Pragmatic Cooperation Instead of a Strategic Partnership SWP Comments the Current Status and Perspectives for German-Polish Relations Kai-Olaf Lang

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Pragmatic Cooperation instead of a Strategic Partnership SWP Comments The Current Status and Perspectives for German-Polish Relations Kai-Olaf Lang

German-Polish relations are currently going through a difficult phase. The announce- ment by expelled Germans, to file claims for restitution in Polish and international courts, and the demand made by the Polish Parliament for war reparations, have ensured that there will be turbulent relations between the two countries. Although both the German and Polish governments distanced themselves from those demands, tension in bilateral relations in the near term should be expected, in part because in Poland there are growing doubts about whether a long-term orientation towards Germany makes sense. At the same time, since Poland’s accession to the European Union on May 1, 2004, there has not been a big project that binds both sides together in a constructive way. Therefore, the approach of a less ambitious “pragmatic cooperation” of both countries seems to be more realistic than one with a specific two-party relationship, a type of “strategic partnership.”

The announcements by German citizens The Parliament requested the govern- of their intention to sue to recover their ment to become more involved with assets lost because of World War II, or at regard to the question of obtaining war least compensatory damages, in Polish reparations from Germany. and international courts has bothered the The Sejm emphasized that no financial general public in Poland for some time. obligations to German citizens what- The Polish Parliament took the opportu- soever, which arise as a result of World nity, on September 10, 2004, to pass a War II, would be accepted. resolution, which called upon the govern- The Polish government was requested to ment in Warsaw to demand compensation estimate the amount of the damages that from Germany for the damages caused Poland suffered as a result of the German during the occupation in World War II. occupation. Some large Polish cities have The resolution of the Sejm, the lower house already carried out the corresponding of the parliament, which passed with 328 mandate. For Warsaw alone the damages of 329 votes, contained several points:

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1 are estimated to be approximately 35 binding under international law, Poland million euros. has already renounced claims against The Federal government has been re- Germany for reparations, which was more quested to deny the claims of the Ger- or less confirmed later in the “Two-plus- man citizens on the grounds that they Four-Agreement.” are baseless and illegitimate and to turn The German government indicated, also down the authorization of the legal following the Sejm resolution, its refusal to process. intervene, which Chancellor Schröder had Although this Polish preemptive strike announced on August 1, 2004 in Warsaw. is not legally binding, the resolution inten- In his speech on the occasion of the 60th sified the rhetoric in German-Polish rela- anniversary of the Warsaw resistance, the tions and provoked a lack of understand- Chancellor assured the Polish side that his ing, consternation and indignation in government would not support any indi- Germany. vidual claims (also in international courts) that are related to questions about assets in connection with World War II. The Level-Headed Attitude of the Governments After the initial commotion, the waves in ... would be conducive to a the German-Polish relationship smoothed provisional calming of the situation themselves out again for the time being. At their meeting on September 27, Chancel- This can be attributed primarily to the con- lor Schröder and Prime Minister Belka tried duct of the governments. to get the initiative back into their hands. The Polish government expressed its The package presented by the government understanding for the Sejm resolution and heads on this occasion consists of measures wants to somewhat meet the Polish parlia- to reduce the historical-legal potential for mentarians’ demands, such as document- conflict as well as forward-looking initia- ing the magnitude of the damages incurred tives. The first type of measures includes during the occupation and finding ways the establishment of an expert commission, to grant legal assistance to Polish citizens which should contribute to ensuring that to defend themselves against possible claims for damages from German expellees claims from Germany. Naturally, the (and also including possible claims of government rejected the principal demand Polish citizens against Germany, as the case of the parliamentarians and refused to con- may be) have only a slight chance of suc- front Germany with claims for reparations. cess. Moreover, Prime Minister Belka agreed In fact, on July 13, 2004, it confirmed its that the competent authorities can no official position: hereafter the “reparations longer threaten recipients of burden question” is closed for the Polish govern- sharing payments with demands for repay- ment, bilateral relations should not be ment of money they have received, pro- burdened [by this issue]. (Statement of the vided that the affected people cannot prove Polish Foreign Ministry from September that they no longer control their former 10, 2004). assets. In this way, possibly thousands of The Belka government bases its position German citizens, especially Germans who on a political and legal argument. First, were resettled, will be prevented from German-Polish relations, because of its going to a Polish court in order to recover high-ranking importance in Europe, should their property or to receive the confirma- not be allowed to be damaged by frivolous tion that they no longer have it under their or “adventurous” initiatives (from both control. sides). Second, through its governmental In addition, the Schröder-Belka package declaration of August 23, 1953, which is contains some new recommendations,

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2 which are supposed to stimulate German- Germany’s participation in the bilateral Polish cooperation as well as defuse the expert commission. Suspicion prevails in present conflicts. For a project that is sup- Poland as Germany balks at administering posed to symbolize this cooperation, the its own settlement of the claims, due to Viadrina University in Frankfurt an der domestic politics or financial reasons, in Oder is due to be transformed into a tri- effect putting its own individual interests national French-German-Polish research ahead of German-Polish relations. This dis- university with the respectable sum of 60 satisfaction will lead to nervousness in bila- million euros (50 million of which come teral relations. However, the more deeply from Germany). The government-appointed embedded deficiencies and developments “coordinators” of the bilateral relationship outweigh those that have become apparent are supposed to improve mutual coopera- in the last few years. tion. In order to ease tensions, German and Polish experts are supposed to participate in a regular dialogue on EU finances. What the dispute revealed In order to further reduce tensions, both In an unmistakeable way, the latest dis- parliaments want to add to and intensify putes made clear numerous deficiencies exchanges. At the meeting of the two par- that have impaired the German-Polish liament presidents in the middle of October relationship for a fairly long time. in Słubice, it was announced that the Thus it became visible, that the three foreign and European committees of the fundamental principles and development German Parliament and the Sejm would trends, to which the bilateral cooperation hold joint sessions. The German-Polish oriented itself in the 90s—de-historification, group of parliamentarians is supposed to de-politicization and Europeanization—, get moving, and a joint group of younger have reached their limit. The attempt to representatives might be established. reduce the overwhelming influence of his- Without a doubt, these are steps in the tory for cooperation in the present and right direction. The fact that they neverthe- future by excluding contentious issues was less do not offer any protection against without a doubt, in hindsight, justified. further irritations in German-Polish rela- The resulting modus vivendi contributed tions can at least in part be attributed to significantly to the intensification of the the fact that the legal arrangements mutual cooperation in the previous regarding possible German claims is un- decades. Certainly people in Poland as well satisfactory from the Polish point of view. as in Germany allowed themselves to be Although the Polish government welcomed blinded by the success of the reconciliation the German government’s refusal to inter- efforts and the marginalization of prob- vene, Warsaw still hopes for a formal lems, which are rooted in the past. The renouncement of claims from Berlin com- latter point also applies to the efforts made bined with a German settlement of the to achieve a progressive depoliticization of claims of expellees. Warsaw’s goal is still bilateral relations. to redirect the disputes between German Since the end of the 90s at the latest, citizens and the Polish state and to refer “Germany” started to appear in Poland German citizens to the German govern- again as an issue in domestic politics. The ment. This solution, however, is not sup- end phase of the EU accession negotiations ported by the German government. The demonstrated that the gradual integration reasons for its position receive barely any of the bilateral relationship into a multilat- attention in Poland, as little attention as eral one, above all in the European context, the fact that Berlin has substantially accom- is not a panacea. Controversial issues such modated the Polish side, as demonstrated as the freedom of movement of workers by the Chancellor’s speech on August 1 and and land acquisition by foreigners reflected

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3 a strong German-Polish connotation. Even Second, concern about an “assertive” more emphatically, the German-Polish Germany is also spreading. This concern differences over the Iraq War or over the is based on several factors: (1) that the voting system in the EU Constitution external or self-imposed connection to the showed quite clearly that politics on the post war era is fading, (2) that Germany has European level is not only an additional become an unreliable ally of America, forum for discussion of bilateral problems, (3) that Germany is making efforts, together but also a place where bilateral friction with France, to build an informal leader- can begin or even increase. ship role in the EU, (4) through intensive What was known as the “community of bilateral cooperation with Russia, Germany interests” in the 90s, the peak of German- is making it more difficult for the Union to Polish cooperation, mutated into a “com- maintain a uniform position in its relations munity of conflict,” at the latest following to Moscow, and (5) through Germany’s the disagreements over transatlantic rela- efforts to obtain a seat on the UN Security tions and the method of voting for the EU. Council, it is placing its own interests above In the meantime, one cannot even speak of the welfare of Europe. a “community of conflicting interests” Third, among the Polish elite, Germany because this at least presumes that both has lost its status as a model in social and sides considered themselves to be depend- economic matters. In consideration of the ent on one another and on, above all, a structural challenges that Germany must specific, mutual cooperation which tran- face, many observers in Poland fear that in scends the bilateral and European contexts. the future they will have to deal with an In Poland, a new “Germany Syndrome” economically, socially and also politically is spreading, which manifests itself in the unstable Germany. form of overreactions and increasing Through membership in the EU (and uncertainty and is causing a structural NATO), in principle, the possibility exists crisis of confidence. This is based on the for Poland to reduce the effects of asymme- interplay of multiple factors. tries in bilateral relations through the First, there is considerable fear of an multilateralization of cooperative relations. alleged, general reinterpretation of the Nevertheless, structural asymmetries have history of the 20th century in Germany. In not disappeared as a result of Poland’s this context, it is much more than just accession to the EU: based on political “radical” voices in Poland that have warned potential, economic strength and sheer against playing with history and revision- size, there is still a considerable gap ism. It must be disconcerting that so far between Germany and Poland. This im- rather moderate circles have also exhibited balance explains, at least in part, why an a selective and biased perception and, for outsized sensitivity to social, political and example, assume that the public discussion foreign policy developments in Germany in Germany denies historical causes or that dominates in Poland and more than a few the political class wants to at least escape Poles are somewhat fascinated, in a nega- responsibility. A good example of this are tive way, by the German expellee associa- the statements of the deputy Sejm Presi- tions and their representatives. Accord- dent Donald Tusk of the conservative-liberal ingly, the entire lower house of the Polish Citizens Platform at the second reading of Parliament reacted so strongly to the the draft resolution for the Polish repara- initiative of a few people in the “Prussian tion demands. According to him “the Ger- Trust” of united German citizens. mans [want] to do away with their history” After the “German Factor” found its way and “independently from party member- back into Poland’s foreign policy in the ship, rewrite history or at best forget it course of the past few years, it is now also a entirely.” determinant of domestic policy again. This

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4 supports the notion that in Poland foreign In all probability, there will be a change policy is replacing, more and more, domes- of government in Poland after the election. tic policy as the terrain on which the polit- It is most likely that the parties of the right ical parties fight for the favor of voters. and center-right will set the tone in a new (See Jerzy Surdykowski in Gazeta Wyborcza coalition. Presumably, such a government dated October 26, 2004). In this context, would act more pragmatically, as is present- the dynamic nationalistic and “patriotic” ly suspected. The Citizens Platform party in powers as well as the heated public debates particular (it would be according to current play an important role. Thus, in considera- polls the strongest party and it would have tion of the success of the National-Catholic a very good chance to designate the prime League of the Polish Family (LPR), the con- minister) would act with a level-head, as servatives and the conservative-liberal has been the case so far. Groups for which a groups of the center-right can not elude the confrontation with Germany is part of their rhetoric that is increasingly critical of ideology, such as the PiS or possibly even Germany. As the Sejm resolution for the the LPR, could, however, be represented in reparations demands shows, the parties of a future coalition. Even a pragmatic head the left cannot even permit themselves to of the government would be under con- remain outside of the debate. Otherwise stant pressure from the nationally-aligned they run the risk of being defamed in parties. If a prime minister selected by Poland as “useful idiots” or comrades-in- Citizens Platform were to refrain from arms of the supposed “front for pushing making reparation demands to Germany, through German interests” (according to he would risk a fight within the coalition. the chairman of the conservative Law and In Poland, a collapse of the foreign policy Justice party [PiS], Jarosław Kaczyński). It consensus that originated in the 90s has must be viewed as rather ominous that in been visible for some time. If the divisions the course of this discussion, dialogue- that accompany this collapse solidify, in oriented people are becoming isolated or the next few years “European”-oriented stigmatised. This trend accompanies a politicians who want a friction-free rela- temporary loss of importance for the tra- tionship with Germany might be juxta- ditional “reconciliation lobby” in business, posed with Europe and Germany skeptics. politics and journalism. The disagreement between the two camps could become a dominating, permanent dividing line in Poland’s political land- A Gloomy Outlook scape. With this background, the German-Polish The likely soon to be carried out filing relationship could be continually tested, in of the restitution and damage complaints both large and small ways, for the foresee- of the German Trust in Polish courts will able future. cause the public debate in Poland to Domestic and foreign policy debates in escalate again. Even if the legal process, Poland are already taking place with an eye as most legal experts anticipate, turns out to the parliamentary elections expected well from the Polish perspective, an for next Spring. The public debate over explosive debate in Poland’s politics and Germany will thus intensify due to the media should be expected for the duration election campaign: the advocates of a tough of the case in Poland, in the European Germany policy have a good chance to be Court of Human Rights and in the Euro- the leaders in the opinion polls. With a new pean Court of Justice—and therefore for draft resolution, which is supposed to in- an extended period of time. validate the renunciation of reparations of In parallel, the Poles will carefully follow 1953, the LPR intends to keep this theme the progress of the discussion about the on the front burner. planned Berlin “Center against Expulsion

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5 and Displacement” (CED). Some Polish com- still by no means settled. Surely, until then, mentators are already of the opinion that there is still an appropriate way to go. the damages issues will be less burdensome At present, the German-Polish relation- for German-Polish relations in the long run ship has definitely lost the glue that holds than the CED. While the claims of German it together. After Poland’s accession to the expellees can be denied after some time, EU and NATO, German-Polish cooperation the CED would be the manifestation of a is missing an overarching mandate that lasting and fundamental reappraisal of both sides can accept. While the relations German history. In addition to support between the two countries in the 90s were received from the Prussian Trust, this re- stabilized by their immersion in the Euro- appraisal is being promoted by parts of the pean context, now they seem to have hit a political establishment in Germany. stumbling block again. It is a cause for Finally, there will also be in the future concern when the Sejm, out of its national some European issues, to which a German- interests, wants to prevent the development Polish “Note” is attached and which could of the (German-Polish-Czech) traffic infra- be the source of additional disagreements structure in “Zittauer Zipfel,” when parlia- in bilateral relations. Indeed, with regard to mentarians want to require the foreign the important finance issues, both sides are minister to resolutely protest against anxious to avoid any German-Polish con- “undue pressure from German politicians” frontations. But the process of the negotia- who “demand that Poland and other EU tions could badly hamper these efforts. countries increase taxes,” and when not Moreover, there are differences of opinion least there is talk of mistrust of the Polish with regard to how the economy and busi- foreign minister because of his supposedly ness should be managed in the EU. Thus, conciliatory attitude towards Germany. It in May, the ideas of the Chancellor with also makes sense that if the PiS becomes regard to taxation in the EU, which he stronger as a result, that in the future a had presented in Warsaw, were labeled as 5%-hurdle would also apply to national “German-centric” by the head of Citizens minorities—which would deprive the Platform, Jan Maria Rokita (possibly the German minority of its existing represent- future prime minister). The European tation in the Polish Parliament. The prob- policy of Germany, as it is defined by the lem with these types of approaches is that Schröder government, stands in “open through them, the current, historically conflict with the economic interests of motivated differences threaten to encroach Poland.” on other areas of mutual cooperation. In Poland, everything possible should be done to make sure that these trends do not con- Rebuilding German-Polish Relations tinue. Presumably the current stage in German- Without a doubt, German-Polish rela- Polish relations will later be viewed as a tions, after May 1, 2004, must be set, or necessary desensitization phase, which was “reconstructed,” on a new, European-based required for both sides to come to terms foundation. In a first step, both countries with their joint role in Europe. It may also should ascertain the “levels of ambition” of be perceived as the expression of the level their mutual cooperation: they should of maturity of the bilateral relationship, if define which objectives and expectations the Germans and Poles are able to demon- they have in the context of the mutual strate that they can bitterly disagree but relationship. Simply put, it is possible to after a short time, or even at the same time differentiate between three such levels. with respect to many undisputed issues, work together constructively. Whether the German-Polish path reaches this point, is

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6 1. “Strategic Partnership.“ Should What kind of Partnership? Germany and Poland agree on this wide- From the German perspective, which of ranging approach, they must draw up a these models should be worked towards? joint agenda with long-term projects that A “strategic partnership” and a “go-for-it” are relevant for both sides. Both countries German-Polish tandem with a forward- would then see the maintenance of their looking palette of European issues would cooperation as a special responsibility for surely be worth working for: such a respon- the European Union. The common past sible cooperation would promise new would not be understood as a dividing initiatives for the EU and a harmonic factor, but rather as an obligation to be German-Polish coexistence. Such a strategic especially constructive. The objective of a partnership is predicated on two things: “strategic partnership” would include the the existence of a common agenda and the goal of intensifying bilateral relations on will on both sides to agree to this style of all levels. It would also encompass the collaboration. In regard to both premises, mutual claim to understanding and sen- at least at present there are substantial un- sitivity. certainties. A German-Polish agenda fur the larger 2. Pragmatic Cooperation. Under this less EU must first be defined. The “Neighbour- ambitious concept, German-Polish cooper- hood Policy” of the European Union and ation would still be deemed to be benefi- the relations with the eastern neighbours cial, but, it would have the character of a are surely an issue, which both sides want partnership of convenience for avoiding to take up. And as the German-Polish Coun- bilateral or European conflicts rather than cil initiative on EU policy towards Ukraine for the implementation of a few, albeit demonstrates, both countries are also important projects. Tension, which origin- ready to engage together on this question. nates in the past, could temporarily chill Other issue areas could be energy, infra- the bilateral relationship. In any event, the structure or transport policy. It is also pos- cooperation in many areas would be un- sible to imagine cooperation on security disturbed and deepened. No specific value and defense policy in the course of the would be assigned to the German-Polish strengthening of the European Security and relationship. Instead, it would be under- Defense Policy (ESDP). Whether in further, stood as one of many intensive, but ulti- partly disputed policy fields (tax policy, mately “normal” relationships in Europe. industrial policy, environmental protection, etc.) a special German-Polish role is 3. “Indifferent Neighbors.” In this imaginable, remains to be seen. scenario, Germany and Poland would However, at present and in the near primarily focus on other partners. Strategic future, it is doubtful that the prevailing discord over important European political desire in Warsaw would be to ally Poland issues would alienate the countries from “strategically” with Germany in the EU. one another. The mutual contact would be On the one hand, it is due to the (already plagued with mistrust and far-reaching discussed) growing suspicion of Germany disinterest. They would be hypersensitive to among the political class of Poland. On the conflicts “from yesterday” and would prefer other hand, especially after a possible to merely coexist than to cooperate with change of power in Warsaw, there could each other. Notwithstanding these issues, be a European policy in effect that em- there would be however a robust basis for phasizes national interests within the EU cooperation: economic exchange, business more strongly than in the past. See, as an contacts, cross-border cooperation and example, the words of a parliamentarian other things would continue largely un- from Citizens Platform: “No foreign prime harmed. minister, no foreign minister has to like us.

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7 What is important is that he must reckon with our opinion. [...] Those who have the steering wheel of Polish foreign policy in their hands should take Margaret Thatcher as an example, she was the most unloved leader in the history of united Europe, but at the same time she defended the strategic national interests of her citizens in a highly efficient manner” (Parliamentarian Paweł Graś in the debate over the no-confidence vote against foreign minister Cimoszewicz on October 13, 2004). Thus, at present, a “strategic partnership” seems to be out of the question.

SWP with regard to alliance building and Stiftung Wissenschaft und making compromises, of the larger Union. Politik German Institute for Moreover, Poland must first find a new International and consensus for its foreign and European Security Affairs policies as well as learn how to construc- Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 tively handle dissent. Perhaps both coun- 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 tries should leave the disputes in bilateral Fax +49 30 880 07-100 relations to the side for a moment. Then, www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] when certain disagreements have been defused, a reactivation of the bilateral relationship might have a chance to suc- ceed. All things considered, at present a form of “pragmatic cooperation” between Germany and Poland seems to be a more realistic approach than one based on “special roles” for both countries.

SWP Comments 32 November 2004