Unit 27 Modern Warfare
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UNIT 27 MODERN WARFARE Structure 27.1 Introduction 27.2 Conceptualizing Modern War 27.3 Mobilizing Military Manpower 27.4 The Marriage between Technology and War 27.5 Modern War in the Colonies 27.6 Weaknesses of Modern Warfare 27.7 Summary 27.8 Exercises 27.1 INTRODUCTION War is the father of all things. Heraklitos The clash between Napoleon’s infantry armed with muskets and the Mamelukes on horses in the sandy plain of Egypt was a classic case of modernity confronting tradition. Mobile artillery of Napoleon blasted the sabre wielding Mamelukes in the backdrop of the Sphinx. Firepower, an adjunct of modernity resulted in victory over muscle power, the hallmark of traditional warfare. War has always been a catalyst of great change. Modern War not only initiated but also resulted from complex changes in metallurgy, chemistry, ballistics, politics and economics. Continuous encroachment of the military in the non-military sphere is termed as militarization. The emergence of Modern Warfare resulted in military spillover into political, economic, social and cultural spheres. This unit attempts to explain the origin, forms and legacies of Modern War. 27.2 CONCEPTUALIZING MODERN WAR Karl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was an untypical Prussian military officer because he was a scholar in uniform. He proved to be a philosopher in his own right. Modern scholars have placed him on the same pedestal as Karl Marx, Adam Smith etc. Clausewitz fought against Napoleonic France and then distilled his experience in writing. His philosophical treatise titled Vom Kriege (On War) was published in 1832 by his widow Maria Von Clausewitz. Clausewitz’s analysis of warfare turned out to be one of the best if not the best ever produced in history. For Clausewitz, war is organized violence unleashed by the state. He divided war into Limited War and Real or Absolute War. For him, eighteenth century European warfare as practised by Louis XIV and Frederick the Great represented Limited War. In contrast, Napoleon Bonaparte, whom he admiringly called the ‘God of War’, tried to break out of the paradigm of Limited Warfare. For Clausewitz, Napoleonic Warfare exhibited seeds of Absolute War that would reach fruition in near future. Clausewitz’s prophecy proved true but he did not live to witness Absolute Wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45. So, what we mean by Modern War is Clausewitz’s early forms of Real or Absolute War. Thus, Modern War is the stage between Limited War of the eighteenth century 5 Violence and and Total War of the twentieth century. Limited War is also referred to as Dynastic Repression War because the various monarchies fought against each other for making limited gains along the frontiers at the expense of other dynasties. Louis XIV fought for extending the French frontier on the left bank of Rhine. In contrast, Absolute War in Clausewitz’s paradigm means war untrammeled by any obstruction. The objective is to unleash organized violence wholeheartedly for absolute destruction of the enemy. This in turn required mobilization of all available resources of the state for total defeat of the enemy. The aim in such conflict is to annihilate the enemy’s schwerpunkt (centre of gravity). For Clausewitz, schwerpunkt referred to the enemy’s army which could only be destroyed by Kesselschlact (big bloody battles). The French Revolution ushered in the idea of destruction of the enemy’s government. Hence, the beginning of French Revolution i.e. 1789 could be taken as the beginning of Modern War. This process reached its logical culmination under Adolf Hitler’s der totale krieg (Total War) when the objective was complete destruction of enemy’s society by wholesale mobilization of the volk (common people). 27.3 MOBILIZING MILITARY MANPOWER From this moment until our enemies shall have been driven from the territory of the Republic, all Frenchmen are permanently requisitioned for the service of the armies. Young men shall go to battle; married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; women shall make tents and clothing and serve in hospitals. Decree of the French National Convention authorizing levee en masse, 23 August 1793 God is on the side of heavier battalions. Napoleon Bonaparte Increasing size of the armies was a characteristic of Modern War. Between Napoleon Bonaparte and General Schlieffen, the size of the armies registered a linear growth. Under Louis XIV (1643-1715), the French Army numbered 200,000. The opposing British Army under Marlborough comprised about 100,000 personnel. In 1786, when Frederick died, the size of the Prussian Army was 160,000 men. Since the objectives of Dynastic Warfare were limited, small armies were adequate. Alternately, small size of the forces under their disposal also prevented the monarchs from conducting lengthy war for unlimited gains. Actually, the monarchs were afraid of arming the landless peasants and the urban proletariat. The monarchical courts feared that mass arming of the lower order might result in revolution against the ancien regime (the old French regime before the revolution in 1789). Hence, the core of the armies was composed of nobility who constituted the officer corps and their armed retainers functioning as soldiers. During emergencies extra men were hired as mercenaries. They were of various nationalities who preferred the trade of soldiering due to pecuniary motives. Most of these soldiers were unenthusiastic to die for the monarchs’ ambitions. However, the French Revolution changed the ‘face of war’. The French Revolution with its cry of la patrie en danger and the consequent levy en masse in 1793 cleared the path for larger armies. The National Convention decided to conscript all single Frenchmen aged between 18 and 25. This also enabled the Napoleonic government to mobilize manpower on a hitherto unimaginable scale. In 1812, when Napoleon invaded Russia with 600,000 men, his Grande Armee 6 numbered one million soldiers. However, for total mobilization of both the males and the females, the West had to wait till the Third Reich’s clash with USSR during Modern Warfare 1941-45. Modernization of organized violence resulted in the rise in scope, intensity and lethality of warfare. Dynastic conflicts occurred within a confined geographical space. But, under Napoleon, thanks to greater number of soldiers available, war acquired a continental character. The theatre of Napoleonic warfare embraced whole Europe: from Moscow in the east upto Lisbon in the west; and from Denmark in the north till Sicily in the south. Thus, in terms of geographical spread, Napoleonic Warfare was the prelude to Total War of 1939-45 which occurred on a truly global scale. Increasing sizes of the armies and their deployment on a continental scale also resulted in the battles becoming more bloody and lengthier. Battles in the age of Limited War lasted for a maximum of about twelve hours. Combat in case of Dynastic War stopped during night and campaigning ceased during winter. But, under Napoleon, fighting continued throughout the year. In 1813, the Battle of Leipzig was fought between Napoleonic France versus Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary. The fighting lasted for three days. Battling continued even during the night. In this single battle, Napoleon deployed 190,000 soldiers while the anti-Napoleon block responded with 300,000 men. The point to be noted is that the strength of the army deployed for a single battle during the age of Modern War was bigger than the total size of the army maintained by a country during the age of Limited War. One consequence of the rising size of the armies was increasing casualties. In 1809, at the Battle of Wagram against Austria-Hungary, Napoleon concentrated 160,000 soldiers. Though victorious, Napoleon suffered 40,000 casualties. Due to Napoleon’s policy of sacrificing 30,000 men every month, France between 1789 and 1815 lost 1.7 million men. During the American Civil War, the Confederates mobilized half a million warriors. About 622,000 soldiers died during the American Civil War. Since, the ‘Butcher’s Bill’ continued to increase with the passage of time, the percentage of national population dying in war went up. In France during the eighteenth century, 27 people out of 1000 died due to warfare. The number for nineteenth century was 30. Ironically, militarization of the society also accelerated democratization. Frederick the Great of Prussia even conscripted enemy prisoners for meeting manpower shortage in the army. In the pre-modern era, the armies were cosmopolitan organizations. Changing sides did not offend national identities. National identities, however, became rigid in the nineteenth century, during the course of the Modern Wars. The causative factor behind nationalization of war was conscription of the nation’s males, as it was necessary for mass mobilization. Thus, national armies replaced mercenary militias. The notion of ‘every citizen a soldier’ was first introduced in the 1790s by the revolutionary dictatorship of France. In continuation of this policy, during 1883, the German military theorist Colmar Von der Goltz coined the term ‘Das Volk in Waffen’ (nation in arms). While the French Revolution resorted to mobilization on a large scale for meeting the rising demand of Modern Warfare, this process also increased the political consciousness of the common mass. Thus the slogans of ‘Liberty, Fraternity and Equality’, not only generated the cannon fodder for mass warfare but also created ‘homo politicus’. When the states conscripted citizens, they were told to fight in order to maintain the sovereignty of their fatherland cum motherland. While citizens were under the obligation to give their lives for the state, the citizen soldiers in return also demanded political rights. For survival, Napoleonic France’s opponents were forced to increase their armies by recruiting serfs who were given civic rights. Thus, the nineteenth century witnessed continuous expansion of adult franchise in West Europe.