Military Intervention and Civilian Reaction in Chile, 1924-1936
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MILITARY INTERVENTION AND CIVILIAN REACTION IN CHILE, 1924-1936 By TERENCE STEPHEN TARR A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA August, I960 PREFACE The problem of militarism has been increa singly studied during the past few years, and as world tensions mount, will continue to receive tne attention of scholars, Latin America has usually been pictured as one area where military influence permeates many facets of national life. Many people believe that Latin American history is nothing but a story of recurrent military coups. In some areas the military has constantly left its normal role in order to enter into otners, but it is a mistake to generalize for the entire continent. Chile is one notable exception, since the military has generally remained out of politics. He' long tradition of civilian government was interrupted by the devolution of 1891 and during the 1924-1932 period, and even then the military intervened not to benefit it^eli e, but in an attempt to solve vital national problems. The period from 1924-1932 was one of these times when the military felt it was necessary to enter into the political ^cene. ,-rturo ^lesLundri 's government toppled and fell, as a result. From September, 1924, until October, 19^2, wiiileans v.itnes^e- a series of governments, none of which lasted for i^s le_,ai term, abruptly in 1932, hov. ., with the election or .le^anari to the presidency for a ii second time, the situation changed. The /ailitary returned to its labors and promised to remain out oi politics. Part of the answer for this sudden change in attitude was due to the Influence of officers who wanted to return the adminis- tration of the nation to the civilians and to return the military to its rightful duties. Tne civilians themselves, furthermore, provided an answer as they organized and threatened the military with retaliation if it intervened again. The Republican :;ilitia, tku civilian organization, was hence an answer formulated by the civilians to stop il- legal . ilitury coups. ..lee andri supported and aided the ailitia because oi tue uncertainty of the military's loyalty, iiven though the militia was never called on to protect the constitu- tional government, t L«rt was little doubt that its presence was enough to cause the plotters to pause before they at- tempted to organize a coup. In this manner the militia played an important role in recent Cnilean history, for it aided in re-establishing tranquility and law to a country that had been ravaged by ei^ht years oi political unrest. This study does not attempt to analyze completely the military intervention into Chilean political lire. That is a subject ior a luter work. Instead this stuuy is pri- marily concerned with the civilian reaction to the military intervention, and more speciiie^iiy, apublican ;!ilitia. The major drawback to a study of this natux-e is the lack of material either in epanish or lagllsfc on Latin American iii militarism. This ^tuay, therefore, la nopod to be the first in in a series on the subject of the military and its role Latin American history. This study was made possible by the 'lenry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation who kindly granted a re- search fellowship to the author. Bt il deeoly gratef il to the Foundation and eternally thankful, ^ven though the author aid not have the pleasure of meeting rt« lelen .vould like to thank Lassen, t oundation'a benefactress, her first of all for t^e opportunity she gave him to learn of Chile and compliment her, secondly, for her promotion of Chilean-American relations. ier >..ork has been a pioneer effort and hus offered innumerable opportunities for stu- dents, while ere ti-, goodwill in Lhile for the United / tea. The Foundation's secretary in iaantiago, iso faydee .icci, should also be remembered for her assistance and secretary . =.len Deugherty, the Foundation's . indness. in New York, is remembered for her promptness and aid. The mcab rs of his committee, Drs. orcester, c lister, Harrison, Boyd, anu Go^in, are thanked for their advice, p tience, and understanding. A special vote of gratitude is due Professor orcester for being the Chairman suggestions that were most ap- of the I o. littee and for his preciuteu. r.x -Id like to thank the librarians del and staff of th. _ liotec ional and the Biblioteca uia and advice was mo: t , .,3 la ti«g«, hile. Their useful and was a predated. TO his many friends in Cuile, iv n«iir, tixe author wom. ta aeDi , uu l ra.6abraiioe IHelr kinunoas m. nev.r bo full, repaid. I OF CONTEOT Pa e PAOl il Chapter I. 1 19^4 1 ii. r 1925 - 1 FIG 39 III. FIGU IBA% 70 IV. TBI ADMZ I ION OF IB..ftfiZ 91 V. OJ I till R ...TION 103 1 VI. C HU ! 100 Di.Y ISM 133 -- VII. Tiui CIVILIAN R I .UG OF THE ILITli H9 VIII. THS MAY, 193;, — ^N OF .'.rE MILITIA lbO I . X. RUKZU XA AID . ITIOAI PAHTIES ... 214 Liberal and OoaMITatlTf Parties lloala The Leftist -rlies Fascism and t:.o :'ilitia MiLin 243 XII. ODfOBXI I, DI ION . 272 BIBLI KHUPHI 292 vi CHAPTER I THE REVOLUTION OF 1924 In retrospect the period of Chilean history from 1920-1924 could best be termed a power vacuum, a situation ripe for exploitation by a well-organized and disciplined group. In 1924 tiie armed forces were able to take advantage of the situation and wield political power. It was a strange role for the Chilean military, but the action was based on certain qualifications they alone held. The politi- cal partios which could usually qualify as the most powerful national force, had lost their claims. They were grouped in- to two coalitions, the Union liacional and the Liberal al- liance; but no single one oarty could operate outside the coalition and amass any widespread support, rue Conserva- tives, Liberals, \A tadlMlfl were tiie largest parties, but separately aid not constitute a majority. Ideologically, there was li tie uniformity Of opinion in either of the po- litical coalitions. Tuo cliurch- t to question, differences over econoaic thought and personal conflicts kept factional disputes alive, at time3 nearly splitting the coalitions, and always hindering the~i. I rmed forces were not plagued by these uoctrinal debates. It was evident that none of the po- litical parties ooulu provide a firm foundation for 1 . constructing a stable government . Um LojmI « jbably tot best disciplined, but tt racter of ales- saaciri*s govermuoat eliminated any cooperation from the coa- lition. The training of the armea forces, furtiiermare, inad- vertently prepared them to act as an independent political force. German Jiiicers had been engaged by the government to instruct the Chilean officers a^ early as 1886. tfafl first of the Geraians to arrive was General .orner. 1 Under his di- rection, as head of the j I 'ay or General, -ad v.ith the -irmy reorganized aid oi »t . I StorttM .oers tae ohilean was pletely along German lines. Uoaern armaments were intro- duced, standards raised, and aver-all instruction improved. -Luilar reorganization, directed by ish officiola, took pluce in the navy. The rest oi Lao country, hjommfM 9 was not : ing itself it tlM Jwice of the military, and the government remained as ineffective as it had been in 1900 Outwardly, the country I I r«4 tranquil, but it was J only a thin lacjco ictlt a rotten structure. i ar- .aient virtually ran the country, the presidents being mere pawns for tne deputies and senators. TJm situation to many to be tho ultiaute development in democracy, but the partis ch maintained a stranglehold on parliament were a the ri .- 1. , reactionary groups. Chila as 1 .rturo ahucuda, :,1 e.iercito y la revoluoion del 5 de ccptiembre de 1924 . >-.. ilni-eencias F~ La traccion, 19J1) » P« 2. 3 private economic arid social preserve, Igj orl&g Jem&nds for reforms from the middle ood I ^s^ Tiie army, unlike the government, became especially cognizant a intel- lectual, social, OAd oconoaic developments and of Chile's backwardness in these areas. Officers were sent to Germany to study, and were introduced to the Militarism of pre- orld ar I Germany, ^y saw a country proud and wealthy. The 06 It between Germany and C.iile was stril. i . Upon to Q LXo those officers told of _urope oa4 es- pecially of Germany. The desire . Jdernize Chile was ... strengthened one I ..d by the reports of t .rman- trained ofiicers. The primary consideration which foretold military action was t'.i . ri a of longstanding grievances of the army. Bo organization of the army by th. 11 I . I /iaers was thorough; but too "ola guard" of the MO, at times, op- posed to the innovations. The government ho4 ^iven a free rein to the advi ira, and the olaer officers could do little but complain and delay. 1 . 3mpori'-ing c resentment among the young officers, \.ha felt toot the reforms could best be carrier out by the men trained in the new iueas, in other .j a, themselves. This meant an efficient promotional system which i 9 1 Ive opportunity ;e specialists to advance ii not rapidly, at least rogol rly« Congress ignored the problem. fiio foojp icers, beixi^, increasingly frus- trated at tne action of some of the hi^h commanders, met secretly in 1907.