ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT NO. 117 JANUARY 2004 INSIDE DEMOCRACY: Japanese Political Reform: SHIN’ICHI KITAOKA Japan’s Dysfunctional Progress in Process Democracy page 6 ABSTRACT: The six contributors to this Special Report are cautiously optimistic about the ROBERT PEKKANEN future of Japanese political reform. Sudden transformation is unlikely, but such factors as gen- Sources of Policy Innovation erational change and the slow cumulative impact of electoral and bureaucratic reforms are grad- in Japanese Democracy ually contributing to a more open and innovative system. These essays focus not on the elec- torate, but on the leaders—politicians and bureaucrats—and how their choices are shaped by page 9 education, age, foreign pressure, American example, and the decade-old electoral system to LEADERSHIP: which they are still adapting. The expansion of civil society and shifting perceptions of “leader- RICHARD J. SAMUELS ship” are also highlighted as important developments of the 1990s. Generational Change and Japanese Leadership Introduction None of the six essayists in this report are page 16 pessimistic about Japan’s future, but transform- Amy McCreedy VERENA BLECHINGER-TALCOTT ing political institutions will involve consider- apanese politics appear to be stuck. able uncertainty and dislocation. On the eco- Learning to Lead: Incentives Deregulation proceeds slowly, and bad nomic side, a system that allows innovation will and Disincentives for loans continue to clot the country’s eco- also permit bankruptcy and job loss. On the Leadership in Japanese J nomic arteries. The government seems unable political side, the dangers are demagoguery and Politics to set priorities, work toward goals, or imple- instability. But if, as these essays suggest, the page 20 ment meaningful policies. Though many com- country can gradually advance from the “poli- mentators point to watershed developments in tics of consensus” deplored by Shin’ichi Kitaoka BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS: the 1990s—the end of stable, one-party majori- in the first paper to the culture of creativity MICHIO MURAMATSU ties and the fatal crippling of the factional sys- desired by Junko Kato in the last, Japan will An Arthritic Japan? The tem, for example—these shifts involved have accomplished a transformation in gover- Relationship between destruction but not creation. Where can we nance almost as impressive as its past economic Politicians and Bureaucrats look for positive change in Japan? If the politi- and educational achievements. page 26 cal system that served Japan well through decades of growth is no longer appropriate, ELECTORAL AND OTHER POLITICAL JUNKO KATO where will the dynamism come from? REFORMS Reforming the Japanese The six authors in this Special Report par- Bureaucracy: Perceptions, ticipated in two symposia sponsored by the Asia One of the main sources of change discussed in Potential and Pitfalls Program in 2003. They examine how the this report is the electoral reform of 1994, the page 34 Japanese system has changed in the 1990s and most ambitious attempt at political engineering offer some suggestions for improving gover- since the U.S. occupation.The introduction of nance. According to the authors in this report, single-member (“first past the post”) districts the key issue is innovation. Not only does Japan was supposed to encourage candidates to square need new policy ideas, but must open the sys- off on policy issues and end one-party domi- tem to allow experimentation—in the parties, nance.The effectiveness of the reforms is debat- the bureaucracy and the country at large. ed among Japan scholars, and certainly change Amy McCreedy is program associate in the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program. ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT has been slower than many hoped. In this report, four the notorious factions, perhaps) can come to play essays address directly how the new system is new roles. Though Koizumi pledged to change encouraging new types of political behavior. Japan by changing the LDP, it will probably take a According to Michio Muramatsu, “At a minimum, major political realignment and a new ruling party parliamentarians will be less likely to tie themselves to bring out the full effect of electoral reform. to specific interests than when the multiple-member Kitaoka relates electoral reform not only to district system existed. Generally, the system domestic policy,but also to foreign affairs. He points makes election promises more meaningful, strength- out that the 1994 reforms have weakened the ens the top leadership, and relaxes the grip of factions Socialist Party.Therefore, the Socialists’ support for on political power.” Shin’ichi Kitaoka maintains that unarmed neutrality has less obstructionist clout than “In the new system, parties with extreme ideologies in the past, enabling Japan to involve itself in over- or narrow power bases are less likely to win.”Verena seas peacekeeping operations and to pass the special Blechinger-Talcott describes how candidates no measures law for dispatching Self-Defense Forces to 2 longer focus on specialized groups of longtime sup- Iraq. porters; in a single-member district they need to The introduction of single-member districts is appeal to a larger spectrum of voters to maximize not the only major change to Japan’s political system their chances of electoral victory. The result, she in recent years. Muramatsu mentions the increased concludes, is less pork and more professionalism. involvement of local party chapters in choosing the Robert Pekkanen pays particular attention to the LDP president.Thus Koizumi achieved a surprise 1994 reforms, but is less optimistic about their victory in 2001 in spite of belonging to the LDP’s impact. Drawing on his research with Ellis Krauss, smallest faction. Muramatsu points out the he points out that many unhealthy features of the “Koizumi paradox”: many rank-and-file members, pre-1994 system are showing surprising staying beholden to vested interests, dislike Koizumi’s power. For example, single-member districts were reform platform—but need to be seen shaking his supposed to encourage candidates to compete on hand to win their own electoral races. policy issues and to eliminate the “personal vote.”In fact, koenkai—support groups through which the GENERATIONAL CHANGE personal vote is channeled—are still active in Japan. Koenkai membership has decreased only slightly, Politicians may focus on election cycles, but many despite public disaffection with politics. Pekkanen’s Japan observers tend to think in terms of genera- point is not that the system doesn’t change, but that tions. Many of these essays anticipate that future reform’s effects are unpredictable. Old features (even political leaders will conduct themselves quite dif- ferently than their predecessors, with a general trend toward openness and accountability. THE ASIA PROGRAM Richard Samuels gives the example of a new group of young Diet members (Wakate Giin no Kai) The Wilson Center’s Asia Program is dedicated to the proposi- tion that only those with a sound scholarly grounding can begin who seek to “establish a security system for the new to understand contemporary events. One of the Center’s oldest century.” Like Kitaoka, Samuels sees pacifism’s regional programs, the Asia Program seeks to bring historical decline as healthy, part of the larger break with the and cultural sensitivity to the discussion of Asia in the nation’s postwar political system. He points out that the capital. In seminars, workshops, briefings, and conferences, Wakate Giin no Kai crosses party lines, and that prominent scholars of Asia interact with one another and with policy practitioners to further understanding of the peoples, tra- younger politicians are generally supportive of con- ditions, and behaviors of the world’s most populous continent. stitutional reform. Another instance of generational change that Samuels mentions is the revision of the Asia Program Staff: Communist Party’s manifesto. Under a new,younger Robert M. Hathaway, Director Gang Lin, Program Associate leader, the Communists have dropped ideas of Amy McCreedy, Program Associate “socialist revolution” and thus may eventually be Wilson Lee, Program Assistant able to merge with other left-wing parties. Samuels’ Timothy R. Hildebrandt, Program Assistant essay focuses on leadership and points out that JAPANESE POLITICAL REFORM: PROGRESS IN PROCESS “Japanese leadership was not always an oxymoron.” Muramatsu’s data also shows. The percentage of Japan has a rich tradition of strong leaders such as bureaucrats who perceive their influence as declin- postwar Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida.Lately, the ing has climbed steadily from 19 percent in the “muscle” of leadership has atrophied, but a future 1970s to 73 percent last year. While Muramatsu’s inspirational leader will likely draw on symbols of data reflect perceived (not actual) declines in influ- the past—“what the people already know and love.” ence, bureaucratic pessimism may help give politi- Verena Blechinger-Talcott also focuses on leader- cians the upper hand on a whole variety of issues. ship and generational change. According to her, the Interestingly, this loss of assurance well predates the up and coming generation of leaders is trained and biggest scandals of the 1990s, such as the HIV-taint- prepared in new ways, through policy-oriented and ed blood fiasco, which are credited with destroying overseas education.The generation in their 30s and the bureaucracy’s reputation in society. 40s is ready, even more than Koizumi, to meet the Junko Kato describes the 2001 bureaucratic demands of a changed electoral environment in reforms—which merged 22 ministries into 12 and which urban districts are increasingly important. bolstered the power of the prime minister and the 3 While Pekkanen stresses continuity and the persist- cabinet office—as the most ambitious in Japan’s ence of koenkai, Blechinger-Talcott maintains that,at postwar history.The reforms have enhanced political least in urban districts,“to establish a stable, efficient control over the ministries and agencies, through, personal support group is almost impossible.” New for example, doubling the number of appointees.