3.12 Kazakhs’ Knowledge of the Kazakh and Russian Languages, 1989 and 1999 96 3.13 Ethnic Composition of Kazakhstan’s Parliaments, 1990-2004 106 4.1 Parliamentary System of Kazakhstan, 1995-2007 113 6.1 Compatriots, Russian Citizens, and Ethnic Russians 172 Abstract How can political stability be secured in a non-democratic, multiethnic state in which power is monopolised by a particular ethnic group? If minorities residing in a host state have ethnic kin states abroad, do these international ethnic links pose a threat to the security and territorial integrity of the host state? This study asks these questions by examining the case of Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, a state which has often been viewed as ethnically fragile due to a substantial presence of ethnic ‘others’—primarily Russians—in the country. This study provides an empirically grounded account of how and why ethnicity failed to emerge as an arena of conflict in Kazakhstan. It identifies a government strategy designed to manage ethnic diversity—based both on repression and co-optation, which it examines in the context of the complex international environment after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By comparing the four major transnational ethnic communities in Kazakhstan (Russians, Uzbeks, Uighurs, and Koreans), this study provides an in-depth analysis of triadic nexuses—the dynamic interaction between the government of Kazakhstan, minorities residing in that state, and the ethnic homelands of those minorities. The main method of inquiry employed is intensive, individual interviewing with ethnic movement leaders. The findings of this study suggest that control—a strategy that uses coercive methods as well as minority elite co-optation to render ethnic contestation difficult or impossible—is an effective means by which to manage ethnic divisions under authoritarian rule, as it simultaneously serves to de-politicise ethnicity and also maintain the regime. It also demonstrates that President Nazarbaev established cross-ethnic coalition of loyal elites, and skilfully exploited the logic of ethnic representation to bolster the legitimacy of his rule. On an international front, this study shows the limits of the power of ethnic linkages between minorities and their kin states as a means to promote ethno-mobilisation. i Acknowledgements This study is based on fieldwork conducted over several years, which has only been possible due to the support of so many people. I am deeply indebted to those individuals who were so generous with their time and agreed to be interviewed over the course of research. I am profoundly grateful to all of my interviewees, both quoted and anonymous, and also a number of people who provided various support in the field. Nurbulat Masanov, a distinguished scholar and ceaseless source of help for me, never failed to provide insightful viewpoints on my research. His sudden death in 2006 was not only a great personal tragedy for his family and friends, but also a real loss to the scholarship of Central Asia. I owe a lot to Sergei Duvanov for his knowledge of the reality of Kazakhstani politics. Valentina Kurganskaia and Vladimir Dunaev generously provided me with literature on ethnic minorities in Kazakhstan, which I would otherwise not have accessed. I cannot thank Erlan Karin enough for his invaluable insights and assistance. German Kim, who served as mentor of my research on the Kazakhstani Koreans, always helped me with materials and contacts. I am very thankful to Khamit Khamraev and Tamara Mametova who assisted me in organising interviews with Uighur informants. My fieldwork in the South Kazakhstan oblast would not have been possible without the generous support of Olga Dosybieva, Daur Dosybiev, Bakhyt Ashirbaev, and Igor Savin. In addition, I wish to thank Timur Dadabaev for arranging interviews for me in Tashkent. I would like to express my utmost gratitude to Neil Melvin, Neil Winn and Bhavna Dave for their continuing encouragement, careful reading of my chapters and constructive comments. I also owe thanks to my Japanese teachers and colleagues who have supported me intellectually in this task. My colleagues at the Institute of Developing Economies, as well as Nobuaki Shiokawa and Tomohiko Uyama read earlier versions of the text and provided me with critical and insightful comments. Yasushi Shinmen’s invitation to join his research project ii on the Uighur community in Central Asia widened my understanding of the Uighur people. Hisao Komatsu’s invitation to participate in his team of the Islamic Area Studies Program has also provided me with an invaluable opportunity to share my research with others and interact with a stimulating intellectual community. Last but not least, special thanks are due to my long-term friend Katya Burns for carefully editing the text.