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Home , Khartoum massacre, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Sudanese Revolution

Report 6 months of in

Prepared by: Victor Olivereau

Member of International Relation Unit

ACHRS July,2019

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Contents Introduction 1. Chronology of an uprising  Political Context of Sudan  Chronicle of the revolt – The in a few dates

2. Human's rights violations  Shutdown

3. Characteristics of the movement  Women’s role  Neighbourhood Resistance Committees  Peaceful

4. Mapping the 2019 Sudan Protests and the role of Sudanese diaspora  movement among the Sudanese of the diaspora

5. Conclusion

6. Recommendations

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Introduction On December 16th and 19th 2018 Atbara was the epicentre of social an earthquake that would soon spread to all Sudan. The images of the in Atbara, historical cradle of the workers insurrection in Sudan, where protesters set fire to the National Congress Party building, travelled around the country and caused a chain reaction. The following days, demonstrations broke out in Berber, , Gedaref and Port Sudan. Triply of bread and fuel prices fed the anger in the country, which quickly turned out into big anti- government protests. Thus, the slogans of the movement rapidly shifted from socio-economic demands to directly question the political order, embodied in the prominent slogans 'Tasqut bes' (your fall, that's all) and 'Al-Shaab yurid isqat an-nizam' (the people want the regime fall). The first day the repression was violent: the armed forces of the regime shot at the crowd with real ammunition causing more than twenty victims in December. At the beginning, authority tried to appease protesters but on February 22nd Al-Bashir declared the . Over the weeks, the repression was less deadly, but there were massive arrests of demonstrators. Outstripping gender, ages, classes or background the uprising clearly expressed its desire to depose 30 years ironclad ruling President Omar Al-Bashir. Amid all this turmoil, protesters were focussing their demand on three basics needs: freedom, peace and justice. Indeed, Sudanese people are asking for freedom from the military rule, tyranny and oppression. Also, one of their main claim was and is still the freedom to choose their government that represent them truly. Structured around the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) that gathers doctors, lawyers, journalists or pharmacists, the opposition is fighting against the core of the legacy of Al-Bashir's regime, that is to say: the restriction of freedom, more wars and finally more injustice. The current is deeply rooted in a long decade of distrust and expression of strong dissatisfaction with the regime. Indeed, factors such as the disappearance of the oil income, which stemmed from the exploitation of the wells in the South, and which were lost after the independence of in 2011, along with the drying up of patronage networks and their tightening around smaller groups, have consequences on the lives of the entire Sudanese population. On a deep economic crisis background and following the announcement of new austerity policies, the Sudanese protest movement took root in many sectors of the population and enlisted them during demonstrations that have lasted now for more than four months. Also, the role of women needs to be underline, notably in urban areas where they have emerged at the forefront of the demonstrations and have largely participated in various forms of protest since December, to the extent that their participation has become an emblem of the movement. Although this participation appears as unexpected for many observers according to the patriarchal structure that still dominates in Sudan's society (women's access to the public areas is governed by restrictive laws), this reality is however part of a historical dynamic of

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women movements (feminists/communists/islamists) and can also be explained by the overrepresentation of women in institutions of higher education. Another important aspect of this uprising movement is the echo beyond the national borders. The Sudanese diaspora mobilised to show support for local activists. It highlights the involvement of all generations in exile against the Islamist regime of Al-Bashir, the diversity of mode of action and the way in which the participation of the Sudanese residing abroad is a resource for the activists in Sudan. This report will thus focus on several crucial dimensions of this movement to understand its essence. After a brief look back on the political context of Sudan before the uprising and its chronology, we will point out the different violations that have taken place since December. Also will we highlight the main characteristics of these protests, focussing notably on the mapping of the uprising across Sudan and abroad with the role of the diaspora in the Revolution.

1) Chronology of an uprising Sudan has known a long tradition of uprising and revolution since its independence from the British in 1955. The history of the country is actually a long succession of military regime, civil and temporary civilian rule. Everything started in 1958 when the General Ibrahim Abboud took the power by a military coup, he will rule until 1964 when a by the trade unions of Atbara railway workers blocked the all country for three days and thus toppled the military regime. The civil regime that follows will maintain until 1969. Another General, Jaafar Al-Nimeiry took the reign of the country with a second coup d'état in May 1969 while becoming prime minister, abolishing the parliament and outlawing all political parties. April 1985 was the theatre of the second that hits Sudan. Following the announcement of the increase in the prices of the basic necessities at the request of the International Monetary Fund, eight unions based once again in Atbara called the 2nd of April for mobilization until the abolition of the current regime. Five days later a group of military officer overthrew Nimeiry. A transitional military council assured the interim until an umpteenth coup performed in 1989 by a military junta brought into power General Omar Al-Bashir with the acquiescence of the National Islamic Front (NIF) of Hassan al- Tourabi. Political Context of Sudan In 1996, Omar Al-Bashir and members of the former NIF founded the National Congress Party (NCP), the party that would remain in power until the fall of its leader on April 11 2019. The establishment of a radical and revolutionary policy of political rupture and refoundation of the society was the first step of the Islamist movement. Political parties, trade unions and professional associations were banned and their activists violently repressed. The new authorities mobilized the population around the issue of the islamisation of the society. This process started in 1983 under , was accentuated by educational reforms implemented by the Ministry of Social planning, but also by the application of public order laws that allowed control of public areas by means of religious norms. These social processes went along with a policy of austerity and privatization of public enterprises conducted since the 1990's. The 2000's were marked by important economic and political changes. The oil income allowed the regime to

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fund big development programs. At the same time the rebellion in southern Sudan, led by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) ceased and a peace agreement was concluded in 2005. If a certain lull was established in the South, other conflicts persisted, especially in the west of the country. Since 2003, a war of great violence has taken place in causing more than 300 000 people and displaced millions of others. The years 2010 and 2011 finally embodied a rupture in the political history of the country. In 2010, Omar Al-Bashir was re-elected President. In 2011, following a referendum of self-determination, South Sudan became an independent state. These events left the military-Islamist coalition in power, without any armed and powerful opponents. However, the split of the country drove Sudan into an economic and financial crisis. The extractive industries economic model was bankrupt by the loss of oil resources because most of them were located in the southern part of the country. This crisis continued today and is now a factor in the current revolutionary movement. Chronicle of the revolt – The Sudanese revolution in a few dates . 19th December 2018: massive protests break out after government announcement to triple bread price. . 20th December: 8 people are killed in clashes with police in the country's different cities. . 21st December: several headquarters of the National Congress Party are fires.

. 1st January 2019: twenty opposition parties (among them, notably the Gathering of Sudanese Professionals, The Forces of National Consensus, the Forces of Sudan Appeal and the Federal Opposition Rally) demand a change of regime and the departure of the President Omar Al-Bashir. . 22nd February: the President declares the state of emergency and announces the dismissal of the government. . 6th April: on the anniversary date of the 1985 popular uprising and the fall of Nimeiri's regime, militant groups, after weeks of preparation called on all Sudanese people, inside and outside the country to join the protest movement by participating to a giant sit-in in front of the armed forces' headquarters. Despite repressive actions and the security forces attempts to contain the movement, protesters stayed in place. . 11th April: the army announces the fall of Omar Al-Bashir and his arrest, as well as that of the senior regime officials. A two-year Military Transition Council (CMT) was proclaimed, directed by General Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf, vice-president of the fallen government and former defense minister. The state of emergency declared by Al-Bashir on February 22nd was maintained by the new government and a curfew was imposed. The Sudanese rejected these measures and demanded the removal of Ibn Auf. . 12th April: General Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf resigned and was replaced by Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, senior army officer, assisted by (nicknamed Hemeti), leader of the (RSF). Negotiations were difficult between representatives of the civil protester and the CMT which seemingly aspired to preserve part of the military regime at the head of Sudan since 1989. . 3rd June: tensions continued to rise and on 3 June 2019, 118 people were killed, 70 were raped and hundreds were injured in the massacre as a result of storming a camp and opening fire on protesters. Security forces also opened fire on protesters inside medical facilities. Security forces dumped bodies of some of the killed protesters in the river . 4

. 7th June: Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed attempts mediation between the Forces of Freedom and Change alliance (FFC) and the junta. . 10th June: Internet breakdown in all the country. . 30th June: on the 30th anniversary of Al-Bashir's coup, "the million march" gathered several hundred thousand demonstrators. The putschists prevent the demonstrators from approaching the presidential palace with tear gas and clashes provoke seven dead and 181 injured. The next day three other bodies are found. A demonstration of tribute to the victims is scheduled for July 13, followed by for July 14. . 5th July: shortly after a meeting held on June 29 with both sides and US officials, the FFC and the coup leaders reached an agreement on a transition of three years and three months. A Sovereign Council of eleven members including five from the FFC and five from the army, and a civilian chosen by both sides, must be set up, as well as a civilian government. It will be run for 21 months by a soldier and then the last 18 months by a civilian. Finally, a national survey must be held about the dispersion of the sit-in on the 3rd of June.

2) Human's rights violations

Since the start of the Sudanese revolution in December, several Human’s Rights violations have been reported ranging from killings, arbitrarily arrests aiming at civilians, political activists or journalists, raping, kidnapping, to Internet shutdown.

According to local groups monitoring casualties, including the opposition doctors’ union, more than 100 people were killed between the beginnings of the protests in December up to the time when al-Bashir was ousted on the 11th of April.

Since the military council’s April takeover, the Rapid Support Forces have risen to prominence and participated in or led most crackdowns on protesters. The unit is commanded by the military council’s deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – “Hemeti” – who is known for his unit’s abuses in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile.

On the 3rd of June, a massive attack on peaceful protesters in Khartoum occurred. It began with the violent breakup of the sit in claiming more than 128 people were killed according to the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors on 9 June 2019, and left hundred more injured. The Rapid Support Forces, police, and national security officials riding in armed vehicles reportedly attacked the protest site early in the morning, when most protesters were sleeping. They shot at protesters, burned down tents, chased people into homes and office buildings, where they whipped and beat them, and reportedly raped several civilians. Even after they cleared the camp, residents said that soldiers continued to loot, beat, and commit other crimes. They reportedly blocked the exit so that protesters could not easily leave and used live ammunition. In an apparent effort to conceal the extent of their crimes, attackers reportedly threw bodies into the Nile, weighing them down with bricks. According to the Central Committee of Doctors, more than 40 of these have now been recovered from the waters. A dozen cases of were also reported in the

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attack. At least three hospitals were attacked, with reports of doctors assaulted. Since then, targeted harassment of medical personnel has led to the closing of eight hospitals, according to the Central Committee of Doctors.

On June 30, when tens of thousands of Sudanese marched calling for a transition to civilian rule, government forces again used deadly force to break up protests. Witnesses told that Rapid Support Forces soldiers shot at them as they crossed a bridge. Video evidence from that day shows security forces opening fire on and beating peaceful protesters as well as attacking patients and health workers at a hospital in Khartoum. Local monitors said that at least 11 people were killed, including 3 young men whose slain bodies were found by residents on a street in following the protests.

Internet Shutdown

Sudan has been facing a global Internet shutdown since the 3rd of June. Activists began reporting mobile Internet disruptions on this day when government forces carried out a bloody, large-scale attack on the sit- in in Khartoum, killing more than 100 people and injuring hundreds more. The military council has offered no compelling justification for denying Internet access. On June 10, the authorities cut the remaining fixed line connections, effectively shutting down nearly all Internet access. Netblocks, a non-profit organization monitoring Internet censorship, announced that Sudan now faces a “near-total restriction” on Internet access in the country. The same day, Shamseddin Kabashy, spokesperson for the military council confirmed on Al-Jazeera that the council had ordered the shutdown. “We stopped internet services for a limited period, at our discretion.” he said.

Such shutdowns violate multiple rights, including the rights to freedom of expression and information, and hinder others, including the right to free assembly, or indirectly prevent from the freedom of movement or the access to care. In their 2015 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Responses to Conflict Situations, UN experts and rapporteur declared that, even in times of conflict, “using communications ‘kill switches’ (i.e. shutting down entire parts of communications systems) can never be justified under human rights law.”

Under international law, Sudan has an obligation to ensure that internet-based restrictions are provided by law and that they represent a necessary and proportionate response to a specific security concern. Officials should not use broad, indiscriminate shutdowns to curtail the flow of information, or to harm civilians’ ability to freely assemble and express political views, Human Rights Watch said.

3) Characteristics of the movement

The Sudanese uprisings of 2019 do not merely repeat the , but rather extend and deepen it. It shows that the sociology of popular resistance has changed. This popular front is not only the product of youth movements, but also stem from cross-class social foundations. Women also play a markedly more central role. The use of violence is banned. These new rebellious actors have learned critical lessons from 2011.

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Women’s role

If the Sudanese revolution had to be embodied by one face, it would very likely be the face of , this 22 year old architecture student that was pictured in the world press singing slogans of the revolution around hundreds of followers. This icon of the Uprising is the symbol of a movement that was equally driven between men and women. Women have indeed equally taken part in theses vast protests as men, and they probably have more reasons to go down the streets, frustrated by more than 30 years of public humiliation and social injustice. This revolution is for them the opportunity to overthrow the patriarchal structure of the Sudanese society, while being at the core of a society project that will equally deal with both genders. The history of women paving the way to an equal and free society goes back to the Mahdi who always considered that Islam was intrinsically tolerant and progressive. This is the reason why he anointed his daughter at the head of the Ummah party in order to succeed him. Despite this legacy favourable to women’s emancipation, 30 years of Al-Bashir ruling created a favourable ground to massive frustration and resentment. Under his rule, humiliating laws were passed such as the ban on wearing pants or clothes considered as unsuitable, and raping was a common practice of the militias in the peripheral region of the country such as Darfur or Kordofan. Furthermore, Al-Bashir’s era enabled the spread of the tamkin a policy that promoted and empowered loyal women partisans of the regime irrespective of their technical achievements. All these factors ignited the spark that saw dispossessed women join the demonstration. Several times women were at the centre of the claim of the demonstrations such as on the 10th February walk all over the country, which first claim was to advocate for women’s prisoners’ rights or on the 21st of March when the protest was aiming at honouring the mothers of the fallen and those detained. These very active and first front women are called Kandaka in Sudan, referencing to the title given to the powerful queens of the ancient Sudanese Kingdom of Meroe two thousands years ago. Ultra active in the sit in and the protests, they are also a major component of committees of resistance. Their presence is the proof that Sudanese uprising is seeking for higher ideals of justice and inclusion. A quest for a decent life accompanied with an equal representation among the society is the reason why so many women have been embroiled in the revolution. This is the Revolution of all the Sudanese and they were waiting for the opportune moment to erupt. In one word, the over spilling or resentments and a sense of injustice, articulated by women as doubled for them, in a society that still tends to facilitate male lives, make it easier to understand the claim that the revolution taking place is a “girl revolution”. Neighbourhood Resistance Committees Another characteristic feature of the Sudanese protest movement is the presence of neighbourhood resistance committees. The latter spontaneously and quickly improvised "peaceful vigilantes" ensuring the nocturnal gatherings, counting the damage of the repression and taking care to prevent infiltration attempts. Concretely these committees of popular resistance (not to be confused with the popular committees of districts, tools of surveillance and local grid of the regime) are the link which ensure the coordination of the actions on the ground between the association of the Sudanese professionals and the citizens. These informal gatherings including many women and neighbourhood residents are non-violent and express their opposition through and leaflets. The coordination of the protest also involves the distribution of drugs, food or water to the demonstrators.

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Peaceful protests

Another important aspect of this revolution is the peaceful dimension of it. On that point, we can clearly identify the lesson that took the Sudanese people from their own uprising movements in 2013 or 2015, but foremost from the sad experiences of their neighbours, Syria, or Libya for example. Another key that enable to understand this characteristic is that the Sudanese and social organizations retained a strong sense of autonomy. This is partly due to the historical legacies of pluralism and party politics in the struggle for power in Sudan, in that different competing streams including Islamism often had to mobilize social forces to legitimate themselves. Thus, while the Sudanese popular movement is enormous, as in Algeria, it also enjoyed clear leadership from professional syndicates and legal associations that helped maintain intense pressure upon the military to commit itself towards democracy. Being peaceful and blameless are the essential conditions for the people not to fall in the trap of the military on the one hand, and to gain the support of the International Community on the other hand.

4) Mapping the 2019 Sudan Protests and the role of Sudanese diaspora

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Revolutionary movement among the Sudanese of the diaspora

We can say that the mobilization of the Sudanese diaspora was really very rapid, especially in France. The current revolutionary movement started with the demonstrations in Atbara on December 19th, and as soon as December 23rd and 24th, there was a mobilization of Sudanese migrants in Paris in front of the Sudanese embassy. In the rest of France, we observed the same tendency: in Lyon and Marseille, for instance, on December 29th there were also demonstrations gathering around a hundred people.

However, this is not peculiar to France, or to Europe, since on December 24th Sudanese in The Hague and Washington were also mobilizing in large numbers. Starting at Christmas the mobilization of the Sudanese diaspora grew, organized itself, unified hundreds of people and began to be relayed on social networks. Until then, only spontaneous gatherings with a few dozen people had broken out, particularly in front of the Sudanese embassies in countries where the Sudanese were established: in Calgary and Edmonton, Canada, in Victoria and Melbourne, Australia, in Dallas, Houston, and Iowa in the , in Dublin, Ireland, in London and Manchester, England, but also in Cairo, where the desire to gather in front of the embassy was quickly undermined by Egyptian authorities. This quick reaction proved to be resilient since the Sudanese

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diaspora continues its mobilizations. This strong mobilization from abroad is in contrast to the lack of attention given to the Sudanese uprisings by mainstream Western media in these same countries.

Apart from the number of organized events, we can already notice from this map some important information: the mobilization of the different Sudanese communities in the world is more or less centralized according to the country, except for France and to a certain extent. The phenomenon of concentration of supportive events in England, for example, also reflects the different Sudanese communities’ capacity to structure themselves and organize large-scale gatherings in symbolic places. Thus the success of the February 16th march in Washington, where more than a thousand people apparently assembled, had a strong impact on the Sudanese population. Buses were chartered from different parts of the country, which testifies to the material and financial means of supporting the movement within the Sudano-American community.

Among all the characteristics of the mobilization, it interesting to notice the various methods of action of the diaspora. While some collectif like Activists Sudanese United Against (ASUAD) in France for example are focusing their work on cultural events to promote Sudanese culture and awareness about the situation, other initatives gather Sudanese diaspora beyond the boarder. For exemple the page « Sudanese Translator for Change » on facebook started to translate some contents with 3 people. Now, their way of action, that is to say spreading the information by translating it into very various languages, has enabled to gather more than 40 translators around the world. Today their work is reachable in French, English, German, Spanish, Greek and Romanian. Finally, women’s mobilisation for Sudan is also worldwide with initiative like Mahan min ajl Al tahir for women, aiming at supporting actions in Sudan and raising awareness about the women’s rights situation and actions in Sudan. Also we must probably insist on the flow of information, videos, ideas, via social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram) that currently occupy a central place in the connection between the diaspora and Sudan as well as in the constitution of the image of a Sudanese people united behind the same struggle, even at the risk of amplifying this reality. The Sudanese Professional Association (SPA) publishes calls for mobilization on social networks that go beyond the national framework and confer a role to the diaspora. Therefore, the leaders of the movement call for protests in front of Sudanese embassies abroad and in front of the host countries’ foreign ministries. It is also interesting to mention that the inclusion of the Sudanese diaspora appeared at the precise moment when the association was being built and began to formalize its calls: the meeting places became more precise, the planned and alternative routes of demonstrations were detailed on maps, manifestations based on themes gradually appeared (women’s march, march of martyrs, etc.), calls coordinating actions over a week were published. And these calls included the diaspora during the days of mobilizations, either at the same time as actions were carried out in Sudan or, on the contrary, so that something happened in the world almost every day. This is the first time a Sudanese political movement crossed national borders with such strength and such willingness to make the cause visible. Finally, the flow of activists for four months and the beginning of the uprising have not ceased and it is likely that the SPA networks, as well as the family networks, are organized to get people who are particularly targeted by the repression in Sudan out of the country when they can. We can think that there are currently activists arriving in European countries and imagine that others will take over in Sudan. Four months of revolt is long, and for the moment there is no demobilization or loss of impetus, neither in the diaspora nor in Sudan.

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Conclusion

After tearing off a shaky political agreement in extremis on the 5th of July, the Sudanese revolution is entering a new phase now, the transitional phase. We have clearly underlined the fact that this uprising learned from the mistake of the past, in Sudan but also in the region. On that point, two times in Sudanese history, in 1964 and in 1985 the 'contractors of the protest' have lost their battle with the military after toppling the regime. These two antecedents have shown that the civilians must remain extremely suspicious about the military. Another key point of the uprising is probably the ability of the protesters to maintain a peaceful climate in the demonstrations in order to avoid an armed escalation of the protests like in Syria or in Egypt. Nevertheless, just as both popular movements and authoritarian regimes have learned from the Arab Spring, so too has the counterrevolutionary front in the Arab world, mainly composed of , the Emirates and Egypt, changed its strategies. It has not waited for democratic breakthroughs, but rather activated quickly to crush the possibility of regime transitions. In Sudan, the Saudi-led front incited the actions of the RSF in attacking the protest movement. The goal of this counterrevolutionary push is to create havoc and distort any positive political change in the region that could potentially spread back into autocratic centers. This counterrevolution is undeniably the bigger threat for this revolution to succeed. Anyway, the strength of this revolution comes from its consciousness and energy that transcends all the divisions of Sudanese society, gender, ethnicity or geography. 30 years after the beginning of Al-Bashir's era, Sudanese people have a great opportunity to change their destiny, it is a duty of the international community to support them by any means.

Recommendations

Mindful of the current unstable and unpredictable political situation in Sudan, we demand: 1) The immediate withdrawal of RSF militias and other paramilitary groups from the main cities of the country. 2) An independent international inquiry into the June 3 massacre at the Army HQ and the and human rights violations since the beginning of the uprising in December 2018. 3) The immediate release of all political prisoners. 4) An international investigation against Mohammed Hamdan Daglo told Hemedti, number two of the transitional military council and leader of the RSF.

Also, Sudan’s leaders have not ended the full range of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law nor investigated or prosecuted the vast majority of new and old cases documented. The power-sharing deal signed on 5 July includes a pledge to investigate violence, but the language appears to limit the scope to the period following 11 April. Any credible investigation should include all abuses against protesters since December and the investigators should be fully independent from the Transitional Military Council and other actors possibly implicated in violations.

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