The Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc., Et Al., V
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OFTEXAS -r FILED MAY 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT C O T CLERK, U.S.1M T COURT By NORTHERN DISTRICT OF y _Deput DALLAS DIVISION THE ARCHDIOCESE OF MILWAUKEE § Civil Action No . 3 :02-CV-1152-M SUPPORTING FUND, INC ., et al., On Behalf of Itself and All Others Similarly Situated, § CLASS ACTION Lead Plaintiff, § THIRD CONSOLIDATED AMENDE D § COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF THE vs. § SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 HALLIBURTON COMPANY, DAVID J. LESAR, DOUGLAS L . FOSHEE, GARY V § MORRIS and ROBERT C. MUCHMORE, Defendants . § § § DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Copyright O 2005 by William S . Lerach, Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP and Scott + Scott LLC. William S . Lerach, Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP and Scott + Scott LLC will vigorously defend all of their rights to this writing/publication . No copyright is claimed in the text of statutes, regulations, and any excerpts from news articles or analysts' reports quoted within this work . All rights reserved - including the right to reproduce in whole or in part in any form . Any reproduction in any form by anyone of the material contained herein without the permission of William S . Lerach, Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP and Scott + Scott LLC is prohibited . r • C ~1 This Third Consolidated Amended Complaint, filed pursuant to leave of Court, i s intended to consolidate and relate back to all prior complaints previously filed in this action , including the Moore complaint, the first and second consolidated amended complaints, the Kimble complaint and the Murphey complaint. INTRODUCTION 1 . This is a securities class action on behalf of purchasers of the common stock of Halliburton Company ("Halliburton" or the "Company") between 9/29/98 and 12/7/01 (th e "Class Period"), seeking to pursue remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"). The defendants include Halliburton, David J . Lesar, Halliburton' s President and COO during 96-7/00 and who succeeded Richard Cheney as Halliburton's Chairman/CEO i n 7/00, Gary V . Morris, Halliburton's EVP/CFO through 8/01, and Douglas L. Foshee, Halliburton's EVP/CFO after 8/01, and Charles C . Muchmore, EVP, Principal Accounting Officer/Controller (the "Individual Defendants") . These Individual Defendants were Halliburton's top executives and were each Certified Public Accountants . They controlled the accounting policies and practices and public statements of the Company . They operated under the leadership of Richard Cheney, who became CEO/Chairman of Halliburton in 8/95 and served as its CEO/Chairman until 7/00, when he left to run for Vice President - hailed on his departur e as a successful corporate executive who had turned Halliburton around, reorganized it s construction businesses, made a very successful acquisition, i.e., Dresser Industries, Inc. ("Dresser"), led Halliburton to record profitability and positioned Halliburton to continue t o achieve growing profits going forward . 2 . This action arises out of a scheme to manipulate and falsify Halliburton's 1998- 2001 financial results and statements, including a series of false and misleading statements tha t misrepresented the condition and success of Halliburton's business, including its constructio n -1- 0 0 .s operations, the benefits of its acquisition of Dresser, its exposure to asbestos liabilities , Halliburton's financial condition and results of operations and its future business and financia l prospects. These misstatements stressed the supposed successful restructuring of Halliburton' s construction businesses during 97-98, Halliburton's new practice of accepting more large fixed- price/lump-sum contracts which were improving its profitability due to its expertise in managin g and successfully performing these large fixed-price/lump-sum construction contracts, including the $2 .5 billion Barracuda/Caratinga contract (the largest contract in Halliburton's history) , Halliburton's success in obtaining large liquefied natural gas ("LNG") contracts in the major oil- producing nation of Nigeria, the beneficial impact of Halliburton's acquisition of Dresse r (including the successful integration of Dresser's construction operation (Kellogg) int o Halliburton's construction operation (Brown & Root)), and the balance sheet strengthening an d net income enhancements to be and being achieved as a result of that acquisition, which did not expose Halliburton to material financial liabilities due to asbestos claims/suits . However, b y these false statements, defendants were concealing ever increasingly serious operationa l problems with Halliburton's construction businesses, huge unpaid change orders and cost overruns ("Unapproved Claims") it was suffering on several of its large fixed-price/lump-sum contracts, the negative impact of the Dresser acquisition - including the true extent of the financial liabilities Halliburton was facing due to asbestos suits/claims Halliburton inherited via the Dresser acquisition - and some $180 million in improper/illegal payments made i n connection with obtaining the Bonny Island, Nigeria LNG plant contract . In truth, pervasive accounting manipulations were being engaged in at Halliburton to conceal mounting losses o n several of Halliburton's large fixed-price/lump-sum construction contracts, including ever- increasing losses being suffered on Halliburton's huge $2.5 billion Barracuda/Caratinga offshore -2- 0 0 drilling contract in Brazil and Halliburton's truly gargantuan financial liabilities arising out of it s exposure to asbestos suits/claims. 3 . As a result of defendants' scheme to defraud and the resulting artificial inflatio n in Halliburton's stock price due to defendants' financial falsifications and other misleadin g statements, investors who purchased Halliburton stock during the Class Period suffere d significant damages, as defendants' prior manipulations, misrepresentations and other fraudulen t conduct was revealed and Halliburton's stock price collapsed to much lower levels . As at least some of the true adverse facts came out in a series of revelations and disclosures, Halliburton' s stock collapsed to as low as $8-$10 per share - a 15-year low and well below the stock's Clas s Period high of $55 . Calculated in accordance with accepted securities class action damag e methodologies, class-wide damages suffered by investors are approximately $3 .1 billion. By contrast, Halliburton's top insiders did quite well for themselves. During the Class Period they sold off 1 .34 million shares of their Halliburton stock - 61% of the Halliburton stock they owne d - for illegal insider trading proceeds of $68 million . In addition, during 97-01, Halliburton's top executives (Cheney, Lesar, Morris, Coleman, Bradford and Vaughn) collected aggregate salaries and bonus payments of $17 million and $19 million, respectively, which were based upon the appearance of business success and profits reported by Halliburton and which have subsequently been all but wiped out by the recognition of Halliburton's actual losses on fixed-price construction contracts (including Barracuda/Caratinga) and Halliburton's actual asbesto s liabilities ! Halliburton's stock, which soared to a Class Period high of $56 per share in 9/0 0 based on Halliburton's false earnings reports, false positive statements and false forecasts o f future success, collapsed to $10 per share at the end of the Class Period and to as low as $8 pe r share a few weeks later - a 15 year low - as shown in the following graph : -3- 0 0 HaRiburton September 1, 1998 - January 15, 2002 Daily Share Prices 60 90 rr a N 30 sp 20 10 0140"1 "4Aa09 31-Dec49 30•Aag40 02401ay49 07-Jan42 314ec43 01-ep-f0 024fty400 204)w-00 30,A"-01 SUMMARY OF COMPLAIN T Pre-Class Period Event s 4. After years of mediocre business performance, in 8/95 Halliburton hired Richar d Cheney as its new CEO/Chairman . When Cheney took over the reins at Halliburton , Halliburton's stock was trading at around $20 per share . Cheney's challenge was to lead a new executive team and successfully manage Halliburton's business so that it could achieve strong, profitable growth, which would cause its stock to reach higher levels . Cheney elevated Lesar, who had been Halliburton's CFO, to be Halliburton's President and Chief Operating Officer ("COO"). They, along with Morris (CFO) and Muchmore (Controller), became Halliburton' s new executive team. -4- 0 0 5 . Prior to 8/95, Cheney had been a politician . He had never been an executive at a public corporation, let alone the Chairman/CEO of a multi-billion dollar New York Stoc k Exchange-listed company. Thus, there was considerable skepticism in the financial communit y as to whether or not Cheney and his new executive management team could successfully oversee and manage Halliburton's worldwide operations . According to a Wall Street Journal article reporting Cheney's selection as Halliburton's CEO : [S]ome questioned if Mr . Cheney has the business background for the job . "There's a pretty big difference between the world of government and the private sector," said James Stone, who follows Halliburton for Schroder Wertheim & Co. "Whether or not he is capable of running" a $6 billion-a-year company, "clearly is an issue that must be addressed in the next couple of months. " Bloomberg reported: Halliburton Choice of Cheney as CEO Prompts Analyst Downgrad e A NatWest Securities Corp . analyst cut his rating on Halliburton Co . after the oilfield service company named former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney as chief executive. NatWest analyst Wes Maat said he downgraded Halliburton ... because he expects disappointment over Cheney's hiring to drive the stock down ... during the next three months. "Most industry observers believed that the company would select a candidate with extensive senior management experience in the oil services or oil and gas sectors ," Maat said in a report. 6. This skepticism placed pressure on Cheney to demonstrate his executiv e competence and the effectiveness of his management team by producing successful results - growing Halliburton into a larger and more profitable company.