1947-48 Indo-Pak War Fall of Gilgit and Siege and Fall of Skardu
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Occasional Paper July 2013 1947-48 Indo-Pak War: Fall of Gilgit and Siege and Fall of Skardu d) Col Tej Kumar Tikoo (Ret 1947-48 Indo-Pak War: Fall of Gilgit and Siege and Fall of Skardu 2 of 20 Col Tej Kumar Tikoo (Retd) was born at Srinagar (Kashmir) on 15 April, 1950. After completing his school and college education at Srinagar, he joined the Indian Army; being commissioned into Ist Battalion of the newly raised Naga Regiment, on 22 August 1971. Soon thereafter, he found himself fighting the 1971 Indo-Pak war in the eastern sector, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. As an infantryman, Col Tikoo spent a major portion of his thirty four years of service in the Army, on the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir or fighting insurgency operations. This includes deployment in present day southern Siachen Glacier and counter- insurgency operations in Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, Punjab, Sri Lanka (as part of IPKF) and later in Jammu and Kashmir. Col Tikoo also raised the counter-insurgency training school in Jammu and Kashmir which, over the years, has contributed immensely to the success of Army, Para Military and Central Armed Police Forces in fighting insurgency in the State. He retired in 2004. He is a M.Sc. in Defence Studies from Madras University. He was awarded Ph.D. in Defence Studies in 2012. Col Tikoo’s recently authored book, Kashmir; Its Aborigines and their Exodus (Lancer Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi), is considered to be an authentic and authoritative account of the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir in 1989-90 http://www.vifindia.org © Vivekananda International Foundation 1947-48 Indo-Pak War: Fall of Gilgit and Siege and Fall of Skardu 3 of 20 India has fought many conventional wars since independence; it has also been involved in fighting insurgency and proxy wars during this period. Many heroes that these wars produced have become household names. However, these wars also produced heroes who remain unsung; whose stories of bravery and gallantry are not so well known. One such story is recounted here. It is a story of indomitable spirit in the face of impossible odds. This story is about Lt Col Sher Jung Thapa, MVC, whose tenacity, courage, commitment and ability to motivate his troops under most adverse conditions, over a prolonged period of time, has few parallels in the annals of military history. Though his exploits of bravery are confined to the siege and fall of Skardu, the battle itself cannot be divorced from what happened in Gilgit, prior to the commencement of siege of Skardu, which lasted for four months. Therefore, as a background, Part-I covers in brief, the fall of Gilgit, which served as a prelude and set the stage for the siege and fall of Skardu. During the first Indo-Pak war of 1947-48, the northern front saw some intense fighting. On most occasions, even though the fighting was in progress simultaneously in most of the area, the terrain imposed such severe restrictions on the movement and switching of forces, that the battles were, by and large, fought in each sector in isolation. This, however, changed later when Pakistani forces, ably led, turned this handicap into an advantage. The terrain of the Northern areas ( now re-named Gilgit-Baltistan) was extremely rugged and broken. Its main features were high mountain tops with steep gradients and deep river valleys, leading into numerous narrow and inaccessible gorges. Gurez, Dras, Kargil and Leh were its main towns, with Gilgit being the headquarters of the Governor, appointed by the Maharaja.These towns also represented the sectors into which the northern battle field was divided. Due to low mountains on its south-west, criss-crossed by many tracks, the natural outlet of the area followed this lie- of- the- ground; much along the mighty Indus River. Gilgit had another advantage: it dominated one of the caravan routes from Srinagar to Kashgar, passing through Gurez-Burzil or Kamri-Mintaka Pass. Gurez also dominated an equally important route that took off towards east, followed the Indus to Skardu and then on to Kargil and Leh. Importance of this route in strategic terms, at the outbreak of the hostilities, was obvious as Kargil was connected directly to Srinagar via Dras, Zojila and Baltal. There were other shorter and tactically invaluable tracks which crossed over the Deosai Plateau, a table top plain stretch at 4270 meters, lying between Korakoram and Himmalayan Ranges. These tracks provided enough scope for outflanking maneuvers by http://www.vifindia.org © Vivekananda International Foundation 1947-48 Indo-Pak War: Fall of Gilgit and Siege and Fall of Skardu 4 of 20 foot infantry, provided the leaders were willing to take the risk. Another track that emanated from the junction of Indus and Shyok Rivers went eastwards along Shyok River and followed the old caravan route to Leh and Yarkand. Rough and desolate terrain with limited means of communication for movement made these tracks militarily very important. For an inept military commander it was a severe handicap, but for a bold and imaginative leader these provided an excellent means to outflank and isolate the enemy. Gilgit region, which had been brought under Dogra rule in the 19th century, was inhabited by a turbulent and an overwhelmingly Muslim population, distributed in semi- feudal principalities of Chitral, Hunza, Nagar, etc,. In July 1947, with their departure from India imminent, the British terminated the 60 years lease over Gilgit and handed it over to the Maharaja. Brig Ghansara Singh, one of the senior most officers of the State Forces, was immediately appointed as the new Governor. He took over the charge of his office on 01 Aug 1947 from Lt Col Bacon, the Political Agent appointed by the British. The event took place in the midst of a joyous welcome accorded by the local people. Brig Ghansara Singh had the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar and Raja of Punial and Chieftains of Koh Gizar, Yasin and Askoman as his subordinate chiefs. Out of all these influential heavyweights, the new Governor enjoyed the support of all except that of the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar, who were decidedly hostile to him. Their hostility was soon to prove disastrous to the Governor, as 75% troops of Gilgit Scouts belonged to these two principalities. What proved even more http://www.vifindia.org © Vivekananda International Foundation 1947-48 Indo-Pak War: Fall of Gilgit and Siege and Fall of Skardu 5 of 20 damaging was that the Sub Major of the unit (the highest ranking appointment other than officers, rising through ranks from within the men composing the unit. In British Indian Army - to a large extent even today- he is the most important functionary in a unit, next only to the Commanding Officer, and exercises great influence over the rank and file), Babar Khan, happened to be related to both Mirs; he was an uncle of the Mir of Nagar and married to the sister of Mir of Hunza. As if this was not enough of a handicap, Maj W A Brown and Capt Matheson, whose services had been retained by the State, proved to be inveterate foes of the Maharaja and played a treacherously pro-Pakistan game, which ultimately sealed the Governor’s fate. Brig Ghansara Singh had at his disposal 6 J&K Infantry, less two companies, which, along with Battalion Headquarter, was located at Bunji, 54 kilometers from Gilgit, on the road to Srinagar. Lt Col Abdul Majid Khan commanded the Battalion which had Sikhs and Muslims in almost equal proportion. However, the Sikh element, consisted of raw recruits, who were not fit for battle and needed additional training of 6 months to be battle-worthy. A detachment of these raw Sikh troops, numbering roughly a platoon ( 35 Men) was stationed at Janglot. It was ironical that even as local people and Gilgit Scouts appeared untouched by the communal passions let loose by the communal violence that engulfed the north western region of India, same thing could not be said of the Muslim troops of 6 J&K Infantry. Having learnt of the communal flare up in Punjab from some of their colleagues hailing from Poonch, they were deeply infected by the religious passion. Brig Ghansara Singh realized the dangerous situation he was in, but went about his work with true soldierly courage and dignified poise. His repeated requests to Srinagar for urgent help elicited no response, perhaps because his requests never reached there in the first place; the telegraph office at Gilgit was manned by a Muslim officer and the wireless station was controlled by Peshawar Radio Station. To add to his woes, the Governor did not enjoy executive powers like operating the budget or even having an adequate stock of essential commodities at his disposal with which he could buy local favour. It did not take long for the Governor to realize that both the British officers and Babar Khan were upto some serious mischief. But his options to deal with them were strictly limited. He could not call for Muslim troops from Bunji as he no longer trusted their loyalty; and his request to Lt Col Abdul Majid Khan to send him two companies of Sikhs, was flatly turned down, though on purely professional grounds, as they were not battle- worthy as yet. Around midnight of 31 Oct- 01 Nov 1947, about 100 men of Gilgit Scouts under Maj Brown, Lt Hyder Khan and Sub Maj Babar Khan, surrounded Governor’s house. Some of them tried to steal inside to capture the Governor in sleep.