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Ing in the Gray Zone Operating in the Gray Zone Countering Iran’s Asymmetric Way of War Michael Eisenstadt Operating in the Gray Zone Countering Iran’s Asymmetric Way of War Michael Eisenstadt THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org Policy Focus 162 First publication: January 2020 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2020 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1111 19th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington DC 20036 www.washingtoninstitute.org Design by Sensical Design & Communication Cover image by Yarr65/Shutterstock Contents Acknowledgments iv Author’s Note: The Killing of Qasem Soleimani—Avoiding Escalation and a Broader Conflict v Executive Summary vii 1. Introduction 1 2. Defining Gray Zone, Asymmetric, and Hybrid Warfare 5 3. Iran’s Gray Zone Strategy 13 4. Toward a U.S. Gray Zone Strategy 26 5. Conclusion 37 Appendix: Asymmetry in Iran’s Gray Zone Operations 39 iii Acknowledgments he author would like to thank Omer Carmi, Frank Hoffman, Michael Knights, Patrick Clawson, and Assaf Orion for their vital feedback on a prior draft of this piece; Hannah Coupe for her invaluable research assistance; and Arjan Ganji, Cyrus Jabbari, and Jonathan Sameyach for their indispensable Persian-language Tresearch assistance and translation support. Finally, the author would like to thank Jason Warshof and Miriam Himmelfarb for their patience and deft editing of the paper, and Daniel Kohan for the appealing layout and cover design. iv Author’s Note The Killing of Qasem Soleimani— Avoiding Escalation and a Broader Conflict his monograph incorporates information Muhandis, the KH commander and de facto head of available as of mid-December 2019 and was Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces in a missile strike, being readied for publication when the most citing intelligence that Soleimani was planning a recent round of U.S.-Iran escalation culmi- series of attacks on U.S. diplomats and military per- nated in the targeted killing on January 3, sonnel in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and beyond.4 T2020, of Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, the head of the With these events, U.S.-Iran tensions have entered Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps–Qods Force a new, more fraught phase, with a heightened poten- (IRGC-QF). Tehran has threatened to avenge Soleima- tial for escalation, as Iran prepares to avenge Solei- ni’s death, underscoring the importance—more than mani’s death. Strategy, properly understood and ever before—of understanding Iran’s asymmetric practiced, is first and foremost a learning process, way of war and developing a strategy to counter it. and it is therefore essential for policymakers to draw First, some background. According to U.S. officials, appropriate lessons from these recent events to for- since May 2019 pro-Iran proxies carried out more mulate more effective strategy from here on. than ninety attacks on U.S. personnel in Iraq, and First, the nearly eight months in which the United between late October and December 2019, Kataib States did not respond forcefully to a series of mili- Hezbollah (KH), Iran’s foremost Iraqi proxy, launched tary provocations and attacks almost certainly con- eleven rocket strikes on Iraqi military bases hosting tributed to the increasingly assertive and audacious U.S. military personnel as part of Tehran’s pushback actions by Iran and its proxies (i.e., the mining of against Washington’s maximum pressure policy.1 six tankers in May and June, the downing of a U.S. These incidents were likely intended to warn the Global Hawk drone in June, the drone and cruise United States and to press it to ease sanctions on missile strike on Saudi oil facilities in September, Iran. Although no U.S. personnel were killed in these and the uptick since late October in rocket attacks harassment attacks—several Iraqis were killed and on U.S. personnel in Iraq). Might this escalation and injured—the size of the rockets used and of the salvos the death of the U.S. contractor have been averted fired increased over time. had the United States responded earlier with nonle- Then, on December 27, 2019, thirty-one rockets thal “warning shots” of its own? And might this past hit an Iraqi security forces base near Kirkuk, kill- record of restraint and President Trump’s repeated ing a U.S. contractor and wounding four U.S. ser- pledges to pull U.S. troops out of the Middle East con- vice members and several ISF personnel—thereby vince Tehran that he lacks the stomach to endure a crossing a longstanding U.S. redline.2 The United prolonged gray zone campaign that inflicts painful States responded on December 29 with airstrikes costs on the United States? against five KH bases in Iraq and Syria that it Second, while the December 29 U.S. strike on KH claims hosted the group’s command-and-control facilities was a necessary departure from the U.S. elements and storage facilities for weapons used policy of excessive restraint, aspects of the oper- in these attacks, killing twenty-five and wounding ation seem ill-considered. Given local sensitivities fifty-one KH fighters.3 On December 31, hundreds of regarding the U.S. presence in Iraq, it might have KH militiamen and their supporters besieged the been preferable to target only KH facilities in Syria, U.S. embassy in response, torching and wrecking while also targeting IRGC-QF facilities or person- reception areas at the compound entrance. After nel there. And might it have been better to target two days of violence, the rioters withdrew, but KH more junior IRGC-QF personnel than Soleimani in promised to revive efforts in parliament to expel order to deter further action, rather than to under- U.S. forces from Iraq. Then, on January 3, 2020, the take such a potentially escalatory act? These U.S. United States killed Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al- strikes have provoked a backlash in Iraq across the v Operating in the Gray Zone political spectrum, enabled Iran and its proxies to pitfalls of both excessive restraint and overkill. Such divert attention from ongoing anti-government and an approach would be more consistent with the U.S. anti-Iran protests there, and may energize efforts public mood—which is tired of “endless” Middle East in parliament to expel U.S. forces. And rather than wars—the regional operational environment, and a deter, they may lead to further escalation and per- U.S. national defense strategy that seeks to shift focus haps a broader conflict. and forces to the Indo-Pacific region.5 Finally, given the potential risks and costs of the It is therefore my hope that as U.S.-Iran tensions current U.S. approach, which relies on overt action, enter a new, more dangerous phase, this monograph blunt force, and emphatic messaging, it is appropriate may provide a road map for an alternative strategy to ask whether there are less fraught and more effec- that might help U.S. policymakers navigate the uncer- tive ways to achieve the desired deterrent effect. Such tain days ahead and advance U.S. interests in the an alternative approach, outlined in this monograph, Middle East, while avoiding further escalation and a would rely more heavily on covert or unacknowl- broader conflict with the Islamic Republic. edged activities, subtlety, and discreet messaging; on the pursuit of advantage through cumulative, incre- Michael Eisenstadt mental gains rather than dramatic, decisive blows Washington DC that are liable to be escalatory; and would avoid the January 3, 2020 Notes 1. U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing with Special Commander,” Defense News, December 2, 2017, https://www. Representative for Iran and Senior Policy Advisor for the defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/reagan-defense- Secretary of State Brian Hook and Assistant Secretary for forum/2017/12/03/cia-director-confirms-he-sent-warning- Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker and State Department letter-to-quds-commander/. Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus,” December 30, 2019, 3. U.S. Department of Defense, statement from Assistant to https://www.state.gov/special-briefing-via-telephone-with- the Secretary of Defense Jonathan Hoffman, December special-representative-for-iran-and-senior-policy-advisor- 29, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/ to-the-secretary-of-state-brian-hook-and-assistant- Release/Article/2047960/statement-from-assistant-to- secretary-for-near-eastern-affairs-david-schenker-and-s/. the-secretary-of-defense-jonathan-hoffman/. 2. Missy Ryan, Greg Jaffe, and John Hudson, “Pompeo Warns 4. Statement by the Department of Defense, January 2, 2020, Iran About Trigger for U.S. Military Action as Some in https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/ Administration Question Aggressive Policy,” Washington Article/2049534/statement-by-the-department-of-defense/. Post, June 18, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 5. U.S. Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National national-security/pompeo-warns-iran-about-trigger-for-us- Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military’s military-action-as-some-in-administration-question- Competitive Edge,” January 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/ aggressive-policy/2019/06/18/48bd3be0-9116-11e9-b570- Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense- 6416efdc0803_story.html. See also Joe Gould, “CIA Direc- Strategy-Summary.pdf. tor Confirms He Sent Warning Letter to Iranian Quds vi Executive Summary ince the establishment of the Islamic Republic because it knows how bloody and costly they can be. in 1979, Iran has distinguished itself as per- When it has to fight, it prefers to do so on foreign soil, haps the world’s foremost practitioner of “gray far from its borders, and to rely on proxies for much of zone” activities.
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