“The Spirit of the Age”: British War Correspondents

“THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE”: BRITISH WAR CORRESPONDENTS

AND INTERPRETATIONS OF WAR AND CULTURE

IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-1905

Alexander Massey Nordlund

(Under the Direction of John H. Morrow, Jr.)

ABSTRACT

The study of the Russo-Japanese War has fallen heavily into the shadow of the

First World War, resulting in a distorted understanding of the conflict, particularly regarding the European observation and analysis of it at the time. This study proposes to take this event out of such a context, drawing attention to military and cultural influences that Europeans, particularly British war correspondents, carried with them into the war, such as Mahanism, Orientalism, and anxieties regarding modernity. It argues that these correspondents entered the conflict influenced by prominent, preexisting discourses on naval warfare, the Orient, and modernity, which generally advocated for a conscious link in the future development of society and the military. These and other discourses, not those stemming from the memory of the First World War, ought to be emphasized in the study of war, society, and culture before 1914.

INDEX WORDS: Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905; History – Britain 20th Century; War Correspondent; Alexander Nordlund; M.A.; The University of Georgia; Orientalism; Alfred Thayer Mahan

“THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE”: BRITISH WAR CORRESPONDENTS

AND INTERPRETATIONS OF WAR AND CULTURE

IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-1905

Alexander Massey Nordlund

B.A., The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2011

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF THE ARTS

ATHENS, GA

2013

Alexander Massey Nordlund

“THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE”: BRITISH WAR CORRESPONDENTS

AND INTERPRETATIONS OF WAR AND CULTURE

IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-1905

Alexander Massey Nordlund

Major Professor: John H. Morrow, Jr.

Committee: Steven Soper

John Short

Electronic Version Approved:

Maureen Grasso Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia May 2013 iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all of the historians at the University of Georgia that at some point provided invaluable insight and criticism to the makings of this thesis from its origins, particularly Professors John Morrow, Steven Soper, John Short, Ari Levine, and

James Cobb. Also, I want to thank Professor Benjamin Ehlers and Laurie Kane for assisting with all the official paperwork involved outside of writing and research for this project. Additionally, I would like to thank my fellow graduate students of HIST 8030 and HIST 8860 that read and commented on early drafts of my writing. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of those at the First Division Museum in Wheaton, IL, in helping to locate materials from their collections related to my research on this project and my other academic interests, particularly Andrew Woods, Eric Gillespie, Kate

Kleiderman, Melissa Tyer, and J.D. Kammes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………………iv

PREFACE………………………………………………………………………………...vi

CHAPTER

1 THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER

UPON WAR CORRESPONDENTS, 1904-1905………………………………...1

2 A WAR FULL OF OTHERS…………………….……………………………...32

3 EDWARDIAN JAPAN………………………………………………………….59

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………..82

BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………..86

PREFACE

Between the end of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) and the outbreak of the

First World War (1914-1918), the British popular press often wrote on the subject of

warfare. Like British society itself, warfare underwent a rapid and sweeping evolution

sparked by industrialization and imperialism during this period, sparking considerable

debate within and without the military sphere on the nature of future warfare, particularly

the “Next Great War.” Despite several colonial wars throughout this period, writers had

to content themselves with simply imagining the nature of future war until the outbreak

of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) provided them with the first concrete example of

warfare between two modern militaries. With their own preexisting discourses on naval

warfare, the Orient, and Edwardian politics, gender norms, and education, British war correspondents conveyed an image of modern warfare in their postwar writings that

depicted war and military development as inseparable from social and cultural

development, arguing that the increased destructiveness and stresses of modern warfare

required a society culturally conditioned to fight and succeed in such an environment.

Following Britain’s military embarrassment in the Second Boer War (1899-1902),

British writers saw an opportunity to learn of the nature of the “next war” in the Russo-

Japanese War as it featured the two modern militaries of Russia and Japan or, in the

words of Times correspondent Charles à Court Repington, “an island Empire at grips with

a first-rate continental Power.”1 Additionally, this war would ultimately be the final case

1 The Military Correspondent of The Times (Charles à Court Repington), The War in the Far East, 1904- 1905 (E.P. Dutton and Co.: New York 1905), p. 1

vii

study for the Western powers of conventional war before 1914. Given the general public

enthusiasm and willingness of millions to voluntarily enlist for military service in Britain

at the outbreak of the First World War, it is important to understand how these millions

understood the nature of warfare before 1914. As the British press commissioned several

correspondents to cover the Russo-Japanese War, there was a demand amongst its readers

for news of the war – or, more broadly, a general interest in war amongst British readers.2

This study hopes to support the recent “World War Zero” scholarship on the Russo-

Japanese War, which argues in favor of the global impact of the war, which became overshadowed by the historical significance of the First World War.3 While many

studies on the background of the First World War allude to the Russo-Japanese War, the

latter war has not been significantly studied as an important historical event in its own right. Additionally, this particular emphasis on the Russo-Japanese War risks potential problems with teleology as it sometimes results in a “lessons not learned” approach to the war that began in the post-1918 scholarship of military historians such as B.H. Liddell

Hart and J.F.C. Fuller.4 The observations of correspondents in this war can help inform

the historian how and possibly why these writers, as products of what Repington called

“the spirit of the age,” viewed a subject like war the way they did leading into a future

2 See I.F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War: Future Wars 1763-3749 (Oxford University Press: Oxford 1992); Antulio Echevarria, Imagining Future War: The West’s Technological Revolution and Visions of Wars to Come, 1880-1914 (Praeger: London 2007); A.J.A. Morris, The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and Rearmament, 1896-1914 (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London 1984); Cecil D. Eby, The Road to Armageddon: The Martial Spirit in English Popular Literature, 1870-1914 (Duke University Press: Durham 1987) 3 See John Steinberg, David Wolff, et al., ed., The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero, 2 vols. (Brill: Leiden, Boston 2005); John Chapman, Inaba Chiharu, Rotem Kowner, ed., Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, 2 vols. (Global Oriental: Kent 2007) 4 For example, see J.F.C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, vol. III (Da Capo: New York 1956) p. 168; T.H.E. Travers, “Technology, Tactics, and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory, 1900-1914,” Journal of Modern History, Vol. 51, No. 2, Technology and War (June 1979) pp. 264-286; David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, “Rewriting the Russo-Japanese War: A Centenary Retrospective,” The Russian Review (January 2008) 78-87

viii

war rather than merely what they failed to learn, why what they learned was wrong, or

the actual reality of the war seen through historical hindsight.5

For sources, this project will primarily utilize the postwar monographs of British

war correspondents on the Russo-Japanese War. These will consist primarily of

correspondents from a civilian background, with the exceptions of Charles à Court

Repington of the Times (who actually wrote on the war in London) and military attaché

Sir Ian Hamilton, both of whom were widely read by British readers. Such an approach

requires emphasis on national and London-based newspapers as many, if not all, of the

British war correspondents wrote for them. Historian Glenn R. Wilkinson has criticized this approach as it overemphasizes the “personalities of the image-makers” of war by targeting the “post-battle monographs rather than the text of the newspaper reports written at the time.”6 While conscious of this shortcoming, this study attempts to

consider both sources as both products and perpetuators of a larger discourse of war and

culture rather than original “image-makers” themselves. Additionally, in consideration of

the strict censorship placed on correspondents and their newspaper dispatches during the

Russo-Japanese War, “post-battle monographs” allowed correspondents greater freedom to articulate their observations on war and culture. Also, these expanded monographs following the war on the observations made by correspondents may also give further insight into the brief reports they made during the war. Furthermore, aside from the use

5 Repington, p. 606. See S.P. MacKenzie, “Willpower or Firepower? The Unlearned Military Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War,” in David Wells and Sandra Wilson, ed., The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904-05 (Macmillan: London 1999) pp. 30-40; Yigal Sheffy, “A Model not to Follow: The European Armies and the Lessons of the War,” in Rotem Kowner, ed., The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War (Routledge: London and New York 2007) pp. 253-268; Bruce W. Menning, “Neither Mahan nor Moltke: Strategy in the War,” in Steinberg, Wolff, et al., ed., Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective, vol. I, pp. 129-156 6 Glenn R. Wilkinson, Depictions and Images of War in Edwardian Newspapers, 1899-1914 (Palgrave MacMillan: New York 2003) p. 4

of identifying titles such as “Our Military Correspondent” (Repington) in newspapers, it is relatively difficult to identify the writer of newspaper dispatches – especially for papers

employing multiple correspondents – as they tend to cite authorship to a “correspondent”

rather than the author himself. As for imagery, despite having their own correspondents

in the field, the Illustrated London News often used photographs originating from other

news sources, such as the American magazine Collier’s Weekly.

Additionally, in analyzing the writings of war correspondents on the Russo-

Japanese War, this study does not attempt to analyze “Britain” or “British society” as a

monolith. Rather, it attempts to follow trends in historical scholarship on the dominant

intellectual and cultural views of war in Britain before the First World War. For Michael

C.C. Adams, this included the views of the “older established classes of gentlemen

farmers, lawyers, professors, and military officers” that influenced Victorian and

Edwardian culture.7 Cecil Eby approached British popular fiction of the time as

symptoms of a “contagion” that infected British society with a “martial spirit” up to

1914.8 Others, such as Antulio Echevarria and I.F. Clarke, attempted to analyze the

broader intellectual trends (military and civilian) of the time regarding imaginings of the

future of warfare and society.9 Additionally, while such imaginings may fall within the realm of conservative, nationalistic “scaremongers,” Hew Strachan argued that the diverse societies of the First World War ultimately transformed into monoliths in 1914:

Immediately the war broke out [in 1914], previously polymorphous societies were

overtaken by uniformity in thought and deed. Ideas which the other side had also

entertained before the war became the monopoly of one. Germany could now see no

7 Michael C.C. Adams, The Great Adventure: Male Desire and the Coming of World War I (Indiana University Press: Bloomington 1990) p. xiv 8 See Eby, The Road to Armageddon 9 See Clarke, Voices Prophesying War; Echevarria, Imagining Future War

good in capitalism or liberalism, Britain none in collectivism or militarism. Thus the war

became the stuff of ‘low’ politics as well as ‘high.’10

While perhaps representative of many intellectual and societal views of war analyzed by

Adams, Clarke, Echevarria, and Eby, British war correspondents had very few (if any)

fundamentally different views of war and society in their postwar works on the Russo-

Japanese War, views that essentially perpetuated up to 1914.

As the focus of this study is more on discourses of war and culture rather than

actual warfare, it does not provide a deep analysis of the events of the Russo-Japanese

War, with the sole exception being the naval war. To broadly analyze the writing of

correspondents on the naval campaign, the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, perhaps best

known as “Mahanism,” are emphasized. While Mahanism represented a much wider

context of naval discourse, the focus on the public presentation of naval warfare requires

an analysis of a source known at least implicitly within a popular audience. With a fairly

strong public following in Britain leading up to 1904, Mahanism provided both a direct

and indirect context into understanding the naval discourse utilized by correspondents

during the war.11 Interestingly, historiography has placed Mahanism predominantly

within the context of the First World War rather than the Russo-Japanese War. Mahan

and his work are often cited as a major spark to the naval arms race between Britain and

Germany starting in the 1890s and whose theoretical approach was disproven by the First

World War (and yet perpetuated to some extent into the Second World War). Such an

10 Hew Strachan, The Outbreak of the First World War (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2004) p. viii; There is also a new work that asserts militarism was indeed a phenomenon within the British left as well. See Matthew Johnson, Militarism and the British Left, 1902-1914 (Palgrave MacMillan: New York 2013) 11 For studies of Mahan, see Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton University Press: Princeton 1986); Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis 2006); Strachan, The First World War, Vol. I: To Arms (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2001) pp.815-817

approach, however, fails to highlight the importance of the Russo-Japanese War in this

acceptance of Mahanism. By placing Mahanism within the context of the Russo-

Japanese War, this study attempts to explain how it perpetuated through 1914.

For cultural discourse, the study attempts to analyze the social observations of

correspondents regarding Japan and Russia, or, more broadly, Orientals and Occidentals.

This approach utilizes the theoretical concept of Orientalism approached by Edward Said,

Richard Minear, and Patrick Porter in addition to other secondary studies on the Russo-

Japanese War.12 Using the concept of “Military Orientalism,” Porter defines Orientalism

as “the dialogic relationship between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, and how perceptions of the East

are bound up with Western debates about the West.” From this perspective, Porter claims

to deviate from Said’s view of Orientalism, arguing that it is “not a monolith, but it is a

plural and shifting set of epistemological ideas, attitudes, and practices.”13 While Porter

did allude to the British analysis of the Russo-Japanese War as part of his study, he

focused primarily on the views from the military and policymakers in British.14 This

study attempts to both expand upon and, to an extent, challenge Porter’s analysis by

focusing on the writings of press correspondents, which offered a more popular analysis

of the war for the British reading public. This approach aims at explaining how war

correspondents related Japanese and Russian society to their British readers and what

features of these societies led to either victory or defeat in the war. Additionally, it

argues that prewar cultural discourses helped produce their analyses, as according to

Porter, “British officers and war correspondents projected onto the war their own

12 Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes (Columbia University Press: New York 2009); Porter, “Military Orientalism? British Observers of the Japanese Way of War, 1904- 1910,” War & Society, vol. 26, no. 1 (May 2006) 13 Porter, Military Orientalism, p. 14 14 Ibid., pp. 85-109

xii

preconceived ideas.”15 Similarly, this cultural analysis attempts to show how the British

saw themselves as a society compared to the warring nations of Japan and Russia in the

Russo-Japanese War.

Chapter I covers the naval theatre of the Russo-Japanese War. It utilizes the best

known work of Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-

1783 (1890), and the writings of Times correspondents Repington and Lionel James and the Daily Telegraph’s Bennet Burleigh. These correspondents were some of the only ones to have written extensively on the naval theatre of the war. The chapter attempts to analyze the extent to which Mahanism had come to define naval warfare in Britain. It

argues that these correspondents entered the war heavily influenced by Mahanism and

constantly presented the naval war to their readers in terms of its discourse, despite

encountering some inconsistencies. Chapter II interprets how British war correspondents

culturally explained Japanese success and Russian failure in the war. Incorporating

Said’s, Minear’s, and Porter’s views of Orientalism, it offers a possible cultural

explanation as to why Europeans ultimately did not accept many of the military lessons from the war. Although British correspondents praised Japan’s social transformation, they perceived that the war essentially contained too many “Others” to apply to European military needs and circumstances. Chapter III considers the ways that British correspondents portrayed Japanese society and politics. Considering the cultural anxieties regarding modernity circulating in Edwardian Britain, it asserts that correspondents projected these fears into their works in the ways they idealized Japan in

terms of politics, gender norms, and education.

15 Ibid., p. 109

xiii

Lastly, it is not an objective of this study to analyze (or criticize) the ways in which war correspondents provided inaccurate or “glorified” depictions of the Russo-

Japanese War. While British correspondents often pointed to acts of heroism in the war, they also reflected quite directly on the carnage and horrible fighting conditions they

witnessed, especially at Port Arthur. What is perhaps most interesting is that despite such

depictions of warfare, correspondents advocated that society adapt itself so that it could

sustain such carnage rather than avoiding future war altogether. Such a rationale seems

the product of a society that had become increasingly resigned to the “inevitability” of its

own future war.

CHAPTER I

THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON WAR CORRESPONDENTS, 1904-1905

Introduction

In 1890, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), an American naval officer and

lecturer at the U.S. Naval War College, published his first major treatise on naval

warfare, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. It became an international bestseller and provided navalists with a case for a significant increase in the size of navies, especially those of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan.

Additionally, many of these navies adopted several of the naval principles advocated by

Mahan, most notably the emphasis on the capital ship and concentration of battle fleets in home waters, by the start of the First World War. Despite this popularity and influence, the relatively peaceful global situation would not allow for a major test of Mahan’s theories until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Along with military attachés from several countries, a sizeable number of British press correspondents went to East Asia to report to the public on the nature of warfare between Russia and Japan, a traditional imperial power and an aspiring one. This chapter shows that many of these correspondents often revealed a tendency to observe naval operations in terms of the discourse and theories presented by Mahan in 1890, perhaps better known as Mahanism.

Furthermore, Mahanism, and its perceived success in the Russo-Japanese War, reveals a public presentation of naval warfare in British society as a phenomenon with unchanging

principles that transcended technological change before its first experience of industrialized warfare in 1914.

While Mahan certainly influenced views of naval warfare amongst British military and government circles, his popular theories began to permeate into the public sphere as well after 1890. They appeared in several articles in the Times (some written by Mahan himself) and influenced the immensely popular espionage story The Riddle of

the Sands (1903) by Erskine Childers. As the British had not experienced any major

naval wars since the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), the Russo-Japanese War offered

them one of their few case studies of modern naval warfare. Only three book-length

works, however, by Lionel James and Charles à Court Repington of the Times and

Bennet Burleigh of the Daily Telegraph, offer extended studies of the naval war. While

these authors did not regularly or directly allude to military theorists like Mahan and his

ideas, they provided readers with descriptions of warfare that were influenced to an

extent by the popular military theory of the time.

Land warfare has served as the primary focus of historians in their critique of

military doctrine leading up to 1914. Naval warfare, perhaps due its inconclusive results

in the First World War, has received only some attention, dwelling mostly on

technological advances – submarines in particular – and the diplomatic tensions caused

by the naval arms race between Britain and Germany. In consideration of Mahan, the

Influence of Sea Power is often considered the intellectual spark that caused the naval

arms race between Britain and Germany leading up to the First World War. As the work

connected imperial power with naval power, historians argue that Germany decided to

build a navy to rival Britain in an effort to elevate its global status, which created tensions

that ultimately resulted in Britain siding against Germany in 1914. In connection with

the Russo-Japanese War, historians argue that the results of the naval battle at Tsushima

in 1905 essentially confirmed the validity of Mahan’s theories to Western observers.

These theories, which carried a heavy emphasis on historical study, essentially argue that

the history of naval warfare pointed to the existence of unchanging strategic principles

that remain relevant beyond technological change. It is also important to note that

Mahan’s methodology was not entirely unique. Mahan’s own influence can be attributed

to British naval historian Sir John Knox Laughton.16 Thus, a key observation to note is

that Mahan’s work resulted from a trans-Atlantic exchange of naval theory between

Britain and the United States. From this perspective, Mahanism becomes part of an

international discourse favoring imperialism and naval spending.17

To approach this subject, this chapter primarily utilizes two types of sources:

Mahan’s Influence of Sea Power and the postwar accounts of Repington (which is a

collection of his Times articles written during the war), Burleigh, and James on the naval

war. Mahan’s work provides background and context for the conceptions of naval

warfare by British writers during the Russo-Japanese War, especially their perspectives

on new technologies like the torpedo, guerre de course, the primacy of firepower, the

logistical importance of navies and colonial bases, and the role of battle fleet

engagements in deciding the outcome of a war. This chapter will attempt to illustrate that

the Russo-Japanese War confirmed to several observers that while technology had

changed the face of warfare, it had not changed the fundamental principles of warfare, a

16 Andrew Lambert, The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession (Chatham Publishing: London 1998) p. 12 17 See Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore 1997) p. 28

major theme in Mahanism. While not necessarily unique, Mahan argued that

technological change affected only the tactical precedents of warfare, which was not

nearly as important as the unchanging, underlying principles of warfare:

But a precedent is different from and less valuable than a principle. The former may be

originally faulty, or may cease to apply through change of circumstances; the latter has its

root in the essential nature of things, and…remains a standard to which action must

conform to attain success.18

Looking at history, Mahan argued that this notion especially applied to naval warfare. He

insisted that past changes in weapons and military conditions only attained success when

they adhered to the unchanging tactical, operational, and strategic principles of war,

especially the concentration rather than dispersal of navies with the ultimate aim of

decisive fleet battle to decide control of trade and overseas communications. By

analyzing the particular language Mahan used in approaching aspects of strategy,

weapons, and the particular operations of war, this study aims to emphasize what

correspondents saw as important in naval operations and how or if their observations

directly related to Mahan’s theories, or, how they were part of the discourse of

“Mahanism.” This will not rely simply on outright mentions of Mahan and allusions to

his theories, but also on how what they observed during the war did or did not relate,

whether by choice or unconsciously, to Mahanism. It cannot be assumed that these war

correspondents all read and agreed with Mahan’s theories. However, like Carl von

Clausewitz’s Vom Kriege, Mahan’s influence most certainly spread implicitly – and, like

Clausewitz, perhaps fairly crudely – into the general discourse on naval warfare outside

18 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (Little, Brown, and Company: Boston 1894) p. 7

of the military establishment, thus indirectly influencing both military and public

observations of war.

The Direct Background of the War

When the Russo-Japanese War broke out at the beginning of 1904, large numbers

of Western correspondents – mainly British and American – and military attachés rushed

to East Asia to observe and report on both the land and naval war. While many British

correspondents did not stay for the entire war due to heavy censorship by Japan, or they

simply did not go at all, they continued to write for their newspapers on their insights into

the events and background of the war. Through these reports, British readers could have

gained an increased knowledge of the origins, early engagements, and predicted results of

the naval war, which often contained some influence from Mahan’s theories of naval

warfare. With this emphasis on Mahanism, correspondents helped spread a particular

knowledge of naval warfare before it had even been tested in 1904.

The writings of the Military Correspondent for the Times, Charles Court à

Repington, offered civilian readers the most obvious allusions to elements of Mahanism,

especially regarding perspectives on battle fleet engagements.19 A former army colonel,

the British Army forced him to resign his commission in 1902 after the discovery of an affair he had with the wife of a British official in Egypt. Soon after, he became the

official military correspondent to the Morning Post in 1902 and then the Times in 1904.

At the outbreak of the war, Repington resorted to acting as an “arm-chair” correspondent, using mainly secondary information from military and diplomatic contacts that he gained

19 For more on Repington, see W. Michael Ryan, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles à Court Repington: A Study in the Interaction of Personality, the Press, and Power (Garland: New York 1987)

as a fairly high-ranking officer while in the army and other news sources. With this

approach, Repington became, in Trevor Royle’s words, “a new kind of military

commentator, a journalist who relied on contacts and his professional instincts instead of strength and stamina to take him round the battlefields.”20 Thus, it is highly likely that

Repington’s writings on the war relied heavily on his own military experience (or theoretical biases) and a more direct knowledge of the leading military theories of the time in comparison to civilian journalists.

In his articles, Repington almost immediately alluded to Antoine-Henry Jomini’s military theory, telling his readers that “war is not an exact science, but an art.”21 He

continued along this vein by stating that “the principles of strategy are eternal and of

universal application.” In this context, it is important to realize that Mahan had one

particularly heavy influence for his theories to whom he alludes occasionally in his work:

Jomini. A contemporary – and competitor – of Carl von Clausewitz, Jomini wrote

extensively on military theory and is perhaps best known for his work entitled The Art of

War (1838). Generally, Jomini – as the title would suggest – argued that “war in its ensemble is not a science, but an art.”22 Rather than being dictated by “scientific

combinations,” he argued in favor of several other “controlling elements”:

The passions which agitate the masses…the warlike qualities of these masses, the energy

and talent of their commanders, the spirit, more or less martial, of nations and epochs, –

in a word, everything that can be called the poetry and metaphysics of war, – will have a

permanent influence on its results.23

20 Trevor Royle, War Report: The War Correspondent’s View of Battle from the Crimea to the Falklands (Grafton Books: London 1989) pp. 110-114 21 Repington, p. 15 22 Antoine-Henri Jomini (Baron de), The Art of War, trans. Capt. G.H. Mendell and Lieut. W.P. Craighill (J.B. Lippincott & Co.: Philadelphia 1862) p. 321 23 Ibid, p. 321

Jomini also acknowledged the existence of inherent rules in war. He argues that while

they are not mathematically precise, these rules can help one point out errors to be

avoided and attain success in war. Additionally, Jomini asserts that “Correct theories,

founded upon right principles, sustained by actual events of wars, and added to accurate

military history, will form a true school of instruction for generals.”24 Mahan’s theories

of sea power bore a heavy resemblance to Jomini on the art of war. Mahan argued that

there are six general conditions that affect the sea power of nations: geographical position, physical conformation (including “natural productions and climate”), extent of territory, size of population, character of the people, and the character of the government and its national institutions.25 This first section of Mahan’s work is unique in that the

extent and strength of a nation’s sea power are directly determined by geography and the

social and political makeup of a particular nation. It also relates to Jomini’s notion of the

“poetry and metaphysics of war.”

In viewing the situation of Japan in January 1904, Repington quickly transitions

into Mahanian theory. The language used by Repington was also meant to relate Japan’s

strategic situation to that of Britain, which shared the same insular geography:

If there is one principle of national strategy more pregnant with meaning than another for

an insular state, it is that which affirms and reiterates the danger of the dispatch of

military forces across waters not thoroughly cleared of hostile ships…until the Russian

ships are sunk, captured, or shut up in their ports…there can be no security for the sea

communications of an expeditionary force.26

This relates directly to one of Mahan’s primary strategic objectives in a sea war: to

maintain secure communications between the secondary and home bases. According to

24 Ibid., p. 325 25 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, pp. 28-29 26 Ibid, p. 17

Mahan, when the principal theatre of operations sits overseas, the navy must maintain

communications between these two strong points by enforcing “military control of the

intervening sea” so that troop transports and supply-ships can move in safety. He states

that this can be done by “clearing the sea in all directions of hostile cruisers” or “by accompanying in force (convoying).”27

What is especially interesting about this section of Repington’s work is that it is

compiled from a Times article he wrote from January 19, 1904, over two weeks before

war was declared on February 8.28 Although it is highly likely that war between Russia

and Japan was considered inevitable by the end of January, since both countries had broken off diplomatic ties, Repington had begun making predictions of how the war

would take shape in Mahanian terms. As noted in the previous quote on his allusion to

the essential strategic principles to be followed by an “insular state,” Repington made his

objective quite clear to his reader:

Our [Repington’s] object is rather to stir the pulse of the British people, and to make

them channel the engrossing problems which may soon be solved under their eyes…no

campaign that has ever been waged since the close of the Great War promises such

intensely dramatic interest for England and her Empire …29

In this context, Repington hoped to stress to his readers that the military lessons of this

war would offer insight into the correctness of military theory and the defense policies

utilized by Britain. He believed that this was especially important in terms of the Royal

Navy, as “the whole theory and practice of modern naval war will be on its first great

27 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, p. 514 28 See Repington, War in the Far East, 15n1 29 Ibid, pp. 23-24; It is important to note immediately that the term “Great War,” which is today most commonly associated with the First World War, refers here to the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815).

trial.” 30 This theory of modern naval warfare would include both Mahan and other

contemporary theorists, perhaps most notably the British civilian theorist Julian Corbett.

In observing the initial disposition of the Russian Pacific Fleet and its base, Port

Arthur, before the war, Repington noted several deficiencies that were consistent with

Mahan’s view of the mutual dependency of fleets and strategic bases along lines of

communication. Repington told his readers that “docks, arsenals, skilled mechanics, and

all the vast paraphernalia of naval yards are so many component and inseparable parts of

sea supremacy.”31 Since Vladivostok iced-up in the winter, Port Arthur was Russia’s only year-round warm-water port in the Pacific Ocean – and acted as a strategic position for the Russian Navy. Repington, however, noted that Russia had not developed Port

Arthur for this purpose, which deprived the Pacific Fleet of an immediate base for resupply and repairs. Additionally, Russia had not sufficiently fortified it for costal defense, thus leaving its defense mainly to the Pacific Fleet. Mahan perceived these elements as strategic issues throughout his work, arguing that a government must develop its sea power by providing “resting places,” or seaports, for its navy to repair and refuel

(or “coal”). Furthermore, Mahan also insists that “seaports should defend themselves,” as a navy’s sole purpose is to engage the enemy in open waters.32 From Repington’s

perspective, Russia had prepared for neither of these considerations.

In viewing the outbreak of the war, Lionel James of the Times shared a less

obvious recognition of Mahan’s theory of naval warfare. In covering the war, James is

especially known for his unique coverage of the early naval war aboard the Chinese

steamship SS Haimun, where he reported the war using wireless telegraphy, which

30 Ibid., pp. 23-24 31 Repington, p. 29 32 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, pp. 83, 453

allowed James more constant coverage of the action as he did not have to return to land

to relay his reports. This style of reporting, however, created Japanese and Russian

suspicion, as it allowed James the ability to report outside of official surveillance and

censorship. The Russians especially protested this reporting, fearing that the Japanese

would intercept his wireless messages to track Russian positions. By the summer of

1904, James abandoned reporting aboard the Haimun in favor of moving inland into

Manchuria when the Russians threatened him with charges of espionage.33 At the end of

the war, James wrote a book-length work entitled A Study of the Russo-Japanese War in

response to what he believed were “partisan” studies of the war heavily favoring either

Japan or Russia.34

The earliest acknowledgement of a least some kind of knowledge of Mahan’s theories in James’ work occurs in his study of the military situation in the Far East

leading up to the war. Like Repington, James recognized Japan’s concern of controlling

the sea during a land campaign in Manchuria. As Japan’s home base rested much closer

to the main theatre of operations compared to Russia (the Trans-Siberian railway was its

quickest route to the Far East), control of the sea would allow Japan to “place between

four and five hundred thousand men in the field, long before the Siberian railway could

reinforce the existing strength of the Russian garrisons in the Far East.”35 Additionally,

James also attributes Russian optimism towards their naval position in the Far East to

Mahan’s influence on naval thought at the time:

33 Peter Slattery, Reporting the Russo-Japanese War: Lionel James’s First Wireless Transmissions to “The Times” (Global Oriental: Kent 2004), pp. xi-xvi, 125-126 34 I had initial skepticism for the authorship of this work due to the pseudonym used, although it is catalogued under his name in Google Books. I decided that James did indeed write it after finding it within the Cornell University Library catalogue. 35 “Chasseur” (Lionel James), A Study of the Russo-Japanese War (William Blackwood and Sons: Edinburgh 1905) p. 11

…the prevailing impression in Western naval schools was that the battleship would be

the decisive factor in modern naval warfare, and as on paper the Japanese were

considerably inferior to the Russians in this class of vessel, the Russian officers were

satisfied that their Pacific fleet would be able to carry the war to the coasts of Japan until

the time was ripe to engage upon a land campaign.36

The idea of the battleship, or “capital ship,” as the most important weapon of any navy

has influential roots in the works of Mahan. While the Influence of Sea Power never

directly advocates favoring battleship navies, its treatment of torpedo cruisers indirectly

advocates an emphasis on large, heavily-gunned ships within navies.37 Comparing

torpedo cruisers to fire-ships of the imperial wars of Early Modern Europe in tactics,

Mahan argues that both types of ships were incapable of acting outside the artillery support of their fleet’s larger ships, particularly the ships-of-the-line, which Mahan seems to subtly equate to the battleship, especially in his view of Cromwell’s use of such ships against the Dutch in 1652.38 Thus, it can be inferred that Mahan believes a large artillery ship like the battleship ought to be the main focus of any navy as it is capable of carrying

the largest caliber and quantity of artillery of any other class of ship in a fleet, thus

making it the predominant ship in any major naval engagement.39

With this allusion to “the prevailing impression in Western naval schools,” James

reveals the extent to which Mahan had influenced naval thought outside the United States

leading up to the First World War. With superiority in battleships, the Russians believed

that they were capable of defeating Japan through naval power alone. When the Russian

36 Ibid, p. 16 37 Mahan’s theories on naval architecture did not receive the same positive acceptance as did his theories on strategy and military principles. Nevertheless, he did in essence favor capital ships as the primary weapon of a fleet. See Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command, pp. 63-64 38 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, pp. 109-115, 132-133 39 Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,” in Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, p. 458

fleet sailed from Port Arthur on February 4, 1904, James noted the concern within

Japanese naval circles, which feared that the Russian naval commander, Admiral Stark,

was “bringing his fleet to force matters in Japanese waters.” 40 Believing that the

Russians would use their fleet for offensive operations to force fleet engagement, it also appears that the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) anticipated that the naval war would take

on a Mahanian character – or, in more British terms, they expected the Russians to

“Coppenhagen” their fleet in port.41 This appears highly likely as the IJN – which had

received its training from the Royal Navy – was also heavily influenced by Mahan’s

theories. This consideration is confirmed by Japanese historian Sadao Asada, who noted

that Mahan’s work became a textbook in the Japanese Army and Naval Staff Colleges

and that more of Mahan’s works were translated into Japanese than any other language.42

Unlike Repington, James does not speak as authoritatively on military matters, as he does not have a military background. However, as previously mentioned, James does acknowledge that he is aware of what was widely accepted and discussed within the military community regarding the perceived superiority of battleships. In order to discuss actual military events and their significance, James had to rely on actually being close to the action, as his authority to his readers rested in his observations and the necessity of communicating with a wide variety of people with more intimate knowledge of happenings in the Far East. Repington, by contrast, had previous experience in the

British Army and had risen to the rank of Colonel before resigning his commission,

40 James, p. 18 41 To “Coppenhagen” an enemy fleet refers to Admiral Horatio Nelson’s preemptive strike against the Danish fleet in 1807 to eliminate a potential future strategic threat to Britain against Napoleon. It became a relatively common term to advocate the preemptive destruction or confiscation of potentially hostile fleets. The destruction of the neutral Vichy French Fleet by the Royal Navy in 1940 accorded with this principle. 42 Asada, p. 4

giving him access to more privileged military circles. This higher rank allowed him to

comment from a cozy office in London, perceived as credible by his readers due to his

residual prestige.

When the Japanese fleet left port on February 6, James noted that “in the

existence of that fleet was vested the whole of the scheme of expansion which had

inspired all of their labours and ambitions of the last twenty years.”43 This statement marks an important distinction regarding Mahan’s notion of sea power. To Mahan, sea power was not the ultimate instrument of simply national power, but imperial power. A

nation’s sea power was directly related to the extent of its commerce and control of

colonies, both as military bases and markets. To expand sea power, colonial and

commercial expansion had to ensue at the same pace, or vice versa. In a way, Mahan’s

view of naval history was a reaction to the rapid European imperial expansion into Africa

and the Far East occurring during his own lifetime, which may explain the instant global

popularity of his theories.44 Thus, to James, Japanese imperial expansion relied

absolutely upon its fleet in a time “ripe for her to commence expansion” into China and

Korea, the latter where James claimed that Japan intended to utilize “as the best source

from which the defect in the home produce of rice was to be supplied” and as an outlet of

employment for Japan, thus increasing its overall commercial and imperial power.45 As dictated by Mahanism, a capital ship-based fleet and imperialism were the “natural” by- products of one another, as one could not be feasibly attained without the other.

Like James, the reports of veteran Scottish war correspondent Bennet Burleigh of the Daily Telegraph also contain fewer overt allusions to Mahanism on sea power in his

43 James, p. 19 44 Crowl, in Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 462-9 45 James, pp. 5-6

work entitled Empire of the East. With previous reporting experience from the British colonial wars in Sudan and South Africa and even military experience as a Confederate soldier in the U.S. Civil War, Burleigh had already become fairly well-known in his field.

Like Mahan, Burleigh shares the same view of the seas as “the great highways of the world.”46 Additionally, he noted the Russian’s intended projection of sea power into the

Far East, making Port Arthur its “great naval arsenal” and Dalny (Dalian) “the commercial haven of Manchuria.” 47 Compared to Repington and James, Burleigh’s

most unique comments relating to Mahan involve his speculation on the stationing of

Russian cruisers in Vladivostok before the war:

I know not if the Russians had raiding designs, in the event of war, upon northern

Japanese ports, such as Hakodate, or intended rushing through the channels and putting in

an appearance off Yokohama. But if so it would matter little, and would not sensibly

affect the main struggle, which must take place elsewhere.48

Burleigh’s view is practically identical to Mahan’s view of guerre de course, or

“commerce-destroying.” Mahan views this strategy as an inferior form of naval warfare,

arguing that it cannot act without support from a home base, outposts abroad, or a

powerful fleet. Additionally, he also views the results of such a strategy as minimal,

arguing that it can never obtain control of the seas and does nothing more than cause

needless suffering. Furthermore, it never seeks to do what Mahan advocates is the

ultimate objective of a navy: to destroy the enemy fleet.49 Burleigh here takes on a

similar attitude, arguing that such a strategy would “matter little” in comparison to what

he believed was more important: the “main struggle” involving the fleets.

46 Bennet Burleigh, Empire of the East, or, Japan and Russia at War, 1904-5 (Chapman & Hall: London 1905) p. 3 47 Ibid., p. 39 48 Ibid., p. 49 49 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, pp. 132-6

In looking at the strategic situation in the Far East leading up to the Russo-

Japanese War, the observations of Repington, James, and Burleigh contain several

elements of Mahan’s doctrine of sea power, perhaps most notably the anticipation of a

decisive fleet engagement. Repington’s work is especially of interest as it is reveals a

more conscious attempt to disseminate popular ideas within military circles to his more

public audience within the Times. Although James and Burleigh wrote their analyses

following the war in 1905, their allusions to elements present in Mahan’s theories of naval war indicate that they survived what Repington argued would be the first test for the theory and practice of modern naval warfare. From these analyses, it appears that

Mahanian doctrine of naval warfare had begun to make its way into the mainstream of

public knowledge through major news outlets like the Times and Daily Telegraph before

the Russo-Japanese War even put it to the test. But some questions remained: would this

war reveal evidence that contradicted Mahan’s naval doctrine? If so, would

correspondents acknowledge this evidence and reject it, or would Mahan’s doctrine be

too prevalent of an influence over their observations?

The Outbreak of War: From Port Arthur to the End of 1904

On the night of February 8, 1904, the IJN launched a surprise attack with torpedo

boats against the Russian Pacific Fleet, which was at anchor in Port Arthur. Although neither side had formally declared war, this act signaled the outbreak of the Russo-

Japanese War. Several fleet engagements ensued over the course of the year, the largest being the Japanese victory at the Battle of the Yellow Sea on August 10. After sustaining crippling losses, the Russian fleet retreated back to port, only to be destroyed by joint

attacks from the IJN and Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) at the end of the year during the

Siege of Port Arthur.

The successful torpedo attack by the Japanese resulted in the damage to important

Russian capital ships, the battleships Retvisan and Tsarevitch and the heavy cruiser

Pallada. To readers at first glance, the Japanese success implied the invalidity of

Mahan’s theory of the superiority of capital ships over torpedo boats, or the strategy of

battle fleet engagements over guerre de course. Nevertheless, Repington was quick to

discourage his readers from making such a hasty conclusion in the wake of this

engagement. Repington, perhaps out of duty of being British, blamed the French and the

jeune école, a French naval school which advocated the strategy of guerre de course

using small craft such as torpedo boats and destroyers against battleships, for this

misguided approach to naval warfare. Repington argued for a “balance between the

claims of torpedo fanatics and the counter-claims of their opponents,” borrowing some of

the language used previously by Mahan on the subject. He acknowledged that “torpedo

warfare offers limitless opportunities for the display…of nerve and audacity.”50 These

are similar to the sentiments of Mahan, who acknowledged the “large demands upon the

nerve of the assailant” in comparing torpedo boats to fire-ships.51

The outbreak of the naval war in East Asia provided a contradiction for proponents of Mahan’s naval doctrine. The small, inexpensive, and supposedly inferior torpedo boats of the IJN had inflicted a serious material blow to the expensive and

“superior” capital ships of the Russian fleet. These small craft did so with minimal losses using a weapon considered inferior to that of the battleship. Additionally, the

50 Repington, p. 56 51 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, p. 109

engagement offered a major refutation of the role that Mahan gave them in a fleet

engagement, arguing that the “rôle [sic] of the latter [torpedo boat]…is to be found in the

mêlée which is always to succeed a couple of headlong passes between the opposing

fleets.”52 Here, Mahan argues that torpedo boats play a secondary role after the main

ships of the fleet have engaged the enemy in a gunnery engagement in “headlong passes,”

with torpedo boats essentially conducting “mopping-up” operations against crippled and unsupported larger ships. This proved not to be the case at Port Arthur, where torpedo boats acted as the primary attacker with little support from the larger ships of the fleet,

yet another prerequisite in Mahan’s argument for torpedo boat tactics.53

With so much apparently contradictory evidence put before them by the naval

phase of the Russo-Japanese War, one could expect that the correspondents would drop

or at least make proposed revisions to the Mahan’s naval doctrine. Instead, these

correspondents showed no inclination of abandoning Mahanian discourse – or were

perhaps imprisoned by it – in their analyses of the naval war in East Asia. In an effort to

debunk claims of the superiority of torpedo warfare in the wake of the Port Arthur attack,

Repington argued that the attack did not offer any new lessons for naval strategists. He

took note of the “comparative slightness of the Russian losses,” and stated that

“battleships, as engines of war, stand precisely now where they stood before.” To

explain the success of the attack, Repington pointed to the strategic situation as to why

the Russian fleet remained in port:

Because they [the Russians] were, strategically speaking, afraid of the Japanese navy.

And why? Because of the assumed superiority of the enemy’s battleships; therefore, one

52 Ibid., p. 113 53 Ibid., p. 114

might claim with perfect justice that it was the direct threat of the superior battleships that

caused the Russians to suffer the disaster we know.54

Repington refuses to acknowledge that the events at Port Arthur invalidated Mahan’s

naval doctrine. He defends his position by essentially accusing the Russians of strategic

cowardice. The torpedo craft of the IJN had achieved success because the Russians had

not adhered to the correct strategy: the Mahanian strategy. While the Russian fleet

remained in a defensive position at Port Arthur, this was not the correct defensive

strategy for a fleet in Mahanian terms, which called for the fleet strategy of the offensive

defense.55 Thus, because the Russian fleet did not seek to defend itself in the open waters outside of Port Arthur – or, in other words, follow the doctrine of Mahan, it suffered the humiliating loss at Port Arthur. As for the success of the torpedo boats, he stated “in the art of war there is a place for everything.”56 This notion once again

resembles the sentiments of Mahan towards the fire-ship, which, he noted, despite being

no longer appropriate for fleet engagements had been useful in attacking enemy fleets at

anchor up to the U.S. Civil War. Like the fire-ship, Mahan believed that the torpedo boat

would find a similar role, albeit within a short range outside of its port. Additionally,

Mahan did not oppose the use of the torpedo itself in fleet engagements on the open sea.

His reservations were directed towards the smallness of the torpedo boat, as it could not

sustain high speeds in heavy seas, which would hinder the overall speed of the rest of the

fleet.57

Compared to Repington, James and Burleigh did not show overt recognition that

the events at Port Arthur potentially put Mahan’s theories of sea power – or, more

54 Repington, p. 56 55 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, p. 87n1 56 Repington, pp. 56-57 57 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, pp. 109-111

broadly, the superiority of fleet action over jeune école strategy – into question. Rather,

both journalists treat this and other smaller actions in the naval campaign as mere set-up

for the eventual fleet action they anticipated. While Repington claimed that the Russian

fleet lay at anchor due to the perceived superiority of the Japanese fleet, James observed

that the Japanese had similar apprehensions that prompted their torpedo attack. Noting

the “paper superiority” of the Russian fleet in battleships, the Japanese Admiral

Heihachiro Togo used his torpedo boats as a secondary part of his strategy: “to reduce

this superiority by any means that would still keep the power of his own battleships

intact.” Thus, in the context of Port Arthur, James still saw a future fleet engagement as

the primary strategic objective. Togo’s use of torpedo boats sought to improve the

chances of success for the IJN in the intended future fleet engagement as before the

attack, James argued that “unless it were forced upon him, he would not have been

justified in engaging in a fleet action.” 58

Burleigh also took a similar stance to that of James with respect to the Russian

concerns of the superiority of the IJN. Before the outbreak of war, he made a claim that

“everybody realized…the fleet must first secure the supremacy of the seas for Japan, and

that the Russians would try and fight under the guns of their batteries.”59 While this

strategic necessity for Japan – which apparently “everybody realized” before the war – is a part of Mahanism, the second part of Burleigh’s statement regarding Russian intentions reveals that it was apparently predicted that the Russians would not follow the strategy advocated by Mahan, despite noting that “they [the Russians] professed…to be ready to risk a naval engagement” and thus follow Mahanian strategy. Burleigh, however,

58 James, p. 25 59 Burleigh, p. 61

declares that this profession by the Russians was “buncombe.” Like Repington, Burleigh

appears to have little faith in the Russians doing anything the “correct,” or “Mahanian,” way in the naval war.

In January, he claimed to have argued that “the Russians would have to be

‘smoked out’ in some fashion, or risk being shut up altogether.”60 At Port Arthur, the

Japanese torpedo boats provided the means to smoke the Russian fleet out of the

protection of their costal defenses, although they never fully accomplished this aim.

However, Burleigh’s idea of “smoking out” the Russians was consistent with Repington

remarks on the Russian fleet’s fear of Japanese superiority. As for the attack itself, he,

like James, gave only a brief overview, blaming torpedo losses mainly on Russian

complacency. Additionally, his later observations of failed Japanese torpedo boat attacks

at Port Arthur confirmed to himself Mahan’s notion that guns could offer a superior

defense against such attacks. This is most noticeable when he concluded that a torpedo

attack on February 24 failed due to the fire from shore batteries and “quick-firers upon

the Retevezan.”61

Several naval engagements ensued in the wake of the surprise attack at Port

Arthur. As recently mentioned, the Japanese attempted a few more torpedo attacks, but

none attained the success of the first. An attempted blockade followed these attacks, with

mines damaging ships from both fleets. In other areas, a cruiser engagement – and a

Japanese victory – at Chemulpo Bay (now part of Inchon, Korea) on February 9 preceded

the Japanese troop landings in Korea. The Russians would not attempt a sortie from Port

Arthur until August 10, but the resulting Battle of the Yellow Sea – which witnessed the

60 Ibid., p. 62 61 Ibid, p. 130

longest-range naval gunnery ever experienced in battle to that date – compelled the

remains of the Russian fleet to retreat back to Port Arthur, where it would stay until the

fall of Port Arthur itself to the IJA at the end of 1904.

In the months leading up to the Battle of the Yellow Sea, Repington noted

potential concerns regarding the Japanese “becoming intoxicated by the naval successes,”

which might compel them to become overambitious with their armies in Manchuria.

However, he is confident that this will not be the case on account of one important

assertion:

But the Japanese have read their Mahan; they must know the pregnant words with which

he advises a maritime Power to “grasp firmly some vital chord of the enemy’s

communications and so force him to fight there,” and they will surely perceive that if the

fortune of war places Korea, the Liautung Peninsula, and Vladivostok in their hands, the

vital chord of Russian East Asia is severed, and that Russia must fight on the ground of

Japanese choosing or not at all.62

Repington argues that as long as the Japanese continue to follow the strategic advice of

Mahan, they will achieve success. What is especially interesting about this segment is

that Repington only says “Mahan” rather than “Alfred Thayer Mahan.” He does not feel

the need to get into a lengthy background description of Mahan and directly alludes to

one of his theories. This seems to imply a public familiarity with Mahan and his work, as

the expert (Repington) does not need to explain the significance of Mahan or his theories.

Times publications before the Russo-Japanese War contained plenty of discussion of

Mahan’s theories in various articles and Letters to the Editor dating back to the early

1890’s, following the publication of the Influence of Sea Power. Thus, it appears that the wider reading public shared some familiarity with Mahanian naval theory. By the Russo-

62 Repington, pp. 96-97

Japanese War, it appears that this familiarity translated into a prevalent way of

“knowing” naval warfare.

The accounts of the Battle of the Yellow Sea on August 10 reveal evidence of

Mahanism at work. In observing the “first fleet-action of modern warships in the world’s history,” James notes that the Japanese superiority in marksmanship dominated the action, causing the death of the Russian Admiral Wilgelm Vitgeft (1847-1904) that resulted in the loss of cohesion within the Russian fleet.63 Burleigh also asserts that

artillery dominated the action, while “the torpedo flotillas, while observant, were unable

to take part in the action.” When the Japanese torpedo boats entered the action to attack

the crippled battleship Tsarevitch, Burleigh notes that they were unsuccessful, in a way

confirming Mahan’s theory of the minimal role of torpedo craft in fleet action due to their

lack of long-range weaponry.64 Repington also shares this observation of torpedo boats

in the battle, noting that “the freshening wind and rising sea militated against the success

of the torpedo.” This is a direct allusion to Mahan, who states that a torpedo boat

experiences significant losses in speed during moderate to heavy seas, thus putting it and

the speed of the fleet as a whole at a disadvantage.65

The destruction of the Russian fleet after the fall of Port Arthur, however, offers

another challenge to Mahan’s doctrine. While the Russian fleet had been shut into Port

Arthur following the Battle of the Yellow Sea, it was not actually destroyed. Its

destruction at the end of 1904 resulted not from a naval engagement, but from a land

bombardment by the IJA just off the coast near Port Arthur. Once again, Repington

denies that this is a result of the failure of Mahan’s naval doctrine in modern naval

63 James, pp. 56-59 64 Burleigh, pp. 261-264 65 Repington, p. 261

warfare. Rather, he blames the Russians for once again refusing to adhere to Mahanian

doctrine, stating that the incident provides a “solemn warning for nations and navies that

are blind to the teachings of history and presume to improve upon the principles and the

practice of the great masters of the art of war.”66

In the context of Port Arthur, each correspondent sought to explain that the

Japanese victory was due more to naval than land strategy. Aside from mere description,

Burleigh has little more to offer in terms of analysis of the naval war after 1904. Perhaps

his last most significant remarks on the naval war revolved around the fall of Port Arthur to the IJA:

When Admiral Togo succeeded in securing the sea-power for Japan, and could assure its

retention, Port Arthur was doomed. The capture of Nanshan [Hill] and the seizing of the

neck of the promontory but put the seal on the matter.67

This perspective provides reinforcement to Mahan’s belief in the greater strategic

importance of a navy in deciding the outcome of a military campaign and the higher costs

of land strategy. Rather than credit the IJA for the victory at Port Arthur, Burleigh argues

that its efforts were pointless as the IJN had already won the battle by securing control of

the seas. The IJA could have averted the human and material costs of this siege, Burleigh

argued, had they realized the “worthlessness of the Russian Navy shut up in Port Arthur.”

Rather than simply “starve out” the Russian garrison, the Japanese resorted to storming

the fortress as they “feared the chance of the Russian fleet putting to sea from Port Arthur

and working them incredible injury.”68 Such a statement reveals the predominance of

naval strategy in Japanese land operations.

66 Ibid., p. 430 67 Burleigh, p. 388 68 Ibid., pp. 390-1

Despite being blocked in by the IJN, the mere existence of the Russian fleet remained a priority consideration in the overall strategic thought of Japan, as it could potentially threaten Japanese communications in Manchuria if it broke out. Although not mentioned, the existence of the fleet was even more threatening considering that the

Russian Baltic Fleet had started its redeployment to reinforce the Pacific Fleet in the fall of 1904. The fear of this combination most certainly affected Japanese strategy at Port

Arthur, as the combination of both fleets would alter the control of the sea in the war.

Thus, an assault rather than a mere investment of the fortress by the IJA proved necessary to seize the Russian base of naval operations and force the inferior Russian fleet out to sea for an engagement before it could concentrate with the Baltic Fleet. While Burleigh may not have agreed with such a strategy, it revealed that he was relatively familiar with the prevalence of Mahan’s naval theories on overall military strategy.

Repington also argued that the IJN played a greater role in the siege of Port

Arthur than had the besieging IJA, as the latter heavily relied on the former for “effectual and local assistance” and protecting lines of communication. However, Repington condemned this strategy as it did not adhere to his conception of the correct objectives of a navy, or, in other words, to Mahan’s theory of the objective of a navy. With the loss of the battleships Hatsuse and Yashima to Russian mines, Repington insisted that “great battleships are built and intended to fight with their peers in blue water: they are not meant for in-shore duties.”69 The issue that he observed was that the evolution in naval weaponry was incomplete:

69 Repington, p. 186

If the torpedo boat…replaced the fire-ship, and with a far more formidable weapon, the

bombketch and kindred craft…have not yet advanced a similar stage on the path of naval

progress.70

In what seems a conscious attempt to mimic Mahan, Repington recognized the evolution

of the fire-ship to the torpedo boat. He argued that another ship, the bombketch, ought to

evolve into a new class of ship as well so that the battleship can remain in its intended

role at sea.71

In the engagements surrounding Port Arthur, James continued to view Japanese

naval action as a precursor to its inevitable fleet engagement with the Russian fleet. By

mining the entrance to Port Arthur, James claimed that Admiral Togo intended to “entice

the Russian squadron out to sea” for fleet action and drive the remnants of the enemy

fleet through the previously lain minefield.72 While this strategy proved successful,

James highlighted that the Japanese did not fully control the seas, noting that the Russian

cruiser squadron in Vladivostok still managed to attack Japanese transports headed to

Manchuria. Despite this setback, James still emphasized the importance of seizing Port

Arthur for Japanese naval strategy. Acknowledging Japanese fear of Russian fleet

reinforcements, James argued that “if they [the Japanese] could succeed in gaining

possession of the stronghold [Port Arthur], they at once quadrupled the difficulties of any

attempt on Russia’s part to regain her lost sea supremacy.” 73 Reiterating Mahan’s claim

for the mutual dependency of seaports and fleets, James noted that without a major

seaport like Port Arthur to fall back on, Russian sea power would essentially collapse.

70 Ibid., p. 187 71 The “bombketch” refers to a ship introduced at the time of Mahan’s historical study of sea power. Using the mortar as its primary weapon, the ship was intended for supporting land operations by bombarding fixed enemy positions. Interestingly, this ship is not encountered in Mahan’s study. 72 James, p. 38 73 Ibid., pp. 42, 45

After the fall of Port Arthur to the Japanese in January 1905, the naval war

quieted down for a time. Japan had gained control of the sea, but its method was not

entirely consistent with Mahanian theory, especially with the torpedo attack at Port

Arthur in February 1904 and the destruction of the Russian fleet by the IJA.

Nevertheless, Repington, James, and Burleigh persisted in reinterpreting contradictions

into Mahanian terms, thus maintaining its perceived relevance in naval warfare. If

uncertainty remained amongst correspondents and their readers at this point, their

concerns over the validity of Mahanism would be dispelled in the summer of 1905.

The Decisive Clash: Tsushima

On May 27-28, 1905, the IJN and the newly-arrived Russian Baltic Fleet clashed

at Tsushima. The result was an overwhelming victory for the Japanese fleet that would

ultimately result in the elimination of a second Russian fleet and the Japanese occupation

of Sakhalin Island, compelling the Russians to sue for peace. With the Treaty of

Portsmouth signed on September 5, 1905, Japan won a favorable settlement in the war.

In the eyes of Repington and James (Burleigh’s account ends before the Battle of

Mukden in early 1905), this victory confirmed the validity of several elements within

Mahan’s theories of naval warfare, especially the superiority of artillery over torpedoes in fleet engagements.

As the Russian Baltic Fleet slowly made its way to the Far East, Repington commented on the potential impact that its arrival would have on the war. According to his reports, Mahan’s theories heavily influenced the naval strategy of both sides. He

claimed that Russian authorities had the impression “that a successful naval action with

Admiral Togo will at once bring the whole military edifice of the Japanese to the ground with a crash, and that the Russian army will then have nothing to do but pick up the pieces.”74 However, Repington argued that this Russian assumption only selectively utilized Mahan’s theory of naval strategy. He insisted that a Russian naval victory would be costly and indecisive, as the remnants of the Baltic Fleet would not be able to disrupt communications in the seas between Manchuria and Japan due to the large number of secondary Japanese bases, whose “avenues [of communications], being unlimited and not shown on any chart, cannot be commanded by a limited force.”75

In comparing the two fleets, Repington noted the Russian fleet’s superiority in capital ships, while the IJN had superiority in cruisers and torpedo boats. With this in mind, he attempted to predict the appropriate tactics that Admiral Togo would utilize, reiterating the very Mahanian theory that “the object in war is to smash the enemy’s main force and have done with it”:

He is in this position, that he has a dangerously small number of first-class battleships

which he cannot afford to see overwhelmed…His problem is to utilise his superiority in

secondary ships for the benefit of his primary elements, and for the re-establishment of

the balance between these latter and the battleships of the enemy.76

Repington here notes that the IJN was at a major disadvantage in Mahanian terms due to its inferiority in capital ships. Although he notes that it had a superiority in inferior ships, his suggestions to use them to the benefit of the IJN’s capital ships reflects a fairly

Mahanian sentiment towards the usefulness of second-rate ships in a naval engagement.

With this in mind, he alluded to the theory recently presented by a Captain Bacon of the

74 Repington, p. 563 75 Ibid., pp. 564 76 Ibid., p. 571-2

Royal Navy. This British officer advocated that small, fast craft like torpedo boats ought

to be sacrificed against the enemy’s capital ships before a major fleet engagement to the

advantage of their fleet’s own capital ships, which Repington equated to “an exhilarating

naval cavalry charge.”77 While Mahan does not consider this in his own work – he

steered clear of tactical theories, stating that “theories about the naval warfare of the

future are almost wholly presumptive,” the strategy of concentration against capital ships

in a fleet engagement remained the overall principle in this obscure work by Bacon.78 In a later note on this article from April 15, Repington reminded readers of his compiled work that the Japanese actually reversed Bacon’s tactics, although he believed that “the spirit of Captain Bacon’s advice was adhered to.”79 How Repington reached this odd

conclusion in consideration of the actual events at Tsushima is unclear, considering he

was essentially expecting the Japanese torpedo craft and destroyers to take part in an

intentional “Charge of the Light Brigade” at sea.

On July 7, Repington exclaimed that the Japanese victory at Tsushima “must

inevitably exercise a predominant influence upon naval policy, construction, armament,

tactics, and training for many years to come.”80 With this result, Repington told his

readers that the war ought to end. Interestingly, he concluded that the Japanese could not

have won without the agency of “British seamen and British constructors,” who had

trained and equipped the IJN:

The tactics of the battle bear the impress of the Nelson traditions, the battle-worthiness of

the ships is a tribute to the efficiency of British yards, while the havoc wrought by guns

77 Ibid., p. 573 78 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, p. 2 79 Repington, p. 574n1 80 Ibid., pp. 576-7

made in England appears to justify us in the belief that we can hold our own with the

best.81

Repington’s praise for Lord Horatio Nelson (1758-1805) reflects similar sentiments of

Mahan, who wrote a biography of Nelson in the 1890’s, believing that the “great naval

hero should be developed as the basis for naval education.”82 Additionally, he argues that the course of British naval doctrine, with the influence of Mahan, proved to be the correct course given the results at Tsushima. This attitude also reflects Wilkinson’s argument that British newspaper presentations of Japanese victories “were seen as the crucial indicators of the successful adoption of ‘our’ civilization by the Japanese.”83

Repington, however, did not attempt to analyze the battle itself, choosing to present

Admiral Togo’s own official account, which offers its own allusions to naval strategy advocated by Mahan. He stated that the fleet “adopted the strategy of awaiting him

[Russian Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky] and striking at him in home waters,” concluding that “the fate of the Empire depends upon this event.” Within an hour of engaging the Russian main squadron with gunfire, Togo claimed that “the result of the battle had been decided in this interval.” 84 The following engagements of Togo’s

destroyers and torpedo boats, then, had little decisive effect on the outcome.

Unlike Repington, James attempted to offer his own detailed account of the battle.

Despite the Russian superiority in battleships, James noted that the IJN had superiority in

other areas, particularly cruisers. Additionally, he claimed that naval opinion favored the

chances of the IJN:

81 Ibid., p. 579 82 Lambert, p. 173 83 Wilkinson, p. 40 84 Repington, pp. 580, 582, 583

To sum up, naval opinion placed great faith in the swift Japanese armored cruisers.

Collectively, Togo’s fleet was superior in homogeneity, pace, total gun-power, morale,

and, most importantly, strategical position.85

While he does acknowledge the Japanese superiority in torpedo boats, James chose to

emphasize the “total gun-power” of the IJN compared to the Russian Baltic Fleet. Like

Mahan, James does not seem entirely won over to the decisiveness of the torpedo in naval

war. Additionally, while historians have incessantly noted Mahan’s favoritism towards

battleships, he approaches the subject of fleet engagements more broadly in Influence of

Sea Power. In constructing a navy for the strategic purpose of seeking out fleet

engagements, Mahan simply argued that “it requires a navy equal in number and superior

in efficiency,” not necessarily implying that it be constructed mainly of large

battleships.86 Additionally, in describing the battle, James confirmed the report made by

Togo of the decisive effect of the first hour of battle, noting that “gunnery won the

victory, the torpedo simply completed it.” Once again, James reiterated the superiority of

guns over torpedoes.

Conclusion

If the past events of the Russo-Japanese War had left doubts in the minds of

Repington or James, the Battle of Tsushima erased them. With this battle came the

decisive fleet engagement called for by Mahan that gave Japan the uncontested control of

the seas in East Asia and helped lead to a relatively favorable peace at Portsmouth.

Interestingly, both authors had essentially embraced Mahan’s theories before the battle

had even started. With Burleigh finishing his account beforehand and the decreased level

85 Ibid., p. 211 86 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, p. 534

31 of analysis of the battle by Repington and James compared to previous engagements, it appears that Mahanism had prevailed before Tsushima, or perhaps the Russo-Japanese

War itself, had even begun.

In the naval war, British war correspondents entered East Asia with a preexisting discourse of naval warfare that they projected onto their analyses of the conflict, a discourse that seemed to have trapped them. The Japanese or the Russians themselves did not figure prominently into their writing on the naval war. Rather, the naval doctrine of Mahanism and their insistence on its validity overrode a deeper analysis of the

Japanese and the Russians in the naval war, which they viewed as a test of British naval doctrine rather than a test of Russian and Japanese capabilities. However, as Chapter II will discuss, the results of the Russo-Japanese War threatened other prewar discourses of these correspondents, particularly regarding cultural conceptions of the Orient as a realm of inferior power. While these correspondents sought to reconcile Orientalist discourse through somewhat contradictory revisions, the Russo-Japanese War seems to have become a historical event that not only allowed Europeans to project their preexisting ideas upon the East but also marked the declining validity of the very discourse of

Orientalism.

CHAPTER II

A WAR FULL OF OTHERS

Introduction

Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) has had a profound influence on the historical

study of Western representations of the East. Focusing on the Middle East, Said asserted

that Orientalism is the “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority

over the Orient” in terms of academic, political, and imaginative discourse.87 As a

discourse, Orientalism served to justify and reinforce European imperialism as it situated

the Occident in a self-imposed hegemonic position over the Orient. Since its publication,

Orientalism has received criticism by historians and its methodology and arguments have

evolved in various studies. In the Russo-Japanese War, the Orientalism adopted by

British war correspondents to culturally justify a nation’s victory or defeat contained

considerable fluidity to it. Influenced by Social Darwinism, European conceptions of

nationalism, and anxieties towards modernity, these correspondents did not see the status

of “Oriental” and “Occidental” as concrete states of being. Rather, they perceived that

mutually-reinforcing social, military, and political development served as the keys to a

nation’s emergence, regeneration, and survival, as an uneven balance amongst these

factors would ultimately result in disaster.

Compared to other regions, Japan has a unique place within the discourse of

Orientalism. East Asianist Richard Minear pointed out that Japan did not figure into the

imagination of Europe until the time of Marco Polo and intensive contact did not exist

87 Edward Said, Orientalism (Vintage: New York 1994) p. 3

between the two cultures until Matthew Perry’s expedition in 1854. Thus, “Japanese

studies never experienced the naked ‘authority over the Orient’ which Said sees as an

integral part of Orientalism.” Minear’s consideration of Orientalism in Japan takes note

of two caveats: Japan did not “wait for the West to discover its own past, its history, its

identity,” and the link of “imperial military power” to Japanese Orientalism did not

exist.88 While this is true, Said did not argue that the discourse and imperialist activity occurred simultaneously, but rather the discourse predated imperialism, which created a loop through which both Orientalist discourse and imperialism provided feedback to one another. Upon opening contacts with Japan in the mid-19th century, the West already had

its own discourse for the non-West that they could recreate and impose upon Japan.

Furthermore, considering imperial politics surrounding the Russo-Japanese War, Western imperialism did indeed begin encroaching on Japan, particularly with the West denying it the gains it had made in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), President Theodore

Roosevelt’s arbitration of the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) ending the Russo-Japanese

War, and the rejection of Japan’s request for a clause acknowledging racial equality in the Covenant of the League of Nations following the First World War. While such actions did not result in an actual imperial project as Japan, unlike China and India, developed the capability to defend itself against such ambitions, Western imperial and racial politics had begun encroaching on Japan.

Perhaps most unique to Japan’s place within Orientalism is the military discourse associated with it. Despite any assumptions of Oriental “inferiority,” Westerners did not entirely have a negative picture of the “martial traits” of non-Western cultures. In fact,

88 Richard Minear, “Orientalism and the Study of Japan,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3 (May, 1980), pp. 514-515

Western powers often employed non-Western troops – under the command of Western

officers – as part of their imperial projects, such as the French tirailleurs (or Charles

Mangin’s La Force Noire) and the British employment of “primitive” Orientals like

Gurkhas and Sikhs in the Indian Army. In many ways, the Orientalist characterization of martial traits helped serve the interests of the Western imperialist project. When observing Japan, Western observers seem to have identified the Japanese as a martial race, particularly with the fascination they had for the samurai class and Bushido. The

British, however, did not show a particular interest in directly incorporating Japan into its empire like other Eastern regions. Rather, by allying with Japan in 1902, it used Japan to ease the costs of imperial defense in the Pacific and create a buffer against Russian expansion.

In his recent work entitled Military Orientalism (2009), defense studies expert

Patrick Porter applied Orientalism to the study of war and culture, particularly when considering Western military conceptions of the East in the contexts of “tactics to strategy, morale to morality, casualty tolerance to authority” in Western military studies, from Ancient Persia to present-day struggles with the Taliban.89 From this perspective, it

is important to consider the ways in which war correspondents culturally conceived and

represented the combatants of the Russo-Japanese War. Porter defines Orientalism as

“the dynamics of cultural perception within a complex set of relationships, as opposed to

a coherent, single ideology, or as opposed to the approach of Edward Said, who defined it as a continuous ‘system of ideas and ‘imaginative geography.’” Essentially, Orientalism becomes a means through which Westerners debate “about themselves, their own societies and policies, through visions of the Orient” and often entails “a history of

89 Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism, p. 2

Western anxieties, ranging from fear to envy to self-criticism.”90 In the Russo-Japanese

War, Porter argues that military Orientalism treated the “foreign ‘Other’…as a superior

model to inform self-examination.” With regards to the colonial or racial context of

military Orientalism, Porter notes that military defeat at the hands of the Other – such as

at Italy’s defeat to Ethiopia at Adowa in 1896 or Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese

War – threatened to challenge Western identity. When such threats arose, Porter states

that the West adapted often by presenting such enemies as “kindred Westerners.”91

Interestingly, this was not entirely the case with British perceptions of Japan in the

Russo-Japanese War. Perhaps the closest these correspondents came to acknowledging

some kind of kinship with the Japanese comes from Burleigh, who speculated that they

were “of belated Malay origin” and “kin to the race…that spread over North Europe,

until cleared off by the white branches of the Aryan family.”92 Despite Japan’s victory in

the war, Burleigh only went as far as to link Japanese kinship to a branch of Northern

European peoples wiped out by his own “white” race.

In his analysis of Orientalist discourse during the Russo-Japanese War, Porter

argued that negative British perceptions of their own society – particularly their perceived

inability to endure a future war – led observers to idealize their East Asian ally, Japan,

whose example they believed “held out the promise of regeneration and change.”93 As

his work focuses mainly on the Orientalist views of intellectuals, military professionals,

and policymakers, Porter focused primarily on the military observers of the conflict

(including Hamilton), with a limited number of press correspondents (Repington, B.W.

90 Porter, pp. 14, 18 91 Ibid., pp. 37, 108 92 Burleigh, p. 10 93 Porter, pp. 85-109

Norregaard of the Daily Mail, and Francis McCullagh of the New York Herald and

Manchester Guardian). Additionally, Porter’s analysis focused primarily on Japan.

Given the European racial views of Eastern inferiority and stagnation prevalent in this era of imperialism, it is necessary to understand how observers of the war interpreted the defeat of Russia, an empire ambiguously defined as Occidental (much like the geography of the Occident itself), and the place of Japan amongst other Oriental peoples. While quite possibly observers embraced the Japanese as “kindred Westerners” in the war, they still perceived Japanese Otherness.

This chapter proposes to consider the British war correspondents of the Russo-

Japanese War as agents of Orientalist discourse. In this context, correspondents shaped

Orientalist discourse to adhere to their own non-Orientalist conceptions on the interrelation of military and social development linked with Social Darwinism and nationalistic sentiments. While such an approach did not necessarily entail perceptions of

Oriental inferiority or overt imperialist ambitions, it did perceive Otherness. Within the context of Said’s Orientalism, war correspondents perhaps fall best into the category of amateur enthusiasts and travel writers in the Orient – or “generically determined writing” as defined by Said, such as Gustave Flaubert, Richard Burton, Gérard de Nerval, T.E.

Lawrence, and others.94 While these correspondents did not necessarily create their own

Orientalist discourse while in East Asia, they were products and perpetuators of the tradition which influenced the way in which they wrote on the war and the peoples they encountered, particularly the belligerents from Japan and Russia. When they encountered the defeat of Russia to Japan, they attempted to reconcile such a contradiction to the

Orientalist tradition by framing the Russo-Japanese War through contemporary European

94 Said, p. 202

conceptions of nationalism and Social Darwinism, thus maintaining the intellectual

hegemony of Orientalism.

Japan: A “Nation’s Soul” Modernized

According to Said, “Orientals were rarely seen or looked at; they were seen

through not as citizens, or even people, but as problems to be solved or confined

or…taken over.” In the era surrounding the Russo-Japanese War, the Orient to the

European imagination was “a place isolated from the mainstream of European progress in

the sciences, arts, and commerce.”95 To British war correspondents, Japan presented an

enigma: an Oriental nation that had successfully molded Western progress to fit into its

own culture, thus allowing it to succeed in its war against Russia. Although they praised

Japan for the way in which it modernized, correspondents still predominantly saw the

country from a place of superiority, highlighting Japan’s backwardness, superficial modernity, cultural peculiarities, and, in essence, Otherness. Nevertheless, these same

correspondents almost universally argued that Japan’s superficial modernization, which

allowed it to maintain its “primitive” and “warlike” abilities, was the key to its success in

the war.

According to British war correspondents of the Russo-Japanese War, progress had

brought Britain its dominant position in the world, yet they also feared it would

ultimately be its undoing. Hamilton perhaps best articulated this anxiety, stating that

“up-to-date civilisation is becoming less and less capable of conforming to the antique

standards of military virtue.” He believed that Britain had to adapt itself, or “prepare to

go down before some more natural, less complex and less nervous type.” His analysis

95 Ibid., p. 207

relied on a belief that societies underwent a linear process of development. Japan

represented to Hamilton “the overlapping of two stages of civilisation.” As an officer in

the Indian Army, Hamilton believed the Japanese soldier took the shape of a “civilized”

Gurkha, an identification that carried with it both pros and cons:

These [IJA soldiers] were surely Gurkhas; better educated, more civilised: on the other

hand, not quite so powerful or hardy.96

Hamilton here cast the Japanese in the status between the warlike primitive (Gurkha) and

the educated European. They have gained some intelligence, but by doing so have lost

the positive traits of the primitive (power and hardiness). Several correspondents shared

Hamilton’s racial view of Japan as inherently warlike. W. Richmond Smith of the Daily

Telegraph asserted that “what the West has not given the Japanese is their conception of

military duty and service.” Stemming from the “Spartan spirit of the old Samurai,” Japan

had “transferred bodily to the national army” its own indigenous martial culture, which

was once only the privilege of the Samurai.97 Douglas Story of the Daily Express shared views similar to Hamilton towards the Japanese, whom he characterized as barbarians with the “fanatical patriotism” of the Zulu and Dervishes under the “scientific intelligence” of its government and generals.98 Additionally, B.W. Norregaard of the

Daily Mail went as far as to speculate that the military spirit exhibited by Japan would

not last:

With the greater prosperity which will follow after the war there is the possibility of the

disease spreading. So far no alien people has come under the influence of Western

96 Sir Ian Hamilton, A Staff Officer’s Scrap-Book during the Russo-Japanese War, vol. I (Edward Arnold: London 1907) pp. 9-10 97 W. Richmond Smith, The Siege and Fall of Port Arthur (Eveleigh Nash: London 1905) p. 26 98 Douglas Story, The Campaign with Kuropatkin (T. Werner Laurie: London 1905) pp. 248, 253

civilization without losing more than it has gained. Japan is the only exception. Will it

remain so?99

As correspondents perceived that Japan still remained in a “semi-barbaric” state, it remained possible that Japanese society would fall victim to the effects of prosperity and

urbanization that came with modernity, just as the West had already experienced.

Therefore, as the West strove to cure its “disease” over time, the Japanese had yet to

catch or feel the symptoms of it. Norregaard and other correspondents cited this

possibility at Port Arthur, noting that one particular regiment (2nd Reserve) recruited from

a wealthy area of Japan refused to advance at one point in the siege.100

The perception that Japan had only modernized superficially presented itself throughout the works of correspondents. In considering this aspect of Japanese culture, correspondents showed a tendency to present it “like some aspect of the West.”101 To

Hamilton and many correspondents, Japan represented medieval civilization modernized.

Hamilton asserted that “the Japanese are just as civilised as would be the Black Prince

and his army” with the advantage of a “thorough good German education grafted on their

unformed mediaeval minds.” William Maxwell of the Standard shared similar

sentiments, arguing that the Japanese still lived under the codes of its former feudal

society. Thus, the Japanese would become like the West, but a past version of the West rather than equivalent to it.102 He claimed that this “short-cut” to modernity allowed

Japan to maintain its medieval culture in a modern context, thus avoiding the Oriental

99 B.W. Norregaard, The Great Siege: The Investment and Fall of Port Arthur (Methuen and Co.: London 1906) p. 308 100 See Norregaard, p. 135, 307-308, and accounts from other correspondents at Port Arthur regarding the IJA 2nd Reserve Regiment. See also Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, Port Arthur: The Siege and Capitulation (William Blackwood and Sons: London 1906) pp. 497-498 101 Said, p. 67 102 William Maxwell, From the Yalu to Port Arthur (Hutchinson and Co.: London 1906) p. 17

qualities of “luxury, sensuality and nerves” affecting European modernity.103 Repington,

by contrast, focused almost exclusively on Bushido, which incorporated “ideals of

knightly chivalry and of Spartan simplicity.”104 The correspondents’ infatuation with

Bushido presented it (in addition to its deification of the Mikado, or Emperor) as the defining characteristic of modern Japanese society. According to Burleigh, “the modern

Japanese has no religion, no system of rewards or punishments, but is only taught to

revere the past and admire the deeds of the Samurai, the fighting-men.” There is no other

driving force or complexity to Japanese society, which is merely developed and driven by

what Burleigh called its “feudal nursery system.” Aside from Bushido, Burleigh asserted

that Japan had created nothing uniquely Japanese. Rather, it owed its arts and religion,

although Burleigh stated that “exact creeds do not thrive in Japan,” to China, Korea, and

India.105 For any other aspect of culture aside from Bushido, Japan looked elsewhere

rather than create something of its own, as it did with the West and modernization.

Despite the advantages of Japan perceived by Hamilton and correspondents, they

did not go as far as to conclude that Japan as a nation was inherently superior to Britain.

Rather, they identified Otherness and potential disadvantages of the Japanese character

that would deem them inferior in other circumstances. Story believed that Japanese

success stemmed from their “intense absorption in the affair of the moment,” a quality

that he saw as indicative of the “better” humanity of the Russians, who revealed to him a

“breadth of view” that allowed them to think beyond their military occupations.106

Hamilton concluded that the Japanese were collectively “slow thinkers,” incapable of

103 Hamilton, vol. I, p. 16 104 Repington, p. 381 105 Burleigh, p. 10 106 Story, pp. 90-91

genius, but still capable of accurate thinking. Nevertheless, his nationalist pride led him

to insist that “the Japanese army…surpasses any European army, excepting only the

British army at its best.”107 Some correspondents even claimed to have found biological

evidence to explain Japan’s success in modern warfare. According to Smith, there was

one principle reason why Japanese soldiers proved capable of enduring battlefield

wounds:

The principal reason for this is that they have an entirely different nervous system from

Western peoples. In fact, what one saw during every visit to the field and stationary

hospitals was convincing proof that in all cases the wounded had few nerves and in some

none at all.

Along with Norregaard and Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett of the Times, Smith attributed this biological Otherness to Japan’s diet of fish and rice, which “is not a diet calculated to produce great vitality,” and its cultural stoicism, which allowed (or required, according to

Smith) Japanese surgeons to operate without anesthetics.108 Additionally, this diet also

led to the contraction of an ‘Other’ disease in the war referred to as “Beri-beri.”109 Thus,

the almost superhuman ability of the Japanese at Port Arthur to sustain enormous

casualties was a testament to both biological and cultural Otherness. Francis McCullagh

of the Guardian, who spent the war with the Russians until captured by the IJA at

Mukden, wrote with Orientalist terror of the Japanese “banzai,” or what he referred to as

the cry “for the blood of white men”:

It is like the cry of wild, invulnerable tribes! It is like the defiant shrieks of Dervishes! It

swells on the air like a fierce Oriental Marseillaise. In this abrupt, staccato roar is

107 Hamilton, vol. I, pp. 4-5. 16 108 Smith, p. 270, 275; See also Norregaard, pp. 118-119; Bartlett, pp. 484-486 109 See Norregaard, p. 120; Smith, p. 280; Bartlett, pp. 105-106; David H. James, The Siege of Port Arthur: Records of an Eye-Witness (T. Fisher Unwin: London 1905) pp. 22, 100

something foreign, repugnant, disquieting. It does not belong to the European

brotherhood. It does not come from Christian lips. It does not even seem to come from

human beings.110

McCullagh perhaps represented the most outward Orientalist depiction of the Japanese

amongst correspondents. While some looked upon the “banzai” with fascination, he

interpreted it as disturbing evidence of Japanese Otherness, reminding him of the cries of

the Dervishes in Sudan and, perhaps even more terrifying to British memory, the French

Revolution Orientalized. With Yellow Peril sentiments, he feared the “terrible fellows” that called themselves Japanese, believing their “fanatical patriotism” and “superhuman

perseverance” would one day challenge Western supremacy as it made them “demons for

warfare.”111

Even with Japan’s success in the war and the admiration they shared regarding its

transformation, correspondents continually denied the equality of the Japanese to

Europeans in various ways, focusing particularly on intelligence, rationality, and

Japanese peculiarity – especially its poor cavalry force, which correspondents universally

found abhorrent – that could not translate into a European context. Smith often wrote of

the Japanese in terms that almost questioned their humanity, particularly emphasizing

what he perceived their “lower vitality.” Despite having German-trained doctors, the

Japanese to Smith were better surgeons than doctors, best suited for the mechanical work

with a knife rather than the intelligence required of a diagnostician. Essentially, Japanese

doctors to Smith were mechanical, yet lacking in creative capabilities. Additionally,

Smith and others perceived several cultural contradictions in Japan. According to Smith,

110 Francis McCulllagh, With the Cossacks, Being the Story of an Irishman who Rode with the Cossacks throughout the Russo-Japanese War (Eveleigh Nash: London 1906) p. 110 111 Ibid., p. 234

the “Japanese as a nation know little or nothing about even the elementary principles of sanitation,” despite having high standards of personal and domestic cleanliness.112

Norregaard also attributed to Japanese culture the irrational decision-making resulting in the high casualty rates at Port Arthur. As the battle required European-style siege tactics involving entrenchment and sapping, Norregaard claimed that such a system opposed the natural tenacity and fortitude of the Japanese, who preferred open assaults and close- quarter fighting. As a result, Japanese troops did not sufficiently complete sapping operations, compelling them to advance in the open over greater distances against

Russian fortifications.113 Additionally, the second general assault on Port Arthur on

October 30, 1904, which Norregaard, Smith, and others estimated resulted in 10,000

Japanese casualties, was the product of Japanese sentimentality – General Nogi sought to present the Emperor with the gift of Port Arthur for his birthday on November 3 – rather

than rational calculation.114 Story criticized the continued “barbarism” of Japan, citing in

particular its lack of a free press (stemming from his experience with strict censorship) or

freedom of speech. Additionally, he claimed that Japan had obstructed the British and

other powers from mediating a peaceful solution to the problems that had sparked the

war, declaring that it “sooner or later, must depend upon the great English-speaking

nations for protection from the glacier of Russia.” Since it ignored Britain and the United

States in 1904, Japan would “marvel at their unresponsiveness” in the future, thus making

its gains in the war only temporary.115

112 Smith, p. 275, 277 113 Norregaard, p. 166 114 See the accounts of Smith, Norregaard, Bartlett, and James and their corresponding chapters on the second general assault on Port Arthur. 115 Story, The Campaign with Kuropatkin, p. 43

Correspondents also observed what they saw as uniquely Japanese traits that translated into military success, such as the ability to work in the cramped positions of trenches and mines and its espionage system. Smith and others claimed that “no other soldiers in the world” could work in such positions, “but it was the position the Japanese always take even when sitting in their own houses.” Additionally, he cited that the philosophical nature of the Japanese allowed them an “immovability and patience which would be impossible to Western troops.”116 Ernest Brindle of the Daily Mail pointed to the “few needs of the Japanese soldiers” that simplified logistics and organization “to a point without parallel in modern times.”117 Correspondents also almost universally pointed to the Japanese as the “poorest horsemen, the word ‘horsemen’ being taken in its widest significance.”118 Story concluded that the IJA’s lack of effective cavalry resulted in their inability to “secure the fruits of their victory, to clear the ground of their demoralised enemy.”119 Thus, its lack of cavalry denied Japan any decisive victory in the course of the war. Correspondents also highlighted what they perceived as a Japanese disregard for life on the battlefield exhibited in the war. Story condemned the

“barbarism” of the Japanese that resulted in looting, “the absence of quarter,” and an attack on a Western missionary at Liaoyang.120 James at Port Arthur claimed to have witnessed Japanese soldiers impale themselves on Russian bayonets at the orders of their officer (“Throw yourselves on their bayonets, honourable comrades!” he [the officer] shouted; “those who come behind will do the rest.”) to capture a trench. As eight men

116 Smith, pp. 313, 392 117 Ernest Brindle, With Russian, Japanese and Chunchuse: The Experiences of an Englishman during the Russo-Japanese War (John Murray: London 1905) p. 110 118 Norregaard, p. 133 119 Story, p. 143 120 Ibid., p. 237

followed these orders, James described an almost animalistic frenzy of a pack of Japanese

“war-dogs” inflicting a massacre on the Russian defenders who could not free their bayonets from the bodies.121 Lord Brooke of Reuter’s, alluding to the IJA casualties at

Liaoyang, informed his readers that “eye-witnesses assure me that it is impossible to

exaggerate the utter disregard of death exhibited by the Japanese.”122 Maurice Baring of

the Morning Post recalled the horror of Russian officers, who depicted a scene where

“line after line of Japanese came smiling up to the trenches to be mown down with

bullets, until the trenches were full of bodies, and then more came on over the bodies of

the dead.”123 Where the primitive Japanese “smiled” at death, the “civilized” Russians

looked upon it with horror.

One perceived peculiarity most cited by correspondents was the massive Japanese

espionage system and its “fog of secrecy,” which Maxwell claimed made them “the most

Oriental of people,” in the war.124 However, correspondents saw this system as a product

of the Oriental mind that Occidentals would never have considered under different

circumstances. James asserted that the Japanese went beyond lengths ever contemplated

by Europeans to gather intelligence, claiming that high-ranking Japanese officers

accepted “menial posts in all quarters of the globe in the service of those from whom they

have something to learn.”125 Correspondents also insisted that espionage was not a

system culturally compatible in the West. Story declared that “the closer one sees it, the

less one esteems it as a profession for the man of Western birth.” Noting the omnipresence of Japanese spies behind Russian lines – disguised often as Chinese

121 “O” (James), The Yellow War (McClure, Phillips and Co.: New York 1905) pp. 299-300 122 Lord Brooke, An Eye-Witness in Manchuria (Eveleigh Nash: London 1905) p. 145 123 Maurice Baring, With the Russians in Manchuria (Methuen and Co.: London 1905) p. 132 124 Maxwell, p. 134 125 James, A Study of the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 13-14

coolies, peasants, and even in one instance as a hairdresser to Russian officers, he declared that Japanese espionage “cost the Russians more lives in this war than Japanese strategy or Japanese leadership.”126 Thus, the peculiarities of ‘Eastern’ war, found

distasteful by the West, rather than military capabilities on the battlefield, resulted in

Japanese success in the war.

In viewing Japanese society and its “way of war,” British correspondents sought

to understand how a society withstood the strains of modern war. While many did

attempt to advocate or highlight many military and social observations made of Japan

during the war, they also contradicted their efforts in their presentation of Otherness.

Highlighting various Japanese peculiarities, correspondents in a way presented a society

very distinct from that of Britain and other Western nations. Thus, while correspondents

attempted to draw particular lessons from Japan in the war, it seems that their own

notions of Orientalism hindered such efforts.

Russia: The Decline into Oriental Despotism

With Russia’s defeat by Japan, the West faced an intellectual dilemma: how did

Russia, the nation that defeated Napoleon and a major force in European diplomacy, lose

to Japan, an Oriental nation? The fluid nature of Orientalism and notions of Social

Darwinism influenced the response of British correspondents. Although some

correspondents characterized Russia as Western despite its declining status following the

Crimean War (1854-1856), many isolated it into the category of “Slav” or “partially

126 Story, pp. 173-174, 181, 186-187. The story of the Japanese hairdresser is also in James, The Yellow War pp. 95-97. These accounts of a spy disguised as a hairdresser is intriguing as it made its way into William Le Queux’s bestseller, The Invasion of 1910 (1906), with German soldiers disguised as hairdressers in London preparing for a German invasion. For other accounts of Japanese spies in the war, see Brooke p. 55.

Western.” Additionally, they also presented Russia as a society that had once attained the

status of “Western,” but had declined to the status of “Oriental” due to the corruption and

negligence of the Tsarist government to vigilantly improve the country as a whole.

In Orientalizing Russia, correspondents did not characterize it with significant

hostility. In fact, many correspondents advocated creating closer ties with Russia

(perhaps due to fears of the “Yellow Peril”) and sympathized with the Russian people.

Some correspondents hoped that the Russo-Japanese War would spark Russian

regeneration. The best example of this was in the allusions of correspondents to the

Russian Revolution of 1905 caused by the war. Repington hoped that “Russian history

may trace the earliest dawn of real emancipation from this useless, bloody, and disastrous

war,” believing that without the war, “Russia might have borne her chains, without hope

of redemption, for another fifty years.”127 Leaving East Asia to following the uprisings

in Warsaw and Tiflis (Tbilisi) during the Revolution, F.A. McKenzie of the Daily Mail

insisted that the Tsarist government had to reform itself or face its downfall, noting that

“in far too many cases officialism is rotten” and “once the army is weakened the

autocracy has gone.”128 While Repington saw hope in the Revolution, McKenzie was

somewhat alarmed at the prospect of it, hoping that the Russian government would

reform itself under the threat of a general uprising.

With the believed potential for Russian regeneration, some British correspondents

advocated for improving Britain’s diplomatic relationship with Russia, despite the

Dogger Bank Incident (1904) during the Russo-Japanese War that almost led to war

between Britain and Russia. Baring criticized British diplomacy towards Russia,

127 Repington, p. 611 128 Frederick Arthur McKenzie, From Tokyo to Tiflis: Uncensored Letters from the War (Hurst and Blackett: London 1905) pp. 327-328

believing that like with France, “the relations of nations [Britain and France] shift and

change as quickly as those of individuals, and out of the bitterness came the entente.”129

In September 1904, Repington argued in the National Review that “England and Russia have need of each other in order to allow the full and peaceful development of their respective people and subject races,” indirectly alluding to the imperial agitation caused by The Great Game.130 Despite its alliance with Japan, Russian defeat alarmed some

British correspondents perhaps due to Yellow Peril sentiments. In his view of Japan,

McCullagh shared “clash of civilizations” sentiments in his writings:

It [the banzai] is the cry of that strange and monstrous Asia with which Europe has been

at feud for thrice a thousand years. It demands vengeance not only for Port Arthur but for

Kagoshima and Shimonoseki, nay, more, for Salamis…for Plassey, for Kandahar, for

Mindanao.

Oh, England! Oh, my country! What deed is this thou hast done?131

McCullagh saw Japanese victory as a foreboding for the Western powers, lamenting

Britain’s alliance with Japan. At Mukden, he told his readers that he and the

correspondents from Britain, Germany, France, and the United States (“the only White

Powers now left on the face of the earth”) envisioned the “Yellow Wave toppling over us,

it almost seemed to us as if old Europe were undone.”132 Hamilton also shared Yellow

Peril warnings with his readers, insisting that “Japan is our ally, and not one, if I may

presume to judge so early, who will prove ungrateful.”133 Much to his indignation,

Maxwell had to admit the “dangerous argument by analogy” of a Japanese cavalry

129 Baring, p. 196 130 Repington, p. 2 131 McCullagh, p. 110 132 Ibid., p. 286 133 Hamilton, vol. I, p. 12; Some correspondents feared the Yellow Peril from an economic perspective, believing that modernity in East Asia would result in more competing industries and Eastern intellectual influences on Western society. See Story, p. 46

officer, who asserted to him that despite their cavalry and infantry being “darker and smaller” than their European counterparts, they achieved resounding success in warfare.134 In the war, Westerners had to acknowledge the martial abilities of an Oriental

nation, a prospect they viewed with fascination, fear, and distaste.

Despite such sympathy, the descriptions of Russia by correspondents presented a society in decline. In the people of Russia, Repington saw a “patient, silent mass of

inarticulate humanity” deserving of the Britain’s sympathy.135 Correspondents often

portrayed the Russian soldiers in an almost child-like, irrational state incapable of

controlling their passions and inhibitions. Following the surrender of Port Arthur, Smith

claimed that the Russian commander, General Stoessel, had to request Japanese

assistance in restoring order to the city after his troops “broke open bonded warehouses and liquor-stores and drank vodka until the streets were full of drunken soldiers,” a direct result of what Maxwell saw as the Russian garrison’s concern to ensuring an

“inexhaustible store” of alcohol in the siege.136 Norregaard concluded that “Russian soldiers are children of the moment, impressionable and easily moved by changing circumstances.” Rather than strive to persevere in the wake of defeat, Russian soldiers

fell sway to their childlike, violently-changing mood that hindered their warlike abilities.

Lord Brooke also criticized the Russians’ “kind-hearted,” gentle, and sympathetic

attitudes to the Chinese – with the exceptions of being in battle or intoxicated, insisting

that no other European soldier would have behaved in such a way.137 While he

134 Maxwell, p. 371 135 Repington, p. 3 136 Smith, pp. 472-473; Maxwell, p. 364 137 Brooke, p. 45; Brooke came to this conclusion after observing a “Chinaman” chasing off six Russian soldiers that tried stealing his property. Apparently, Brooke thought it was acceptable for a European to steal from Orientals, or meet resistance from an Oriental with violence. See also Baring, p. 45

acknowledged the European identity of the Russians, Brooke still denied their kinship to

the rest of Europe by characterizing their behavior as ‘Other’ to the rest of Europe.

Moreover, he speculated that the “rapid recovery of morale” amongst Russian soldiers in

the war came from “a dulness of imagination…or a simple child-like nature,” which

allowed them to soon forget the “memory of a reverse” and return to “his [the Russians’]

careless self.”138 At the Battle of the Shaho, Maxwell remarked that the Russian army,

“fought with the courage and fatalism of their race” indicative of their declining “aptitude

for war.”139 A once-feared military force in the West had fallen into a decrepit state as

reflected in its defeat to an Oriental army.

Militarily, perhaps most shocking to correspondents was the poor performance of

the once-formidable Cossacks in the war, especially considering the poor quality of

cavalry units employed by the IJA recognized by nearly every correspondent and attaché.

Brindle lamented that “the Cossacks, have in measure lost the fame which at one time

fascinated the attention of the world,” insisting that the “force of the conditions of

warfare imposed upon him in Manchuria” resulted in its decline.140 Maxwell insisted

that the theatre of the Russo-Japanese War was “not a country for cavalry, as the

Cossacks have found.”141 By these statements, like other conclusions made by Western military attachés following the war, the Russo-Japanese War became Orientalized itself, where conditions of Otherness applied to the failure of cavalry such as the Cossack on the

Eastern battlefield.142 Story asserted that cavalry became a burden to Russian tactical

138 Ibid., pp. 172-173 139 Maxwell, p. 266 140 Brindle, pp. 118-119 141 Maxwell, p. 371 142 See Echevarria, After Clausewitz, pp. 121-156; Howard, “Men against Fire,” in Paret, ed., pp. 519-522

circumstances in the war as they lacked the artillery to support them.143 Others, however,

insisted that the Cossacks had declined like the rest of Russian society. Hamilton quoted

the opinion of an IJA Staff officer (General Fukushima), who found the Cossacks had

“lost all of his former Boer attributes, except that of horsemanship, and is now simply a

yokel who is living on the Napoleonic legend.”144

To correspondents, the root cause of Russia’s decay came from the Tsar and his

government, which produced the culture that could not prevail over Japan in the war.

Noting the antagonism between Russia and Britain, Repington places the blame entirely on the Russian government, whose “diplomacy is calculated to tire out the patience of its

best friends” and whose leaders blunder “due to the absence of all serious knowledge of

statecraft.”145 Additionally, he argued that the Tsarist government failed to socially

engineer the Russian people for the demands of modern warfare:

…the fault lay not with the army itself, but with an effete and pernicious system of

government resting on the twin pillars of force and superstition, which had left the mass

of a great people in the slough of ignorance, and when the day of trial came demanded

the attributes of freemen from the son of serfs.146

Like other correspondents, Repington shows a belief in the positive influences of state- driven social engineering, particularly through the medium of education. While Japan

became a successful model of modernization from above, Russia became a model for

utter backwardness and stagnation created from above, admired for the achievements of

its past and despised for the state of its present. Additionally, some correspondents

perceived that the policies of the Tsarist government socially engineered the Russian

143 Story, p. 143 144 Hamilton, vol. I, p. 33 145 Repington, pp. 2-3 146 Ibid., p. 611

people in an improper direction. Brindle saw the Russian soldier as “splendid but

spoiled…a slave to a conservatism as fatal to the development of individual qualities as that of the Chinese mandarin.”147 The Russian people thus became the victims of

Oriental despotism. The Tsarist regime represented the source of Russian stagnation

apparent in the Russo-Japanese War. While correspondents never went as far as to

express any imperial ambitions towards Russia, they believed that Russia required a new

force or influence that would spark progressive change. Hamilton asserted that this state

of affairs had resulted in the decline of its once-powerful military under modern

conditions, claiming that it had peasant soldiers lacking in the “habitude of war,” the

“martial ardour” outside of home defense, and the intelligence to act independently on the battlefield.148 Thus, Russians only fought well for their own individual self-interests as

the Russian government had not sought to instill the education, training, or patriotic ardor that would improve their abilities in modern warfare. In his historical study of Russia,

Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, a Times correspondent at the Portsmouth peace

negotiations, asserted in his historical study of Russia that unlike the nobility, the

peasantry was never compelled to abandon its “primitive moral habitat” by the Tsarist

government in Russian history. Thus, for a time, the greatest successes of the Tsarist

regime came under the leadership of Tsars like Peter the Great, who attempted to socially

engineer a portion of Russian society to accept modern reforms. As the Tsars began to

abandon such policies, Wallace claimed that the new noble culture lost control of itself,

with the Russian nobility constantly adopting “foreign manners, customs, and

institutions” without any governing force to control or direct such influences into

147 Brindle, p. 114 148 Hamilton, vol. I, p. 10

something uniquely Russian.149 Essentially, Wallace depicted Russian society as a product of a chaotic system of government, which neither encourages the development of

its peasantry nor controls the development of its nobility.

Correspondents often remarked on what they saw as the backwards, superstitious

religious beliefs of Russians. Story saw Russian religious devotion as “strangely pathetic,” driving Russian soldiers to “sing their hymns with a manly conviction that is given to no western nation.”150 Brindle believed that Russian Orthodoxy left the

Russians “children in knowledge,” forced to remain in such a state “by a feudal system of

government which permits no revolt against the ways of orthodoxy.” While he wondered

if Russia would benefit from the eradication of such a religion, he concluded that “his

[the Russian soldier’s] simple faith alone saved him from a dark and pitiable life.”151

Wallace saw Russian conceptions of religion, especially amongst the peasantry, as a result of stagnation in the “Eastern Church,” and its Otherness to that of Western

Protestantism:

Primitive mankind is everywhere and always disposed to regard religion as simply a mass

of mysterious rites, which have a secret and magical power of averting evil in this world

and securing felicity in the next…the Russian Church has not done all it might have done

to eradicate this conception and to bring religion into closer association with ordinary

morality.

Influenced by Russian religion, the Russian people remained in a primitive state and

outside of Wallace’s perceptions of “ordinary morality,” which influenced such acts as a

robber that “commends his undertaking to the protection of the saints.” Additionally, he

149 Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, Russia (Cassell and Company, Limited: London 1912) pp. 248-249; The first edition was written in 1877 and based on Wallace’s six years of residence in Russia. He began revising and expanding the book in 1905. 150 Story, p. 197 151 Brindle, pp. 115-116

asserted that the influence of Russian Orthodoxy discouraged the development of primary

education as it did not emphasize the reading of scripture as did Protestantism. Wallace

also noted that Orthodoxy did not develop any conceptions of Protestant “inner religious

life” or theology, which resulted in the “unbounded, childlike confidence in the saving

efficacy of the rites which he practices.”152 Thus, the peasantry, content with adhering to

religious ceremonies rather than developing a Western, or Protestant, sense of self-

improvement, remained in a childlike and fatalistic religious state.

Correspondents also applied their own racial explanations to the defeat of Russia

in the war. Influenced perhaps by European trends of highlighting racial or national

identity in this period, they alluded to the “Slavic” or “multi-racial” character of the

Russians. Story regarded the racial diversity of the Russian officer corps as both the

strength and weakness of the Russian army. He admired their linguistic abilities and

cultural adaptability, but criticized their tendency to be “nervous” fighters.153 On his

train ride from Moscow to Manchuria, Baring noted that “there is a Teutonic mass of

rules and regulations, but the Slav temperament is not equal to the task of insisting on

their literal execution.” The Slavic character of the Russians – which Baring found akin

to the Irish character of the Irish – was incapable of comprehending or effectively running a complex bureaucracy, an emerging part of the machinery of modern warfare and society. While Baring placed much of the blame on the Russian system, he believed that “its most crying faults are inherent in the Russian national character,” citing particularly a lack of discipline from both officers and enlisted.154 Brooke also insisted

that Europeans could not expect the same “European” behaviors from a Russian as they

152 Wallace, pp. 63-66 153 Story, pp. 84-88 154 Baring, pp. 19, 189

were a “race of soldiers both ‘old fashioned’ and half-Oriental.”155 The closest he came to attributing “European” characteristics to Russians was to compare their martial abilities to the Spaniards:

The Russian character appears to me unmethodical, a lack of forethought is

manifest…the manana of the Spaniards. This state of mind leads in a battle…to many

orders and counter-orders, inevitably causing much confusion.156

Story also perceived a similar characteristic of the Russian officers, although he found it

to be a positive trait. He referred to it as their fatalism indicative of their common

exclamation of “Nichevo” (“It does not matter”), which Story claimed allowed the

Russians to overcome a potential reverse in morale following a defeat.157 Positive or

negative, Brooke, Baring, and Story observed evidence of a sort of “indifference” amongst Russians inherently “Other” to Europeans.

While British correspondents of the Russo-Japanese War consciously acknowledged the defeat of a European nation, Russia, to Japan, they did not view Russia as a European equal to themselves and the rest of the Western powers. Although its

defeat sparked some alarm amongst correspondents, many attempted to rationalize that

Russia was inherently “Other” to the rest of Europe and therefore backwards and inferior.

Although once revered by Europe as a formidable power, the war suggested to them that

the Tsarist government had caused Russian society to stagnate, which resulted in its

inability to succeed in the conditions of modern warfare.

155 Brooke, p. 168 156 Ibid., p. 229 157 Story, pp. 89-90

Conclusion

As stated by Said, the different views of the Orient and the Russo-Japanese War

shared by British war correspondents “can be characterized as exclusively manifest

differences, differences in form and personal style, rarely in basic content.”158 To

Hamilton and correspondents, success and failure in war resulted from a society’s

inherent warlike nature and its ability to nurture such a nature over time, an anxiety held

by many in Britain at the time. In interpreting an inherent warlike nature in societies,

conceptions of nationalism – of self and other – dictated the cultural explanations of correspondents, in addition to beliefs in Social Darwinism, which called for constant

social and political intervention in culture to maintain a “martial spirit” lest it weaken

from a lack of vigilance. Japan’s victory proved to correspondents the warlike nature of

the Japanese, while the defeat of Russia stirred observations of societal indifference that

resulted in military and cultural decline.

However, with the influence of Orientalist discourse looming in the minds of

British correspondents, it seems that while they praised Japan’s societal ability to fight a

war and become a power in its own right, they applied a heavy Otherness to the

conditions of the war and Japan’s victory. In essence, they saw the Russo-Japanese War

as a war between Others. They perceived the Japanese as culturally, intellectually, and

even biologically Other. They saw their opponent, Russia, as an Other. The environment

the war took place in resulted in a war with Other conditions. When historians lament the

“lessons not learned” from the Russo-Japanese War, it is perhaps important to realize

158 Said, p. 206

how cultural perceptions of Otherness on the part of British correspondents affected the

conclusions they made.159

Nevertheless, the perceptions of Russia and Japan shown at times by these

correspondents resulted in some deep contradictions. Japan, an Oriental and “barbaric”

nation, yet still a cultural and political model for success in modern warfare, had defeated

Russia, an Occidental and “civilized” nation. In their observation of the Russo-Japanese

War, British correspondents seemed to attempt to reconcile preexisting notions of the

Orient from the Orientalist tradition with prevailing conceptions of Social Darwinism,

social engineering, and nationalism. Essentially, Russia and Japan appeared as cases of

an Other within the realm of the Occident and Orient, respectively. While Japan was

indeed Oriental, it was an exceptional Oriental nation endowed with martial traits

nurtured by the policies of the Meiji government, but was only artificially Occidental and

thus remained an Other. Citing Russia’s Slavic nature and the corruption of the Tsarist

government, correspondents maintained Russia as an Occidental nation, culturally and

politically explained its defeat to an Oriental nation, and declared it Other from the rest of

the Occident. Thus, Russia remained an Occidental, Japan an Oriental, and the Occident

maintained its hegemonic position over the Orient. In a sense, with regards to Japan and

Russia, the analyses of British correspondents perhaps showed a “Western ignorance

which becomes more refined and complex.”160 Indeed, such contradictions may have

potentially threatened the hegemonic potential of this discourse, as “orientalist

159 See Porter, “Military Orientalism? British Observers of the Japanese War of War, 1904-1910,” War & Society, Vol. 26, No. 1 (May 2007) p. 12; European and American military theorists, according to Echevarria, did indeed resolve the “military crisis” on a theoretical level, but had problems putting these theories into widespread practice by 1914, thus resulting in the “surprise” of the lethality of the First World War. See Echevarria, After Clausewitz, pp. 224-228; See also Michael Howard, “Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer, 1984), pp. 41-57, particularly pp. 52-57 160 Said, p. 62

constructions are profoundly vulnerable to war’s contingencies, which perhaps explains

why war is such an incitement to orientalist discourse.”161 By turning to European

perceptions of Social Darwinism and nationalism, correspondents sought to maintain the

way in which they knew the Orient as both a source of Otherness and Occidental anxiety.

However, as will be discussed in Chapter III, the roots of these contradictions arose not

from the Orient, but rather from Edwardian cultural fears of modernity in Britain

developing before the Russo-Japanese War.

161 Tarak Barkawi and Keith Stanski, ed., Orientalism and War (Columbia University Press: New York 2013) p. 10

CHAPTER III

EDWARDIAN JAPAN

Introduction

Despite their marked Orientalist discourse, British war correspondents did write

admiringly of particular aspects of Japanese society. However, the particular aspects of

Japanese society that they focused their admiration on were quite specifically linked to

social concerns arising in Edwardian Britain. While they did find Japan’s successful

modernization along Western lines laudable – although not equal to that of the West itself

– correspondents constantly expressed their fascination with what they perceived were

inherent traditions within Japanese society that allowed it not only survive but also thrive

in the modern world. Through this lens, British war correspondents thought more of

themselves and their own society, projecting their own Edwardian discourse on politics, gender norms, and education sparked by Britain’s own modernization. Thus, Japan provided British correspondents at times throughout their narratives an image of how they idealized their own society.

In the Russo-Japanese War, the corrupting influences perceived in Western progress influenced the observations of British war correspondents. To them – as well as many others in Britain, progress brought increased comfort and leisure to society through technology and wealth. In warfare, this technology and wealth translated into more lethal weaponry and greater resources to expand the scope of the battlefield. This situation, however, resulted in a perceived major dilemma, as modern society, having acclimated

itself to an “improved” lifestyle, lost its “martial spirit” and the austerity to win a war under such increasingly demanding conditions. Hamilton and Repington perhaps best

articulated these anxieties in their writings on the war. Hamilton concluded that “up-to- date civilisation is becoming less and less capable of conforming to the antique standards of military virtue.”162 Additionally, Repington believed that progress and modernity had created a culture that could not produce effective armies:

It is not possible to raise, from among a people abandoned to luxury, materialism, and the

cult of undisciplined individualism, armed forces endowed with all the Spartan simplicity

of life, the moral strength, and the sentiment of collective self-sacrifice which distinguish

the warriors of Japan.163

Developments such as feminism, increasing political suffrage, and socialism were found

alarming by many Edwardians in the older established classes, who saw these changes as

symptoms of the “disease” of modernity, which threatened to undermine both their future

status and also British society’s will to defend its world status in a war. Japan had

acquired technology and wealth, but its performance in the Russo-Japanese War showed

correspondents that it had not lost its military abilities or societal resolve. Thus, in

studying the “problem” of Japanese modernity, British correspondents sought to resolve

their own problem: uncontrolled progress.164

Porter included this particular aspect of British observation of the war within his

definition of Military Orientalism, arguing that Japan served as a “rhetorical device” for promoting “state-driven social engineering” to prepare British society for a future war.

Thus, British observers of the Russo-Japanese War shaped their conclusions around this

162 Hamilton, vol. I, p. 5 163 Repington, pp. 606-607 164 Adams, The Great Adventure, p. 5

agenda, resulting in several misperceptions of Japan.165 However, while Porter argued that British observers attempted to draw political and cultural lessons exclusively from a monolithic Japanese society, it is important to realize that the political and social discourse projected onto Japan by correspondents had begun circulating within Britain outside of the influence of Japan.166 Viewing Japanese society, British correspondents

often saw uniformity: a nation void of individuality, extravagance, and all the other

perceived vices of modern culture. Rarely, if at all, did the Japanese stray from this

perceptive mold of British correspondents. If deviation did appear, it had negative connotations. Noting calls by new Japanese intellectuals to abandon bushido, Hamilton denounced their “unpatriotic” desires, supposedly acquired from the corrupting influences of their education at American universities.167 In addition to creating a better

society, homogeneity, according to Norregaard’s view of the IJA, resulted in “the most

perfect engine of war”:

Look at a company of Japanese infantry marching past…They all resemble each other in

face and figure, one sees that they belong to one race which has developed certain

features…The sight, therefore, gives one an impression of compactness, solidity, and

regularity, as if one were looking at well-constructed machinery, where all the many

small parts are perfectly homogenous, and fit well into each other.168

Rather than focus on the perceived “ills” of modern society seen by British war

correspondents, the chapter will analyze the social discourse prominent in the writings of

British correspondents. As Said argued, “cultures have always been inclined to impose

complete transformations on other cultures, receiving these cultures not as they are but

165 Porter, p. 86 166 Porter, “Military Orientalism? British Observers of the Japanese War of War, 1904-1910,” War & Society, Vol. 26, No. 1 (May 2007) pp. 12-15 167 Hamilton, vol. II, pp. 31-32 168 Norregaard, p. 302

as, for the benefit of the receiver, they ought to be.”169 In their positive observations of

Japanese society, British correspondents revealed a greater interest in their own society,

projecting Edwardian discourse on politics, gender norms, and education on Japanese

society. Rather than imposing a prejudiced Otherness on Japanese society or attempting

to dominate Japan by defining it through discourse, they portrayed a society capable of

sustaining modern war and the corrupting influences of modernization, something that

many in Britain desired. This does not go as far as to conclude that the British

correspondents absolutely misrepresented Japanese society and culture within their

discourse.170 Rather, like Porter’s study, it points out that their writing at times perhaps

created an oversimplified or distorted image of Japanese society by imposing upon it a

desire for uniformity.171 British correspondents brought to the war their own preexisting

discourse on progress and political and social ideology originating outside of the direct

Orientalist context of Japan. In other words, Britain, not Japan, was the target of this

exercise in discourse.172

The Driving Force of the Mikado

British correspondents highlighted one particular moral force that drove Japanese soldiers to commit to unimaginable acts of heroism and sacrifice in the Russo-Japanese

169 Said, p. 67 170 The problem of presenting Japan as a monolith is reflected on by Lionel James in The Yellow War, particularly in the chapter entitled “The Path in the East is Strange,” which cover his experiences with a Japanese officer named Kamimoto, the spy disguised as a hairdresser. I have yet to find any similar instances in other British monographs. 171 Ibid., pp. 96-97 172 This approach by correspondents to Japan might be considered in the context of David Cannadine’s work on “Ornamentalism,” which argued that Britain sought to transplant its idealized system of social hierarchy, perceived as under threat by “urban democracy” within Britain, in its Empire. Japan, of course, was not a part of the British Empire, but had become associated with it through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance formed in 1902. See David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire (Oxford University Press: New York 2002)

War: the Mikado, or Emperor of Japan. Revered as a god-like leader, the Mikado

represented to correspondents the driving force behind Japanese modernization and

military success. Essentially, correspondents saw in the Mikado an example of the

benefits of societal reform from above and the power of a unifying ideology to drive a society towards a particular goal.

Surrounded by urban democracy in Britain, correspondents saw in the Mikado, or

Emperor, a concrete example of the notion that a nation’s change or regeneration had to

first start from the top. Repington commented that “the Emperor is the first of his

people…because he is entirely devoted to the continual study of the interest of his

country…and attentive to the destinies of his people to the exclusion of all else.”

Through this selfless figurehead, Japan attained stability “from the keystone to the foundations of the arch of government” and “the moral and the patriotic basis of government and people.” 173 He also compared the regeneration of Japan to the

emergence of Prussia (whose military system Japan had adopted), arguing that “it was

that system of rigid economy, and of unity of direction maintained in the hands of the

[Prussian] Emperor, that best suited the political atmosphere of Japan.”174 Like Prussia,

it was the guidance of an all-powerful leader, the Emperor, which sparked the

regeneration of Japan. He created a Japanese political and social order collectively

driven by no other interest than morality and patriotism. Thus, a unity of purpose

resulted from the Emperor in Japanese society, which, according to Repington, ought to

deal a “mortal blow to Western egoism”:

173 Repington, pp. 607-608 174 Ibid., p. 226

As for the highest, so down through all the intervening grades to the humblest private

soldier or seaman, there runs one single thought of devotion to the Emperor, victory at all

costs, death if need be, but even the victory of death better than no victory at all.175

The role of the Emperor in Japanese society also impressed Hamilton, who observed that

“the overshadowing power and divinity of the Emperor…tends to obliterate all minor,

merely worldly differences between subjects,” allowing the Japanese to become

“genuinely casual and democratic in their social relations.”176 With an all-powerful ruler, a society could eradicate dysfunctional social differences:

I think I prefer that [government] of the Japanese. An autocratic government with a

genuinely democratic society is better than a democratic society divided into strata, each

autocratic to its inferiors and servile to its superiors, as in England, or servile to its

inferiors and autocratic to its superiors, as in America.177

In an increasingly democratic world sparked by modernity, Hamilton perceived that an

autocracy would create uniformity and order out of the chaos of the complex and unequal

social order of representative government in the West. Noting the events of the Meiji

Restoration, Smith claimed that “the closer relations between the Emperor and his

people…made his expressed wishes a potent factor in fusing warring interests and

overcoming traditional prejudices.”178 Thus, an energetic, ambitious and omnipotent

ruler had the capacity to eradicate societal divisions and resistance to needed reform.

In characterizing the Japanese perceptions of the Mikado, correspondents stressed

that the Mikado was an all-powerful deity in Japanese society. He did not represent a personality, but rather an ideology that had driven the IJA and IJN to victory in the

175 Ibid., pp. 605-606 176 Hamilton, vol. I, pp. 36-37 177 Ibid., p. 38 178 Smith, p. 21

Russo-Japanese War. Norregaard stated that “they [the Japanese] regard their Emperor

as a god, and their officers as his lieutenants, and willingly give their lives at a word from

them.”179 The devotion to the Mikado allowed Japanese society to withstand the strains

of modern warfare, as “death was commonly spoken of as the desirable and anticipated

thing in the service of the Emperor.”180 Japanese soldiers and the home front avoided the moral collapse associated with modern war, as death was the preferable outcome in war.

Bartlett insisted that “soldiers fight their best either for some great personality at their

head, appealing to the imagination; or for some great national cause.” Listing historical

examples from Alexander the Great to the “national issues” involved in the American

Civil War (1861-1865), he asserted that the Japanese had both a national issue and “a

great personality in the Mikado”:

This concentration of the mind on one man, a living image, who bestows praise or blame

from the steps of a throne which represents in the popular imagination the summit of all

earthly and celestial power, is a high incentive for the soldier in the hour of battle.

To Bartlett, one of the greatest driving forces that a nation at war could have was an all-

powerful personality. Without the Mikado, he believed that Japan would follow the rapid

courses to collapse of Macedon and Carthage after the deaths of Alexander and

Hannibal.181

In writing on the Mikado in Japanese society, British correspondents indirectly

critiqued the political direction of Britain towards a more democratic system of

government. In the Mikado, correspondents perceived the positive influence of an all-

powerful ruler linked to a universally-accepted ideology (the Mikado as a deity) in

179 Norregaard, p. 303; see also Maxwell, p. 106 180 McKenzie p. 5 181 Bartlett, pp. 482-483

directing the development of a society into modernity. However, in order for a society to acquiesce to its role under an ideologically-reinforced ruler wielding absolute political power, future generations had to receive indoctrination at home and in school to maintain such a political system over time.

Gender and the Family

The entrance of women into the British public sphere – particularly Suffragettes,

had challenged prevailing Edwardian notions of proper gender roles aimed at combating

the “excess” associated with modernity.182 In an effort to combat this “sex war,”

Edwardians sought to frantically reinforce tradition by highlighting the perceived positive

influences of the “male sphere” of war and the military. Stressing the importance of the

separation of the sexes, the maternal role of women and the nation, and the utility of war

in instilling accepted manly virtues, British war correspondents of the Russo-Japanese

War imposed Edwardian gender values on Japanese society, emphasizing their utility for

success in warfare and the continued survival of Britain in a competitive, hostile world.

In their accounts of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War, British correspondents

centered their analysis on Japanese men. Although they did not figure directly into

accounts of the war, Japanese women often appeared as models for depicting the “proper

role” of women for British readers. As their subject was directly of war or closely

associated with it, men had to be the focus, as war was an integral part of the male sphere

of society. Nevertheless, correspondents saw women as an important factor in shaping

men for this sphere. Hamilton, a man who Adams depicted as obsessed with “Mother-

need” stemming from his own mother’s death when he was young, shared overt fears of

182 Adams, The Great Adventure, p. 13

the “sex war” in Britain in his writings on the war.183 In Japan, he saw the “un-

emancipated” position of women as beneficial to its society as opposed to the “appalling danger…in the shape of the American selfish woman and her imitators in Europe”:

In Japan the sphere of the sexes is still totally distinct; and although this may shock

foreign feminine opinion, in practice it certainly seems to tend to…not only the general

happiness, but also to the general military efficiency. Women occupied in passing

examinations, struggling through society, sport, plays, travel, with interludes of flirtation,

can scarcely find the time the Japanese mother does to stir the young imaginations of her

children with tales of derring-do.184

Japanese women represented to Hamilton the societal advantages of the separation of the

sexes on grounds of female “happiness” and military efficiency. Female indulgence

(depicted as a “struggle”) in pursuit of education, leisure, and promiscuity deviated from the source of a woman’s “natural” happiness in the private sphere, where they must devote themselves to inspiring their children to seek heroism on future battlefields. The male realm of war fulfilled the separation of the sexes, but Hamilton insisted that women threatened even that sphere as they sought to physically distract the soldier by their mere presence. Again, Japan represented the ideal of gender separation to Hamilton, as “not a single soul feminine is allowed even at the base.”185 When women sought to break from their traditional maternal role into the realms of seduction and promiscuity, they threatened to corrupt both men in society and at war. Even when Hamilton awkwardly attempted to enter into the world of “flirtation” with Japanese geishas, he wrote of his embarrassment when Japanese men brought it up in conversation. In attempting to compliment a geisha, he told her that “I wish…that I had a beautiful golden cage into

183 Ibid., p. 22 184 Hamilton, vol. I, p. 17 185 Ibid., p. 171

which I might put you and carry you off home.”186 Embarrassed of his flirtations with

women, Hamilton’s only attempt at complimenting a woman alluded not to a sexual

desire, but rather a desire to shelter her in the appropriate realm of “domestic bliss.”

British correspondents saw that the proper adoption of the role of women in

Japanese society benefitted Japanese soldiers fighting in Manchuria. To Repington, this

originated from the Japanese parental “conservation of the ancient tenets of bushido.”187

According to Baring, war represented man’s equivalent to the motherhood of women, contemplating in the wake of the Battle of Liaoyang that “I thought that war is perhaps to man what motherhood is to a woman, a burden, a source of untold suffering, and yet a glory.”188 As men experienced the suffering and glory associated with war, women must equally burden themselves with the glories and pains of being mothers. With this

perception of the complimentary gender roles of motherhood and war, women must

strive, as mothers, to prepare men for their assigned gender role as warriors. Women,

therefore, become the primary agents of developing the “warrior spirit” in boys and

husbands, and teaching “maternal duties” to girls, or future mothers. Any attempt of a

woman to emancipate herself or deviate from this role, such as the Suffragettes in Britain,

would disrupt the continuation of the warrior spirit and threaten the security of the nation.

In Japan, Smith asserted that Japanese devotion to the Mikado present in the soldiers of

the IJA first came from home as part of its indigenous gender roles:

…the women of Japan channel the first lesson. The child is taught that he is born to

serve the Emperor, and that every boy must become a soldier; therefore he must at all

times be prepared to die.

186 Ibid., pp. 39-42 187 Repington, p. 383 188 Baring, p. 133

Thus, the continuation of the symbolism of the Mikado in Japan relied on the perpetuation of the maternal role of Japanese women. Smith insisted that “to properly channel this fundamental idea in the minds of their offspring is as much the duty of the women as to meet death is the duty of the men of the country.” Any deviation from this maternal duty in Japan brought disgrace to the mother, “because in so failing she brings disgrace upon the houses of both her husband and her father, and is known as the mother of a son who is afraid to perform his first duty as citizen.” 189 McKenzie wrote of a story of a Japanese grandmother telling her grandson of his soldierly duty:

“My boy,” she said, “I shall never see you alive again. Don’t be satisfied with killing one

Russian before you die. Kill six, and then you will have proved yourself worthy of our

stock…”

…A friend asked her if she did not feel sorrowful. “Why should I?” she demanded,

proudly. “My grandson goes to die for his Emperor. What nobler death could our family

wish than that?”190

It is the role of Japanese mothers, grandmothers, and women in general, as part of their own duty to the Mikado, to produce soldiers for Japan that would fulfill their ultimate civil duty of dying on the battlefield. They must not content themselves with producing soldiers willing to “fight,” but rather those willing to “die” for Japan. When that day arrived, these same women had to control any weak, feminine emotions to send their husbands or sons off to war.191

It seems that the role of mothers transforming children into soldiers was more broadly interpreted by some correspondents as developing boys into men, as it was the

189 Smith, pp. 382-383 190 McKenzie, p. 3 191 Several correspondents remarked on the stoicism of Japanese women in sending off their sons and husbands to war. See James, Yellow War, pp. 277-278; Burleigh, pp. 256-257.

natural progression for boys to become men and men to become soldiers under the guidance of mothers and wives. As women must become mothers, men must become soldiers. A man not instructed at home by a mother in the importance of his duty as a soldier did not become a man at all and essentially remained in a child-like state. The comparison of Russian and Japanese soldiers by British correspondents reflected these sentiments. To Norregaard, the individual Japanese soldier at Port Arthur following the failure of first general assault of August 1904 represented “a man in the full significance of the word.”192 Despite being beaten, they continued to persevere in their manly duty as

soldiers. The Russians, by contrast, represented “children of the moment, easily

impressionable and easily moved by changing circumstances.”193 The Russian soldier,

perhaps having missed the maternal or spousal reinforcement of his duty, remained in a

childlike, impressionable state incapable of committing to the “manly” duty required of

him.

Like women, essentially, the “nation” itself became a maternal figure to its

citizens. As the woman at home must prepare her children and husband for their national

duties, the nation must act in like manner towards its citizens. Such subtleties arose in

the works of many correspondents, who referred to the nation as a feminine entity and a

nation’s citizens its children. Comparing the “births” of the nations of East Asia,

Maxwell stated that “the fairy who watched over the birth of Japan was of a dainty form;

Korea had a slut for godmother, and China an opulent dame.”194 Sexuality and greed

mark the origins of the “decadent” nations of Korea and China, while Japan’s “fairy” was

“dainty,” feminine, but non-sexual in nature. McKenzie concluded his account predicting

192 Norregaard, p. 102 193 Ibid., p. 92 194 Maxwell, p. 103

the future of the Japanese nation and “her power,” “her statesmen,” and “her younger

men and the might of her armies.”195 In criticizing the state of Britain in comparison to

that of Japan, Bartlett remarked that “the one nation [Japan]…claims her soldiers as her

due, and sends them home when she has finished with them,” whereas “The other

[Britain]…she sends them to the front, and removes any general who sacrifices one of

these national darlings unnecessarily.”196 Hamilton stated that the Japanese nation would prove its new status to the Western powers “by the mouth of her cannon.”197 David

Henry James of the Daily Telegraph saw the Japanese victory at Port Arthur as a

testament to Japan’s “devouring spirit of revenge, which, carefully nurtured in the

succeeding years, grew into a national sentiment” towards the goal of recapturing Port

Arthur after the IJA’s expulsion by the Russians following the Sino-Japanese War (1894-

1895).198 Like a mother, the nation needed to nurture the spirit of its citizens towards its

desired goals.

In a society that sought to strictly enforce the “separation of the sexes,”

Edwardian men ultimately drew to each other for “intellectual and emotional closeness.”

Distanced from women, men also placed an intense admiration upon accepted traits and physical features of masculinity.199 As a distinct male sphere, the military provided a

profession through which to protect masculinity by its reinforcement in soldierly

camaraderie and male companionship. As modernity had essentially “feminized” men,

war and the military (and, to be discussed, the public school) became the institutions

through which masculinity could regenerate itself in the presence of other men and

195 McKenzie, p. 334 196 Bartlett, p. 495 197 Hamilton, vol. I, p. 12 198 David James, p. 2 199 Adams, pp. 24-25

opportunities to test one’s manliness. Baring concluded his monograph with the

sentiments that “war seemed…like the palace of truth, to act as a touchstone on men’s

characters,” revealing both their weaknesses but, more importantly, their inner strengths

through the “beautiful” acts of war:

…among these [“beautiful” acts] perhaps the most precious are the unexpected surprises

in men, the “self sacrifice of the indifferent, the unworldliness of the worldly, the

unselfishness of the selfish.”

Despite Baring calling it an “insensate abomination,” war redeemed itself with its

cleansing properties that provided a cure to (or escape from) modernity and its collapsing gender distinctions that had made men “indifferent, worldly, and selfish.”200 With war,

men could rediscover their masculine “beauty.” It liberated men from the corrupting

influences of the modern world and provided them with a Social-Darwinist haven where

a man could prove himself above the vices of prosperity. David Fraser of the Times asserted that “the howitzers, and the pontoons, and the flaunting cavalry…they represent

the manliness of a nation, the manliness that is humanity.”201 In a modern world, war

itself became an outlying expression of masculinity and the weapons of war the nation’s

most outward, masculine, physical appendages. Correspondents expressed considerable

admiration for the manly, physical and personal qualities of the Japanese exhibited in the

war. Many of them admired the “great respect, and sometimes a remarkable affection” of

the enlisted for their officers, a bond which they believed reinforced the warlike abilities

of the IJA.202 Maxwell asserted that warfare allowed a soldier to “develop…manly

qualities – patience, self-restraint, ingenuity and courage,” all of which presented

200 Baring, pp. 204-205 201 David Fraser, A Modern Campaign, or, War and Wireless Telegraphy in the Far East (Methuen & Co.: London 1905) p. 92 202 Smith, p. 390

themselves in Japanese soldiers.203 Ashmead-Bartlett exclaimed that “the Japanese are

undoubtedly the finest race physically that exists…they are very thick-set and well-made,

especially about the legs, and are a perfect height for soldiers.” As their women did not

shed tears for men departing for the war, “the Japanese soldier also displayed no unmanly

regrets.”204 Considering the manliness of the Japanese, he turned to critique the modern

and “hysterical” (or feminine) state of Britain perceived in the aftermath of the Boer War:

John Bull still appears in popular caricature as a solid, red-faced, substantial person,

incapable of being aroused by even an explosion under his house. What a farce is such a

portrait! He should be represented thin, neurotic, idle, conceited…alternating between

excessive optimism and excessive despair.205

Correspondents saw war and the nation’s constant preparation for it as a liberating force

from modernity and a bastion for the development of manly traits and separation from

negative feminine influences encroaching upon the male-dominated public sphere.

Essentially, these Edwardian men saw positives as indicative of masculinity and

negatives as indicative of femininity. John Bull, the personification of Britain, had become feminine and therefore a symbol of weakness, shame, and an object of derision.

Thus, war and a nation’s preparation towards it offered Edwardian Britain a

means through which to reignite traditional views of gender and family life threatened by

modernity. As mothers, women served as the primary agents of instilling patriotic values

in their children and husbands. Additionally, the nation itself had to adopt a maternal

role towards its citizens by further nurturing sentiments of nationalism that boost societal morale in warfare. Lastly, with the successful nurturing of their biological and national

203 Maxwell, p. 16 204 Bartlett, pp. 484-487 205 Ibid., p. 494

74 mothers, men would lean towards their ultimate calling in the military, where they would develop manliness in the absence of women and the corrupting influences of the modern world.

Education

Another feature of Japanese society heavily emphasized by British correspondents was the education system of Japan, which they believed, along with the Mikado and

Japanese women, attributed heavily to the overwhelming willpower of Japanese soldiers in the Russo-Japanese War. Indeed, the established classes of Edwardian Britain found the utility of using education as a “tool of conservatism and moral control.”206 By reinforcing their own social values, instilling patriotic sentiments, and developing a perceptive link between war and sports, Edwardians aimed at reproducing, maintaining, and perhaps improving their traditions in British society. Naturally, British war correspondents often showed themselves to be products of Edwardian (or Victorian) education, which influenced how they both analyzed the Japanese education system and observed the Russo-Japanese War in their works.

According to Maxwell, “children are true hero-worshippers, and it is their nature to set up their high altar on the gory battlefield – the gorier the better.” As children are

“naturally-inclined” to admire the feats of soldiers on the battlefield, it was the duty of a nation’s education system to reinforce such sentiments, as war and the military would ultimately become the duty of these future citizens. While Maxwell recalled British children writing letters to Lord Roberts during the Boer War, he believed that Japanese teachers had developed a superior system for disseminating the “hero-worship” of

206 Adams, p. 3

children by having their students send letters to the soldiers at the front. Of these letters,

Maxwell emphasized that “the girls are better letter-writers than the boys,” citing several

examples of Japanese schoolgirls writing encouraging letters to IJA soldiers.207 Even the

education system played a prominent role in instilling the national duties of female

citizens and sentiments of nationalism at a young age. Hamilton also asserted the

importance of the role of education in creating both patriotic citizens and soldiers that began at home:

…upon the patriotism, which they [the Japanese] have absorbed with their mother’s milk,

their government has been careful to graft initiative, quickness, and intelligence. This is

accomplished in the schools, which keep the soldierly virtues in the forefront of their

curriculum.208

Believing that modernity resulted in the decline of a nation’s “warrior spirit,” Hamilton

asserted that “from the nursery and its toys to the Sunday school and its cadet company,

every influence of affection, loyalty, tradition, and education should be brought to bear

on the next generation of British boys and girls.” Although “moral character” started its

development at home, the Japanese “do not…trust entirely to heredity to produce them an

army.”209 According to Thomas Cowen of the Times and Daily Chronicle, education was

part of the nation’s duty to its citizens, warning that “a nation failing in its duty is liable

to pay the penalty in having the duty performed by others.”210 In the classroom, hero-

207 Maxwell, pp. 377-384 208 Hamilton, vol. I, pp. 10-11 209 Ibid., p. 11-15 210 Thomas Cowen, The Russo-Japanese War: From the Outbreak of Hostilities to the Battle of Liaoyang (Edward Arnold: London 1905) p. 43; It is important to note that James claimed to “have found Mr. Cowen so inaccurate that he is often ludicrous.” He also questionably claimed that Frederick Palmer (Collier’s) to had the “least partisan” work on the war. Analysis of content, not accuracy, is the objective of this study, however. See James, Study of the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 1, 77; See also Frederick Palmer, With Kuroki in Manchuria (Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York 1904)

worship of the military and patriotic indoctrination would create a citizenry willing to fight on the modern battlefield and sustain the economic costs of war at home.

In addition to instilling nationalism, correspondents saw education as a means to both perpetuating and improving upon an established political and social order. In Japan,

Smith observed that “with the dissemination of education and the influences of Western civilization, the devotion of the nation to the Emperor is increasing rather than diminishing.”211 Cowen compared Japanese education to “prison life in England,”

noting, like Hamilton, that “boys do not spend nine-tenths of their time in sports, and

study casually for a change.”212 Recalling a conversation with an IJA colonel, Hamilton

remarked that education would ultimately create a society amenable to introducing

conscription, as “conscription is only applicable to an educated, intensely patriotic nation

like Japan.”213 With a nationalist education directed towards instilling martial abilities in

its youth, a nation could create an efficient short-term conscript army. Within this

framework, Britain, like Russia, was not capable of creating an effective mass conscript

army as its draft-age population had not received a nationalist, military-oriented

education.

Indeed, the education of boys in Victorian and Edwardian Britain, particularly in

the public school system, sought to achieve such nationalistic and militaristic objectives.

According to English literary scholar Cecil Eby, the desired final product was “neither

Christian nor gentleman, but rather a hybrid creature trained for no particular purpose, yet expected to hold the reins of power because he had undergone, and survived, the rigorous social Darwinist environment” created within the British public school system – an

211 Smith, p. 14 212 Cowen, p. 66; see also Hamilton, vol. I, pp. 17-18 213 Hamilton, vol. II, p. 10

77 experience recalled with horror by Hamilton.214 Rather than emphasizing a scientific curriculum, British headmasters demanded discipline by means of corporal punishment and uniformity, discouraging any sort of intellectual curiosity and individuality. Thus, in such a warlike environment, individual “success matters less than mere survival,” which depended upon submission to authority and assimilation into the culture of the student body.215 Thus, violence became a primary instrument in British school culture for pushing boys towards manhood. Whether through the violence of the headmaster, student intimidation and bullying, or vicious competition on the rugby or football field, boys would ultimately become men. Like the violence of school, the violence of war also provided boys the opportunity to enter the realm of manhood.

Interestingly, Hamilton and Cowen critiqued Britain’s education system, alluding to its overemphasis on sports and games rather than actual study. Nevertheless, many correspondents often wrote of war in terms of sport and games, revealing the extent to which perceptions of sport, games, and war had merged in British culture. This had become a phenomenon in the British press in the 19th century as, like warfare itself,

“participation in sport was seen as one way to increase fitness and defeat the ravages of increased urbanization.” Rather than being a merely useful analogy, depicting war as a sport or game had considerable meaning throughout the ranks of Edwardian society, as it believed both war and sport “inculcated desirable attitudes and values,” with team sport providing British youth with a means to develop martial qualities.216 With such a high regard for martial values, “British headmasters increasingly valued sports so that by the

214 Eby, pp. 86-87; for more on British public school culture, see Eby, pp. 86-127 215 Ibid., p. 94 216 Wilkinson, p. 69; for more, see pp. 68-90; see also Adams, pp. 36-45, 121-122; Eby, 109-127

1860s they were prominent in the curriculum.”217 Indeed, British society carried such attitudes into the First World War, where British soldiers quite literally “kicked off” the

Battle of the Somme (1916) with footballs punted into the German trenches.218

Correspondents often treated their experience in observing the Russo-Japanese

War as spectators to a dramatic game or sporting match or using sport and games as a

means of comparison to war. Norregaard and Smith continuously referred to the events

of the siege at Port Arthur as part of the “game” of war.219 Additionally, like organized

sports, Smith noted the rules of the “awful game of war” created “by common consent of

all civilized nations.” Like sports, violation of the rules of war required censure as it

threatened to overshadow the positive benefits drawn from it. Recalling the extensive use

of hand grenades by the Japanese and Russians at Port Arthur, he lamented the “most

awful price for their [the Japanese] breach of the usages of civilized warfare.”220

McKenzie recalled an instance in Manchuria where correspondents “knew that another move had been made in the great game where men are pawns and kingdoms are the prize.”221 Justifying Japanese censorship of the press, Cowen asserted that “a man

playing a game of chess or cards cannot bear to have people standing round discussing

his play aloud, commenting on what he does, or what he might have done or may yet do.”

Additionally, he compared the foresight of the Japanese Intelligence Department to the

boxer “watching the eye” of his opponent.222

217 Adams, p. 37 218 Wilkinson, pp. 89-90 219 Norregaard, pp. 83, 92, 190, 231; Smith, pp. 128, 215-216, 219, 283, 357, 220 Smith, pp. 215-216 221 McKenzie, p. 199 222 Cowen, pp. 203-204

In addition to comparing the elements of war to games, correspondents saw the act of war itself as a game. At Mukden, McCullagh equated an artillery duel to

“watching a football match at such a distance that you could only see the dust raised by the players.” Burleigh wrote that the “special charge of the Second Army was to force the Russian game into a trap” at Liaoyang.223 Interestingly, Story also denounced the

creation of rules in war at that time:

War has been refined to an affectation. In the old days when war was still claimed some

effect as a political argument, it gained its efficiency from the stern rigour with which it

was pursued. Since then it had degenerated to the level of a game, it had become hedged

about with rules, and the combatant who infringed those was tabooed as he would be on

the polo-ground or on the football field.224

With somewhat pacifist sentiments, Story remarked that war no longer simply resembled

a game, but rather war itself had become a game. The utilization of terminology of games for war was not simply simile, as the two activities had become inseparable from

one another. Thus, when one trained for the rigors of sports and games, one also

prepared for the trials of war. While Hamilton and Cowen condemned the emphasis on

sports in education, they themselves had fallen victim to such an emphasis in their

approach to warfare. At the Battle of the Yalu, Hamilton noted a Japanese officer had become dismayed that a particular unit of Russian defenders had fought to the last man.

In this instance, Hamilton remarked that “every good sportsman would disdain to kill

game under such conditions; and yet, where fellow creatures are concerned, there is no

alternative but to take prisoners or to kill.”225 Interestingly, like Story, Hamilton did not

see such an instance as a simile for war and sport, but rather war and sport as an

223 Burleigh, p. 297 224 Story, p. 249 225 Hamilton, vol. I, p. 126

inseparable reality. The IJA and the Russians themselves were not simply like a

“sportsman” and “game,” respectively. Rather, the IJA and Russians were the

“sportsman” and “game.”

The writings of British war correspondents of the Russo-Japanese War in many ways reinforced Edwardian perceptions of education. Channeled towards warfare, education became a device to shape British youth into capable citizens and soldiers by further developing patriotism outside of the home, improving the social order by preparing future citizens for the demands of conscription, and reinforcing the utility of sport as a means of training for war. Like the role of women at home with their children and husbands, the nation had the mutual role of preparing its children and adolescents for

the demands they would face as citizens.

Conclusion

Edwardian cultural anxieties exhibited by British correspondents took on a very

militaristic character in their writings on the Russo-Japanese War. Believing that

individuality, feminism, commercial success, and several other “vices” had corrupted

British society, correspondents imposed to some extent their own idealized society upon

Japan, citing the utility of using war and the military as a means of cultural regeneration.

However, this does not mean that correspondents shared a culturally deterministic

approach to warfare, a historiographical subject in the history of war and culture debated

by several military historians, including John Keegan, Victor Davis Hanson, John Lynn,

and Jeremy Black.226 Rather, British correspondents of the Russo-Japanese War saw war

226 See John Keegan, A History of Warfare (Vintage Books: New York 1994); Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (Anchor Books: New York 2002),

81 and the military as a means to positive societal and cultural change. While war itself still maintained its Clausewitzian model as “eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen

Mitteln” at the level of government and diplomacy, it also appeared to correspondents as a tool for driving social and cultural improvement on the domestic level by encouraging increased government intervention in society, reinforcing gender spheres, and directing education towards the goal of producing not just citizens, but soldiers as well.227

Essentially, correspondents perceived that British society faced its own war from within against the degenerative culture of modernity, a war that could only be won through political direction from above and channeling gender roles and education towards militaristic aims.

John A. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Westview: Oxford 2003), Jeremy Black, “Military Cultures, Military Histories and the Current Emergency,” in Michael S. Neiberg, ed., Arms and the Man: Military History Essays in Honor of Dennis Showalter (Brill: Boston 2011) pp. 63-82 227 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege: Hinterlassenes Werk (Dümmlers: Berlin 1905), p. 19

CONCLUSION

In his final Times article on the “War in the Far East,” Repington concluded that

“national armies and fleets reflect, and always must reflect, the spirit of the age among

the populations from whom they are recruited.”228 If the military reflected the cultural

sentiments of its people, the ways in which people interpreted war and the military fell

heavily under such cultural influences. British war correspondents in the Russo-Japanese

War showed themselves to be products of the “spirit of the age,” defining naval war in

terms of Mahanism, Orientalizing Russia, Japan, and the war itself, and imposing

Edwardian political, gender, and educational values upon Japan.

Witnessing the Japanese reaction to the imminence of war with Russia in 1904,

McKenzie sought to depict a modern society capable of winning a modern war, a feat

many believed Britain could not achieve. Walking through the streets of Tokyo just

before the war, McKenzie recalled children enthusiastically singing “Kill! Kill! Kill! Kill!

Kill until the sword breaks. Kill! Kill! Kill! Kill!” He interpreted this song and other

observations as representative of a “great, grim, determined people, on the eve of what all

knew would be a long, hard, life-and-death struggle.”229 He noted the “Japanese national spirit” on the eve of war, which contained xenophobic denunciations against Russians,

Americans, and essentially anyone foreign, calls to assassinate unpatriotic Japanese officials, “spy mania,” and mass civil austerity.230 McKenzie and other correspondents

emphasized that a moral force contributed to this Japanese spirit, a force powerful enough

228 Repington, p. 606 229 McKenzie, pp. 1-2 230 Ibid., pp. 4-10

to push a modern society to victory in the increasingly unforgiving environment of the

modern battlefield. If correspondents left East Asia with any lessons, perhaps the most

important to their minds was the centrality of nationalism to creating both an ideal society

and an effective army. However, as with Mahanism and Orientalism, it is quite possible

to assert that correspondents travelled to East Asia with this discourse already in their

minds, with the results of the conflict essentially confirming what they had already

known. Thus, it was the “spirit of the age” in Britain that saw naval warfare as

Mahanism, the Orient in a continued state of Otherness, and the dissemination of

nationalism at home, in politics, and within the classroom as the keys to the betterment of

modern society.

If the Russo-Japanese War has become historically linked to the First World War,

the same could be said for the correspondents themselves. For some of those that

covered the events in the Far East from 1904-05, the experience would not be their last.

Interestingly, a few British correspondents from the Russo-Japanese War would become

prominent for their actions in the First World War as well. Repington, would go on to

expose the Shell Crisis of 1915, which ultimately led to the fall of the Liberal government

and the dismissal of the British Commander-in-Chief, General Sir John French. That

same year, at Gallipoli, Times correspondent Bartlett struggled against the Chief Field

Censor Maxwell and former Standard and Daily Mail correspondent to report on the

brutally-mismanaged campaign led by General Hamilton, the Indian Army attaché to the

IJA from 1904-05. Even those that covered the Russo-Japanese War continued to have some connection to each other during the next war. Additionally, several others left the

press corps to fight in the First World War. Lionel James left the Times in 1913 and

fought in the British Army in France and Italy with some distinction. Baring served in

the Royal Air Force (RAF) as an assistant to David Henderson and Hugh Trenchard, two

of the most prominent figures in the early history of the RAF. Lord Brooke served with

the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and rose to the rank of Brigadier General by 1915,

commanding the 4th and 12th Canadian Infantry Brigades to the end of the war. Like the

study of the Russo-Japanese War itself, the legacies of these men as correspondents in

1904-1905 became overshadowed by their own exploits in the First World War.

Nevertheless, like the war itself, their writings on the Russo-Japanese War should not fall into obscurity.

In the context of Britain and the First World War, the Russo-Japanese War was important not in that it produced lessons to British observers, but rather it confirmed preexisting notions shared by many of these observers on the interrelation between war, society, and culture. Observers and participants experience war in different ways. In this case, observers were more prone to adhere to what they already knew about warfare.

Throughout their postwar works, British war correspondents essentially projected prewar discourses of war and culture onto the Russo-Japanese War. Looking at the naval war, they overwhelmingly defined it within the discourse of Mahanism, thus confirming its validity to British naval policy. When Japan’s victory challenged prewar Orientalist discourse, these same writers sought a means to maintain the prewar intellectual hegemony of Orientalism by integrating Social Darwinism and conceptions of nationalism. Lastly, they idealized Japanese society within the framework of Edwardian discourse on politics, gender, and education. Britain entered the First World War with a

85 similar if not identical “spirit” to its correspondents in the Russo-Japanese War, a “spirit” that the experiences of 1914-1918 would transform.

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