Democracies and Small Wars
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
DEMOCRACIES AND SMALL WARS The Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ian University The BESA Center is dedicated to the study of Middle East peace and security, in particular the national security and foreign policy of Israel. A non-partisan and independent institute, the BESA Center is named in memory of Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, whose efforts in pursuing peace laid the cornerstone for future conflict resolution in the Middle East. Since its founding in 1991 by Dr Thomas O.Hecht of Montreal, the BESA Center has become one of the most dynamic Israeli research institutions. It has developed cooperative relationships with strategic studies centers throughout the world, from Ankara to Washington and from London to Seoul. Among its research staff are some of Israel’s best and brightest academic and military minds. BESA Center publications and policy recommendations are read by senior Israeli decision-makers, in military and civilian life, by academicians, the press and the broader public. The BESA Center makes its research available to the international community through three publication series: BESA Security and Policy Studies, BESA Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy and BESA Studies in International Security. The Center also sponsors conferences, symposia, workshops, lectures and briefings for international and local audiences. Democracies and Small Wars Editor EFRAIM INBAR FRANK CASS LONDON • PORTLAND, OR First Published in 2003 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED Crown House, 47 Chase Side, Southgate, London N14 5BP, England This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS c/o International Specialized Book Services, 920 NE 58th Avenue, Suite 300 Portland, OR 97213–3786 Copyright © 2003 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Democracies and small wars—(BESA studies in international security) 1. Low-intensity conflicts (Military science) 2. Counterinsurgency 3. Military policy 4. Low-intensity conflicts (Military science)—Case studies 5. Counterinsurgency—Case studies 6. Military policy—Case studies 7. Democracy I.Inbar, Efraim, 1947—II. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies III. Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (Ankara, Turkey) 355′.0218 ISBN 0-203-48542-4 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-58415-5 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0 7146 5534 1 (cloth) ISBN 0 7146 8423 6 (paper) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Democracies and small wars/editor, Efraim Inbar. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146-5534-1 (Hardback)—ISBN 0-7146-8423-6 (Paperback) 1. Low-intensity conflicts (Military science)-Political aspects. 2. Democracy. I.Inbar, Efraim, 1947–II. Title. U240.D383 2003 355.02′18–dc21 2003012081 This group of studies first appeared as a Special Issue of The Review of International Affairs (ISSN 1475–3553), Vol. 2, No. 3 (Spring 2003) [Democracies and Small Wars] All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permission of Frank Cass and Company Limited Contents Notes on Contributors vii Introduction viii Efraim Inbar Part I: Democracies and Small Wars in Comparative Perspective 1. Western Democracies in Low Intensity Conflict: Some Postmodern 2 Aspects Avi Kober 2. Why do they Quarrel? Civil-Military Tensions in LIC Situations 20 Stuart A.Cohen 3. Democracies, Limited War and Psychological Operations 40 Ron Schleifer 4. Trends in Low Intensity Ethnic Conflict in Democratic States in the Post- 53 Cold War Era: A Large N Study Jonathan Fox Part II: Case Studies 5. The American Way of War in the Twenty-first Century 71 Thomas G.Mahnken 6. The Indian Way in Counterinsurgency 82 Sankaran Kalyanaraman 7. Winning a Low Intensity Conflict: Drawing Lessons 99 from the Turkish Case Ümit Özdağ and Ersel Aydmh 8. Greek Democracy on Trial: From Insurgency to Civil War, 1943–49 119 André Gerolymatos 9. Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing 135 Steven R.David 10. Exploiting Democracy: The IRA’s Tactical Cease-Fire 155 Jonathan Stevenson vi 11. Between Bullets and Ballots: The Palestinians and Israeli Democracy 166 Hillel Frisch Abstracts 182 Index 187 Notes on Contributors Ersel Aydinli is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. Stuart A.Cohen is Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University, Israel and a Senior Research Associate at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies. Steven David is Professor of Political Science and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the School of Arts and Sciences, Johns Hopkins University. Jonathan Fox is a Lecturer at the Department of Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University and a Research Associate at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies. Hillel Frisch is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Studies and Middle Eastern History, Bar-Ilan University and a Senior Research Associate at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies. Efraim Inbar is Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and Director of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies, as well as Series Editor of the BESA Studies in International Security. André Gerolymatos is Professor of History at Simon Fraser University, Canada. Sankaran Kalyanaraman is an Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India. Avi Kober is a Lecturer at the Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and a Research Associate at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies. Thomas G.Mahnken is Professor of Strategy at the US Naval War College. Ümit Özda is Chairman of the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM), Ankara, Turkey. Ron Schleifer is a Lecturer at the Department of Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University and a Research Associate at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies. Jonathan Stevenson is the Editor of Strategic Survey and Senior Fellow for Counter- terrorism at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. Introduction EFRAIM INBAR Since the end of the Cold War, large-scale conventional conflict and nuclear war have become a more remote possibility for Western democracies. In the twenty-first century, most democracies are prosperous and technologically advanced, which makes them also relatively powerful, as well as status quo powers. The main security challenges of contemporary Western democracies are small wars, often called low-intensity conflicts. India is probably the only exception, having to face also the imminent challenge of large- scale conventional war with its neighbors, and even the possibility of escalation to a nuclear exchange. The growing disparities in technological and economic capabilities in the world lead to numerous asymmetries in military power, which are likely to increase the incidence of small wars, the classic ‘poor man’s war’,1 in case of unresolved conflict.2 Small wars—a term originally used by the British to categorize their colonial campaigns3—combine several distinct characteristics.4 These conflicts are asymmetric, due to a gap in the discernible power of the opponents. Such engagements fall into the category of limited war, since at least one side of the armed conflict employs only a part of its total military power. Obviously, the British campaign against the Mau Mau in Kenya, or the French in Indo-China, were secondary theaters for the Western powers, which consumed only a part of their military forces. It is usually the stronger part that places limits on resources committed to deal with the security challenge posed by the weaker protagonist. The military strategy chosen is an additional criterion for identifying small wars. Generally, the weaker side adopts a military strategy of attrition because it lacks sufficient military muscle to force a battle decision (a strategy of annihilation) on its stronger opponent.5 In the absence of sufficient conventional might to coerce the opponent into accepting its political program, the insurgents employ attrition that is designed to exhaust their enemies over time. Such a military strategy stresses the cumulative effect to be obtained during the course of a prolonged sequence of intermittent military actions, none of which alone can be regarded as decisive in the attainment of political objectives. Guerrillas, terrorists, insurgents all employ such long-term strategies. On the part of the state, too, the typical form of fighting is characterized by the use of small military units, often in a low-profile mode in terms of the media coverage, due to topographical and political circumstances. Therefore, wars of attrition take more time and are often termed protracted conflict. Examples of such multi-year struggles include the Chechens against Russia, the Hizbullah in the Israeli security zone in Southern Lebanon, or the Mizo people against the Indian state. ix Generally, political high stakes, rather than incremental changes in the political or strategic environment motivate at least one side to the discord in a small war. The Viet Cong fought for regime change in South Vietnam and for unification. The Palestinian radical Muslims advocate a protracted struggle to attain the demise of the state of Israel. The IRA’s goal is replacing British rule in North Ireland with the sovereignty of the Irish Republic. The far-reaching goals contribute to the length of the conflict, as compromise is more difficult, and at times seems inconceivable since the conflict often takes a zero-sum game form. Indeed, small wars usually do not end with a political compromise, but with the political defeat of one side, which takes place only after a lengthy and bloody struggle. It took Turkey over a decade to subdue the PKK, and only the capture of its leader Abdullah Öcalan and the emergence of an unsupportive regional context, in which obtaining outside support for the PKK became extremely difficult, put an end to the PKK insurgency.