Contact details.

Mr. David Ede.

EDINBURGH AIRPORT RAIL LINK BILL OBJECTION NO: 10

JOHNU DAVID EDE

I John David Ede wish to object to the above bill being promoted by TIE (Transport Iniatives Edinburgh) Limited. My objections are set out below.

1) Tunnel Safety.

I am objecting to part of the bill, the design of the proposed railway tunnel, on the grounds of safety. My concern is that I or other members of the travelling public may be involved in a dreadful accident involving spilled diesel fuel and a severe fire within the tunnel at the proposed underground junction. I would be very wary of using the new railway because the tunnel does not comply with all the 2003 railway group standards and has many other safety compromises. I have prepared a document outlining in detail the extent of the design compromises and I suggest alternative safer designs.

2) Network Efficiency.

I am objecting to the entire bill because my railway journeys between Edinburgh and Aberdeen and Edinburgh and Glasgow are going to take longer and the incidence of late running and delays will increase. I have prepared an assessment of EARL that details my concerns about the railway track layout. The longer journeys and the reduction in timetable reliability will adversely affect my business and leisure activities and will require that I use my motor car more frequently to travel around Scotland (already quicker than the train). The longer journeys for the majority of railway users will have an adverse effect on the local economy, increased road congestion, accidents and adversely affect my employment prospects by limiting the distances I can reasonably commute to from Edinburgh.

3) Sustainability.

I am objecting to the entire bill because EARL adversely affects my future economic wellbeing; employment prospects; property values, and my ability, and that of my fellow citizens, to travel to London economically and quickly for work or leisure. The promoters have failed to consider the dire reality of ever- increasing and sustained energy shortfalls that will impoverish the U.K. economy and decimate the aviation industry within the next 20 years.

TIE Limited claim that in the year 2026 Edinburgh airport will be three times busier than it is today. It is estimated Scotland will have to become 40 times richer to support the threefold growth against a background of rocketing energy prices and oil shortages as the global energy supply dries up. I discuss the mechanisms for this in more detail in my presentation on EARL. The reality in 2026 will be that 95% of Scottish residents will be grounded (it is estimated flying will be 16 to 20 times more expensive in real-terms than today, more so if the effects of energy poverty on our everyday lives is taken into account) and flying will be the preserve of the military and the super-rich. The airport will become redundant.

EARL does not recognise this time limitation and it assumes that the airport will grow and operate forever. EARL diverts the existing railway lines and services through the airport and no new railway capacity is constructed anywhere on the remainder of the network. This is the greatest weakness of EARL because the new infrastructure will become obsolete with the airport, requiring the abandonment of four-twin track spurs, all the junctions and an extremely expensive combination bored / cut and cover tunnel because they have no other strategic value. EARL is dependant on the airport economy and we know this will be time limited to 20 years at best with falling passenger numbers after 10 years of EARL operation. To reduce construction costs EARL compromises railway efficiency. Six junctions will be flat Victorian affairs, rather than being grade separated, and a single island platform will be hard pressed to serve two (already fragile) mainline railway timetables. A combination of junction conflicts and queuing trains approaching the platform will strangle the railway network while EARL is operating.

In my presentation, I address the EARL design weaknesses and I suggest a better strategic alternative. A new high quality 200-year railway on twin tracks should be constructed from Edinburgh Waverly through a new tunnel to Haymarket and on to Roddinglaw. Initially this would be connected to a sacrificial 20-year railway running from Roddinglaw to a surface terminus at the airport. The new 200-year railway and tunnel would afford capacity and gauge improvements at Waverly for articulated duplex high-speed trains. It would help enable reintroduction of south suburban services; expanded national train service frequency to soak up extra passengers as car ownership becomes increasingly expensive. It would of course enable frequent direct airport trains. Haymarket station would have extra platforms. Enclosing and landscaping the enlarged railway through West Prince’s St Gardens will enhance amenity, restoring the park to its pre railway 1830 appearance. Eventually the line will be incorporated into the future high-speed rail network. The majority of this (substantial) investment is where it is most needed and it would continue to generate economic benefits well into the post-aviation era for generations to come. Only the single short sacrificial spur to the airport would eventually close.

Constructing EARL at substantial cost, then writing the entire railway infrastructure off after only 20 years of operation, is poor strategic planning because the country ends up with nothing of long-term value. Any delay to the construction of a sustainable high-speed railway, or a part thereof, will increase the eventual infrastructure costs due to oil price inflation. The lack of timely sustainable local and national transport provision will harm the local economy, reduce my economic prospects and increase my tax burden.

John David Ede rd 3P P May 2006

Retrospect and Prospect

A presentation evaluating the proposed E.A.R.L project and objecting to the proposal.

Contents

1) The future of aviation at Edinburgh. 2) Carbon footprint. 3) Government intervention. 4) EARL patronage forecasts. 5) Aviation summary.

6) The provision of an Edinburgh Airport Railway Link 7) Journey times. 8) Railway quality. 9) EARL summary.

10) Alternative schemes providing better quality or long-term value. 11) Long-term strategic plan. 12) Residual infrastructure after airport closure. 13) Conclusion.

1. The future of aviation at Edinburgh.

0.01) Much of the business case put forward by TIE Limited, the EARL promoters, relies on traffic forecasts from the UK Department of Transport or BAA, the British Airports Authority and no independent scrutiny has been applied to the claimed future growth rates for either set of statistics. Nor have the organisations publicised which factors they have taken into account, and which factors they have ignored in reaching their figures. To rely on such figures and to argue a business case for £ 1 billion’s worth of public investment is a risky strategy.

0.02) The forecasts are based on the past growth of aviation which has shown an increasing exponential trend, especially within the last decade. To understand the growth one has to look closely at the drivers and inhibitors which influence the trends. The drivers in the past have encouraged growth and this, for the time being, appears to be the way forward.

However much this economic expansion may benefit the economy, it is naïve to assume that the conditions favouring growth will continue ad-infinitum. This assumption is akin to driving a car forward by looking only in the rear view mirror! Knowing what has happened in the past is no guarantee that the future can be predicted with any accuracy.

0.03) The Future of Air Transport - White Paper and the Civil Aviation Bill by the UK government raises environmental concerns such as the increasing carbon footprint and upper atmosphere pollution. The report assumes that growth will continue to be fuelled by demand, driven by the market and competition. The report fails to consider, let alone take into account, the severe reversals that will come about as the energy supply runs out. By not accepting this finite limitation and fully grasping the fact that the mass aviation industry will more or less be relegated to history, the report presents a very misleading, optimistic, and unsustainable picture of what might take place in the future. The forecast is unreliable and very wrong. I would estimate there is a 95% margin of error and the long term forecasts should be predicting the rate of civil aviation decline in the future, which will be faster than people would wish.

0.04) The white paper also belittles the impact that rail can have on domestic travel. The paper suggests that upgrades to the existing WCML railway and ECML railway will make little inroad to demand for air travel in the future because both railway routes are running near to maximum capacity with little room for cost effective engineering measures to reduce journey times. Their conclusion is that rail and aviation serve different markets and that it is right to press on with continued airport expansion.

0.05) The report ignores the impact that high-speed rail can have in making a modal shift away from air travel. In France, the construction of the LGV tracks and introduction of 200 mph TGV train services from city centre to city centre over distances between 300 and 400 miles has been an enormous success with demand far exceeding expectations. The lines run with heavy passenger loadings, so much so that 18 carriage double deck trains have had to be introduced to provide enough seats. The business case is so good that the new lines repay the enormous construction costs within a few years. In France, most electricity is generated from nuclear power and this means that the TGV service produces very little in the way of carbon emission. Travelling by high-speed train with conventional power stations producing the electricity is still 5 times more fuel-efficient than flying short-haul over a distance between 300 and 400 miles and 15 times less CO2 reaches the upper atmosphere.

0.06) A single well designed north to south LGV route serving Edinburgh and Glasgow to London would follow the French model and see a 70% - 80% switch from air to rail for domestic travel. There is already strong evidence from the CTRL to London, and the second high speed phase into St Pancras station is not completed yet, that significant inroads are being made into the London to Paris aviation market. If a single high-speed line were constructed between London and the two Scottish cities, passenger numbers would fall at both Edinburgh and Glasgow airports and consequently EARL patronage would fall by an estimated 70%.

2. Carbon Footprint.

0.07) The aircraft design and operational lifecycle is amortised over 25 to 30 years and aircraft like the Boeing 737 have had a long operational career. It takes strong competition to make aircraft manufacturers design new aircraft and once they have gone to the expense of designing and tooling up for manufacture they require as long a production run as possible to maximise returns. Tried and tested formats are re-launched as new variants, for example, the 737-100, 737-200 and 737-300 series and so on with extended fuselages and newer engine design. The basic design is nearing 40 years old.

0.08) New generation aircraft appear at +/- 25 year intervals and typically are only 10% to 15% more fuel efficient than their predecessors. While we think of aircraft as being very aerodynamic, and the fundamental shape and wing profile has been honed to be as efficient as possible, they are actually very inefficient aerodynamic shapes because of the large wing surfaces required for lift and the large engine pods. In order to fly they have to overcome drag and this reduces efficiency & requires high altitude. Each new generation of jet aircraft is slightly more efficient than the last, but the improvements are becoming smaller and smaller as the optimum design is approached and the most modern jet aircraft are still less fuel efficient than the 1950’s piston engined prop airliners, such as the 95 seat Lockheed 1649 Constellation. The older aircraft may have been noisy and ‘slow’ but they flew through the weather, burning less fuel while contributing less to upper atmosphere pollution. Jet aircraft are quieter and quicker but they fly mostly above the weather causing direct high altitude pollution.

0.09) If fuel conserving gate to gate flight management is included in efficiency calculations and the entire jet aircraft fleet is replaced by brand new aircraft by the year 2030, flying will only be 10% to 15% more fuel efficient than at present. (Gate to gate flight management aims to cut fuel consumption by ensuring that aircraft are never delayed in the air or stacked waiting to land because of congestion at the destination airport. The flight departure would be timed to match the allotted arrival slot at the destination and less fuel would be carried)

0.10) If the planned growth figures are attained Edinburgh Airport will be producing 3 times the current level of greenhouse gasses by the year 2030 even if the aviation industry maximises efficiency.

0.11) To reduce aviation CO2 emissions to 1990 levels would require a 50% reduction in flights abroad and a 60% reduction within the UK.

0.12) The threefold increase in CO2 emissions would far exceed the UK government’s Kyoto commitment to reduce greenhouse gasses to pre 1990 levels. The government has yet to act in any effective way to address this issue, though there is a carbon tax on all flights, it is set at a token level. The Scottish Executive has also pledged to play a part in reducing greenhouse gasses.

0.13) To maintain today’s (2006) carbon footprint, aviation growth could only be permissible by making improvements in fuel efficiency and reducing pollution. The reduction in pollution per aircraft flight would enable more flights to take place without increasing the overall carbon footprint. Such a strategy requires a closely monitored change in efficiency. The levels of growth that current efficiency improvements would allow equate to 5% growth over 10 years, or a compound annual growth rate of approximately 0.3%. The current level of expansion at Edinburgh airport is well in excess of this by a huge margin (about a hundred times) and the rate of increase of greenhouse gas emission is a serious concern.

Evidence has been presented, with some credibility, that a combination of con-trails, long lived high altitude aerosol pollution and haze is reducing the strength of sunshine reaching the ground in Scotland and other northerly locations. Summer sunshine in hours has remained fairly constant, but the strength of our sunshine has fallen by 2.7% per decade since 1950 and is estimated to have fallen by 16% since 1900. Scotland is worst placed for this because of the low incident angle of the sun. Our summer sunshine is now disproportionately dull compared to southern locations with similar pollution: a phenomenon called global darkening. This is also associated with the degradation of the night sky with a claimed loss of 40% of stars visible from the darkest parts of Scotland and 90% of stars lost from the central belt where the additional blight of stray light illuminates the high pollution. It doesn’t take too much of a leap of imagination to foresee what three times the current level of upper atmosphere pollution would do in the future.

3. Government intervention.

0.14) The Government would have to act to curtail the growth in aviation or abandon any sense of responsibility, or control of pollution. Taxes, either directly on passengers, or on aviation fuel would be necessary to drastically cut demand if any attempt is to be made to adhere to Kyoto agreements.

0.15) The application of new or increased taxes on aviation to reduce growth would make a second runway at Edinburgh very uneconomic.

0.16) The safeguarding of land for an additional runway at Edinburgh and the impact this has on the EARL tunnel design and construction plans needs to be evaluated. Unnecessarily safeguarding the land increases the cost of the railway project.

0.17) If, now or in the future, the government take no action to restrain aviation growth and encourage expansion instead, then oil price inflation will act as a restraint on growth and it will eventually force the industry into terminal decline.

4. EARL patronage forecasts.

0.18) Projections considering all known factors indicate that Edinburgh airport passenger numbers will peak around the year 2020. This is an inevitable result of the cost of A1-Jet Fuel increasing exponentially: effectively doubling in price every 5 years as the oil supply continuously declines to only 10% of current output by 2050, eventually running out in 2100. The current price of A1-Jet fuel is £0.60 a litre, by the year 2040 the price will be £ 38.40 a litre. Unlike the passenger forecasts by the Department of Transport and BAA, which have a 95% error (and are based on wishful thinking), the price of fuel projection is based on known oil reserves, recovery rates and global economic expansion. Passengers will be far less likely to jet off for a weekend in Prague when it costs them the equivalent of £ 7,000.00 each, or visit the Capital when round trip to London costs £ 15,000 at today’s wage levels.

0.19) Recessionary pressure may moderate the oil price inflation but will drive down demand instead. There is a delay between the increasing fuel prices and a change in travel habits because people will pay extra to continue their lifestyle choices for a while until the price differential increases enough to force a change in habit.

0.20) The increasing expense of air travel directly linked to continuous increases in energy costs and the resultant high cost of living will induce an exponential shift away from air travel. The airport will decline sharply to a very low economic level by 2040 because aviation is a very inefficient heavy user of fuel. The rate of decline will be as equally dramatic as the recent growth rates. The airlines will fight to stay operational but will become unprofitable due to oil based inflationary pressures and insufficient custom.

0.21) The demise of the airport will be of little consequence to the government. The government will have other important problems to consider because the economy will be contracting. Investment will be targeted towards sustainable transport and rail is best placed in this regard. The UK is currently 40 years behind some other European countries in converting and modernising railway networks for the future and there is much catching up to do.

0.22) Aviation as cheap transportation for ordinary people will not survive. Fuel resources will be required for food, fertiliser production and basic transport.

0.23) It is unlikely passenger growth will rise to the 4.9 million by 2026 projected by TIE Limited because of energy supply and environmental constraints.

0.24) A more objective analysis of the expected passenger peak at Edinburgh airport and a 25% modal shift to rail for the journey to the airport will result in a probable passenger peak of circa 3 million passengers in 2020 for EARL.

0.25) If generously averaged over the operating life of the railway project the 3 million peak equates to an annual average footfall of 2 million over each of the 20 years. 40 million passengers total.

0.26) Together the construction and rolling stock costs equate to £1 billion, more so if electrification is included in the tally. Therefore the best case figures shows each EARL passenger costs the taxpayer £ 25.

0.27) On the negative side of the equation 160 million rail passengers over the 20 year operational life of EARL will have their journey time extended due to the railway diversion and unspecified delays due to traffic conflict on the proposed track network.

0.28) The net result of longer journey times is to suppress any general modal shift from road to rail because the rail service becomes slower, less reliable and less attractive due to network complexity.

0.29) The increase in passenger numbers using the service to travel to the airport may be counteracted, in part at least, by the wider negative aspects of the scheme.

0.30) The economic case for EARL becomes weaker when other factors are introduced.

0.31) Global unrest or conflict could see a rapid escalation of oil price above the natural exponential price curve expected for war free depletion. Unrest also negatively affects air travel.

0.32) The taxation of aviation, featured earlier, will almost certainly be increased to dampen demand and restrain CO2 emissions. Additional taxes may be introduced to reduce energy consumption and as a result, the growth in EARL patronage will mirror the changes. This taxation would also stimulate more demand for domestic rail travel to London.

0.33) Construction of a north – south LGV railway with 200 mph trains would reduce 70 – 80 % of domestic air travel in the UK and take away a significant portion, probably 70 % of EARL patronage. The cost per EARL passenger could increase dramatically if patronage falls because of a competitive and environmentally friendly rail service to London.

5. Aviation summary.

The passenger forecasts for EARL are optimistic and unsustainable and have a 95% error margin.

The EARL promoters have not considered oil price inflation, oil depletion and the inevitable decline of aviation.

Aviation growth continues to be proportionate to pollution.

The effect of increased carbon taxation has not been considered.

The impact of high-speed rail to London has not been considered.

The total negative environmental impact of expanding aviation from Edinburgh outweighs any local environmental improvement brought about by a 25% modal shift of local transport too and from the airport resulting from EARL.

6. The provision of an Edinburgh Airport Railway Link

E.A.R.L. Project.

0.34) EARL has been devised to work as a stand-alone project which requires no enhancements to the existing route infrastructure or capacity enhancements elsewhere on the railway network. It diverts the existing Edinburgh & Glasgow Line and East Coast Main Line railways through the airport. Train services will be diverted from both main-line routes to call at the airport and after calling at the airport, they will return to the main lines and continue their journey.

0.35) The weakness of the concept and indeed the usefulness of the scheme is tied to the economic fortune of the airport. The scheme assumes that aviation at Edinburgh will continue to go from strength to strength well into the future. This assumption is a major flaw in the proposed business case. We know that the aviation industry is becoming increasingly unsustainable and that continued provision of airport facilities at Edinburgh will be time limited. The EARL scheme falls short on strategic merit because the new tracks offer no useful additional capacity other than providing an airport station. The EARL tracks are of no other strategic value to Scotland. After the fall in passengers at the airport between 2030 and 2040, the railway tracks will effectively become obsolete.

0.36) If implemented in 1970, at the same time as the rail links to other major European cities, EARL would have had 60 years of economic life. Today, in 2006 it will be lucky to see 20 years of satisfactory economic return before passenger numbers begin to fall away rapidly. A second runway is likely to suffer the same inevitable economic fate.

0.37) It is right to point out that 10 railway tracks into the airport constitutes infrastructure overprovision on a massive scale. Once EARL is completed, there will be eight x heavy rail and two x light rail tracks.

0.38) This overprovision contrasts with a lack of any significant catchment railway or metro system within Edinburgh to feed customers into EARL. The tram scheme appears to duplicate much of the single railway corridor through the city. Instead, EARL is being promoted as a scheme for the entire rail network in Scotland.

0.39) Other cities, such as Glasgow or London have extensive suburban rail infrastructure which afford through journeys connecting with the airport link: connections which encourage greater footfall. Edinburgh has little of such rail infrastructure support to supply EARL with passengers.

7. Journey times.

0.40) Increased journey times and fuel consumption result from the railway diversion and the station stop near the bottom of steep gradients. TIE Limited have already acknowledged this fact.

0.41) The EARL railway is energy inefficient. The trains will be diesel powered; probably diesel hydraulic and braking energy is dissipated as heat. On electric trains induction braking can partially return energy to the overhead line equipment. The EARL route would be more energy efficient if trains ran non-stop through the network and could conserve all the momentum gained on the downhill parts. The trains have to stop at the station, and probably at some of the junctions too and any momentum gain has to be scrubbed off to stop the train. That energy has to be replaced by heavy fuel burn when the trains climb the rising gradients back to the elevated mainlines. At today’s fuel prices this may not be an issue, but as fuel costs rise in the future energy efficiency on the railways will increasingly become important.

0.42) Approximately 6 minutes will be added to all timetable journey times. This is likely to bring Edinburgh – Glasgow journeys up to almost an hour in duration and experience has shown that journey time lengthening is always a disincentive which will reduce market share.

0.43) A maximum 20% of passengers will be using the service to the airport. The other 80% of railway users will be inconvenienced because their trains no longer take a direct route and there is another stop on the journey. Or direct trains may be delayed at the new mainline junctions because of congestion and late-running effects. This may well drive customers from rail to road. Moves are afoot to electrify the Edinburgh to Glasgow railway to negate the negative effects of EARL. The fact that this is being considered shows that EARL does not fit in seamlessly with the existing network as claimed.

8. Railway quality.

0.44) Despite the apparent overprovision the railway has counterproductive elements and is inefficient.

0.45) It is as far away from ‘The infinite twin track railway’ concept as it is possible to get.

An infinite twin track railway is a concept for optimizing capacity on two tracks. The railway is completely separated from the highway network and designed so that it doesn’t restrict its own carrying capacity. There are no intermediate stations on the main line (always on passing /stopping loops) and no flat junctions where opposing trains have to stop and give way to one another. All junctions are grade separated. There are many examples of this type of design throughout the world: some high speed lines and also on commuter networks. The railway operates efficiently in a similar manner to the dendritic blood circulation system in the human body. The blood in the arteries travels from the core to the periphery without interfering with the returning opposing vein structure. In the UK there has been considerable investment on the mainline railways to convert the classic Victorian structure into something more efficient, with varying degrees of success.

0.46) The EARL project has 8 miles of new twin track railway between the Edinburgh & Glasgow Line and East Coast Main Line. The new tracks and the mainlines are connected by no fewer than 6 flat junctions approximately 1 and 2 miles apart, where trains in opposing directions have to slow down or stop and give way to each other. It is rather unusual to see this concept being applied because it is the opposite of most upgrading projects where engineers are trying to remove junction traffic conflicts and bottlenecks from networks.

0.47) Only one junction is grade separated. The resulting number of traffic conflicts at the flat junctions has implications for timetable provision, route capacity, journey times, and recovery from delays, safety and fuel efficiency. The manufacturers of turnouts, signaling interlocking systems, signals and control systems must be very enthusiastic because the complexity of the track will require a lot of expensive control equipment for 8 miles of railway. The railway appears to be costing between £70 million and £90 million per route mile because of the tunnel and high junction count. With electrification of the Edinburgh to Glasgow route EARL looks like costing over £100m per mile. This is expensive infrastructure when compared to other railway projects

0.49) Only the new Roddinglaw Junction is to be grade separated. It is by far the best aspect of the EARL design.

0.50) This junction enables direct trains on the up Glasgow to Edinburgh line to operate independently of traffic on the down line from Edinburgh to the Airport. The junction prevents timetable interference between opposing trains and affords the greatest efficiency and safety for the affected routes.

0.51) The costs of construction for grade separation are higher than a flat junction because extra embankments / cuttings and a bridge are needed. Other costs are lower: Only two sets of points are required and the signaling system interlocking is drastically simplified and considerably cheaper than for a flat junction. Used within good business models on the right route design and grade separation will pay handsome dividends. Earl would work much better as a railway if more junctions were to be grade separated. However the operational life of the project will be too short and traffic volumes over the twenty years will be too low to really justify the extra expense.

0.52) Six junctions in EARL are to be ‘classic’ flat junctions. To be fair the Kirkliston junction with the Dalmeny freight line will have so little conflicting traffic that its effects will be negligible.

0.53) The other five junctions will be heavily used and frequently switched. The location of the ‘Central’ junction inside the EARL tunnel is very ill advised because of the fire risk underground if there were ever a collision. (The subject of another presentation)

0.54) Twin lead junctions can permit a reliable timetable providing the entire network is operated below 70% of theoretical maximum capacity. This maintains sufficient headway between following trains and conflicting trains so that delays do not escalate into massive disruption.

0.55) At a twin lead junction, say the proposed Dolphington Junction, on the ECML with running speeds up to 100mph a complete cycle time from clearing a route, giving clear signals, a train traversing the line, signals resetting to danger and a new route being set at the junction takes approx three and a half minutes. This is to allow for the long stopping distances of trains, which typically slow between 8 – 12% G under emergency braking.

The signals must be reset at least three minutes before the next northbound (down) train for the Forth Bridge is due, so that the train does not get a restrictive aspect on approach to the junction. It therefore takes a further three minutes to set, occupy and clear the junction.

Consequently a late running up EARL service from Aberdeen, crossing from the ECML towards the Airport blocks both the up and down ECML for at least 6 and a half minutes, a northbound Down train from EARL blocks the Down ECML for a shorter time.

0.56) The presence of the junction reduces capacity on the mainline by 10% every time it is switched back and forth between scheduled trains. If the junction is reset for a late running diverging train and reset after passage of the train mainline capacity is reduced by up to 15%. Opposing trains faced with a restrictive aspect have to slow and eventually stop. By the time they can proceed and recover line speed they may too be running late.

0.57) With the large number of junctions in EARL, it is possible to see how a daisy chain of disruption can migrate through the network and escalate. Late running trains may be further delayed, or on-time services may be delayed to allow a late train through, resulting in two late running services. Those delayed services then affect opposing traffic flow through the next junction and so on. Signals are sited well away from the junctions they protect to allow for a train over-run past a danger aspect. This increases the time for a stationary train to pick up speed and then clear the junction. Not a problem at a single junction, but the cumulative effects at many junctions, one after the other, has to be considered.

0.58) Combining many twin lead junctions together within a relatively short route mileage will Increase the potential for traffic conflict and will impose very complex timetable restrictions to avoid train diagrams interfering. Many direct non-airport trains will approach junctions on the mainlines with a restricted signal aspect and this will degrade the line speed average that would be attained without EARL. Visually the EARL layout resembles an hourglass or spider’s web, the inference being that it approximates a bottleneck, or a trap for trains.

0.59) Out of course running (late trains) will be handled unpredictably. Delays or sequences of delays could escalate to 15 minutes on top of the 6 minutes for the scheduled diversions. With electrification this would still result in some journeys between Edinburgh and Glasgow extending to 1 hour and 5 minutes. Without electrification journeys could take up to 1 hour and 15 minutes. Recent claims of electrification reducing journey times to below 30 minutes are over optimistic. With the current intermediate stopping schedule a five minute reduction in journey time may result from electrification. A 30 minute timing between the two cities is possible but it would require considerable additional expenditure on track capacity, junction and line speed upgrades, signaling enhancements and/or a cut in the number of intermediate services to create the paths for non-stop electric trains.

0.60) The faster diesel train fleet or electrified trains will make little impact on counteracting the delays. The trains will only save time on the acceleration up to the line speed. Thereafter speed is governed by the track geometry, traffic density, dwell times and signaling system headway. Acceleration and braking is governed by railhead adhesion conditions, vehicle weight, time of year and the weather. This results in unpredictable performance, particularly on steep gradients and timetable slippage due to defensive driving is common on gradients with some form of restriction at the end, in the case of EARL either a junction, or a station stop.

0.61) Express services delayed through EARL may rejoin the mainlines out of course behind slower stopping services and may never have any opportunity to recover lost time.

0.62) Twin track railway networks constructed for high capacity with grade separated junctions and stopping loops (4 tracks) at intermediate stations have very reliable timetable operations with a low standard deviation of arrival times. Examples include the TGV and ICE tracks in Europe; the CTRL in Kent, Shinkansen in Japan and the metro systems in Singapore and New York. Classic networks operated below 70% of total system capacity may also perform well.

0.63) The Scottish network is intensively used and the E&G and ECML frequently run between 80% and 95% of theoretical capacity.

0.64) Both routes are affected by disruption where lack of headway between trains escalates problems, causing delay migration down the line and large-scale disruption. The standard deviation of arrival times is more spread out as a result.

0.65) The EARL promoters have claimed that the timetable can operate through all the new twin lead junctions when trains are running exactly on time. They have not demonstrated that EARL will not have a detrimental effect when less punctual services, an inherent outcome of working the Scottish network so near maximum capacity, become further delayed through EARL. They have also downplayed the fact that EARL locks the network carrying capacity at its current rate and that it would seriously undermine the effects of capacity upgrades elsewhere on the network in the future.

8. EARL Summary.

EARL will provide direct links to Edinburgh Airport by diverting existing train services.

EARL will cost £750M - £1100M when new rolling stock / electrification is included.

EARL track complexity and tunnel will cost between £70million and £110million per route mile.

EARL is expected to have a revenue life of 20 years.

EARL may loose customer base if a North-South TGV service operates.

EARL has little or no strategic value after the airport declines.

Edinburgh has no metro or feeder network to act as catchment.

EARL has one grade separated and six flat twin lead junctions in 8 miles of track. Journeys will be 6 minutes longer.

Disruption due to delays and traffic conflict may be worse: up to 15 minutes due to inefficient track layout.

Underground Central Junction raises fire safety concerns unless the Edinburgh to Glasgow Line, East Coast Main Line, Dunblane and Waverly lines are all electrified.

10. Alternative schemes providing better quality or long-term value.

0.66) Simplifying EARL to one twin track railway loop on the Edinburgh to Glasgow line would allow for more reliable running, and simple timetable operation, reduced delay incidents, and reduced construction investment. However the scheme is still limited to 20 years of economic return and it retains the need for an expensive tunnel.

0.67) Grade separation of both the new Roddinglaw junction and existing flat Winchborough junction combined with the removal of the planned Ingleston and Central junctions and spurs linking to the ECML removes 5 twin lead junctions and all the traffic conflicts from EARL. It improves safety by simplifying the tunnel. This results in a safer, simple high efficiency scheme that adds capacity to the E&G route.

0.68) The ECML would not be connected to EARL. Journey times on the ECML would not suffer and passengers would change trains at Haymarket if they wished to travel to the airport. The better journey times for the majority of ECML users offsets the increase in time for the 10 to 20% of passengers who would have to change trains going to the airport.

11. Long-term strategic plan.

0.69) A better scheme would provide for a smaller dedicated rail link to a station terminus at the airport. There would be no need for a tunnel under the airport runway. The plan would consist of a ‘classic’ twin track line. The line would run south from the Airport and pass underneath the current Edinburgh to Glasgow railway at Roddinglaw.

0.70) South of Roddinglaw the line would run through a route that would enable later construction of a grade separated triangle junction. Here, the railway would connect with a completely new twin track line that would run from Roddinglaw all the way to Waverly Station through new tracks and tunnels. Increasing the number of tracks into Waverly from four to six and partly reinstating the efficient grade separated capacity lost with the closure of the access lines to Prince’s Street Station during the 1960’s.

0.71) The new railway from Roddinglaw to Waverly would be constructed to European high speed standards and it would be capable of handling articulated TGV duplex sized trains.

0.72) There is very strong evidence to suggest that construction and operation of a ‘stand- alone’ high-speed rail link between Edinburgh and Glasgow would never be viable unless it is a by-product of a larger scheme. The journey is too short to enable trains to cruise for long at 200 mph. Much of the journey would be spent speeding up or slowing down because rail adhesion rates do not afford accelerations greater than 5% G.

0.73) The time saved would not create modal shift away from road and there is no feeder rail network in Edinburgh. The railway would compete with four existing railway corridors that already serve commuter towns between the two cities.

0.74) Initially the new Roddinglaw line would be used for ‘classic’ trains to and from the airport and if properly designed it would also free up existing capacity in west Edinburgh and at Edinburgh Waverly. With other schemes, it would allow the reintroduction of full circuit suburban services on the South Suburban Line.

The current expenditure at Waverly is very welcome as are possible extra through platforms in phase 2 of development. Four tracks limit the number of trains that can access the station. A high-speed rail service requires extra track capacity and a better, larger loading gauge for articulated duplex trains. Failure to address this issue may result in Edinburgh having to have an out of centre parkway station on any future high-speed line between London and Glasgow. Capacity on any new high-speed line will be at a premium and experience in France shows duplex trains to be necessary.

0.75) Eventually the new Roddinglaw line would handle the 200 mph trains. The high speed trains would run on the line between Edinburgh and London (360 miles) connecting via a high- speed grade-separated triangle with the route between Glasgow and London (400 miles) on a shared high-speed line which would probably run down the flat eastern side of the country, thus reducing construction costs and providing better energy efficiency.

The business case for long distance high-speed rail is very robust. Provision of a high-speed service from Edinburgh to Glasgow can be introduced as a by-product of the larger north – south high-speed network.

There is a strategic argument for prosecuting a north – south high-speed line from two construction camps. Building a high speed line between Edinburgh and Glasgow, and then pushing south into North East England at the same time as building a line north from London allows for economies of scale, rapid spread of the technology and engineering skills required, and it halves the construction time of the entire route. The French model of building the line in phases from the capital and then running TGV services partly on high speed lines and then at reduced speed on classic lines to the final destination will not work in the UK. Our classic rail infrastructure is restricted by loading gauge and tight curvature clearance. Articulated high- speed trains could not run any distance beyond the end of the high-speed lines. The disruption and cost of removing the restrictions from the classic lines, busy operating railways, would probably be higher than building a new route.

Prosecuting a phased high speed line north from London without a counterbalance line extending south from Scotland will help unbalance the UK economy further by enhancing travel options in the prosperous South East Region while disadvantaging the North and Scotland who would be limited to classic rail services. After the inevitable escalation in global fuel prices and the loss of affordable air travel there is a risk that Scotland may not have the replacement high- speed infrastructure in place, increasing remoteness and harming our economy.

0.76) The proposed journey times to central London are extremely competitive for high-speed rail and the service; 2 hours for Edinburgh and 2:15 hours for Glasgow would compete extremely well against the airlines and eventually become the only option after the decline of the airport.

0.77) Only one north - south high speed line will be constructed and it must not be constrained as it enters Edinburgh because the one line will have to service Glasgow as well. Good high speed, high capacity infrastructure will be required.

12. Residual Infrastructure after airport closure.

0.78) Contraction of the airport circa 2040 to low level residual activity catering for elite ‘very well heeled’ passengers would make the airport rail link redundant. The alternative rail scheme proposed here would result only in the withdrawal of one short route between the airport and Roddinglaw junction.

0.79) Withdrawing this short line from service would write off about £150 million in infrastructure. This is equivalent to the cost of writing off the G.A.R.L project when Glasgow airport closes. Writing off £150 million for a short airport spur is considerably less costly than writing off the entire £750 million to £1100 million for the EARL project as proposed by TIE Limited.

(The author has not raised any objection to GARL which is a far lower order of expenditure and which fits better into the existing railway network than EARL)

0.80) The remainder of the railway investment made between Roddinglaw and Waverly Station would be of benefit for generations to come because it increases capacity and would be part of the high-speed rail network.

13. Conclusion.

0.81) The aspirations of the EARL project are well understood and many of the ‘great and the good’ have voiced support for the scheme.

“It will ensure continued economic growth, reduced congestion and pollution, while expanding links to a growing airport”

0.82) However, with the best will in the world, the economic outcome can never be what the EARL scheme promoters or supporters would wish. The reality is going to be very different, the skies will become quieter and pretending otherwise is not wise. The changes will start to have a bearing on our daily lives much sooner than people and governments realise. The demand for oil and gas continues to increase year on year, here in the West and in the emerging economies of the East, and we have to prepare for the days in the very near future when oil supply falls behind demand and prices soar.

0.83) Questions may be asked about thinking BIG and the costs involved in a high speed rail network, and whether we can afford a fast link all the way to London. A better question is can we afford not to build for the future? Especially when many of our competitors are already well placed and connected to a high-speed European rail network. London is now closer to Paris in terms of rail travelling time, than Edinburgh is, and this places us at a distinct disadvantage in terms of tourism, our green image and business. The UK government is in no hurry about high speed rail to the North and by the time feasibility studies, business cases, public planning enquiries and route is decided upon we may have run into oil shortages that will quadruple the construction costs. The earlier construction begins, the better for all.

0.84) The alternative scheme proposed here would ensure that public funds invested in the EARL project accrue many benefits, not just connection to the airport by rail.

0.85) EARL would also become the first phase of the high speed railway infrastructure necessary to maintain economic growth well into the future and It would, in part, be a commitment to environmentally friendly and more sustainable transportation.

0.86) In the short term there is currently a need for a rail link to Edinburgh Airport, but we’ve left it far too late to implement a large ‘single focus’ scheme that reflects out of date thinking and that ignores important constraining factors. The debate really has moved on. The size of the EARL scheme and design of the scheme needs more enlightened strategic planning so that we retain benefits from the railway investment long after the airport closes.

0.87) This change to a longer term view may yet attain the best outcome for our future and for the future of many generations in Scotland.

0.88) Please invest in railway infrastructure wisely so that most of the infrastructure will bring continued prosperity long after commercial aviation has gone into decline.

End of presentation. Thank you. David Ede, 2006.

A Safer Railway Tunnel for Edinburgh Airport.

E.A.R.L Safety Leadership.

0.01) The railway industry, as it has evolved and been subsequently shaped in the U.K. is a very complex and fragmented mix of institutions and organisations. The following slide is meant to represent the complexity. In such a complicated structure safety leadership will always require extra effort to be effective.

0.02) After the House of Commons debate on the Ladbroke Grove public enquiry the deputy Prime Minister the Rt Hon John Prescott reminded the railway industry they had to make safety their first, second and third priority. The Rt Hon Lord Cullen PC recommended many practical changes, including updating the Railway Group Standards, and that ownership of safety management had to be improved. In essence that good safety is good business.

0.03) It is rather depressing, therefore, to be presenting an objection to the E.A.R.L. project on the grounds of safety. The design of the railway tunnel for a diesel powered line is without precedent anywhere in the world. The common sense and simple approach used elsewhere in the UK or abroad has been replaced by cleverness and a reliance on technology and procedures for safety.

0.04) Railway tunnels are inherently dangerous places that can operate safely providing the design respects the unyielding, unforgiving and omnipresent nature of the danger. Tunnels should be a simple safe design, and be seen to be safe, especially new infrastructure.

0.05) Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) was established on 1 April 2003, implementing one of the core sets of recommendations from the second part of Lord Cullen's public inquiry into the Ladbroke Grove train accident.

0.06) The new standard dates from Dec 2003 and has 500 Regulations. It is less prescriptive than blue book and it fosters a pro-active and common sense approach to safety issues and technology changes. It encourages a safety case culture for infrastructure and business models. Safety risks managed down A.L.A.R.P. It has been very difficult to track down the decision making process and safety management process that has resulted in the proposed tunnel design for EARL. There is no argument put forward which explains how including a busy junction within the tunnel design enhances safety.

Learning from the past and best practice elsewhere.

0.07) In the days of steam it was impracticable to have signals or crossovers inside railway tunnels because of poor visibility and the need to keep trains moving to prevent smoke build up. This ‘simplicity’ prevented accidents in railway tunnels in the UK until 1991. In the 1991 Severn Tunnel accident Electric signals replaced the original one train at a time token system to allow more trains to use the tunnel at any given time. Unusual working resulted in a tail end collision.

The first example is on the Edinburgh to Glasgow railway. Falkirk high or Winchburgh tunnels.

Falkirk high tunnel has 3 Physical Safety Barriers.

1. Twin tracks & standard left hand running. Two separate swept motion envelopes. 2. No Switches or crossings to deflect derailed wheels or bogies. 3. Track circuits; Signalling and TPWS to maintain headway.

New tunnels, such as those on the CTRL or TGV lines have 4 physical safety barriers.

1. Twin tracks & standard left hand running. Two separate swept motion envelopes. 2. Continuous derailment containment barrier and walkways. 3. No Switches or crossings to deflect derailed wheels or bogies. 4. Track circuits; Signalling and TPWS to maintain headway.

In comparison the EARL design has only 1 Physical safety barrier because of the unusual converging track layout and underground junction.

1. Track circuits; Signalling and TPWS to maintain headway and prevent collisions. All other physical safety barriers are compromised or absent from sections of the design.

Point end and derailment risks.

0.08) Points are known to deflect derailed wheels and bogies and are traditionally kept out of short tunnels with moderate to high line speeds. There are many instances in railway history where the presence of points on a network has caused escalation of a derailment situation into a major incident. The points may in themselves not be the cause of the incident, but their presence frequently determines the outcome.

0.09) This tunnel is too short to deploy effective derailment detection because the prevention technology would not operate effectively and safely at the desired line speeds.

The tunnel points would be unprotected. Points and crossover introduce:

Derailment and accident risk. Risk of non-parallel running. Swept envelope fouling. Collision with another train. Escalation to explosion or fire if one or both routes are diesel powered. Collision with containment barrier end.

Sources of derailment include: Cracked rail; track fault; wheel/axel/suspension fault; vandalism. Foreign object; Tree/Farm animal on tracks, point damage etc.

0.10) Safety cross-overs, a passive safety feature, and operational feature to enable track maintenance work etc. in very long electrified tunnels, such as the Channel Tunnel, or Alpine Tunnels are protected by derailment detectors at the tunnel portals and again on approach to the cross-over some 7 miles from the portals. Derailment triggered signals are placed at a safe stopping distance before the points. This prevents a derailed wheel or bogie from ever reaching the crossover points in the tunnel.

0.11) EARL tunnel safety is not improved by including the junction. The Railway Group Standards recognise this fact and recommend that S&C shall not be sited within tunnels.

0.12) There are alternative locations for the junction and there are no compelling site constraints that absolutely require the junction to be located where it is.

Compromised tunnel derailment containment.

0.13) The junction requires a long gap in the tunnel derailment containment barrier on both the routes where the two converging tunnels form a wide chamber, and where the accident risk is greatest as the four tracks converge to two.

0.14) The unusual tunnel width increases the risk of jack-knife during a collision or derailment, resulting in concertina of wreckage. This may expose passengers to dangerous decelerations and rotational forces as a result of derailment.

0.15) The derailment containment barrier normally provides an additional physical safety barrier if it is continuous through the tunnel. In this design the barrier is compromised and the ends around the junction gap present a hazard to fuel tanks on any derailed diesel powered train exiting the junction and not running parallel to the tracks.

Gradient related risks.

0.16) The long 1:40 and 1:50 falling approach lines between the main-line junctions and tunnel do not in themselves constitute a risk and many modern railways incorporate similar gradients. It is the close proximity of the bottom of the gradients with the junction that increase risks.

0.17) Increased track wear and tear because of the need to accelerate uphill away from the tunnel and the need to brake downhill approaching the tunnel and junction increases the need for renewals and maintenance on the gradients. Runaway trolleys and vehicles associated with renewals should never be a risk, but there are continuing incidents on the network. (Larkhall extension in 2005 being the last Scottish example when a trolley ran from the new branch onto the Hamilton circle.)

0.18) SPADs (Signal passed at danger) caused by braking problems, wheel-slip detection problems, seasonal and/or weather related adhesion problems or driver error. Insufficient rail cleaning and gradient may result in reduced emergency braking effort between 6 – 8 %G rather than 10 – 12 %G allowing trains to foul the junction.

0.19) Communication failure regarding hazardous rail head conditions. A change in weather or leaf fall conditions affecting track adhesion conditions may not be relayed effectively to drivers.

0.20) Risk of accidental through-routing of unsuitable rolling stock by train controllers. E.g. Heavy locomotive with 600 ton freight at 40 mph may experience braking problems. A recent derailment at Haymarket was the result of misrouting and subsequent emergency braking. The longitudinal forces through the freight wagons caused derailment at a switch diamond.

0.21) Defensive driving affecting timetable.

Track circuit risks.

0.22) Lightweight trains with disk brakes have dirtier wheels than heavier trains with traditional brakes: i.e. brake shoes on wheel rims. DMU sets with a low axel count are fitted with track circuit actuators (Induction loops) underneath bogies to ensure the train will trigger the track circuits if the wheels and tracks are dirty. The train can then be ‘seen’ at the signalling centre.

0.23) After a train fire/ power failure the onboard track circuit actuators will stop, possibly leaving the train unprotected by the signalling system.

0.24) The EARL tunnel track complexity requires extreme care when setting emergency circuit clips to protect a broken down or stuck train straddling the junction area in the tunnel. Train staff may only set one pair of clips behind the train and these may not activate the right circuit to protect the train.

0.25) The EARL network complexity (6 Flat Junctions) may result in the signaller’s attention being diverted elsewhere and the train’s exact location in relation to the tunnel junction may be identified wrongly from manually placed clips behind the train, possibly activating the wrong portion of the complicated track circuit. This could escalate to a collision.

0.26) Setting a single set of emergency circuit clips on the track at the back of a train will provide full protection in a normal simple twin track tunnel with simple track circuits.

Collision Risk.

0.27) The tunnel track layout and geometry affords the possibility of accidents and escalation to fuel-fed fires underground if other parts of the railway operating/ control system fail or procedures are not adhered to.

0.28) Changes to rolling stock in the last 30 years have seen a switch to DMU services. Each carriage carries a fuel tank and today a train collision involving a diesel train carries a higher risk of fuel fire than in the past.

0.29) It is important that new tunnel design reflects this change in fire risk.

0.30) Increased complexity of track layout, is more vulnerable than a simple twin track tunnel. A worldwide study of railway tunnel accidents by the DNV revealed that tunnels with sections of bi-directional track had 30 times the casualty rate of conventional tunnels. The junction area of the EARL tunnel is bi-directional because trains run in opposing directions over the junction points and crossovers.

0.31) The design requires stationary trains in the tunnel when a train wishing to cross the junction may be given a restrictive signal aspect while an opposing train runs through the junction. Stationary trains waiting to cross the junction also have an increased risk of impact damage, and more severe damage from a following train if a driver accidentally sets away from the airport station without clearance.

Emergency evacuation

0.32) On the middle two of the four tracks through the junction area there are 10’ wide gaps between train doors and the nearest emergency walkway. Rolling stock has no communicating door between separate 3 car sets and emergency exit is via side doors and a 5’ drop.

0.33) Passengers would have to cross parallel tracks and climb up onto the raised walkway to evacuate. The raised walkway becomes a hazard because it prevents escaping passengers on the tracks stepping out of the way of any oncoming train.

0.34) No provision for disabled, very elderly, or young passengers. Dangerous for all because it delays efficient evacuation and poses the risk of injury due to falls in any real emergency.

0.35) Both middle tracks at the junction have parallel tracks where evacuating passengers have extra hazard of being struck by a passing train. The side which poses a danger varies according to the train direction and route. Passengers may escape on their own, or may be directed the wrong way in a real emergency because the side that poses a risk may not be obvious if there is a panic.

Fire Risk.

0.36) In the event of a collision the powered ventilation system airflow will not match the acceleration rate of an expanding fireball made up of burning spraying fuel which results from an accident closing speed of 80 to 100 mph into the confined space around the wreckage at the tunnel junction. Converting one route to 25k OLE supply and electric traction reduces the number of fuel tanks by 50% but introduces a potential ignition source that could ignite spraying fuel during a collision. Ideally both routes should be electrified to reduce the fire risk. As many diverging routes from as far afield as Tweedbank, Dunblane, Glasgow, Aberdeen will use the tunnel it would be necessary to electrify hundreds of miles of track to eliminate fuel tanks from trains. It makes more sense to sort out the tunnel design weakness.

TIE Limited recognises the risks from fuel tanks during a collision and has banned trains and locomotives with larger fuel tanks from the route. The argument being that 1000 litre fuel tanks full of diesel in a collision would be much safer than 2000 litre tanks half full. The author takes the view that fuel tank size should not determine which trains may or may not run through the tunnel. The design of the tunnel should be safe for all classes of train just like every other tunnel on the network: Electric EMU, Electric loco haul. Diesel Locomotive haul, or Diesel DMU.

0.37) In a collision burning fuel spray from a ruptured diesel tank, propelled by rapid thermal expansion, unable to rise because of the tunnel roof, and rapidly starved of oxygen, will expand along the tunnel and engulf the carriages and wreckage.

0.38) Secondary fires may start, including additional fuel tanks, engine oil, grease on track-bed, luggage and flesh. Temperatures up to 1000 degrees can build up rapidly.

0.39) Immediate fire-fighting measures within seconds (and not 20 minutes later) would be necessary to reduce the burn casualty rate.

0.40) During normal operations at the junction inside the tunnel diesel trains may have to wait at a number of locations ahead of the junction until their route is clear. The powered ventilation system in the tunnel switches air flow one way or another depending on train location to prevent CO build up in the tunnel from the engine exhausts.

0.41) Passengers escaping from dense heavy smoke in an emergency may experience reversals in smoke direction depending on the operational status of the over complicated powered ventilation system.

Passenger rolling stock fire risk.

1840 Steam hauled: Wooden superstructure, oil lamps, stove heating. 1880 Steam Hauled: Wooden superstructure, Gas or acetylene lighting, steam heating. 1920 Electric lighting, steam heating. 1950 Nationalisation: Improved carriage strength. BR MK 1- 4. Electric lighting, Steam/ electric heating. Fire retardant materials. 2000 Phasing out of Locomotive haul and introduction of fixed car train sets. Under-slung diesel fuel tanks.

0.42) Accident rates are low, but the risk of fire in an accident has increased with modern diesel rolling stock.

Comparison of different tunnel designs.

The following slide compares the proposed tunnel with four other concepts.

0.43) All the alternatives offer a higher level of safety than the proposed tunnel and there are a variety of options regarding traffic handling capability. These include a four track option and three differing twin track options with three levels of junction, ranging from no junction; a twin lead junction; or a grade separated junction.

Comparison of different tunnel designs in order of safety.

1) Two separate twin track tunnels: One tunnel per route. One tunnel for E&G loop And one for ECML loop 4 Physical safety barriers. No stationary trains. High construction cost.

2) One twin track tunnel serving only one route: No junction required. 4 Physical safety barriers. No stationary trains. Lower construction cost.

3) Single twin track tunnel incorporating flying junction serving two routes. 4 Physical safety barriers. No Stationary trains. Medium construction cost.

4) Single twin track tunnel with external flat twin-lead junction serving two routes. 4 Physical safety barriers. Stationary trains. Lower construction cost.

5) T.I.E. Converging twin tunnels with underground junction serving two routes. 1 Physical safety barrier. Stationary trains. Medium construction cost.

0.44) Of all the alternative tunnel options the concept with a flying junction is hardest to visualise and the next few slides ( on PowerPoint presentation) walk through the tunnel taking cross sectional slices along the way.

0.45) This option offers very high traffic handling capacity because the junction is grade separated. It will afford fewer delays to trains than the planned tunnel with the flat junction. The concept is not new and all of the underground junctions in the New York subway employ grade separated ‘flying junctions’ wholly enclosed inside the tunnel network. Here the difference is that the grade separation is partly inside tunnel while the junction is outside to reduce the escalation risk from fire.

0.46) The tunnel has been designed with safety as the number one priority. This results in a concept that is inherently safe and the result is far better than trying to bolt on safety attributes to a concept that is fundamentally flawed.

Tunnel safety optimised by reducing risk of accident and escalation to fire: 4 Physical Safety Barriers. (Safety features not in the T.I.E proposal are green)

• Continuous welded rail and two separate swept envelopes. • No switches or crossings in tunnel. • Continuous and effective derailment containment - end to end. • Simple track circuits, minimal signalling and TPWS.

• No requirement for stationary trains in tunnel or powered ventilation. • Junction outside tunnel with grade separation of conflicting traffic- at foot of gradients.

Fire Safety. • Twin track cross-sectional area for smoke dispersal. • Heat channelling roof profile. Heat driven ventilation • Water spray curtains.

Emergency / Evacuation Safety. • Emergency walkways continuously adjacent to all train doors. • Unaided mass evacuation of passengers of all ages and disabilities: • Low level emergency exit, low level lighting.

(Series of slides showing cross sections of tunnel with flying junction.) One of the four alternative tunnel designs that all offer better safety than the TIE design.

0.47) Safeguarding land for a second runway keeps the railway underground for longer and relocates the north portals towards higher terrain. This requires longer cuttings and steeper gradients than would be the case otherwise. All the tunnel options are affected in this way.

Conclusion.

0.48) Should the committee and parliament pursue construction of EARL they must ensure that the proposed tunnel conforms to the best standards of safety and it is my wish that the concerns raised here are addressed by the adoption of a safer design.

Thank you.

David Ede, 2006

Peak Oil: The Coming Global Crisis and the Decline of Aviation By Drs. Alex Kuhlman October 29, 2005

Reprinted from www.airliners.net

Although debated and denied frequently, a massive shortfall in oil production is coming faster than many are willing to admit. Drs. Alex Kuhlman assesses the situation and its effect on the airline industry, and reminds us to start thinking about tomorrow.

In the last few months, there has been increased media coverage about record high oil prices and future global oil production. Inevitable tightening of supply is destabilizing oil markets, which now exhibit extreme price responses to the smallest of disturbances. Interestingly, very few people know that world oil production is nearing its all-time peak, and today’s $60 barrel may seem like a bargain a few years from now. Production in more than 54 of the 65 most important oil-producing countries has already gone into decline, with the Middle East predicted to follow soon. The implications of having less oil tomorrow than we have today are far reaching with a global crisis certain to follow. Energy-intensive industries like commercial aviation will suffer first, followed by other industries, national economies, and the global economy. Ultimately, oil shortages will severely limit the world’s ability to sustain its population as food production relies heavily on fossil fuels. This is not a conspiracy theory or bible prophecy. Rather, it is the scientific conclusion of the most widely respected and conservative geologists, physicists, and economists.

PEAK OIL

The world is not running out of oil, but its ability to produce high-quality cheap and economically extractable oil on demand is diminishing. With great effort and expenditure, the current level of oil production can possibly be maintained for a few more years, but beyond that oil production must begin an irreversible decline. More than 95 percent of all recoverable oil has now been found and approximately 90% of all known reserves are currently in production. There have been no significant discoveries of new oil since 2002. Oil is now being consumed four times faster than it is being discovered, and the situation is becoming critical. It is a problem without a remedy and it is the most pivotal challenge facing modern civilization

ALTERNATIVES

There's no readily available source of energy that can replace oil as it steadily declines over the coming decades. In their present form, alternative energies are simply not capable to replace fossil fuels at the scale, rate and manner at which the world currently consumes them. The public, business leaders and politicians are all under the false assumption that oil depletion is a straightforward engineering problem, but humankind’s ingenuity is unlikely to overcome the basic facts of geology and physics. Fossil fuels allow us to operate highly complex systems at gigantic scales. Renewables are simply incompatible in this context and the new fuels and technologies required would take a lot more time to develop than available and require an abundant fossil fuel platform from which to work.

THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

The Short Term: Oil provides 40 percent of all primary energy, and approximately 90 percent of our transportation energy. For most airlines, fuel it is the second largest expense category behind labor. As a direct result of the dramatic increases in oil prices, the cost of jet fuel has more than doubled since the beginning of 2004. The profitability of airlines was already under extreme pressure because of increased competition, overcapacity and lower yields. Furthermore, terrorist attacks have had temporary negative effects on demand in general and on specific routes, while the cost of security has also soared. Once again, the aviation industry is suffering. In recent news, Thai Airways’ chairman and Thailand's finance minister have expressed concerns about the carrier’s future amid rising oil prices. In August the airline announced it had lost 4.78 billion baht ($117 million) in its third quarter after being hit by soaring jet fuel costs. Only a few airlines had the foresight, courage and required funds (or credit worthiness) to hedge fuel prices. Southwest managed to hedge their price at $26 for 85% of its fuel with profits soaring 41% in the second quarter of 2005 as a result. In 2004, Delta Airlines held positions but was forced to sell them in a short-term cash crunch. Those hedges would have protected about a third of its fuel needs. Their share price has collapsed from more than $8 a year ago to less than $0.70 today. Continental has no hedges in oil-futures contracts this year. United Airlines, which filed for bankruptcy protection in December 2002, has 30% of its fuel hedged at $45. Recently, American has cut routes as a result of high fuel cost, while the outlook for Northwest is far from optimistic with shares having dropped from over $22 to less than $4 in the past 12 months while under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Ryanair hedged at around $45, while Easyjet managed to cap at $60. In the short term, hedging has become a crucial part of business for the most successful airlines.

Click for large version

Airlines with more efficient jets will have a distinct advantage in years to come. The Airbuses, especially the A380, are going to burn a lot less per passenger-mile than other aircraft. Photo © Sam Chui

Medium Term: Within a few years, or even sooner, oil extraction from wells will be physically unable to meet global demand. Prices will soar, fuelled by market-based panic, further hurting the airline industry. In addition, high oil prices will decrease consumer’s disposable income and dampen demand. The number of cash-strapped airlines will increase. The weaker airlines without hedging contracts, that somehow managed to survive in the short term, are doomed to collapse. In addition, higher fuel costs will dilute the competitive advantage that the low cost carriers have. The reason for this is that as fuel cost’s share of total cost increases, the relative share of all other operating expenses decreases, weakening the low cost advantages that these airline have traditionally based their model on. Another possible effect may be a relative increase in short haul travel, at the expense of long haul. The most successful airlines will most likely be the flag carriers from the Middle-East as this region will benefit from the high oil prices, allowing these airlines to go from strength to strength. Emirates have ordered 45 of the new giant new Airbus A380’s, which is key element in the company’s future growth, while experts believe that many Arab airlines will place more orders of Airbus and Boeing in the coming few years.

Long Term: In a worst-case scenario, the long-term future for aviation is disastrous. As oil prices continue to rise, the world economy will be confronted with a major shock that will stunt economic growth and increase inflation. The chief economist of Morgan Stanley recently predicted that we have a 90 percent chance of facing “economic Armageddon.” During the transition period to a post oil era, there may be massive disruptions to transportation as the global decline of oil deepens. There will be social unrest and a strong reduction of business and government activity and very serious unemployment. Eventually, a large proportion of the demand for air travel will be almost completely destroyed, with the risk of the aviation adventure going out of business, with the exception of perhaps a handful of airlines. Once again, air travel will be reserved for the rich and for government business and the world will become a larger place again.

Solutions Must be Grounded in Science: If we want to have at least a shot at changing this gloom-and-doom future scenario, it is vital that we fully understand the problem. It is what some call "an outside context problem"—so far from our normal realm of experience that we are collectively having a hard time processing it. The decline of oil is a certainty and is guaranteed by the natural laws that govern our physical world, and nothing in science, technology or engineering can prevent it. The world needs to prepare for a post-oil era and make huge commitments and sacrifices to avoid a deep crisis. With the little time that we have left, we need a well-orchestrated and large-scale intervention by governments from around the world to conserve the underlying fossil fuel base required to develop and implement sustainable energy sources capable of running countries like the United States—or even a substantial fraction of it—the way we are running them now. With a dwindling energy base, we may simply lack the tools and time to replace a fluid so cheap, abundant and versatile.

The traditional view of economists that the ever-insightful market will solve all problems is a fallacy. The supreme goal in all countries to raise incomes, living standards, and the GDP as much as possible, constantly and without any notion of a limit, is unattainable. On current trends, a country like China will be requiring 99 million barrels of oil per day by 2031, while total world production today is only 84 million barrels. Even present levels of production and consumption are grossly unsustainable with a shrinking energy base. The theory that economic stimulus will spur discoveries, and the market will maintain equilibrium, ignores the serious technical limitations of various replacement technologies. Furthermore, it assumes that the supply side can respond quickly in the short term, ignoring the long lead times required for any new oil projects and alternative energy projects to go online (up to 10 years) while disregarding the huge cost involved in modifying the trillion-dollar global infrastructure that was predicated on consistently low oil prices (aviation included). Finally, fundamental economic theory fails to address the laws of physics and thermodynamics. For example, looking at energy equations, to extract oil from the highly glorified tar sands takes two units of energy to produce three units and its net energy value is therefore marginal. In the early days of oil discovery, this ratio used to be 1:20. There will always be large deposits of oil left in the earth that would simply require more energy to extract than they yield regardless of the market price.

We must move quickly towards global regulations that will restrict economic growth and consumption of fossil fuels to allow the transition to a post-oil era to be as painless as possible. At present, it is impossible to get people or governments to even address this issue. However, to avert a future that is so drastically dislocated from the present, we must realign our thinking with our goal and take radical actions on a global scale.

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Chapter 5 - Scotland

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Key issues

5.1 Aviation makes a significant contribution to Scotland's economy and social welfare. Air services are essential to reach many international destinations for business and leisure purposes, and they are frequently also the most convenient means of travelling to other parts of the UK as well as the Highlands and Islands.

5.2 Throughout Scotland, therefore, many people make extensive use of air travel for domestic, as well as international journeys. This is true in the Central Belt, where air travel plays an important part in improving the economic competitiveness of Scottish businesses and attracting inward investment, as well as serving the main population centres. And it is also true in the Highlands and Islands, where air services provide essential social and economic links.

5.3 Ensuring the provision of adequate airport capacity in Scotland, whilst taking full account of environmental concerns, is therefore an important priority for the Government and the Scottish Executive. Indeed, in the face of growing demand for new routes and increased service frequency in recent years, the Executive has made improving international connectivity one of the key elements of its economic strategy for Scotland. The conclusions which follow have been drawn up in conjunction with the Scottish Executive, which also has devolved responsibility for land use planning, surface transport and a number of other matters related to air transport.

Main conclusions

1 5.4 As requested by a number of respondents to the consultation,HPTU UTHP we have reviewed the passenger forecasts for the main Scottish airports. The most significant result has been a substantial upward revision of the forecast for Glasgow Prestwick International Airport, reflecting its rapid recent growth, with consequential adjustments of the forecasts for the other Central Belt airports. Overall, the forecasts show demand for air travel increasing from around 20 million passengers per annum (mppa) today to close to 50mppa by 2030. A sizeable proportion of this demand is expected to arise at airports in the Central Belt. The revised forecasts suggest that demand at the two main West of Scotland airports, taken together, will be higher than indicated in the consultation document, and is likely to be broadly similar to that attracted by Edinburgh Airport. The forecasts for cargo traffic remain unchanged.

5.5 The consultation document described options for development at both Edinburgh and Glasgow airports, including additional runway capacity. Based on the analysis set out in the Scottish consultation document, the consultation responses we received and the review we have undertaken of some aspects of that analysis, our conclusion is that we should safeguard for an additional runway located at Edinburgh Airport. We recommend that appropriate measures should also be considered to ensure that the possibility of providing an additional runway at Glasgow Airport during the period covered by the White Paper is not foreclosed.

5.6 The consultation document also referred briefly to the option of a newT Central Scotland

Airport,T but indicated that this did not appear attractive. An independent study by the David Hume Institute concluded that there was no economic case for such an option; and the great majority of respondents who commented on this proposal were also opposed to it. We therefore confirm that we do not support the development of a new Central Scotland airport. Edinburgh Airport

5.7 In the East of Scotland passenger demand at Edinburgh Airport is forecast to be above 20mppa by 2030. It is also anticipated that Edinburgh will remain the focus of the express freight and flown mail operations serving Scotland. In the Government's view, there is therefore a good economic case for a phased development of additional runway capacity:

• first, making full use of the existing main runway through building a full length parallel taxiway, together with a new control tower, additional terminal capacity and more aircraft stands. A number of these measures are being planned or will be needed soon to address peak period pressures; • second, making more use of the current crosswind runway for departing aircraft - although this will provide only a relatively small amount of additional runway capacity; and • third, constructing a new parallel runway, probably around 2020, whereupon the use of the crosswind runway would be terminated and the runway closed to all but taxiing traffic.

5.8 The new runway would require a section of the River Almond to be culverted, and associated mitigation measures would need to be undertaken to prevent flooding elsewhere within the river's floodplain, but we would not anticipate any other significant environmental impacts. Indeed, by 2030 we would expect the new runway to help reduce the number of people within the 57dBA noise contour by around 1,000 compared with 4,500 today, and also to allow a reduction in the number of night movements flying directly over Cramond.

5.9 The phased approach described above implies that the crosswind runway will be used more intensively for departing aircraft for a limited period. We propose that the crosswind runway should be closed to all but taxiing aircraft once the new runway is brought into operation. This would:

• limit the additional noise that intensification of use will generate over South Gyle and Edinburgh Business Park; • remove the need for the existing runway, which has approach paths over Cramond on westerlies, to take a greater share of inbound aircraft, allowing noise contours to shrink commensurately; • bring forward the date at which the expected noise reductions would be experienced by the population of Cramond; • remove building height restrictions on Edinburgh Business Park that would otherwise have to be kept in place, thereby capping building densities and increasing development pressures on open land in West Edinburgh; and • allow a robust long-term land use planning framework for West Edinburgh to be developed, by enabling a major investment site to be created on land to the north of the A8 adjacent to the Gogar roundabout.

5.10 Analysis of potential future route development suggests that at some stage it may also be necessary to extend the existing runway to allow a wider range of aircraft to access Edinburgh and facilitate direct services to a range of long haul destinations. We believe the length of runway available could be extended to meet most requirements within the airport's existing boundaries, thereby avoiding possible impacts on the Fife Line and M9. Provision for this should be made alongside the safeguarding of the new runway.

5.11 The growth of road traffic on the strategic road network in the vicinity of the airport has the potential to become a major concern in the medium-to-long term unless action is taken. The current widening of the A8000, rail and tram links to the Airport, proposals for which are currently being developed on behalf of City of Edinburgh Council and the Scottish Executive, and improvements to the road layout serving the Airport directly (including the possibility of additional access points from the A8), should help to address potential congestion problems in the period to 2015. The rail link in particular would contribute significantly to increasing the share of passengers travelling to or from the airport by public transport. Beyond 2015 there may be a need to improve the capacity of the strategic road network as well as access from it to the airport. This will be reviewed in the context of the Scottish Executive's proposed revisions to the West Edinburgh Planning Framework and its planned review of strategic transport projects, both of which will be informed by this White Paper. All these surface access requirements will need careful environmental assessment.

5.12 Our conclusion, therefore, is that the option of a new close parallel runway, broadly as shown in the map below, and the associated development of terminal and stand capacity needed to support its development, should be safeguarded.

ItT must be stressed that this map is only indicative, pending detailed design work and the submission of a planning application by the operator. The map should not therefore be taken to be a formal safeguarding map.T

5.13 The particular circumstances at Edinburgh will require land for terminal and apron development in advance of the construction of a new runway to be safeguarded, in addition to 2 the steps the airport operator will need to take to safeguard the new runway.HPTU UTHP Scottish 3 Ministers will therefore issue an Article 17 DirectionHPTU UTHP requiring the City of Edinburgh Council to refer to them any relevant planning applications within the areas of land likely to be required for the expansion of terminal, apron, taxiway and landside support facilities at Edinburgh Airport. The Direction will remain in force until the policies contained in a review of the West Edinburgh Planning Framework, to be undertaken following this White Paper, are embodied in statutory development plans. 5.14 We have considered in some detail whether these plans would allow the Royal Highland and Agricultural Society of Scotland (RHASS) site to remain in situ, possibly with modified boundaries, but still able to function effectively. This, however, would require development of the airport to be concentrated south east of the existing terminal facilities on land which is mostly in the ownership of the RHASS, rather than on land to the west. We have concluded that this would not be an appropriate long term development strategy for the airport because it will be important to:

• maintain efficient use of the crosswind runway until the new close parallel runway is operational; • minimise the impact on existing passenger facilities to keep construction costs within viable limits; • minimise the number of gates and the extent of aircraft circulation dependent on the parallel taxiway serving the crosswind runway as this will reduce the potential for operational delays; • maintain active gates close to the main runway to reduce aircraft taxi time on the ground, limit fuel burn and therefore noise and emissions; and • maintain a balanced passenger facility providing equivalent walking distances for passengers using both of the main piers planned for the airport.

5.15 Our proposals would therefore require the relocation of the RHASS, by around 2013 (or earlier if that would be more suitable). The Scottish Executive will work with the Society, BAA and relevant local authorities to identify an alternative site for the Society and help facilitate their relocation.

Glasgow International Airport

5.16 In the West of Scotland, Glasgow International Airport will continue to play a very important role in meeting the needs of air travellers. Recent announcements including the commencement of a new route to Dubai by Emirates next year and Continental's commitment to use a larger aircraft on its established route to New York provide tangible evidence of this. Our central forecast of demand at Glasgow Airport in 2030 is around 15mppa, representing a broad doubling of current passenger volumes. However, it could be higher if the recent trend of more rapid growth in passenger demand on the eastern side of the Central Belt were to halt or be reversed.

5.17 The Government's view is that substantial development of terminal and airside facilities at Glasgow Airport will therefore be required, including doubling or more the present terminal capacity. We support their provision and the safeguarding of any land required outside the airport boundary to allow full use to be made of the existing runway. This would allow growth to be accommodated under even the most optimistic of forecast scenarios. However, there will be a need to balance the economic and social benefits that would undoubtedly be generated by the expansion of Glasgow Airport against the environmental impacts that would arise from it. For example, the consultation document estimated that under the highest growth forecasts around 35,000 people could be within the 57dBA noise contour in 2030 compared with 25,000 today; the level of increase under lower traffic forecasts would be much smaller. With this in mind, the airport operator, working with the relevant planning authorities, will need to ensure that every effort is made to limit any increase in the size of the 57dBA noise contour as the airport grows. The aim would be to minimise the number of people potentially affected.

5.18 Although we expect Glasgow Airport to continue to develop and increase passenger numbers, the evidence provided in the Scottish consultation document indicated that, on the basis of the analysis we have undertaken, there does not at this stage seem to be a clear case for an additional runway at Glasgow International Airport.

5.19 In part this is because charter and long-haul flights form a significant proportion of Glasgow's traffic. Charter and long-haul services tend to carry relatively large numbers of passengers per flight, which means that fewer aircraft movements are needed to handle a given annual passenger throughput. This in turn makes it easier for Glasgow to accommodate greater passenger volumes without putting pressure on the capacity of its runway. Any assessment must also recognise the recent growth of Glasgow Prestwick in the short-haul scheduled market. Indeed, given its core catchment area, Glasgow Prestwick could be viewed as already providing a second runway serving the west of the Central Belt.

5.20 For these reasons, and taking account of the principles and policies set out earlier in this White Paper, there is not a clear justification for the formal safeguarding of land for the construction of a second runway at Glasgow International Airport in the period covered by the White Paper.

5.21 However, we recognise that various factors could lead to a different balance of development across the Central Belt, particularly towards the end of the period covered by the White Paper, or beyond. For example we note that there are significant plans for development in the City of Glasgow, particularly along the Clyde, which may have an impact on the volume and type of passenger traffic at Glasgow Airport.

5.22 In addition, we have also had regard to the likelihood that there will be little pressure to develop land north of the airport, which might be needed for a second runway at Glasgow Airport (see map), because of existing land use and ecological designations. This means that the impact of protecting land for the possible addition of a close-spaced parallel runway in the longer term would probably be limited. In these circumstances, both the UK Government and the Scottish Executive recommend that Renfrewshire Council, as planning authority, consider reserving further land for long-term development of the airport, including beyond the timescale of this White Paper, in a future review of their Local Plan.

5.23 The proposed increase in terminal capacity at Glasgow Airport would need to be supported by improvements to the surface transport infrastructure serving the airport. The Scottish Executive has asked Strathclyde Passenger Transport (SPT) to work up plans for a rail link to the airport. This could form one element of a potential package of surface access improvements that may be needed to cater for increased traffic volumes associated with the airport's future growth. BAA and the relevant local authorities, in conjunction with Strathclyde Passenger Transport, are therefore invited to work up proposals for enhancing the transport corridors serving the airport for consideration as part of the Executive's review of strategic transport projects. All surface access requirements will need careful environmental assessment.

5.24 Glasgow Airport also provides an important heavy maintenance base for some airlines. As part of a wider strategy for developing the West of Scotland as a Centre of Excellence for aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul activities, we also support provision being made for the replacement of existing hangar facilities elsewhere in the airport, as these need to be demolished to allow the development of a new eastern pier. We would encourage BAA to make provision for this in their master plan for the airport.

ItT must be stressed that this map is only indicative, pending detailed design work and the submission of a planning application by the operator. The map should not therefore be taken to be a formal safeguarding map.T Glasgow Prestwick International Airport

5.25 In the timescale covered by this White Paper, Glasgow Prestwick International Airport is expected to grow rapidly. It already plays an important role in serving the market for passenger travel, especially in the West of Scotland, and the market for air freight throughout Scotland. The revised forecasts indicate that Glasgow Prestwick could be handling up to 6mppa (three times current passenger volumes), and over 200,000 tonnes of freight annually (an increase of around 400 per cent on the 40,000 tonnes handled last year), by 2030. The airport operator has been working on a master plan setting out how these levels of traffic and beyond could be accommodated.

5.26 Our appraisal shows no significant local environmental impacts associated with growth at Glasgow Prestwick. Indeed, noise impacts should reduce over time as older aircraft are replaced by quieter, more modern ones.

5.27 We therefore conclude that the terminal and support facilities at Glasgow Prestwick should be developed to accommodate the likely increase in passenger and freight traffic once current capacity of around 3mppa has been reached, prospectively within the next 5 to 10 years.

5.28 Enhanced capacity may also be needed on rail services connecting the airport to Central Glasgow, especially as a significant proportion of passengers (currently around 30 per cent) already access Glasgow Prestwick this way. The airport will benefit substantially from improvements to the M77/A77 which are already under construction. 5.29 Recent developments in the aerospace sector at Glasgow Prestwick, including the creation of an aerospace park at the airport, are welcomed. Glasgow Prestwick has an important role to play in developing the West of Scotland as a Centre of Excellence for aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul operations.

Aberdeen Airport

5.30 Growth at Aberdeen Airport over the last five years has been relatively flat due to the decline in oil industry-related traffic. However, passenger demand is expected to rise to between 4mppa and 5mppa by 2030 from around 2.5mppa today.

5.31 Our appraisal does not indicate serious local environmental impacts associated with growth at Aberdeen Airport. By 2030 the additional population affected by noise is likely to be small and possibly could reduce over time depending on future traffic levels and the extent to which older aircraft are replaced by quieter, more modern ones.

5.32 We therefore conclude that there is a good case for the existing terminal to be developed incrementally to reflect the increase in traffic.

5.33 There may also be a need for an extension of the runway to allow a wider range of aircraft types to use the airport and to enable existing users to fly longer sectors with full payloads. We invite the airport operators to reach a firm view on their future requirements in this respect, so that the necessary land can then be safeguarded.

5.34 Surface access links to Aberdeen will be significantly improved by the plans the Scottish Executive has announced to support construction of the Aberdeen Western Peripheral Route. This will ease congestion on the A96, which provides the principal road corridor linking the airport to the city centre and its wider catchment area. The A96 is frequently congested at peak times and the new bypass should also enable more reliable bus journey times from the city centre to the airport.

Dundee Airport

5.35 Although runway length and approach constraints at Dundee Airport impose limitations on the range of aircraft that can use the airport, its London City service has been successful in attracting a local business market. We believe there will be opportunities for Dundee to attract further services of this nature in the future.

5.36 There are no physical, land use or environmental constraints that should prevent incremental development of terminal capacity to cater for demand up to 0.25mppa as and when this proves necessary. Edinburgh Airport is also relatively accessible from Tayside and offers a wide range of scheduled services, many of them at competitive frequencies. Access to Edinburgh Airport would also be improved by the proposed new rail link, which would allow rail services to be provided from Dundee direct to the airport.

5.37 RAFT Leuchars T is also located nearby. However, so long as this remains an operational military airfield, the UK Government and the Scottish Executive believe that commercial aviation related development there should be confined to business aviation, diversions from other airports in poor weather and niche freight operations.

Highlands and Islands

5.38 Air links greatly enhance accessibility for people living, working and doing business in the Highlands and Islands, and for tourists wishing to visit the area. Direct services reduce the need to rely on connections at other airports to reach key destinations - such as Scotland's major cities, London and key European business cities - and reduce overall journey times. They also open up the opportunity to attract visitors to the area. 5.39 The Scottish Executive and its agencies will work with the airport operator and airlines to help deliver an air transport network in the Highlands and Islands which:

• is sustainable in the long term; • serves social and economic needs; • enhances internal and external business links; • develops opportunities for the promotion of inbound tourism; and • respects the unique environmental heritage of each location.

5.40 Delivery of an enhanced air network serving the Highlands and Islands may be assisted through a combination of imposing Public Service Obligations (PSOs), and the provision of financial support via a route development fund (see Chapter 12).

5.41 There will also be a need for infrastructure enhancements at some airports in the Highlands and Islands within the timescale covered by this White Paper.

5.42 At Inverness, the revised forecasts suggest the airport may have the potential to grow to beyond 1mppa, and there are no local environmental or other constraints that should prevent this. An extension of the runway may be required to cater for larger planes and longer sector lengths. Additional terminal capacity will also be required, probably before 2015. Any consequential surface access improvements are likely to be local rather than strategic in nature.

5.43 Potential enhancements at the other main Highlands and Islands airports include:

• an extension to the length of the runway at SumburghT ;T • runway rehabilitation and improvements to the Instrument Landing System and

runway lighting (already underway) at KirkwallT ;T and • new runway lighting, improvements to the taxiway and development of new heliport

facilities at StornowayT .T

5.44 With the exception of Scatsta, these are the largest airports in the Highlands and Islands after Inverness. They are likely to see much of the future traffic growth outside Inverness and consequently have the greatest potential to attract jet operations, which will improve both the quality of service and journey times.

5.45 A programme has been developed for small-scale improvements at their other airports to 2009, and the operator will consider the possible development of Oban and Broadford airports to meet local needs in conjunction with the Scottish Executive and other stakeholders.

5.46 Airport infrastructure and air services operate under the regulatory framework set by the Civil Aviation Authority and the Department for Transport. With traffic volumes at airports in the Highlands and Islands comparatively low, the cost per passenger in maintaining infrastructure is substantially more than at major airports elsewhere in the UK. This directly contributes to the higher fares that people living in the Highlands and Islands have to pay and the high subsidy that is necessary to maintain airport infrastructure. The Civil Aviation Authority has already agreed a number of derogations for the smaller Scottish airports. The operator will continue to explore with the regulatory bodies the scope for further derogations consistent with ensuring the continued safety of operations.

1 PHTU UTH SeeP Bibliography.

2 PHTU UTH InP accordance with the Town and Country Planning (Safeguarded Aerodromes, Technical Sites and Military Explosive Storage Areas) (Scotland) Direction 2003.

3 PHTU UTH TheP Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) (Scotland) Order 1992.

The end of oil is closer than you think

Oil production could peak next year, reports John Vidal. Just kiss your lifestyle goodbye

Thursday April 21, 2005 The Guardian

The one thing that international bankers don't want to hear is that the second Great Depression may be round the corner. But last week, a group of ultra-conservative Swiss financiers asked a retired English petroleum geologist living in Ireland to tell them about the beginning of the end of the oil age. They called Colin Campbell, who helped to found the London-based Oil Depletion Analysis Centre because he is an industry man through and through, has no financial agenda and has spent most of a lifetime on the front line of oil exploration on three continents. He was chief geologist for Amoco, a vice-president of Fina, and has worked for BP, Texaco, Shell, ChevronTexaco and Exxon in a dozen different countries. "Don't worry about oil running out; it won't for very many years," the Oxford PhD told the bankers in a message that he will repeat to businessmen, academics and investment analysts at a conference in Edinburgh next week. "The issue is the long downward slope that opens on the other side of peak production. Oil and gas dominate our lives, and their decline will change the world in radical and unpredictable ways," he says. Campbell reckons global peak production of conventional oil - the kind associated with gushing oil wells - is approaching fast, perhaps even next year. His calculations are based on historical and present production data, published reserves and discoveries of companies and governments, estimates of reserves lodged with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, speeches by oil chiefs and a deep knowledge of how the industry works. "About 944bn barrels of oil has so far been extracted, some 764bn remains extractable in known fields, or reserves, and a further 142bn of reserves are classed as 'yet-to-find', meaning what oil is expected to be discovered. If this is so, then the overall oil peak arrives next year," he says. If he is correct, then global oil production can be expected to decline steadily at about 2-3% a year, the cost of everything from travel, heating, agriculture, trade, and anything made of plastic rises. And the scramble to control oil resources intensifies. As one US analyst said this week: "Just kiss your lifestyle goodbye." But the Campbell analysis is way off the much more optimistic official figures. The US Geological Survey (USGS) states that reserves in 2000 (its latest figures) of recoverable oil were about three trillion barrels and that peak production will not come for about 30 years. The International Energy Agency (IEA) believes that oil will peak between "2013 and 2037" and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran, four countries with much of the world's known reserves, report little if any depletion of reserves. Meanwhile, the oil companies - which do not make public estimates of their own "peak oil" - say there is no shortage of oil and gas for the long term. "The world holds enough proved reserves for 40 years of supply and at least 60 years of gas supply at current consumption rates," said BP this week. Indeed, almost every year for 150 years, the oil industry has produced more than it did the year before, and predictions of oil running out or peaking have always been proved wrong. Today, the industry is producing about 83m barrels a day, with big new fields in Azerbaijan, Angola, Algeria, the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico and elsewhere soon expected on stream. But the business of estimating oil reserves is contentious and political. According to Campbell, companies seldom report their true findings for commercial reasons, and governments - which own 90% of the reserves - often lie. Most official figures, he says, are grossly unreliable: "Estimating reserves is a scientific business. There is a range of uncertainty but it is not impossible to get a good idea of what a field contains. Reporting [reserves], however, is a political act." According to Campbell and other oil industry sources, the two most widely used estimates of world oil reserves, drawn up by the Oil and Gas Journal and the BP Statistical Review, both rely on reserve estimates provided to them by governments and industry and do not question their accuracy. Companies, says Campbell, "under-report their new discoveries to comply with strict US stock exchange rules, but then revise them upwards over time", partly to boost their share prices with "good news" results. "I do not think that I ever told the truth about the size of a prospect. That was not the game we were in," he says. "As we were competing for funds with other subsidiaries around the world, we had to exaggerate." Most serious of all, he and other oil depletion analysts and petroleum geologists, most of whom have been in the industry for years, accuse the US of using questionable statistical probability models to calculate global reserves and Opec countries of drastically revising upwards their reserves in the 1980s. "The estimates for the Opec countries were systematically exaggerated in the late 1980s to win a greater slice of the allocation cake. Middle East official reserves jumped 43% in just three years despite no new major finds," he says. The study of "peak oil" - the point at which half the total oil known to have existed in a field or a country has been consumed, beyond which extraction goes into irreversible decline - used to be back-of-the envelope guesswork. It was not taken seriously by business or governments, mainly because oil has always been cheap and plentiful. In the wake of the Iraq war, the rapid economic rise of China, global warming and recent record oil prices, the debate has shifted from "if" there is a global peak to "when". The US government knows that conventional oil is running out fast. According to a report on oil shales and unconventional oil supplies prepared by the US office of petroleum reserves last year, "world oil reserves are being depleted three times as fast as they are being discovered. Oil is being produced from past discoveries, but the reserves are not being fully replaced. Remaining oil reserves of individual oil companies must continue to shrink. The disparity between increasing production and declining discoveries can only have one outcome: a practical supply limit will be reached and future supply to meet conventional oil demand will not be available." It continues: "Although there is no agreement about the date that world oil production will peak, forecasts presented by USGS geologist Les Magoon, the Oil and Gas Journal, and others expect the peak will occur between 2003 and 2020. What is notable ... is that none extend beyond the year 2020, suggesting that the world may be facing shortfalls much sooner than expected." According to Bill Powers, editor of the Canadian Energy Viewpoint investment journal, there is a growing belief among geologists who study world oil supply that production "is soon headed into an irreversible decline ... The US government does not want to admit the reality of the situation. Dr Campbell's thesis, and those of others like him, are becoming the mainstream." In the absence of reliable official figures, geologists and analysts are turning to the grandfather of oil depletion analysis, M King Hubbert, a Shell geologist who in 1956 showed mathematically that exploitation of any oilfield follows a predictable "bell curve" trend, which is slow to take off, rises steeply, flattens and then descends again steeply. The biggest and easiest exploited oilfields were always found early in the history of exploration, while smaller ones were developed as production from the big fields declined. He accurately predicted that US domestic oil production would peak around 1970, 40 years after the period of peak discovery around 1930. Many oil analysts now take the "Hubbert peak" model seriously, and the USGS, national and oil company figures with a large dose of salt. Similar patterns of peak discovery and production have been found throughout all the world's main oilfields. The first North Sea discovery was in 1969, discoveries peaked in 1973 and the UK passed its production peak in 1999. The British portion of the basin is now in serious decline and the Norwegian sector has levelled off. Other analysts are also questioning afresh the oil companies' data. US Wall street energy group Herold last month compared the stated reserves of the world's leading oil companies with their quoted discoveries, and production levels. Herold predicts that the seven largest will all begin seeing production declines within four years. Deutsche Bank analysts report that global oil production will peak in 2014. According to Chris Skrebowski, editor of Petroleum Review, a monthly magazine published by the Energy Institute in London, conventional oil reserves are now declining about 4-6% a year worldwide. He says 18 large oil-producing countries, including Britain, and 32 smaller ones, have declining production; and he expects Denmark, Malaysia, Brunei, China, Mexico and India all to reach their peak in the next few years. "We should be worried. Time is short and we are not even at the point where we admit we have a problem," Skrebowski says. "Governments are always excessively optimistic. The problem is that the peak, which I think is 2008, is tomorrow in planning terms." On the other hand, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome, Chad and Angola are are all expected to grow strongly. What is agreed is that world oil demand is surging. The International Energy Agency, which collates national figures and predicts demand, says developing countries could push demand up 47% to 121m barrels a day by 2030, and that oil companies and oil-producing nations must spend about $100bn a year to develop new supplies to keep pace. According to the IEA, demand rose faster in 2004 than in any year since 1976. China's oil consumption, which accounted for a third of extra global demand last year, grew 17% and is expected to double over 15 years to more than 10m barrels a day - half the US's present demand. India's consumption is expected to rise by nearly 30% in the next five years. If world demand continues to grow at 2% a year, then almost 160m barrels a day will need to be extracted in 2035, twice as much as today. That, say most geologists is almost inconceivable. According to industry consultants IHS Energy, 90% of all known reserves are now in production, suggesting that few major discoveries remain to be made. Shell says its reserves fell last year because it only found enough oil to replace 15-25 % of what the company produced. BP told the US stock exchange that it replaced only 89% of its production in 2004. Moreover, oil supply is increasingly limited to a few giant fields, with 10% of all production coming from just four fields and 80% from fields discovered before 1970. Even finding a field the size of Ghawar in Saudi Arabia, by far the world's largest and said to have another 125bn barrels, would only meet world demand for about 10 years. "All the major discoveries were in the 1960s, since when they have been declining gradually over time, give or take the occasional spike and trough," says Campbell. "The whole world has now been seismically searched and picked over. Geological knowledge has improved enormously in the past 30 years and it is almost inconceivable now that major fields remain to be found." He accepts there may be a big field or two left in Russia, and more in Africa, but these would have little bearing on world supplies. Unconventional deposits like tar sands and shale may only slow the production decline. "The first half of the oil age now closes," says Campbell. "It lasted 150 years and saw the rapid expansion of industry, transport, trade, agriculture and financial capital, allowing the population to expand six-fold. The second half now dawns, and will be marked by the decline of oil and all that depends on it, including financial capital." So did the Swiss bankers comprehend the seriousness of the situation when he talked to them? "There is no company on the stock exchange that doesn't make a tacit assumption about the availability of energy," says Campbell. "It is almost impossible for bankers to accept it. It is so out of their mindset." Crude alternatives "Unconventional" petroleum reserves, which are not included in some totals of reserves, include: Heavy oils These can be pumped just like conventional petroleum except that they are much thicker, more polluting, and require more extensive refining. They are found in more than 30 countries, but about 90% of estimated reserves are in the Orinoco "heavy oil belt" of Venezuela, which has an estimated 1.2 trillion barrels. About one third of the oil is potentially recoverable using current technology. Tar sands These are found in sedimentary rocks and must be dug out and crushed in giant opencast mines. But it takes five to 10 times the energy, area and water to mine, process and upgrade the tars that it does to process conventional oil. The Athabasca deposits in Alberta, Canada are the world's largest resource, with estimated reserves of 1.8 trillion barrels, of which about 280-300bn barrels may be recoverable. Production now accounts for about 20% of Canada's oil supply. Oil shales These are seen as the US government's energy stopgap. They exist in large quantities in ecologically sensitive parts of Colorado, Wyoming and Utah at varying depths, but the industrial process needed to extract the oil demands hot water, making it much more expensive and less energy-efficient than conventional oil. The mining operation is extremely damaging to the environment. Shell, Exxon, ChevronTexaco and other oil companies are investing billions of dollars in this expensive oil production method.

World: Oil And Gas Industry

- Peak Oil: an Outlook on Crude Oil Depletion - C.J.Campbell

This paper was first presented by MBendi in October 2000, just before the end of a cycle of rising prices and dwindling capacity. It recognised the resource constraints and presented a scenario of the natural consequences, foreseeing soaring prices, imminent shortage and recession. While this general picture remains valid in resource terms, events did not unfold as expected but took a different turn. The limits to production capacity were indeed reached at the end of 2000 and prices did soar, but the economy reacted more quickly than expected by plunging the world into recession, which cut oil demand and reduced pressure on prices, which have remained weak. Most of the points made in the paper remain valid, but an update of the study to incorporate the latest data and new understandings does call for some revision. A new scenario is proposed. The paper has been revised to better reflect current understanding. Introduction This paper is about Peak Oil. It truly is a turning point for Mankind, which will affect everyone, although some more than others. Those countries, which plan and prepare, will survive better than those that do not. It is a large and difficult subject, but the essentials are clear. In summary, these are the main points that have to be grasped:

• Conventional oil - and that will be defined - provides most of the oil produced today, and is responsible for about 95% all oil that has been produced so far. • It will continue to dominate supply for a long time to come. It is what matters most. • Its discovery peaked in the 1960s. We now find one barrel for every four we consume. • Middle East share of production is set to rise. The rest of the world peaked in 1997, and is therefore in terminal decline. • Non-conventional oil delays peak only a few years, but will ameliorate the subsequent decline. • Gas, which is less depleted than oil, will likely peak around 2020. • Capacity limits were breached late in 2000, causing prices to soar leading to world recession. • The recession may be permanent because any recovery would lead to new oil demand until the limits were again breached which would lead to new price shocks re-imposing recession in a vicious circle. • World peak may prove to have been passed in 2000, if demand is curtailed by recession. • Prices may remain weak in such circumstances but since demand is not infinitely elastic they must again rise from supply constraints when essential needs are affected

Background

Peak oil is a turning point for Mankind. The economic prosperity of the 20th Century was driven by cheap, oil-based energy. Everyone had the equivalent of several unpaid and unfed slaves to do his work for him, but now these slaves are getting old and won't work much longer. We have an urgent need to find how to live without them. It is stressed that we are not facing a re-run of the Oil Shocks of the 1970s. They were like the tremors before an earthquake, although serious enough, tipping the World into recession. Now, we face the earthquake itself. This shock is very different. It is driven by resource constraints, not politics - although of course politics do enter into it. It is not a temporary interruption but the onset of a permanent new condition. The warning signals have been flying for a long time. They have been plain to see, but the world turned a blind eye, and failed to read the message. Our lack of preparedness is itself amazing, given the importance of oil to our lives. The warnings were rejected and discredited as if they were words of soothsayers and prophets. But the warning was not prophecy - it simply recognised two undeniable facts:

• You have to find oil before you can produce it • Production has to mirror discovery after a time lag

Discovery reached a peak in the 1960s - despite all the technology we hear so much about, and a worldwide search for the best prospects. It should surprise no one that the corresponding peak of production is now upon us. This simple reasoning has, however, been rejected by flat-earth economists and others with a blind faith in technology and markets forces. Worse still, governments have listened to bad advice. There are many vested interests bent on confusion and denial. It is worth briefly recalling what occurred in Europe in late 2000, as a foretaste of what happens when oil supply becomes short and expensive. The French fishermen blockaded the Channel Ports because their fuel costs had doubled, even though their fuel was already tax- free. The dispute spread rapidly to England and other countries. Schools were closed. Hospitals had red alerts because staff and patients could not reach them. Supermarkets started rationing bread. Trade and industry was seriously interrupted: the cost was huge. People lost confidence in their governments, whose popular support fell sharply. If an interruption in supply lasting only a few days could cause such havoc, it surely demonstrates how utterly dependent on oil we have become. Depletion is an easy concept to grasp. Think of an Irish pub full of happy people. Think of their pleasure at the first sip from a full glass. Think of the frowns that begin to cross their faces when their glasses are half-empty. They know they have drunk more than is left. It is the turning point. Watch them savour the last drops. While they can order another round of drinks, they know in the back of their minds that eventually closing time will come when there are no more to be had. That is the meaning of depletion. We need to know how big each glass - or oilfield - is, and we need to think of closing time, and judge how many oilfields are left to find. We are not about to run out of oil, but production is about to reach a peak, if it has not done so already. When peak comes depends on the issue of Rates:

• Discovery Rate - we now find one barrel of conventional oil for every four we consume • Extraction Rate is controlled by the physics of the reservoir

Demand is driven by economic growth and price. Remember that price is not the same as cost. The cost of producing oil remains low, but its price has to reflect tax, scarcity and control of the main sources of supply. Before measuring something, the first step is to decide what exactly to measure. It is a question every butcher asks. Does he weigh the meat or the bones as well? There are many different kinds of oil. Each has its own endowment in Nature, characteristics, costs, and rate of extraction that follows a general and inevitable zero-peak-zero profile. Each type contributes differently to peak. Some types rise to peak quickly, others slowly. We need to identify and measure each type carefully. It is convenient to identify so-called Conventional Oil. It is the meat not the bones. It has contributed most oil to-date and will dominate all supply long into the future. We may concentrate on it, as it controls the date of peak. But there is no universal agreement on how to define it. Here, it is defined to exclude:

• Oil from coal and “shale” • Bitumen and Extra-Heavy Oil • Heavy Oil • Deepwater Oil • Polar Oil

Natural Gas liquids from gasfields are also excluded because they belong to the gas domain. Understanding the Data We should at least define what we try to measure, even if the database is not up to doing it so accurately in all cases. We may start by asking two simple questions:

• How much oil has been found? and • When was it found?

They sound simple, but they are difficult to answer because the data are weak. There is no consistency in what is reported. There is a large range even for production, which is simply reading the meter. Reserve estimates are still less reliable. The treatment of gas liquids ranges widely. There are two main sources of public data: the Oil & Gas Journal and World Oil, which are trade journals that compile information given to them by governments and others. They are not in a position to assess the validity of the information supplied to them. Another widely used source is the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. BP is in a position to evaluate the data, but prefers to reproduce the Oil and Gas Journal numbers, understandably not wanting to involve itself with sensitive issues that might affect its relationship with the host governments of the countries where it works. Lastly is the industry database, which is relatively reliable, but too expensive for most analysts to access. All these sources provide different numbers. The industry is required to furnish estimates of so-called Proved Reserves in its financial reports to governments and the stock-exchanges. These estimates relate to what the wells in the current stage of development are expected to produce, but say little about what the field as a whole may eventually deliver. The industry has accordingly systematically under- reported the size of discovery. It has good commercial reasons for doing so rather than booking all their reserves up front because it smoothes their assets, presenting a better image. It is not its job to forecast the future. For most purposes, it does not matter, but we need to know the real record of the past if we are to use the trend to forecast the future. Governments variously under-report or over-report, or simply fail to update their estimates. As many as 64 countries reported unchanged numbers in 2001, which is utterly implausible. We need the "best estimate" of the size of the field, namely its Proved & Probable reserves, such that any revisions are statistically neutral. An oilfield contains what it contains because it was filled in the geological past, but knowledge of how much it contains evolves over time. If we want a genuine discovery trend, we need to backdate revisions to the discovery of the field. Failure to backdate gives the illusion that more is being found than is the case. It is a cause of great misunderstanding

This demonstrates how BP reports reserves, failing to backdate the revisions. It has misled many analysts. The large increases in the late 1980s were simply due to the OPEC quota wars. Nothing particular was actually added. Kuwait added 50% in 1985 to increase its OPEC quota, which was based partly on reserves. No corresponding new discoveries had been made. Nothing particular changed in the reservoir. Venezuela doubled its reserves in 1987 by the inclusion of large deposits of heavy oil that had been known for years, forcing the other OPEC countries to retaliate with huge increases. Note too how the numbers have changed little since despite production. But it is not quite as simple as that, because the early numbers were too low, having been inherited from the companies before they were expropriated. Some of the increase was justified but it has to be backdated to the discovery of the fields concerned that had been found up to 50 years before. The failure to backdate gives this misleading popular image of growing reserves. It is widely used by flat-earth economists in support of classical economic theories of supply and demand By no means all economists believe in a flat-earth. There are enlightened economists who now relate economics with resources, and they are coming to the fore. Financial institutions too are beginning to understand the inevitable reality of the depletion of oil.

This shows the effect of proper backdating. The discovery trend shown in yellow is falling not rising. You will hear many claims for technology. No one disputes the huge technological advances of the industry. But, what has been the impact? In exploration, it shows better both where oil is and where it is NOT - thus allowing better estimates of the potential to be made. In production, it keeps production rate higher for longer, but has little impact on the reserves themselves. Note that much of the oil in a reservoir cannot be extracted because it is held there by capillary forces and natural constrictions. The percentage recovered can be improved in some cases by injecting steam and other well-tried methods, but by no means all fields are susceptible to treatment. Most modern fields are produced to maximum efficiency from the outset. This is well illustrated by the Prudhoe Bay field. It is the largest field in North America. The Operator internally estimated its reserves at 12.5 Gb in 1977, but reported 9 Gb to comply with stock-exchange rules. Various techniques, such as gas injection followed by horizontal drilling, were started in 1982, but decline commenced in 1988. Gas injection did arrest decline for one year, but then the decline became steeper. It is now evident that the field will barely make the original estimate of 1977. Nothing was added by technology. This is a quite typical example, with many large fields showing the same pattern. Such plots are incidentally a good way to estimate genuine reserves. Now let us turn to how much is yet-to-find. A geochemical breakthrough in the 1980s made it possible to relate the oil in a well with the rock from which it came. It became possible to identify and map the generating belts. They are few and far between because prolific oil was formed only under very rare geological circumstances. In fact, most of it comes from no more that three or four epochs of intense global warming. We now know where most of the generating areas are. Great advances in seismic technology make it possible to see the smallest and most subtle trap. In general, this better knowledge has reduced the perceived potential, because it shows a dearth of large prospects. In other words, we can find a needle in a haystack, but it is still a needle. We did not need the resolution to find the giant fields of the past holding most of the world's oil. It means we have a much better knowledge of the endowment in Nature than we used to have. Once we have secured valid data on the amounts and dates of discovery, we can use it to project future discovery

This is the so-called creaming curve. It plots discovery against exploration wildcats. They are the wells that either do - or do not - find a new field. The larger fields are usually found first for obvious reasons, being too large to miss. The curve flattens until new discoveries are too small to be viable. It gives a good idea of how much is left to find. There are other statistical techniques that evaluate the size distribution of fields and correlate production with the corresponding earlier discovery trends.

The same applies to an individual oil company. Shell has found about 60 Gb with almost 4000 exploration wells, drilled over its entire history since 1895. If it drilled as many again, it could expect to find only 16 Gb. Other companies have not had such a successful record.

Measurement Measure

Produced-to-date 873 Gb Reserves 928 Discovered-to-date 1801 Yet-to-Find 149 Yet-to-Produce 1077 Ultimate recovery 1950 Current consumption (2001) 22 Gb/y Current discovery rate 6 Gb/y Current depletion rate (ann. prod. as % of Yet-to-Produce) 2%

To sum up, these are the main parameters for Conventional oil. The numbers are shown as computed but should be generously rounded. We have produced almost half what is there, and we have found about 90%. We consume 22 Gb a year but find only 6 Gb. That is to say, we find one barrel for every four we consume from our inheritance of past discovery. The current depletion rate is about 2 % a year. These estimates are broadly consistent with those presented in 2000, but we now take a different view of the treatment of Condensate, including that from the gas-caps of oilfields with oil. It largely explains the increase in the estimated ultimate recovery.

This shows the growing gap between discovery and consumption as we move from surplus to deficit. The yellow curve shows exploration drilling. Note that the level of activity barely affects the discovery trend. It destroys the flat earth economists' claim that discovery is driven by market forces. But in year 2000, we did have an exceptional discovery spike from two large finds in the Caspian and Iran, which had hitherto been areas closed to the industry. These exceptions apart, underlying general trend is down to about 6 Gb, with perhaps as much again coming from new deepwater discovery, here treated as Non-conventional. The new deepwater areas are yielding an early crop of giant fields, as is to be expected, but discovery there is set to decline too.

Depletion A few examples illustrate the nature of depletion. Remember that the peak of discovery has to be followed by the peak of production, which generally comes close to the midpoint of depletion when half the total has been used.

Let us start with the US-48, the most mature oil country of all. It had plenty of money, every incentive with the oil rights in private hands and soaring imports, and it had a large prospective territory. We can be sure that if more could have been found, it would have been found. So what did Nature deliver? Discovery, shown in green, peaked in 1930 at the edge of the chart. Production peaked 40 years later. It is the same pattern in the North Sea (UK, Norway and Denmark), which peaked in 2001. Advances in technology have reduced the time lag from peak discovery in 1974 to 27 years. We are getting better at depleting our resources.

Figure 7 shows the World as a whole. The oil shocks of the 1970s cut demand so that the actual peak came later and lower than would otherwise have been the case. It means that the decline is less steep than it would otherwise have been. It reminds us that if we produce less today, there is more left for tomorrow. It is a lesson we need to relearn as a matter of urgency.

This shows the distribution of oil. Note how North America has consumed most of its oil, and how the Middle East has most of what is left. It introduces the notion of Swing Share. The five Middle East major producers countries have been forced into a certain swing role around peak, whereby for a certain limited period, they can - at least in resource terms - make up the difference between world demand and what the rest of the world can produce. Swing Share was 38% in 1973 at the time of the first oil shock. It had fallen to 18% by 1985 because new provinces in the North Sea, Alaska and elsewhere started to deliver flush production from their giant fields, which are usually found first. It is stressed that these new provinces had been found before the shock and were not a consequence of it, as is so often claimed by flat-earth economists. Swing share reached 29% in 2000, before falling to 25% in 2001 in response to falling demand. Under the new scenario, discussed below, it is set to reach 40% by 2010, which will likely represent the limit of capacity. Unlike in the 1970s, this time there are no new major provinces waiting to deliver, or even in sight.

This shows the depletion of the Middle East swing countries. Production matched the theoretical unconstrained model well until the shocks of the 1970s when it was artificially restricted by OPEC quota. Actual production has been far below what was possible. Even though World demand is assumed to be flat under the 2001 Scenario, discussed below, the Middle East swing countries will be under pressure to increase their production rapidly to offset the decline elsewhere. The scenario assumes that they can reach 24 Mb/d by 2010 but it may prove to be beyond their ability, given that weak prices for the next few years curb incentive. It is worth digressing briefly to explain the impact of expropriation. It started with BP in Iran in 1951 but had spread to the other main producers by the 1970s. The major companies lost their main sources of supply. Had they remained in control, they would have produced the cheap and easy oil before turning to the expensive and difficult, offshore and in remote areas. It would have given a gradual transition as depletion began to grip. But when they lost their main supplies, they moved to the expensive and difficult areas and they worked flat out. The main OPEC governments were left with the cheap and easy stuff. It was contrary to normal economic practice and one of the causes of the impending crisis

Facing the Future

This is a very compelling graph. The red line is discovery smoothed with a ten-year moving average. It shows a clear downward trend, easy to extrapolate, as shown in orange. The green line is production, extrapolated at a 2% growth in demand to match the past trend. The inheritance from past discovery is the area between the red and green lines. The inheritance is being increasingly consumed because future discovery is insufficient, but like all inheritances, it does not last for ever. There just is not enough to sustain growth, or even hold current production for long. The blue line shows the inevitable decline.

New Scenario

Previous studies evaluated alternative scenarios of supply and demand, based on various assumptions of demand and oil price. Generally, they depicted a plateau of production, starting when Swing Share reached a critical threshold triggering an oil price shock, and ending when the Swing share reached 50% of world demand, which was held to be maximum Swing capacity. But as we approach closer to these critical times, we can see the unfolding picture with greater clarity. It now appears that the world capacity limits were about breached at the end of 2000, and oil prices began to soar when it became clear that the historic trend of growth at about 2% could not be maintained. As in all previous cases, the high prices triggered economic recession, although there may have been other contributory factors. A highly inflated stockmarket, built on the cheap energy supply of the past and illusions of perpetual growth was evidently due for a radical readjustment. The demand for oil plummeted, falling 5% between 2000 and 2001 according to the Oil & Gas Journal, and prices accordingly crumbled. OPEC found itself unable to react lest any action were perceived to be hostile to the United States in its conflict with Afghanistan, while the US grand fleet was anchored off the coast of Middle East. Iran and Iraq have been declared enemies by the US President, prompting fears that a new American invasion in the region may be contemplated. It would be a brave man to forecast the future in such circumstances, but the underlying resource constraints do give a basis for a new scenario. It assumes that if the world economy were to try to recover, the demand for oil would rise in parallel until it again hit the ceiling of falling capacity. High prices in a volatile market would follow, re-imposing recession. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to contemplate flat average demand and production until the Swing countries reach their assessed capacity limit of 24 Mb/d by 2010. Soaring prices and growing shortage will then initiate the long-term decline of oil production at the then depletion rate of about 2% a year. Although the model pictures a plateau of production to 2010, it is unlikely to be a very flat one, as great fluctuations in a highly volatile market may be anticipated. It seems therefore that we may look back and find that world peak was passed in 2000, six years before the midpoint of depletion. The above scenarios refer to Conventional oil only, as herein defined. Deepwater oil with an estimated endowment of about 60 Gb is expected to peak at about 8 Mb/d around 2010, although weak prices in the meantime may curtail investments somewhat. The production of heavy oils and tarsands of Venezuela and Canada are expected to increase slowly with the added incentive of strategic supplies in the United States. Gas is expected to peak around 2020.

These resource constraints are all very obvious from even a cursory examination of the resource base and its depletion, which poses the question of why this important subject is not better understood. People once believed the earth was flat. Scientific observations to the contrary were treated as blasphemy. The same pressures manifest themselves to-day in a different guise. We might almost call some of them conspiracies of denial and obfuscation. The United States seeks to exaggerate the world's oil endowment to reduce OPEC's confidence. It pretends that it does not depend on Middle East oil. It puts out very flawed studies by the US Geological Survey and the Department of Energy. OPEC, for its part, exaggerates its resource base to inhibit non-OPEC investments and moves to energy savings or renewables. It fears losing its oil market on which it utterly depends, with its rapidly rising population. Companies conceal depletion because it sits badly on the investment community

The US Geological Survey has failed to live up to its scientific reputation. It has assessed the Undiscovered Potential of each basin with a range of subjective probabilities. It has a Low Case for the most sure and a High Case for the least sure. The High Case itself has little meaning, being little more than a wild guess. The Low Case is consistent with the discovery trend, but The Mean value, which is the one publicised is meaningless because it is influenced by the High Case. This has been confirmed by experience in the real world because the Mean estimate is already 100 Gb short, five years into the study period. Its notion of "reserve growth" is also flawed. It is depicted as a technological dynamic when it is simply an artefact of reporting practice, not to be extrapolated into the future.

Source 2010 2020

NGLs 11.3 15.2

Unconventional 2.4 2.4

Refining/Processing gains 2.1 2.5

Middle East (now 18 M/d) 40.9 45.2

Non-Middle East (now 45 M/d) 38.0 27.0

Unconventional 0 19.1

The International Energy Agency was established by the OECD countries in the aftermath of the oil shocks of the 1970s. In 1998, it succeeded in delivering a coded message. It showed how a "business as usual scenario" could not be fulfilled without inventing a so-called balancing item of Unidentified Unconventional, which miraculously rises from zero in 2010 to 19 Mb/d in 2020, when the identified makes a ceiling of only 2.4 by 2010. Since the identified deposits are huge but constrained by low extraction rates, no one needs to find more. The so- called Unidentified Unconventional is accordingly a euphemism for rank shortage. It is also not realistic to imagine that oil price will still be $25/b when the Middle East supplies 62% of the world's needs. Now, two years later a new study appears in which the mythical balancing item has disappeared, and non-Middle East production by 2020 is shown to almost double the previous estimate. The IEA evidently was influenced by the flawed study by the USGS. No credence can be given to such fluid pronouncements, yet most governments build their energy policies on them. Most companies have to sing to the stockmarket, but the Italian national company is less concerned by stockmarket imagery. Its Chairman was able to tell the truth when he reported "New reserves are failing to keep up with growing output…… My forecast is that between 2000 and 2005 the world will be reaching peak". The French company, Total-Fina-Elf, has also published its view of a peak around 2010. British Petroleum certainly wins the prize for the most oblique reference to depletion when it changes its logo to a sunflower and says that BP stands for Beyond Petroleum. But its executives sit on the board of Goldman Sachs, the bankers. They should accordingly know what BP actually thinks behind the lace curtains of corporate make-believe. What do the bankers say? "The rig count over the last 12 years has reached bottom. This is not because of low oil price. The oil companies are not going to keep rigs employed to drill dry holes. They know it but are unable and willing to admit it. The great merger mania is nothing more than a scaling down of a dying industry in recognition that 90% of global conventional oil has already been found" (Goldman Sachs - August 1999) Actions speak louder than words. The major companies and many others in the industry are merging and shedding staff. They are also buying their own stock. They conspicuously fail to invest in new refining capacity, which would surely be needed if production were set to rise as depicted. These are moves to downsize because there are no major investment opportunities left. Their past is worth more than their future - and they know it.

Conclusions

Some general comments may be offered in conclusion, starting with a oil price

Oil outside the Middle East peaked in 1997, as was easily foreseen. It should have heralded a gradual rise in price from growing Middle East control. But instead there was an anomalous fall. Price collapsed in 1998 because of the interaction of warm weather, an Asian recession, the devaluation of the rouble, events in Iraq, false supply estimates by the IEA that prompted higher OPEC production and perhaps some manipulation by insiders. Then, prices surged through 1999 in a staggering 300% increase, as the underlying capacity limits were breached, triggering recession. Demand fell and prices slumped. Spare capacity can mean many things. A closed flowing well is the only form of spare capacity that can be restored at will. All the other elements take investment, work and, above all, time to deliver. OPEC had very little operational spare capacity, having to run ever faster to stand still, as it desperately tried to offset the natural decline of its ageing fields. It will be hard pressed to meet the demands made upon it even to maintain current world production, never mind growth. We may look back and find that the year 2000 was the peak: a turning point when the prosperity of the past, driven by an abundant supply of cheap oil-based energy, gave way to decline in the future. A discontinuity of this magnitude is hard to grasp. The poor countries of the world will bear most of the burden. But the United States will be in serious difficulties. There is a danger of some ill-considered military intervention to try to secure oil, of which the Afghan War may have been a foretaste. That affair may be seen to have been more of an act of defiance to impose global economic hegemony by military means than a calculated action to reduce the level of so-called terrorism. The growing population pressures from declining wealth are manifested in new migration trends as are already being felt in Europe and the United States with human smuggling becoming a gruesome addition to the global market. As global order disintegrates, self-sufficiency at the local level may become a priority for survival. An oil crisis is bad for politicians. Blaming OPEC or the oil companies will not wash much longer. It would be better to make a proper analysis of the true position and inform the people at large. No one blames the government for an earthquake. So they wouldn't blame it for an oil crisis either, if they realised it was a natural phenomenon. "If you don't deal with reality, reality will deal with you" But let us not be too alarmist. The roof does not fall in at peak. What changes are people's perceptions, as they come to realise that the growth of the past is set to become the decline of the future. It may herald the end of the US economic and cultural hegemony - which some people might think was no bad thing. Climate concerns may recede as the emissions, held responsible for change, dwindle. In the face of these pressures, we should use our current high oil supply intelligently while it lasts to ease the transition. For example, much more efficient vehicles have already been designed, awaiting only a mass market to be introduced. More could be done to penalise the wasteful use of energy. Peak oil is a turning point for Mankind, when a hundred years of easy growth ends. The population may be about to peak too for not unrelated reasons. The transition to decline is a period of great tension when priorities shift to self- sufficiency and sustainability. It may end up a better world, freed from the widespread gross excesses of to-day.

Total Energy Source UK dept of Energy TABLE 1.1. Indigenous production of primary fuels Million tonnes of oil equivalent Primary electricity Total Coal Petroleum Natural gas Nuclear Wind and natural flow hydro

1995 269.7 34.1 142.7 71.2 21.25 0.45 1996 281.7 32.5 142.1 84.6 22.18 0.33 1997 280.9 31.7 140.4 86.4 21.98 0.42 1998 287.1 27.3 145.1 90.8 23.44 0.52 1999 297.5 24.7 150.2 99.9 22.22 0.53 2000 288.7 21.0 138.3 109.3 19.64 0.52 2001 277.4 21.5 127.8 106.9 20.8 0.43 2002 272.9 20.5 127.0 104.7 20.1 0.5 2003 260.4 19.5 116.3 104.2 20.0 0.4 2004 238.4 17.5 104.5 97.5 18.3 0.5

Table from UK Dept of Energy showing date of Peak oil and Gas production from North Sea.

FIRE! What’s Wrong With Our B******* Trains Today? by Ray State

The accidents in Norway on 4 January, 2000 and at Paddington on 5 October have produced a new fear, especially to accident watchers in Britain and on the Continent, which is the emergence of FIRE.

In the 19th century the use of oil lamps in passenger trains which could spill in the event of an accident presented an all too present risk of fires starting in collision damaged or overturned coaches. Later oil gave way to gas and this proved even more lethal with a photo: BBC gas-fed fire causing the highest death toll in the history of accident FIRE! Head-on collision at on Britain’s railways. This was at Quintinshill, near Gretna Green in Aasta station, near Elverum, 1915 when 225 were killed at. Norway

This terrible accident spurred the introduction of electric lighting and serious fires were drastically reduced. A spate of spark and cigarette related fires after the second world war at Beattock (1950) and at Huntingdon (1951) indicated that care still had been taken over fire-proofing interior materials and this was again emphasised in the sleeper train fire at Taunton in 1978.

Despite the latter incidents, fires following accidents on passenger trains since the global introduction of electric lighting have been comparatively rare. So what has happened to change this?

While attention to interiors has meant the use of fire-proof paints, upholstery and finishes, the drive for economies has meant that, trains have to remain longer in service between maintenance or servicing visits. This means that, for diesel powered trains, the fuel carried has to be drastically increased.

During the modernisation of British Railways in the early 1960’s the design of diesel equipment and the retention of features such as steam heating meant that there was little spare space and fuel tanks were small. In addition, tanks were tucked up high under the body or even inside the locomotive body itself. Thus in the event of collision or derailment the chance of spillage was greatly reduced. Nevertheless, the propensity for diesel oil to burst into flame on collision was demonstrated in 1984 during the staged collision between a class 46 locomotive and a nuclear flask on the Old Dalby test track. Despite having in-board tanks and the fuel kept at only a few gallons the locomotive erupted in a sheet of flame at the point of collision.

After the activity of modernisation, new diesel orders stagnated until the onset of the 1980’s when the High Speed Trains (HST) were built. The advent of electric heating meant the size of the fuel tanks could be increased giving increased range between fuelling. Largely, these trains have operated without problem but the shape of things to come was evident in the incident at Maidenhead on the 8th September 1995. Here, a evening rush-hour train leaving London lost a fuel tank when the mounting bolts failed. The fuel immediately ignited but because the train was travelling fast it was thinly distributed along the train and on the track. Although it looked fierce there was no penetration of fire into the passenger compartment (although there was plenty of smoke). Nevertheless, the smoke caused an evacuation of the train in which one person was unfortunately killed by a passing train.

Following the HST’s, the next big order was for replacement of the ageing first-generation Diesel Multiple Units. The class 150 were introduced from 1984 and with the smaller but powerful Cummins engine, air brakes and longer bodies there was space for a larger fuel tank. The amount of fuel carried now almost doubled and even worse, tanks now extended to the limit of the loading gauge. This not only meant that there was more fuel to spill but the tanks were more vulnerable to puncture.

This practice was carried through on all subsequent builds including the Turbostar class 165 and 166 now with Perkins engines. It was one of the latter which was involved in the Ladbroke Grove accident.

In the US fuel carried by the larger locomotives is nearly double FIRE! Ladbroke Grove, that of European locomotives. The effect of this is apparent in the Paddington disproportionate number of fires which accompany a collision. The Federal Rail Authority (FRA) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have been seriously concerned by this development and solutions are being sought. To date no lasting answers have been found.

Like Beattie’s battlecruisers of the first World War, "armour" has been sacrificed on Europe’s trains for range and maintenance economy. It may take another Hood before the problem is solved.

During the Battle of Jutland the British battlecruisers being heavily armed but lightly armoured were found to be vulnerable to a plunging shot from the enemy and two were sunk leading Admiral Beattie to cry in despair "What’s wrong with our B***** ships today". In reality the decision to sacrifice armour to obtain speed left the battlecruiser with little protection over the magazine behind B turret. Nor was the lesson completely learnt as the Hood was later built to the same design and suffered an identical end at the hands of the Bismarck in 1940.